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Seeing (the Other) Through a Terministic Screen of Spirituality:

Emotional Integrity as a Strategy for

Facilitating Identification

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A thesis submitted to the faculty of
Brigham Young University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

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ABSTRACT

Seeing (the Other) Through a Terministic Screen of Spirituality: Emotional Integrity as a Strategy for Facilitating Identification

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Although philosopher Robert Solomon and rhetorician Kenneth Burke wrote in isolation from one another, they discuss similar concepts and ideas. Since its introduction in Burke’s *A Rhetoric of Motives*, identification has always been important to rhetorical theory, and recent studies in emotion, such as Solomon’s, provide new insight into modes of identification—that human beings can identify with one another on an emotional level. This paper places Solomon and Burke in conversation with one another, arguing that both terministic screens and emotions are ways of seeing, acting, engaging, and judging. Hence, terministic screens and emotions affect ethos, or character, both in a specific moment and over periods of time as they are cultivated through habit. Because emotions influence ethos, it is important for a speaker to cultivate the right emotions at the right time—Solomon’s notion of emotional integrity. Emotional integrity facilitates Burkean identification between speaker and audience because it enables human beings to see the other as synecdochically related to themselves, a part of the whole. Hence, this paper ultimately argues that a speaker will improve his or her ethos by cultivating emotional integrity.

Keywords: Kenneth Burke, rhetoric, emotion, identification, terministic screens, ethos, ethics, emotional integrity, Aristotle, Robert Solomon, spirituality
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SEEING (THE OTHER) THROUGH A TERMINISTIC SCREEN OF SPIRITUALITY:
EMOTIONAL INTEGRITY AS A STRATEGY FOR FACILITATING IDENTIFICATION

Introduction

Robert C. Solomon, the distinguished philosopher who has written voluminously about the emotions, unfortunately never seems to have read Kenneth Burke. The closest contact with Kenneth Burke in Solomon’s books comes from a book that he co-edited with Kathleen Higgins entitled The Philosophy of (Erotic) Love, in which an article by Louis Mackey gives a one-sentence explanation on Burke—that courtship is the ultimate in persuasion (345)—and references A Rhetoric of Motives and A Grammar of Motives in the end notes. As one of the editors, Solomon probably read Mackey’s article, but may not have been persuaded to read Burke after reading the essay. If Solomon did read Burke, there is no other trace of Burke’s name in Solomon’s books. Burke’s ideas, however, among other ideas pertinent to rhetorical theory, are a different story.

Solomon does not have an overtly rhetorical theory. In What is an Emotion?, a compilation of readings about emotion from philosophers throughout the Western tradition, Solomon includes selections from Aristotle’s Rhetoric, De Anima, and Nicomachean Ethics. And yet, Dorothea Frede argues that if we’re to find any helpful material on the emotions in Aristotle, we won’t find it in his De Anima, “the official work on ‘psychology,’” but, interestingly, in his Rhetoric and in his Ethics (258), a fundamental point, Ellen Quandahl writes, because “in Aristotle there is a significant connection and interplay of emotion with ethics as well as persuasion” (13). And while Solomon certainly does ask why Aristotle included the helpful material on emotions in the Nicomachean Ethics, as I discuss below, Solomon never seems to
ask why Aristotle also puts material about the emotions in the *Rhetoric*. Indeed, the word *rhetoric* hardly ever appears in Solomon’s work. When it does appear, it is almost always in reference to or in connection with Aristotle’s treatise of the same name, and the focus is not on the ability to see the available means of persuasion in any given situation, but on Aristotle’s discussion of the emotions (*Not Passion’s* 88, 92, 109, 124), which “happen” to be in his *Rhetoric*. Although it almost never happens, when Solomon does use the word *rhetoric* to refer to something other than Aristotle’s treatise, he seems to have in mind an idea that will sound a bit too narrow for modern rhetoricians: language that persuades, usually because it has incited emotion (*Not Passion’s* 18, 125; *Better* 30; *Good Business* 21, 22, 27, 82, 138, 214, 224, 320; *Justice* 17-19, 29, 139). Solomon does realize that rhetoric is not necessarily “a negative notion or a dishonest concept” (*Justice* 18), and would agree that it is at least somehow related to ways of seeing: “It is not our reasons but our emotions that are moved when we are persuaded to ‘see’ one point of view rather than another” (18). Hence, similar to Mark Johnson in his recent *The Meaning of the Body*, Solomon also believes that reason and emotion are not two separate and distinct entities, but two different parts or ways of seeing the same thing.

Furthermore, while Solomon discusses emotions in terms of important words and ideas in rhetorical theory, such as strategies, engagements with the world, judgments, ways of defining character, and as having an ethical dimension, Solomon’s focus—even in writing about the ethics of emotions—tends to be about the self and on how emotions affect one’s self. Solomon does argue that emotions are political in the sense that they are, to some degree, “constituted in relations with other people” (“The Politics of Emotion” 4), but when he discusses the ethics of emotions, which he does most succinctly in *True to Our Feelings*, his focus is on what happens to these “relations with other people” from the emoter’s perspective, not from the perspective of
these “other people.” The book is about how emotions are strategies for the one who has them: Solomon shows how what he calls emotional integrity is good for me (the speaker), but he does not explicitly show or discuss why it is also good for everyone else (the speaker’s audiences). In Solomon’s own words, “emotions are first of all, for me at least, a personal concern, that is, an ethical matter,” and he uses the word ethical “in the old classical meaning, having to do with living the good life rather than a moral question of right and wrong” (True x, emphasis added on “personal concern,” but not on “ethical”).

