Open (Adoption) for Business: Opposing Movements and Environmental Opportunity Structures in the Adoption Organizational Field, 1972-2000

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Structures in the Adoption Organizational Field, 1972-2000

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A thesis submitted to the faculty of
Brigham Young University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Science

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June 2012

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ABSTRACT

Open (Adoption) for Business: The Rise of the Pro-life Countermovement and Entrepreneurial Opportunity in the Adoption Organizational Field

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Recent directions in organizational studies have demonstrated progressive social movements’ ability to generate rewarding enterprises or environmental opportunity structures (EOS) in receptive markets. However, more nuanced opposing movements (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996), such as the pro-choice and pro-life movements, receive far less attention, leaving scholars to postulate that there is much yet to know about the impact of movements other than those with strict progressive orientations (Zald, Morrill, and Rao 2005). To better understand how opposing movements contribute to environmental opportunity structures, this thesis examines dramatic growth in the number of adoption agencies advertising services in the Yellow Pages during the last quarter of the twentieth century. Some suggest the growth may be due to changing attitudes and laws regulating interracial adoption, the growing acceptance of international adoption as a family formation strategy, and the success of the adoptee rights movement. However, I argue that at least some of this growth is related to changes in abortion laws associated with the Roe v. Wade Supreme Court decision and associated pro-choice and pro-life opposing movements that dominated public debate during the same period. Applying cultural entrepreneurship and competitive framing, I demonstrate that pro-choice language is adopted by adoption agencies that compete with abortion clinics as they offer services to birth mothers. Opposing movement features are evident in organization growth patterns, the services offered, and the slogans used. Dissecting the adoption services field into generalist and specialist organizational forms, I find that specialists experienced precipitous growth and were more likely to make use of certain “choice” frames, co-opted from the pro-choice movement and redirected to support pro-life ideologies. Further, I find that “open adoption” services, championed by the adoptee advocacy community for their identity-affirming and sustained relationship-allowing practices, are most often marketed by the adoption provider as a choice-granting process, giving adoption providers further opportunity to mirror the pro-choice movement’s choice-centric practices. Because adoption agencies’ growth, slogans, and services are largely bound up in tactics specific to the pro-choice and pro-life opposing movement dynamics, I conclude that opposing movements can indeed contribute to environmental opportunity structures for market growth.

Keywords: social movements, opposing movements, environmental opportunity structures, adoption, pro-choice, pro-life
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I owe a great debt of gratitude to Marie Cornwall, whose own innovative research questions allowed me the opportunity to develop the ones I delve into in this paper. I cannot say enough of her support in enabling my scholarly goals. She is a mentor of the highest order. Each iteration of this thesis was a product of her unmatched ability to cull out my ideas. I know the path before me as a scholar has been paved by her generous tutelage.

In addition to my thanks to her many talents in bringing this thesis to fruition, I am also grateful for her financing, made possible by her professorship at Brigham Young University and grantees at the BYU College of Family, Home, and Social Sciences Mentoring Environment Grant.

Thank you to the other members of my thesis committee: Cardell Jacobson, who not only was instrumental in clarifying the main issues in infant adoption, but was also the first to suggest I consider graduate study in Sociology; and Teppo Felin, whose thoughtful critiques led me to dig deeper and find more interesting research questions and literature contributions.

Thank you to my family’s unending encouragement and to my husband, my constant, Nathan Frederico. Finally, special thanks to my parents and my birthmother, whose love first taught me that adoption is far more than a social service.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HISTORICAL OVERVIEW</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The “Perfect Storm”</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The “pill” and the Women’s Health movement</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Legalized abortion</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Abortion opposition</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Pro-life and pro-choice language</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The pro-life conservative movement</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The adoptee rights movement</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Domestic and international transracial adoption</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEFINITIONS</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Adoption</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Generalist and Specialist Forms</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Cultural Entrepreneurship</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Competitive Framing</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>METHODS</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Variables</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RESULTS</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REFERENCES</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF TABLES

TABLE 1: Weighted membership in "Movement Choice Use" variable ................................. 52
TABLE 2: Frame use among closed and open adoption providers by organizational form ....... 57
TABLE 3: Percentage of organizations with advertisements using choice by form ............... 58
TABLE 4: Percentage of firms with advertisements utilizing movement choice frames ........ 59
LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE 1: Abortions reported to the Center for Disease Control, 1973-2000 ........................... 51
FIGURE 2: Total organizations by organizational form, 1972-2000 ........................................... 53
FIGURE 3: Total organizations with birthmother-directed services by form, 1972-2000............. 54
FIGURE 4: Percent of organizations with birthmother-directed services by form, 1972-2000... 55
FIGURE 5: Percent of birthmother-directed firms with open adoption by form, 1972-2000 ...... 56
INTRODUCTION

In 1970, the number of domestic, unrelated child adoption placements hit an all-time high of approximately 89,200 in a single year (Anderton, Barrett, and Bogue 1997:283). By 1975, due in large part to the advent of prescription birth control, the legalization of abortion, and increasing acceptance of single motherhood, this figure flagged to 47,700, where demographers estimate placements remained over the subsequent decade.\(^1\) In 1986, a one-year national data collection on adoption placement reported 51,157 domestic, unrelated child adoptions (ibid). Despite the substantial decrease in adoption placements from the 1970 figure, the number of organizations offering adoption services unexpectedly and dramatically increased after 1970. This is surprising given adoption’s history as a conservative unwanted pregnancy remedy, particularly in the face of abortion’s increasing prominence. Scholars contend that adoption’s durability may be due to loosening laws governing interracial adoption, rising international adoption rates, and the success of a social movement championing adoptee rights (Babb 1999; Gritter 1997), yet the confluence of reproduction substitutions and solutions offers many possible explanations for the adoption market’s growth. Could the social movements specifically surrounding abortion’s legalization have afforded entrepreneurs novel logics to translate into market opportunities?

Organizational scholars have recently argued that social movements can help explain niche market growth (for reviews, see King and Pearce 2011; Davis, McAdam, Scott, & Zald 2005). This meso-level focus represents an innovative shift in the consideration of social movement outcomes, which have previously highlighted macro—political and economic—and micro—participant biographical—aftereffects. Considering these organizational outcomes,

\(^1\)U.S. adoption figures through the end of the twentieth century are largely unknown. The federal government, through the National Center for Social Statistics, has not collected data on annual adoption placements since 1975. Figures are based on estimates through several states’ voluntary reports (Mabrey and Kelly 2006).
Swaminathan and Wade (2001) argue, “Just as favorable [political] opportunity structures give rise to social movements, changes in the environment opportunity structure create niches for new organizational forms” (292) (emphasis added). It is clear that the rampant growth in the adoption field must be related to some kind of entrepreneur-perceived EOS, but what would motivate market prospects in the face of mounting reproductive alternatives? Even amidst competition, social movements create market-opening environmental opportunity structures (EOS) by altering structural dimensions, including arrangements of the State and historical power relations, and cultural elements, including legitimating novel solutions and shifting consumer preferences.

First, in altering governmental structures, social movements create market niches as they modify the bounds of permissible market behavior. Goldstein (1984) found that after second wave feminist movement-championed Roe v. Wade, obstetricians and gynecologists added abortion procedures to their service repertoire. In adapting to the shifting climate, entrepreneurial-minded medical professionals seized an opportunity to add a service already congruent with their medical attention to women’s reproductive and/or pregnancy issues. On the other hand, when Temperance movement-elicited laws constricted lawful business activity, entrepreneurs met unsatisfied beverage demands by developing the immensely lucrative soft drink industry (Hiatt, Sine, and Tolbert 2009). Therefore, social movements, by aiming for State action, can create new avenues for entrepreneurial activity.

Second, social movements upend dominant economic structures, providing entrepreneurs with new market outlets. The abolition movement and the subsequent American Civil War resulted in the demise of plantation-owner dominion over enslaved workers. According to Ruef (2004), postbellum entrepreneurs, such as those in new industrialization ventures, sought and
employed skilled and semi-skilled freemen and freewomen. Thus, social movements elicit new organizational strategies as entrepreneurs capitalize on shifting power relations.

Third, social movements can inspire and legitimate novel cultural solutions to social movement-framed problems. Entrepreneurs pioneered alternative energy technologies to suit the vision of conservationist social movement organizations (SMO) (Sine and Lee 2009). As social movements suggest remedies to social ills, savvy individuals stand to benefit by developing goods and services that meet the SMO’s goals.

Fourth, social movement grievances may shift consumer preferences, an important consideration in culture and markets. Before the food transparency movement, grass-fed cattle were generally considered insufficiently “finished” or fattened by beef industry standards (Weber, Heinze, and DeSoucey 2008:533). The movement so profoundly shaped consumer preferences that those grass-fed products “now sell at a premium, when they were sold at a discount before” (533). Social movements certainly demonstrate their considerable pull when they transform unpopular existing market practices into an entrepreneurial boon.

