



10-1-1962

## Full Issue

Follow this and additional works at: <https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/byusq>

 Part of the [Mormon Studies Commons](#), and the [Religious Education Commons](#)

---

### Recommended Citation

(1962) "Full Issue," *BYU Studies Quarterly*. Vol. 4 : Iss. 3 , Article 15.

Available at: <https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/byusq/vol4/iss3/15>

This Full Issue is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at BYU ScholarsArchive. It has been accepted for inclusion in *BYU Studies Quarterly* by an authorized editor of BYU ScholarsArchive. For more information, please contact [scholarsarchive@byu.edu](mailto:scholarsarchive@byu.edu), [ellen\\_amatangelo@byu.edu](mailto:ellen_amatangelo@byu.edu).

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY BULLETIN

Brigham  
Young  
University

STUDIES

SPRING AND SUMMER 1962

- |   |                               |
|---|-------------------------------|
| The Spectrum of Faith in Victorian Literature                       | <i>Bruce B. Clark</i>         |
| New Address, <i>A Poem</i>  | <i>Carma de Jong Anderson</i> |
| The Pardoner as Huckster: A Dissent from Kittredge                  | <i>Alexander Evanoff</i>      |
| Theoremes Spirituels, <i>A Poem by Jean de la Ceppéde</i> (trans.)  | <i>Clinton F. Larson</i>      |
| Background to the Theory of Arabic Origins                          | <i>M. Carl Gibson</i>         |
| Broken Ice  | <i>Winona F. Thomas</i>       |
| "Snake": A Moment of Consciousness                                  | <i>Robert O. Dalton</i>       |
| The Reflections of Brigham Young on the Nature of Man and the State | <i>J. Keith Melville</i>      |
| A New Emphasis for the American Dream                               | <i>Weldon J. Taylor</i>       |



**Brigham  
Young  
University**

# STUDIES

Volume IV

Numbers 3 and 4

## CONTENTS

The Spectrum of Faith in Victorian Literature	<i>Bruce B. Clark</i>	183
New Address, <i>A Poem</i>	<i>Carma de Jong Anderson</i>	208
The Pardoner as Huckster: A Dissent from Kittredge	<i>Alexander Evanoff</i>	209
Theoremes Spirituels, <i>A Poem by Jean de la Ceppède</i>	(trans.) <i>Clinton F. Larson</i>	218
Background to the Theory of Arabic Origins	<i>M. Carl Gibson</i>	219
Broken Ice	<i>Winona F. Thomas</i>	235
Theoremes Spirituels, <i>A Poem by Jean de la Ceppède</i>	(trans.) <i>Clinton F. Larson</i>	242
"Snake": A Moment of Consciousness	<i>Robert O. Dalton</i>	243
Theoremes Spirituels, <i>A Poem by Jean de la Ceppède</i>	(trans.) <i>Clinton F. Larson</i>	254
The Reflections of Brigham Young on the Nature of Man and the State	<i>J. Keith Melville</i>	255
Theoremes Spirituels, <i>A Poem by Jean de la Ceppède</i>	(trans.) <i>Clinton F. Larson</i>	268
A New Emphasis for the American Dream	<i>Weldon J. Taylor</i>	269

---

University Editor	Ernest L. Olson
Managing Editor	Clinton F. Larson

*Editorial Board for 1961-62: J. Roman Andrus, Jay V. Beck, Lars G. Crandall, Crawford Gates, Bertrand F. Harrison, Charles J. Hart, Clinton F. Larson, Melvin B. Mabey, Truman G. Madsen, Keith R. Oakes, Ernest L. Olson, Blaine M. Porter, Robert K. Thomas, Arthur R. Watkins, Dale H. West.*



*Brigham Young University Studies* is published by Brigham Young University. Send manuscripts to Editor, *Brigham Young University Studies*, Box 12, McKay Building, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah. Enclose self-addressed, stamped envelope. Subscriptions, \$2.00 for four issues; single copies, \$.50 each. Please send subscriptions to Office of University Publications, C-341 Smoot Administration Building, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah.

The purpose of *Brigham Young University Studies* is to be a voice for the community of L.D.S. scholars.

Vol. 60

Provo, Utah

March 25, 1963

No. 7

**Brigham Young University Bulletin.** Re-entered January 25, 1962, at Provo, Utah, as second-class matter under act of Congress of July 16, 1904. Accepted for mailing at special rate of postage provided for in Section 1703, Act of October 3, 1917, authorized July 30, 1918. Published five times during May and September; three times during February, March, April, and August; and twice during January, June, November, and December.

Printed by Brigham Young University Press

# *The Spectrum of Faith in Victorian Literature*

BRUCE B. CLARK

Unlike that of the Romantic Age preceding Victorianism, and of the Neo-classic Age preceding Romanticism, the literature of the Victorian Age—that is, English literature of the middle and later nineteenth century—is characterized, not by unity but by diversity, not by basic harmony in tone and philosophy but by basic contradiction. On the surface this was an age of solidarity and even stuffy placidity, with its triumph as well as its tragedy arising from an over-confidence in things material. But underneath it was an age of turbulence and of ideological revolution. In this age Darwin and his associates were challenging man's traditional confidence in a God-created, God-controlled universe; and on a different scientific front Marx and his associates were propounding theories that would prove equally shattering to western man's traditional faith in divine teleology as well as to the economic structure of his comfortable world. In this age the great labor unions began their climb to power, and Freud with all his impact on life and literature was emerging on the horizon. The Victorian Age began in early nineteenth century romantic idealism and ended a little over a half century later in modern naturalistic pessimism. And the greatest ideological issue of the age was faith versus doubt, with the latter seeming to emerge unsteadily triumphant. Hence the appropriateness of the most famous figure of speech in nineteenth century poetry: Matthew Arnold's "Dover Beach" description in 1867 of the Sea of Faith, which had once encircled the earth so securely, as retreating with a melancholy and fading echo of withdrawal.

Significantly, in Victorian literature not only do we find a general heterogeneity and complexity of tone and philosophy, but we can identify in major works of literature of the period clear expressions of all four of the basic and contradictory

---

Dr. Clark is chairman of the English Department at B.Y.U.



religious positions which human beings may hold: liberalism, fundamentalism, humanism, and existentialism.<sup>1</sup> To see and feel these positions in conflict as voiced by the great writers of the era, a surging ideological tug of war for dominance, is one of the rewards of exploring Victorian literature.

*Liberalism.* Liberalism is "the conjunction of proximate optimism with ultimate optimism." It is affirmative and optimistic with regard to man not only in this life but also in a life after death. "Its theology defines man as good rather than evil, or at least as morally neutral with a high potentiality for goodness." It affirms that man, both as an individual and collectively as part of the social group, is "inherently capable of achieving an abundant and happy life," especially as aided and guided by God, his creator. In mortal life happiness and goodness are richly attainable, and beyond death the promise is even more glowing. "For man is an immortal soul, God is real, and man's destiny is an eternal beatitude in communion with his divine creator."<sup>2</sup>

As the spokesman of liberalism one might choose Tennyson if his voice were not so sentimentally plaintive as he endeavors to make peace with his troubled soul and as he stretches "lame hands of faith"<sup>3</sup> and "hopes" (rather than knows or even firmly believes) that he will meet his Maker face to face.<sup>4</sup> A better choice would be Thomas Carlyle, that impassioned Victorian prophet who cried out against the growing materialistic atheism of his age and vigorously asserted his faith that man and the universe are "sky-woven" creations of

---

<sup>1</sup>I am indebted to Dr. Sterling McMurrin for the definitions of these four terms as I have used them, with his permission, throughout this paper. In a 1954 lecture Dr. McMurrin (then Professor of Philosophy and later Academic Vice-President of the University of Utah, now just resigned after two years as U. S. Commissioner of Education) discussed liberalism, fundamentalism, humanism, and existentialism as the four basic compass points of religious attitude defined in terms of a concept of man. In employing these four terms I am aware, as Dr. McMurrin also was surely aware, that they are used in a somewhat limited sense with disregard for the entangled ramifications of meaning that have at times attached to their use. Especially is this true of humanism and existentialism, as evidenced in the latter, for example, by the varied views of Soren Kierkegaard, Martin Heidegger, Jean Paul Sartre, Martin Buber, and Paul Tillich. I have chosen to use the terms with exactly the same limitation of meaning as Dr. McMurrin employed for them. (See Dr. McMurrin's *The Patterns of Our Religious Faiths*, Eighteenth Annual Frederick William Reynolds Lecture, delivered at the University of Utah January 18, 1954, published by the University of Utah Extension Division as Bulletin No. 7, Volume 45.)

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 12-16.

<sup>3</sup>*In Memoriam*, Section 55.

<sup>4</sup>"Crossing the Bar."

God and that "the fearful unbelief is unbelief in yourself."<sup>5</sup> And the best choice is Robert Browning (1812-1889), that robust optimist whose total affirmation of life here and hereafter makes him an ideal spokesman for liberalism. That he now seems not only the greatest poet of his generation but possibly also the greatest English poet since Milton is not central to the subject of this essay but is a point worth noting in passing.

Optimists are usually either so insensitively worldly or so sentimentally unworldly that they are offensive, and especially so in literature; but Browning's optimism is vigorously attractive even to those who may not share it. Strangely, his most widely known statement of optimism, "God's in his heaven—All's right with the world,"<sup>6</sup> is an extreme and unrealistic view that Browning himself scorned. He put the words into the mouth of a naive little girl, and to ascribe the point of view as Browning's own would be as wrong as to identify Browning with the hypocritically self-righteous Johannes Agricola or the debased Caliban. Nevertheless, Browning does firmly believe that God is in heaven controlling the universe and that, while much is wrong with the world, the potentiality of man in this life is great and the confidence with which he can look forward to life beyond death is equally great. Occasionally Browning speaks directly of himself and his views, as in the "Epilogue to *Asolando*" when he describes himself as

One who never turned his back but marched breast forward,  
 Never doubted clouds would break,  
 Never dreamed, though right were worsted, wrong would triumph,  
 Held we fall to rise, are baffled to fight better,  
 Sleep to wake.

Or as in "Prospice" when with unwavering assurance he looks through death to a reunion with his beloved wife:

I was ever a fighter, so—one fight more,  
 The best and the last!  
 I would hate that death bandaged my eyes, and forbore,  
 And bade me creep past.  
 No! let me taste the whole of it, fare like my peers,  
 The heroes of old,

---

<sup>5</sup>See *Sartor Resartus*.

<sup>6</sup>From the drama *Pippa Passes*.



Bear the brunt, in a minute pay glad life's arrears  
 Of pain, darkness, and cold.  
 For sudden the worst turns the best to the brave,  
 The black minute's at end,  
 And the elements' rage, the fiend-voices that rave,  
 Shall dwindle, shall blend,  
 Shall change, shall become first a peace out of pain,  
 Then a light, then thy breast,  
 O thou soul of my soul! I shall clasp thee again,  
 And with God be the rest!

At other times Browning speaks his views not directly but through the words of one of his characters, as when the worldly but exuberantly likeable Fra Lippo Lippi says,

This world's no blot for us,  
 Nor blank; it means intensely, and means good.

And earlier says, referring to his purpose in painting,

If you get simple beauty and nought else,  
 You get about the best thing God invents.

Browning also speaks through Rabbi Ben Ezra—of his confidence that life is good all the way, even into old age:

Grow old along with me!  
 The best is yet to be,  
 The last of life, for which the first was made.  
 Our times are in his hand  
 Who saith, "A whole I planned;  
 Youth shows but half. Trust God; see all, nor be afraid!"

Of his assurance that man is divinely created and, at his best, divinely motivated to unselfishness:

Rejoice we are allied  
 To that which doth provide  
 And not partake, effect and not receive!  
 A spark disturbs our clod;  
 Nearer we hold of God  
 Who gives, than of his tribes that take, I must believe.

Of his belief in the God-like potentiality of man:

Therefore I summon age  
 To grant youth's heritage,  
 Life's struggle having so far reached its term.  
 Thence shall I pass, approved  
 A man, for aye removed  
 From the developed brute—a god, though in the germ.

And of his conviction that mortal existence is a divinely planned phase of progressive immortality for each human being:

Aye, note that Potter's wheel,  
That metaphor! and feel  
Why time spins fast, why passive lies our clay—  
Thou, to whom fools propound,  
When the wine makes its round,  
"Since life fleets, all is change; the Past gone, seize today!"

Fool! All that is, at all,  
Lasts ever, past recall;  
Earth changes, but thy soul and God stand sure.  
What entered into thee,  
*That* was, is, and shall be.  
Time's wheel runs back or stops; Potter and clay endure.

We feel Browning's vigorous affirmation of life especially in the several poems that develop his doctrine of "success in failure," the "philosophy of the imperfect"—that man should direct all his energy toward achieving high goals, even impossibly high goals, for to set low goals and achieve them is to fail whereas to set high goals and strive unceasingly toward them is to succeed even though the goals may not be fully reached. Browning would on this point agree with the pathetic Andrea del Sarto, who broodingly acknowledges that "a man's reach should exceed his grasp, / Or what's a heaven for?" And even more explicitly the pall-bearer in "A Grammarian's Funeral" expresses Browning's philosophy when he says,

That low man seeks a little thing to do,  
Sees it and does it;  
This high man, with a great thing to pursue,  
Dies ere he knows it.  
That low man goes on adding one to one,  
His hundred's soon hit;  
This high man, aiming at a million,  
Misses an unit.  
That, has the world here—should he need the next,  
Let the world mind him!  
This, throws himself on God, and unperplexed  
Seeking shall find him.

Many times elsewhere Browning communicates his strong spiritual affirmativeness to us, as in the great musical soul-study "Saul," and in "The Epistle of Karshish," that extraordinary psychological study of the impact of Christ's mission



on a non-believer who, in spite of all his stubborn assertion otherwise, reveals himself as almost a believer.

But even more vividly than when Browning speaks explicitly through himself or through his characters, he ironically communicates his views to us indirectly and upside-down through his unattractive characters. In fact, the bulk of what we know about Browning's specific views we infer in this manner. We sense his admiration for sincerity and honesty and simple goodness because the proud, jealous Duke of Ferrara in "My Last Duchess" is so arrogantly materialistic, and because the dying Bishop in Saint Praxed's Church and the soliloquizing monk in the Spanish Cloister are so sensually worldly and (the latter at least) so hypocritically self-righteous. We know that Browning believes man has the responsibility and opportunity, in this life, to work towards his own eternal salvation because the despicable Johannes Agricola (See "Johannes Agricola in Meditation") and the degenerate Caliban (See "Caliban Upon Setebos") believe otherwise, thinking themselves destined to inherit (Johannes) or endure (Caliban) the unalterable whims of an irresponsible God who predestines them to their reward or doom. And we know that Browning believes earthly man should live his daily experiences to the fullest capability in joy and meaning without brooding about the hopes of the past (see "The Last Ride Together") or procrastinating the desires of the present (see "The Statue and the Bust") or rationalizing one's failures (see "Andrea del Sarto").