Although Kenneth Burke does not have an overt theory of the emotions like Solomon, emotions are very important to him. He wrote extensively in Counter-Statement about how emotions, when channeled into symbols, affect and are effected in an audience. Later, in his Grammar of Motives, among other writings, he closely related emotion to attitude, his word for an incipient action. Burke does not write explicitly about emotions themselves as being strategies, but he does argue that emotions become symbols, which symbols are strategic because of their form. His theory of form, essential to his entire project, is grounded in the creation and fulfillment of desires, which desires, I argue below, are intimately related to emotions. For Solomon, however, emotions themselves are strategies that human beings can use and do use to engage the world.

In addition to emotions as strategies, I add that the idea that emotions are strategic can also be a strategy. Solomon’s notion of emotional integrity—that the right emotion should be used at the right time, for the right reason, towards the right person, and to the right degree—does something to an audience. Adding a voice to Brian Jackson’s recent exhortation in JAC that we should “talk about the ethical dimensions of emotional appeals” (491), this paper argues that a speaker will improve his or her ethos by applying Solomon’s notion of emotional integrity
because emotional integrity facilitates identification between speaker and audience. This paper therefore also discusses related implications of Burkean identification—that speakers can identify with an audience on an emotional level. Indeed, it is unfortunate that Solomon never seems to have read Burke because by applying Burke’s theory of identification to Solomon’s theory of emotional integrity, we can see better why it is important for all human beings to cultivate the right emotion, at the right time, towards the right objects, and to the right degree. We can see what a speaker’s having emotional integrity does to an audience—that it facilitates identification.

Because Burke and Solomon are addressing similar ideas but in isolation from one another, some integration of terms and notions is important for understanding the proposed relationship between emotional integrity and identification. I will first relate the fundamental concepts of acting in the world, engaging with the world, and making judgments of the world. I will then demonstrate common ground between Burkean terministic screens and emotions—both are ways of seeing, acting, engaging, and judging. Next, I discuss habit, character, and ethos, arguing that Solomon’s notion of emotional integrity entails an ethics of emotions and enhances a speaker’s ethos. Finally, I will show how emotional integrity facilitates identification: it enables human beings to more fully identify with one another because it lets them see the other as synecdochically related to themselves.

These ideas about emotions are important because the study of emotion is, as Solomon argues, “part of a much larger discussion about how people relate and respond to each other, how they understand themselves, [and] how they manipulate both themselves and others, in part by the very language they use in ascribing and describing the emotions” (True 10). In other words, the study of emotion is necessary and essential to the study of rhetoric. Emotions affect and
determine who we are, and they can and do improve or impair our interactions with one another. By learning to use emotions strategically, speakers can and will more fully identify with other members of the human family.

Acts, Engagements, and Judgments

As human beings, we act in order to engage with the world in a moment of time. Such acts and engagements are two different ways of seeing the same thing insofar as they become habits, which define and determine character. But acts are not just engagements with the world—they are also explicit or implicit judgments of the world. Since all human beings necessarily die, all have a limited amount of time to live, and time is therefore a limited resource. No human being knows exactly how much time he or she has left, and since the things we do in the world take time, by acting, we assume that what we are choosing to do is worth the time we spend doing it. In this view, all acts and engagements are also either implicit or explicit judgments: we identify with what we choose and divide ourselves from what we do not choose (Rhetoric of Motives 23). Acts in the world, engagements with the world, and judgments of the world are all different ways of seeing the same thing.

When we engage with the world in a moment in time, our acts-engagements-judgments, as we might call them, define and determine our character, or who we are, in that moment of time. But these acts-engagements-judgments also define and determine our character over periods of time as we cultivate a range of acts-engagements-judgments through habit. In the following sections I discuss two different kinds of acts-engagements-judgments, or ways of seeing and ways of being: terministic screens and emotions. Both terministic screens and emotions are necessarily interrelated and are ways of engaging the world, ways that determine
who we are in the moment of acting-engaging-judging. Since acting, engaging, and judging imply one another, when I use one term I imply the use of the other two.

Terministic Screens

In foreshadowing one of his “Five Summarizing Essays” that he would later include in *Language as Symbolic Action*, Burke wrote in *Permanence and Change*, “A way of seeing is also a way of not seeing—a focus on object A involves a neglect of object B” (49, emphasis in original). This statement about seeing is crucial when considering his later-published essay “Terministic Screens,” where he asks the reader to consider some photographs of the same objects, photographs that appeared differently because of the different lenses on the camera:

When I speak of “terministic screens,” I have particularly in mind some photographs I once saw. They were *different* photographs of the *same* objects, the difference being that they were made with different color filters. Here something so “factual” as a photograph revealed notable distinctions in texture, and even in form, depending upon which color filter was used for the documentary description of the event being recorded. (*Language* 45, emphasis in original)

In this passage, Burke is using camera lenses as a metaphor to explain his notion of terministic screens: things change depending on the lenses we use to see them, and language and words are necessary lenses that symbol-users necessarily use, lenses that affect and determine the way we see the world. In other words, “A way of seeing involves a way of not seeing” (*Permanence* 49); “A textbook on physics . . . turns the attention in a different direction from a textbook on law or psychology” (*Language* 45, emphasis in original).
From this passage and others (*Language* 46, 51), Burke uses sight as a meta-terministic screen—a terministic screen that is intended to help his audience see and understand what he means when he talks about terministic screens. That he uses sight is instructive because sight affects and determines many of our structures of experience, what Burke calls “innate forms of the mind” in *Counter-Statement*: by sight, we learn to differentiate between things like permanence, change, “crescendo, contrast, comparison, balance, repetition, disclosure, reversal, contraction, expansion, magnification, series, and so on” (46), many of which are best or perhaps only understood *in terms of* sight and because of an ability to see. Furthermore, not only does an object seen through one lens appear different than when it is seen through a different lens, but the direction that a seer is facing will also affect what is seen: “a focus on object $A$ involves a neglect of object $B$” (*Permanence* 49). Hence, the title of Burke’s first section heading in his essay on terministic screens is “Directing the Attention.” Furthermore, Burke’s statement that “all terms . . . are necessarily ‘fictions,’ in the sense that we must express such concepts by the use of terms *borrowed from the realm of the physical*” (*Language* 46, emphasis added) helps us see why Burke asks the following rhetorical questions when he discusses his definition of human beings as the symbol-using animal:

