Brigham Young's Indian Superintendency (1851-58): A Significant Microcosm of the American Indian Experience

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BRIGHAM YOUNG'S INDIAN SUPERINTENDENCY (1851-58):
A SIGNIFICANT MICRO COSM OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN EXPERIENCE

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INTRODUCTION

A microcosm is a portion of a greater whole which is either symbolic or representative of that whole. In a very real sense, Brigham Young’s Indian superintendency fits the criteria of a microcosm. Born in 1801, the same year that Thomas Jefferson began his presidency, Brigham Young grew up on the frontier in New York. His mature years spanned the Jacksonian era and he undoubtedly was aware of the removal policy and subsequent reform efforts with the displaced northern and southern tribes. Brigham Young served as Superintendent of Indian Affairs in Utah Territory during the implementation of the "reservation plan" and shared the desire of his counterparts that Indian land titles be extinguished and treaties consummated with the various Indian tribes. The prevailing pattern in dealing with "the Indian problem" later affected Superintendent Young’s administration of Indian affairs in Utah Territory.

During the early years in the Great Basin, Brigham learned by experience that "it was cheaper to feed the Indians than to fight them." Brigham Young’s Indian superintendency is significant on the American frontier because he successfully instituted a conciliatory policy without the aid of official treaties and with limited
federal funding. His administration of the Walker War demonstrated his determination to pursue the conciliatory policy, even though many of his Mormon constituents appealed for retaliation against the natives. He relentlessly endorsed the policy in spite of opposition, telling his people to defend themselves, but not to give an offense. His perseverance paid off and the war ended with minimal loss of life and property.

This thesis provides insight into the conflict which Brigham Young had with non-Mormon officials, both within and outside the Indian superintendency. It contributes a synthesis of previous writings regarding the superintendency and analyzes the intent and motives of Brigham Young and the non-Mormon officials in their interaction with one another and with the Indians during the years of Brigham's superintendency (1851-58). Brigham Young was motivated by Mormon self-interest and perceived no traitorism in utilizing his political authority in behalf of his people. (The non-Mormon officials, on the other hand, felt that Brigham Young's emphasis on Mormon colonization clouded his vision and ability to properly supervise territorial Indian affairs.) This thesis considers and discusses these powerful forces which created discord within the Utah Indian superintendency.

No other study to date treats Brigham Young's superintendency within a framework of United States Indian policy of the period, nor integrates an exposition of the
history of the Great Basin Indians prior to the arrival of Brigham Young. Brigham Young's administration of Indian affairs cannot be objectively studied without this backdrop. This thesis provides such a context, thus portraying Brigham Young and his Indian leadership in a realistic and comprehensive manner. It is a necessary supplement to the able contributions of earlier writers.

Most of the primary material substantiating the thesis comes from three sources: (1) The Brigham Young Collection, located in the LDS Historical Department Archives, contains correspondence initiated and received by Brigham Young. This collection was not generally available for perusal when most of the earlier work was written. (2) The Madeline McQuown Collection, located in the Special Collections area of the Marriott Library on the University of Utah campus, contains transcripts of official Indian department correspondence with the Utah superintendency from the National Archives in Washington, D. C. (3) Senate and House of Representative executive documents, located in the Documents area of the Marriott Library on the University of Utah campus, contain valuable federal government data regarding legislative decisions and discussions concerning Utah Territory. Much of this primary material substantiates previous research, but it also offers significant new insights and clarifications.

The most significant literature which is currently available regarding the Indian superintendency of Brigham
Young is reviewed below in chronological order according to publication date.

(1929)


Leland Creer became the first authority on Brigham Young’s Indian superintendency. His work cites several editions of the *Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs*. His well written history is still credible and accurate today, but it lacks interpretation regarding the internal conflict within the Utah Indian superintendency.

(1948)


Dale Morgan researched correspondence from the National Archives between the Indian department and the Utah superintendency. His article focuses on the conflict between Brigham Young and agents Hurt and Holeman. It also deals somewhat with the neglect of Commissioner Manypenny and others toward the Utah superintendency. It is pro-Brigham Young and provides only limited understanding of the attitudes of the non-Mormon officials in the superintendency.

(1963)


Gowans’ thesis was the first work of such magnitude
solely on Brigham Young's Indian superintendency. He utilized secondary material by Leland Creer and called on Senate Documents and editions of the Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs as data for his analysis of the troublesome triangle (Brigham Young, Non-Mormon officials in the superintendency, and the Indians of the Great Basin). His research is accurate and well documented, but lacks the expanded insight of primary materials not available for his perusal in 1963.

(1978)


Layton and O'Neil approached their study of Brigham Young's superintendency from the perspective that much of Brigham's administration as superintendent was colored by self-interest and political expediency. Citing several non-Mormon sources, they provide a flavor of the gentile reaction to Brigham Young's leadership. Their article is critical of Brigham Young and his lack of attention to the needs of the Indians and the various Indian agencies. They have not integrated Mormon sources nor anything pro-Brigham Young.

(1978-1979) (2 articles)


Christy's articles present his argument that Brigham Young's heralded Indian policy that "it was cheaper to feed the Indians that to fight them," took time to develop. He argues that during the early years in the Great Basin, the Mormons conducted selective campaigns to kill Indians who stood in the way of colonization. By 1852, according to Christy, Brigham Young had learned that defense and conciliation could better preserve peaceful relations with the Indians. In this view, the Walker War was Brigham Young's successful test case for defense and conciliation as an effective Indian policy. Christy does not discuss the Mormon doctrine of Lamanite redemption, nor does he identify Brigham Young's personal struggle to apply the doctrine amid the powerful reality of the need for more and more land to colonize the Great Basin.

(1985)


Leonard Arrington devotes two chapters of his biography to Brigham Young's dealings with the Indians. His well documented account provides an expert synthesis of all prior material and presents Brigham's Indian administration in a palatable and concise manner. Although it doesn't really provide new information or interpretation, it is an excellent resource.

Although the works of Lawrence G. Coates and Richard E. Bennett do not directly discuss the Indian superintendency of Brigham Young, they are, nevertheless,
important contributions in understanding Brigham Young's early experience in Indian affairs. Coates and Bennett have written about the doctrine of Lamanite redemption, Brigham Young's early encounters with Indians near Nauvoo, Illinois in the early 1840's, and his administration of Indian conflict on the Iowa and Nebraska plains. Their works are pro-Brigham Young and utilize mostly Mormon sources, but they provide insight into Brigham Young as a church leader.
CHAPTER I

A SURVEY OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY (1776-1859)

To understand the Indian superintendency of Brigham Young in Utah Territory, it is essential to provide an overview of United States Indian policy prior to and during Brigham Young's settlement of the Great Basin. The natives of Utah Territory had been influenced to a great degree by white men prior to the arrival of the Mormons and they had a vast history and a distinctive culture of their own. Mormon settlement of the Great Basin presented new and unique challenges for the natives because, unlike other whites, the Mormons came to establish permanent residency. Inevitably, conflicts arose between the Mormons and the Great Basin Indians because of their diverse religious, social, and political customs. Brigham Young's response to these conflicts often demonstrated an adherence to similar Indian policies and attitudes exhibited by his counterparts on other frontiers. By the 1850's many federal Indian policies had solidified and become standard operating procedure on the various frontiers. Thus, a review of the dealings of the United States Government with the indigenous tribes establishes an appropriate context in which Brigham Young's Indian superintendency can be objectively studied.
The New Republic

As the Founding Fathers drafted the Constitution of the United States, they could not have anticipated the tremendous impact of the advancing frontier nor the role it would play in shaping federal policies and legislation regarding the Indian tribes that dotted the continent. The Constitution granted Congress the power "to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and among the Indian tribes." These last five words, "and among the Indian tribes," became the scant foundation upon which federal legislation regulating Indian affairs would be built.\(^1\) The Northwest Ordinance of 13 July 1787, which became law under the new congress, further clarified the position of the Federal Government:

The utmost good faith shall always be observed towards the Indians, their lands and property shall never be taken from them without their consent; and in their property, rights, and liberty, they shall never be invaded or disturbed, unless in just and lawful wars authorized by Congress; but laws founded in justice and humanity shall from time to time be made, for preventing wrongs being done to them, and for preserving peace and friendship with them.\(^2\)

In 1789 the new republic established the Department of War and gave it jurisdiction over the Office of Indian Affairs.\(^3\) The Federal government commissioned the Department of War to enforce United States Indian policy and assure that "utmost good faith" underscore white-Indian relations on the frontier. In 1790 Congress enacted a law requiring licenses to trade with the natives, specifying
penalties for trading without a license, outlawing the purchase of Indian lands unless made by public treaty with the United States, and affirming that whites committing crimes against the Indians be duly punished according to the law. In 1793 Congress added provisions that authorized the president to remove white settlers from Indian lands, prohibited government employees from trading with the Indians, and specified that states could not impose their trade restrictions on the Indian tribes. The act of 1796 added a detailed definition of Indian country, prohibited whites from driving their cattle on Indian lands, and required passports for anyone traveling into Indian territory.4

During the 1780's and 1790's three important treaties were consummated with the northern Indian tribes. Between October 1784 and January 1785 several northern tribes including the Wyandots, Delawares, Chippewas, and Ottawas signed the Treaty of Fort Stanwix and the Fort McIntosh Treaty. These tribes ceded lands in western New York and Pennsylvania to the United States and a reservation for each was created in the Northwest Territory.5 In 1795 much of their reserved land was again ceded by treaty. In the Treaty of Greenville tribal leaders gave most of Ohio to the United States. In return the United States distributed twenty thousand dollars worth of provisions and pledged an annuity of ten thousand dollars to be shared by the tribes, including the Delawares, Potawatomis, Wyandots, Shawnees,
Miamis, Chippewas, Ottawas, and Kickapoos.6

During the early years of the new republic, legislation and official policy regarding Indian affairs favored the natives and promised that their lands and rights would not be threatened. However, on the frontier, treaties and land cessions were already foreshadowing the next era of United States Indian relations. As Americans began looking to the western frontier and realizing that the Indians inhabited vast domains, including some of the most fertile grounds for agriculture, they questioned the Indians' right to remain on their lands without cultivating the rich natural resources. The natives were hunters and didn't comprehend the agricultural value of their lands. Because of such considerations, by the year 1800 "utmost good faith" with the Indian tribes began to receive a different interpretation and Thomas Jefferson, newly elected president of the United States, proposed a new approach in federal Indian Policy.

The Jeffersonian Age

One of the most critical periods in the history of United States Indian policy was the administration of Thomas Jefferson. Jefferson did not believe that mandatory removal of the natives was the answer to "the Indian problem" on the frontier. Rather, he maintained that proper assimilation of the Indians into the Union would come through "civilization." This, he believed, would be
accomplished by displacing hunting with agriculture. In 1803 President Jefferson said,

I consider the business of hunting has already become insufficient to furnishing clothing and subsistence to the Indians. The promotion of agriculture, therefore, and household manufacture, are essential to their preservation, and I am disposed to aid and encourage it. This will enable them to live on much smaller portions of land... While they are learning to do better on less land, our increasing numbers will be calling for more land, and thus a coincidence of interests.

Jefferson perceived no contradiction in working for the civilization of the Indian and at the same time gradually reducing his land holdings. He viewed these issues as complimentary sides of the same coin.

Jefferson also asserted his belief that the amalgamation, both cultural and physical, of the Indians and the whites was essential to bring about the civilization of the natives. Writing to Indian agent Benjamin Hawkins, President Jefferson said, "The ultimate point of rest & happiness for them [Indians] is to let our settlements and theirs meet and blend together, to intermix, and become one people." This idealistic view proved totally incompatible with the realities of life on the frontier. The lifestyle of the two peoples varied so vastly as to make the realization of such a measure virtually impossible.

Two events during the Jefferson administration had a profound effect on Indian affairs. The first of these was the Intercourse Act of 1802. For the most part it restated
former legislation, but in addition it authorized the President of the United States "to take whatever steps he deemed necessary to prevent or restrain the vending or distribution of spirituous liquors among all or any of the Indian tribes, to assure fairness in trade, and to maintain peace on the frontier." The broad power granted to the president "to take whatever steps he deemed necessary" clarified former laws governing Indian affairs and foreshadowed the broad presidential authority of the Jacksonian era. The Indian Act of 1802 remained in force until 1834, a period of more than thirty years.

Another event during the Jefferson administration that greatly affected federal Indian relations was the Louisiana Purchase of 1803. With the purchase, the United States gained a vast territory and the resident Indian tribes of the Louisiana Purchase area acquired a "Father" in Washington. The purchase not only meant jurisdiction over Indian tribes on a new frontier west of the Mississippi River, but also provided the land for the famous Indian removal policy of the Jacksonian Era. During the Jefferson administration, Lewis and Clark, Zebulon Pike and others explored the territory acquired by the Louisiana Purchase and reported their findings to the President. Toward the end of his administration, Jefferson urged some of the Indians who could not cope with the relentless surge of the advancing frontier to exchange their eastern lands for tracts west of the Mississippi River.
Although the Jefferson administration never forced removal of eastern Indians from their tribal lands, it nevertheless laid the foundation for subsequent Indian legislation and conceived the embryo of Andrew Jackson's brainchild -- the Indian removal policy of the 1830's. Jefferson maintained his assertion that teaching the Indians the arts of agriculture would provide a "coincidence of interests" -- civilizing the natives and apportioning more land for the conquest of successive frontiers. The continual westward surge of the frontier and a simultaneous effort on the part of the Indians to maintain their tribal lands characterized the two decades following the Jefferson administration.

The lofty assumption that the Indians would respond to civilization efforts and adopt white ways received limited acceptance among the various tribes during the years following the Jefferson administration. Seeing however, as it were, the handwriting on the wall, the southern tribes made noticeable gestures toward civilization hoping that it would appease the obsession of greedy white land speculators that they be removed. The Cherokee tribe, in particular, and to a lesser degree the Creeks, Chickasaws, and Choctaws, adopted white ways of tilling the soil and learned the domestic arts of weaving and spinning. They welcomed missionaries who established schools and eventually assisted the Cherokee in publishing their own newspaper.11 During the War of 1812, these tribes remained
loyal to the United States, even aiding General Andrew Jackson in quieting the rebellion of a hostile Creek faction known as the Red Sticks. All of these efforts proved inadequate in quelling the tide of white expansion and greed.

During the years following the War of 1812, the southern tribes reluctantly ceded large tracts of land to the United States in a series of successive treaties. By 1820 the Cherokees had surrendered most of their lands in western North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee and retained a domain in northwestern Georgia. The Creeks had surrendered their lands in southern Georgia and retained a homeland core in Alabama. The Seminoles were in process of accepting reduced territory in Florida. The Choctaws had ceded much of their territory in southern and central Mississippi and were about to agree to another large cession. The Chickasaws had retreated through successive land cession treaties to a small domain in northern Mississippi and northwestern Alabama. (See Map #1 on page 21.)

By 1827 the Cherokee tribe determined to fight for its own cause. On 26 July 1827 the Cherokee nation adopted a written constitution patterned after that of the United States wherein it asserted that the Cherokee was a sovereign and independent nation with complete jurisdiction over its own territory. This action incensed the officials of the State of Georgia, who responded by extending the authority
of the state and its laws over Cherokee lands. The Georgians made a threat to use force, if necessary, to accomplish their aims.\textsuperscript{14} Both the Cherokee tribe and the Georgia legislature resolutely maintained their political position and although still non-violent when Andrew Jackson entered the White House in 1829, the controversy in Georgia was one of his most urgent and pressing concerns.

The northern tribes likewise lost considerable land holdings. (See Map \texttt{42} on page \texttt{22}.) From 1816 to 1818 federal officials secured a strategic tract of over two million acres between the Illinois and Mississippi rivers displacing the Peorias, Kaskaskias, and several smaller tribes. The powerful Kickapoo tribe, which controlled the territory on the Wabash River in the Indiana Territory and the rich Illinois and Sangamon river country in north-central Illinois, exchanged its lands for a domain in the trans-Mississippi territory. Nearly two thousand Kickapoos moved during 1819, but two bands rebelled against the removal and remained in Illinois until 1834.\textsuperscript{15}

\textbf{The Jacksonian Era}

General Andrew Jackson entered the White House in March 1829 with some fixed views on how the federal government should handle Indian affairs. During the war of 1812 Jackson had become a military hero. For several years following the war he had been active in frontier affairs, including service as a commissioner for the government in
negotiating treaties with the southern Indian tribes. Through this experience he became a spokesman for frontier settlers who desired Indian-owned land. Jackson thought it absurd to deal with the Indian nations as separate enclaves and expressed his views freely that Congress ought simply to legislate for them just like it did for everyone else.

In 1817 he commented to President James Monroe,

> I have long viewed treaties with the Indians an absurdity not to be reconciled to the principles of our government. The Indians are subjects of the United States, inhabiting its territory and acknowledging its sovereignty, then is it not absurd for the sovereign to negotiate by treaty with the subject? I have always thought, that congress had as much right to regulate by acts of legislation all Indian concerns, as they had of territories; . . . 

Although his ideas did not receive immediate attention by Congress, Jackson's views were well-known by 1829, and by then he had gathered substantial support for his frontier program.

Prior to Andrew Jackson's presidency, voluntary removal of certain Indian tribes had been considered one answer to the "Indian problem" on the frontier. James Monroe modified Indian policy by proposing the self-imposed removal of all eastern Indians to the territory west of the Mississippi River. He presented this plan to Congress in January 1825. Jackson, in contrast, brought to the Presidency the view that the Indians must be removed at all costs. His Secretary of War, John H. Eaton, expressed the opinion of the new administration. Referring to the treaty of 1783, Eaton told the Indians:
If, as is the case, you have been permitted to abide on your lands from that period to the present, enjoying the right of the soil, and privilege to hunt, it is not thence to be inferred, that this was any thing more than a permission, growing out of compacts with your nation; nor is it a circumstance whence, now to deny to those states, the exercise of their original sovereignty. 18

The statement sounds harsh, but the Jackson administration justified this notion by perpetuating the idea that removal was in the ultimate best interest of the natives. The administration argued that the Indians could not be "civilized" on their ancient lands, but rather, they must be granted different lands which could not be taken by white men seeking a new frontier. Once removed they would be protected by their "Father" in Washington and taught the skills of civilization. The frontier could then advance at will without conflict and bloodshed and, when the white men again met the Indian, the desired assimilation of the two societies would become a reality. In his first annual message as President of the United States, Andrew Jackson articulated the vision he hoped to see realized through Indian removal:

In the West the Indians may be secured in the enjoyment of governments of their own choice, subject to no other control from the United States than such as may be necessary to preserve peace on the frontier and between the several tribes. There the benevolent may endeavor to teach them the arts of civilization, and, by promoting union and harmony among them, to raise up an interesting commonwealth, destined to perpetuate the race and to attest the humanity and justice of this Government. 19

This lofty rationale, as idealistic and non-pragmatic as it
was, began to gain momentum, especially among the American settlers in the southern states.

As early as 1825, Secretary of War John C. Calhoun recommended that President Monroe set aside the region west of Missouri and Arkansas as a permanent reserve for the several Indian tribes. Monroe designated for that purpose an extensive Indian colonization zone bounded on the north by the Platte River, on the south by the Red River, and extending west to the one-hundredth meridian. For a time the region was known as Indian Country. With the passage of the removal bill on 28 May 1830 the region became officially "Indian Territory" and Congress granted President Andrew Jackson power to organize districts within the territory for Indian removal. (See Map 3 on page 23.)

The removal bill was not without opposition. Several New England congressmen opposed the measure. Jeremiah Evarts believed Jackson had not given sufficient thought to the problems that might arise. He doubted that the government could find good administrators who would go to the Indian Territory and carry out federal policies. He feared the men selected would be "much more intent on the emoluments of office, than on promoting the happiness of the Indians." Edward Everett of Massachusetts added:

Whoever read of such a project? Ten or fifteen thousand families, to be rooted up, and carried a hundred, aye, a thousand miles into the wilderness! There is not such a thing in the annals of mankind. , , , To remove them against
their will, by thousands, to a distant and different country, where they must lead a new life, and form other habits, and encounter the perils and hardships of a wilderness. . . . They are planters and farmers, they are tradespeople and mechanics, they have cornfields and orchards, looms and workshops, schools and churches, and orderly institutions.23

It is interesting to note that the opposition from New England legislators represented a sector of the nation that was no longer plagued by an "Indian problem." Their ancestors had accomplished removal of the New England natives in the generations that preceded them. Ethics on the advancing frontier, however, seemed to have no absolutes.