Despite the surge of interest in social movements’ effect on markets, research tends to focus on progressive movements’ influence on fields that are fundamentally in sync with movement ideologies (for an exception, see Andrews 2002). For example, scholars have demonstrated the impact of the environmental movement on the related recycling industry (Lounsbury, Ventresca and Hirsch 2003), green technology ventures (Meyskens 2011), and the previously mentioned wind energy industry (Vasi 2011; Sine and Lee 2009); however, a narrow focus on progressive movements and intertwined industries may lead scholars to miss the potential “differences in the kinds of organization changes that are sought by ‘progressive’ and ‘conservative’ movements” (Zald, Morrill, and Rao 2005: 277). These studies do little to explain
the potential impact of more complex cycles of protest or “opposing movements” on decoupled or conservative markets. Meyer and Staggenborg (1996) opt for the term “opposing movements,” rather than “initial movements” and “countermovements,” arguing that an enduring struggle between competing progressive and conservative interests obscures the distinction between movement initiation and reaction. Because opposing movements survive over time by focusing the lion’s share of their attention to wrestling with the actions of their opponent (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996), we might expect that these burdened movements would be less able to contribute to the four ground-breaking, market reforming elements of an EOS.

Building on the research connecting social movements to market developments, in this thesis, I argue that the growth in the adoption market can be traced in part to the most active opposing movements of the twentieth century: the abortion rights or “pro-choice” movement and the antiabortion or “pro-life” movement. In the face of an unplanned pregnancy, pro-life advocates support adoption placement or parenthood, while pro-choice adherents assert a woman’s right to bodily autonomy and elective abortion. Since the controversial Roe v. Wade decision in 1973, “pro-life” advocates have sought to overturn the Supreme Court ruling, demonstrating on behalf of the “pre-born” and willing to defend their rights by physical—even lethal—force (Steiner 2006). Meanwhile, “pro-choice” adherents emphasize the threats to women if pro-life advocates overturn landmark abortion rulings. Using graphic images, they highlight the dangers of “back-alley” abortion practices when women are not awarded bodily autonomy (Rohlinger 2002). In this embittered battle, each side fights to privilege their remedy for unplanned pregnancies.

Curiously, scholars have largely overlooked the impact of these abortion-centric opposing movements on the market (see Goldstein 1984 for an exception). This is a noteworthy
omission, as two prominent commercial organizational fields\(^2\)—adoption and abortion services—are bound up in pro-life and pro-choice movement concerns. Both of these organizational fields market to women *reproduction control* services, identified by Cornwall, Frederico, and Juggler (2011) as offerings that interrupt an unplanned pregnancy’s progression to parental responsibility. Before the pro-choice-championed *Roe v. Wade* Supreme Court ruling in January 1973, adoption placement was the only lawful route for reproductive control; however, once surgical and medical (via prescription drugs) abortion became a nationally legal reproductive control strategy, adoption facilitators faced unprecedented competition in the *reproduction control sector*. Cornwall, Frederico, and Juggler (2011) demarcate this sector as the market segment that serves individuals interested in applying law, technology, and social services to mediate conception and parenthood, composed of two broad organizational fields: adoption and abortion providers.

While all organizational fields that depend upon the same limited resources are characterized by rigorous competition, in the reproductive control sector, adoption agencies and abortion clinics not only contend amongst themselves, they also compete against one another in *mutually exclusive* services. While part of this mutual exclusion is self-evident, as abortion decisions that terminate a pregnancy are obviously irrevocable, other elements are primarily legally guided. In 38 states, individuals must make the decision to abort by a defined point in the pregnancy, most often between the 24\(^{th}\) and 28\(^{th}\) weeks of gestation (Guttmacher 2011), after which point the only option to interrupt eventual parenthood is adoption. Therefore, this sector offers a particularly acute case for inquiry, for unlike markets where organizations can continually attract audiences and encourage them to alter their consumption behavior in their

\(^2\)As defined by DiMaggio and Powell (1983), an organizational field is a grouping of relevant actors with similar goals and services. Therefore, I consider all adoption services providers, regardless of generalist or specialist form, members of the adoption services field.
favor, adoption and abortion decisions are much more conclusive and ideologically-charged, underscored by opposing movement dynamics where each side unabashedly defines the market decision as a matter of life and death (Staggenborg 1991). Plausibly, this zero-sum orientation could both react to and intensify the larger opposing movement contention, making this sector an ideal case for testing opposing movement contribution to an EOS.

Despite their oppositional nature, one commonality is that abortion and adoption fields are replete with commercial potential. As mentioned previously, Goldstein (1984) found entrepreneurial gynecologists in the 1970s expanded their business practices to offer newly legalized abortion services. Such action was predicted in 1970 by early pro-choice SMO NARAL\(^3\), who expressed fear that abortion access laws would “cause proliferation of private clinics operated by profiteers,” leading the organization to argue that “abortions for poor [women] be free, that no abortion cost over $300, that pub[lic] and private agencies strive to keep the price below $200” (\textit{New York Times} May 13, 1970). Thus, an unintended though not unanticipated consequence of the legalization of abortion was the emergence of the market-oriented abortion services organizational field.

Like abortion, the child adoption field also ripe with market opportunity. Although most often a non-profit enterprise, Riben (2007) reports that adoption services compose a $2-$3 billion industry annually. Through investigative journalism examining federal income tax returns of 336 local area non-profit adoption agencies, the Atlanta Journal Constitution reported that non-profit status was a misnomer for many executives, as agencies left “plenty of room for lucrative rewards”:

\(^3\)At this time, NARAL stood for National Association for Repeal of Abortion Laws, as abortion was largely illegal nationwide. After \textit{Roe v. Wade}, when it was clear that conservative movement activity threatened abortion’s legal standing, NARAL retained their moniker, but revised the meaning to National Abortion Rights Action League (Staggenborg 1991).
“The newspapers’ review of federal tax returns and other public documents found numerous examples where top executives compensation accounted for one-fourth to one-third of agencies’ budgets. In many instances, administrative costs exceeded expenses on direct services for children” (Judd 2010:1).

The Internal Revenue Service does not stipulate what portion of a non-profit, tax-exempt organization’s budget is spent on operating costs, nor does it place caps on executive salaries (Judd 2010:1). This is exemplified by one such non-profit, tax-exempt adoption agency, Bethany Christian Services, which operates satellite branches across the United States. Bethany Christian Services yielded $7.2 million of their 2008 $9.1 million coffer to administrative expenses, including average salaries of over $173,000 to both the agency’s chief executive and vice president. Only $694,000 of their over $9 million budget was spent on services that directly benefited children. Bethany Christian Services is hardly alone as a non-profit adoption agency with great profit potential for entrepreneurs and executives: From 2007 to 2008, IRS data shows that 168 executives of United States non-profit adoption agencies earned over $100,000 annual salaries (Pound Pup Legacy 2009). Infant adoption is clearly a robust field, with nearly insatiable demand for newborns by infertile individuals eager to achieve parenthood – for a price.

However, unlike abortion services (Goldstein 1984), the adoption services organizational field has yet to be systematically examined as a site of social movement-elicited entrepreneurial potential. Further, much of the literature examining the social movement antecedents of organizational field growth has focused on fields with progressive orientations, neglecting fields with more politically and socially conservative interests. Therefore, this study examines the dramatic growth in the adoption organizational field–predominantly aligned with pro-life concerns–for evidence of abortion-centric opposing movement features.
It is largely impossible to retroactively ascertain each entrepreneur’s full motivation to move into the market during an EOS. Particularly in “social entrepreneurship” enterprises, where individuals can pursue a “double bottom-line” of financial gain and social justice (Emerson and Twersky 1996), it is difficult to untangle entrepreneurs’ precise objectives. Given this uncertainty, Weber et al. (2008) posits the basic argument that *entrepreneurs’ transfer of social movement tactics into the market suggests a movement-fueled market development.* Therefore, I similarly argue that organizational use of movement elements, without considering the organizational actors’ affiliation or motivation, signals a movement-intensified EOS.

To push forward scholarship assessing the four elements of movement-contributed EOS, this thesis (1) examines the growth in generalist and specialist adoption providers in the decades after the legalization of abortion and rise of the abortion-centric opposing movement; (2) considers the prevalence of movement-charged language in adoption organizations’ advertising; and (3) explores the development and growth of innovative adoption services, suggesting new consumer stipulations. Though this has broad utility for gender, family, and adoption scholars, this research aims to clarify the market contribution of nuanced opposing movements, shedding light on the complex repertoires from which organizational actors could interpret entrepreneurial possibilities.

**HISTORICAL OVERVIEW**

To assess opposing movement presence in the adoption field EOS, it is essential to explore the field’s history. While the social upheaval of the 1970s offered a turning point for adoption, its storied past provides a much-needed sense of the field’s broader trajectory.