[C]an we bring ourselves to realize . . . just how overwhelmingly much of what we mean by “reality” has been built up for us through nothing but our symbol systems? . . . What is our “reality” for today . . . but all this clutter of symbols about the past combined with whatever things we know mainly through maps, magazines, newspapers, and the like about the present? (*Language* 5)
Much of what we know and “see,” he writes, comes directly from symbols. And as the “symbol-using animal,” we also attempt to describe things—symbolize them—by using terms that correspond to our own experiences, especially from visual perception, for example.$^3$

A symbol is a terministic screen. It is “the conversion of an experiential pattern into a formula for affecting an audience” ([Counter-Statement] 157) and “provides a terminology of thoughts, actions, emotions, attitudes, for codifying a pattern of experience” (154, emphasis added). A symbol is an act that signifies an engagement with the world. Burke writes, “if any given terminology is a reflection of reality, by its very nature as a terminology it must be a selection of reality; and to this extent it must function also as a deflection of reality” ([Language] 45, Burke’s emphasis). The terms we choose “affect the nature of our observations” (46), and “all terministic screens must implicitly or explicitly embody choices” (50). Hence, a terministic screen also implies a judgment about the world. Like all choices, an implicit or explicit judgment is made as soon as a choice (to use a symbol or a term) is made. By focusing on object (or symbol) A and neglecting object (or symbol) B, an actor implicitly makes the argument that A is better than B, at least in the moment of time that he or she has chosen A over B.

We symbolize our experiences and our patterns of experience. These symbols are simultaneously acts, engagements, and judgments. “The symbol is the verbal parallel to a pattern of experience” ([Counter-Statement] 152), Burke writes. Furthermore, emotions become symbols: “We have the original emotion, which is channelized into a symbol” (61). In other words, our emotions cannot be separated from our symbol-using—our acts, engagements, and judgments.
Emotions

Burke’s metaphor of different colored lenses as a way of describing terministic screens is similar to the way Robert Solomon uses a comparable metaphor for describing our emotions. Solomon writes that “Emotions, to use the all-too-common image of popular ethics, are not either black or white but display all sorts of complex color patterns” (True 2). In other words, just as there are many different colors, even ones that we do not have names for, there are also different kinds of emotions, even ones that we do not have names for in English, but that are named in other languages or that may not be named in any language. Not only that, but just as there are different shades of each color, there are likewise different “shades” of each emotion (2). There are degrees of red, each with its own name (and some unnamed), and there are degrees of anger, which each might be given its own name. Because emotions “color” our world, Solomon writes, they also affect and determine the way we see the world (24). Leighton argues that, for Aristotle, emotions both affect judgments and are “supposed to be part of our way of viewing the world . . . [which] is the way we put things together, . . . thus [bringing] about an alteration of perception” (215). He also writes, “What something is perceived as . . . differs for one moved by a particular emotion” (215). Since, according to Wayne Booth, we human beings “can see only what our equipment allows us to see” (Critical 33), these emotions, this “alteration of perception,” as Leighton calls it, does something—changes, in some way or to some degree—our “equipment.” Our emotions are not only part of our “equipment,” but they also determine what our “equipment” will be in a given situation. Far from being irrational or not rational, our emotions are intimately linked with rationality, a point that Solomon never stops arguing: emotions affect and to some degree determine our ways of seeing the world, and they are also engagements with and judgments of the world (True 124, 148, 224; Not Passion’s 76-90, for example).
Not only do emotions change and determine the way we see the world, but emotions are also similar to terministic screens in the sense that the language we use to describe our emotions is in some sense a necessary part of the emotion itself, as Solomon argues. Emotions, he writes, are to some extent “shaped as well as defined by the language (and the metaphors) through which we identify and describe them” (True 227). Hence, our emotions, he says, are completed only when we verbalize them using words or symbols. I can feel happiness, for example, but when I say the words, “I am happy,” I not only assert my happiness to myself and to others, but I also “argue” to myself and to others that I am happy. And when I make this “argument,” I am thereafter more likely to act in accordance with what I have already said I am (Cialdini 52). For Burke, on the other hand, “We have the original emotion, which is channelized into a symbol” (Counter-Statement 61). It is this “channelizing,” Solomon would argue, that completes the emotion. For Burke, “man is the symbol-using animal” (Language 3), and these symbols are “complex attitudes” (Counter-Statement 153). Additionally, Burke wrote a few years later in The Philosophy of Literary Form that “The symbolic act is the dancing of an attitude” (9, Burke’s italics). Thus, “The Symbol,” he wrote, “is the verbal parallel to a pattern of experience” and “Whether [that] pattern is permanent . . . or temporary . . ., while it endures it tends to make over the world in its own image” (Counter-Statement 152). Emotions are terministic screens in the sense that they are engagements with the world and they affect and determine the way we see and judge the world.