Out of and through all his poems Browning emerges not only as a great poet but as the most vigorously optimistic writer of his age—optimistic, that is, about the potentiality of man, both in this life (proximate optimism) and in the life to come (ultimate optimism). He stands as a complete and almost perfect example of and spokesman for religious liberalism.

*Fundamentalism.* Fundamentalism is "the conjunction of proximate pessimism with ultimate optimism." Its view of this life is basically negative, but its view of life after death is vibrantly affirmative. It regards man, both individually and collectively, as sinful and helpless. "By nature he is depraved and morally corrupt, his mind and will at enmity with God." Thus, "without confidence in himself, skeptical of human



reason, suspicious of every human effort, and afraid of contamination by the world's culture, fundamentalist man throws himself upon the mercy of God." Burdened with original sin and debased by all the influences of earthly environment, man is lost, but in his unworthiness he is redeemed by an omnipotent and merciful God. "Without merit and convicted of utter depravity, he is yet saved and exalted by the free gift of grace."<sup>7</sup>

As a representative of fundamentalism a case might be made for Gerard Manley Hopkins, who in "The Leaden Echo" laments the transitoriness of beauty and joy in this life and in "The Golden Echo" asserts that all that is lost in mortality endures permanently in immortality with God; but Hopkins is too vividly descriptive of beauty all around us in the God-created universe to be fully fundamentalistic in point of view. A better case could be made for Francis Thompson, who in his masterpiece, "The Hound of Heaven," portrays sinful man as, however unworthy, ultimately overcome by the saving grace of an omnipotent, all-merciful God. But the best example of fundamentalism in Victorian literature is Christina Rossetti (1830-1894), that gifted poet<sup>8</sup> and anguished Christian burdened not so much by personal sin as by a heritage of sin-consciousness in the human race—yet looking forward to redemption through Christ and an after-life of joy and fulfillment.

To understand Christina Rossetti's religious attitude one needs to know something of her life: that as a girl she was by nature affectionate and even gay, that twice she declined to marry men whom she deeply loved, that increasingly as she grew older she lived as an ascetic recluse, yearning for the beauties and pleasures of the world but deliberately withdrawn from them.

The first man whom Christina Rossetti loved was James Collinson, an earnest young painter of pious habits and not very great talent whom she met when she was seventeen. From the very first they loved each other, and for months they made preparations for marriage; but when the wedding-date drew near, Christina refused to go through with it. Her explanation

<sup>7</sup>McMurrin, *op. cit.*, pp. 9-12.

<sup>8</sup>She seems a better poet than her more famous brother Dante Gabriel Rossetti, and perhaps she is England's greatest poetess, second as a poetess in our language only to America's Emily Dickinson.

was that some vacillations by Collinson between Catholicism and Anglicanism made marriage with him impossible, but other reasons more deeply rooted in her religious background seem at work. Religion first drew them together, and now religion held them apart. And Collinson slipped out of her life into obscurity and pathetic memory. Perhaps their romance was doomed from the outset, for even in her earliest poems the theme of love is frequently accompanied by the theme of renunciation, her typical maidens turning from an earthly to a heavenly lover. But whatever the explanation for her actions, there seems little doubt that she sincerely loved Collinson and that, loving him, she rejected him. Her decision caused her months of suffering and probably contributed to her life-long melancholia. But she endured her grief alone. Only in poems, mostly found among her manuscripts after her death, did she write of her broken dreams. When the experience was full upon her, she wrote "Seeking Rest," which ends,

My Spring will never come again;  
 My pretty flowers have blown  
 For the last time; I can but sit  
 And think and weep alone.

"Mirage," written when Christina was almost thirty, indicates that after ten years her sense of loss was still acute:

The hope I dreamed of was a dream,  
 Was but a dream; and now I wake,  
 Exceeding comfortless, and worn, and old,  
 For a dream's sake.  
 I hang my harp upon a tree,  
 A weeping willow in a lake;  
 I hang my silenced harp there, wrung and snapt  
 For a dream's sake.  
 Lie still, lie still, my breaking heart;  
 My silent heart, lie still and break:  
 Life, and the world, and mine own self, are changed  
 For a dream's sake.

And when she was over forty she wrote the sonnet "Love Lies Bleeding," certainly in remembrance of Collinson, perhaps after passing him on the street without his recognizing her:

Love, that is dead and buried, yesterday  
 Out of his grave rose up before my face;  
 No recognition in his look, no trace  
 Of memory in his eyes dust-dimmed and grey;



While I, remembering, found no word to say,  
 But felt my quickened heart leap in its place;  
 Caught afterglow thrown back from long-set days,  
 Caught echoes of all music past away.  
 Was this indeed to meet?—I mind me yet  
 In youth we met when hope and love were quick,  
 We parted with hope dead but love alive:  
 I mind me how we parted then heart-sick,  
 Remembering, loving, hopeless, weak to strive:—  
 Was this to meet? Not so, we have not met.

Christina Rossetti's second love was Charles Bagot Cayley, a shy, myopic, absent-minded person, with a sweet and quaintly unworldly disposition, who entered her heart several years after her refusal of Collinson. Her feeling for Cayley was not as intense as it had been for Collinson, but it was deeper and even more permanent. She loved his gentleness and admired his learning and integrity, this wistful, lonely scholar. His very oddities endeared him to her, as in a thousand timid ways he tried to let her know that he loved her, not realizing that she had long been aware of this. Christina's affectionate little poem "A Sketch" delightfully shows her devotion to this timid and lovable man:

The blindest buzzard that I know  
 Does not wear wings to spread and stir;  
 Nor does my special mole wear fur,  
 And grub among the roots below:  
 . . . . .  
 My blindest buzzard that I know,  
 My special mole, when will you see?  
 Oh no, you must not look at me,  
 There's nothing hid for me to show.  
 I might show facts as plain as day:  
 But since your eyes are blind, you'd say,  
 "Where? What?" and turn away.

Between 1862 and 1866 Christina's love for Cayley reached its climax, though for the rest of his life he remained a wistful figure weaving in and out of her world. William Michael Rossetti, Christina's brother, says that she loved Cayley "deeply and permanently . . . to the last day of his life . . . and, to the last day of her own, his memory."<sup>9</sup> In 1864 Cayley worked up enough courage to propose, and for the second time Christina

<sup>9</sup>W. M. Rossetti, "Memoir" in *The Poetical Works of Christina Georgina Rossetti* (London: Macmillan and Company, 1904), p. liii.

refused to marry a man she loved. It was not that she was without passion. "To give, to give . . . I long to pour myself, my soul," she cried in one of her untitled little poems; "I long for one to stir my deep—for one to search and sift myself, to take myself." Again the reason Christina gave for refusing marriage was religion. To her devout Anglicanism, Cayley's gentle agnosticism was as objectionable as Collinson's vacillating Catholicism had been.

To understand more fully Christina's rejection of Collinson and Cayley, we need to look into the centuries-old heritage of fundamentalist Christianity which viewed man as in a fallen state, depraved, unworthy, at enmity with God, and bearing the heavy burden or original sin with all its propensities towards daily evil. Christina was torn with conflicting allegiances, for on the one hand she yearned with all the passion of her sensitive nature for love and beauty, and on the other hand the deep convictions of her family tradition persuaded her that all desires of the flesh are evil, to be subdued, and that even beauty is suspect. The proper course of religious devotion would compel a renunciation of earthly love and a dedication of oneself to God. For a time Christina thought of following her sister Maria into an Anglican Sisterhood, but she chose rather to renounce the world while remaining in it. Two sonnet sequences—*Monna Innominata: A Sonnet of Sonnets* (14 sonnets) and *Later Life: A Double Sonnet of Sonnets* (28 sonnets)—reflect fully Christina's renunciation of the earth and its fulfilling pleasures and record specifically her devotion to Cayley even while she withdrew from him. Many of the sonnets were written directly to Cayley, as for example number six of *Monna Innominata*, which begins:

Trust me, I have not earned your dear rebuke,—  
I love, as you would have me, God the most;  
Would lose not Him, but you, must one be lost.

Such expressions as this—and there are many in her poems—make clear that Christina's refusal to marry arose from something very deep in her nature which made her shrink from the yearnings of the flesh. In the actions of her life she seems to have been generally successful in subduing the claims of the flesh, but she seems not to have been so successful in conquering her thoughts. Her desires as a woman were never com-



pletely quelled by her piety as a saintly martyr. And the consequence was a terrible sense of guilt and anguish and frustration.

Christina's great source of comfort was a conviction that, although earthly life is a time of suppression and denial, a joyless struggle against sin, life after death is a time of rich fulfillment when all the joys denied in mortality are bestowed in abundance, including the ecstasy of love. Sonnet 10 of *Monna Innominata* will represent the dozens of her poems which express this fundamentalist faith in the beauty of life after death as contrasted with the weary struggle of mortal life:

Time flies, hope flags, life plies a wearied wing;  
 Death following hard on life gains ground apace;  
 Faith runs with each and rears an eager face,  
 Outruns the rest, makes light of everything,  
 Spurns earth, and still finds breath to pray and sing;  
 While love ahead of all uplifts his praise,  
 Still asks for grace and still gives thanks for grace,  
 Content with all day brings and night will bring.  
 Life wanes; and when love folds his wings above  
 Tired hope, and less we feel his conscious pulse,  
 Let us go fall asleep, dear friend, in peace:  
 A little while, and age and sorrow cease;  
 A little while, and life reborn annuls  
 Loss and decay and death, and all is love.

The poems are numerous indicating that for Christina "religion was a hair-shirt"<sup>10</sup> and that she spent much of her life striving to make herself more acceptable to God and eschewing the earthly things that naturally gave her pleasure. Note as further typical these lines from "A Better Resurrection":

My life is like a faded leaf,  
 My harvest dwindled to a husk;  
 Truly my life is void and brief  
 And tedious in the barren dusk;  
 My life is like a frozen thing,  
 No bud nor greenness can I see;  
 Yet rise it shall—the sap of Spring;  
 O Jesus, rise in me.

Many of these poems are rather commonplace artistically, but occasionally a vivid stanza breaks through to show the anguish

<sup>10</sup>Virginia Moore, *Distinguished Women Writers* (New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, 1934), p. 47.

of desire denied but not destroyed. For example, "An Apple Gathering" begins:

I plucked pink blossoms from mine apple-tree  
 And wore them all that evening in my hair;  
 Then in due season when I went to see,  
 I found no apples there.

And "De profundis" reads:

Oh, why is heaven built so far,  
 Oh, why is earth set so remote?  
 I cannot reach the nearest star  
 That hangs afloat.

I would not care to reach the moon,  
 One round monotonous of change;  
 Yet even she repeats her tune  
 Beyond my range.

I never watch the scattered fire  
 Of stars, or sun's far-trailing train,  
 But all my heart is one desire,  
 And all in vain.

For I am bound with fleshly bands,  
 Joy, beauty, lie beyond my scope;  
 I strain my heart, I stretch my hands,  
 And catch at hope.

The most interesting of all Christina Rossetti's poems, both in artistry of language and in ethical content, is "Goblin Market," that shimmeringly poetic allegory of temptation, submission, and vicarious redemption; but it is too long and complex for analysis here. More explicit, and still vividly poetic, is "The Convent Threshold" (note the implications of the title), which reads in part:

There's blood between us, love, my love,  
 There's father's blood, there's brother's blood,  
 And blood's a bar I cannot pass.  
 I choose the stairs that mount above,  
 Stair after golden sky-ward stair,  
 To city and to sea of glass.  
 My lily feet are soiled with mud,  
 With scarlet mud which tells a tale  
 Of hope that was, of guilt that was,  
 Of love that shall not yet avail;  
 Alas, my heart, if I could bare  
 My heart, this selfsame stain is there.

I seek the sea of glass and fire  
 To wash the spot, to burn the snare;  
 Lo, stairs are meant to lift us higher—  
 Mount with me, mount the kindled stair.  
 . . . . .  
 You sinned with me a pleasant sin;  
 Repent with me, for I repent.  
 Woe's me the lore I must unlearn!  
 Woe's me that easy way we went,  
 So rugged when I would return!  
 How long until my sleep begin,  
 How long shall stretch these nights and days?  
 Surely, clean angels cry, she prays;  
 She laves her soul with tedious tears;  
 How long must stretch these years and years?  
 . . . . .  
 For all night long I dreamed of you;  
 I woke and prayed against my will,  
 Then slept to dream of you again.  
 At length I rose and knelt and prayed.  
 I cannot write the words I said—  
 My words were slow, my tears were few;  
 But through the dark my silence spoke  
 Like thunder. When this morning broke,  
 My face was pinched, my hair was gray,  
 And frozen blood was on the sill  
 Where stifling in my struggle I lay.

Anyone reading these lines unacquainted with Christina Rossetti's ascetic life would almost certainly interpret them as an anguished confession of a carnal sinner pleading with her lover to join with her in repentance and throw themselves upon the mercy of God. A search of her life, however, has not as yet revealed that Christina really sinned in a way to warrant this tormented confession. Scholars have sometimes concluded, therefore, that the poem is not to be interpreted autobiographically. But is it not possible for a really sensitive woman, torn by subdued desires, to remember the Sermon on the Mount and suffer almost as greatly for sins of thinking as for sins of doing?

"The Convent Threshold" turns in a significantly fundamentalist manner<sup>11</sup> away from the anguish of the earthly now toward the glory of the heavenly future:

<sup>11</sup>And also with a point of view common in German romanticism. In fact, a study of this poem in relation to the whole movement of German romanticism would be rewarding.



Your eyes look earthward, mine look up.  
 I see the far-off city grand,  
 Beyond the hills a watered land,  
 Beyond the gulf a gleaming strand  
 Of mansions where the righteous sup;  
 Who sleep at ease among their trees,  
 Or wake to sing a cadenced hymn  
 With Cherubim and Seraphim.  
 They bore the Cross, they drained the cup,  
 Racked, roasted, crushed, wrenched limb from limb,  
 They the offscouring of the world.  
 The heaven of starry heavens unfurled,  
 The sun before their face is dim.