In the late nineteenth century, in conjunction with abolition, suffrage, and temperance movements, individuals frustrated with the deplorable state of orphaned or impoverished
children campaigned for massive reform. Zelizer (1994) analyzes this period as the rise of the “priceless child” or the emergence of the idea that children were not valuable based on their ability to procure financial gain, but through their emotional worth as the tender youth of the rising generation. As they professionalized, social workers became involved in representing the welfare of marginalized children, encouraging prospective adoptive parents to become “angels” to helpless children (Donner 1996). Birthmothers were considered by agency workers to be “neurotic” and unable “to make and act upon conscious decisions” (47). Even professional social work literature of the 1920s remarked that unmarried pregnant women were “feebleminded and inherently depraved” (Dickson 1991:926). Further, social workers argued that “only the most seriously disturbed unwed mothers kept their babies rather than giving them up to middle-class Caucasian couples for adoption” (Babb 1999:44, Solinger 1992).

While African American women were issued a cultural mandate to raise their out-of-wedlock children, even to the point that African American women seeking adoption placement could be charged with desertion (Babb 1999:44), it seems white women were “expected to pay for violating norms against premarital sex” (44). Through her interviews with white birthmothers that surrendered their newborn children as young women in the 1950s and 1960s, Fessler (2006) found that these unmarried expectant mothers were routinely told that they would be inadequate parents and received inordinate pressure from adoption facilitators to place their babies. Because facilitators often arranged maternity housing, particularly for teenage women who wished to be removed from the judging eyes of their community, most young women felt an obligation to give up their child as reciprocation for the room and board services. After giving birth, women who toyed with ideas of single parenting were denied access to information regarding their rights under the law and threatened with their housing, food, and hospital bills
Attorneys and judges often felt no compunction at impelling new single mothers to become birthmothers, believing they were guarding tax payers from paying the maternity bills and eventual welfare support for the mother and child, as well as ensuring the child’s best chance at becoming a healthy, well-disciplined citizen.

Fessler (2006) asserts that it was these closed adoption policies – where women did not have knowledge of the adoptive family or their child through the years – that left birthmothers emotionally compromised and searching for greater autonomy in the adoption process. However, scholars argue that Fessler’s interviews from a self-selected pool assess retrospective pain and regret (Harrison 2006): At the time of their placement, many upper- and middle-class women sought the asylum provided by closed adoption records to avoid the stigma of an out-of-wedlock pregnancy (Carp 1998). In taking these disparate accounts together, a common narrative suggests that regardless of pregnant women’s willingness, adoption agencies from the late nineteenth century through the mid-twentieth century were primarily oriented toward seeking out suitable placement for children while shielding young pregnant women from information.

However, the tide began to turn as the demand among prospective adoptive parents began to outnumber the supply of healthy, white infants (Landes and Posner 1978). In the midst of the baby boom, infertile couples sought adoption in unprecedented numbers to alleviate their childlessness (Zelizer 1994), specifically seeking out “as if” children: babies whose physical features and racial identity matched the adoptive parents, “as if” they were the couple’s biological offspring. By the mid-1970s, demand for white babies was so high, one agency began telling potential adoptive couples they would likely wait three to five years for “their” baby (Babb 1999). During this time State social services agencies maintained their focus on seeking
out suitable homes for surrendered children, though the children whom agencies actively needed to find homes for now fell under the spectrum of “special needs adoption,” including older, non-white, and/or mentally or physically disabled wards of the state (Carp 1998). These supply and demand shifts, combined with a cultural climate of anti-establishment social movements promoting rights for marginalized groups, came together to create a “perfect storm” of conditions ripe for an overhaul of the reproductive control field.

*The “Perfect Storm”*

The confluence of social changes in the 1960s and 1970s set the stage for dramatic shifts in how women viewed their reproductive capacities, including the ability to mediate conception and parenthood.

*The “pill” and the Women’s Health movement*

The first element of this “perfect storm” was the FDA approval in 1961 of birth control pills. Initially poorly tested, many women in the years following its release experienced confusing side effects and avoided “the pill” altogether (Gordon 2002). Also, the personal biases of many doctors left even married women initially unable to access the pill. In 1965, *Griswold v. Connecticut* ruled that barring married women from prescription contraceptives violated the constitutional right to marital privacy. However, single women had diminished access to “the pill” through the remainder of the decade. Only nine states allowed single adult women (eighteen or older) to lawfully obtain prescription birth control in 1969 (Goldin and Katz 2002). Taking this into account, it is unsurprising that the number of births to unmarried women did not decrease through the 1960s, though birth control was FDA approved. However, into the 1970s, the pill was increasingly prescribed to and used by married and single women (Gordon 2002). As a whole, the United States birthrate trajectory slowed considerably into the 1970s, attributed
by adoption scholar E. Wayne Carp (1998) to the “58 percent of all married couples who relied on the pill, the IUD or sterilization to control family size” (200). In 1961, live births to married and single women in the US totaled 4,268,326 (CDC 1963). By 1973, the number fell to less than 3,200,000 for the first time since World War II. Therefore, with birth control deterring unwanted pregnancies, fewer women needed to mediate between pregnancy and parenthood by placing babies for adoption, creating a destabilizing force in adoption’s operating climate.

With birth control representing a shift to medical options for avoiding unwanted pregnancy, feminists aimed to further expand reproductive choice. Though they did not initially rally under the “pro-choice” slogan, choice and bodily autonomy was central to feminists’ participation in the Women’s Health movement. Women aimed to gain control over their bodies by learning about their anatomy and health options by “wrest[ing] back some control over their sexuality, their reproductive lives, and their health from their doctors, particularly their obstetrician-gynecologists” (Morgen 2002:3). In 1968, during a “women’s liberation” conference, a small group of women formed a break out session to discuss their reproductive health. Realizing their collective naiveté, they gathered information on various aspects of women’s health and published their encyclopedia-like entries, *Women and Their Bodies*, in December 1970, with a follow-up edition under the name *Our Bodies, Ourselves* printed in 1973. In the 1973 edition, this group, operating as the Boston Women’s Health Collective, clearly state that in aiming for reproductive autonomy, they desired abortion rights:

“It was not until we researched carefully and learned more about our reproductive systems, about birth control methods and abortion… that we began to feel we could truly set out to control whether and when we would have babies. This knowledge has freed many of us from the constant energy-draining anxiety… It has made our pregnancies better because… we actively choose them and enthusiastically participate in them… This knowledge has freed us from playing the role of mother if it is not a role that fits us… And one of the things we most want to do is to help make this freedom of choice… available to every woman. This is why people in the women’s movement have been so
active in fighting inhuman legal restrictions… that keep too many women from having this crucial control over their bodies” (Boston Women’s Health Collective 1973:13; emphasis added).

Though they may not have united under the “pro-choice” moniker from the beginning, “choice” was certainly an oft-used circumlocution for abortion early on. In her interviews with abortion rights activists, Staggenborg (1991) was told by one informant that she objected to using “choice” on the grounds “that it is… euphemistic… [when] activists had worked hard to bring the term ‘abortion’ out into the open” (188).

**Legalized abortion**

In 1967, Colorado became the first state to decriminalize abortions obtained in cases of rape, incest, or serious health detriments posed to the woman (Planned Parenthood 2011). Between 1967 and 1972, a third of U.S. states passed laws either allowing abortions or decriminalizing previously illegal abortion procedures (Guttmacher 2003). In January 1973, the landmark *Roe v. Wade* decision legalized abortion nationwide. This 7-to-2 Supreme Court ruling, with an opinion based upon an interpretation of the right to privacy in the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, balances the two legitimate interests of the government in regulating abortions: the health of the mother and the life of a viable citizen (Arch 1995). The high court affirmed a woman’s right to an abortion before the fetus’ viability (at the time of ruling, approximately 28 weeks gestation), with restrictions nearer the end of the 40 week gestation. According to Center for Disease Control data (2003), abortion usage peaked in the late 1980s and early 1990s, with 1,429,247 abortions performed in 1990, but declined over the last ten years of the twentieth century to 857,475 in 2000, representing a decline of approximately forty percent (Figure 1). Thus, abortion contributed to the adoptable baby shortage, as after the early 1970s, abortion offered a legal resolution to an unwanted pregnancy.
After the Roe ruling, the balance of power shifted to abortion opponents. Staggenborg (1991) remarks that one of the “unfortunate side-effects of victory is that it often provokes opponents into action while the victors may be lulled into complacency. Roe v. Wade was indeed a powerful stimulus for the anti-abortion conservative movement, which grew enormously after 1973” (4). However, various state anti-abortion groups had formed between 1967 and 1972, as 17 states passed abortion-accommodating laws before the high court handed down the Roe decision (Staggenborg 1991:35). The National Right to Life Committee, arguably the largest anti-abortion SMO, formed in 1971 to coordinate the efforts of these state-level anti-abortion groups. Nevertheless, Staggenborg (1991) maintains that “although anti-abortion groups had been active before 1973, the legalization of abortion provided a tremendous spur to the conservative movement as it lobbied to overturn or block implementation of the Court ruling” (58). By 1974, the National Right to Life Committee was joined by four additional national anti-abortion SMOs: American Citizens for Life, March for Life, National Committee for a Human Life Amendment, and For Life, as well as numerous local SMOs (Staggenborg 1991:194).