Burke acknowledges that emotions are engagements with the world when he writes that “an attitude is a state of emotion” (Grammar 476), since for Burke, “an attitude is an incipient or inchoate act in the sense that an attitude of sympathy or antipathy might lead to a corresponding act of helpfulness or aggression” (“Eye-Poem” 24). Note that, in the previous quotation, Burke
uses words that signify emotions to describe the corresponding states of inchoate acts. He also closely relates attitudes to emotions in his other works (Philosophy of Literary Form 11, 143; Grammar 236; A Rhetoric of Motives 90). Although Burke acknowledges that both emotion and attitude are closely related, he may have two separate things in mind when he writes about them. And while one may be a subset of the other, whether attitudes and emotions are the same thing or not, the important thing is that both are incipient actions. Burke shows how important attitude (and, by implication, emotion) is to him when he wrote, “If I were now to write my Grammar over again, I'd turn the pentad into a hexad, the sixth term being attitude” (“Eye-Poem” 24, Burke’s emphasis). If language is attitudinal, and if “the symbolic act is the dancing of an attitude” (Philosophy of Literary Form 9, Burke’s emphasis), then language is closely related to emotion. Language and emotion both to some degree determine and reveal who a person is in a given situation and over time because both are actions, potential or actual.

Although recent scholarship, such as Antonio Demasio’s Descartes’ Error and Mark Johnson’s The Meaning of the Body has much to say about reason and emotion being very closely related to one another, several scholars such as Fortenbaugh, Koziak, and Sokolon argue that the idea can be traced back to Aristotle, who discusses the power and importance of emotional appeals in his Rhetoric: “we do not render our judgments the same way when grieved as when delighted, or when friendly as when hostile” (1356a16-18). In other words, when we’re distraught, we may make decisions that seem reasonable at that moment. But then later, when we’ve been cheered up a bit, we may think back at our earlier, “unreasonable” actions, and laugh softly to ourselves, “What on earth was I thinking?” Since we, to some degree, at least, reason from emotional states of mind (Marcus et al., Jackson 483), emotions are a large part of who we
are—our ethos, or character, which consists in part of how we make decisions and how we see the world, and in part of how the world is made and is seen.

Burke’s metaphor of seeing through color filters in connection with Solomon’s (and Booth’s) discussion of seeing reminds one of Aristotle’s definition of rhetoric: the ability to see what means of persuasion are available in any situation (*Rhetoric* 1355b25). We see (and even think) differently depending on what sort of emotion we are having, and the means of persuasion that are available for us to see will be filtered through our emotions because emotions, to some degree, affect judgment. But for Solomon, to say that emotions only affect judgment is an understatement. Throughout several of his works, especially *The Passions* and *True to our Feelings*, Solomon argues over and over again that emotions *are* judgments of and about the world (see, for example, *Not Passion’s* 92-113). They are judgments because they, like terministic screens, make assumptions about the world. Let’s say, for example, that I am afraid as I walk down a dark alley in New York City at 2:00 am. To be afraid is to feel unsafe, and implicit in my fear is a judgment about the world, that it is unsafe, that I am in danger, and that I need to engage with the world in order to be more safe than I now am. My fear also includes a desire to act in some way that will make me safer than I now believe myself to be. Perhaps this means walking faster, glancing around for shadows, or crossing the street so that I do not walk meet a stranger on the sidewalk. My emotion is a judgment of, in, and about the world. And my actions (judgments) thereafter are affected by my initial emotion, in this case, fear.

In a Specific Moment. Emotions are engagements with the world because they are a way of acting, and they create a desire to either change some aspect of the world or to *act* in a certain way in the world. Emotions are closely related to desire, and desire leads to some kind of an
action, some further kind of engagement with the world, a further engagement that is not just emotional, but a further engagement that exists because of an emotion or an attitude. Solomon thinks of emotions this way—as tending to either create or come from a desire (True 147, 238). Emotions are not only related to desires, but the desire that often comes with an emotion is a very important part of it. That desire is important because it is what makes us want to act in a certain way, to somehow influence our world. Daniel Gross would agree (2, 44, 80-81). Solomon writes that when we experience an emotion we have an “overwhelming felt need to do something,” and for example, “an essential part of getting angry is the experience of wanting to do something” (True 238, emphasis in original). Fear, on the other hand, includes a desire to be safer than one is at the moment, and one desire that comes from love is the desire to be with the beloved.

Since emotions are closely related to desires, how exactly emotions influence who we are in a given situation can be better understood from noting what Wayne Booth has written about desires. In the following, Booth is discussing how literature affects a reader, but since his discussion is in terms of desires (and hence is related to emotions), we can learn something about how our emotions influence and determine the kind of person that we are in a given situation. Literature, Booth writes, creates certain kinds of desires in the reader: “We may not want to call this patterning of desires, . . . a practical effect, but it does have one obvious and inescapable effect on the reader’s practice: it determines who he or she is to be for the duration of the experience” (Company 202). In other words, the work of literature “at each step molds me into its shapes, giving me practice, as it were, in wanting certain outcomes and qualities and ignoring certain others” (“The Way” 167, Booth’s italics). In other words, “I become . . . that kind of desirer” (“The Way” 167, Booth’s italics). A focus on object A involves a neglect of object B,
and, “If I choose to go on, I shall do so because I want more of this” (Company 202). Notice the word *want* in that last statement, a word that is synonymous with desire. Desires lead to other desires, and when we choose to keep reading, we become the kind of person that desires more of those desires that we are currently having. Furthermore, the very having of desires determines who we are in the moment of having those desires. (Perhaps one way of defining a human being could be as “a certain kind of desirer.”)

Emotions work in a similar way. When we have an emotion, we become *that kind of emoter*, which includes being “that kind of desirer.” Brian Jackson discusses emotions in terms of desires—in terms of things that we *want*: “[E]motions ‘happen’ fundamentally because we either *want* something or *want* to avoid something, and our emotional states prepare us not only to *judge* . . . but also to *act*” (479, emphasis added). And, Solomon argues, as we gain the ability to consciously reflect on the emotions that we are having, we can eventually choose to go through with an emotion or we can choose a different strategy. But when we do go through with the emotion, we become that kind of person that emotes. Whatever we choose to do, whatever we decide to go through with, will define and determine who we are in the moment of our act: “[W]hat we affirm and deny [by evaluating our emotions] is not just the emotion. It is the emotion as a reflection of one’s *self*. It shows or betrays who one is” (218-219, emphasis in original).