The Indians also resented the removal policy, but only a few like Black Hawk were brave enough to militantly oppose the "Great Father." Black Hawk, a Sac and Fox Indian chief, ranged the country between the Illinois and Wisconsin rivers. During the summer of 1831 he gathered his people numbering about one thousand men, women, and children and courageously defended the lands of his fathers. Several skirmishes with the Illinois militia followed. Finally in desperation, the militia summoned help from federal troops. Black Hawk and his people made a last stand during the summer of 1832 against the combined army. The carnage that followed left three hundred Indians dead and Chief Black Hawk a prisoner of war.24

The most united Indian opposition to the removal policy came from the Cherokee tribe residing in the boundaries of the state of Georgia. In 1831, when Georgia
passed laws that extended jurisdiction over the Cherokee nation, the Cherokees brought a suit before the Supreme Court of the United States against the state of Georgia. The Supreme Court determined that Indians were "dependent domestic nations." In an unprecedented move, Jackson refused to accept the decision of the Supreme Court and required that the Indians move voluntarily or be provided a military escort to see that the move take place. Although reluctant, most Indian tribes ceded their lands without testing the President's threat. In the case of the Cherokee tribe, however, Jackson called on the military to round them up and escort them to Indian Territory.

Only about two thousand of the eastern Cherokee had deserted their lands by 1838. General Winfield Scott received orders to take command of seven thousand troops already in Cherokee country and enforce removal. Fifteen thousand Cherokee had already been disarmed prior to the arrival of General Scott. The army carried out its orders to gather the Indians. Squads of troops were sent to search out with rifle and bayonet every small cabin hidden away and to seize and bring in as prisoners all the occupants, however or wherever they might be found. Men were seized in their fields or going along the road, women were taken from their wheels and children from their play. In many cases, on turning for one last look as they crossed the ridge, they saw their homes in flames. Several soldiers hunted for Indians' graves to rob them of the
silver pendants and other valuables deposited with the dead.  

Finally realizing the futility of resistance, the Cherokees proceeded without a military escort. Their famous journey has been remembered as "The Trail of Tears," a journey which reaped a heavy harvest of misery and death. The trek began in the summer of 1838. The weather was so hot that the marches started each day before sunrise and ended at noon. Three, four, and five deaths occurred each day. By the end of the first month between two and three hundred were ill. After several months, the companies arrived in Indian Territory, each having suffered great loss of life. Of the original fifteen thousand Cherokee that left Georgia, nearly four thousand never reached their destination.

Another important act of Congress affecting Indian affairs during the Jacksonian era was the Intercourse Act of 30 June 1834. It was a wholesale reconstruction of the Intercourse Act of 1802 and made a three-fold attack on problems encountered during a half-century of Indian affairs. First, it reorganized the Indian department making provisions for Indian agents and eliminating confusion that had frequently arisen in financial matters. Second, it detailed a new trade and intercourse act ripened in light of frontier experience and congressional debate. Finally, it proposed the organization of a western territory for the Indians and pledged protection from their
government in Washington.29

By the time Andrew Jackson left the White House in 1837 he had affected a permanent change in the direction Indian affairs would take for many years to come. It is difficult to evaluate Jackson’s removal policy because the forces of expansion cut short many of the programs and goals that the removal policy had outlined. Indian expert Francis Paul Prucha summarizes the difficulty historians face in evaluating Jackson’s policies:

Ultimate evaluation of Indian removal is difficult. Removal brought neither the utter collapse of Indian society and culture direly predicted by the critics of Jackson’s program nor the utopia in the West that advocates envisaged. Like so many human affairs, it had elements of good and evil, of humanitarian and philanthropic concern for the Indians and fraud and corruption practiced by unscrupulous men. How it might finally have turned out cannot be determined, for the development of the emigrant Indians in the West was cut short by new forces of expansion in the 1840’s and 1850’s and then by the cataclysm of the Civil War.30

The 1840’s and 1850’s:
Reform, Emigration, and Reservations

By 1840 the removal of eastern Indian nations to homes west of the Mississippi had largely been accomplished. The decade that followed marked an interlude of relative peace in Indian relations on the frontier. The Indian Department promoted the "civilization" effort and advocated fulfillment of promises made to the several Indian tribes. The Indian reformers of the 1840’s agreed that the panacea for all ills afflicting the Indians was education. The
Indian department employed missionaries to educate the Indians in reading, writing, arithmetic, geography, and history. They established day schools to demonstrate agricultural and mechanical skills. The natives also spent considerable time studying the Bible and religious doctrines of the missionaries who served as instructors. Although some Indians responded to the education, most assimilated very little of the white man's ways. Perhaps the reason for the discouraging results was that American officials wanted to devastate Indian culture and replace it entirely with their own institutions. Their zeal became their downfall. Most Indians became confused and disoriented or otherwise resisted assimilation and many resorted to whiskey to make life more bearable.\textsuperscript{31}

A compelling obsession to conquer the Western frontier during the 1840's tended to nullify the efforts of the reformers. The frontier diminished at a much faster rate than anticipated. The United States annexed Texas in 1845. The Mormons settled the Great Basin (then Mexico) in 1847. The next year (1848) Mexico ceded an immense territory to the United States through the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. Thousands of emigrants crossed the plains to Oregon and then to California with the Gold Rush of 1849.\textsuperscript{32} All of this expansion affected the several Indian tribes on the frontier and increased the "interior" affairs in the United States. It was no longer fitting to keep the Indian Office in the War Department. In 1849 Congress created the
Department of the Interior and placed Indian affairs under its jurisdiction. The change reflected the philosophy that Indian affairs was indeed a domestic concern and should be kept under civilian control. 33

During the late 1840's and early 1850's thousands of emigrants and gold seekers flooded into Texas, Oregon, California and Utah, thus causing the United States government to come face to face with new groups of western Indians. Problems that had plagued the conduct of Indian affairs in the East, then in mid-America, resurfaced in Indian relations on the western frontier. An agitation to build a railroad to the Pacific coast, thus creating a necessity to clear the central region of the United States to accommodate the railroad, became an important issue in Congress. 34 Again the Indians in Indian Territory became a nuisance in the path of "progress." Senator Stephen Douglas expressed the need to remove the Indian "barrier." He said,

How are we to develop, [sic] cherish, and protect our immense interests and possessions on the Pacific, with a vast wilderness fifteen hundred miles in breadth, filled with hostile savages, and cutting off all direct communication. The Indian barrier must be removed. The tide of emigration and civilization must be permitted to roll onward until it rushes through the passes of the mountains, and spreads over the plains, and mingles with the waters of the Pacific. Continuous lines of settlement with civil, political and religious institutions all under the protection of law, are imperiously demanded by the highest national considerations. These are essential, but they are not sufficient. No man can keep up with the spirit of this age who travels on anything slower than the locomotive, and fails to receive intelligence by lightning. We must therefore have Rail Roads and
Telegraphs from the Atlantic to the Pacific, through our own territory.35

During the 1850’s territorial Indian agents, under the direction of various Indian commissioners, concluded fifty-two treaties with western Indian leaders in several organized territories and states west of the Mississippi River. These treaties created separate reservations for various Indian tribes and marked a departure from their concentration in an "Indian Country." Generally the reservations were islands of land within the larger area the tribes once possessed.36 The treaties typically included provisions promising annuity payments for a specified number of years and the financing of agricultural implements, opening farms, fencing land and erecting buildings, etc. to advance the cause of civilizations.37 The reservation system as outlined by the Indian department was in full stride during Brigham Young’s Indian superintendency.

Brigham Young’s early life and mature years spanned all of the Jeffersonian and Jacksonian eras and their aftermath. It is reasonable to assume that since Brigham Young lived on the frontier (Ohio, Missouri, and Illinois) during the 1830’s and 1840’s, the Indian policies of the Jackson administration and subsequent efforts at reform exerted their influence and contributed to the formulation of his Indian leadership attitudes. In his early years in the Great Basin, Brigham Young advocated policies similar to those of his predecessors and counterparts. When Indian
resistance posed no more significant threat to the colonization effort, he supported reform measures and adopted a conciliatory policy with the Indians. Although conditions varied on the several frontiers, the result was always the same for the Indian. He lost the lands of his fathers and reluctantly accepted the white intrusion.
Map #1: Land Cessions of the Five Civilized Tribes

Map 12: Indian Land Cessions in the North

Map #3: Indian Territory Before 1854

ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER I


5. Gibson, p. 262.

6. Ibid., p. 267.


13. Ibid., p. 317.


17. Ibid., p. 293.


19. Andrew Jackson on 8 December 1829 as cited in Prucha, Indian Policy in the United States: Historical Essays, 155.

20. Gibson, p. 312.


22. Ibid., p. 130.

23. Edward Everett in 1830 as cited in Gibson, p. 308.

24. Ibid., pp. 297-98.

25. Prucha, American Indian Policy in the Formative Years: The Indian Trade and Intercourse Acts (1790-1834), p. 244.


27. Ibid., p. 295.

28. Ibid., p. 312. (An account by company is provided on pages 310 to 312.)


34. Ibid, p. 345.

36 Gibson, pp. 354-55.

CHAPTER II

THE NATIVES OF THE GREAT BASIN

When the Mormons entered the Great Basin in 1847, there were approximately twelve thousand Indians scattered throughout the region from two kindred tribes - the Shoshoni and the Ute. The Shoshonis consisted of the Northwestern Shoshoni of northern Utah, the Bannock of southern Idaho, the Western Shoshoni of northern Nevada, the Northern Paiute of western Nevada, and the Eastern Shoshoni of western Wyoming. The Utes were divided into the Tumpanawach (Timpanogas) Utes of Central Utah, the Uintah Utes of northeastern Utah, the Pahvant Utes of southcentral Utah, the Gosiutes of western Utah and eastern Nevada, and the Southern Paiutes of southern Utah and southern Nevada.¹ (See Map #4 on page 42 for the location of the various Shoshoni and Ute bands.)

The most powerful of the Great Basin Indian bands in terms of numbers and organization was the Timpanogas Utes. Due to their acquisition of the horse during the late eighteenth century, they had acquired elements of the plains culture. They hunted deer, antelope, elk, bear, etc., all of which were plentiful in the Great Basin prior to the arrival of the white man.² The Southern Paiutes,
Gosiutes, and Northern Paiutes were impoverished tribes commonly referred to as "Digger Indians." They received this nickname because of their practice of digging roots from the ground for food. They ate whatever they could capture including insects, snakes, lizards, etc. The horse never became important to these bands because it would have devoured the very grasses and seeds that the people ate. The horse was a valuable trade item, but the Digger Indians rarely used it as such because in their poverty they often were obliged to use its meat instead. The more powerful tribes often took advantage of the "Diggers" because of their pitiful circumstances.

**Spanish Exploration**

The culture of the various Ute bands literally transformed as a result of Spanish exploration and influence. Their impact on the Utes was so tremendous that it would be impossible to understand Ute culture when Brigham Young and the Mormons arrived in the Great Basin without giving it some attention. Even before the 1607 settlement at Jamestown on the Atlantic coast, representatives of the Spanish crown were already approaching southern Ute lands from their New Mexican outposts.

Spain arrived in Aztec lands near modern Mexico City in 1519 under the leadership of Hernán Cortés. Cortés and his conquistadores were intrigued by the reports of cities
of gold. The Aztecs spoke of fabulously rich lands to the north. They believed their ancestors came from seven caves near the Lake of Copala. The Lake of Copala may be identical to the Spanish Lake Timpanogus, present-day Utah Lake. Aztec tradition taught that the lake was in the land of Teguayo which included the area extending north of the Yutas (Utes). 4

In 1527 Pánfilo de Narváez left Spain in search of a water route to these alleged cities of gold. His expedition reached Tampa Bay in Florida in April 1528. After searching in Florida for a time, Narváez abandoned his hopes of finding the golden city in that region. After constructing new ships, he and his men set forth from Pensacola along the southern coast of the United States. Narváez drowned west of the Mississippi delta, but some of his men grounded on an island off the Texas shore west of Galveston. Among those surviving the expedition was Álvar Nuñez Cabeza de Vaca. In 1535 Cabeza de Vaca sought an overland route to Mexico City. He wandered through southern Texas, into the present north Mexican states of Chihuahua and Sonora, and finally to Spanish settlements on the Gulf of California. (See Map #6 on page 44.) In 1540 Francisco Vásquez de Coronado left Mexico city commanding an expedition in search of the fabled cities of gold. He explored an enormous portion of the southwestern United States, wandering through Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona on the fringes of Ute lands. 5 (See Map #6 on page 44.) It is
not known whether Coronado actually came in contact with the Utes or merely skirted their territory. (See Map #5 on page 43 for the locations of the various Ute bands of Utah and Colorado.)

Of all the Spaniards in the sixteenth century who left Mexico City into the northern country, none was more important than Juan de Oñate. In 1598 he led an expedition into New Mexico and established a mission within the present boundaries of the United States. Oñate established some permanency in New Mexico. It was from these New Mexican settlements that Spain supervised the exploration of what would become the southwestern United States and as a result came in contact with the Ute Indians. Spanish-Ute relations during the seventeenth century and the majority of the eighteenth century were limited to trading enterprises with southern and eastern Ute tribes living in the closest proximity to New Mexico. The Utes visited the settlements of Santa Fe and Taos bringing meat, hides, tallow, suet and salt to exchange for cotton blankets, pottery, and corn.6

Another important contributor to Spain's settlement of the present-day southwestern United States was the Jesuit missionaries. By 1600 five missionaries had founded eight churches near the Sinaloa River in northern Mexico. During the seventeenth century the Jesuits established dozens of missions. In 1687 Father Eusebio Kino and his companions entered Pimería Alta, including that part of Arizona which
was later contained in the Gadsden Purchase. Father Kino's

The Jesuits
did not come into contact with Ute tribes, but they added to
the body of accumulating knowledge of the vast resources
and territory north of Mexico.

The next surge of exploration into Ute lands did not
occur until 1765. At present there is no record available
of Spanish exploration into Ute territory between 1692 and
1765. In 1765 Juan María de Rivera penetrated into the

In 1769 an event occurred which served as
a powerful incentive to catapult Spaniards deep into Ute
territory. Word reached Mexico City that the Russians were
moving in force into the Oregon country. In the early
1770's, in order to protect their interests on the Pacific
coast, Spanish officials in Mexico City sent requests to
Santa Fe that they seek an overland route from Santa Fe to
Monterey.9

The most important personalities among those who set
forth in search of a possible overland route were the
Franciscan friars Francisco Atanasio Domínguez and
Silvestre Vélez de Escalante. On 29 July 1776 they set out
from Santa Fe. When they returned on 2 January 1777 they
had travelled more than two thousand miles over rugged
terrain, made friends with Ute bands, and opened up what would become the eastern arm of the Old Spanish Trail. (See Map 7 on page 45.) The expedition of Fathers Domínguez and Escalante is of special importance because of their impact on the Ute bands of the Great Basin. They commenced an interchange between Spain and the Timpanogus Utes in particular, introducing them to Spanish culture and trading enterprise.\(^\text{10}\) On 24 September 1776 the Domínguez-Escalante party encountered the Indians of present-day Utah Valley near Utah Lake. The occasion was very cordial and the natives offered all their land to the Spaniards for them to build their homes wherever they pleased. After giving presents to the Indians, the friars promised they would return.\(^\text{11}\) Although the Franciscan friars never returned to Utah Valley, Great Basin Indians began an interchange with Spaniards and could be found bartering with them and acquiring horses, which would literally change their way of life.

The Domínguez-Escalante expedition provided a catalyst which lured others northward from Santa Fe, thus increasing the knowledge of and interchange with Ute bands. In 1779 Governor Juan Bautista de Anza led an expedition which penetrated into the Ute country of central Colorado.\(^\text{12}\) (See Map 7 on page 45.) A final Spanish expedition of note was the Arze-García venture of 1813. Their route is unknown but their record affirms that they explored as far north as Utah Valley.\(^\text{13}\) (See Map 7 on page 45.)
The Influence of the Horse on Ute and Shoshoni Culture

The Spaniards had a tremendous impact on the culture of the Ute and Shoshoni Indians. From very early contacts with the Spaniards, their lifestyle began changing until it had become so drastically different from what they had known as to make it doubtful whether their previous culture will ever be known. Perhaps the greatest reason for the assimilation of Spanish culture with their own is that the Spaniards never did encroach into Ute lands with the intent of permanent residency. Generally they enjoyed peaceful relations which contributed to the trade and interchange between the two peoples. It is through this early trade that the greatest single element for cultural change was introduced to the Ute -- the horse. In contrast, it is generally believed that the Shoshoni obtained their horses via the Comanches rather than directly from the Spanish. The Comanche tribe resided closest to the Spanish source of horses in New Mexico.

In their pre-horse days the Utes brought dog teams with them to the Spanish settlements to carry their supplies. Bolton describes them from an observer’s journal:

It is a sight worth seeing and very laughable to see them travelling, the ends of the poles dragging on the ground, nearly all of them snarling in their encounters, travelling one after another on their journey. In order to load them the Indian women seize their heads between their knees and thus load them or adjust the load, which is seldom required, because they
travel along at a steady gait as if they had been trained by means of reins.  

When first acquired, the horse was not ridden; instead it was used as a pack animal. Speaking of the Utes' early experience with the horse, Lyman Tyler wrote, "They never ride although the Spanish trade horses and mares are old and tame, without the saddles, bridles, and harness, and they use them to carry their tipis and possessions." 

The increased use of the horse literally changed the Ute way of life. Spanish horses became available to the natives following the Pueblo Revolt in 1680 and subsequent reoccupation in 1692. The first Utes to obtain the horse were those closest to New Mexico, but by the turn of the nineteenth century (1800) almost every Ute tribe and the Eastern and Northern Shoshoni were equestrian. Prior to having the horse, these tribes had lived off small game and any big game that could be ambushed when they went to water. Because all hunting had to be done on foot, the hunting areas were limited. They had been a rather docile, non-aggressive people. One of the first great benefits of the horse for the Utes was an increase in respect from other Indian tribes, particularly the Plains Indians. Prior to having the horse the Utes were considered to be on a lower cultural level. With the horse, the Ute bands grew in strength and began raiding horses from other Indian tribes. It increased the range and efficiency of hunting far beyond the prior capabilities of the Utes. It also allowed them to develop a unique and efficient method of
defense. They were able to gather food on the plains and quickly return to the mountains which they knew so well and where pursuers from other tribes were at a great disadvantage.19

As the value of the horse became more evident, the Utes began to plot ways to acquire more of them. A Ute obsession for horses ushered in a whole new era of Spanish-Ute relations -- trading Indian children for Spanish horses. Year by year the equestrian tribes became more involved in the slave trade with Spain and Mexico and the enterprise evolved to be a vital part of their economy.

The Indian Slave Trade

The Spaniards wanted Indian children to serve as house servants. Seizing an opportunity to obtain Spanish horses, some of the stronger Ute tribes began making raids on weaker bands, capturing their children, and using them as a trading commodity in Santa Fe. Many of these children came from the destitute Paiute or "Digger" Indians. The slave trade became a mutually lucrative business for both the Utes and the Spaniards. After the expeditions of Rivera and Domínguez-Escalante the Spaniards travelled to Ute territory and traded horses for children, then returned to Santa Fe to sell them at a tremendous profit. Boys sold for an average of one hundred dollars and girls for up to two hundred dollars. The girls were considered more valuable because they made better house servants.20
After the Domínguez-Escalante expedition of 1776, the Timpanogas Utes entered the slave trade. Being the strongest of the Great Basin bands, the Timpanogas Utes saw an opportunity to gain a great deal of wealth in horses. An incident in 1813 reveals the zeal this band had acquired for the slave trade. The Arze-García trading party arrived in Utah Valley hoping to trade for items other than Indian children, but the Utes insisted that the Spanish horses be exchanged for children. When the Utes assembled they would trade nothing but Paiute slaves as they had done on other occasions. When the offer was rejected, the Indians became infuriated, and before their chiefs succeeded in quieting the tribesmen, eight horses and one mule belonging to the Spaniards had been killed. After collecting their remaining animals, the Spanish traders departed the next morning for the Sanpete Valley and the Rio Colorado beyond. Near the Colorado River they encountered the Ute chief Wasatch. At first the traders were greeted cordially by the Indian and his followers, but when slaves were offered, the Spaniards again refused to trade, and hostilities threatened anew. Deciding to prevent possible injury to themselves, the traders agreed to take twelve slaves and 109 pelts in exchange for their horses.\(^{21}\)

The slave trade was not without opposition from the officials in Mexico City. In 1812 Spanish authorities passed a law prohibiting slavery, but the order was largely ignored in Santa Fe.\(^{22}\) The shift in government from Spanish
to Mexican rule in 1821 had virtually no effect on the Indian slave trade. It continued with little change and was still a vital part of Ute commerce when the Mormons arrived in the Great Basin in 1847.