Interestingly, “pro-life” was not widely held as the conservative movement slogan in the years immediately following Roe. Rather, the phrase “pro-life” frequented the media through the mid-1970s as term describing a broad agenda promoting the sanctity of human life. In one of the earliest recorded uses, the Roman Catholic Church used “pro-life” in 1973 as a euphemism for pro-natal and anti-birth control policies. As reported in The New York Times, New England Catholic bishops denounced married couples’ sex education programs on the grounds that any
instruction on frequency of births ought to align with “pro-life teachings” (Staff 1973). The bishops’ statement made no reference to abortion procedures. In another religious usage, Reverend Robert F. Willett led his followers in what he called a “pro-life” demonstration in Washington, D.C. in 1974, bemoaning the nation’s “lack of concern for totality of life that includes capital punishment, war, and quality of life for the poor and aged” (Staff 1974). Not long after, the phrase “pro-life” took a decidedly conservative and single-issue turn. In 1977, the National Pro-life Political Action Committee was formed, focusing solely on anti-abortion political action (Staggenborg 1991:95). “Pro-life” quickly became a widely-adopted phrase and an important rhetorical device.

Pro-life and pro-choice language

It was throughout this time that Staggenborg (1991) argues that abortion rights activists mobilized the euphemistic “choice” language to present their stance against the repeal movement. She claims, “The term ‘pro-choice’ was not used until after the legalization of abortion in 1973, in response to the ‘pro-life’ rhetoric of the anti-abortion movement” (188) (emphasis added). She also found that abortion rights activists admitted that the pro-choice term was an example of strategic mirroring: “Of course, it’s a reaction to the ‘pro-life’ term, but the trick is to get things accomplished,” one informant stated (188). However, this may not be giving the abortion and “pro-choice” movement full credit, since “choice” and “freedom of choice” were used widely by abortion rights supporters, like the Boston Women’s Health Collective, in the early and mid-1970s while “pro-life” was still floundering in its meaning. Famed political columnist and political jargon expert William Saffire asserts that “pro-choice” was more common in the mid-1970s than “pro-life,” as the conservative movement still preferred the phrase “right-to-life”: In the March 20, 1975 Wall Street Journal, reporter Alan L. Otten
stated, “Both right-to-life and pro-choice forces agree the abortion issue is going to be around for a long time” (Saffire 1990) (emphasis added). Perhaps an accurate accounting of which phrase became more rooted in popular culture first is elusive; however, what does seem to be clear is that the slogans were wielded strategically, as sagaciously commented by op-ed writer William Raspberry in *The Washington Post* in 1981:

“A recent Washington Post-ABC News poll asked respondents whether they agreed with the "right-to-life" advocates. Some 51 percent of those who said they had heard of "right to life" said they agreed with its position on abortion. A subsequent question, however, dealt with specific circumstances surrounding abortion, and this time… only 16 percent said they would not approve of abortion under any circumstance. They may have had trouble with "right to life" as a legislative program, but as a slogan they found it irresistible. If the battle over abortion remains undecided, it is because the other side also has a pretty good slogan: pro-choice, a formulation that evokes the American traditions of freedom and individuality. If they had made the error of calling their position ‘pro-abortion,’ they would have lost the fight long ago” (Raspberry 1981:A23).

*The pro-life conservative movement*

The fight was certainly greater than which side had the strongest rhetorical angle. The schisms between pro-life and pro-choice ideologues took violent, even fatal, turns throughout the 1980s. One of the most notorious anti-abortion SMOs was radical Operation Rescue, founded by Evangelical Christian Randall Terry in 1986 under the slogan, “If you believe abortion is murder, act like it’s murder” (Steiner 2006). Following Terry’s lead, the late 1980s brought “an influx of evangelicals” into “pro-life direct action… ranks” (Maxwell 2002:8). The vast majority of these religious-led protests took the form of civil disobedience outside of abortion clinics, with a predictable repertoire of tactics, including picketing and prostrating in front of traffic (Maxwell 2002). Approximately forty thousand individuals participated in abortion clinic sit-ins from the mid-1980s through early 1990s (Ginsberg 1998). However, the 1980s were also characterized by “a dramatic rise in more extreme violence in the form of arsons and bombings” (Blanchard
1996:4), which peaked in 1984-1985 and then again in 1992-1993. Dr. David Gunn, a Pensacola, FL abortion provider, was fatally shot during an anti-abortion protest in March 1993, a few months after Operation Rescue created “Wanted”-esque posters with his face. Another five abortion-providing doctors or staff members were killed in the remainder of the decade. The National Abortion Federation, arguably one of the nation’s most powerful abortion rights SMOs, maintains a database of abortion clinic violence at the hands of anti-abortion activists. In addition to the six murders, they report 17 attempted murders, 383 death threats, 153 instances of assault, and 3 kidnappings in the U.S. and Canada against abortion providers since 1977, with the most serious attacks connected to Operation Rescue (NAF 2009).

However, certainly not all anti-abortion SMOs relied on perilous public disturbance – many pragmatically sought legislative reform. In 1983, President Ronald Reagan published an essay entirely on the abortion issue, “Abortion and the Conscience of the Nation,” which galvanized the Pro-life cause and suggested a favorable political opportunity structure. One such organization which heeded this cue, Concerned Women for America (CWA), began in 1979 when founder Beverly LeHaye watched NOW President Betty Friedan interviewed on television and felt NOW represented an “anti-God, anti-family, and humanistic” stance, yet considered itself the “spokesperson for most women” (Rohlinger 2002:492). However, up until the mid-1980s, the CWA relied on local, grassroots efforts for reform. In her analysis of the pamphlets, newsletters, and other published materials from CWA, Rohlinger (2002) found that the organization was most active between 1985 and 1993, in which they mobilized for parental consent for abortion laws, deployed lobbyists and a legal team to support Supreme Court challenges, and attempted to gain media coverage (via press releases and press conferences) to advocate the “God-given right to life” (493). By 1994, the winds of political opportunity shifted
when President Clinton signed the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances (FACE) act into law in May 1994, which placed harsh fines and jail time on many of the obstruction and intimidation tactics of Operation Rescue and other like-minded pro-life social protest organizations (Steiner 2006). This was more of a symbolic blow for reform-minded organizations like CWA: without the support of a sympathetic president, the conservative movement at-large waned through the remainder of the twentieth century. Therefore, the mid-1980s through early 1990s were characterized by great conservative movement activity, with mobilization ranging from the professional to the militant, targeting everywhere from Capitol Hill to community clinic doors.

The adoptee rights movement

The widespread rights claims of the 1960s and 1970s led to another element of the “perfect storm”: birthmother and adoptee rights. Birthmothers, particularly educated upper and middle-class women who placed babies for adoption post-World War II, reacted to the shifting ideals of freedom and personal expression by retaliating against the norms that had kept their placements secretive (Carp 1998). Rising divorce rates and a sexual revolution had combined for an upsurge in – and acceptance of – single-parent families, leading birthmothers to combat the system that had pressured them to place their child to avoid the “stigma” of unwed motherhood. These women, as well as adopted individuals, began to protest for open adoption laws as part of the adoptee rights movement (ARM), not only to open the records, but for agencies to open themselves to a birthparent/adoptive-parent relationship that had previously been shrouded in secrecy (Carp 1998). Organizations such as birthmother Lee Campbell’s Concerned United Birthmothers (CUB) pushed social workers to consider the long-term impact of closed adoption placements on birthmothers (Gritter 1997). By the 1980s - 1990s, social workers had largely shifted from the “private” and concealed information adoptions of the past to
“open adoptions” (Solinger 2002). As it is originally described in social work literature, open adoption

“Refers to any form of communication between adoptive parents and birthparents. It includes a variety of options (which must be mutually agreed upon) from a letter exchange to a face-to-face meeting to ongoing contact over the years… Central to the concept of open adoption is that the individuals involved determine how much openness they feel comfortable with” (Chapman, Dorner, Silber, and Winterberg 1986:206).

CUB and ARM alike frequently made clear that the most important feature of open adoption was disclosure: “Secrecy in traditional adoption inflict[s] a variety of psychological traumas on each adoption triad member” (Carp 1998:213). CUB championed “open” adoption placements, asserting birthmothers could better cope with the “tragedies” of adoption through ongoing relationships with their children (Gritter 1997:8).