Over Periods of Time—Habit. Desires and emotions not only determine and reveal who we are in the moment of having them, but also determine and reveal who we are as we cultivate a range of emotions over a period of time. Aristotle explains how people become certain kinds of people over time. In his *Nicomachean Ethics*, he discusses his notion of habit:
The things which we have to learn before we can do them we learn by doing: men become builders by building houses, and harpists by playing the harp. Similarly, we become just by the practice of just actions, self-controlled by exercising self-control, and courageous by performing acts of courage. (1103b)

In his *Rhetoric*, he adds, “what is habitual becomes, at some point, just like something natural, since habit resembles nature” (1370a6-8). In other words, what we choose to do over time becomes part of who and what we are—our character—and also determines what we can see and how we judge. Emotions work the same way. If I am angry in a given situation, then I am an angry person for a moment in time. But the more often I am angry, the more I can be defined as a generally angry sort of person. Emotions affect a person’s character, strengthening or weakening an ethos, depending on the emotion that is felt in a given situation and what kinds of emotions have been cultivated over time and depending on what kinds of emotions an audience wants to see in a speaker, as we’ll discuss below.

Wayne Booth expands upon Aristotelian habit in the passage below, adding that cumulative choices affect character over a period of time:

Many of the virtues we most honor are originally gained by practices that our enemies might call faking, our friends perhaps something like aspiring or emulating... We must fake—must practice—the cello (say) long before we can really play it, and each stage of improvement requires new levels of faking.

*(Company 253)*

He calls it “faking” here and “Hypocrisy Upward” elsewhere, but I think both terms are inaccurate, even if the original meaning of “hypocrisy” meant to pretend to be something you’re not, as Booth argues *(Company 252)*. I think “faking” and “hypocrisy” are inaccurate for two
reasons: first, both terms have negative connotations, and the act of being something better ought to have a positive connotation. Second, I disagree with the words “faking” and “hypocrisy” because of what Booth has written in *The Company We Keep*, namely that we become a certain kind of person depending on the authors with whom we choose to spend our time, and we become a certain kind of desirer in the moment of reading a certain kind of book. In other words, we’re not *faking* anything, but we are who we choose to be in the moment of choosing or “pretending” to be that thing. We are making judgments about how we desire to engage the world. Indeed, I think Booth himself said it most accurately when he wrote, “by pretending to be another, better person, you have become another, better one” (“Confessions” 36).

Emotions mold and are molded by character. Hence, they also define and determine ethos. That which we are able to see determines the kinds of people that we are, for if I see things differently depending on the emotion that I am having, then I am the kind of person that sees things in a certain way because of the emotion I am having. Emotions are ways of seeing, and both emotions and ways of seeing are also ways of being—both in a given situation and over periods of time.

Emotional Integrity and its Effects on (and Affects Towards) an Ethos

In his book, *True to Our Feelings*, Solomon argues that there is an ethical dimension to emotions, an ethical dimension that is also Aristotelian: an ethics of emotions is about (1) having the right emotion (2) to the right degree (3) in the right circumstances (4) for the right reason(s) (5) and directing that emotion at the right person or object (13, 25, 26, 46, 181; cf. *Nicomachean* 1106b20-23, 1109a27-29). Aristotle, Solomon says, “insisted that the passions, that is, the right passions, in the right amounts, at the appropriate times, were essential for living the good life”
Solomon’s notion of emotional integrity is essentially the same thing as the ancient notion of living the good life.

In Aristotle, virtues and emotions are very closely related. Malcom Heath has written that for Aristotle, “there is an intimate link between emotion and virtue” (xxxviii), and Aristotle himself writes that living the good life is living a virtuous life, and “the virtues have to do with actions and emotions” (*Nicomachean* 1104b14). Not only that, but whenever Aristotle discusses virtues, he often mixes in emotional examples with virtuous examples: “anyone can get angry—that is easy—or can give away money or spend it; but to do all this to the right person, to the right extent, at the right time, for the right reason, and in the right way is no longer something easy that anyone can do” (*Nicomachean* 1109a27-29). To live a virtuous life, one must do and also feel the right thing, he says again, “at the right time, toward the right objects, toward the right people, for the right reason, and in the right manner” (*Nicomachean* 1106b20-23). But what does “the right” mean? “The right,” the Good—the virtue or the emotion—does lie somewhere between two extremes of excess and deficiency, but where exactly it lies changes as situations, people, circumstances, and reasons change. In other words, whatever “the right” means depends on the situation—on what the context is, who the person is, what emotion or virtue is in question, and what reasons justify the action (Melchert 192). Irwin, alluding to the doctrine of the emotional mean in his discussion of Aristotelian ethics, comments, “virtuous people neither have uncontrolled emotions nor attempt to eliminate emotions altogether” (161).

Since the meaning of “the right” changes, in order to know what “the right” is, we need to critically consider each situation and then choose the most strategic option. And in order to know what the most strategic option is, we must first be able to see a variety of different options. Solomon writes that “Emotional integrity (or what [the ancient Greeks] considered the virtuous
life) necessarily involves second-order reflection as well as first-order feeling” (True 267) and that it is “reflective recognition that completes the emotion” (265, emphasis in original). Of course, this “reflective recognition” isn’t always possible in the very moment of having an emotion or deciding on a certain virtue—especially if one is out of practice—but it can be practiced and thereby cultivated. Emotions can be reflected on and an actor can choose to do something different or more strategic the next time a similar situation presents itself. What actors feel and do over time affects character or ethos. Quandahl writes after relating emotions to virtues in Aristotle that “virtues are dispositions—that is, characteristics or habits . . . of feeling and action that develop through activities. Thus the name for moral virtue (ethike or habit) is related to ethos” (15, my emphasis on “feeling and action”). And because the act of reflecting on our emotions enables us to cultivate strategic emotions over time, emotional integrity thereby “suggests an ideal of transcending ourselves by allowing us to become the person we most want to be” (True 267). And it is by becoming our own ideal self that we give others a reason to trust us because all people also want to become what they want to be. In short, we begin to make an ethical appeal on an audience.