And in the heavenly promise Christina even sees love-fulfillment. "How should I rest in paradise, / Or sit on steps of heaven alone?" she asks, and answers with confident assertion as the poem ends:

Look up, rise up, for far above  
 Our palms are grown, our place is set;  
 There we shall meet as once we met,  
 And love with old familiar love.

Thus we see Christina Rossetti as a nearly perfect example of fundamentalism, viewing this life as essentially a place of sin and denial and unhappiness (proximate pessimism) but looking forward to life after death as a time of beauty and joy and love fulfilled (ultimate optimism).

*Humanism.* Humanism is "the conjunction of proximate optimism and ultimate pessimism." Like liberalism, it is strongly affirmative with regard to man in this life and his potentiality for earthly happiness and significance. The humanist is theologically negativistic and ultimately pessimistic, however, for he questions the existence and power of God and he does not believe in human immortality. "For him the proximate world exhausts the whole of reality and existence," and in this world man is alone to work out his problems or be destroyed by them. But the humanist does not sink into morbid despondency, for he has courage and confidence in his own capacities for earthly joy and attainment. Without the security of a sustaining faith in a power beyond himself, the humanist turns to the human race for a cultivation of the good life. The strength of humanism is its "supreme commitment to reason, its faith in man's creative intelligence, faith that he has the power

to discern, articulate, and solve his problems." But the optimistic view is limited, and man's victory is fleeting, for the humanist believes that "the universe is totally indifferent to man and his moral aspiration. Every man must die, and after a brief moment the race will perish, and the drama of mankind will be ended without the slightest trace of memory that it ever began."<sup>12</sup>

George Eliot, who as a young woman lost her Christian faith but retained a high sense of ethics and purpose in society, becoming increasingly an advocate of humanity's seeking the good life, could serve as a representative of humanism. But I have chosen rather to use a combination of Matthew Arnold and Edward Fitzgerald (in *The Rubaiyat*) as examples. The combination seems better than a single representative because humanism as a concept-of-life movement spreads from altruism to hedonism.<sup>13</sup> In Arnold we find altruistic humanism, and in Fitzgerald we find hedonistic humanism.

As a young man Matthew Arnold (1822-1888) hungered to believe in God and a God-controlled universe and individual immortality, but he could find no assuring evidence and after some years of anguished searching became in his mature years an agnostic humanist concerned with the improvement of human society. His poems, most of which he wrote as a young man, tend to be melancholy in tone and to reflect the groping, yearning, questioning, searching attitude of youth. His essays, most of which he wrote as an older man, tend to be dignified in tone and to reflect the reasoned, stabilized wisdom of maturity.

In Arnold's poetry we are especially impressed by his searching, question-asking, answer-hunting attitude. Because the questions he asks are big and the answers he can arrive at are discomfiting, his poetry is shrouded by a melancholy and pessimism too gloomy for humanism. Contrast, for example, Arnold's pessimistic view of old age in "Growing Old" with Browning's optimistic view in "Rabbi Ben Ezra." Note also the negative view of life in Arnold's "A Question: To Fausta," where he says,

<sup>12</sup>McMurrin, *op. cit.*, pp. 16-18.

<sup>13</sup>Although in his essay Dr. McMurrin does not discuss hedonism as an aspect of humanism, it is a strong channel within humanism that should be recognized, at least in literature, and it becomes almost a "religion" for those who seriously advocate it.



Dreams dawn and fly, friends smile and die  
 Like spring flowers;  
 Our vaunted life is one long funeral.  
 Men dig graves with bitter tears  
 For their dead hopes; and all,  
 Mazed with doubts and sick with fears,  
 Count the hours.

And in "The Scholar-Gypsy" Arnold speaks of the "strange disease of modern life, / With its sick hurry, its divided aims, / Its heads o'ertaxed, its palsied hearts." Similarly in "Dover Beach" he describes a world that, although beautiful, is filled with the "turbid ebb and flow of human misery" and which has "really neither joy, nor love, nor light, / Nor certitude, nor peace, nor help for pain." And on through "Rugby Chapel," "A Summer Night," and other poems Arnold describes a beautiful but nevertheless insecure and gloomy world. Although most of his poetry is too unaffirmative to be truly humanistic, at times in it we discover strong leanings toward humanism: in "Dover Beach" and "The Buried Life" he appeals for human understanding in a world of incertitude, in "Pis-Aller" he by implication scorns men who cannot believe in the human race unless they believe in God, in "To a Friend" he appeals to us to "see life steadily and see it whole," and in "Self-Dependence" he advises:

Resolve to be thyself; and know that he  
 Who finds himself loses his misery!

If in Arnold's poetry he is primarily a melancholy searcher for truth that he cannot find, in his essays he is primarily a wise counsel-giver, and thoroughly a humanist. It is not that he has now found satisfying answers to the big questions of his poems. If it were this he would be a liberal or fundamentalist rather than a humanist. Rather it is that, having found no solid answers regarding God and immortality, he ceases to worry about them and turns to human society for fulfillment. Throughout his many essays he is a crusader for culture with responsibility, for propagating "the best that is known and thought in the world."<sup>14</sup> He defines culture as "the love of perfection" motivated by not only a "passion for pure knowledge" but also a "moral and social passion for doing good," and he adds that "not a having and a resting, but a growing and

<sup>14</sup>See "The Function of Criticism at the Present Time."

a becoming, is the character of perfection as culture conceives it." Moreover, individual perfection is impossible without perfection of the group as the whole of society endeavors to cast off the superficiality of "machinery" and the materialistic worldliness of "Philistinism."<sup>15</sup>

This is the *social idea*; and the men of culture are the true apostles of equality. The great men of culture are those who have had a passion for diffusing, for making prevail, for carrying from one end of society to the other, the best knowledge, the best ideas of their time; who have labored to divest knowledge of all that was harsh, uncouth, difficult, abstract, professional, exclusive; to humanize it, to make it efficient outside the clique of the cultivated and learned, yet still remaining the *best* knowledge and thought of the time, and a true source, therefore, of sweetness and light.<sup>16</sup>

In his humanistic essays Arnold does not assert that there is neither God nor immortality; he simply quits brooding about them and turns to human society for achievement in this life. He thus becomes the high priest of twentieth-century agnostic humanism with its emphasis upon the world of human potentiality and its assumption that "supernatural" matters are either untrue or beyond proof.

In Matthew Arnold we find agnostic, altruistic humanism. In Fitzgerald's *Rubaiyat of Omar Khayyam* we find atheistic (or almost atheistic), hedonistic humanism. Some may question the validity of "assuming" that Edward Fitzgerald (1809-1883) speaks his own views through *The Rubaiyat of Omar Khayyam* and may argue that the poem, as a translation, reflects only the philosophy of the twelfth-century Persian poet Omar. However, a study of the translation in relation to its source will reveal that it is very "free," and a study of Fitzgerald's life and other writings will reveal that he apparently was drawn to the poetry of Omar because the two poets were in many respects kindred spirits in point of view towards life. Therefore, *The Rubaiyat* seems in large measure to be an expression of Fitzgerald's philosophy as well as Omar's. And in any case the whole question is rather pointless because, whether *The Rubaiyat* expresses Fitzgerald's ideas or not, it is a major and immensely popular poem of the Victorian Age, and it does reflect hedonistic humanism in the Victorian Age.

<sup>15</sup>See "Sweetness and Light" in *Culture and Anarchy*.

<sup>16</sup>*Ibid.*



Two related themes run through *The Rubaiyat*. One is a serious, somber search for meaning in life and for answers to the age-old questions: From whence came life? Does God exist? Is there life beyond the grave? This search is no less serious or meaningful because the searcher finds no answers or only negative answers. The second theme grows out of the first: Since tomorrow we die with nothing beyond, we should eat, drink, and be as merry as possible today.

The "ultimate pessimism" of *The Rubaiyat* is clear and explicit. Some lip-service is paid to the possibility of a rather capricious and irresponsible creator-God, but not even lip-service is given to the possibility of immortality. Death closes all, as the following lines attest:

Ah, make the most of what we yet may spend,  
 Before we too into the Dust descend;  
     Dust into Dust, and under Dust, to lie,  
 Sans Wine, sans Song, sans Singer, and—sans End!  
(Stanza 24)

Then to the Lip of this poor earthen Urn  
 I leaned, the Secret of my Life to learn;  
     And Lip to Lip it murmured—"While you live,  
 Drink!—for, once dead, you never shall return."  
(Stanza 35)

Oh threats of Hell and Hopes of Paradise!  
 One thing at least is certain—*This* life flies;  
     One thing is certain and the rest is Lies—  
 The Flower that once has blown forever dies.  
(Stanza 63)

However much we may yearn for comforting answers to the perplexing questions of life, says *The Rubaiyat*, the yearning is in vain. We are trivial life-atoms in a mechanistic universe, and to ponder our origin or destiny or reason for existence is pointless.

And that inverted Bowl they call the Sky,  
 Whereunder crawling cooped we live and die,  
     Lift not your hands to *It* for help—for *It*  
 As impotently moves as you or I.

With Earth's first Clay They did the Last Man knead,  
 And there of the Last Harvest sowed the Seed;  
     And the first Morning of Creation wrote  
 What the Last Dawn of Reckoning shall read.

Yesterday *This* Day's Madness did prepare;  
 Tomorrow's Silence, Triumph, or Despair.  
 Drink! for you know not whence you came, nor why;  
 Drink! for you know not why you go, nor where.  
 (Stanzas 72, 73, and 74)

Nevertheless, though we are minute victims existing temporarily in a world without meaningful direction, we should not despair. Rather, we should live in the pleasures of the moment, seeking whatever satisfaction and significance they may provide. This *carpe diem* desire to snatch the utmost of pleasure from the irretrievable, fleeting moment is abundant throughout *The Rubaiyat* and makes the poem humanistic rather than existentialistic. Note the following typical lines:

Come, fill the Cup, and in the fire of Spring  
 Your Winter-garment of Repentance fling;  
 The Bird of Time has but a little way  
 To flutter—and the Bird is on the Wing.  
 (Stanza 7)

A Book of Verses underneath the Bough,  
 A Jug of Wine, a Loaf of Bread—and Thou  
 Beside me singing in the Wilderness—  
 Oh, Wilderness were Paradise enow!

Some for the Glories of This World; and some  
 Sigh for the Prophet's Paradise to come;  
 Ah, take the Cash, and let the Credit go,  
 Nor heed the rumble of a distant Drum!  
 (Stanzas 12 and 13)

Waste not your Hour, nor in the vain pursuit  
 Of This and That endeavor and dispute;  
 Better be jocund with the fruitful Grape  
 Than sadden after none, or bitter, Fruit.  
 (Stanza 54)

*Existentialism.* Existentialism is "the conjunction of proximate pessimism with ultimate pessimism." It is "the religion of meaninglessness and emptiness and despair; the religion that offers no hope here or hereafter, that finds man in his anxieties and leaves him there, that describes him as appetites that cannot be stilled, as impulsive striving that cannot be fulfilled, as passions that find no satisfaction, as irrational action guided by no integrated purpose." Existentialism shares with fundamentalism a negative view with regard to the possibility of happiness or meaningful attainment in this life, and it shares



with humanism a negative view with regard to the assurance of anything beyond this life. It leaves man with no function but to endure as best he can, to exist without purpose and without hope.<sup>17</sup>

Existentialism finds expression in quite a few writings of the later Victorian period. Both Hardy and Housman lean in this direction, fluctuating between the melancholy hedonism of *The Rubaiyat* and full negativism. In his *Shropshire Lad* and other poems Housman has a lilting surface manner almost as lyrically light and lovely as *The Rubaiyat*, but the underneath philosophy is even more grimly pessimistic. Hardy's touch is not quite so light nor perhaps his philosophy quite so grim as Housman's, but Hardy, with great compassion for those who suffer, also depicts people victimized by the double forces of a deterministic universe and an inhumane humanity. William Ernest Henley also is at times somewhat existentialistic, advocating defiant courage to endure the burden of life until its suffering is quelled by the black mystery of death (note "Invictus"). And Swinburne, that amazingly gifted young man with the elf-like body and leonine head who flaunted his paganism and exuberant love-and-hate passions before whatever startled audiences would listen, likewise at times seems totally pessimistic. For example, in the world-weary "Garden of Proserpine" Swinburne writes:

I am tired of tears and laughter,  
And men that laugh and weep,  
Of what may come hereafter  
For men that sow to reap;  
I am weary of days and hours,  
Blown buds of barren flowers,  
Desires and dreams and powers  
And everything but sleep.

And the poem ends:

From too much love of living,  
From hope and fear set free,  
We thank with brief thanksgiving  
Whatever gods may be  
That no life lives forever;  
That dead men rise up never;  
That even the weariest river  
Winds somewhere safe to sea.

---

<sup>17</sup>McMurrin, *op. cit.*, pp. 18-21.



Then star nor sun shall waken,  
 Nor any change of light;  
 Nor sound of waters shaken,  
 Nor any sound or sight;  
 Nor wintry leaves nor vernal,  
 Nor days nor things diurnal;  
 Only the sleep eternal  
 In an eternal night.

But however pessimistic they are at times, Hardy, Housman, Henley, and Swinburne do not seem fully and consistently existentialistic. For such a point of view we need to turn to James Thomson (1834-1882),<sup>18</sup> author of "The City of Dreadful Night." In many of his little poems Thomson is grimly pessimistic. In "Two Sonnets," for example, he explains that his songs are "all wild and bitter sad as funeral dirges" because "the bleeding heart cannot forever bleed / Inwardly solely; on the wan lips, too, / Dark blood will bubble ghastly into view" and adds that his "grief finds harmonies in everything." However, it is in "The City of Dreadful Night," that nightmare shaped into a work of art,<sup>19</sup> where Thomson most fully develops his bleakly negativistic philosophy and where we find the most total and consistent expression of existentialism.

Years filled with poverty, drunkenness, sickness, and death bludgeoned Thomson's sensitive nature to a condition of total despair which culminated in the writing of his magnificently brutal masterpiece, which in its 1123 lines contains "the most formidable and uncompromising use of the speculations of the mechanistic materialists for the purposes of poetry."<sup>20</sup> Superficially the "city of dreadful night" is London with its midnight streets of poverty and crime and desolation, but symbolically<sup>21</sup> the city is life and the agony of human existence. From the beginning to the end of the poem there is no cessation of the overwhelming gloom that smothers the reader through

<sup>18</sup>Not to be confused with the eighteenth century nature poet having the same name who wrote "The Seasons."