**Explorers, Trappers, and Emigrants**

While the Spaniards were exploring Ute territory, French and American explorers penetrated Ute and Shoshoni territory from the east and the north. In 1743, Chevalier de la Verendrye and his party explored the fringes of Shoshoni country as far south as northeastern Wyoming. In July 1806 Zebulon Pike led an expedition from St. Louis, Missouri which penetrated Ute territory as far as central Colorado. (See Map #8 on page 46.) Meriwether Lewis and William Clark were the first Americans to enter the Three Forks region of southwestern Montana on the fringes of Shoshoni territory. They relied on the experience of a French-Canadian, Toussaint Charbonneau. He acted as guide and interpreter and his Shoshoni wife, Sacajawea, also was invaluable to the expedition. She had been taken a prisoner of war by the Hidatsa tribe of North Dakota and sold to Charbonneau. The knowledge and experience of the Lewis and Clark expedition, aided by Charbonneau and Sacajawea, provided a potent catalyst for the exploration of the Northwest. (See Map #8 on page 46.) Others, American and British, to skirt Shoshoni lands during the first quarter of the nineteenth century included Wilson Price Hunt and
the Astorians, Robert Stuart, and Donald McKenzie.\textsuperscript{26}

Among the most important of those to follow Lewis and Clark into Shoshoni country were the fur traders. In 1822 William Ashley and Andrew Henry founded the Ashley-Henry Fur Trading Company, later to become the Rocky Mountain Fur Company. They employed a group of trappers to penetrate the rich beaver lands of the Rockies. Among those originally hired were James Bridger, Jedediah Smith, David E. Jackson, Thomas Fitzpatrick, William Sublette, James Clyman, and Edward Rose. The roster is impressive because each man distinguished himself in the history of the American West.\textsuperscript{27}

The greatest single opportunity for interchange between the Shoshoni and the mountain men was realized in the annual Fur Trade Rendezvous. The first of these was held in 1825 and the last in 1840, many of them being held in the heart of Shoshoni country. (See Map #10 on page 48.) Trappers, Indians, and beaver fur traders gathered annually at the rendezvous. At the first official rendezvous in 1825, 191 fur packs, each worth one thousand dollars were brought in by the trappers from the country belonging to the Shoshonis and Bannocks.\textsuperscript{28} Great festivities and interchange of culture between the mountain men and the Indians characterized each rendezvous. "... Mirth, songs, dancing, shouting, trading, running, jumping, singing, racing, target-shooting, yarns, frolic, with all sorts of extravagances were freely indulged in. The
unpacking of the medicine water contributed not a little to the heightening of our festivities."\(^29\) Sometimes the festivities of the rendezvous lasted for up to a month. Members of the various Shoshoni bands regularly attended the rendezvous. Shoshoni women often attracted the amorous attention of the trappers. Often jealousies and feuds broke out at the rendezvous because of the trappers' competitive attention for the Shoshoni beauties.\(^30\) Some of the trappers married Shoshoni wives. Alfred Miller, present at the Green River rendezvous in 1837, provided this description of the rendezvous:

A large body of Indians, Traders, and Trappers are here congregated, and the view seen from a bluff is pleasing and animated.

In the Middle distance a race is being run, the horses in all cases running in a direct line and never in a circle as with us. The bets pending on the result are extraordinary in character and diversity, and the Indians are passionately fond of this species of gambling. If an Indian happens to lose all,—he will stake the dress he wears against 3 or 4 ounces of vermillion (worth here about $4 per oz.), and if you win can demand it at once, leaving him almost in the condition of Adam before the fall.\(^31\)

The Fur Trade era solidified the American presence in the West forever and prepared the way for the emigrant travel of the 1840's and 1850's along the Oregon and California trails. The Indian tribes had become accustomed to seeing white men and women by 1840. Unfortunately, it is also true that having worked with white men in the fur trade enterprise made the natives more vulnerable to the vile treatment that they received from many of the emigrants while enroute to their western homes. The fur traders, as
a rule, treated them as partners in a lucrative enterprise, while emigrants saw them as little more than a nuisance to be eliminated.

The 1840’s ushered in a new era of White-Shoshoni relations. Thousands of emigrants traversed the Oregon and California Trails to establish permanent residency in the West. The Oregon Trail passed through the middle of the Northern Shoshoni lands in southern Idaho. At the Raft River the road diverged, the north fork heading to Oregon Country and the south to California. The California Trail proceeded southwest along the Humboldt River and through the Sierra Nevada Mountains to Sacramento through the lands of the Western Shoshoni and the Northern Paiutes. (See Map #9 on page 47.) During the mid-1840’s several explorers and emigrants crossed their territory. Among these were John C. Fremont, Lanceford Hastings, Edwin Bryant, the Bidwell-Bartleson party, and the tragic Donner-Reed party of 1846.32

The impact of emigrant travel upon the Western Shoshoni bands was extremely devastating. Many died from exposure to exotic diseases like small pox, measles, cholera, etc. The whites destroyed food supplies and big game moved to higher elevations. By 1850, thousands of Gold Rush emigrants had traversed Western Shoshoni territory. Their cattle destroyed, devoured, and trampled nearly all of the grassland from South Pass to Carson Valley. This devastation caused the starving Indians to rob and plunder
the emigrant trains. Of all the emigration, none had a more profound and lasting impact upon the Great Basin Indians than did that of the Mormons. Unlike the others, they would not disappear again over the western horizon.
Map 14: Natives of the Great Basin

Brigham D. Madsen, The Shoshoni Frontier and the Bear River Massacre (Salt Lake City, Utah: University of Utah Press, 1985) p. 27. (Some adaptations were also made.)
Map 45: Location of Ute Bands

Map #6: Expeditions of Cabeza De Vaca and Coronado

Elaine W. Fowler and Lewis R. Wright, The Moving Frontier (No city mentioned: Delacorte Press, 1972) pp. 17, 35. (Some adaptations were also made.)
Map 17: Expeditions of Rivera, Anza, Domínguez-Escalante, and Arze García

Map #8: Expeditions of Lewis and Clark and Zebulon Pike

Map 49: The Oregon, Old Spanish and California Trails

Fred R. Gowans, Rocky Mountain Rendezvous: A History of the Fur Trade Rendezvous 1825-1840 (Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University Press, 1976). This map is located on the last two pages before the back cover of the book.
ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER II

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3Edward Dorn, The Shoshoneans: The People of the
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4S. Lyman Tyler, "Before Escalante: An Early History
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(1765-1853)," Utah Historical Quarterly, III (January
1930):5-6.

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10Hill, pp. 8-13.

12 Hill, pp. 13-14.

13 Ibid., p. 17.


17 Tyler, "Before Escalante: An Early History of the Yuta Indians and the Area North of New Mexico," p. 103.


21 Hill, pp. 17-19.

22 Hafen, pp. 263-64.


24 Fowler and Wright, pp. 239-40.

25 Carley and Trenholm, p. 42.

26 Ibid., pp. 50-53; 62.

27 Ibid., p. 56.

28 Ibid., p. 63.


30 Captain Bonneville as cited in Cowans, p. 106.
31 Alfred Miller as cited in Gowans, pp. 201-02.


CHAPTER III

INDIAN AFFAIRS IN EARLY UTAH

When the first Mormon companies began settling the valley of the Great Salt Lake in July of 1847, they entered a "buffer zone" between prime hunting and fishing grounds of the Ute Indians to the south and the Shoshoni to the north. It is doubtful that the Indians of the Great Basin had any idea of the magnitude of Mormon emigration headed their way. In the first three months alone, July through October, more than two thousand settled the unclaimed region around the Great Salt Lake. Just three years later, when the territory of Utah was organized in September of 1850, the Mormons numbered twelve thousand, a figure which matched the Indian population in the same region.

The Mormon religion was still in its childhood in the year 1847. Joseph Smith organized the church at Fayette, New York in 1830. Its official name was "The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints." Mormons believe that Joseph Smith translated a book from gold plates in his possession. The book, published as The Book of Mormon, contained a religious history and told the story of the ancient ancestors of the Indians. The new religionists simply became known as "Mormons" because of the book. The
Mormons encountered opposition and antagonism wherever they resided. In 1831 Joseph Smith and his followers moved from New York and settled in Ohio and Missouri. In 1838 they united in Missouri where, later that same year, they were forcibly removed. Eventually they founded Nauvoo, Illinois, where they enjoyed peace for a time.

In 1842 Joseph Smith prophesied that the Mormons "would leave Nauvoo and be planted in the midst of the Rocky Mountains." Several years after his arrival in Salt Lake, Brigham Young indicated that he had sat with Joseph Smith "many hours at a time conversing about this very country," and that Joseph had often said, "If I were only in the Rocky Mountains with a hundred faithful men, I would then be happy, and ask no odds of mobocrats." Oliver B. Huntington wrote that Joseph even went so far as to make "a sketch of the future home of the saints in the Rocky Mts., and their route or road to that country as he had seen in vision." Joseph Smith never led the Mormons to the Rocky Mountains because on 27 June 1844 a mob killed him in Carthage, Illinois.

Many thought the Mormons would disband without their founder, but instead they assembled in greater strength under the capable leadership of Brigham Young. From 1844 until the time he left Nauvoo in 1846, Brigham Young devoured anything he could read about the West, particularly the Great Basin. He especially studied the writings of Lansford W. Hastings and John C. Fremont, both
of whom had written much about their exploration of the Great Salt Lake region. By the year 1845 non-Mormons pressured the Mormons to leave the state of Illinois. Already preparing to do so, Brigham Young and the Mormons determined to abandon Nauvoo the following year. On 4 February 1846 they began a trek into the western frontier which culminated in the Great Basin west of the Rocky Mountains.

**Brigham Young’s Experience in Indian Affairs**

Because of The Book of Mormon, from the beginning the Mormons have felt it their divine duty to "redeem" the native Americans. The Book of Mormon presents an explanation of the origin of the Indians. It teaches of a man named Lehi who left the Old World in 600 B.C. and sailed to the American continent. Laman, a rebellious son of Lehi, and his descendants rejected the teachings of God and became a "dark and loathsome" people. They became fierce and warlike and succeeded over a period of several centuries in totally destroying their lighter-skinned brethren. They remained in this condition until the arrival of the Europeans. Thus, to the Mormons, the Lamanites (Indians) were of the seed of Joseph of the house of Israel and must be redeemed and taught their true identity. Joseph Smith and Brigham Young freely taught this concept and it cannot be overlooked as basic to Young’s attitude regarding the native American.
When the Quorum of Twelve Apostles was organized on 14 February 1835, Brigham Young's ordination included an inference that he would influence "heathen nations," and "declare the tidings to nations that know not God." This reference apparently commissioned him to a special mission among the American Indians. Shortly thereafter, it was proposed "that Brigham Young should open the door of the Gospel" to the Indians.8

As a result of frontier life in Ohio, Missouri, and Illinois, the Mormons often had contact with Indians. Joseph Smith's policies and feelings regarding the Indians deeply affected Brigham. In 1836, with Andrew Jackson's enforcement of Indian removal in full stride, Joseph Smith revealed his support of the president:

The Book of Mormon has made known who Israel is, upon this continent. And while we behold the government of the United States gathering the Indians, and locating them upon lands to be their own, how sweet it is to think that they may one day be gathered by the gospel! . . . The joy that we shall feel, in common with every honest American, and the joy that will eventually fill their bosoms on account of nationalizing the Indians, will be reward enough when it is shown that gathering them to themselves and for themselves, to be associated with themselves is a wise measure, and it reflects the highest honor upon our government.9

On several occasions Brigham Young and Joseph Smith sought opportunity to teach the natives about the Great Spirit and the book of their ancestors, The Book of Mormon. In 1844 nearly forty Sac and Fox Indians visited Joseph Smith in Nauvoo, Illinois complaining to him that they had been mistreated by whites. After convincing them that the
Mormons had not been responsible for the deed, Joseph turned the conversation to *The Book of Mormon* as was often his practice in conversing with Indians.

Trying to impress upon them the importance of *The Book of Mormon*, he showed them a copy and said, "The Great Spirit has enabled me to find a book... which told me about your fathers. The Great Spirit told me, 'You must send this book to all the tribes that you can, and tell them to live in peace;' and when any of our people come to see you, I want you to treat them as we treat you."[10]

Shortly after this event Joseph Smith died and Brigham Young became the new church leader by virtue of his position as President of the Quorum of Twelve Apostles. Young accepted the responsibility of leading the young church to the prophesied Rocky Mountain haven. Brigham Young undoubtedly felt overwhelmed to think that it must be done without his mentor, and the memory of Joseph Smith's leadership continued to affect him. From the time in late 1832 when he first met Joseph Smith in Kirtland, Ohio, no other man had a greater impact on Brigham’s life than did Joseph. They had spent many hours together and Brigham lived by every doctrine and philosophy that Joseph taught.

After crossing the Mississippi River into Iowa, Brigham Young and the Mormons encountered the Potawatomi Indians. Fearing that the Mormon livestock would eat the grass which the natives used for their stock, the Indians demanded payment for crossing their lands. Finally the natives agreed to let the Mormons pass through their lands provided that once they moved west they granted the
Potawatomi possession of bridges and other improvements they built.\textsuperscript{11} The Mormons passed through Iowa with minor conflict, but being unable to achieve their destination of the Great Basin in the year 1846, they were obliged to establish a temporary village in eastern Nebraska. They called it Winter Quarters.

The first real test of Brigham Young's developing Indian policies came in January 1847 near Winter Quarters when a company of Sioux Indians killed thirty of Asahel Lathrop's herd of cattle and appeared ready to kill more. Brigham Young sent twenty-three armed men to bolster Lathrop's defenses and prevent further depredations. His instructions to Lathrop included the following:

Let the loss be what it may, but you must be diligent and sleep with one eye open and never again let the Indians or any other enemy within your fort. To do this is to throw yourself in the power of your enemy, as it gives him an advantage you cannot recall, until it is too late... keep them at respectful distance with the power always in your hands.\textsuperscript{12}

Brigham Young's early Indian policy included three basic principles. First, he wanted the Mormons to show, but never use, a strong display of military force unless in self-defense. This principle would later be challenged and temporarily modified in the early colonization of the Great Basin. A second and related policy was to not take sides or form alliances with one Indian tribe over another. The third principle was to leave the Indian alone and shun any personal social, religious, or economic intercourse with the natives.\textsuperscript{13}
While the Mormons were encamped at Winter Quarters, the Omaha Indians began stealing two or three head of cattle per day. Some of the Mormons suggested the culprits be shot. Brigham Young objected to shooting them. He told his people that, "It was wrong to indulge in feelings of hostility and bloodshed toward the Indian, who might kill a cow, an ox, or even a horse." He further added that if they persisted in robbing and stealing "after being warned not to do so, whip them."\(^{14}\) Brigham Young approached Chief Big Elk of the Omahas and promised him some tobacco, powder, and lead if the Mormons could herd their cattle without molestation. Brigham Young delivered on his promise and it helped maintain a certain degree of friendship with the Omaha tribe.\(^{15}\)

Another problem that Brigham Young dealt with in Iowa and Nebraska was accusations from Indian agents and other citizens that the Mormons intended to ally themselves with the Indians and disturb America's frontier borders and overland trails.\(^{16}\) Brigham Young's sole intention on the Nebraska and Iowa frontier was to help his people safely arrive in the Great Basin at the earliest possible date. Nevertheless, although the allegations had no substance to them, Brigham Young succeeded in bargaining from a position of power by making such statements as the following: "We have more influence with the Indians than all other nations on the earth and if we are compelled to, we will use it."\(^{17}\) Brigham Young later employed similar tactical rhetoric
during the Utah War when rumors spread that the Mormons had formed an alliance with the Great Basin natives. The various encounters with the Indians on the Iowa and Nebraska plains helped prepare Brigham Young, to some degree, for his Indian administration in the Great Basin. However, he experienced an entirely new set of challenges as he established permanent residency on Indian lands in the midst of the Rocky Mountains.

1849-1851: A Precarious Peace

As previously mentioned, when Brigham Young led the Mormons to the Salt Lake Valley, it was a largely uninhabited "buffer zone" between the Ute and Shoshoni tribes. Partly because of that, at the outset neither tribe officially exhibited resistance to Mormon settlement of the region. One notable renegade chief, however, named Wakara advocated immediate attack on the invading colonists but Sowiette, the older and more conservative political chief, overruled the hot-blooded younger chief and the issue was put to rest. Conditions remained peaceful until the Mormon leadership began looking elsewhere for suitable land for the emigrants. In 1849 the colonization of Provo in Utah Valley presented the first challenging conflict. The area was inhabited by the most powerful of the Ute bands, the Timpanogus Utes.

The Ute Indians had lived in Utah Valley for generations prior to the coming of the Mormon colonists in
1849. Initially, they welcomed the Mormons without resistance, but as the Mormons claimed the most fertile tracts of land, and fenced off large portions of real estate for their cattle, the natives began to question the prospects of peaceful co-habitation. Progressively, it became much more difficult for the Utes to hunt game because the wild animals sought refuge on higher ground. Pastures and orchards soon encroached on prime fishing grounds. In a desperate state, some of the Indians began stealing cattle and produce from the newcomers, justifying it as "rent" for the use of Ute lands.

In October 1849 Isaac Higbee, leader of the Provo colony, corresponded with Brigham Young and complained that the Indians had been troublesome for several weeks. Reminiscent of the precedent established at Winter Quarters, President Young reiterated counsel to build up their fort and mind their own affairs. His censuring reply dated 15 October 1849 included the following:

Stockade your fort and attend to your own affairs, and let the Indians take care of theirs. Let your women and children stay in the fort, and the Indians stay out; but, while you mix with them promiscuously, you must continue to receive such treatment from them which they please to give. . . .
You have been too familiar with them, your children have mixed promiscuously with them, they have been free in your houses, and some of the brethren have spent too much time in smoking and chatting with them; and instead of teaching them to labor, such a course has encouraged them in idleness and ignorance, the effects of which you begin to feel.

This reply is evidence that Brigham Young concurred
with Joseph Smith's response to the Indian removal policy of Andrew Jackson. Brigham Young believed that if the Indian were to ever desire the civilization and benefits of white society, he would learn those best at a distance. He believed that total integration of the two societies was not the way to effect the most good for the natives or the Mormons. Living apart, the Mormons could go among them and more easily demonstrate a spirit of benevolence than they could through co-habitation of the same land.

In early January 1850 a senseless tragedy infuriated the Indians in Utah Valley. Three Mormon men assaulted "Old Bishop", a member of one of the Ute Indian bands, for stealing a shirt. They shot him, cut his stomach open, filled it with rocks, and dumped his body in the Provo river. They returned to the settlement and boasted of the horrible deed. Upon discovering the body, the Indians clamored for revenge. The settlers became alarmed at the increased killing and stealing of cattle and wrote Brigham Young requesting that action be taken against the Indians. The reply reiterated Brigham's policy. He warned them that if they killed Indians for stealing they would have to answer for it.

When depredations continued, Isaac Higbee travelled to Salt Lake City to petition authority to launch a punitive expedition against the Indians. On 31 January 1850 he attended a meeting with President Young, his counselors, the Quorum of the Twelve, and the militia commander, Daniel
H. Wells. They determined that the only alternatives were to abandon Utah Valley, defend the Utah Valley settlement, or leave the Mormons to their destruction. Brigham Young authorized a selective extermination campaign against the Utah Valley Indians. He ordered that the male offenders be killed, and the women and children be saved if they behaved themselves. The tragedy of the decision is that there is no mention made of the "Old Bishop" episode which created the dilemma. All evidence suggests that at the time of the order Brigham Young was not aware of the murder of "Old Bishop."\(^{22}\)

The campaign was carried out quickly. On 8 February 1850 a volunteer force surrounded and laid siege to a group of about seventy Indians who were dug in near the Provo River sniping on the Mormon settlers. After two days of heavy fighting the Indians withdrew, leaving eight dead, including one woman whose legs had been severed by cannon shot. One militia man was also killed in the battle. The natives retreated with their wounded and sick to Rock Canyon and the main body fled south in the direction of Spanish Fork.\(^{23}\) Daniel Wells, leader of the campaign, describes the unfortunate sequel as they pursued the natives:

> With the majority of the troops I went out to Spanish Fork on the Indian trail and left a guard at the mouth of Rock Canyon to keep those Indians there; but some of them made their escape over the mountains. We encountered the Indians near the north end, on the west side of the mountain, east of the south end of Utah Lake, and completely defeated them.\(^{24}\)
During the episode twenty-seven warriors were killed. The militia escorted the squaws, papooses, and children to Salt Lake City where they were cared for until spring.

After the Utah Valley expedition, reports of depredation customarily precipitated militia action. Likewise, the murder of an Indian for stealing continued to provoke further retribution. In September of 1850 Urban Van Stewart, a Mormon farmer in Weber county, caught Terikee, a Shoshoni chief, in his corn field and killed him. Enraged, the Shoshonis murdered a nearby millwright named Campbell and threatened to massacre all the settlers if Stewart was not delivered to them for punishment. A large militia force rode out from Salt Lake City with orders to peacefully put an end to the disturbance. At the approach of the militia the Indians fled and the incident terminated without bloodshed.\(^25\) The Mormon leadership mobilized the militia several more times during the year 1851 whenever cattle were driven off or depredations persisted.

In an 1852 letter to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Jacob Holeman, an Indian agent serving in Utah Territory, described the growing concern of the Indians about the expanding Mormon settlements:

\dots the Indians are becoming very excited by the encroachments of the Mormons, who are making settlements, throughout the Territory, on all the most valuable lands—extending these settlements for three hundred miles South, from this City—and north to Marys River, and Carson Valley. In the first settlement of this city,
and the adjoining country, by the Mormons, they at first, conciliated the Indians by kind treatment, but when they once get a foothold, they began to force their way—the consequence was, a war with the Indians, and in many instances, a most brutal butchery, of the Indians. This they fear, will again be the result, wherever the Mormons may make a settlement. 26

Jacob Holeman’s assessment was correct. During the Mormons’ first four years in the Great Basin, the Indians received the same treatment in Utah as their counterparts had on other frontiers. With the magnitude of Mormon emigration requiring more and more fertile land, the scriptural injunction to "redeem the Lamanites" was conveniently forgotten until the settlements were in place and free from possible extinction by native resistance.