Since emotions to some degree determine the kind of person a speaker is, a speaker needs to cultivate emotional integrity so that he or she is credible to an audience. For example, most people don’t want to see a speaker angry unless that anger is righteous anger, or if that anger is perceived by the audience as being right. The same goes with other emotions. Speakers that have been too afraid too often are not as believable as one who has been and is fearful in the right circumstances at the right person for the right reason and to the right degree. Emotional integrity is important to a person’s character and ethos for the same reason that integrity is important to building a person’s character and ethos—integrity and emotional integrity make a speaker more
believable because the persons’ emotions and actions are directed at the right object for the right reason, etc. with “the right” being understood not just by the speaker, but also by the audience. Hence, one way speakers can make a stronger ethical appeal to an audience is by cultivating strategic emotions: “A steady diet of crude emotions makes a person hardly worthy of our company, and this has nothing to do with manners” (True 215). Not only are some emotions bad strategies in and of themselves, but they are also bad strategies because, over time, they turn people into the kinds of beings that no one wants to be around. And what other people want, as we have already discussed, is important.

Integrity is also important because it implies that human beings are responsible for their emotions, a point Solomon seems to be constantly arguing (see, for example, almost any chapter in The Passions, Not Passion’s, In Defense, and True). And while Solomon argues that emotions are closely connected to the words we use to describe them (127-136, 218-219, 265), Kenneth Burke argued that the words we use to describe things presuppose a system of ethics. In The Philosophy of Literary Form, Burke writes,

A fully moral act is a total assertion at the time of the assertion. Among other things, it has a style—and this style is an integral aspect of its meaning. If it points to the chair by saying ‘faugh,’ it pledges itself to one program—to quite another if it adopts the style of ‘ho, ho’ or ‘might I?’ The style selected will mold the character of the selector. Each brand of imagery contains in germ its own ‘logic.’ If he says ‘faugh’ and deeply means it, he thereby vows himself to ‘faugh’; he must go through the faughness. (148, Burke’s emphasis)

That is, words reveal attitudes, and saying and really meaning what one says is and ought to be the same thing as doing and being. Emotions and emotional integrity function in a similar way.
Just as saying something and really meaning it presupposes the act of doing, acknowledging that I am having an emotion completes the emotion and makes me responsible for that emotion. Our emotions, like our language and our actions, “will mold the character of the selector,” both over time, and in the moment of having or choosing them. A speaker both creates and manifests character, or ethos, in a speech and prior to a speech.

Ethos

I have been using Aristotle to argue for an ethos or character that is the cumulative sum of a speaker’s acts, engagements, and judgments throughout his or her life, an ethos that is who and what a speaker has been as much as it is who and what he or she now is, and an ethos that is brought to a rhetorical situation, created in a rhetorical situation, and manifest in a rhetorical situation. And yet, many believe that, for Aristotle, ethos is created or crafted only in the speech. Aristotle himself even says that persuasion “ought to come about through the speech, and not because the speaker has a prior reputation for being a certain sort of person” (1356a9-11), a passage that is interpreted to mean that ethos is created in a speech and that a speaker’s actions prior to a speech should not influence our judgment of the speech itself. James M. May writes that in the *Rhetoric* Aristotle differentiates between three different kinds of ethos: the speaker’s moral ethos, the audience’s ethos, and a dramatic or stylistic ethos, which is only discussed in Book 3 (2-3), which Book 3 of the *Rhetoric*, according to George Kennedy, may have originally been a separate work from Books 1 and 2 (418). May continues by saying that a speaker’s moral ethos “should be established in and by the speech itself and not through any previous notion the audience may have of the speaker”; otherwise, it would not be an art (2), an important point because one of Aristotle’s chief points in the *Rhetoric*, Amélie Rorty comments, is to write about
rhetoric as an art, as opposed to the way other writers were writing about it, namely that when persuading an audience, a speaker’s moral character does not really matter, but only the inciting of that audience’s emotions (27n1). But character really does matter, says Aristotle. In fact, character is the most powerful or most effective means of persuasion: “we are more persuaded, and more quickly, by decent people, about all matters without exception” (Rhetoric 1356a6-8) and “character, one might say, has in it just about the most decisive means of persuasion” (Rhetoric 1356a14-15). And for rhetoric to be an art, character must be manifest in a speech.

But in partial contrast to May, S. Michael Halloran adds that while the general acceptance of ethos for Aristotle is that it is only created in the speech, in another sense Aristotelian ethos must also be brought to a speech (60). This is because “To have ethos is to manifest the virtues most valued by the culture to and for which one speaks—in Athens: justice, courage, temperance, magnificence, magnanimity, liberality, gentleness, prudence, wisdom” (60), and a speaker cannot manifest these virtues in a speech without having cultivated the ability or the capacity to manifest them in a speech, which happens via a habitual process as we have already discussed. The virtues that Halloran lists are not created during a speech, but are manifest during a speech—an important distinction. These virtues—along with what Solomon has called emotional integrity—cannot be manifest in a speech if they have not been acquired through habit.