<sup>19</sup>Samuel C. Chew, *A Literary History of England*, ed. Albert C. Baugh (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1948), p. 1418.

<sup>20</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>21</sup>Much of the throbbing power of the poem comes through its image-symbols, with the "city" and the "desert" as the two controlling images unifying all the details into a terrifying whole, and with the eyes—burning, bleeding, glaring eyes—and the shroud as the two most vividly morbid secondary images, the latter with its charnel house, grave, and tomb references never letting the reader forget that the city is a city of death, not the death that ends all suffering but the infinitely more terrible death-in-life.

a relentless welter of grim phrases: "dead faith," "mute despair," "cold rage," "false dreams," "false hope," "helpless impotence," "termless hell," "supreme indifference," "unmitigated dearth," "fatal gloom," "unutterable sadness," "incalculable madness," "incurable despair."

They leave all hope behind who enter there;  
 One certitude while sane they cannot leave,  
 One anodyne for torture and despair—  
 The certitude of Death.

(lines 120-23)

Throughout the poem life is described as totally dismal and completely purposeless, with Death-in-Life as "the eternal king." Confronted with such a dark view, one might well ask, as does a haunting figure in the poem,

"When Faith and Love and Hope are dead indeed,  
 Can Life still live? By what doth it proceed?"

(lines 155-56)

And the narrator-poet answers with this bleak analogy:

"Take a watch, erase  
 The signs and figures of the circling hours,  
 Detach the hands, remove the dial-face;  
 The works proceed until run down although  
 Bereft of purpose, void of use, still go."

(lines 158-62)

In the powerful Section 4 of the poem Thomson recounts experiences in his life which compelled his total gloom. Two stanzas with their haunting desert-of-mortality refrain will suggest the mood and grim substance of this section:

"As I came through the desert thus it was,  
 As I came through the desert: Eyes of fire  
 Glared at me throbbing with a starved desire;  
 The hoarse and heavy and carnivorous breath  
 Was hot upon me from deep jaws of death;  
 Sharp claws, swift talons, fleshless fingers cold  
 Plucked at me from the bushes, tried to hold.

But I strode on austere;  
 No hope could have no fear.

.....

"As I came through the desert thus it was,  
 As I came through the desert: On the left  
 The sun arose and crowned a broad crag-cleft;  
 There stopped and burned out black, except a rim,  
 A bleeding, eyeless socket, red and dim;



Whereon the moon fell suddenly southwest,  
 And stood above the right-hand cliffs at rest.  
 Still I strode on austere;  
 No hope could have no fear."

(lines 218-26 and 254-62)

Briefly his "soul grew mad with fear" when a sweetheart came into his life and kindled hope, but

A large black sign was on her breast that bowed,  
 A large black band ran down her snow-white shroud.

(lines 284-85)

And with her death his unrelenting gloom returned that knew neither hope nor fear but only numbed existence with nothing to do but endure.

Beginning in Section 8 of the poem there is a debate between a demonist and a determinist—the demonist arguing that there is a creator God who out of malice and wild irresponsibility made earth and its suffering inhabitants, and the determinist arguing that no God, however capricious and irresponsible, could be blamed for the madness of the universe. The mechanistic-deterministic universe, says the determinist, is brutally hostile to man, but simply because it is that way—not because a God wills it that way.

"Man might know one thing were his sight less dim;  
 That it whirls not to suit his petty whim,  
 That it is quite indifferent to him.

"Nay, does it treat him harshly as he saith?  
 It grinds him some slow years of bitter breath,  
 Then grinds him back into eternal death."

( lines 462-67)

Later in the poem a voice from the darkness reiterates even more explicitly that there is no God, no resurrection and immortality:

"I have searched the heights and depths, the scope  
 Of all our universe, with desperate hope  
 To find some solace for your wild unrest.

"And now at last authentic word I bring,  
 Witnessed by every dead and living thing;  
 Good tidings of great joy for you, for all;  
 There is no God; no Fiend with names divine  
 Made us and tortures us; if we must pine,  
 It is to satiate no Being's gall.



And he aches for the peace of annihilation:

O length of the intolerable hours,  
 O nights that are as aeons of slow pain,  
 O Time, too ample for our vital powers,  
 O Life, whose woeful vanities remain  
 Immutable for all of all our legions  
 Through all the centuries and in all the regions,  
 Not of your speed and variance *we* complain.

*We* do not ask a longer term of strife,  
 Weakness and weariness and nameless woes;  
 We do not claim renewed and endless life  
 When this which is our torment here shall close,  
 An everlasting conscious inanition!  
 We yearn for speedy death in full fruition,  
 Dateless oblivion and divine repose.

(lines 672-85)

The reader may wonder why, with such a philosophy, Thomson did not advocate suicide, or at least did not take his own life.<sup>22</sup> But, anticipating full twentieth-century existentialism, he apparently found some compulsion, not purpose but compulsion, in the mere fact of existence. Even in this, as in his total philosophy, Thomson stands as Victorian England's most powerful voice of existentialism.

### *Summary*

Some literary periods are significant and interesting in the centrality of their philosophy. But, as previously stated, the Victorian Age was significant and interesting in its variety and conflict of philosophy. It was the fresh battleground upon which the war between faith and anti-faith was fought, the war that in our twentieth-century world is still being fought but now seems a little stale and muddled. In the age that ideologically stretched from Browning to James Thomson, the issues seemed clearer and the positions to be taken more sharply identifiable. That we can find in the first-quality literature of late nineteenth-century England vivid spokesmen for all four basic positions of liberalism, fundamentalism, humanism, and existentialism is evidence not only of the complexity of the age but also of its vigorous vitality—that age with its surface solidarity and equanimity and its underneath turmoil and ideological conflict.

<sup>22</sup>Actually he almost did. His death in 1882 was so fully a result of spiritual despair and physical dissipation that it was almost self-inflicted.



## *New Address*

Where once lay golden apples,  
Heady and fermenting,  
A burgeoning crop  
Of sunburned children  
Spills upon the rutted road  
To watch in fascination:  
Asphalt trucks, and giant  
Rollers making uniform  
Each clover hill, each  
Grassy rise, and covering  
Every shadowed shape  
Of lavender with black.

Carma de Jong Anderson

## *The Pardoner as Huckster: a Dissent From Kittredge*

ALEXANDER EVANOFF

As early as 1893, writing in the *Atlantic Monthly*, Mr. George Lyman Kittredge offered a theory of the Pardoner's character which remains virtually intact to the present day. It is not a theory for which the facts of the case would seem to offer unqualified support, but it is a theory which probably finds its basis more upon Mr. Kittredge's established stature as a scholar than upon the actual events of "The Pardoner's Tale." I propose to provide an explanation which, if not unquestionable, is at least as satisfactory and demonstrable as that of Mr. Kittredge. Here, in part, is Mr. Kittredge's supposition concerning the Pardoner in reference to the supposed revelation of lines 916-918. It is taken from *Chaucer and His Poetry*:

The Pardoner has not always been an assassin of souls. He is a renegade, perhaps, from some holy order. Once he preached for Christ's sake; and now under the spell of the wonderful story he has told and of recollections that stir within him, he suffers a very paroxysm of agonized sincerity. It can last but a moment. (p. 216)

Mr. Kittredge has surely overstated his case. The word *paroxysm*, for example, is a very strong epithet to apply to the words which the Pardoner actually mouths. The imputation of sincerity (to say nothing of agonized sincerity) is likewise suspect. But here are the lines to which Mr. Kittredge refers:

I you assoile by myn hy power,  
You that wol offre, as clene and eek as cleer  
As ye were born—And lo! sires, thus I preche.  
And Jhesu Crist, that is oure soules leche,  
So graunte you his pardon to recyve;  
For that is best—I wol you not deceyve!



There is nothing in these lines which would warrant the use of such extreme and intense terms as *agony* and *paroxysm*. Mr. Kittridge's use of terms descriptive of such strong passions may have been dictated by a certain constraint to embroider upon an inference rather than by any pertinence of the facts inhering to the passage in question. Words do not always say what they ostensibly mean. They must be judged in context. We perpetually strive to arrive at both the letter and the spirit of meaning; but as we are sometimes in danger of not looking deeply enough, so we are sometimes guilty of looking deeper than common sense should permit. Thus, too great a subtlety may be as subject to error as a paucity of depth perception. Our standard interpretation of the Pardoner is perhaps overly subtle. The Pardoner is assumed to have undergone a revulsion of feeling against the lamentable and perhaps unavoidable circumstances of his present hypocritical existence. It is assumed that his better nature has, for the moment, asserted itself and that he now speaks in dead earnest when he says, "And Jhesu Crist, that is our soules leche,/ So graunte you his pardon to receyve,/ For that is best—I wol you not deceyve." I would submit that there is nothing in these pious lines to which any pious hypocrite might not subscribe as a matter of policy, a policy ready-made for use at the most opportune moment. One bent upon malpractice would naturally want to assure his victims that nothing is further from his mind than deception. In the course of his machinations, in order to assure ultimate acceptance of his design, he may well speak recognized truths. But every man who cries "Holy! Holy!" need not be sanctified; nor need we assume, with Kittridge, that an honest, though passing, change of heart has taken place. The Pardoner's recommending his auditors to Christ's grace need not obviate the possibility that he is as great a scoundrel as always, and that he may yet hope to profitably dispose of his relics. The Pardoner's object is to sell for profit. He is not personally concerned with ethics. "I wol you not deceyve!" he says. But can we doubt that he would deceive if he could? Whether the Canterbury Pilgrims believe in the efficacy of his baubles or not is of no great concern to the Pardoner. He may sell relics to scoffers and unbelievers as well as to the humbly pious. We know that not every man who buys a rabbit's foot is convinced of its efficacy. Cuff-

links and pendants enclosing four-leaf clovers are sold to others than the Irishman and the superstitious. Not every man who throws salt over his shoulder does so from faith or conviction. Nor need every man who buys from the Pardoner be motivated by faith or conviction. This, the Pardoner knows full well.

In *Chaucer and His Poetry* Mr. Kittredge makes this comment upon the necessity which constrains the Pardoner towards the use of frankness in the Prologue:

"I know I am a rascal," he says in effect, "and you know it; and I wish to show you that I know you know it!" Like many another of us poor mortals the Pardoner is willing to pass for a knave, but, he objects to being taken for a fool. To deceive mankind is his business, but this time no deception is possible, and he scorns the role of a futile hypocrite.

The interpretation is on the whole plausible, but there are some minor and major qualifications that can be made. I would suggest that not for a moment does the Pardoner actually lay aside the role of hypocrite, for hypocrisy is not a character part he plays. It is the hypocrite in him which underlies the only role he really assumes: that is to say, the role of the open, frank, hale-fellow-well-met. Nor does he feel that the final effect of his speech is to be futile and without its appropriate influence upon his listeners. The whole subterfuge of frankness is intended for effect, and that effect is not frankness for its own sake but frankness for the sake of financial advantage. He is a man of unlimited gall, utterly confident in his ability ultimately to influence his auditors in whatever direction he should choose. If he seems to make concessions as in the Prologue and in lines 916-918, he does so only as a tactical strategy in order to allay doubts and establish a community of interests and ideas. It is a stratagem, calculatingly conceived in order to take in and subvert his listeners. He makes no ultimate concession. He makes motions towards concessions which he intends to take back and recoup. His only ultimate intention is to domineer and impose upon his listeners. To accomplish this end, he will take whatever means the present situation may call for. He has unshakeable faith in himself and his powers of eloquence. He has not a groat of respect or reverence for any individual. He is (in his way) a type of the modern huckster, a foot-in-the-door-salesman. His gall and self-esteem are



boundless. Whatever powers of reason and learning he may possess are so utterly self-centered that he is incapable of fully appreciating that the quality and learning of some of his auditors may so completely transcend his own abilities as to nullify the purpose of his efforts, however cleverly conceived and executed.

The Pardoner is an insistent, assertive, domineering salesman who has underestimated the quality of some of his auditors—chiefly because he is incapable of properly evaluating them. He has over-estimated his own powers and has overstepped the proprieties of the occasion. His own arrogance prevents a just appraisal, either of his auditors or of the occasion. An arrogant man fully convinced of the efficacy of his eloquence and trusting in the usefulness of a rattling patter of salesmanship can be made to spume and sputter with inward fury when brought sharply to account by an exasperated Harry Bailly, righteously indignant at the temerity and assertiveness of the Pardoner of this world. Mr. Kittredge assumes that the Pardoner is silent and angry at Harry Bailly's rough jocularity because the Pardoner has suffered a regenerative, but evanescent, emotional crisis in lines 916-918. Mr. Kittredge further assumes that the Pardoner would have paid Harry Bailly "tit for tat" were it not for the evanescent emotional crisis of lines 916-918. Here is the pertinent passage from *Chaucer and His Poetry*:

Under ordinary circumstances the Pardoner would simply have paid him tit for tat. But the moment is too intense for poise. With another revulsion of feeling, the Pardoner becomes furiously angry, so angry that words stick in his throat.  
(p. 217)

Thus, the Pardoner is believed to have experienced two emotional upheavals, and the second revulsion is assumed to have had its origin in the first. This crisis, says Kittredge, speaking of the first, "can last but a moment." Yet when it is the Pardoner's turn to make some reply to Harry Bailly, we are at line 956, some thirty-eight lines and three hundred words following upon the earlier putative regenerative impulse. Substantially more than a moment elapsed. It would seem that sufficient time elapses for one so quick-witted as the Pardoner to recover his equilibrium after his first loss of balance during his "agonized paroxysm of sincerity." But that any loss of equili-



brium occurs prior to Harry Bailly's rebuke is sheer inference based upon events which will bear other interpretations of equal validity with the standard position long supported by custom and usage. The Pardoner's inability to answer seems to stem more from the formidable nature of Harry Bailly's rebuke and character than from any genuine, though momentary, regeneration in the Pardoner's heart. Harry Bailly's personal power and force of character is sufficient reason to account for the Pardoner's anger and speechlessness: anger because Harry Bailly should have had the effrontery to refuse the Pardoner's inane importunities, and, speechlessness because of the force of Harry Bailly's character and invective. To assume that the Pardoner's anger is the result of his being misunderstood is to assume more than the events would seem to warrant. It is precisely the obverse of this which is true. It is rather because he was so thoroughly understood that the Pardoner is speechless—so overcome with surprise and anger. It is because he has been thwarted in his object to make the Pilgrims either purchase or venerate his relics, though they know them to be false. Surprise and anger are the only reactions available to the arrogant under the circumstances which obtained. Let us also acknowledge that Harry Bailly could have held his part in a repartee with any man. In view of the Pardoner's silence it would seem rather foolhardy to contend that the Pardoner could have given as good as he received in a battle of wits with Harry Bailly. Our Host must have had unlimited experience in jocular banter and in dealing with obstreperous, wine-besotted celebrants. The Host, Harry Bailly, who holds the center of the cavalcade, is a first-rate character, and his jokes are no trifles; they are always (though uttered with audacity) equally free with the Lord and the Peasant; they are always substantially and weightily expressive of knowledge and experience. Harry Bailly was keeper of the greatest inn of the greatest city, for such must have been the Tabarde Inn in Southwark, near London; our Host was also in his way a leader of the age. Such a man could well have cut short any speaker. It is difficult to believe that the Pardoner was much too clever a rascal to have received a setback at the hands of Harry Bailly. We need not suppose that only an unappreciated "agonized paroxysm of sincerity" prevents him from replying to Harry Bailly.