By mid-summer of 1851, Brigham Young and the Mormons stood at a critical junction in Indian affairs. Experience, and perhaps a conscience crisis for not having "redeemed" the Indian, had both confirmed the folly of killing Indians for stealing and taught Brigham Young that militia action was expensive and provided no lasting peace or solution to difficulties. In a letter to Lorin Farr of Ogden, Brigham stated: "Do not the people all know that it is cheaper by far, yes hundreds and thousands of dollars cheaper to pay such losses, [food and provisions] than raise an expedition." 27 A major shift of emphasis toward a conciliatory Indian policy began to gain momentum which would last through the duration of Brigham Young’s Indian superintendency.
1852: A Shift in Emphasis

During the three year period from 1849 to 1852, Brigham Young's Indian policies gradually transformed toward a more empathetic perception of the deprived natives of Utah Territory. From 1852 forward, Brigham Young emphasized the Mormons' duty of redeeming the Indians. He hoped that the natives would eventually become both spiritually and physically dependent on the Mormons. By creating such a dependence, perhaps the Mormons could justify having displaced the natives from their tribal lands. Brigham Young stated his philosophy as follows:

If we can secure the good will of the Indians by conferring favors upon them we not only secure peace for the time being but gradually bring them to depend upon us until they eventually will not be able to perceive how they can get along without us.

He further stated that he wished the natives would become perfectly dependent and be obliged to come to us for food and clothing, whereas if we drive them to take care of themselves it begets an independent and self reliance among [them] which ... [would be determinental [sic] to us as a people].

As evidenced on other frontiers, Indian displacement was further justified by perpetuating the notion that the whites made more efficient use of the land through agriculture than did the Indians. Therefore, they perceived no ethical misconduct in taking the land to be used "as God intended it". After all, they could later teach the natives to cultivate the earth themselves. This ideology was fine in theory, but in practice it was not
realistic. The natives could not adapt to white culture, nor did they desire it. The following statement, made in 1866, demonstrates Brigham Young’s expanded empathy for the plight of the Indians. Unfortunately, by that time the damage was irreversible. Regarding the condition of the natives, Brigham said:

This is their home, and we have taken possession of it, and occupy the land where they used to hunt the rabbit and, not a great while since, the buffalo, and the antelope were in these valleys in large herds when we first came here.

When we came here, they could catch fish in great abundance in the lake in the season thereof, and live upon them pretty much through the summer. But now their game has gone, and they are left to starve. It is our duty to feed them. The Lord has given us the ability to cultivate the ground and reap bountiful harvests. We have an abundance of food for ourselves and for the stranger. It is our duty to feed these poor ignorant Indians; we are living on their possessions and at their homes. 

Nevertheless, as on other frontiers, the result had been the same for the Indians of the Great Basin. The white man disrupted their lifestyle and culture, colonized and fenced off their prime hunting and fishing grounds, and by their very presence, desecrated the lands of their fathers.

As Brigham Young’s Indian policies gradually solidified, the following concepts provided a foundation for his counsel regarding the Indians:

1) Feed them when necessary. Settlers were advised to take the responsibility of caring for the Indians near them.

2) Teach them to work. He wanted to teach them farming in order to foster self-sustainment. Agents were to supervise this work.

3) Teach them the value of property,
4) Teach them Mormonism. Missionaries were to teach the Mormon way of life.
5) Educate and civilize them. The Indians, to some extent, responded and gradually began to make a distinction between the Mormons and other whites. This distinction often infuriated non-Mormons who came to Utah.

One may well ask, "Why was the conciliatory policy not commonly practiced until 1852?" Howard Christy suggests five reasons that account for the retarded development of peaceful co-habitation in early Utah Indian affairs. First, conflict over the use of the limited fertile land was inevitable, especially as more Mormons flooded into the Great Basin. Second, the cultural gap between the two peoples was so vast that it was almost impossible to bridge. Third, the Mormons were convinced of the inferiority of the Indian race and there was little desire to encourage assimilation. Fourth, there was little compassion on either side for the feelings of the other. Fifth, no programs to benefit the Indian went into effect until 1852.

Mr. Christy's assessment of the gradual solidification of Brigham Young's conciliatory policy is absolutely correct. He has analyzed the factors which would inevitably affect even the most principled of people as they struggle for co-habitation with Indians on their lands. He demonstrates that military encounters and experience taught Brigham Young that "it was cheaper to
feed the Indians than to fight them." Mr. Christy, however, fails to acknowledge the important role that The Book of Mormon concept of "redeeming the Lamanite" played in affecting Brigham Young's moral conscience for the deprived natives of the Great Basin. This "conscience crisis" solidified the continuation of the conciliatory policy as much as did the hard reality of the dollars and cents it cost to raise expeditions against the Indians. Efforts to assist the natives of the Great Basin and programs for the same went into effect only after Brigham Young resolved the ethical turmoil that proved inconsistent with the doctrine of redemption.

In addition to Howard Christy, it is important to note the opinions of two other scholars. Mr. Lawrence Coates expressed his opinion that Brigham Young's conciliatory policy began as early as 1846 during his encounters with the Omahas' stealing of cattle and subsequent appeasement by conciliation. Although Brigham Young made a conciliatory gesture by giving gifts to Chief Big Elk, thus eluding bloodshed, there was no uniform implementation of the same, void of intermittent bloodshed and retribution, in the Great Basin until 1852. By definition, a policy must be tried and tested through consistent application before it qualifies as such. That consistency did not exist until 1852 and beyond.

Mr. Floyd O'Neil asserted that "the special place of Indians in Mormon theology was special only in belief, not
in practice." He added that the Mormon system was "... part and parcel of the history of the American West -- no better and no worse." When compared with their counterparts on other frontiers, the Mormons responded typically in their treatment of the natives during their first five years in Utah. However, after 1852 there was a marked difference in the philosophy by which Brigham Young governed Indian affairs in Utah, a difference which favorably distinguished him and the Mormons from the majority. It is a credit to Brigham Young that he applied the conciliatory policy as early as he did, even though he still encountered difficulty in convincing some of his Mormon constituents of its ultimate worth as official Indian policy.
ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER III


8. Ibid., p. 162.


12 Journal History of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 12 February 1847. (The Journal History is a daily chronicle of events in the Mormon church and is at the LDS Church Historical Department Archives in Salt Lake City, Utah.)


14 Journal History of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 26 March 1847.


17 Brigham Young as cited in Bennett, Mormons at the Missouri, 1846-1852 "And Should We Die . . . ", p. 103.


19 Journal History of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 15 October 1849.

20 Ibid., 31 January 1850.

21 Ibid., 29 January 1850.

22 Brigham Young to Daniel H. Wells, Brigham Young Collection, 31 January 1850, Microfilm reel 80, box 47, folder 6. (The Brigham Young Collection contains correspondence initiated and received by Brigham Young and is at the LDS Church Historical Department Archives in Salt Lake City, Utah.)


25 Journal History of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 16 September 1850.
26. Jacob Holeman to Luke Lea, Madeline McQuown Collection, 29 March 1852, Manuscript 143, box 40, folder 2. (The Madeline McQuown Collection contains transcriptions from the National Archives in Washington, D.C. of Correspondence between the Indian Department and the Superintendency in Utah. The Collection is in the Special Collections area of the Marriott Library on the University of Utah campus in Salt Lake City, Utah.)

27. Brigham Young to Lorin Farr, Brigham Young Collection, 11 July 1851, Microfilm reel 31, box 12, folder 15.


CHAPTER IV

GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION IN EARLY UTAH

The Territory of Utah

When the Mormons entered the Great Basin in 1847, they were on Mexican territory and the United States was at war with Mexico. In 1848, as a result of the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, the Southwest became United States' territory. When the treaty was signed Brigham Young was not in the Salt Lake Valley, but had returned to Winter Quarters, Nebraska to help the next group of Mormon emigrants prepare for the journey. Upon hearing of the Mexican cession of the Great Basin region to the United States, Young planned the drafting of a constitution for a provisional state government. Back in the Great Basin, he summoned a convention on 4 March 1849 for that purpose. He proposed the state be called "Deseret" after a Book of Mormon word denoting industry and unity. Deseret originally included all of present-day Utah and Nevada, and parts of Idaho, Wyoming, Arizona, New Mexico, Colorado, Oregon, and California. This "State" of Deseret operated independently of the Federal Government in Washington for about a year and a half.

In April 1849 Brigham Young selected Dr. John M.
Bernhisel to carry an official request that Deseret be admitted into the Union as a territory. When Dr. Bernhisel arrived in the East, he consulted with Colonel Thomas L. Kane on the matter. Colonel Kane had befriended the Mormons after they left Nauvoo and was a man of some influence. Kane advised the citizens of Deseret that:

You are better off without any government from the hands of Congress than with a territorial government. The political intrigues of government officers will be against you. You can govern yourselves better than they can govern you. . . . You do not want corrupt political men from Washington strutting around you, with military epaulettes and dress, who will speculate out of you all they can.  

Concurring with the opinions of Colonel Kane, Dr. Bernhisel altered the petition so that it requested statehood. The timing was unfortunate because California applied for statehood at the same time. Congress admitted California as a free state, thus preserving the delicate balance between free and slave states and postponing Utah's hopes to be admitted to the Union. Rather than creating the State of Deseret, Congress established the Territory of Utah (named for the Ute Indians) and cut the area to a little more than half the petitioned size. In spite of this reduction, the new territory remained large enough to present some real management difficulties for the new government. Still an impressive 187,923 square miles, Utah Territory comprised one-eleventh of all the land mass under the American flag and measured five times larger than New York or Pennsylvania.  

(See Map #11 on page 89.)
Millard Fillmore appointed Brigham Young as governor. On 3 February 1851 Daniel H. Wells administered the oath of office to Brigham Young, which included an ex-officio appointment as Superintendent of Indian Affairs. An ex-officio appointment is one that comes by virtue of serving in another capacity. In this case, as in other territories, the superintendent of Indian affairs was an ex-officio appointment accompanying the governorship. Washington appointed several other territorial officials for Utah, of whom only half were Mormon. Personality clashes and differences of opinion emerged between the Mormons and the "Gentile" officials, as the non-Mormons were called, foreshadowing difficult days ahead for the new administration. Brigham Young hoped to make the non-Mormon appointees feel superfluous and understand that there was no issue that the Mormons intended to leave solely to their jurisdiction and judgment. Complaints reached Washington that Brigham Young ruled as he pleased, that no man dared question his authority, and that although "foreign" judges may collect their salaries, "they should never try a case if he could prevent it." Generally, the non-Mormon officials were capable and respectable candidates for office, however, their goals and cultural views differed vastly from those of the Mormons. Brigham Young had his own agenda for the territory and when the non-Mormons' views conflicted with that agenda, they met with stiff opposition. Therefore, their criticisms of the governor's
power were not unfounded, for Brigham Young and the Mormons had no intention of relinquishing Mormon control in the territory.

Although the earliest notable conflict between the Mormons and "gentile" officials did not involve any appointees from the Office of Indian Affairs, it helped confirm Brigham Young's determination not to yield the reins of government to the Gentiles. On 8 September 1851 the Mormons had gathered together for a conference and Young gave one of the federal judges, Perry E. Brocchus, permission to speak to the congregation. At first, Judge Brocchus was very complimentary of the Mormons, and then commenced calling them to repentance for continually maligning the United States government leaders. He also suggested that the young women learn virtue. The comment about virtue was probably an attack on the Mormon practice of polygamy. Brocchus' speech incensed the congregation.

Brigham Young took the stand and said the following:

Judge Brocchus is either profoundly ignorant, or willfully wicked, one of the two... It is well known to every man in this community, and it has become a matter of history throughout the enlightened world that the government of the United States looked upon the scenes of robbing, driving, and murdering this people and said nothing about the matter, but silence gave sanction to the lawless proceedings. Hundreds of women and children have been laid in the tomb prematurely in consequence thereof, and their blood cries to the Father for vengeance against those who have caused or consented to their death...

I am indignant at such corrupt fellows as Judge Brocchus coming here to lecture us on morality and virtue. I could buy a thousand of such men...
and put them into a bandbox. Ladies and gentlemen, here we learn principle and good manners. It is an insult to this congregation to throw out such insinuations. I say it is an insult, and I will say no more. 

Within one month of this event Brocchus and two other non-Mormon officials fled the territory and returned to Washington D.C.

The Utah Indian Superintendency

In April 1849 Congress appointed John Wilson as the first territorial Indian agent for California and gave him jurisdiction over the Great Basin "State" of Deseret. During the eighteen months that Wilson supervised Great Basin Indian affairs, nothing of record was accomplished aside from a few recommendations through correspondence with the Commissioner of Indian Affairs. When Congress created the Territory of Utah in September 1850, the authority to administer Indian affairs in the region transferred to Brigham Young. In March 1851 the federal government appointed three men to aid Brigham Young in the superintendency. The Office of Indian Affairs nominated Major Jacob H. Holeman, from Kentucky, as Indian agent, and Henry R. Day, a Missourian, and Stephen B. Rose, a Mormon from New Jersey, as sub-agents. Day and Rose arrived at Great Salt Lake City on 19 July 1851 and Holeman on 9 August of the same year. Brigham Young established three Indian agencies in the Great Basin. The Parvan (also Pauvan) agency administered the central and northwestern
portions of the territory west of the Shoshoni nation and north of the Pauvan Valley. The Farowan agency included the southwest region of the territory west of the eastern rim of the Great Basin and south of the Pauvan Valley. The Uintah agency had jurisdiction over all the area east of the eastern rim of the Great Basin. (See Map #12 on page 90.) Superintendent Young assigned Day to the Pauvan agency, Rose to the Uintah, and Holeman to the Farowan agency.⁹

When Major Holeman arrived in Great Salt Lake City in August 1851, he brought news that a treaty was to be held at Fort Laramie for the Great Plains Indians. Holeman asked permission to attend the treaty with a band of Shoshoni Indians he had met enroute to his post. Brigham Young gave his blessing to the venture but seemed a little exasperated that he had not received prior information about the treaty. In a letter to Holeman on 11 August he said, "I should have been most happy to have received a letter of instructions from the Department at Washington."¹⁰ The assignments of Day and Rose were temporarily interrupted as Rose accompanied Holeman to Laramie, and Day lingered behind to try to persuade some Ute chiefs to also attend the treaty-making gathering. Day's efforts proved unsuccessful as the Utes could not be convinced that there was no trickery or deception intended by the invitation.¹¹ Day remained in Salt Lake City.

During the absence of Holeman and Rose, the previously mentioned conflict between Brigham Young and Judge Brocchus
occurred. Affected by the sentiments of Judge Brocchus, Day fled the territory with Brocchus and others in late September. Fearing that Holeman might also be persuaded by Day and Brocchus to return to the States, Brigham Young wrote to President Millard Fillmore, "The Indian agent, Mr. Holeman, came here, but immediately left to attend a treaty at Laramie, which he had preengaged to do. He has not returned to this place since. Mr. Day accompanied the officers, and it is presumed that upon meeting with Mr. Holeman they all returned to the States together."\(^{12}\)

Brigham's concerns proved unfounded as Holeman did return to his post to resume his duties as Indian agent. When Mr. Day arrived in St. Louis, he and the federal officers that had fled the territory were censured severely in the press for abandoning their posts. In an editorial under the date of November 25, 1851, the *St. Louis Republican* printed the following:

> But what surpasses our comprehension is what the sub-agent of the Utah Indians has to do with the civil or political affairs of the people of Utah Territory unless they conflict in some way with the Indians, . . . One would have supposed that he could have discharged his duties to the Indians at least, even if Governor Young had committed treason and had been hanged for it.\(^{13}\)

The vacancy left by Day was never filled and Brigham Young reorganized the superintendency into two districts with one Indian agent and one sub-agent. (See Map #13 on page 91.)

Superintendent Young and Major Holeman

Initially, Major Holeman favorably impressed
Superintendent Young. On 30 November 1851, in a letter to Luke Lea, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs in Washington D.C., Brigham Young wrote:

I take great pleasure in forwarding Major Holeman’s report to your department which I doubt not you will find unusually interesting, and highly satisfactory. That gentleman has spared no pains to make himself useful, and to subserve the interest of the government, he has used the utmost economy, consistent in all his transactions so far as I am capable of judging, and made his expenditures and losses far less than similar services usually incur.  

During Holeman’s first few months at his post the only indication of any friction with Superintendent Young took the form of a mild complaint from Brigham Young to Commissioner Lea that Major Holeman thought it his right to choose his own agency.  

But it gradually became evident that Holeman was not happy with his appointment among the Mormons and that he, like Brocchus and Day, felt restrained under the powerful influence of Brigham Young’s authority in the Territory. Realizing that any derogatory comment about Brigham Young or the Mormons sent through official channels would only cause trouble for himself, Holeman found ways to release his frustrations by circumventing Brigham Young and corresponding directly with the Office of Indian Affairs in Washington D.C. In one such letter written from Fort Laramie on 21 September 1851, he stated:

I find much excitement among the Indians, in consequence of the whites settling and taking possession of their country, driving off and killing their game and in some instances driving
off the Indians themselves.

The greatest complaint on this score is against the Mormons; they seem not to be satisfied with taking possession of the valley of the Great Salt Lake, but are making arrangements to settle other, and principally the rich, valleys [sic] and best lands in the Territory. This creates much dissatisfaction among the Indians; excites them to acts of revenge; they attack emigrants, plunder and commit murder, whenever they find a party weak enough to enable them to do so; thereby making the innocent suffer for injuries done by others. 

Brigham Young would never have known of this letter, but for lack of other information on Indian affairs in Utah Territory for the year 1851, Commissioner Lea printed Holeman's letter in the official Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs and distributed it to all the superintendencies. When the Commissioner's report arrived in the Great Salt Lake City in May 1852, Brigham Young examined it and penned a rebuttal:

At the time Major Holeman made the above statements he had never seen an Indian upon whose land the whites who make improvements and cultivate the earth had settled, and no Indians have ever been driven off these lands that I have ever heard of. The Shoshonees and Uintas, to whom I more particularly allude being the only ones in the Territory with whom the Major had at that time had any knowledge of, or intercourse with, have at various times solicited settlements to be made in their respective lands in order that they might be benefited in the articles of clothing and provisions, as the game spoken of affords even in the most retired and secluded places, but a very precarious dependence for subsistence. The only dissatisfaction that I have ever been able to learn as existing among them, was in consequence of no such settlements being made as they desired although they have been told that they will be accommodated in this thing as soon as circumstances will permit.

It is probable that from each individual perspective,
both Holeman and Young were right. The Indians obviously vented their feelings to Holeman about Mormon displacement of their lands. Conversely, whether out of fear or hope of presents and provisions, they also courted Mormon favor and encouraged, at least verbally, Mormon occupation of their lands. Nevertheless, Brigham Young perceived Holeman's negative communication to Commissioner Lea as unwarranted and disloyal to the superintendency.

The altercation over Holeman's accusations in the Annual Report revealed only the tip of the iceberg. In late 1851 Holeman described an unusual incident in some detail to Commissioner Lea. In August of that same year, just prior to the council at Laramie, Indian sub-agent Day visited Holeman seeking information regarding the funding of an interpreter to encourage the Utah Indians to attend the council. Holeman referred him to Superintendent Young. Shortly thereafter, two prospective interpreters, Dimick Huntington and E. W. Vanetten called upon Holeman and he referred them to Brigham Young. They left and returned pressing Holeman for a commitment, which was flatly denied. Holeman then left for Laramie. When he returned three months later Vanetten presented him a bill for his services as an interpreter and Holeman refused to pay it unless accompanied by a certificate from the governor that the job had indeed been performed. Later that same day a constable served Holeman a summons to appear in court and confiscated his government carriage as collateral. Humiliated, Holeman
paid the debt rather than being further condemned as a "gentile" in a Mormon court. Holeman included in the letter to Commissioner Lea his personal belief that Brigham Young was behind the whole affair:

I take this opportunity of again stating to you, as my fixed opinion, that with Governor Young at the head of the Indian Department in this territory, it cannot be conducted in such a manner, as to meet the views of, or do justice to, the Government. He has been so much in the habit of exercising his will, which is supreme here, that no one will dare to oppose any thing he may say or do. His power and influence is so great, that no officer, either of the Territory or the Government, who is a Mormon, will dare to disobey his will—therefore, these offices are managed and controled [sic] by him, as completely as if all their powers and duties were invested in him alone. . . From all the circumstances, I feel well assured, that he was at the head of this suit of Vanetten against me.19

During the few months that followed the Vanetten episode, Holeman sent a series of critical letters to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs. On 29 March 1852 he wrote to Commissioner Lea:

. . . on my arrival in the City, from Laramie, I found the Governor absent on an expedition to the Indians, some 150 miles distant—He had taken with him, Sub-agent, S. B. Rose, who is a Mormon, with several hundred dollars worth of Indian goods, as presents, for the purpose, no doubt, of conciliating the Indians and getting permission to extend his settlements—Thus making use of his office, as Superintendent, and the money of the Government, to promote the interest of his church—therefore, it seems to me, that no Mormon, should, officially, have any thing to do with the Indians.20

Holeman, and others, accused Brigham Young of utilizing his government office to further the cause of the Mormon church. Brigham Young undoubtedly did so. However, in his
mind there was never occasion to separate church and state, nor did he feel it his moral obligation to do so. He felt that the "gentile" officials delved into affairs in which they had no business interfering, or even stating an opinion. The territory was "Mormon" long before they arrived and he fought against any influence to reduce Mormon control. Brigham Young did not consciously wear the government or church "hat" at any given time. To him it was one "hat" and he perceived no conflict in maintaining Mormon independence in the territory through the political process.