Commenting on Aristotle’s discussion of character or ethos in the Rhetoric, Rorty adds that “A person’s character consists of those long-standing actively dispositional qualities and traits—his natural capacities and habits . . .” “It is,” she concludes, “his nature and his second nature” (12). And for Aristotle, “habit resembles nature” (Rhetoric 1370a6-8).

Aristotelian ethos in the Ethics and the Rhetoric is not inconsistent because Aristotle’s purposes in writing the Rhetoric are different from his purposes in writing his Ethics. Thus, when
an audience is duped by a speaker who merely appears to be good but really isn’t, the problem is
twofold: the speaker’s bad intent and the audience’s inability to see and thereby judge. Even if a
speaker appears to be credible but really isn’t, that speaker is still the kind of person that appears
to be credible but really isn’t. Hence, another reason why Aristotle wrote the Rhetoric is to teach
that rhetoric is not persuasion, but the ability to see the available means of persuasion in any
given situation (1355b10-12, 15-17, 25-27, 31-32) and “is for the sake of a judgment” (1377b21).
Character does contribute to persuasiveness—perhaps even more than anything else—but
audiences still need to judge a speaker’s acts during a speech and not rely only on what a speaker
has previously done or said. Audiences need to let a speaker’s acts and ethos during a speech add
to or diminish from a speaker’s overall ethos. Hence, Aristotle writes, “rhetoric is a sort of
outgrowth of dialectic and also of the study that has to do with states of character” (Rhetoric
1356a26), which is known as ethics. Part of making good judgments is the ability or capacity to
judge a speaker’s character. And “states of character” necessarily include emotions.

Character, or ethos, is made up of habits, and habits are made up of engagements with the
world—things that we do over periods of time and in specific moments of time. Ethos is the
summation of all acts-as-engagements-as-judgments. And when a speaker manifests qualities or
virtues that an audience wants to see manifest, that speaker not only makes an ethical appeal on
an audience, but an ethical appeal that is made because it is also an act of Burkean identification.

Emotional Integrity as Identification

Like many of Kenneth Burke’s terms, identification is both simple and somewhat elusive. Two
people identify with one another when they see (or think they see) something that they have in
common, such as interests or motives: “A is not identical with his colleague, B,” Burke writes,
Identification is a powerful tool because it often includes “a partially ‘unconscious’ factor in appeal” (“Old and New” 63). When an audience identifies with a speaker, that speaker’s ability to influence increases, since “You persuade a man only insofar as you can talk his language by speech, gesture, tonality, order, image, attitude, idea, identifying your ways with his” (Rhetoric of Motives 55, Burke’s emphasis). “Language” can include all of these strategies of identification with another person. We identify with one another when we see that we share the same means of engagement, and thus identification happens, not just in verbal settings, but also in nonverbal settings (“Rhetorical Situation” 263). Non-verbal identification is often more subtle than verbal identification since we are not always aware that it happens. Emotional integrity is a mode of non-verbal identification. It subtly improves a speaker’s ethos because it enables a speaker to more fully identify with an audience. I will discuss two ways in which this happens: via happiness and via what Solomon calls spirituality.

Identification via Happiness. Like all acts and engagements, there are consequences of living the good and virtuous life. Aristotle says that one of these consequences is happiness: “Character gives us qualities, but it is our actions—what we do—that we are happy or the reverse” (Poetics 1450a18-20; see also Nicomachean 1099b15, 26). Quandahl defines happiness in Aristotelian terms as “doing well, or living well, over time” (13), and Irwin adds that, for Aristotle, “happiness [is] activity of the soul in accordance with complete virtue in a complete life” (155). And, as noted earlier, we can usually substitute the word virtue in Aristotle with the word emotion. Since happiness comes after having emotions and virtues in the right situations, for the right reasons, etc., Solomon can’t help but define happiness as a meta-emotion or a super-
emotion (True 265, 267). Happiness depends on the degree to which our emotional life is “complete”: “As the word would suggest,” Solomon writes, “integrity has to do with ‘wholeness,’” so emotional integrity has to do with the unity of our emotional life” (True 267). For both Aristotle and Solomon, happiness necessarily follows having the right emotion, at the right time, to the right degree, for the right reason, and towards the right objects. I use the terms emotional integrity and happiness interchangeably.

A speaker’s credibility is improved when he or she identifies with an audience, and one way for a speaker to more fully identify with an audience is by manifesting happiness. Happiness is one thing that audiences both want to see in a speaker and want to have for themselves. It is a desire or appetite that all audiences and all human beings have in common. Audiences want to see happiness in a speaker because they want it for themselves. And since the act of listening to a speech takes time, an audience will consider an act of listening more worth their time when a speaker manifests happiness. Furthermore, when an audience sees a speaker that manifests happiness, that speaker partially fulfills the audience’s unfulfilled desire to both see happiness and to be happy. According to May, Quintilian attributes Cicero’s great success to his displaying a “happy felicity” in his speeches (167). A speaker’s happiness becomes persuasive and rhetorical insofar as it fulfills a desire in an audience—the desire for happiness that all human beings already have. And when audiences see a speaker with happiness or emotional integrity, the audience “want[s] more of this” (Booth, Company 202).

Identification via Spirituality. But there is another sense in which emotional integrity leads to identification. And happiness isn’t the only meta-emotion. There is another meta-emotion, one that Solomon calls the “ultimate happiness” and “the ideal expression of emotional integrity”
In *Spirituality for the Skeptic*, Solomon writes that “Reverence, trust, and love . . . are the very essence of spirituality” (29). Spirituality, contrary to what some believe, is *not* a denial of the self, a “killing” of the self, or an “abandonment of the self,” but is an “expansion of the self” (7, my emphasis). Spirituality is when the other is synecdochically related to the self. It is “the thoughtful love of life” (ix, 7), and equals emotions plus rationality (73). Here, Solomon’s notion of spirituality expands on Aristotle’s statement in the *Nicomachean Ethics* that the virtuous person is one “who is in the truest sense an egoist or self-lover. [This] self-love is different in kind from that of the egoist with whom people find fault” (*Nicomachean Ethics* 1169a2-4).