The Pardoner's opinion of God and society may be discovered in his description of the authenticity of his credentials:

Our lige lordes seel on my patente  
 That shew I first, my body to warente  
 That noe man be so bold, ne preest ne clerk,  
 Me to destourbe of Christes hooly werke.

Mr. Alfred L. Kellog, writing in the *Speculum* of July, 1951, provides an unequalled interpretation of precisely these lines. He avers that

The Pardoner proclaims the complete superiority of his evil will to God or man. He laughs at human law because it protects him; at the parish priest because he is powerless; at the "lewed people" because they cannot see behind his hypocrisy; at God because he, a miserable mortal, parodies Christian doctrine with complete impunity. Order is turned upside down. (Vol. 26, p. 472)

In spite of this most cogent interpretation Mr. Kellog has found it possible to support Mr. Kittredge's earlier inference. Mr. Kellog's article entitled "An Augustinian Interpretation of Chaucer's Pardoner" will probably remain as the classic analysis of the Pardoner for many years to come. It is expertly written, giving evidence, from first to last, of a profound and incisive understanding; but at whatever point he touches the earlier interpretation he is upon equivocal ground. His seconding evaluation of the Kittredge thesis is beautifully written and marvelously expressive, and I should like very much to accept it both on stylistic and moral considerations if it were not that some of the assumptions are so readily susceptible to challenge and doubt. Here at some length is Mr. Kellog upon the subject of a suffering and tormented Pardoner who succumbs to the promptings of his better nature:

In the prologue one finds a concentrated study of the evil destructive side of the Pardoner: his aversion from God through pride, his defiance of the judgment of God. In the Tale, which is told as a continuation of this defiance of Divine Providence, there is conveyed paradoxically the power of Divine Providence: one begins to see emerging through the Pardoner's defiance the inevitable judgment of God, the tormenting struggle of good and evil, of humility and pride, to which his aversion has made him heir. In the final confession (lines 916-918) there springs forth suddenly fully dis-



closed the side of the Pardoner's being he has been striving to conceal—the nature, created good, suffering, indestructible, whose very presence makes the Pardoner's existence a hidden torment and his whole way of life, folly. Of the final judgment of God, Chaucer tells us nothing. (p. 478)

This, at many points, is an unequalled interpretation. The Pardoner becomes invested with a dignity which we, as ethical, moral beings, would rejoice to find in any soul lost in sin. But the investment of such dignity would seem to be superimposed upon actuality by the warm and sympathetic natures of the Pardoner's commentators rather than from any demonstrable qualities residing within the heart of the Pardoner himself. It is comforting to believe that all men may be saved and that the germ of regeneration lies within the reach of the blackest and most diabolical natures. But whether this be so or not Chaucer tells us nothing. The rest is conjecture. It is not surprising to find that Mr. Kittredge was the first to expound the necessity of dignifying the Pardoner. In his *Atlantic Monthly* article of 1893, Mr. Kittredge provided the following disclosures:

Nothing but a ribald story appears possible from him. But, by showing us the man in a moment of moral convulsion, Chaucer has invested him with a sort of dignity which justifies the poet in putting into his mouth one of the most beautiful as well as one of the best told tales in the whole collection. (p. 833)

The beauty or interest of a tale need not correspond to the goodness or rascality of its teller. Mr. Kittredge cannot have forgotten that Chaucer himself tells so poor a tale that our Host is forced to stop him. Because a tale is "beautiful" and well told need not lead us to believe that it was above the powers of an unregenerate Pardoner to tell. Indeed, the Pardoner knows the story by heart and may have repeated it a hundred times. The poet is justified in permitting the Pardoner to tell his tale on a more substantial basis than on Mr. Kittredge's supposition that Chaucer intended to dignify the Pardoner and thus prepare for his putative "moral convulsion." Mr. Kittredge believes and would have us believe that without a supposed "moral convulsion" Chaucer would hardly have been justified in permitting the Pardoner to tell so fine a tale. But the tale is beautifully appropriate to the Pardoner whether regenerate or unregenerate. I would submit that the



Pardoner is a hypocrite from beginning to end. That he is an unreformed rake and scoundrel. It is my own belief (and it would seem to me an inescapable position) that the story illustrates the Pardoner's ruling passion for material gain. The story is perfectly suitable to the Pardoner since it illustrates and emphasizes his own cynicism and hypocrisy. Furthermore, it does not seem to be Chaucer's purpose to show moral growth or moral development in any of his characters. All of the Canterbury Pilgrims are depicted as completely formed individuals as of the time of their delineation. Nowhere else in *The Canterbury Tales* does he show either a complete, partial, or momentary alteration in the basic character make-up of the pilgrims. Nor does he do so in the case of the Pardoner. The Wife of Bath with her insistence upon sovereignty over men does not alter her character or position one jot, though she is perhaps in even greater need of rehabilitation than the Pardoner. The Miller, the Monk, the Franklin, the Sumpnor do not change, though they could well benefit by even the smallest change. Nor does the Pardoner change. None of the evidence which Mr. Kittredge introduces is final or unquestionable. The Pardoner, in common with all salesmen, is feeling his way, seeking to find a method of approach suitable to the pilgrims' prejudices and knowledge, in his effort to clinch a final sale. He is a peddler who cannot lay his trade aside. He would combine business with pleasure at every opportunity. He is shrewd enough to recognize that frankness is disarming. His shift from early frankness to the apparent sincerity in lines 916-918 can be accounted for by his attempting to offer something in his speech which will please everyone. That is one possibility. It is also possible that he may have recognized the incongruity of lines 916-918 with the tenor of his earlier sentiments. Perceiving that others may also discover the incongruity, he shifts again precipitately into a style and subject matter more in keeping with the earlier professions of his prologue. The Pardoner is a skillful enough salesman to recognize that consistency in his statements will be expected of him from the scholars and "gentles" of the company. Thus, for Mr. Kittredge's putative regeneration of heart I would suggest the following possibilities:

1. Desire from beginning to end to put something over on the Pilgrims.

## THE PARDONER AS HUCKSTER

217

2. Desire to offer sentiments which are likely to find acceptance.
3. Recognition of incongruity—thus, the shift to his first approach.
4. The whole motivated by his recognition that frankness is disarming, and that the sentiment of lines 916-918 is a blunder which would be immediately recognized as insincere.

My victorious King receives his vestments from mocking  
 Men at arms, but he is dressed inwardly  
 In a red royal tunic—so as conqueror  
 Of evil, prince of right, he stands in glory.  
 May I cry for him, for the purple and red,  
 That they might flow from me as tears  
 Yielding meaning, distilled from my contemplation  
 So that my being becomes a spring of his mystery.  
 Our sins are his color, lamb's wool  
 Stained red by the Father,  
 And so as Christ takes him as prince, he takes us,  
 And suffers them. O Christ, Holy Lamb, please hide  
 My red sins, hell's faggots for fire.  
 In my King's redeeming royalty.

—Translated by Clinton F. Larson from  
 "Theoremes Spirituels" by Jean de la Ceppède



## *Background to the Theory of Arabic Origins*

M. CARL GIBSON

In 1912 Julián Ribera read his discourse of reception into the Royal Spanish Academy on the *Cancionero* of Ben Guzmán. His final assertion produced a shock among the learned Academicians: "la clave misteriosa que explica el mecanismo de las formas poéticas de los varios sistemas líricos del mundo civilizado en la Edad Media está en la lírica Andaluza, a que pertenece el *Cancionero* de Ben Guzmán."<sup>1</sup> Although the romanists found Ribera's hypothesis very reasonable, they asked for documentary proof that this lyrical system existed before Guzmán and the Provençal poets who were using it in the twelfth century, whom everyone considered to be predecessors of all *Romania*. In 1915 he presented his proof, but the Academicians, who resisted any radical change in the question of origins, remained silent on the matter. It was not until other scholars continued and extended the investigation on the subject that it gained many new followers. Menéndez Pidal, who in 1919 gave little importance to the theory, by 1938 had become convinced of the Arabic-Andalusian thesis.

Ribera's assertion re-opened for discussion and investigation a thesis which had lain dormant for over a century—a thesis which had been championed by some of the foremost scholars of the last half of the eighteenth century, but which, due to lack of concrete proof, had been all but forgotten.

One of the first to subscribe publicly to a belief in the Spanish-Arabic origin of the Provençal poetic tradition was Xavier Lampillas, who, in his *Saggio storico-apologetico della letteratura spagnuola contro le pregiudicate opinioni d'alcuni moderni scrittori italiana* (6 vols.; Genoa, 1778-81)<sup>2</sup> attempted to establish as fact that the Italian poets of the fourteenth century were directly indebted, through the Provençal, to Spanish poetic tradition.

---

<sup>1</sup>"The mysterious key which explains the mechanism of the poetic forms of the various lyric systems of the civilized world in the Middle Ages is in the Andalusian lyric, to which the *Cancionero* of Ben Guzmán belongs."

Xavier Lampillas was one of the thousands of Spanish Jesuits who, following the mandate of Carlos III in 1767, were exiled from Spain and took refuge in Italy. While there, he became acquainted with the Italian historians Saverio Bettinelli and Girolamo Tiraboschi and took exception to their claims that Italy was the "maestra del orbe" and that Spain was directly responsible for all the poor taste and decadence which had appeared from time to time through the centuries in Italy. In his *Saggio storico-apologetico* he vindicates Spain and makes certain claims as to Spain's priority in time over Italy in certain literary genres. His thorough treatment of Spanish literature of all types and of all periods constitutes the first complete history of Spanish literature.<sup>3</sup>

The claims which Lampillas makes for Spanish priority over Italy in the field of poetry after the eleventh century are based upon his belief that Provençal poetic tradition was taken from the Spanish Arabs. The Italians admit having received their poetic forms from the Provençal poets, and the Spanish, as teachers of the Provençal poets, were, therefore, the teachers of the Italians: "De los Españoles tomaron los Provenzales el uso de la rima, y de estos los Italianos, como confiesan muchos críticos de ambas naciones."<sup>4</sup> (*Ensayo histórico-apologético*, V, 37.)

It was Lampillas's contention that during the eleventh and twelfth centuries poetry flourished in Spain, not only among the Arabs but among the Spanish Christians as well. Around the middle of the twelfth century the Spanish princes who ruled in Provence began to protect and encourage poetry, "y de estos, y de los poetas Españoles, que se exercitaron en la poesía, llamada provenzal (si bien tuvo su origen en España) se comunicó después a los Italianos."<sup>5</sup> (Lampillas, II, 160.) Under the influence of these Spanish princes the Provençal

<sup>2</sup>This was translated from the original Italian to Spanish by Doña Amar y Borbón in Madrid, 1789, with the title *Ensayo histórico-apologético de la literatura española, contra las opiniones preocupadas de algunos escritores modernos italianos*.

<sup>3</sup>See M. Carl Gibson, "Xavier Lampillas: His Defense of Spanish Literature and His Contribution to Literary History," a thesis written for the Department of Languages of the University of Oregon, 1960, as partial fulfillment of requirements for the Ph.D. degree.

<sup>4</sup>"From the Spaniards the Provenzals took the tradition of rime, and the Italians took it from the Provenzals, as many critics of both nations confess."

<sup>5</sup>"And from them, and from the Spanish poets who wrote poetry which is now designated as Provençal (even though it had its origin in Spain), it was later passed on to the Italians."



language arrived at such a high point of perfection that it was imitated and copied by other nations. Lampillas cites the testimonies of Varchi, Bembo, Fontanini (Abp. of Ancyra), and others to the effect that the Italian literary language was made up of many expressions and locutions imitated from the Provençals. He then traces the Provençal poetic tradition to Spain through the Catalan language which, he claims, was the same as Provençal:

La lengua Provenzal, que desde el principio del siglo XII fué la erudita, la de los poetas, y la que enriqueció la Italiana, no era otra que la Catalana, que llevaron a Provenza los Condes de Barcelona. Estos la afinaron con algunas voces y locuciones propias a su país, y así tomó el nombre Catalán-Francés. . . . Montaner escribió su historia en Catalán puro y claro, como acredita la empresa en Barcelona. Y sobre todo, para convencerse más de la identidad de estas dos lenguas, pueden leerse las poesías de los poetas antiguos Provenzales, y se verá quantas voces, y frases tienen propias de la Catalán.<sup>6</sup> (Lampillas, II, 163.)

He bases this rather startling claim that the Provençal language was nothing but Catalan on the supposition that from the ninth century the Counts of Barcelona introduced their native language into those provinces of France where they ruled with the title of Duques de Septimania. Raymundo Berenguer, the third Count of Barcelona, acquired the Condado of Provence in 1080, and it remained under the Berenguer counts until 1245. That prince, claims Lampillas, being very fond of the *bellas letras* sought to beautify the language of his domain and eventually succeeded in making it the most suave and flowery of those times.

Lampillas seeks proof for his claim in the French and Italians themselves, who seem to agree with him as to the effect that the Counts of Barcelona had on the language of

---

<sup>6</sup>"The Provençal language, which since the beginning of the twelfth century was the learned language—that of poets, and that which enriched the Italian language—was nothing other than Catalan, which the Counts of Barcelona took with them into Provence. The Provençals embellished it with some locutions and figures of speech common to their region, and thus it took the name Catalan-French. Montaner wrote his history in pure, clear Catalan, according to the Barcelona press. And furthermore, in order to be even more convinced of the identicalness of these two languages, one can read the poetry of the ancient Provençal poets, and one will see how many words and phrases there are in common with Catalan."