In another letter to Commissioner Lea, Holeman wrote, "The Superintendent and the sub-agent Rose, seem disposed to conceal their movements from me--They never consult with me, or pay an attention to my opinions."21 Another communication exhibited an apparent fear for his life. He confided to the Commissioner, "... If it was known here, that I had made such a communication," (referring to the several private statements he had made) "there is no telling what would be the result. I have heard them boldly assert, that if Brigham was to tell them to cut any man's throat, they would do it without hesitation."22

Commissioner Lea neither vindicated nor censured Holeman for his statements against Superintendent Young. This, no doubt, was a source of frustration to Holeman, for he never received any response to all the letters he painstakingly prepared. Perhaps feeling a personal need to be vindicated, Holeman sent a copy of the 29 March 1852
letter to Henry Day and requested a supportive letter to 
the Commissioner. In a fiery letter Day endorsed "to the 
fullest extent, that portion of Mr. Holeman's letter, as to 
the unjustifiable conduct of the Mormon authorities of 
Utah, and their seditious and violent expressions with 
regard to the Government of the United States." That 
still didn't arouse Commissioner Lea. Bewildered at the 
lack of response, Holeman continued to plead his cause with 
influential men. Writing to a Colonel D. D. Mitchell he 
said:

I get on badly with the Mormons--they find 
fault with me, because they say, I will not take 
council [sic]--meaning, that I will not be 
influenced by Brigham, and his 12 apostles. They 
have no friendship or respect for anyone who will 
not support them, and their church. As I cannot 
do this--and, according to the best of my 
judgment, discharge my duties to the government, 
we of course, frequently disagree. Their object 
is to promote the interest of their church and 
people, without regard to the interests of 
Government or the Indians, and very frequently 
abusing both. While my object is to support the 
interests of the Government and the Indians, and 
let them manage their church affairs in their own 
way. In this we frequently differ very widely. . 
. . Gov. Young's conduct towards me, has been 
such that we do not speak. 24

The feelings were not all one-sided. Brigham Young 
grew more and more impatient and irritated with Major 
Holeman. In a personal letter to John M. Bernhisel, Utah's 
congressional delegate in Washington, D.C., Brigham said 
that Holeman 

. . . has not accomplished anything that I have 
heard of and is literally doing nothing, unless, 
as I suspect, writing letters designed by him to 
injure the good people of this territory, and
soisot
prejudice the people and government of the United States against us... He assumes that he has accomplished great things. I hope it may prove so, but have my doubts, if it has accomplished any good."

From all the available evidence, it appears
Commissioner Lea did not spend much time worrying about the Utah Superintendency. Undoubtedly to Brigham Young's delight, two instances demonstrate that Lea recognized the authority of Superintendent Young over that of Major Holeman. On 20 February 1852 Lea wrote to Brigham Young, "The remoteness of Utah from Washington and the little that is known here of the Indians in that Territory render it necessary that the management of our Indian Affairs in that quarter be left almost entirely to your discretion and judgment." In March 1852 John M. Bernhisel wrote to Brigham Young and said, "On the 8th instant I had an interview with the Hon. Luke Lea, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, who, I am happy to inform you, stated that your report was a good and interesting one, and expressed himself pleased with the manner you had performed the duties of your Superintendency."26

Brigham Young and Jacob Holeman often disagreed in issues regarding Indian affairs. Exasperated, Holeman began writing letters to Commissioner Lea conceding defeat and requesting reassignment. As early as May 1852, he wrote:

I have no idea that with Governor Young at the head of the Indian department, that I shall be able to do anything, that can be of service to
the Government or to the Indians, or creditable to myself. Therefore, if Gov. Young is continued as Superintendent, I had as well leave—for it must be evident to the department, from his course recently, that his personal feelings towards me, or something else, has induced him to neglect the interests of the Government. . . . Whether any other Gentile could succeed better with him, than I have done, is extremely doubtful." 28

In March 1853 Holeman pled with the commissioner, "If it should be the wishes of the department I would like to be called home, as my duty to the Government compels me, to act in such a manner, as to give offence frequently, to the Mormons, who seem to recognize no law but their own self-will." 29 This time the commissioner responded, and by fall of the same year Holeman left the territory.

It is interesting that there should be so much discord between Holeman and Young when both had at heart the well being of the Indians. Dale Morgan expressed the dilemma:

Holeman conceived that he had no other responsibility than to the Indians, and he was prepared to defend their interests against anyone. Young’s point of view was more colored by social self-interest, yet it was essentially more realistic because it took into account the continuing pressures of American expansion. The question was not what was best for Indians living in a political vacuum or cultural void, but how Indian interests could best be reconciled with the expansionist forces of white colonization. . . . Young’s thinking about the Indians was thus discerning and farsighted, looking beyond the possible immediate injustices which aroused the zealot in Holeman. 30

Had Brigham Young been administering the stipulations of an official treaty with the various Ute and Shoshoni tribes, Jacob Holeman would have been more disposed to work under Superintendent Young. Since there was no official
treaty, Holeman perceived many actions and decisions of Brigham Young regarding Indian affairs as colored by Mormon self-interest. Holeman felt trapped between Governor Young and the Indians, never being able to serve either one completely. Both men were capable individuals, but their relationship was doomed to corrode from the beginning as neither was willing to relinquish his authority to the other. Few non-Mormon officials understood how tenaciously Brigham Young and the Mormons intended to maintain control in governing their own affairs, including the supervision of the natives. Without further federal regulations or treaties to dictate Superintendent Young's administration of Indian affairs in the territory, he implemented his own procedures, which naturally favored the colonization of the Great Basin.
Map #11: State of Deseret vs. Territory of Utah

Map #12: Original Division of the Utah Superintendency

Map #13: Division of the Utah Superintendency
After Day's Departure

Fred R. Cowans, "A History of Brigham Young's Indian
Superintendency (1851-1857)--Problems and Accomplishments,"
(Unpublished Master's Thesis, Brigham Young University,
1963) p. 34.
ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER IV


3Arrington, p. 228.

4Reports of Brandebury, Brocchus, and Harris to Millard Fillmore as cited in Arrington p. 229.


6Ibid., pp. 96-97.


9Gowans, p. 8.

10Brigham Young to Jacob Holeman, Madeline McQuown Collection, 11 August 1851, Manuscript 143, box 43, folder 2. (The Madeline McQuown Collection contains transcriptions from the National Archives in Washington, D. C. of correspondence between the Indian Department and the Superintendancy in Utah. The collection is in the Special Collections area of the Marriott Library on the University of Utah campus in Salt Lake City, Utah.)

11Morgan, p. 385.

12Brigham Young to Millard Fillmore, Madeline McQuown Collection, 20 October 1851, Manuscript 143, box 34, folder 43.

13St. Louis Republican on 25 November 1851 as cited in Creer, Utah and the Nation, p. 104.
14 Brigham Young to Luke Lea, Madeline McQuown Collection, 30 November 1851, Manuscript 143, box 40, folder 2.


17 Brigham Young to Luke Lea, Madeline McQuown Collection, 28 May 1852, Manuscript 143, box 40, folder 2.

18 Jacob Holeman to Luke Lea, Ibid., 28 December 1851.

19 Ibid.

20 Jacob Holeman to Luke Lea, Ibid., 29 March 1851.

21 Jacob Holeman to Luke Lea, Ibid., 29 February 1852.

22 Jacob Holeman to Luke Lea, Ibid., 29 March 1852.


24 Jacob Holeman to D. D. Mitchell, Brigham Young Collection, 26 November 1852, Microfilm reel 93, box 59, folder 7. The Brigham Young Collection contains correspondence initiated and received by Brigham Young and is at the LDS Church Historical Department Archives in Salt Lake City, Utah.) A copy of this Holeman letter was in the Collection.

25 Brigham Young to John Bernhisel, Journal History of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 28 August 1852. The Journal History is a daily chronicle of events in the Mormon church and is at the LDS Church Historical Department Archives in Salt Lake City, Utah.)

26 Luke Lea to Brigham Young, Brigham Young Collection, 20 February 1852, Microfilm reel 92, box 58, folder 10.

27 John Bernhisel to Brigham Young, Brigham Young Collection, 10 March 1852, Microfilm reel 86, box 52, folder 11.

28 Jacob Holeman to Luke Lea, Madeline McQuown Collection, 8 May 1852, Manuscript 143, box 40, folder 2.

29 Jacob Holeman to Luke Lea, Ibid., 5 March 1853.

30 Morgan, p. 389.
CHAPTER V

CONFLICT WITH THE NATIVES

Chief Walker, Brigham Young, and the Indian Slave Trade

Because of his vital role in early Utah Indian affairs, it is imperative to understand something about the Timpanogas Ute Chief Wakara, anglicized "Walker." Prior to the arrival of the Mormons in 1847, Walker was infamous as one of the great horse thieves of the West. His raids had taken him as far east as the Great Plains and west to California. Walker also participated in the lucrative Indian slave trade, using children of the weaker Paiute bands as a trading commodity. As mentioned in chapter two, the Spaniards and Mexicans traded several items, including (after 1692) horses, for Indian children, which were then taken to Santa Fe and sold as house servants. When the Mormons arrived in the Great Basin, Chief Wakara and his band were active in the Indian slave trade and it represented a significant part of the Timpanogas Ute economy.

During the first four years of Mormon settlement in Utah, Walker and other Indian chiefs courted Mormon favor and had frequent contact with the Mormon colony in Sanpete Valley. After receiving help through the difficult winter
of 1849-50, Walker reciprocated by being baptized in the Mormon Church along with his brother, Arapeen, and an older venerated chief, Sowiette, on 13 March 1850.\(^1\) On 9 June of the following year the same three were ordained elders in the Mormon Church.\(^2\) This further cemented Walker's friendship with the Mormons, but the relationship crumbled when Brigham Young adopted measures to undermine the Indian slave trade.

When he became governor of the Territory of Utah in 1851, Brigham Young determined to see Indian slavery abolished. He vigorously denounced the practice and warned of prosecution to offenders. A test case materialized in the person of Pedro León, a Mexican slave trader who appeared in the territory (doing business as usual) in the fall of 1851. Learning of León's activities, Mormon officials arrested León and his associates and brought them before Judge Zerubbabel Snow of the First District Court in Provo. The traders were found guilty, fined fifty dollars each, and expelled from the territory. On 15 November 1851 Brigham Young issued fair warning to all who might venture into Utah seeking Indian slaves. He declared, "The purchase and removal of Indian children from Utah Territory to any other state or territory, or the removal of Indian children without purchase to any other territory by such means or processes . . . is kidnapping in the eyes of the United States law and ought to be treated so in any United States court."\(^3\)
The disruption of the long-established slave trade angered the Ute Indians, especially Walker and Arapine. They decided that if the Mormons were going to keep the Utes from continuing the trade with New Mexico, then they had better be prepared to purchase the Indian slaves themselves. Dan Jones told how Arapine used some rather gruesome leverage to coerce the Mormons into taking the Indian slaves.

Arapine, [sic] Walker's brother, became enraged saying that the Mormons had stopped the Mexicans from buying these children; that they had no right to do so, unless they bought them themselves. Several of us were present when he took one of these children by the heels and dashed its brains out on the hard ground, after which he threw the body towards us, telling us we had no hearts, or we would have bought it and saved its life.

To avoid the recurrence of such scenes, Brigham Young suggested, "It would indeed be far better to place these Indian children in Latter-day Saint [Mormon] homes, where they would receive love and education, than to subject them to the inhuman treatment of New Mexican slave procurers."

In March 1852 the territorial legislature passed a bill authorizing the purchase of Indian children for adoption. It stated that Indian children could be legally bound over to suitable guardians for a period of not more than twenty years. The master was required to send the Indian children between the ages of seven and sixteen years to school for a period of three months during each year, and was answerable to the Probate Judge for his treatment of the adopted child.

By the mid-1850's the Utes abandoned the slave trade.
Mormons bought Indians for adoption, but the lucrative nature of the trade dwindled. The Timpanogus Utes, particularly Chief Walker’s band, had gained substantial wealth through the slave trade. Brigham Young’s efforts to abolish the trade shook Walker and his band to their economic foundations.  

Another case to test Brigham Young’s determination to terminate the slave trade presented itself in April 1853. Several Mexicans arrived in the territory claiming to have a license from the governor of New Mexico granting permission to trade with the Utah Indians. Brigham Young had the traders arrested, examined, and released with instructions not to meddle or trade with the Indians of the territory. Again, the Indians involved in the trade became furious over Brigham Young’s action.

By July 1853 Walker could no longer restrain his band. In an interview with the Indian agent Holeman, Walker said through an interpreter

"... that the Mormons when they first commenced their settlement of Salt Lake Valley, was [sic] friendly, and promised them many comforts, and lasting friendship - that they continued friendly for a short time, until they became strong in numbers, then their conduct and treatment towards the Indians changed - they were not only treated unkindly, but many were much abused and this course has been pursued up to the present - sometimes they have been treated with much severity - they have been driven by this population from place to place - settlements have been made on all their hunting grounds in the valleys, and the graves of their fathers have been torn up by the whites."

Tension deepened, and patience wore thin. Conflict was
inevitable. Only a spark would be required to detonate an explosion of bitterness and hatred. That spark ignited in Springville on 17 July 1853 at the home of James Ivie.

The Walker War and the Gunnison Massacre

Leland Creer described what happened:

In the forenoon of July 17, 1853, an Indian Squaw came to the cabin of a Mormon named Ivie. The squaw presented three large trout to Mrs. Ivie and asked for flour in return. Mrs. Ivie gave the squaw three pints, whereupon an Indian, apparently the squaw’s husband, who had just come into the cabin, dissatisfied with this small amount, began kicking the squaw in a brutal manner. While this assault was going on, Mrs. Ivie ran for her husband, who, upon reaching the scene, and while the Indian was still beating the squaw, took hold of the savage and pulled him away, the squaw being prostrate upon the floor. Ivie attempted to push the Indian out of the cabin but as he did so the savage grabbed his gun and attempted to shoot him. The latter got hold of the muzzle and in the struggle the gun was broken, the Indian retaining the stock and Ivie the barrel. Although the gun broke, Ivie dealt the Indian a hard blow on the head and the savage fell to the floor, apparently dead, but he did not expire until some hours later. A second Indian, who came to the cabin at the same time as his companion, drew his bow and arrow and shot Ivie, the arrow piercing through the shoulder of Ivie’s buckskin hunting shirt. At this, Ivie struck the Indian a violent blow and he fell unconscious by the side of his prostrate companion. Just as Ivie felled the second Indian, the squaw, whom he had been trying to protect struck him with a piece of wood, cutting an ugly gash in his face. Ivie again used the gun barrel to defend himself and struck the squaw who fell unconscious by the bodies of the other Indians.

The news of the trouble soon spread through the Indian camp and the settlement. The Indians demanded that the whites surrender Ivie to them, which they refused to do.
The next day in Payson, Walker's braves killed Alexander Keele while on guard duty. The so-called "Walker War", named for the renegade war chief whose band perpetuated the conflict, had begun. "On August 17, two teamsters were shot while loading lumber near Salt Lake; a guard was killed at Fillmore on September 13; four men hauling wheat from Manti were massacred on October 1; three days later two more were killed near Manti and on October 14 another fell at Summit Creek. Then it was all over - the Mormons were safe behind their fort walls."\(^{11}\) Approximately the same number of Indians were killed in the various conflicts.\(^{12}\) The massacre on 1 October was especially frightening to the Mormon settlers. A caravan of fourteen wagons loaded with wheat and provisions for the semi-annual conference at Salt Lake City left Manti on 30 September. The leaders of the two leading wagons disobeyed orders and forged ahead of the main body to camp at a different site. Indians attacked the four drivers, William E. Reid, James Nelson, William Luke, and Thomas Clark, and horribly mutilated their bodies.\(^{13}\)

A tragedy occurred in late October 1853 which, although not directly caused by the Walker War, was incident to it. The California-bound Hildreth Company, one of many groups to pass through the territory, arrived in Fillmore in mid-October. At the same time, a survey crew for the United States Government was working near Fillmore under the direction of Captain John W. Gunnison. Aware of
the outrages perpetrated during the Walker War, some of the emigrants in the Hildreth Company swore they would kill the first Indian who came to their camp. The Mormon leadership in Fillmore informed the emigrants that the Indians in that region were friendly and had nothing to do with Walker and requested that they be treated kindly. The Hildreth Company ignored the counsel and when three Indians later came to their camp to trade with them, the emigrants seized them forcibly and stripped them of everything. They then turned one of the Indians loose, and when he got a short distance from the camp they shot him down. They did the same thing with the second Indian and severely wounded him. When the third was told to run, he refused. The Hildreth Company then tied a rope around his neck and held him captive until Bishop Call and a few citizens of Fillmore liberated him the next morning. Bishop Call returned to Fillmore and tried to pacify the Indians, but they were livid and demanded retaliation. Some of the Indians followed the emigrant train for some time but were unable to attack. Not obtaining adequate satisfaction, they instead massacred Gunnison and seven of his surveying party.¹⁴

Following the massacre, some across the country accused the Mormons, along with Chief Walker, of committing the terrible deed. Lieutenant Beckwith, who replaced Gunnison and carried out his assignment, countered these false notions.
The statement which has from time to time appeared or been copied in various newspapers of the country, since the occurrence of these sad events, charging the "Mormons" or "Mormon" authorities with instigating the Indians to, if not actually aiding them in, the murder of Captain Gunnison and his associates, is, I believe, not only entirely false, but there is no accidental circumstance connected with it affording the slightest foundation for such a charge.

Similar accusations as to the involvement of Walker and his band were also countered, nevertheless, the Gunnison Massacre resulted from the confusion and hysteria that accompanied the Walker War and can thus be counted as a casualty of the war. During the six months following the tragedy depredations ceased, and Brigham Young sought a peaceful resolution to the conflict.

Wanting peace without losing dignity, Walker determined to accept a peace settlement provided Brigham came to him. In May 1854 Brigham led a party loaded with presents and peace offerings to the designated gathering place at Chicken Creek, near present-day Levan, Utah. At Provo Brigham arranged for four beeves to be sent ahead to Walker. The party arrived at noon on 11 May 1854 and extended opening courtesies, but Walker refused to leave his tent. Negotiations proceeded only after Brigham entered Walker’s tent, where he and George A. Smith gave a priesthood blessing to Walker’s daughter. After the episode in Walker’s tent, Brigham Young presented gifts and a large feast of celebration ensued. The Walker war was over. Walker remained friendly with the Mormons until his
Neither Walker nor his brother Arapeen instigated any plot resulting in the bloodshed of the Walker War. After the initial retaliatory killing of Alexander Keele, Walker forbade his Indians from harming the citizens of Payson. The nearly four hundred Indians gathered at the time could have easily killed all of the settlers of Payson had they so desired. The few casualties of the war seem to indicate that there was no official campaign by the whole tribe.\textsuperscript{17}

One month before the peace settlement at Chicken Creek, Brigham Young exonerated Walker and Arapeen. He said:

> It is proper to state, that many of these depredations, in fact nearly all of them, have been committed in the absence of Walker and Arrowpine, [sic] and without their knowledge or consent. It is known that he was hostile in his feeling, but many of his men were much more so; and he found it impossible longer to restrain them.\textsuperscript{18}

\textit{Brigham Young's Administration of the Walker War}

On 25 July 1853, just one week after the outbreak of the Walker War, Brigham Young wrote a letter to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs in Washington, D.C. In the letter he said,

> On the 18th inst. the celebrated Indian, Walker, one of the Utah Chiefs, began open and energetic hostilities upon the Settlements in Utah, Juab, and San Pete Counties, killing one man and wounding three, and driving off and killing Cattle and Horses. This occurring in the midst of our wheat Harvest, is causing us much inconvenience and loss, and we do not as yet know, what amount of loss of life and destruction of property will be included in the final result.
We have thus far acted entirely on the defensive, using that conciliatory policy, that we still deem to be the best, hoping that hostilities will soon cease.