In other words, emotional integrity is spirituality, spirituality is love, and both love and spirituality are the act of expanding the self to include the other, an act that resonates with Burkean identification: “To identify A with B is to make A ‘consubstantial’ with B,” and “In being identified with B, A is ‘substantially one’ with a person other than himself” (*Rhetoric of Motives* 19). Burke also comments on the word “substance” in his *Grammar of Motives*: “etymologically ‘substance’ is a scenic word. Literally, a person’s or a thing’s sub-stance would be something that stands beneath or supports the person or thing” (22). When people identify with one another, they support and sustain one another. And, while the word “substance” is “used to designate what a thing is,” it “derives from a word designating something that a thing *is not*” (23, Burke’s emphasis). Hence, when two people identify with one another and thereby become consubstantial, they both are and are not the same thing. They hold shared assumptions, shared beliefs, and shared attitudes—shared strategies of engagement. In short, they see the world in the same way and are, in a sense, “of the same substance”: “For substance, in the old philosophies, was an *act*; and a way of life is an *acting-together*; and in acting together, men
have common sensations, concepts, images, ideas, attitudes that make them *consubstantial*” (*Rhetoric of Motives* 21, Burke’s emphasis).

Spirituality is identification because it is an expansion of the self to include the other. When the self and the other identify with one another they thereby become consubstantial—of the same substance, which substance, here, refers to holding the same assumptions, *seeing* the same things, and acting together with someone else. About the same idea but in different terms, Solomon writes that

> In some philosophical moments, we think of this expanded personal identity in abstract terms, ‘I am a human being.’ Such thoughts are already a step towards spirituality, for we (momentarily, at least) cease to think of ourselves as particular beings with our own interests and instead think of ourselves in a community of essentially similar beings. (*Spirituality* 125)

We are not just isolated selves that live apart from other people, but who we are is made up, to some degree, of the others that exist in our lives (*Spirituality* 126). Burke agrees that “identification includes the realm of transcendence” between two people (“Old and New” 63), and also seems to relate the ideas of identification with some degree of “spirituality” in “Responsibilities of National Greatness.” Commenting on what it means to be identified with, he writes that the term “brings into focus a more ‘spiritual’ kind of aggrandizement,” an aggrandizement which “centers in the nature of ‘identification,’ the kind of corporate identity the individual citizen possesses by reason of his personal identification with the collective might summed up in our present national greatness” (46).

Happiness isn’t the only thing that an audience wants to see in a speaker. An audience also wants a speaker who identifies with them on a “spiritual” level. When an audience sees that
a speaker experiences, emotes, and engages the world as they do, the audience is not only more easily persuaded, but also sees the speaker as synecdochically related to themselves; they then begin to attribute and assimilate the speaker’s happiness as their own. By so doing, they see in the speaker their own potential and their own future self. In some sense, happiness, both on the part of the speaker and the audience, comes by identification. Identification includes the ancient notion of living the good life, that is, having the right emotion/virtue, at the right time, for the right reason, towards the right person, and in the right circumstances.

Conclusion

Emotions make up our lives, and they define and determine who we are, just as who we are defines and determines the emotions that we have. Furthermore, we are and can be responsible for our emotions because they do not just “happen” to us. Human beings can take control of their lives and can learn to use emotions strategically by cultivating the right emotions in the right circumstances, by the right person, for the right reason, and to the right degree, with right being defined as right by the community in which we act. Identification does happen on an emotional level, and there is reciprocity in identification—what we identify with and how we are identified by an audience are two different but important things to take into account in rhetorical criticism. And when a speaker lives the good life via emotional integrity, audience expectations are fulfilled because an audience wants to see a speaker that has emotional integrity. The speaker enacts the good life as the audience desires it.

Solomon’s assertion that spirituality is about “the tremendous effort to discover or realize our better selves” (Spirituality 140) resonates with Richard Weaver’s affirmation that “rhetoric at its truest seeks to perfect men by showing them better versions of themselves” (25). We are able
to see better versions of ourselves because we’re not just thinking about ourselves as an isolated self anymore, but as a self that is made up of the many others that we interact with, communicate with, and influence on a daily basis. Rhetoric and spirituality show us better versions of ourselves because this new self of ours that we see and discover includes other members of the human family and our shared desires for the good life.
Notes

1 But in one sense, if Solomon drew out the implications of his theory of emotional integrity, he would have to say that ultimately there is a right way to have emotions: for he assumes that having the right emotion at the right time and for the right reason is the right way, and Solomon wouldn’t have written about an ethics of emotions if he didn’t believe that other people shouldn’t think the same thing.

2 It is in this way that an audience is brought from emotion to action (cf. Rhetoric of Motives 42).

3 In The Meaning of the Body, Mark Johnson discusses other ways of knowing via the body that Burke would acknowledge.

4 Pondering Solomon’s phrase “worthy of our company” in this quotation and its unintentional but still implicit connection with Booth’s book The Company We Keep is instructive.

5 Although the very next sentence in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics says this: “as different, in fact, as living by the guidance of reason is from living by the dictates of emotion.” Hence, we have to say that Solomon expounds on Aristotle instead of agreeing with everything that he says. Although the Magna Moralia, on the other hand (which many scholars believe is merely attributed to Aristotle), says that the virtuous person should not be a self-lover, but that the virtuous person is a self-lover only insofar as he or she is good and thereby loves the part of himself or herself that is good.
Works Cited