Provence. He quotes Bouche<sup>7</sup> as saying that "por los años de 1110, y en tiempo de los Berengueres, Condes de Barcelona, llegó a tal perfección el dialecto provenzal, que lo aprendían muchos extranjeros, y era comunmente preferida a los más de Europa."<sup>8</sup> (*Histoire de Provence*, Tom. I, lib. 2, cap. 6), and the Italian Jacobo Giunti<sup>9</sup> who holds up the Counts of Barcelona as models:

No hay cosa que conserva más el aprecio de las lenguas que el favor de los Príncipes; el qual las hace florecer y ser estimadas. Buena prueba es de ello la Provenzal en tiempo de los nobles Condes de aquella provincia, en especial del buen Conde Berenguer, Señor tan celebrado, y que por su medio llegó esta al colmo del honor, y a extenderse por toda Europa. Entre nosotros, ya se sabe que se conservó a los principios con todo cuidado, y que después nos dedicamos a imitarla.<sup>10</sup> (*Dedicat. del Decamer. de Bocacio.*)

Although Lampillas does not offer sufficient evidence to substantiate his claims, he is nevertheless thoroughly convinced that Catalan, being, as he maintains, the mother of the Provençal language, played an important rôle in the formation of the Italian language, and thus Spain should receive the credit and the glory for this contribution. Spain, according to him, has the honor and distinction of having contributed to the development of both the modern Italian language and its poetry, through Provençal.

As further clarification for his claims, Lampillas explains that poetry flourished among the Arabs, as did other forms of letters, and by the ninth century Arabic poetry was very common among the Spaniards. It was easy to carry this poetic tra-

---

<sup>7</sup>Probably Charles François Bouche (1737-1795). The earliest edition of his *Essai sur l'histoire de Provence* listed by the Bibliothèque Nationale is that of 1785. Lampillas must have had access to an earlier edition or to the original manuscript.

<sup>8</sup>"Around the year 1110, in the era of the Berenguer Counts of Barcelona, the Provençal dialect reached such perfection that many foreigners learned it, and it was commonly preferred over the rest of the dialects of Europe."

<sup>9</sup>Jacopo Giunti (fl. 1564). Giunti was known primarily for his *Esequie del divino Michelagnolo Buonarroti*, written in 1564.

<sup>10</sup>"There is nothing which preserves the dignity of languages more than the favor of Princes. This causes them to flourish and be esteemed. A good example of this is that of Provençal in the era of the noble counts of that province, especially the good Count Berenguer, a gentleman of so much renown. Because of him the language reached the height of honor, and was extended through all of Europe. We know that this language was nurtured in the beginning with great care, and that later we dedicated ourselves to imitate it."

dition over into the Catalan language, which was already flourishing in the territory of Provence. Once established in Provence, the Counts of Barcelona instructed the Provençals in their poetry as well as in their language, and thus the Spaniards became the first teachers of the Provençals:<sup>11</sup> "Los Españoles (dice Fontanini) no aprendieron de los Provenzales el arte de romancear; antes estos lo tomaron de ellos en el largo tiempo que fueron sus súbditos."<sup>12</sup> (Lampillas, II, 165, quoted from Fontanini Lib. I, cap. 22.)

Some Italian historians held ideas not too far removed from those of Lampillas. Quadrio had recognized that Spain was in a position to introduce and perfect poetry in Provence and in speaking of Berenguer and the Spaniards of his court who went to Provence, says: "no tuvo necesidad el Conde ni sus Cortesanos de que les enseñaran lo que era poesía. Ya entendían en España su mérito, y belleza, porque era tan conocida entre los naturales, como entre los Moros."<sup>13</sup> (Lampillas, II, 167, quoted from Quadrio, Vol. II.) It can be inferred from this, comments Lampillas, that in 1080 the Spaniards already knew the merit and beauty of poetry, whereas, according to Bettinelli, Italian poetry was not even cultivated until 1200.

When the Spanish court in Provence fell, Provençal poetry began decaying.

Recobróse entonces en su país nativo, es decir en España, donde se vieron florecer luego las Academias de *gaya ciencia*, primero en Barcelona, y después en Tortosa. Desde aquel tiempo tuvo tres poetas célebres en lengua Lemosina, que son Messer Jorge (Giordi), Gayme Febrer, y Ausias March.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>11</sup>Some modern scholars hold contrasting views as to the extent of Catalan. Joan Gili, in his *Introductory Catalan Grammar* (2nd ed.; New York: Hafner Pub. Co., 1952), p. 66 ("Historical outline of the language and literature"), says that "from the middle of the twelfth to the end of the thirteenth centuries, Provençal was used as a literary language by Catalan poets and Troubadours . . . . During this period, production in *Catalan* was confined to prose and to popular poetry, mostly of a religious nature."

<sup>12</sup>"The Spaniards (says Fontanini) did not learn the art of writing ballads from the Provençals; rather, the latter took it from the former during the long period when these were their subjects."

<sup>13</sup>"The Count and his retinue had no necessity of being taught poetic art. They already understood its merit and beauty in Spain, because there it was as well understood among the native Spaniards as it was among the Moors."

<sup>14</sup>"It returned then to its native country, that is, Spain, where academies of the poetic art were seen to flourish, first in Barcelona, then in Tortosa. Since that time there have been three famous poets in the Limousin language, which are Messer Jorge, Cayme Febrer, and Ausias March." (Lampillas, *op. cit.*, p. 168.) Lampillas does not identify Messer Jorge or Gayme Febrer, but they



For Lampillas the influence of the Spanish Arabs on the poetry of the other nations of Europe was an historical fact, not a theory. He never refers to the idea as a theory and does not develop it as one. He does not go into a discussion of Arabic or Provençal poetry nor the similarities between the two. His main interest was to point out to the Italian historians and his other readers that modern Spain had poetry *first*, and that Italy is indebted to Spain for her own poetry which developed much later.

If we consider Lampillas's treatment of the question of Arabic origins as an attempt to prove a theory, we must admit that he failed. There are many areas within the whole problem which he does not clarify; for example, to what extent was the Catalan language, which he maintains was taken into Provence by the Counts of Barcelona, modified by the already existing language of that area. He does not indicate specifically the territorial extent of Provence or of the Provençal language, although he implies that it extended into parts of northeastern Spain. He is not specific in naming the poetic forms which may have been carried from Spain into Provence, nor in crediting the Provençals with any native poetic tradition. In fact he does not offer any proof based on sound, unbiased, personal scholarly investigation that the poetry of Provence was derived from Spain. His belief in Spanish origins seems to be based on random statements by historians and on a personal desire to establish Spanish priority over Italian poetry rather than on an objective study of the problem. Nevertheless, his claims, though lacking proof, caused others to investigate the problem and were responsible for the great activity in this area of research by more recent scholars.<sup>15</sup>

---

are probably Jordi de Sant Jordi (Valencia, early XVth century) and Andreu Febrer.

The idea that when Provençal poetry began to decay it took asylum in Spain is also held by Juan Andrés, who writes that many attempts were made in Provence to revive poetry, viz. regal protection, contests, prizes, etc., "but these prizes and this protection were not enough to sustain Provençal poetry, which continues to fall into decadence. Nor could they restore the honor and dignity of the troubadours who were now held in little esteem. It was necessary for Provençal poetry to find honorable asylum in Catalonia, where, as we have already stated elsewhere, it is very probably it had its beginning." (Juan Andrés, *Origen, progresos y estado actual de toda la literatura*, III, 98.)

<sup>15</sup>In the eighteenth century, Andrés, Tiraboschi, Pla; in the nineteenth century, Sismondi, Fauriel, and Schack; in the twentieth, Julián Ribera, Burdach, Singer, Menéndez Pidal, González Palencia, and A. R. Nykl. The whole problem has recently been reviewed. One of the most interesting treatments



The belief in Arabic origins was not entirely original with Lampillas. Several scholars had held similar views before him, and the problem has not been entirely settled yet. Many scholars have thrust the theory aside as foolish, denying that there is any basis for such a belief, but a few modern scholars have taken new interest in the problem, and many new discoveries have been made which seem to corroborate some of Lampillas's claims. We shall attempt to summarize briefly the development and present status of the problem.

One of the first to investigate the theory was apparently Giammaria Barbieri, who in the sixteenth century wrote *Dell'origine della poesia rimata*. Although he was probably the first to write extensively about the Arabic theory, it certainly must not have been original with him, as Piccolo states: "Non vorremo certamente fare risalire al Barbieri la prima responsabilità di questa che chiamiamo pure teoria arabica, per quanto nel suo libro essa si trovi per la prima volta letterariamente e sistematicamente presentata."<sup>16</sup> (Francesco Piccolo, *Sull'origine della poesia*, p. 33.) He summarizes briefly Barbieri's beliefs:

L'influenza degli Arabi non si arrestò alla Spagna e alla Provenza; ma si estese, per altra via, alla Sicilia che essi occuparono fino alla sconfitta subita da Roberto Guiscardo, dopo la quale sconfitta ne restarono ancora tanti nell'isola che Federico II potè più tarde trarne parecchie migliaia nel continente e popolare di essi Lucera.<sup>17</sup> (Piccolo, pp. 31-32.)

It is unlikely that Lampillas knew his work, for it was not generally known until it was revived in 1790 by Girolamo Tiraboschi, one of those who was awakened to the possibilities of the problem by Lampillas's *Ensayo*. Lampillas does not refer to Barbieri or to his work.

Other writers before Lampillas also recognized that the Moors of Spain had a highly developed poetic tradition. One

---

is that of Francesco Piccolo (*Sull'origine della poesia moderna*, Naples, 1938) in which he discusses in some detail the arguments of those who have been most influential in promoting the theory.

<sup>16</sup>"We would certainly not want to ascribe to Barbieri the responsibility of being the first to advocate this which we call the Arabic theory, although in his book it is found presented in a systematic, literary form for the first time."

<sup>17</sup>"The influence of the Arabs was not limited to Spain and Provence, but was extended, by other means, to Sicily, which they occupied up until the sudden defeat by Roberto Guiscardo, after which there remained so many of them on the island that later Frederic II was able to bring several thousand of them onto the continent and populate Lucera with them."

who admitted this was Quadrio, who is quoted by Lampillas as having stated that "the poetry of the Moors of Spain caused the Provençals to be imitators or emulators of their fine taste." (Lampillas, II, 167.)

Had not Lampillas voiced his belief with such conviction the whole problem of Arabic origins may never have come to light. Barbieri's book was already forgotten, and Quadrio's admission had gone largely unnoticed. However, when Lampillas stated his claim, the problem suddenly received the attention of some of the foremost scholars of the time due to the polemic<sup>18</sup> which was in progress. Spanish scholars, for the most part, were anxious to substantiate the claim—Italian scholars, to disprove it. Girolamo Tiraboschi was the exception. After examining Lampillas's claim, he found it tenable and instigated further investigations to prove it.

The next after Lampillas to adopt the thesis was Juan Andrés, who treats it, in his *Origen, progresos y estado actual de toda la literatura*, in even more detail than does Lampillas. Because of the encyclopedic nature of his work, Andrés has enlarged his scope of investigation and attributes much more influence, in all fields of learning, to the Arabs of Spain. His work has been widely circulated and is much better known than is Lampillas's *Ensayo*, and this may account for the fact that modern scholars have credited Andrés, instead of Lampillas, with first advancing the theory of Arabic origins.<sup>19</sup> For this reason we will examine Andrés's views rather carefully, keeping in mind that it was Lampillas who gave impetus to his research.

In a letter to Tirabocshi in 1785 Andrés stated that there was no doubt that the Provençal language included Catalonia,

<sup>18</sup>Lampillas's *Ensayo histórico-apologético* had caused a heated polemic to flare in Italy over the relative merits of Spanish and Italian literature, which assumed tremendous proportions. Many books, newspaper articles, pamphlets, letters, and speeches were inspired by this discussion. See Pedro Sáinz y Rodríguez, *Las polémicas sobre la cultura española* (Madrid, 1919).

<sup>19</sup>A. R. Nykl, in his *Hispanio-Arabic poetry and its relations with old Provençal Troubadours* (Baltimore, 1946, p. 378), speaking of the new interest taken in the theory after the first world war by Burdach and Singer, makes the statement that "Ribera had long before been the strongest defender of the Andalusian origin of the Troubadour versification, an idea which appears to have been first advocated in print by the Jesuit P. Juan Andrés in the last decade of the XVIIIth century."

Ángel González Palencia, in his *Historia de la literatura Árabe-Española* (Barcelona, 1945, p. 310), also credits Andrés with having advanced the theory for the first time in the eighteenth century. Neither Nykl nor González Palencia mentions Lampillas.



Valencia, and Majorca and that it had spread from Spain. This letter was occasioned by the dispute which grew out of the claims of Lampillas and the investigations which it caused. Cian reports on the famous letter as follows:

È fin d'ora curioso l'assistere alle oziose dispute che questi eruditi, digiuni del Provenzale, facevano con mirabile disinvoltura intorno ai caratteri della lingua trovadorica e alle sue relazioni con altre. Su di che l'Andrés in quella medesima lettera scriveva: "Che sotto il nome di Provenzali sieno stati compresi Catalani, Valenzani e Maiorchini non ammette alcun dubbio. Ciò che il Sigr. Ab. Lampillas asserisce e non prova, ed io cerco di provare ma non ardisco d'asserire, è che la lingua e poesia provenzale sia più catalana che francese, e che dalla Spagna, sia passata nella Francia, no al contrario. Se qualche espressione del Barbieri darà lumi su questo, meriterà certamente d'essere rilevata; io osservo nell'indice dei codici de lei citati che una volta si dice lingua catalana la provenzale, ma vi saranno altre espressioni più conchiudenti."<sup>20</sup> (Cittorio Cian, *L'immigrazione dei Gesuiti spagnuoli letterati in Italia*, p. 29.)

The knowledge which Andrés had of Spanish literature, his examination of the long forgotten ancient writers, his study on the origin and development of modern languages and their poetry, the style of ancient Spanish and Provençal poets, and many other difficult but necessary investigations led him to the conclusion which to many seemed a ridiculous paradox: that modern literature had as its mother the Arabic, not only in the field of *bellas letras* but also in the other sciences.