The letter reveals Brigham's basic tenets of the administration of the war, namely defense and conciliation. Brigham Young wasted no time in mandating his defense measures. As commander-in-chief of the military, he issued an official edict on 21 July 1853 to Daniel H. Wells, Lieutenant General of the militia, placing the entire Territory of Utah under martial law. The communication outlined his policies for the period of hostility. He directed that the policy of constructing forts in the settlements and occupying them be firmly enforced; that those in small, outlying settlements gather to the larger settlements for protection, and that provision be made for corralling and guarding the stock. "We wish it to be distinctly understood," says the order, "that no retaliation be made, and no offense offered, but for all to act entirely on the defensive until further orders." The communication also mandated that the commandants of the various military districts cause all the forces in their respective commands to go immediately to their posts in the various settlements, and put the same in a state of efficient defense.20

Early in the war, Brigham Young also established some conciliatory measures and then consistently applied them. On 25 July 1853 Brigham wrote a personal letter to Chief Walker expressing his hopes for a quick solution to the
Capt. Walker:
I send you some tobacco for you to smoke in the mountains when you get lonesome. You are a fool for fighting your best friends, and the only friends that you have in the world. Everybody else would kill you if they got a chance. If you get hungry send some friendly Indian down to the settlements and we will give you some beef cattle and flour. If you are afraid of the tobacco which I send you, you can let some of your prisoners try it first and then you will know that it is good. When you get good natured again I would like to see you. Don't you think you should be ashamed? You know that I have always been your best friend.

"Brigham Young" 21

During the two-week period after the Ivie incident in Springville, the Mormon settlers constantly asked Brigham what he was going to do with Walker and his band. In a public meeting on 31 July 1853, he responded,

How many times have I been asked in the past week, what I intend to do with Walker. I say, LET HIM ALONE SEVERELY. I have not made war on the Indians, nor am I calculating to do it. My policy is to give them presents and be kind to them. Instead of being Walker's enemy, I have sent him a great pile of tobacco to smoke when he is lonely in the mountains. He is now at war with the only friends he has upon this earth, and I want him to have some tobacco to smoke...

Walker is hemmed in, he dare not go into California again. Dare he go east to the Snakes? No. Dare he go north? No, for they would rejoice to kill him. Here he is, penned up in a small compass, surrounded by his enemies; and now the Elders of Israel long to eat up, as it were, him and his little band. What are they? They are a set of cursed fools. Do you not rather pity them? They dare not move over a certain boundary, on any of the four points of the compass, for fear of being killed; then they are killing one another, and making war upon this people that could use them up, and they not be a breakfast spell for them if they felt so disposed. See their condition, and I ask you, do you not pity them? From all appearance, there
will not be an Indian left, in a short time, to steal a horse. Are they not fools, under these circumstances, to make war with their best friends?  

Brigham Young's strategy to provide a strong defense and then appease the natives met defiant opposition from some of the Mormons. Some could not understand why Brigham would not destroy Walker's whole band. They had the manpower to do such a thing. Others rebelled at the idea of conciliation. Why should Brigham be sending presents to hostile Indians? The opposition continued throughout the war, but his policy proved successful, ending the war with a minimal loss of life and property. The long and patient application of the conciliatory policy is a credit to Brigham Young's farsightedness and determined effort to pursue it in spite of the costs. Brigham Young believed in the policy of defense and conciliation to such a degree that he censured the Mormons toward the end of the Walker War for not having applied it properly. "Every solitary instance of Indian hostility and depredation has been committed thro' neglect," he said, "in disobedience of orders, carelessness or disregarding the counsel which has been given from time to time."  

Brigham Young's determined enforcement of the defense and conciliatory policy during the Walker War proves that the reversal in Indian administration philosophy was complete, at least for Brigham Young. The Walker War offered a proving ground for the conciliatory policy and crystallized a slogan for the remainder of Brigham Young's
superintendency, that "it is cheaper to feed the Indians than to fight them." Brigham continued to have difficulty persuading the Mormon settlers to practice the policy, but he persistently endorsed it. The Walker War continued to serve as a reminder to Brigham Young that the conciliatory policy must be established as basic to his method of dealing with the Indians. Thus, the conciliatory policy reduced the casualties of the Walker War and the Walker War solidified the continuation of the conciliatory policy.
ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER V


2 Journal History of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 9 June 1851. (The Journal History is a daily chronicle of events in the Mormon church and is at the LDS Church Historical Department Archives in Salt Lake City, Utah.)


4 Daniel W. Jones, Forty Years Among the Indians (Salt Lake City, Utah: Juvenile Instructor Office, 1890) p. 53.

5 Brigham Young as cited in Bailey, p. 162.


8 Brigham Young to George W. Manypenny, Brigham Young Collection, 28 June 1853, Microfilm reel 92, box 58, folder 7. (The Brigham Young Collection contains correspondence initiated and received by Brigham Young and is at the LDS Church Historical Department Archives in Salt Lake City, Utah.)

9 Chief Walker to Jacob Holeman, Brigham Young Collection, 2 July 1853, Microfilm reel 92, box 58, folder 14.

10 Leland H. Creer, Utah and the Nation (Seattle, Washington: University of Washington Press, 1929) p. 176. (This sixty year old account is still the best rendition of the Ivie incident in Springville in July 1853.)

11 Larson, p. 250.

13 Journal History of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 15 October 1853.

14 Ibid., 26 October 1853.


18 Journal History of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 10 April 1854.

19 Brigham Young to George Manypenny, Madeline McQuown Collection, 25 July 1853, Manuscript 143, box 40, folder 3.

20 Journal History of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 21 July 1853.

21 Brigham Young to Chief Walker on 25 July 1853 as cited in Neff, p. 374.


23 Christy, p. 420.


25 Journal History of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 10 April 1854.
CHAPTER VI

STRAINED RELATIONS WITH THE OFFICE OF INDIAN AFFAIRS

As mentioned in chapter four, Jacob Holeman requested that he be relieved as Indian agent. The Office of Indian Affairs appointed Edward A. Bedell from Warsaw, Illinois, to fill the vacancy. Arriving in the late summer of 1853, Bedell endeared himself quickly to the Mormons. In his first communication to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs on 30 September 1853, he stated that "their [sic] is not a more loyal set of people, or inhabitants within the United States" than Utah's Mormons. Bedell performed his duties as Indian agent for about nine months and passed away after an illness in June 1854. His work as Indian agent during the year 1854 remains undocumented due to ill health and his untimely death.

A New Commissioner of Indian Affairs

With the inauguration of Franklin Pierce in 1853, changes occurred in the Office of Indian Affairs. Pierce appointed George W. Manypenny as the new Commissioner of Indian Affairs. It appears that Commissioner Lea did not pass on to Manypenny any adverse comments from Agent Holeman, for on 15 November 1853 Commissioner Manypenny
wrote to Young: "I am not aware of any delinquency on your part in not observing all the regulations of the Department."³

By the end of the year 1853, Brigham Young became concerned that the accounts he sent to the department were not being paid. John M. Bernhisel, Utah's congressional delegate, informed Brigham Young on 14 January 1854, that:

The Commissioner of Indian Affairs had refused to honor your drafts, promising to address a note to me and an official communication to you assigning his reasons therefore, neither of which he has done. He afterwards promised to re-examine the whole case, but I have hitherto been unable to prevail on him to redeem his pledge, though I have called on him time and again, he always promising that he would do so. On one occasion he assigned as a reason for not accepting the drafts that you had charged for a military escort, and had paid some men four dollars a day and others only two for the same service. At another interview he stated that he could not do anything which would recognize those accounts. At one time he observed that he would transmit you a draft by mail, for you doubtless needed some money, but this he has not yet done.

Frustrated by Bernhisel's communication, Brigham Young wrote a letter to Manypenny on 31 March 1854, reminding the Commissioner that in previous correspondence he indicated that he had no knowledge of any delinquency on Young's part in observing department regulations. Superintendent Young's letter included the following:

I must state that it appears strange to me, to say the least, that my drafts are not more seasonably paid, or official information furnished me why they are not; for ordinary courtesy would require one course or the other.

' ' ' On reference to my file papers, I find that there has been no payments on my drafts since the
31st day of May 1853, and that my drafts for June, September, and December, all remain unpaid, as late as the 14th of January 1854. 5

The Indian hostilities and depredations of 1853 compounded the money problems in the Territory of Utah. On 29 April 1854 Superintendent Young informed Commissioner Manypenny that the cost of suppressing Indian hostility for the year 1853 alone was in the neighborhood of $100,000, "and all this expense has fallen upon the young and thinly settled Territory of Utah, unaided therein, as yet, by a single dime from the General Government." 6 By 31 October of the same year, none of the drafts had been paid and Young indicated again to Manypenny, "You are probably well aware that the Department has never advanced one dime to enable me to purchase goods, provisions, etc. to be kept on hand as presents for Indians! For this cause I have been compelled to purchase, from time to time, with my own means, and in amounts to meet, the exigencies of the case." 7

Perhaps one reason for the delay was Jacob Holeman, at least Bernhisel believed so. It appears that ex-agent Holeman sought opportunity to turn the new Commissioner of Indian Affairs against Brigham Young. In April 1854, after denying several drafts from the Utah superintendency, Commissioner Manypenny indicated to John Bernhisel that through Holeman he knew a lot about Brigham Young's dealings. Bernhisel shared a few of his own feelings about Holeman with the Commissioner. Through correspondence with
Brigham Young, Bernhisel commented on his encounter with Manypenny:

I remarked that Holeman had been inimical to you ever since his first arrival in the Territory, that he never had done anything except make a couple of trips, contrary to your wishes, to Carson Valley, not a particle of good had resulted from them, yet he had put the Government to considerable expense, and made plausible reports.

In a later communication Bernhisel commented that many of the problems associated with the lack of Indian appropriations to Utah were due to Holeman's continuing influence on the Commissioner. Holeman remained in Washington through most of the year 1854.

Finally in late summer 1854, Young received a reassuring piece of news from Commissioner Manypenny. In a letter dated 8 August he informed Superintendent Young that Congress appropriated the sum of forty-five thousand dollars for the expenses of negotiating treaties with, and making presents of goods and provisions to the Utah Indians. This news adequately calmed Young for a time -- but the money never came. The next spring Brigham Young received a letter from Manypenny indicating that no money was forthcoming because Utah had taken no action to comply with the requests of the 8 August 1854 letter appropriating the aforementioned forty-five thousand dollars. Feeling he had complied in every particular, Brigham Young sent a fiery reply to the Commissioner:

I have only received for the past two years Five Thousand Dollars, and you have disallowed, and
suspended accounts running back into the time of
your predecessor, which had, as I supposed been
satisfactory, and were paid by him. By this
means you have brought me in debt to the
Department. . . .
I object to having my accounts disallowed, and
suspended from year to year, when your
requirements have always been strictly complied
with. All that has been necessary at any time,
to have them so furnished, was to let me know
what was wanted; of this you have been assured
time, and again, and do know, that your
requirements have been universally complied with,
. . .
So far as the appropriations are made, and will
justify, I have never asked for anything more,
nor do I care a groat, whether the Department, or
the Government ever contribute a penny towards
the support of the Indian relations, for the
suppression of Indian hostilities, or any other
purpose, or object, I, or for the Territory of
Utah. If they will only come out boldly and say,
that they do not wish, or intend to, instead of
eternally thrashing in the dark taking shelter
behind such trivial vain subterfuges, as such men
as you can hatch up. I have not the confidence
to believe, that we could make out a paper that
would be satisfactory to your skeptical brain.
Judging from the manner in which these matters
have been treated by the Department, I should
conclude, that you did not believe there was any
Indians in this Territory, or if there was, that
it was necessary to expend anything to maintain
friendly intercourse with them.12

In his 26 November 1855 report to Robert McClelland,
Secretary of the Interior, Commissioner Manypenny indicated
that Brigham Young had given no reply to the requirements of
Congress' August 1854 appropriations decision for Utah until
almost one year had elapsed. Manypenny added that Young
stated he had forwarded the report twice before, but that
the one he received on 27 July 1855 was dated 30 October
1854.13 The lack of disbursement may not have been a
willful denial of the drafts, nevertheless, the conflict
over appropriations and payment of Utah drafts lingered
throughout the rest of Young's administration, demonstrating a definite lack of attention to the financial needs of the Utah superintendency.

**Treaties and Indian Land Titles**

As early as November 1850 Brigham Young requested Congress to extinguish Indian land titles in the Territory of Utah and to remove the natives to a suitable reservation. When the Indian superintendency was established in July 1851, this continued to be of concern to Brigham Young and the Indian agents. In September 1851 Holeman wrote to Commissioner Lea indicating that if treaty negotiations could be held immediately "it would have the effect of preventing depredations on their [Utah Indians'] lands, quieting their excitement against the whites, and ultimately save the Government from much trouble and expense." 15

Again on 28 June 1853 Brigham Young requested the authorization of treaty negotiations. In a letter to Commissioner Manyipenny he stated:

> I take the liberty to again call the attention of the department to the propriety of some person being authorized to make treaties with the Indian tribes of this Territory, to purchase portions of their lands, and to grant them reasonable annuities that they may not on the one hand fade rapidly from the earth by neglect and starvation, nor on the other be induced to plunder our citizens, or become an onerous burden on a sparse population struggling for a scanty subsistence amid much privation until energy, severe toil, and time shall develop [sic] the comforts and conveniences of
civilized life, and would further suggest that such person or persons be appointed from residents of this Territory on the ground of economy to the government, and justice to the Indians, through a better acquaintance with their condition and wants; all of which is respectfully submitted."

As mentioned in chapter one, the 1850’s marked a decade of the Indian reservation system and Brigham Young felt that Utah had a right to the same treatment that other territories received. The desire for treaty negotiations in Utah persisted with Brigham Young as evidenced in a letter he received from Bernhisel dated 12 December 1853. Part of the letter said:

"You may rely on my best efforts to procure the extinguishment of the Indian title in our Territory . . . . At an interview the other day with the Commissioner of Indian Affairs I stated to him the necessity for our peace and safety of having the Indian title extinguished. He concurred with me in the necessity and propriety of the measure, and added that he had recommended in his report, which is about to be submitted to Congress, that commissioners be appointed for the removal and location of all the Indian tribes."

On 31 December 1853, not yet having received Bernhisel’s letter, Brigham Young wrote to Commissioner Manypenny: "At the risk of being tedious, I am again compelled to call your attention to the fair demands of justice in the behalf of authorizing treaties to be made with the tribes of this Territory."18

In August 1854 the Indian Department appointed Doctor Garland Hurt of Kentucky to replace the deceased agent Bedell. He, like Brigham Young and Jacob Holeman, complained that delay in treaty negotiations made titles to
land insecure and encouraged the Indians to demand tribute.

In his official report for the year 1855, Hurt said:

I would take occasion to suggest here that treaties ought to be negotiated with these tribes as early as possible, for the title to their lands, which are now held and occupied by the whites. It is a thing almost unprecedented in the history of our Indian policy to go into any state or territory and make extensive or permanent improvements upon soil claimed by Indians without extinguishing these claims by treaty. The delay is not only unjust to the Indians by depriving them of the wonted hunting grounds without paying that respect to their claims which is due them according to our usage with other tribes, but it is equally so to the pioneer settler, who is forced to pay a constant tribute to these worthless creatures, because they claim that the land, the wood, the water and the grass are theirs, and we have not paid them for these things. The funds which would fall due these tribes by the negotiation of such treaties, if properly managed would go far to remove from the people the burden which is consequent upon their support. 19

Congress made a token gesture of intent to establish treaties in Utah. In July 1855 David Burr arrived in Salt Lake City, having been appointed by Congress to do surveyor work with the intent that treaties and extinguishment of land titles would follow. Although large tracts of land were surveyed, no treaty followed and the Indian land titles remained unchanged until 1865. 20

The Utah Indian Superintendency had a legitimate complaint as to the neglect of the Indian department regarding treaties and Indian land title extinguishment. Commissioner Manypenny’s report to Secretary McClelland for the year 1856 demonstrates a definite lack of attention to Utah. In the Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs for that year, Manypenny included a list of the expenditures for treaties made during a three-year period from July 1853 to August 1856. An aggregate total of $11,184,203.80 was expended for the treaties and the acquisition of Indian Territory. Of that amount Oregon and Washington received $2,321,350.00, Indian Territory received $2,195,400.00, Nebraska received $1,681,000.00, Kansas received $1,642,000.00, Minnesota received $1,343,199.80, Michigan received $1,278,770.00, New Mexico received $414,000.00, Wisconsin received $330,484.00, and Utah received $3,000.00. That three thousand dollars was for a treaty that Hurt personally arranged with some Western Shoshoni bands on 7 August 1855.

Agent Garland Hurtt: Accomplishments and Challenges

Doctor Hurt arrived in Utah Territory early in the year 1855 and zealously embarked on a farming project for the Indians, trusting that Washington would approve, but not waiting for that approval. Agent Hurt established three farms at Corn Creek near Fillmore, at Twelve Mile Creek in Sanpete Valley, and at Spanish Fork Creek in Utah Valley. (See Map $14 on page 121.) The precise beginnings of Indian farming in Utah are difficult to ascertain. Based on an abstract of employees, which accompanied Brigham Young's report to Commissioner Manypenny on 30 September 1853, it would appear that in the fall of 1851 Brigham Young hired several men to be "farmers to the
Indians." Although these men may have enjoyed some success with the farms, Garland Hurt is credited with reviving the Indian farming effort.

Brigham Young appreciated Garland Hurt's early accomplishments in Indian farming and his general commitment to his assignment. In March 1855 he expressed his commendation of Hurt's effort to Commissioner Manypenny and his desire that the department "promptly and amply furnish him with means necessary to accomplish so desirable an object." Later that same year, following the aforementioned 7 August treaty with some of the Western Shoshoni, Superintendent Young wrote a cordial note of appreciation to Hurt and said, "I am happy to learn from various sources, of the peaceful, and generous policy you pursue, while in the discharge of your official duties among the poor, forlorn, and ignorant Indians. The results of such a course is already felt, and appreciated by them, which gives me no small degree of satisfaction also." 

Brigham Young continued to plead support from the Office of Indian Affairs for Agent Hurt's Indian farms, but with little success. When Hurt submitted his drafts for farming expenditures through Brigham Young, he received the same skeptical scrutiny as did Superintendent Young. Manypenny expressed concern in a letter dated 14 November 1855 for the amount of funds requested by Hurt. He said:

I take this occasion to remark, that your abstract exhibits disbursements during the
quarter of near $12,000. When you consider that there is another Agent in Utah, and that part of the appropriation for the "incidental expenses for the Service in Utah" may be required also to meet requisitions of the Governor and that the whole amount of the appropriation for the year 1855-56, is but $20,000, you will perceive that the rate of expenditure indicated by your accounts cannot be sanctioned, and that should you continue disbursements at the same rate, the Department will be left without funds to meet drafts from Utah. 27

In March 1856 Manypenny again warned Hurt that "unless there be some explanation, at the present rate of drafts, the department may be compelled to reject yours in the future." 28

Recognizing his plight, Doctor Hurt wrote a letter to J. M. Elliott, a personal friend and member of the House of Representatives, requesting that he intercede in his behalf and use his influence to secure an appropriation of funds for his farming enterprises. 29 In response to the plea Elliott wrote to the Department of the Interior recommending that the appropriation be made and that Doctor Hurt "is a man of not only fine ability but great prudence and I am satisfied that he has seen the necessity for the policy he has pursued or he would not have pursued it." 30 Manypenny still refused to offer his approval of the Indian farms and only begrudgingly allowed them to continue.

Writing to the Secretary of the Interior, Robert McClelland, about Hurt's Indian farms, Manypenny said, "Without condemning his action in this respect, I have felt constrained to withhold an express approval of his course." 31
In spite of the lack of encouragement from Washington, Doctor Hurt accomplished much on the Indian farms. Hoping perhaps to impress a new Commissioner of Indian Affairs as to the success of the farms, Hurt wrote to the new commissioner, James W. Denver, on 30 June 1857 reporting the progress of the three farms:

We have in cultivation this season at these settlements 900 acres (viz.) at the Spanish Fork farm 220 acres wheat, 40 oats, 10 barley, 50 corn, 8 potatoes, 2 buckwheat, 4 turnips, and 2 acres garden. At the Sanpete farm 155 acres wheat, 10 oats, 16 corn, 8 potatoes, 8 squashes, and 8 acres Beets, Mellons, and garden. At the Corn Creek farm 95 acres wheat, 50 (or 30) acres Corn, Potatoes, and Squashes. The crops look promising and give every assurance of a plentiful harvest.\(^3^2\)

Brigham Young also expressed his pleasure to Commissioner Manypenny for the Indian farming that Hurt was accomplishing. He told his superior, "I am happy in being able to state that several are turning their attention to agricultural pursuits, and appear desirous of forsaking their idle and predatory habits, and of becoming familiar with the labor and duties pertaining to civilized life."\(^3^3\)

In spite of the laudable Indian farming effort, the Office of Indian Affairs continued to give low priority to the funding of the Utah Superintendency. If the Commissioner had adequate justification for denying the drafts of both Brigham Young and Garland Hurt, no significant documentation has surfaced to warrant his lack of action. The result was that the bulk of the funding of Indian reform fell upon the citizenry of Utah Territory.
Map #14: Location of Indian Farms

- Salt Lake City
- Provo
- Spanish Fork Creek Farm
- Manti
- Sanpete Valley Farm
- Fillmore
- Corn Creek Farm
- Beaver
- Cedar City

UTAH

This is a personally produced map.
ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER VI

1. Charles Mix to Brigham Young, Brigham Young Collection, 6 June 1853, Microfilm reel 92, box 58, folder 11. (The Brigham Young Collection contains correspondence initiated and received by Brigham Young and is at the LDS Church Historical Department Archives in Salt Lake City, Utah.)