Further, open adoption offered birthmothers reproductive autonomy, an important component of the Women’s Health and pro-choice movements. Breaking from the traditional patriarchal models Fessler (2006) describes, open adoption and other autonomy-granting services placed birthmothers in a position of power in the adoption placement process. Though Fessler (2006) found that many maternity homes met birthmothers’ basic physical needs through room, board, and medical care, these enhanced autonomy-granting services represented agency initiatives for “better programs of support” for birthmothers (Cahill 2005:154). Beginning in the late 1970s and early 1980s, agencies increasingly made provisions for birthmothers’ psychological and intellectual well-being through services such as individual and group counseling, college tuition reimbursement, and job training, in addition to their physical welfare.

Scholars disagree as to whether it was the adoptee rights social movement or increasing concerns of a “baby shortage” that led adoption agencies to implement these autonomy-granting services that now, instead of demeaning birthmothers, largely deferred to them (Adamec and
Pierce 1991; Carp 1998; Grotevant and McRoy 1998). Without offering a mechanism, Carp (2001) remarks that open adoption was a calculated effort “to encourage birth mothers to relinquish their babies [by] allowing pregnant women to decide who would parent their children” (Carp 2001:32).

**Domestic and international transracial adoption**

Transracial adoption, or the adoption of a child of a different race, color, or ethnicity than the adoptive parents, is another adoption practice that can be seen as an alleviation of the white “baby shortage.” According to Newman (2004), U.S. transracial adoptions predominantly involve white parents and minority children. International adoption began to rise in the mid-1980s (Babb 1999). Early in the twentieth century, international adoption was a virtually unheard-of practice. In the years leading up to World War II, less than 14 children, not accompanied by a birth parent, immigrated to the United States (Adamec and Pierce 1991). However, international adoption surged in times of war. In the aftermath of World War II, 3,000 orphans were taken in by U.S. “sponsors,” who pledged not necessarily to adopt these refugees, but to provide for them (Babb 1999). Similarly, in the wake of the Korean War, Congress granted visas to 500 Korean children for adoption. Complaints of far too few allowable visas—including those mounted by American servicemen who fathered children while stationed in Korea—led Congress to create the Refugee Relief Act in 1953, which allowed 4,000 children to enter the United States as adoptees. Soon after, Congress removed the numerical limit and had passed the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1961, which established new legal avenues for international adoption. This Congressional action, combined with the work of Korean-adoptee support groups (i.e., Parents of Korean and Korean-American Children, founded in 1967), led Americans to increasingly see international adoption as a legitimate family formation strategy,

Domestically, transracial adoption critics endeavored to protect children’s cultural and racial identities by frustrating the ability of white parents to adopt minority children. By 1987, in part due to the vocal criticism of the National Association of Black Social Workers and many Native American tribal nations, 35 U.S. states had enacted anti-transracial adoption legislation (Adamec and Pierce 1991). Yet, the tide began to turn in the 1990s as eager potential adoptive parents sought to adopt waiting minority children. Influential research in the mid-1990s found that transracial adoption was not detrimental for the adoptee’s well-being, measured as a function of relationships, self-esteem, and academic achievement (Sharma, McGue, and Benson 1995). Congress passed the Howard M Mezenbaum Multiethnic Placement Act of 1994 and the Interethnic Adoption Provisions of 1996, barring adoption agencies from delay or denial of adoption placement based on the race, color, or national origin of either the child or adoptive parent(s) (Newman 2004). This made way for more domestic adoption placement, again offering a remedy against the shortage of adoptable white infants.

Thus, infant adoption providers were caught in a “perfect storm” of novel cultural and organizational offerings and fomented opposing movement action, all the while adoption providers and potential adoptive parents were fraught with anxiety over a “baby shortage.” It is impossible to isolate the changes in the adoption field in the decades surrounding this social upheaval to any one element at play; nevertheless, scholars tend to attribute the changes to the impact of the adoptee rights movement and increase in international adoption (Babb 1999). Research has yet to (1) examine what types of organizations made this decisive shift to open adoption practices and (2) look for evidence of opposing movement-influenced strategies in the
adoption organizations’ offerings. Therefore, this research builds on studies connecting social movements and markets, shedding light specifically on the opposing movement strategies from which organizational actors in the adoption field could interpret entrepreneurial possibilities.

DEFINITIONS

Adoption

In describing adoption, social workers are typically loath to describe their offerings as operating in a market (Gritter 1997). Despite this aversion, organizational actors have indeed provided adoption services for centuries. From the 19th century, adoption was offered primarily by city social services and religious or charitable organizations, with private adoption agencies emerging in the 1980s (Donner 1996). For the purposes of this study, all adoption services providers, regardless of their identity as a city, a religious, charitable, or private placement agency, comprise a singular organizational field due to their similar core characteristics of, among other traits, offering individuals an avenue through which to legally terminate their parental rights.⁴

Generalist and Specialist Forms

Organizational fields are partitioned into both generalist and specialist organizational forms (Carroll 1985), with each form comprising organizations that share structural characteristics (Hannan and Freeman 1989; Swaminathan 2001). Generalist organizations are those that offer a wide range of services to configure to various environments and consumer characteristics. Specialist organizations, on the other hand, identify and fill distinct niches in a market, orienting themselves to best serve a target group.

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⁴Though adoption agencies offer an array of services – including, most notably, children for adoptive couples – this study focuses on the ways adoption is used as a strategy aimed at inhibiting parenthood, even in the face of pregnancy.
Each orientation carries costs and benefits. Generalist organizations, in simultaneously fulfilling a range of relevant activities, carry the capacity burden of offering a range of services to a wide market share. However, generalists are sheltered from the risk of a narrow orientation that may become quickly obsolete or elsewhere served in a dynamic market. Specialist organizations assume great risk by serving a more focused population, but arrange resources to nimbly address the needs of an edited group. Both generalists and specialists offer a repertoire of services, but generalists seek to shallowly address the needs of a wide population, while specialists offer deep services to a narrow population.

Organizational forms are particularly relevant for research on niche-based EOS, as environmental factors are essential in determining form growth potential within a niche (Hannan and Freeman 1989). Resource partitioning theory asserts that as niches increasingly concentrate on a limited pool of resources, specialist organizations will have increasing founding rates while generalists will have decreasing founding rates.

Both generalist and specialist organizational forms are found among adoption services organizations. Generalist providers include organizations that are not narrowly focused on reproductive control. Adoption is a service that is offered to satisfy a broader social services agenda. State social service providers certainly meet this definition, as child services are just one important function of state government. Outside of government-run social services, adoption was initially provided by faith-based agencies (Carp 2004). Church clergy, already acting in a leadership capacity for their congregation, facilitated adoption placement. For these organizations, adoption was just one service among many employed to reform communities and address societal ills in a manner that coincided with religious teachings (Jackson 2005). Religious groups also saw their involvement in facilitating adoption as critical to ensuring a child
was placed in a home that practiced their faith tradition (Carp 2004; Post 2005; Cahill 2005). Based on the wide spectrum of services offered, most faith-based organizations are generalists. By and large, faith-based and state government offices were the main infant adoption providers into the early 1970s (Carp 2004).

Specialist adoption providers focus primarily on adoption-related services. Rather than marketing to a broad population, specialist providers address their offerings to fit the narrow needs of adoption triad members. Specialists can even address subpopulations in each point of the adoption triad by catering to a particular adoptee, adoptive parent, or birthmother population. One of the early results of the “baby shortage” was specialized adoption agencies that organized around specific child subpopulations, including children hailing from foreign countries. For example, Holt Adoption Agency, the first U.S. international adoption provider, specialized in Korean infant adoption (Babb 1999). Some specialist adoption agencies specifically meet the needs of certain populations of potential adoptive parents, such as “Christian” or other-faith affiliated families, as well as older (“over 40”), LGBT, and single parents (Strauss 1999). These adoptive parent-focused organizations may also offer ongoing counseling or support groups after placement. Other specialists arrange their services around the needs of birthmothers. As is characteristic of specialists, their services go deep, not wide, leading them to offer birthmothers “support services,” including services such as job placement, tuition reimbursement, and post-placement individual and group counseling (Cornwall, Frederico, Juggler 2011). Each organization that focuses on specific subpopulations within adoption qualifies as a specialist.

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

How might these generalist and specialist adoption service providers fare in the operating climate surrounding the tumultuous rearrangements of the 1970s? According to Hannan and
Freeman (1977), “under stable environmental conditions, generalists will be outcompeted by specialists” (949), as specialists are configured to offer consumers more focused attention, which ought to bolster their comparative competitive ability. However, generalists, who are shielded from potentially capricious populations as the sole source of financial solvency, may fare better in unstable environment, which largely characterizes the dramatically shifting 1970s-1990s “perfect storm” operational climate. I compare generalist and specialist organizations to assess opposing movement presence in an EOS, drawing on two theories: cultural entrepreneurship and competitive framing.