Para manifestar todavía mejor la influencia de los Árabes en la cultura de Europa, he querido traer algunos inventos, cuyo honor se disputan inutilmente muchas naciones, siendo así que los debemos a aquellos. El papel, los números, la pólvora y la brújula han llegado hasta nosotros por medio

---

<sup>20</sup>"It is still interesting to witness the disputes that these learned men, who did not know the Provençal language, carried on with admirable aplomb concerning the nature of the troubadour language and its relationship to others. Andrés wrote about it in that same letter: 'That under the name of Provençal had been included the Catalonians, the Valencians, and the Majorcans, there was no doubt. That which Lampillas asserted but did not prove, and that which I seek to prove but am not anxious to assert, is that the Provençal language and poetry are more Catalonian than French, and that they passed from Spain to France, and not vice versa. If some quotations from Barbieri will throw light on this, they will certainly merit being revealed. I observe in the index of the codex quoted by him that once the Provençal language is referred to as Catalan, but there are probably other statements which are more conclusive.' "



de los Árabes;. . .<sup>21</sup> (Juan Andrés, *Origen, progresos y estado actual de toda la literatura*, I, xviii-xiv.)

Andrés's investigations led him to the discovery that the types of poetry used by the Provençal poets were correspondent to those used by the Arabs of the same and earlier periods. (See Andrés, II, 74-75.) Although he reached this conclusion, he had no dated Arabic examples of poetry to back his claim. Recent discoveries are now showing that his conclusions were essentially correct. He also discovered that the Arabs had poetic academies before Italy, France, and the Christian part of Spain. (See Andrés, I, 461-62.)

Although Andrés was a remarkable scholar and was correct in many of his conclusions, he was not entirely free from error. Although the original manuscript of the French epic *La Chanson de Roland* had not yet been discovered, the epic hero had been known for centuries in Spain. Many legends had grown up, and these had given rise to other poems in all languages of Europe concerning the great hero. Andrés firmly believed that the first romance about Charlemagne's expedition into Spain and the battle in which Roland was wounded was written in Spanish, later translated or adapted into French, and imitated in Italy. He felt that this "fact" was a decisive factor in proving that poetry had its origin in Arabic and came into Europe through Spanish. (Andrés, II, 79-80.)

This theory that the knightly hero was of Arabic and Spanish origin need not seem so strange when we consider that it was a widely accepted notion that the tradition of courtly love and the serenading of ladies by gentlemen came from the Spanish Arabs.<sup>22</sup> Even Bettinelli, so reticent to attribute anything to Spain, concedes this:

Sin dall'anno 1065 i Mori di Spagna erano giunti a gran coltura di vivere. Cordova poteva dirsi la loro Atene, e Abderamo il loro Augusto; la mollezza, il lusso, l'arti, gli amori vi furono in voga, e a sommo studio di dilicatezza. Sembra di là esser venuta la cavalleria romanzesta pei giuochi, pugne, corse fatte in presenza delle donne, e premiate per loro mano, come la musica, e la poesia amorosa,

<sup>21</sup>"In order to manifest even better the influence of the Arabs on the culture of Europe, I have sought to refer to some inventions, the honor for the discovery of which is being disputed by many nations in vain, since we owe them to the Arabs. Paper, numerals, gun powder, and the compass have all come to us through the Arabs; . . ."

<sup>22</sup>See Saverio Bettinelli, *Risorgimento d'Italia negli studi, nelle arti, e ne' costumi dopo il mille* (Bassano, 1786), Part I, page 11.

con cui celebravan le Belle.<sup>23</sup> (Bettinelli, *Risorgimento*, I, 9, note.)

This admission that the Arabs were the source of the European chivalric tradition seems also to be an argument that the Arabs were the source of Provençal literature, if Piccolo's statement is correct:

La poesía dei trovatori essendo nel convincimento pressocchè generale una manifestazione della mentalità cavalleresca, il problema delle origini della cavalleria si converti nel problema delle origini della letteratura provenzale.<sup>24</sup> (Piccolo, p. 130.)

Juan Andrés claims that the Spanish Arabs were writing books on music theory while the rest of Europe had no more idea of it than the psalms and antiphonies. It is not entirely impossible that the first vernacular songs were those which were written by Alfonso X who transferred the Arab taste for popular music into Spanish. This seems even more logical, explains Andrés, when we consider that the Spaniards took some musical instruments from the Arabs, some of which are still used today and that these instruments spread, along with the new taste for vernacular music, through France where they were known by the name of *moriscos*. "Dos cosas insinuaré: una es . . . que si los Provenzales tomaron de los Árabes el exemplo de poetizar, habrán igualmente recibido de los mismos el uso de aplicar la música a la poesía, . . ."<sup>25</sup> (Andrés, II, 61 note.)

Andrés, like Lampillas, held the view that ancient Provençal was not limited to southwestern France but that it extended southward into eastern Spain. This opinion seems to have been held by many eighteenth-century scholars, among whom was Gaspar Escolano, a Valencian writer whom Andrés quotes as an authority on the languages that pertain to Spain:

<sup>23</sup>"As far back as 1065 the Moors of Spain achieved a very high level of culture. Cordova could be called their Athens, and Abderamo their Augustus. Effeminacy, luxury, the arts, and courtly love were in vogue there, and they attained the utmost refinement. It appears that from there came the adventurous chivalry with its games, jousts, and races, which were carried on in the presence of the ladies, and rewarded by their hands, as well as the music and poetry of love with which beauty was honored."

<sup>24</sup>"The poetry of the Troubadours being, according to general acceptance a manifestation of the chivalric mentality, the problem of the origin of chivalry converts itself into the problem of the origin of Provençal literature."

<sup>25</sup>"I shall suggest two things: one is . . . that if the Provenzals took from the Arabs the tradition of poetizing, they also took from them the custom of setting poetry to music; . . ."



La tercera y última lengua maestra de las de España es la lemosina, y más general que todas . . . por ser la que se hablaba en Provenza, y toda la Guyena y en la Francia gótica, y la que agora se habla en el Principado de Cataluña, Reyno de Valencia, Islas de Mallorca, Menorca, Ibiza y Sardenia.<sup>26</sup> (Part. I, lib. I, cap. XIV.)

Don Antonio Bastero, in the preface of *Crusca Provenzal* (Rome, 1724), also gives the Catalans credit for having created the language spoken in Provence and of having taken it into France along with their political rule, just as they later spread it through the kingdom of Valencia and the Balearic and Sardinian islands.

Although most people, according to Andrés, refer to the French who live in the Langue d'oc region as Provençals, this was not the case anciently. Originally the language was not called Provençal but Catalan, and the people who spoke it were also called Catalan: "Esto lo comprueba la sobredicha disputa, en la qual Alberto, tomando la parte de los Catalanes, baxo este nombre comprehende también los Gascones, Provenzales, Lemosines, Bearnese, y Vianese."<sup>27</sup> (Andrés, II, 64.) Andrés also cites several ancient and modern French authors who concur that the *langue d'oc* was the Spanish Catalan language and that it is referred to by some as *Catalana-francesa*, all of which proved to him, as it had to Lampillas, that Spain was the originator and mother of the Provençal language and poetry, hence the source of modern poetry.

Pero para venir más particularmente a nuestro asunto, la poesía provenzal no se cultivó menos en España que en Francia; y así tal vez puede decirse de esta más que de la lengua, que nació en Cataluña, y pasó después a Francia.<sup>28</sup> (Andrés, II, 66-67.)

After Andrés had published his work in 1782, one of his fellow Spanish Jesuits, Esteban Arteaga, in a note in his book

<sup>26</sup>"The third and last principal language among those of Spain is the Limousin, and it is even more general than the rest, because it was spoken in Provence, and in all of Guyenne and in Gothic France, and it is the language which is now spoken in the principality of Catalonia, the kingdom of Valencia, the islands of Mallorca, Menorca, Iluzá, and Sardinia."

<sup>27</sup>"The forementioned dispute proves this, for in it Alberto, taking the side of the Catalonians, under this name included also the Gascons, Provençals, Limousins, Bearnese, and Vianese."

<sup>28</sup>"But to come more directly to our subject, Provençal poetry was cultivated no less in Spain than in France; and it can probably be said of the poetry even more than of the language, that it was born in Catalonia and afterwards passed into France."

*Rivoluzioni*, opposed the theory of Arabic origins, taking the stand that Provençal poetic models were to be found not in Arabic but in low Latin and ancient Nordic songs. He felt that a note would be sufficient to combat the theory, but when in 1790 Giammaria Barbieri's book was published by Tiraboschi,<sup>29</sup> who had enlisted the aid of Andrés and Pla because of their knowledge of the Catalan language—which he felt would facilitate the interpretation of Provençal poetry, Arteaga was no longer content with a mere note; he wrote a long dissertation of 118 pages (*Dell'influenza degli Arabi sull'origine della poesia moderna in Europa*, Rome, 1791) in which he politely disagreed with Tiraboschi, but his respectful tone prevented further polemic.<sup>30</sup>

Although there were several scholars during the nineteenth century who upheld the theory, no great discoveries were made which might be presented as proof either for or against it. It has not been until the last forty-five or fifty years that the theory has inspired more fruitful investigation. Julián Ribera's discourse before the Royal Spanish Academy in 1912 added new fuel to the smoldering problem and awakened an interest in such great contemporary scholars as Menéndez Pidal, González Palencia, and others.

Menéndez Pidal has produced evidence from Christian chroniclers of the early twelfth century of the poetic activity among the Arabs at that time and the testimonies of Arabic writers indicating that a Cordovese poet at the end of the ninth century imitated songs of Christians who lived within the Mussulman dominions, "lo cual nos permitía afirmar, que también los Cristianos de Andalucía tenían sus canciones siglos más antiguos que las de los cancioneros gallego-portugueses."<sup>31</sup> (Menéndez Pidal, *Los orígenes de las literaturas románicas a la luz de un descubrimiento reciente*, p. 19.)

---

<sup>29</sup>Just how much influence Lampilla's *Ensayo* had upon Tiraboschi's newly-found interest in Arabic origins is not known. It is probably great. Andrés had been moved, by his own admission, to investigate the theory by what Lampillas had written, but it is doubtful that Tiraboschi, the main opponent of Lampillas's *Ensayo*, would have made any such confession.

<sup>30</sup>For a more detailed discussion concerning Barbieri's stand and the polemic over the Arabic theory between Tiraboschi and Arteaga, see Francesco Piccolo, *op. cit.*, pp. 19-69.

<sup>31</sup>"All of which permits us to affirm that the Christians of Andalusia also had their songs which were centuries older than the Galician-Portuguese *Cancioneros*."



The investigations of the Arabists Julián Ribera and A. R. Nykl, the Egyptian Abdalaziz Al-Ahwani, and Professor E. García Gómez have given us testimonies of two Arabic writers of the twelfth century: Aben Bassam and Al-Hijari, who affirm that a well known poet of Cabra named Mucáddam invented a new poetic genre, the Muwashshaha, a form which broke from the classical Arabic meters and which permitted a final strophe written either in vulgar Arabic or in the Romance of the Christians. This poet flourished from 888 to 912.

It was hoped that some of the Muwashshahas containing Romance could be found, but none had at the time of Menéndez Pidal's writing. The scholars responsible for these discoveries had to content themselves with another Arabic-Hispanic poetic form, the *Zéjel*, a type of Muwashshaha without the final verses in the vernacular but which are written in conversational Arabic with occasional romance words and phrases. Of particular interest is the collection of Aben Guzmán, who died in 1160. His *Zéjel* number 82 has a complete verse in Romance which sings of the coming of dawn: "Alba, alba es de luz en nuevo día,"<sup>32</sup> a verse which, according to Menéndez Pidal, belongs to a "albada mozárabe," or a tradition of dawn (*alba, aube*) songs. And what is most significant, "el género literario de la albada era popular entre los Cristianos de Andalucía, medio siglo antes que se escribían las primeras albadas provenzales hoy conservadas, las cuales pertenecen a fines del siglo XII."<sup>33</sup> (Menéndez Pidal, p. 25.) The dawn song, a poem in which two lovers lament the arrival of morning, the hour of painful separation, in Provence, always has a refrain in which appears the word *alba*, announcing the arrival of a new day; this word appears three times in the song attributed to Rimbaut de Vaqueiras (end of twelfth century): "L'alba, l'alba, oc l'alba!"; "Well," exclaims Menéndez Pidal, "now we know that much earlier it was done in Córdoba, also repeating *alba, alba!*" This is an isolated example, but according to this scholar: "Para muestra basta un botón!"<sup>34</sup>

In 1948 Professor S. M. Stern announced the discovery of twenty Hebrew Muwashshahas which had been imitated from

<sup>32</sup>"Dawn, dawn, a new day is breaking."

<sup>33</sup>"The literary genre known as the *dawn song* was popular among the Christians of Andalusia a half century before the first Provençal dawn songs which are preserved today were written, which was at the end of the twelfth century."

<sup>34</sup>"Only one button is needed as a sample."

the Arabic and which did have final verses in very archaic Spanish. A little later Stern published a Muwashshaha in Arabic with final Romance verses, and García Gómez is studying another series of Arabic texts. Others (including Francisco Cantera and Dámaso Alonso) are engaged in very important tasks which promise to shed more light on the problem.

A. R. Nykl, in his *Hispano-Arabic poetry and its relation with the old Provençal Troubadours*, assures us that within Poitou the harsh Poitevin dialect could hardly have appealed to people whose character attracted them towards the South. We may, he says, consider the population of this corner of France as psychologically akin in many ways to the Celtiberians of Spain, extending from the Basque provinces to Galicia. A similar connecting population linked southern France, through Roussillon, with Cerdagne, Aragón, Navarre, and Catalonia. Within this entire region the population would be inclined to enjoy the songs and melodies of the same general kind:

The situation could be briefly stated thus: what is now called Old Provençal poetry was *formed* in its beginning, about 1100 A.D., from elements which were partly autochthonous and partly imitated from the poetic activity in the neighboring Christian-Muslim world in such of its aspects as happened to please the contemporary Méridional taste, especially at the Courts of Noblemen. Guillaume IX of Poitiers and the first Troubadours gave these new forms a vogue, and later a further eclectic elaboration of form and content took place. When after 1200 A.D., following the Crusades against the Albigenses, the social conditions and taste changed, and too much learning replaced the freshness of feeling and the novelty of joyful melodies, Old Provençal poetry gradually died of excessive codification and *trobar clus*. (Nykl, p. 373.)