2. Edward Bedell to George Manypenny, Madeline McQuown Collection, 30 September 1853, Manuscript 143, box 40, folder 3. (The Madeline McQuown Collection contains transcriptions from the National Archives in Washington, D.C. of correspondence between the Indian Department and the Superintendency in Utah. The Collection is in the Special Collections area of the Marriott Library on the University of Utah campus in Salt Lake City, Utah.)

3. George Manypenny to Brigham Young, Brigham Young Collection, 15 November 1853, Microfilm reel 92, box 58, folder 11.

4. John Bernhisel to Brigham Young, Brigham Young Collection, 14 January 1854, Microfilm reel 86, box 52, folder 14.

5. Brigham Young to George Manypenny, Madeline McQuown Collection, 31 March 1854, Manuscript 143, box 40, folder 4.

6. Brigham Young to George Manypenny, Ibid., 29 April 1854.

7. Brigham Young to George Manypenny, Brigham Young Collection, 31 October 1854, Microfilm reel 92, box 58, folder 7.

8. John Bernhisel to Brigham Young, Brigham Young Collection, 11 April 1854, Microfilm reel 86, box 52, folder 14.

9. John Bernhisel to Brigham Young, Brigham Young Collection, 14 July 1854, Microfilm reel 87, box 52, folder 15.

10. George Manypenny to Brigham Young, Brigham Young Collection, 8 August 1854, Microfilm reel 92, box 58, folder 11.
11 George Manypenny to Brigham Young, Brigham Young Collection, 14 April 1855, Microfilm reel 92, box 58, folder 12.

12 Brigham Young to George Manypenny, Madeline McQuown Collection, 26 June 1855, Manuscript 143, box 40, folder 5.


16 Brigham Young to George Manypenny, Brigham Young Collection, 28 June 1853, Microfilm reel 92, box 58, folder 7.

17 John Bernhisel to Brigham Young, Brigham Young Collection, 12 December 1853, Microfilm reel 86, box 52, folder 13.

18 Brigham Young to George Manypenny, Brigham Young Collection, 31 December 1853, Microfilm reel 92, box 58, folder 7.

19 Garland Hurt to Brigham Young, 30 September 1855, Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, p. 201.

20 Creer, p. 182.


22 Garland Hurt to Brigham Young, Madeline McQuown Collection, 30 September 1855, Manuscript 143, box 40, folder 5.


24 Brigham Young to George Manypenny, Madeline McQuown Collection, 30 September 1853, Manuscript 143, box 40, folder 3.
25 Brigham Young to George Manypenny, Brigham Young Collection, 31 March 1855, Microfilm reel 84, box 50, folder 1.

26 Brigham Young to Garland Hurt, Ibid., 1 September 1855.

27 George Manypenny to Garland Hurt, Madeline McQuown Collection, 14 November 1855, Manuscript 143, box 40, folder 5.

28 George Manypenny to Garland Hurt, Madeline McQuown Collection, 19 March 1856, Manuscript 143, box 40, folder 6.

29 Garland Hurt to J. M. Elliott, Ibid., 4 October 1856.

30 J. M. Elliott to the Department of the Interior, Ibid., 20 December 1856.

31 George Manypenny to Robert McClelland, 22 November 1856, Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, p. 16.

32 Garland Hurt to James Denver, Madeline McQuown Collection, 30 June 1857, Manuscript 143, box 40, folder 7.

33 Brigham Young to George Manypenny, 30 June 1856, Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, p. 225.
CHAPTER VII
MISUNDERSTANDING AND MISREPRESENTATION

Conflict with Agent Hurt

Doctor Hurt was a man of influence respected by the Office of Indian Affairs. Recognizing this, Bernhisel appealed to Young at the time of Hurt's appointment, (7 August 1854) saying: "I fondly hope that they [the people of Utah] will get along with him . . . for if he makes a favorable report, it will place the stamp of falsehood upon all of Major Holeman's stories." Although Brigham Young was quite pleased with the work of Agent Hurt, he didn't realize for some time that Hurt, like Holeman, frequently wrote to Washington criticizing him and the Mormons. As early as 2 May 1855, unbeknownst to Brigham Young, Hurt felt it his duty to issue a warning to the nation through the Commissioner of Indian Affairs about the "true" motives of Mormon missionaries. He alleged that they

. . . have either accidentally or purposely created a distinction in the minds of the Indian Tribes of this Territory, between the Mormons and the people of the United States, that cannot act otherwise than prejudicial to the interests of the latter--and what Sir, may we expect of these Missionaries? There is not a tribe on the continent that will not be visited by one or more
of them, . . . 

They embrace a class of rude and lawless young men, such as might be regarded as a curse to any civilized community, . . . My object in writing is to suggest that the attention of all Superintendents, Agents, and Sub-Agents, and all other loyal citizens residing or sojourning in the Indian country be called to this subject and that the conduct of these Mormon Missionaries be subject to the closest scrutiny."

Bernhisel's perception of Hurt's influence proved prophetic for, upon receipt of Hurt's letter, Charles E. Mix, Acting Commissioner of Indian Affairs, prepared a memorandum for the Secretary of the Interior requesting that he give consideration to the aforementioned scrutiny of the missionaries.³

As mentioned in chapter six, Doctor Hurt experienced opposition in getting his drafts paid by the Indian Department. After receiving Brigham Young's approbation for his farming enterprise, and not knowing where the money would come from for the project, Hurt drew on the fund for incidental expenses, for which he was censured by Commissioner Manypenny. When Hurt explained to Brigham Young that he feared over-running the appropriation, Young replied that he had no doubt that all the agent's accounts would be paid.⁴ For a time this rationale placated Doctor Hurt, but as funds for the Indian Farms grew scarce, he became angry as he viewed what he believed Brigham Young was doing with the same funds for incidental expenses. Hurt thought that Young and sub-agent Armstrong were using federal money to further the cause of their church, and he also believed that they were involved in a conspiracy to
divert all of the funds of the superintendency away from him. George Armstrong had been appointed to replace Stephen Rose in January 1855 as a sub-agent in the superintendency. Armstrong lived in Provo in Utah Valley and was a Mormon. Hurt revealed his concern to Commissioner Manypenny in March 1857:

"... His excellency Brigham Young, through Agent Armstrong and himself is arranging to take up the larger portion of the appropriation for the present year. And I have reasons to believe that this move is being made with the view of forestalling me, and throwing the expenditures of making these settlements upon my own shoulders without the means of liquidating them. I am informed that His excellency, is now arranging an outfit of goods to be extended by him on an exploring expedition through the Territories of Oregon, Washington, and perhaps British America."

The expedition Hurt refers to took place in the spring of 1857. Brigham Young and 115 men visited Fort Limhi, Idaho (then Oregon) on the Salmon River. They distributed presents to the Bannock Indians and established a Mormon settlement. Hurt felt that Young's use of the fund to buy presents for the Indians was unwarranted, especially when used for Indians outside the territory. On another occasion he wrote to Commissioner Manypenny, "The policy of giving presents to the Indians is a popular one with them, but its benefits are of a transient character, and leaves them disappointed and dissatisfied, or to remain a burden upon the government and our citizens without any permanent good."

Unlike Jacob Holeman, Garland Hurt did not always circumvent Young with his frustrations. On one occasion he
wrote a letter to Brigham Young and expressed a concern that he felt was subversive to the interests of the United States government. On 31 October 1856 Hurt advised the superintendent that the distinction in the minds of the natives between the Mormons and the Americans "was not altogether compatible with correct policy, believing that it would ultimately operate to the prejudice of one or the other party." ⁹

In February 1857 Superintendent Young re-examined the farming enterprises of Doctor Hurt and felt it necessary to rebuke him for relinquishing control of the Indian farms. On 11 February he wrote the following:

Learning much to my regret of the practices of some of the employees under your charge at the Indian Farm, of gambling, drinking liquor, swearing, and setting bad examples before the Indians: I feel it is a duty incumbent upon me to urge upon you, the discontinuance of these practices. It has ever been my aim, in all my intercourse with the natives, to teach them by example as well as precept, and to endeavor to exercise a good wholesome and salutary influence over them, in order if possible to bring them to appreciate the benefits arising from a civilized existence when contrasted with their own. ¹⁰

Finally, feeling powerless under the control of Brigham Young, Hurt requested that his successor be named because, he said, "I cannot consent any longer to take upon myself the burden of the service under the supervision of one who would decoy me into ruin, and who has so much disgraced the dignity of his position, and the name of an American Citizen." ¹¹ Hurt, like Holeman, had come to believe that Brigham Young used his office to accomplish his own purposes
at the expense of the government and its officials. All of these conflicts originated from Mormon insistence to govern their own affairs, thus clashing with the ideas of men not sympathetic with Mormon objectives.

**Gentile Officials, Mormons, and the Utah War**

In addition to the conflicts with Agent Hurt, misunderstandings arose with other territorial officials. In August 1854 Colonel Edward J. Steptoe arrived in Utah at the head of a civilian and military party. His instructions were to study the feasibility of a military road through the territory and to assist in capturing the murderers of Captain Gunnison and his party who had been killed in an Indian massacre in October 1853. Steptoe's influence in Washington is evident because President Franklin Pierce offered him the governorship of Utah Territory in 1855. Recognizing Mormon loyalty to Governor Young and that the governor was adequately discharging his official duties, Steptoe declined the appointment and recommended that Brigham Young be re-appointed.12 Initially, Colonel Steptoe had a positive working relationship with the Mormons, but he later voiced his concern to Sylvester Mowry, who in turn communicated to his superior, that "... the Utah Indians inhabiting the Valleys of Salt Lake, Juab and Fillmore had been taught that the Mormons were a superior people to the Americans, and that the Americans were the natural enemies of the
Indians."

W. M. F. Magraw, whose hatred of the Mormons proceeded from the loss of his mail contract to a Mormon named Hiram Kimball, also exerted an influence in Washington, D.C., against the Mormons of Utah territory. He charged them with destroying all non-Mormon courts in Utah, thus leaving the gentiles to the mercy of "a so-styled ecclesiastical organization, as despotic and damnable, as ever known to exist in any country."14

By far the most vocal of all the territorial officials in his condemnation of the Mormons was the Associate Justice, W. W. Drummond. From the beginning the Mormons disliked him. Bancroft referred to him as a "gambler and a bully" who openly declared that he came to Utah to make money.15 He also defied decency by leaving his wife and family in Illinois without any means of support and brought a harlot with him from Washington whom he passed off as his wife.16 He resigned in early 1857 after the Mormons refused to recognize his authority. In revenge, Drummond spread accusations against Brigham Young and the Mormons, including the following: (1) Brigham Young is the only law by which the Mormons are governed. (2) There is a secret oath-bound organization called the priesthood which resists the laws of the country. (3) There is a set of men who take the lives and property of those who question the authority of the Church. (4) Records of the Supreme court have been destroyed by order of the Church. (5) Federal officers of
the territory are constantly insulted and harassed. (6)
Federal officers are compelled daily to hear the American
government traduced and slandered.17

Although Drummond correctly assessed the Mormons' complete loyalty to Brigham Young and probably experienced harassment from them and heard critical statements about the American government, he nevertheless embellished his statements and made Mormon defiance appear almost treacherous. There were no priesthood oaths to resist the laws of the country, no murderous outlaws operating in behalf of the Mormon church, nor a delegation which destroyed court records. The Mormons were not anti-American nor anti-constitution. They were pro-isolationists and resented those, like Drummond, who tried to diminish Mormon control. The inevitability of such conflicts escalated because of the cultural and political chasm separating the Mormons and the gentile officials.

James Buchanan became President of the United States in the election of 1856. By 1 May 1857 several former gentile officials who served in Utah territory bombarded the new president with a rash of anti-Mormon sentiment. These included some as far back as Brocchus and Day (1851) and Holeman (1851-53), but also Garland Hurt (1855-57), W. M. F. Magraw (1854-56), Drummond (1856-57), and others. With neither an investigation nor communication of his intent to the citizenry of Utah, President Buchanan appointed Alfred Cumming of Georgia to replace Brigham
Young as governor and ordered General William S. Harney, later replaced by Colonel Albert Sidney Johnston, to command a military force to escort the new governor to his assignment.¹⁸

When the Mormon leadership became aware of the advancing army, they determined to resist the troops if they tried to force their way into the territory. Brigham ordered the mobilization of the Nauvoo Legion, the storing of grain and other staples, the building of fortifications, and the organization of parties to harass the army and its supply trains.¹⁹ If the charge of Agent Hurt and others that Brigham Young and the Mormons consciously tried to create a distinction in the minds of the Indians between Mormons and other Americans was not before true, it certainly had some substance now, as Utah citizens prepared for war. Preparing for an invading army required that the Indians be at least neutralized, if not converted into allies.

It was under these conditions that a tragic saga in Utah Indian affairs took place. During the months of August and September 1857 amid the uncertainty and feverish preparation for the approaching army, an emigrant group numbering about 140 persons, consisting of the Fancher party and the Missouri "Wildcats," passed through Utah territory. The timing could not have been more unfortunate for the emigrants. Mormon patience and tolerance was at an all time low and this group was not fond of Mormons.
The Mountain Meadow Massacre

As they descended the corridor of Mormon settlements in Utah territory, the Fancher Party and the Missouri Wildcats discovered that few, if any, of the Mormons would sell them food or supplies because they had been counseled to preserve them against the time the troops arrived in the territory. Angered by the lack of help from the Mormon settlers, the emigrants, especially the Missouri Wildcats, commenced a rampage of destructive and obnoxious activity as they traveled south down the corridor of Mormon settlements. By the time they reached Fillmore, their reputation preceded them.

The Missourian emigrants expressed a belligerent attitude toward the Mormons and harassed the Indians as well. They named their oxen Brigham Young or Heber C. Kimball and cursed them as they passed through Mormon villages. When refused supplies, they popped off the heads of chickens with whips and turned their cattle loose in Mormon grain fields. Some boasted of participating in the Haun's Mill Massacre and one man claimed to be carrying the gun that killed "Old Joe Smith." As they traveled through the southern portion of the territory, members of the emigrant train threatened to organize an army when they arrived in California and return to destroy all the Mormons. The emigrants also incensed the Indians by poisoning a spring from which a number of cattle drank and died. The Indians then ate some of the meat and several of
them died. One emigrant man insisted on examining an
Indian's bow and arrows but the Indian refused and jabbed an
arrow into the man's chest. The man whipped out a revolver
and killed the Indian.²⁰

By the time the emigrant party reached Cedar City, the
Indians clamored for retaliation and Mormon tolerance grew
thin. In addition to unfriendly acts by some of the
emigrants, the Arkansas origin of the Fancher party also
aroused Mormon emotion, for just months before Parley P.
Pratt, one of the Mormon twelve apostles, had been murdered
in that state.²¹ After angering the inhabitants of Cedar
City, the emigrants determined to camp for two to three
weeks at Mountain Meadow to refresh their livestock prior
to the arduous desert crossing ahead. Mountain Meadow,
located some 35 miles west and a little south of Cedar
City, was an often frequented haven for the weary traveler.
(See Map #15 on page 142.) One person described it
thus, "Seven or eight thousand feet above the sea, a
beautiful level plateau, shut in by mountains, carpeted
with luxuriant grass of the best varieties for grazing, and
divided by a perennial stream of clear cold water, - it is
one of the few places on the route that the traveler
remembers with pleasure."²²

During the first and second weeks of September angry
Indians besieged the Fancher party and the Missouri
Wildcats, pinning them in their encampment at Mountain
Meadow. Jacob Hamblin, a well-known friend of the Indians,
would have been the best candidate to try and calm the Indians, but he had led a delegation of Indian chiefs to a conference in Salt Lake City and was therefore unavailable. The Cedar City Mormons called on John D. Lee, a resident of Harmony, to manage the Indians. He found them unwilling to be appeased and insisting that the Mormons help them attack the emigrants. Though to this point only Indians had attacked, Mormon settlers were an interested party and already involved behind the scenes discussing with the Indians what should be done. Outnumbered by the Indians, southern Utah Mormons could not afford to make enemies of the natives even in peacetime. And now, with the prospects of war, needing the Indians as allies, they could ignore only at their peril the Indian pleas for assistance.

Lacking the strength to liberate themselves, the emigrants managed only to free three men, who ironically hurried towards Cedar City to seek Mormon help. One of them, William Aiden, was shot from his horse and killed instantly. His two companions, both wounded, escaped to the California road, but were pursued and killed by the Indians.

The death of Aiden was the immediate cause of the massacre for two reasons. First, Mormon leaders thought the emigrants would see the shooting as evidence that their assailants included white as well as red men, and thus the threat of sending an army back from California would gather support and have a real cause. Second, the Mormons found that the Indians would turn upon them if they would not help
kill the emigrants, for the murder of Aiden had committed them to the affair.\textsuperscript{24} Sensing their plight, on 7 September the Cedar City Mormons commissioned James Haslam to gallop on horseback to seek Brigham Young's counsel as to how to proceed. He made the nearly 250-mile trip to Salt Lake City in three days, arriving 10 September\textsuperscript{25} and immediately departed for Cedar City with Brigham's counsel to calm the Indians as much as possible and that, whatever the cost, the company of emigrants be allowed to pass through the country unmolested.\textsuperscript{26} The news came too late, for the massacre occurred on 11 September 1857 while Haslam was enroute back to Cedar City.

On Wednesday, 9 September a council of Mormon leaders made the fateful decision to join with the Indians and destroy the emigrants so they could not escape to California and make good their boasts. Though details are unknown, apparently they agreed that John D. Lee would decoy the emigrants from their stronghold, and the Mormon men would each take responsibility to kill one emigrant man, while the Indians worked their revenge on the women and older children. Only the very young children were to be spared. Accordingly, William Bateman and John D. Lee approached the emigrant camp at Mountain Meadow carrying white flags of truce. The emigrant party must have been in desperate straits to accept the terms. Lee and Bateman agreed to escort the weary travelers to Cedar City and protect them against the Indians provided they, in turn,
surrendered their weapons and allowed certain men to be brought to trial for their crimes. The weapons and small children were placed in a separate wagon. All of the women and older children followed the wagon, and the men walked single file behind, each with an armed Mormon escort.

Juanita Brooks describes the horrid sequel:

At the command "Halt! "Do your duty!" each Mormon man was to shoot the emigrant at his side, the Indians hiding in the brush were to kill the women and older children, and Lee and the drivers were to finish off the wounded in the wagon. Those of the Mormon men who protested the killing were to shoot into the air, and then sit down and remain quiet while the Indians killed their men.

All accounts agree that it was quickly over. Most of the emigrant men fell at the first volley, and those who started to run were quickly shot down by Mormons or by Indians. The savages, far outnumbering the women and children, leaped from the brush on both sides of the road at once and, stimulated by the shrieks and screams, fell upon their victims with knives and hatchets and soon quieted them. At the wagons, the three men shot the wounded at close range and pulled the wagons off the road a short distance before they unloaded the bodies.

The deed was performed perfectly. Everything appeared to be perpetrated solely by the Indians. Many anti-Mormons tried to pin the responsibility on Brigham Young, but it is clear that he knew nothing of the terrible ordeal until after the fact. Since those involved from the Mormon community made an oath of secrecy, even Brigham Young apparently did not learn the details of Mormon involvement until several years after the massacre.

This tragedy would never have occurred without the atmosphere of war hysteria on the one hand, and on the other the insistence of the natives and some whites for
retaliation and retribution. Brigham Young understood well the nature of the Indians and their retaliation following senseless acts of emigrants. It had been a perpetual problem during the whole of Brigham Young's superintendency. The Gunnison Massacre resulted from similar disregard for the natives. On 12 September 1857, still unaware of the Mountain Meadow Massacre but angered by emigrant conduct, Brigham Young wrote to the new Commissioner of Indian Affairs, James W. Denver, and complained of the many emigrants that shot Indians at will as they passed through the territory. Therefore, "the Indians regard all white men alike their enemies and kill and plunder whenever they can do so with impunity and often the innocent suffer for the deeds of the guilty. . . . We cannot but expect them to wreak their vengeance upon the next train." 28

Meanwhile, in northern Utah Territory, the advancing troops loomed as a constant threat to the Mormons. On 15 September Brigham Young declared martial law in Utah requiring all inhabitants to have special permission to leave the territory, forbidding the armed forces to enter, and ordering the Mormon militia to be ready at a moment's notice. 29 Most of the non-Mormon officials had left the territory before the declaration of martial law. However, Garland Hurt was still in Utah and subject to the terms of the decree. The relationship between Garland Hurt and Brigham Young had deteriorated further during the year
1857. On 26 September 1857 Brigham Young sent a letter of
suspension to Agent Hurt. He chastized Agent Hurt for
neglecting his official reports and duties. Garland Hurt
never received the letter of suspension because he secretly
fled the territory on the same day that Brigham Young wrote
it.