Cultural Entrepreneurship

To more fully understand how social movements create entrepreneurial opportunities, it is best to apply notions of cultural entrepreneurship, which explores the antecedents of an entrepreneurial venture by taking available cultural material into account. Anthropologist Levi-Strauss (1966) asserts that entrepreneurs recombine and repackage materials that “were part of other coherent sets” (35). Swidler (1986) builds on this agentic view of culture by developing the “tool-kit” model, which asserts that individuals develop their strategies of action from assessing the cultural material available to them. Therefore, both social movement material and organizational material make up the broad cultural source material from which entrepreneurs can generate distinct products and strategies.

I expect that the adoption field growth in the latter decades of the twentieth century is related to the sudden prevalence of reproduction-related cultural source material, including elements from the pro-life and pro-choice opposing movements. Drawing on Hannan and Freeman (1977), I would expect that specialist organizations, which are uniquely configured to
be in tune with the needs of a specific consumer base, would more readily utilize culturally resonant material from these movements.

According to King and Whetten (2008:22), when niche-directed, specialist cultural entrepreneurs sense and sustain preference-shifts by configuring their offerings to meet shifted expectations, they often effectively alter the minimum behavioral standards of their organizational field. While a cycle that progressively raises the minimum criteria may make firm entrance and survival more challenging, King and Whetten (2008) also argue that these cultural entrepreneurs, although challengers, may outpace the incumbents to become organizational field prototypes, facilitating more readily accomplished organizational achievement and further spurring field growth. One of the dominant preference shifts of this period is the demand for women’s reproductive autonomy. As described previously, in the midst of the baby shortage, adoptee rights movement, and pro-choice and pro-life opposing movement dynamics, adoption agencies initiated autonomy-granting services, such as open adoption. Based on these cultural mandates, I expect that the growth in the adoption field can be attributed to an influx of specialists offering autonomy-granting services.

Competitive Framing

Though autonomy-granting services are an essential step in illuminating opposing movement participation in the adoption field’s EOS, myriad cultural sources have advocated and facilitated women’s sovereignty over reproductive decision making, including prescription birth control and the adoptee rights movement, in addition to legalized abortion. A careful exploration of the language used to promulgate adoption’s autonomy-granting services can isolate abortion-centric opposing movements as particularly related to adoption field development.
For opposing movements, competitive framing is a critical linguistic tactic for conveying polarized distinctions. While framing, or articulating a resonant movement message (Snow, Rochford, Worden, and Benford 1986), is an important strategy for all social movement organizations, competitive framing entails manipulating dominant cultural codes – including those stemming from an opposition group – in a manner befitting of the organization’s goals. This “appropriation and reworking of dominant cultural elements” (McCaffrey and Keys 2000:42) occurs in two primary ways. First, competitive framing specifically reverses the original attribution of the cultural object, making it inconsistent with the cultural material. Maney, Woehrle, and Coy (2005) found that in the wake of the September 11th terrorist attacks and military action in the Middle East, the U.S. peace movement mirrored widespread pro-military frames by adopting the essential symbolic content, but infusing the frame package with their own SMO agenda. Peace movement messages included “Support the Troops: Bring them Home” and “Peace is Patriotic” (363). To successfully subvert the frame, a movement must ironically extend their opponent’s symbolic content to make a contradictory intimation. As a result, “the dominant symbolic repertoire becomes contested discursive terrain that both sides seek to define and control” (363).

Secondly, the cultural material is co-opted in a way that undermines the originator. As Davis and Cobb (2010) analyze, when a relatively weak social movement borrows logics from a more powerful movement, it alleviates the vulnerability of relative powerlessness by using the legitimated frames to reinforce its divergent position.

Competitive framing is particularly useful for assessing opposing movement engagement. Because such movements are fundamentally sustained by their opposition, Meyer and Staggenborg (1996) argue that each movement side has “little influence over the way in which
the issue is framed by other” (1641)–a vulnerable condition that breeds appropriation and
subversion of one another’s frames. As discussed in the historical overview, the adoption field
growth occurred in the midst of myriad movement frames, including the pro-choice movement
advocating abortion as a “woman’s choice” and the adoptee rights movement asserting
birthmothers’ right to be in contact with their placed child. If the opposing pro-life and pro-
choice movements are connected to adoption field growth, the adoption providers must
demonstrate particular reliance on opposing movement frames. Because abortion access—a threat
to adoption’s dominance as the preeminent reproductive control solution—is bound up in
opposing movement mobilization, I would expect adoption organizations to frame their services
in a way that directly combats this threat. Thus, not only will the adoption providers invoke
opposing movement frames, but they may do so in a subversive, competitive manner.

However, are both generalist and specialist organization forms equally likely to utilize
caucustic competitive frame packages? Generalist organizations would arguably be loathe to do so,
as they achieve financial solvency by appealing to a wide consumer base (Hannan and Freeman
1977). Generalists are more likely to avoid frames that would pigeon-hole their offerings or
alienate members of their broad base. Therefore, given this theoretical foundation, I would
expect that specialist adoption services, rather than generalists, would primarily engage in
competitive framing, suggesting the presence of the pro-choice and pro-life opposing
movements-contributed EOS.

Two theories motivate exploring the pro-choice and pro-life opposing movements as a
contributor to the adoption field’s counterintuitive growth. Cultural entrepreneurship suggests
that savvy challenger specialists, sensing new consumer demands, would move into the adoption
market armed with autonomy-granting services offered to birthmothers, explaining much of
adoption’s expansion over time. To more specifically connect this EOS to the opposing movements, competitive framing theory asserts that movements invoke and contend with their opponent through frame cooptation and subversion—a technique that could certainly be utilized by adoption providers undermining the pro-choice movement. Therefore, the presence of these combined opposing movement derivatives in organizational offerings would suggest the abortion-centric opposing movements partially incited adoption’s expansion.

To this end, I expect that an influx of specialist adoption agencies will drive the adoption field’s growth and set new minimum standards for adoption provision. Specifically, in exploring autonomy-granting services advertised by adoption agencies, I anticipate that (1) advertisements, particularly among specialists, will increasingly market to birthmothers, (2) persuading placement by offering open adoption arrangements which will (3) draw on “choice” frames, the indispensable vernacular of the abortion-centric opposing movements.

METHODS

To investigate the presence of opposing movement features among adoption providers, a data source ought to (1) consistently offer data for the entire adoption services field; (2) offer the same type of data for each organization; (3) offer data at regular intervals, to assess new organizations as they self-select into the field over time; (4) depict organization-initiated frames and services, including how they change over time; and (5) be directed at the audience bound up in opposing movement attention. Therefore, the Yellow Pages, with their listings of market-oriented organizations, as well as advertisements with slogans and services directed at consumers, are the best source for this type of organization-level data. Though the cost of a Yellow Pages listing and advertisement may prohibit less-inclined organizations from participation, by this rationale, it is the organizations with conscientious and calculated market
goals that are most likely to participate in the Yellow Pages. This makes the data source suitable for an analysis of organizations intending to engage in contentious markets by communicating certain cultural codes and operating under specific organizational field categorizations.

Also, because advertising space in the Yellow Pages is limited and costly, organizations must market themselves in a succinct manner that will both attract consumers and educate them on their offerings. Arguably, the nature of these constraints suggests that only the most central frames and services would be included in the edited space. Thus, a Yellow Pages analysis is in many ways more useful for understanding highly salient movement-generated frames and services than if all marketing documents for each organization were available.

To assess the contribution of opposing movements to an EOS in the adoption services organizational field, I utilized records from Phonefiche, a University Microfilm collection of Yellow Pages data from United States phonebooks from 1976 through 2004 converted into Microfilm format. The specific collection available for research includes phonebooks for every four years, beginning in 1976 through 2000, for cities with a population greater than 250,000 at the time of phonebook printing. I also utilized microfilm records for 1972 Yellow Pages. The years 1972 through 2000 are an ideal range, as 1972 precedes the legalization of abortion and 2000 foray into internet advertising and the decline of Yellow Pages usage. Because a certain lag is to be expected on the heels of social change of this magnitude and because I am most interested in the incorporation of opposing movement logics, it is most useful to have the bulk of the data after the passage of *Roe v. Wade*, which incited the opposing movement fervor.

This analysis relies on Baltimore, Dallas, Minneapolis, San Francisco, and St. Louis data, selected for geographic, political climate, and social movement involvement variety. To sufficiently assess the opposing movement impact, a research team coded available phone books
for the four-year intervals from 1972 through 2000, five books for each city, for a total of forty telephone books. Each book and city unit is considered a Metropolitan Statistical Area Year or MSA Year.

While White Pages use alphabetical ordering of people and organizations’ names, the Yellow Pages are organized by organizational classifications or headings. After creating a database, a research team coded every organization listed under the following specific headings: Abortion Alternatives; Adoption Services; and Homes: Maternity. Only the relevant organizations – those that presented themselves as providing adoption services – were included from the following additional headings: Homes: Children; Information Bureaus; Marriage, Family, and Individual Counselors; Social Service and Welfare Organizations; and Women’s Organizations and Services.