During the fall and winter of 1857-58 the hysteria of
the Utah War entered the conversation of both the troops
and the Mormons. This verbal war had a chance to simmer
down during the winter of 1857-58 because early snowfall in
Wyoming forced the troops to abandon their intentions of
pressing forward to the Salt Lake valley that fall. In
preparation for the long winter, the army set up a winter
camp in Wyoming and christened it "Camp Scott." Jacob
Forney, accompanying the troops as the new Superintendent
of Indian Affairs assigned to replace Young, wrote to
Commissioner Denver saying, "Brigham Young boasts that he
has several Indian tribes in his service, & ready to take
up arms against the U. States." Commissioner Denver
informed Young that he had information from reliable
sources that Brigham Young was impressing upon the minds of
the Indians that there was a difference between Mormons and
United States citizens and told him not to expect any
appropriations for the Indians as long as he exhibited
antagonism toward the government.

The Mormons were no less active in denouncing the
purposes of the government in sending troops to Utah,
They, too, joined in the verbal battle. In a discourse delivered in the Salt Lake Tabernacle on 16 January 1858 Brigham Young said, "If the government is disposed to send some of their poor miserable welps here to order me from this place, they will meet hell. I won't stir one inch."33

As the winter wore on, much of the heated sentiment expressed by both the Mormons and the army subsided. When spring came, both the troops and the Mormons accepted a negotiated settlement, and the transfer of authority in Utah territory occurred without further incident.

The Mountain Meadow Massacre was a terrible tragedy that resulted from the hysteria surrounding the rhetoric of the Utah War. Though it can never be justified, it can be understood. The Mormons operated under pressures and realities that the Fancher party and Missouri Wildcats aggravated by their ignorance and obnoxious behavior while passing through the territory. The significance of the Utah War is realized when one considers that Brigham Young and the Mormons had done all in their power, since Congress authorized the formation of Utah Territory in 1850, to maintain their isolation. Gradually over the seven intervening years they watched their independence deteriorate. Volatile misrepresentations and misunderstandings existed on both sides, thus fueling the verbal battle immortalized as the "Utah War."

The Utah War had an important impact on Indian affairs in southern Utah. Without the threat of the army, the
settlers in the sparsely populated areas around Cedar City would probably not have been so desperate as to court Indian favor at Mountain Meadow. With the threat of the army it became essential that they maintain a friendly relationship with the Indians, lest perchance they be needed later as allies. Certainly Mormon participation in the Mountain Meadow Massacre reduced the credibility that the natives might have developed in such Christian doctrines as forgiveness and "turning the other cheek." The so-called "redemption of the Lamanite" would have to wait until another generation provided a better example.
ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER VII

1. John Bernhisel to Brigham Young, Brigham Young Collection, 7 August 1854, Microfilm reel 87, box 52, folder 5. (The Brigham Young Collection contains correspondence initiated and received by Brigham Young and is at the LDS Church Historical Department Archives in Salt Lake City, Utah.)

2. Garland Hurt to George Manypenny, Madeline McQuown Collection, 2 May 1855, Manuscript 143, box 40, folder 5. (The Madeline McQuown Collection contains transcriptions from the National Archives in Washington, D. C. of correspondence between the Indian Department and the Superintendency in Utah. The collection is in the Special Collections area of the Marriott Library on the University of Utah campus in Salt Lake City, Utah.)


4. Garland Hurt to George Manypenny, Madeline McQuown Collection, 30 August 1856, Manuscript 143, box 40, folder 6.

5. Robert McClelland to George Manypenny, Madeline McQuown Collection, 23 January 1855, Manuscript 143, box 40, folder 5.


8. Garland Hurt to George Manypenny, Madeline McQuown Collection, 30 August 1856, Manuscript 143, box 40, folder 6.

9. Garland Hurt to Brigham Young, Ibid., 31 October 1856.

10. Brigham Young to Garland Hurt, Brigham Young Collection, 11 February 1857, Microfilm reel 84, box 50, folder 1.
11 Garland Hurt to George Manypenny, Madeline McQuown Collection, 30 March 1857, Manuscript 143, box 40, folder 7.


13 Sylvester Mowry to Colonel S. Cooper, Madeline McQuown Collection, 23 July 1855, Manuscript 143, box 40, folder 20.


15 Hubert Howe Bancroft, History of Utah (San Francisco, 1889) p. 490.


19 Ibid.


21 Journal History of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 23 June 1857. (The Journal History is a daily chronicle of events in the Mormon Church and is at the Archives Division of the LDS Church Historical Department in Salt Lake City, Utah.)

22 Sylvester Mowry to Colonel S. Cooper, Madeline McQuown Collection, 23 July 1855, Manuscript 143, box 40, folder 20.

23 Brooks, pp. 49;54.

24 Ibid., pp. 70-72.

25 Journal History of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 10 September 1857.


27 Ibid., pp. 73-75.

28 Brigham Young to James Denver, Madeline McQuown Collection, 12 September 1857, Manuscript 143, box 40, folder 7.

30 Brigham Young to Garland Hurt, Brigham Young Collection, 26 September 1857, Microfilm reel 84, box 50, folder 1.

31 Jacob Forney to James Denver, Madeline McQuown Collection, 26 October 1857, Manuscript 143, box 40, folder 7.

32 James Denver to Brigham Young, Ibid., 11 November 1857.

33 Brigham Young sermon given at the Salt Lake Tabernacle, Brigham Young Collection, 16 January 1858, Microfilm reel 82, box 49, folder 4.
CHAPTER VIII

AFTERMATH OF BRIGHAM YOUNG’S SUPERINTENDENCY

In early April 1858 Governor Cumming set forth from Camp Scott with Colonel Thomas Kane to visit Salt Lake City, unaccompanied by the troops. Brigham Young made sure Cumming was treated well. Governor Cumming recognized the kindness and wrote to General Johnston (still at Camp Scott) saying, "I am gratified in being able to state to you that, in passing through the settlements, I have been universally greeted with such respectful attentions as are due to the representative of the executive authority of the United States in the territory."\(^1\) Cumming also wrote a letter to Secretary of State Cass on 2 May 1858, wherein he reported that the legislative records of the territory "were in perfect preservation and that the territorial library was in excellent condition."\(^2\) Cummings’ statement refuted the erroneous accusation of Judge Drummond that the records had been destroyed.

Governor Cumming also visited the three Indian farms which, following the departure of Agent Hurt, had been maintained by George Armstrong.\(^3\) Cumming corresponded with Jacob Forney at Camp Scott, who in turn wrote to the Office of Indian Affairs, confirming the Governor’s pleasure in
seeing "about 2,000 acres of wheat, cattle, and farming implements." Later, Forney had a chance to add his own evaluations to those of Governor Cumming. After entering the Salt Lake Valley with the troops in June 1858, Forney travelled the territory rather extensively. In September he wrote to Jeremiah Black, the United States Attorney General, and reported that Brigham Young's administrative policies with the Indians had indeed been successful.

As we have seen, there is evidence of extreme neglect from the Office of Indian Affairs in the financial matters of the Utah superintendency. Considering the lack of funds with which to operate the Utah superintendency and the relative success of the Indian farms, Brigham Young's financial administration of Indian affairs was successful. Proper credit must be given to Agent Garland Hurt inasmuch as he did, to a large degree, revive the farming effort and cause it to succeed. We also must consider that during Brigham Young's entire superintendency, any and all conciliatory measures adopted in behalf of peaceful relations in the territory were accomplished without the aid of government money or official treaties. Both Brigham Young and Garland Hurt used their own resources and then were chastized for doing so without authorization. Timely appropriations or a treaty, which would have incorporated the finances to accomplish the objectives that the superintendency pursued, would have been most helpful. Nevertheless, the peaceful relations with the Indians in
1858, when Brigham Young was replaced as superintendent, are a testimonial to the success of the conciliatory policy.

**The Settling of Brigham Young’s Accounts**

When Jacob Forney replaced Brigham Young as Superintendent of Indian Affairs in 1858, many of the accounts for Utah had not been paid by the Office of Indian Affairs. As indicated in chapter six, the depredations of the Walker War of 1853 caused a heavy financial burden for the superintendency. In addition, appropriations for the Indian service in Utah after 1853 never adequately covered the necessary expenses. Brigham Young continued to request payment for disbursements in excess of the limited appropriations. The House of Representatives appointed the Committee on Military affairs to review Brigham Young’s request for reimbursement concerning the expenses of the Walker War. The committee determined:

> That there is no evidence in the case of such a character as to enable the committee to judge of the necessity of the expenditure; that the vouchers submitted are not authenticated either by the governor or any other of the federal officers of the Territory; that the committee have no cognizance either of a proclamation of the governor calling out the troops, which necessitated this expenditure, or of any of his messages to the Territorial legislature with reference thereto. The committee, therefore, without prejudicing any application for the claim in future, when it may become better supported by evidence, ask to be discharged from the further consideration of the subject.

There is no evidence indicating whether or not Brigham Young
sent the requested documentation.

Nevertheless, in 1859 positive things finally began to happen in Brigham Young's favor. Commissioner Denver set the wheels in motion. Regarding the financial affairs of the Utah Superintendency during the period from 1854 until 30 September 1857, he wrote the following to James S. Green of the United States Senate:

The Superintendent and Agents, were from time to time, cautioned to keep their expenditures within the bounds of the appropriations, but owing to their peculiar surroundings, and in view of keeping the Indians in a peaceful attitude towards the government, they were forced, as they allege, to expend large amounts for provisions, clothing, agricultural implements, farm stock, work upon the reservations, etc., until the amount grew into the aggregate... The policy that appears to have actuated the Superintendent of Indian Affairs, and Agents in Utah, in exceeding the appropriations, appears to have been on the principle, that it was cheaper to feed, clothe, and conciliate the Indians by acts of kindness, than to fight them. Without giving any opinion, as to whether or not, they were right in taking the responsibility of creating the excess in their disbursements, in the face of the warnings of this Office, I can very properly remark, that the expenditures generally appear to have been honestly and fairly made...

This demand is just and the appropriation ought to be made.'

On 24 May 1860 Congress appropriated $53,007.35 to supply deficiencies in the accounts of the late Indian Agents in Utah, namely those of Hurt, Armstrong, Rose and Bedell. But the accounts of Brigham Young remained unpaid.

Meanwhile, the expenses incurred during the Walker War also remained unpaid. A special Senate task committee reviewed the vouchers and claims of Brigham Young
pertaining to the hostilities of the year 1853. The committee reported on 23 March 1860 that a legitimate claim of $76,017.40 less $22,505.20 for the pay and allowances of the officers and soldiers should be paid to the Territory of Utah. The resultant sum due was $53,512.20. In August 1860, before paying the claim, A. B. Greenwood, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs at the time, ordered Benjamin Davies, a newly appointed Superintendent of Indian Affairs for Utah Territory, to rigidly scrutinize all the accounts in question pertaining to the Indian hostilities. The edict bound Davies to personally review the vouchers and determine whether the disbursements were actually made by Brigham Young and to ascertain the necessity of the various supplies purchased and the services performed.

In accordance with his commission, Davies proceeded to Utah Territory, arriving in mid-November 1860. He informed Brigham Young of his charge and was graciously allowed to review the accounts and call on any witnesses that he might deem necessary. After an intensive investigation, Benjamin Davies reported his findings to Commissioner Greenwood on 18 February 1861. The following excerpt appears in the report:

Various experiments were resorted to by myself to test their memory and to detect drilling preparatory to their being called to testify; had such been the case, and I am constrained to say that in a practice of many years at the bar, I have no recollection of a single instance in which so many witnesses, testifying, as they often did, in the absence of each other, and
without knowing what had been stated,) concurred with such precision and exactitude. The manner of these witnesses and the familiarity with which they each alluded to the various occasions and circumstances referred to in the accounts, and their perfect recollection of the persons and articles named and described, could not have failed to convince the most skeptical of the truthfulness of their statements.

Although subjected by me to a "rigid" and "searching" examination in the nature of a cross-examination, I detected no evasiveness, no equivocation, or effort to conceal anything. Straightforwardness, candor, and apparent conscientiousness characterized those who testified in behalf of Superintendent Young, and whether the same may be said of all who were called in behalf of the United States is respectfully submitted.\textsuperscript{11}

After receiving Davies' positive report, the Office of Indian Affairs paid the Walker War claim during the same year, after reducing the amount payable to $40,000.00.\textsuperscript{12}

After the year 1861 Brigham Young's accounts with the Indian Department still remained unpaid. In 1862 John Bernhisel indicated that the delay resulted from the continuing prejudice against Brigham Young's superintendency and the belief that a great deal of fraud occurred, in spite of the thorough investigation of Davies which officially exonerated Brigham Young of such accusations.\textsuperscript{13} After four years and more bureaucratic "red-tape", Brigham Young finally received a draft for $38,487.53 in July, 1866.\textsuperscript{14}

**Brigham Young's Influence in Indian Affairs After 1858**

With the arrival of the new governor and superintendent of Indian affairs for Utah Territory in 1858, Brigham Young
removed himself from the political limelight. His influence, however, continued to be felt among the natives, and agents and superintendents still expressed their frustration with Mormon interference in Utah Indian affairs. One such case is that of William P. Dole, who wrote to Commissioner Caleb B. Smith on 26 November 1862 saying, "Another cause for the restless and rebellious spirit manifested by the Indians is attributed to an unwarranted interference on the part of the Mormons, with the legitimate discharge of the duties of the superintendent and agents."  

Another evidence of Brigham Young's influence occurred in 1865, when O. H. Irish, then Superintendent of Indian Affairs in Utah, asked Brigham Young to aid in the treaty making with the Utes at Spanish Fork. Irish utilized Brigham Young's influence with the natives to encourage them to accept the terms of the treaty. Brigham Young persuaded the various Ute bands to accept the treaty negotiations. Some of the salient stipulations were: 1) The Indians were to relinquish their right of possession to all of the lands within Utah Territory occupied by them. 2) The Uintah Valley would be reserved for their exclusive use and occupation. 3) The United States would protect friendly Indians on the reservation. 4) The United States government would expend for their benefit $25,000 annually for ten years, $20,000 annually for twenty years, and $15,000 annually for thirty years thereafter.  

The treaty
was accepted and signed. In a semi-apologetic fashion, Superintendent Irish reported to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs regarding Young's involvement in the treaty negotiations. He said,

Brigham Young accepted my invitation, a copy of which I herewith enclose, that it may be seen to what extent I committed the interest of government to his hands; his name appears on the treaty as a witness only, and he acted only in advising the Indians to make the treaty, as will fully appear from an examination of his remarks made during the proceedings of the council, a copy of which I have the honor to enclose.

The fact exists, however much some might prefer it should be otherwise, that he has pursued so kind and conciliatory a policy with the Indians, that it has given him great influence over them. It was my duty and policy, under your instructions, to make use of his influence for the accomplishment of the purposes of government.

Except for the loss of salary and the authority to administer the daily affairs of the Utah Indian Superintendency, Brigham Young's influence on the Indians remained largely unaffected by the change in leadership. Floyd O'Neil and Stanford Layton explained Brigham's influence in the post-superintendent years:

He continued to be the de-facto director of Indian affairs in Utah, negotiating treaties and other settlements with the Indians, sending missionaries among them, advising the settlers on how to deal with them, directing the territorial militia during the Black Hawk War, and continuing the process of displacement. It follows, naturally, that the Indians themselves were affected barely, if at all, by the change.16

Brigham Young influenced Utah Indian affairs during the Black Hawk War (1865-1868) and thereafter until his death in 1877.
ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER VIII

1 Alfred Cumming to Albert Johnston, 15 April 1858, Senate Executive Documents number 23, 35th Congress, 2nd session, II, serial 975, p. 72.

2 Alfred Cumming to Secretary of State Cass, 2 May 1858, Ibid., p. 92.

3 Brigham Young to James Denver, Madeline McQuown Collection, 6 January 1858, Manuscript 143, box 40, folder 8. (The Madeline McQuown Collection contains transcriptions from the National Archives in Washington, D. C. of correspondence between the Indian Department and the Superintendent in Utah. The collection is in the Special Collections area of the Marriott Library on the University of Utah campus in Salt Lake City, Utah.)

4 Jacob Forney to Charles Mix, Ibid., 21 May 1858.

5 Jacob Forney to Jeremiah Black, Madeline McQuown Collection, 15 September 1858, Manuscript 143, box 41, folder 3.


7 James Denver to James Green, Brigham Young Collection, 26 February 1859, Microfilm reel 92, box 58, folder 15. (The Brigham Young Collection contains correspondence initiated and received by Brigham Young and is at the LDS Church Historical Department Archives in Salt Lake City, Utah.)

8 Leland H. Creer, Utah and the Nation (Seattle, Washington: University of Washington Press, 1929) p. 188.

9 Committee on Military Affairs, House of Representatives Executive Document number 201, 36th Congress, 1st session, serial 1068, p. 2.

11 Beniamin Davies to A. B. Greenwood, 18 February 1861, Ibid., pp. 3-4.

12 Creer, p. 188.

13 John Bernhisel to Brigham Young, Brigham Young Collection, 21 March 1862, Microfilm reel 87, box 53, folder 4.


16 O. H. Irish to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 9 June 1865, House Executive Documents number 1, 39th Congress, 1st session, II, serial 1248, p. 318-19.

17 Ibid., p. 318.

CONCLUSION

Brigham Young was probably the most colorful and dynamic leader of the nineteenth century on the western frontier. He fought boldly against anything that might threaten the Mormon empire. Few "outsiders" ever understood the zeal of Brigham Young for his cause or the determination of the Mormons to live their own lifestyle in the Great Basin. Brigham Young envisioned a Mormon society functioning independently of outside influences. He achieved his desire for a few years and watched it gradually change during the 1850's. Brigham requested statehood as a means of maintaining Mormon control, hoping that all officials would be elected from within the state of Deseret. Appointed non-Mormon officials came to Utah eager to exercise their authority and soon discovered that if they were not in Young's good graces and did not conform their leadership to his will, the Mormons simply refused to recognize their authority. As a result, several Utah territorial officials sent from the East, including Indian agents, perceived Brigham Young as a despot with absolute control of all governmental affairs in the territory.

Indian agents Holeman and Hurt accused Brigham Young of favoring Mormon interests in his official capacity as Indian superintendent. His conciliatory policy also came
under fire by those who believed he tried to win Indian loyalty through bribery. Nevertheless, Young considered his policy a necessary and vital part of his Indian program for maintaining peace with the natives. He gave presents to the Indians, with or without federal aid, and resented the fact that he was not afforded the same treaty negotiations and money disbursements that the Indian Department granted to the other Indian superintendencies. Brigham Young had his own agenda for the superintendency which naturally favored the Mormons, but he considered it no breach of political integrity because he and the Mormons were basically funding his program. Therefore, Brigham Young perceived no traitorism in teaching the Indians that the Mormons were their true friends and that when the United States government failed them they could always rely on the Mormons, thus creating a distinction between them and other whites. This philosophy and subsequent harassment of federal officials was the very root of the chain of events leading to the Utah War.

There is no question that Brigham Young was motivated by Mormon self-interest. How could he be expected to respond in another manner? He was president of the Mormon church and needed to prepare the way for the thousands of Mormon emigrants which annually flooded into the territory during the years of the Indian superintendency. As on other frontiers, white colonization took precedence over all else. Utah Territory is part and parcel of the American Indian
experience at large. In Utah, as was true everywhere else, the Indians lost their lands, the white man smothered their culture, and then offered them treaties and reservations to try and appease them after having destroyed their very identity. In that regard, Brigham Young is just like his counterparts. Yet, when one considers the fact that he effected a conciliatory policy largely without assistance from federal resources and colonized the Great Basin with minimal bloodshed and loss of life, Brigham Young's Indian superintendency is significant indeed.
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BRIGHAM YOUNG'S INDIAN SUPERINTENDENCY (1851-1858):
A SIGNIFICANT MICROCOSM OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN EXPERIENCE

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ABSTRACT

This thesis provides a detailed study of Brigham Young's Indian superintendency within a framework of the federal Indian policy of his era. It focuses on Brigham Young's personal challenges and successes in instituting a conciliatory policy with the natives of the Great Basin. Experience taught Brigham Young that it was "cheaper to feed the Indians than to fight them." Brigham Young pursued his policy in spite of opposition from some of his Mormon constituents until finally his determination overruled pleas to forcibly remove the Indians from their lands.

Another important emphasis of the thesis is the personal interaction between Brigham Young and non-Mormon territorial officials within and outside the Indian superintendency. Each party experienced conflict and frustration in dealing with the other. An analysis of the motives undergirding the conflict between the Mormons and non-Mormons is herein provided. These verbal battles also impacted the Indians, thus diminishing the good that might have been accomplished in a more cooperative atmosphere.

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