These techniques generated a census of all organizations presenting themselves as child adoption providers in the Yellow Pages over the forty MSA years, for a total of 490 organizations, 387 with advertisements beyond their organizational name and contact information. Along with a team of graduate and undergraduate research assistants, I entered all information from the organization’s listing into a database, including address, slogan, services, and “market incentives” (e.g., terms of payment, operating hours, et cetera). If an organization had multiple locations, each unique address was coded as a separate entity, as organizations that are able to successfully harness an EOS will be more likely to expand their organizational apparatus to include multiple venues. Further, if the analysis excluded these additional locations,

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5 Due to lack of availability, the research team substituted Minneapolis 1974 Yellow Pages for 1976 data and San Francisco 1999 Yellow Pages for 2000 data.

6 Coding began in the index of the phonebook to ensure that these headings were included in that Yellow Pages’ yearly publication; if they were not, but rather the index directed the reader to alternative headings or “referred headings,” these were included as part of the analysis.
it would potentially obscure the patterns of increased competition that may lead veteran organizations to reorganize.

Variables

After entering every organization into the database, each organization’s identifying information was assigned to an “organization form” dummy variable (specialist = 1).7 After an organization is coded as a specialist or non-specialist (generalist), the classification persists for each subsequent year they remain in the database. This also hopefully minimized “attrition” from generalist form in advertisement only to better compete with specialist organizations in addressing the target audience. A dummy variable was generated for “open adoption services” by coding each organization’s offerings and assessing cues that signal openness (e.g., “birthmother can select adoptive family” and “birthmother chooses baby’s parents”). Because open adoption practices are not offered by strictly transnational adoption agencies, these organizations were also coded as domestic or non-domestic (domestic = 1).

To track organizations’ deployment of “choice” frames, a dummy variable was generated for “choice use,” which required an organizational name, slogan, and/or service that includes a form of the word “choice.” I excluded synonyms, such as “select” or “decide” so as to keep the focus on the dominant, initial movement cultural frame – choice and the pro-choice movement – as per competitive framing theory. Further, I carefully read each use of “choice” by the organizations, developing and assigning each organization that used “choice” to a five-point scale assessing escalating opposing movement-connected choice frames.

[Table 1 about here]
I use fuzzy-set standards to analyze the degree to which the choice frames represent a full case of initial movement frame appropriation, facilitating a comparison of nuanced choice use across organizational form. Departing from traditional dichotomous variables, which assume set fullness–either fully “out” (0) or fully “in” (1)–fuzzy-set explores increasing shades of set membership (Ragin 2006). I assigned “choice use” values twice, with a several month lag in between, to develop a pseudo-interrater reliability measure. This procedure yielded a Time 1 and Time 2 correlation of .857, which exceeds the .80 threshold commonly advocated by social scientists (Warner 2007).

To measure choice frames against other frame packages used to promote open adoption, I read through each open adoption statement carefully and determined the presence of two other frames: rights and contact/relationship, the major emphases of the birthparent and adoptee rights organizations. Like with “choice use,” the most straightforward way to measure this was through dichotomous variables, each representing the presence or absence of rights frames and contact frames. Next, I created a dichotomous variable reporting whether or not the organization’s advertisement marketed to birthmothers (e.g., medical support, housing, counseling, tuition reimbursement, and other services or slogans directed specifically at the birthmother population). I also developed a dichotomous variable specifically for open adoption services, which included organizations that specifically mentioned “open adoption” by name as well as those whose advertisements described open adoption’s salient services. Guided by the definitions of open adoption employed by Carp (2001) and Gritter (2007), this included organizations that discussed ongoing contact or relationships, as well as the ability to personally
select the adoptive parents. To prevent biased classification, I blinded the generalist and specialist designations while assigning organizations to all the aforementioned dichotomous variables.

RESULTS

Early into the time period in question, the entire adoption services field was composed of only a few generalist forms (Figure 2). Through the 1980s, the field experienced rapid growth. After moving into the market in the early 1980s, specialists enjoyed a precipitous rise, far outpacing generalists in number of organizations. While these growth trends alone are not sufficient, they do satisfy a necessary condition for an opposing movements-spurred EOS: dramatic growth of niche-directed specialist organization forms, which represented zero of the field members in 1976 and comprised 77% of the field by 2000. What is more illustrative is that the most dramatic growth in the 1980s occurred for organizations that directed their services toward birthmothers, as demonstrated by Figure 3.

Specialists were not the pioneers of birthmother-directed services. However, although technically birthmother-directed, the majority of the generalist services to birthmothers in the 1970s and early 1980s were maternity dormitories offered by faith-based organizations—arguably a more paternalistic than autonomy-granting service. Consistent with cultural entrepreneurship, by the early 1980s, the specialist form found a niche in the adoption organizational field, steadily growing and comprised initially of exclusively birthmother-directed firms. This is evidence that the EOS in the adoption field involved greater service delivery to

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8 Because selection autonomy is essential to open adoption, organizations that only mentioned birthmothers could “assist” in selection or be part of a “joint” selection process with the social worker were not included in the open adoption figures.
pregnant women and therefore cannot be wholly attributed to the rise in “baby shortage”-compensating transracial adoption specialists.

[Figure 4 about here]

With growing competition from birthmother-directed specialists, generalists also began directing their listings toward birthmothers. By the late 1980s and early 1990s, generalists, though they paled in number to the burgeoning specialists, hovered near specialists in the percentage of organizations focused on birthmothers.

Further, as depicted in Figure 5, among birthmother-directed firms, specialists set the open adoption trend, with generalists lagging behind specialists’ cultural entrepreneurship. Novel, birthmother niche-directed specialists largely opted to incorporate autonomy-granting open adoption services rather than the closed arrangements which had historically dominated the adoption field.

[Figure 5 about here]

Overall, these findings do suggest that an EOS beginning in the early 1980s led to explosive growth in service providers oriented towards birthmothers. Though birthmother-directed services existed before specialists’ rapid growth, specialist presence is associated with a shift in the minimum standards of service for pregnant women. This is evidence of an enticing EOS, as specialists drove the adoption field growth, emerging onto the scene with autonomy-granting services. Specialists acted as cultural entrepreneurs in open adoption providence.

[Table 2 about here]

However, because open adoption joins adoption providers’ offerings during the caustic “perfect storm” period, it is impossible to fully isolate the emergence of open adoption and other autonomy-granting services as strictly an opposing movements development. After all, as
previously described, open adoption includes a variety of potential benefits to adoption triad members, including acknowledgement of a right to identity and, most notably, opportunities for a sustained relationship after placement.

Exploring the competitive frames used in adoption organizations’ advertisements, it appears in Table 2 that open adoption references are conflated, not with rights or “contact”-related frames, but with choice frames. Just over 60 percent of generalists and 70 percent of specialists used choice frames in conjunction with open adoption in their advertisements. Few generalists or specialists used adoptee rights movement frames: less than 20 percent of either form used contact-related language and a trivial amount of only generalists (3.9%) used rights frames. Further, 90 percent of generalists’ and 66 percent of specialists’ contact frame use occurred in conjunction with choice frames, suggesting the opposing movements, not the adoptee rights movement, were likely the more resonant movements fueling the EOS.

Table 3 catalogs the percentage of organizations that opted to use choice language out of the 387 advertising firms. While choice use increased into the early 1990s for both generalists and specialists, specialists were the more fervent early adherents. In 1992, nearly half of the nascent specialists with advertisements (46.8%) deployed choice frames, compared to 18.8 percent of generalists with advertisements. By 1996, generalists and specialists used choice at similar rates, with generalists surpassing the specialists’ rate in 2000.

However, even though generalists and specialists both utilized choice, this does not mean that they used the frames similarly. While the theoretical underpinnings of competitive framing offer a rationale to consider any use of “choice” a calculated movement co-optation, choice use
fell across a spectrum of escalating frame packages, each signaling a ratcheted movement engagement. According to Table 4, more specialists (23.6%) than generalists (13.6%) marketed services that specifically offered birthmothers “choice,” most often the ability to choose the adoptive parent(s) for their child. Further, more specialists than generalists espoused choice frames in each classification across the movement co-optation continuum, with specialists deploying all six of the full membership incidents. These full membership applications are particularly noteworthy because “choice” use in this instance fully realizes both elements of competitive framing by (1) reversing the original supposition so as to (2) undermine the message originator. One such use was by a Dallas specialist firm in 1996, suitably named About Life, Inc, which stated on their advertisement, “Some decisions involve a brave and loving choice. More women are choosing adoption as a LOVING and POSITIVE solution to an unwanted pregnancy,” implying that other solutions, such as abortion, were neither loving nor positive. Other specialists more overtly co-opted choice to make pro-life pronouncements: "Choose Life — Adoption is a loving alternative. Bless a family by giving them a baby from heaven"\(^9\); "For a choice a mother could love"\(^10\); and "Adoption. A choice you both can live with"\(^11\). In each of these instances, the package involved the same “choice” symbolic language that the pro-choice initial movement utilized, yet the prognostic implications were entirely conflicting with pro-choice aims. Therefore, it appears specialist firms more fully approximated full-set membership compared to generalist firms. With co-optation of frames a predominant opposing movement tactic, I see new specialists’ use of competitive framing during this period as an indication of an opposing movements-linked EOS.

\(^9\) From A Baby From Heaven, advertising in the Minneapolis 1996 Yellow Pages.
\(^10\) From Bethany Christian Services, advertising in the Minneapolis 2000 Yellow Pages.
\(^11\) From Gift of Life, advertising in the St Louis 2000 Yellow Pages.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

The lion’s share of research on social movements and market outcomes has focused on progressive movements and their closely coupled markets. To push theory into novel territory, this thesis assessed the more nuanced pro-choice and pro-life opposing movements along with the historically conservative child adoption field. A systematic analysis of the adoption field, including the growth of specialists relative to generalists, as well as an appraisal of the advertised services and slogans, suggests abortion-centric opposing movements influenced the field’s development and durability amidst competition.

As was stated at the onset of this thesis, social movements generate an EOS through market-opening structural and cultural shifts. The pro-choice and pro-life opposing movements arguably contributed to such macro level shifts, resulting in an EOS in the adoption organizational field. First, adoption services’ advertisements represented altered State arrangements. Choice use, particularly among specialists, suggests adoption entrepreneurs directly contended with the structural changes of newly legalized abortion. Services and slogans were organized, not around the adoptee rights movement’s refrains of rights or contact, but around choice—the law altering, Roe v. Wade-related development. Further research ought to explore the organizational impact of reproduction mediation-related legislation. Laws granting adoptees access to sealed birth certificates, for example, could arguably further reduce anonymity in adoption and widen the EOS niche.

Second, the adoption field demonstrated upended historical power relations, the second element of an EOS. Compared to the historical accounts of adoption practices, open adoption represented a drastic structural shift from demeaning birthmothers to deferring to them in placement matters. Taking cues from the broader opposing movement contention surrounding
women’s autonomy, specialists moved into the market, which grew from zero specialist
organizations in the census data in 1976 and jumped to more than 50 by 1992—a mere sixteen
years. The influx of specialists ushered in a new era for adoption, characterized by open
adoption and other autonomy-granting services for birthmothers. This sea change in adoption
provider/birthmother power relations was arguably stimulated in part by the pro-choice and pro-
life opposing-movements EOS.

The adoption listings were also tied to the third element of an EOS: solutions that stem
from movement grievances. Open adoption satisfied the major grievances of both the pro-choice
and pro-life opposing movements, respectively, by simultaneously acknowledging women’s
needs for reproductive autonomy while also rejecting legalized abortion as the answer to an
unwanted pregnancy. By marketing open adoption’s choice-granting virtues, adoption agencies
could participate in the choice-laden zeitgeist while still advocating that unwanted pregnancies
ought to be carried full term. In evaluating the pro-choice and pro-life opposing movements’
contribution to an EOS in the adoption field, it is particularly noteworthy that open adoption, the
field’s transformative new service, incorporates both pro-choice and pro-life poles.

Finally, adoption providers’ practices demonstrated an opposing movements-provoked
EOS through reaction to shifted consumer preferences. Because the pro-choice opposition
legitimized choice as more than simply a means, but a valuable symbol of autonomy—an end in
and of itself—adoption services offered more choices to pregnant women, most notably through
open adoption. If, as some scholars assert, adoption was solely an offshoot of the adoptee rights
movement, the frame packages would have likely asserted a birthmother’s “right” to remain in
“contact” with her child; however, it is clear that open adoption was overwhelmingly more
frequently packaged with choice frames. This adoption strategy is clearly linked to the opposing
movement tactics of appropriating and redirecting cultural dimensions—such as the pro-choice movement’s frame—which indicates opposing movement centrality in the EOS.

Ultimately, adoption organizations exhibit abortion-centered opposing movement features, which expands the literature assessing movements’ impact on markets in several ways. First, nuanced opposing movements can augment a resource-rich EOS like more straightforward progressive movements, despite the resources opposing movements must divert to simply react to their contender’s offenses. This suggests that movements can contribute to an EOS not only by initiating social change, but also by countering the changes sought by an opponent, an outcome that has yet to be articulated in the movements and markets literature.

Second, an EOS can emerge in fields ideologically aligned with the conservative, rather than progressive, movement entity. The intertwined nature of these opposing movements afforded adoption organizations a broad cultural well from which they could draw resonant frames and services. Despite their traditionally conservative and predominantly religious history, the adoption organizational field curiously relied on progressive pro-choice elements, albeit subverted, to advance their offerings.

Third, using the Yellow Pages as a data source, this study uniquely examines the organizational materials directed at those women seeking reproductive mediation. Studying the cultural materials directed at the population steeped in movement controversy offers a unique vantage. Studies of movement-related cultural materials are rare, with most focusing on political propaganda posters (for example, see Bonnell 1997), which have a decidedly different aim than organizational marketing materials. A critic may argue that the Yellow Pages are limited, as costly advertisement space precludes organizations from offering a complete picture of their organizational identity. Interpreted differently, this study reckons with the field as it is presented.
to pregnant young women seeking advice and relief, making each slogan and service description especially consequential. Assessing the field through this underutilized vantage also grants access to how the opposing movement contention plays out on the organizational level.

Adoption organization’s advertisements not only had to stand out amidst the other adoption competitor firms, but also against the abortion providers advertising within the same book. Further research ought to examine the abortion provider organizational field, cataloging evidence of movement-generated EOS in its growth, frames, and services. Most especially, research should compare abortion providers’ advertisements with adoption providers’ advertisements to gain a more complete sense of the opposing movement engagement that takes place on the inter-organizational field level.

All in all, by analyzing the pro-choice and pro-life opposing movements and the adoption services field, this research adds to multiple bodies of literature. It clarifies understandings in social work on adoption services’ growth and strategic use of open adoption as a means of offering pregnant women choice. It also lends itself to Sociology of Reproduction literature, as it explores the contexts and interpretations of women’s reproductive choices. Most importantly, it adds to the growing literature on movement-facilitated EOS or market niche development, as opposing movements, previously understudied, can now be seen as having the full thrust of strict progressive movement market-altering potential.
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FIGURE 1: Abortions reported to the Center for Disease Control, 1973-2000
TABLE 1: Weighted membership in "Movement Choice Use" variable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weight</th>
<th>Definition of Choice Use</th>
<th>Hypothetical Choice Use</th>
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<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>No choice use</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.2</td>
<td>Choice as a benign given or signal of various market options</td>
<td>&quot;Choose our agency&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.4</td>
<td>Choice as a market service</td>
<td>&quot;You choose the adoptive parents&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.6</td>
<td>Choice as personal, fulfilling, or empowering</td>
<td>&quot;We respect your choice&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.8</td>
<td>Choice as a moral responsibility</td>
<td>&quot;Make the right choice&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Choice as an opposing movement message</td>
<td>&quot;Choose life&quot;</td>
</tr>
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FIGURE 2: Total organizations by organizational form, 1972-2000
FIGURE 3: Total organizations with birthmother-directed services by organizational form, 1972-2000
FIGURE 4: Percent of organizations with advertisements offering birthmother-directed services by organizational form, 1972-2000\textsuperscript{12}

\textsuperscript{12} Because the specialist form was populated by only one organization in 1972 and zero organizations in 1976, the line begins in 1980 to suggest the onset of the form’s sustained presence.
FIGURE 5: Percent of birthmother-directed firms in each form offering open adoption by organizational form, 1972-2000
TABLE 2: Frame use among closed and open adoption providers by organizational form

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Generalist Organizational Form</th>
<th>Specialist Organizational Form</th>
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<td>Closed Adoption</td>
<td>Open Adoption</td>
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<tr>
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<td>134</td>
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TABLE 3: Percentage of organizations with advertisements using choice by organizational form, 1972-2000

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<td>%</td>
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<td>%</td>
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<td>N</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>12.7%</td>
<td>28</td>
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TABLE 4: Percentage of firms with advertisements utilizing opposing movement choice frames by organizational form

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<th>%</th>
<th>.2</th>
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<th>%</th>
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<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>.6</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>.8</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Generalist</td>
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<td>75.3%</td>
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<td>TOTAL</td>
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0: No choice use
.2: Choice as a signal of benign market alternatives
.4: Choice as a market service
.6: Choice as fulfilling, empowering
.8: Choice as a moral directive
1: Choice as an opposing movement co-optation