Guillaume of Poitiers, who is generally regarded as one of the first Provençal Troubadours, had a very close connection with Spain. Nykl tells us that Sancho, the King of Aragón, was related by marriage to the Count of Toulouse. When Sancho died in 1094, the twenty-two-year old queen, Philippa, accepted a marriage proposal from Guillaume de Poitiers, and toward the end of 1094 became his wife. It is not unlikely, he says—and his argument is based on speculation rather than fact—that in her suite there were singers acquainted with the Andalusian ways of composing songs, from whom Guillaume



may have learned something. If we compare forms of poetry used by Guillaume, Marcabru, and Rudel with the forms which were current in contemporary Muslim Spain as well as in the East, "we cannot fail to find considerable analogies which can only be explained by imitation or adaptation, not by independent invention." (Nykl, p. 379.)

The status of the theory at the present time seems to be as follows: Some of the foremost scholars in the field are converted to the idea that Julian Ribera's assertion is correct, and they are searching for further conclusive proof. That further evidence will be found there is little doubt, judging from the recent findings, but whether or not sufficient proof of a conclusive nature can be produced which will have enough impact to overcome the inertia of conservative, traditional beliefs is questionable.

Xavier Lampillas was not responsible for all the research that has gone into the theory of Arabic origins, for the problem was not entirely original with him. However, he did give impetus to the investigations which began in the late eighteenth century, since he was responsible for the interest which Andrés took in the problem and for the activity of Tiraboschi in this area of study. The thesis which Lampillas advanced, far from being disproved, has become the subject of much research and has been substantiated to the satisfaction of many scholars. Lampillas has never received proper credit for his part in the advancement of the theory; he was actually a prime motivator in the investigations which have been conducted since his time.

## *Broken Ice*

WINONA F. THOMAS

Grampa's hands looked like big, hairy spiders as he caught hold of the edge of the lunch table to lift himself to his feet. When I saw him looking at me, I drew my shoulders up by my ears and huddled low in my chair.

"Laura," he said, his watery eyes glaring at me from under his bushy, red-tinted eyebrows. "Get me my wraps and I'll go and see how things are up at the barn."

I hurried to do what he said. When I handed him his cap and coat, he squeezed my arm.

"Don't stand there like a stump," he said, pushing me stumbling toward the table. "Get the table sided and the dishes washed."

Mama is little, dark-eyed and pretty. People say that I look like her. She put her arm across my shoulder.

"I'll do the dishes myself," she said. "Laura has helped me all morning. A girl needs to have time to play on Saturdays. Her face is so pale that it looks like she needs some sunshine to put pinkness into her cheeks." She turned to me. "You should take your sled and go up on the hill. There's a group of boys and girls up there."

"Bu-bu-bu-but I-I-I-I d-d-d-don't wa—"

I'd have liked to tell her how the boys jerk my sled on the steepest place on the hill or toss sticks under the runners so that the sled stops quick and I fall off, but talking takes me too long.

"You do as your mother says," Grampa snapped.

He put on his wraps and got the steak bone from his plate. As he stepped out of the door, he leaned his cane against the house and took the short-handled pitchfork he always carried when he walked outside. I watched him as he staggered up the path jabbing the fork tines deep into the frozen snow to balance himself.

Fluffy, my gray cat, came out from under the granary walking on three legs. She had walked that way since the time a year ago when she was so anxious for her milk that



she had put her paws on the edge of the milk bucket and lapped at the foam when Grampa set it down. I knew that she shouldn't but I couldn't get to her fast enough to save her. Grampa said some awful words and shoved the tines of the pitchfork right into her. She didn't die but when she got well, she couldn't use her one leg. Now, I wondered why he coaxed her along by letting her smell of the bone. He usually scatted her away.

When he came back and settled down by the heater, I tucked my jeans into the top of my boots and put on my red coat, scarf and mittens. I reached into the cupboard for a scrap of meat for Fluffy, and my arm bumped a bottle of jelly and sent it rolling across the kitchen linoleum.

"You stupid idiot," Grampa said, half rising from his chair and striking me across the back with his cane. "I don't see why your folks don't put you in the nut house where you belong."

"Don't you ever do anything like that again," Mama said to him. "If anyone is sent away it won't be she."

She held me tight and wiped away my tears.

"You mean me? Huh? I guess there's not room enough for both of us around here any more."

"Go on, dear," Mama said. "I'll clean up the floor."

As I started up the path, Grampa put his head out of the door.

"You stay away from the barn," he called. "A barn is no place for a girl to play."

"Bu-bu-bu-but . . ."

"Don't you bu-bu-bu-but me. Do what your mother said for you to do."

He watched me as I came back and went up through the orchard pulling my sled.

I was thinking how nice it was before Grampa came to our house to live. He had visited us when I was little, but he never even looked at me. He liked my little brother, Tommy. Everyone liked Tommy; he was so cute.

"You can have the upstairs bedroom," Mama said, when Grampa came with his shabby bags and boxes.

He was her father but he looked at her like he hated her.

"I won't have an upstairs room," he rapped out. "If I could climb steps I could still climb hills and mountains and wouldn't have to quit herding sheep."

"But, Grampa, we only have two bedrooms downstairs. Jack and I have one and the children have the other," Mama said.

"Then the kids will have to move."

He packed his things in and dumped them on my nice clean bed.

Tommy and I hated sleeping upstairs. It was so far that sometimes Mama and Daddy didn't hear us when we called. We often cried ourselves to sleep.

Just before Christmas time I caught the measles and was awfully sick. When I was better, Tommy got them and was so sick that he died. Grampa cried and threw his cane at me.

"She did it!" he yelled, sort of blubbering. "She's a murderer."

He came toward me with his hands out like he wanted to choke me. I threw my arms around Daddy's waist and hid behind him.

"Stop that, Grampa," Daddy said, very cross. "We all feel bad but no one is to blame. Don't ever let me hear you say such a thing again."

He didn't say it out loud, but he'd sit and look at me and shape the word with his mouth. It made my heart hurt deep in my chest.

They buried Tommy just before Christmas. Mama put a new teddy bear in the little coffin to keep him from being too lonesome. I cry now every time I think of him down there in the dark all alone.

Grampa seldom spoke to me, but his eyes followed me and made me think of Fluffy's when she is ready to spring on a mouse to kill it.

After Tommy died I had to sleep upstairs all alone. It was worse than before. When Mama tucked me in bed and turned off the light, I'd shut my eyes tight and cover my head with the blanket. Each time the stairs creaked I imagined it was Grampa coming up to kill me. I didn't dare to open my eyes for fear of seeing him there with his fingers ready to put around my throat and squeeze. He told Mama that he couldn't climb the stairs, but I knew he could. I heard him up there one day when I came home from school early. I crept outside and waited until Mama and Daddy came home.



I didn't like to think of Tommy down there in the dark all alone, but I couldn't think of anything else. Since Grampa said I killed him I thought maybe it was my fault and that I should be choked. My throat ached all the time. My head felt like it had a tight band around it, and my stomach was sick and vomity. It got so that I had to jerk my chin and shut my eyes before I could start to talk to people. It was only when I talked to Fluffy and the other animals that the words came out right.

When I got up into the orchard where Grampa couldn't see me, I leaned my sled up against the corral fence and climbed over it so I could go into the barn through the north door. After the brightness of the sun shining on the snow, the barn was dark and cold, but I liked the smell of the hay and the cattle. They made it seem a friendly place.

"Kitty, kitty," I called, running through the tunnel Daddy had cut in the hay.

Fluffy didn't come. Maybe she was in her box I had fixed for her in the hayloft. Maybe she was having her kittens. If she was I hoped Grampa wouldn't find them and drown them like he had the last ones. She had those in the granary, and they were only a few days old when I saw Grampa come out through the door with something in his hat and Fluffy trotting along by his side looking up at him. I knew he had the kittens. He went through the garden toward the canal. I ran and caught hold of his arm. He pushed me away and dumped them into the water. They put out their little pink paws and started to swim on the swift water. I got a stick and Fluffy and I ran along the bank and tried to save them, but they went over the weir and drowned. Both Fluffy and I were sick afterward.

"Kitty, kitty," I called again.

I found her inside the south door. Her head was mashed in and blood and gray stuff oozed out of the cracks. Grampa's meat bone lay by her. A bloody, hairy spot on the side of the calf pen showed where he must have hit her head as he swung her around by the tail.

I kneeled down in the scattered hay and stroked her. She didn't move or purr or anything. She was all dirty like he had wiped his boot on her. Now she could never make herself all clean and smooth with her little pink tongue. I felt the bumps

in her stomach where the kittens were. They were dead, too. I would never get to see what they looked like. My heart hurt and my throat ached. I wanted to cry but I couldn't as I carried her up to the hayloft.

I had laid her down in her box and sat down on my crossed legs by her when I heard the door of the calf stable pushed open. It was Grampa. He started to gather the litter up from the floor with his pitchfork and toss it out of the window. I was terrified. My heart pounded, and I hardly dared to breathe. When I thought of what he might do to me if he found me there, my teeth chattered until I slowly brought my mittened hand up to cover my mouth so he wouldn't hear them. I didn't dare to shift my position or straighten out my cramped legs. I just sat there and shivered.

He went back outside and came into the barn through the south door. He stood there letting his eyes get used to the dimness, then he looked for Fluffy. When he couldn't see her, he peered into the dark corners and the tunnel. I knew he was thinking he hadn't quite killed her, and she had crawled away. After a minute he took the straw puller and his pitchfork and went to get clean straw for the calves to lie down on.

The straw pile almost filled that end of the barn. Rain and melted snow had leaked in on the rounded top and frozen into a heavy roof. By pulling the dry straw from underneath, Daddy and Grampa had dug a deep cave under it. The ice was left jutting out at the top. As Grampa backed out with his fork load of straw, a big piece of ice broke off and started to slip. It would hit him.

"L-l-l-look out!" I screamed, staggering to stand up on my numb legs.

Grampa fell back into the straw as the ice hit the floor and shattered into bits. He got up brushing the chaff from his beard and clothes as he squinted up at me. He didn't once look at the broken ice but leaned on his pitchfork, his face twitching and his mouth opening and closing like a gasping fish. His dark eyes drew together until I felt like I was looking into the double barrels of Daddy's shot gun.

"So you—you—!" he screamed but he slobbered until he couldn't talk. "You—you come down here, and I'm going to teach you to do what you're told."



He held his fist high in its dirty, woolen mitten and shook it at me. I couldn't move. I was so frightened.

"Come down or I'll fetch you down." He was still screaming.

I knew he couldn't climb up to where I was. He must have thought the same thing because his voice quieted down, and when he spoke, each word was like a bee sting.

"Come down," he said, through his broken, yellow teeth. "If you don't I'll throw this pitchfork right through you."

I reached up and held onto the sloping, cobweb-covered rafters over my head. I knew he could do what he said. He had thrown a pitchfork at Daddy's prize Hereford bull, and the tines went right through his neck. He had staggered around the yard dragging the fork and dripping blood until he dropped to his knees and rolled onto his side and died.

"Come down!" his voice cracked like a whip.

As I took a step forward, he pulled off his mitten and clutched the fork handle with his white-knuckled hand as he raised it above his head and pointed it like a spear. I couldn't take my eyes from the tines that shone beneath the manure-covered shank.

Something snapped above his head and I looked up. More ice broke loose. I put my mittened hands over my mouth to shut off a scream and tried to close my eyes. They wouldn't shut.

My legs gave way under me and I sat down on the hay as the ice struck him. It spoiled his aim. The fork hit the edge of the heavy beam that held up the hayloft and dangled there, one tine deep in the wood.

His legs, in their dirty boots, twitched a little and were quiet. I knew he was dead. Now he couldn't call me a murderer anymore. I could have my bedroom back again. He couldn't kill any more of my kittens. I stood up slowly. My head felt nice and clear and the achyness left my throat. Without looking again at the broken ice, I let myself down from the hayloft and ran out of the barn.

The world was so clean and fresh it looked like the Lord had just made it. Every twig on the orchard trees was downy with frost. The sun turned the edges of everything to gold and the trees made feathery blue shadows on the white ground. I felt warm and at peace as I lay down on my sled, and with

## BROKEN ICE

241

a push from my foot, went sailing down the orchard slope. I stayed there coasting until I saw Mama coming to get me at supper time.

“Where are you, Laura?” she called. “Are you all right?”

“I’m up here, Mama, and—oh, yes; everything is all right now.”



O Cross, the old horror and fear of you are gone;  
Christ has redeemed you from the wrath of God.  
His blood becomes your elixir at Golgotha,  
Where it fell to the earth it redeemed,  
And so you are changed where you grow  
From wormwood to moly; you are polished  
Smooth, the Church of the elect.  
Fair tower of David, where the shields of God  
Repose on your doubled ramparts,  
All men, and I, come to you, refuge!  
You hold the gates of hell ajar;  
Your image across them crosses me.  
May you keep me from their captivity!

—Translated by Clinton F. Larson from  
"Theoremes Spirituels" by Jean de la Ceppède

## “Snake”: A Moment of Consciousness

ROBERT O. DALTON

D. H. Lawrence's unique poetry has received new recognition; some of the old criticisms seem feeble. Many of them revolve around his lack of conventional poetic form. It has been said that Lawrence's poetry quite misses being customary free verse, that he produced inferior poetry akin to some of Whitman's lesser pieces. T. S. Eliot considers Lawrence's poetry in reality unfinished preparation for poetry: he had created a beginning, a sort of prose outline with his writing, but had not bothered to carry through and produce an artistic work—an organic whole. A. Alvarez in his fine essay “D. H. Lawrence: The Single State of Man”<sup>1</sup> counters the criticisms of the lack of form in Lawrence's poetry. He explains that Lawrence was not an indifferent craftsman: he was attempting to record his insights—his feelings—as they were experienced; he endeavored to be intense enough in his poetry to transmit his feelings with verity. His struggle to gain “a complete truth to feeling”<sup>2</sup> could not be hindered by conventional poetic form. It does appear that the more form Lawrence imposed upon his thought the less successful his poetry is: close rhyme, regular beat seem to cut off circulation from his poetry. And in his own interpretation of free verse Lawrence explains that those who err in their understanding of his free verse fail to comprehend that the style follows no cut pattern but is a law of its own: one might write and the impression captured with honesty would make the free verse; the verse would not be imposed upon the recorded perception, though Lawrence's Frieda stated that Lawrence as artificer worked and reworked his poetry after it was written from initial impulse. Lawrence essays, then, to catch what he calls “The instant; the quick,” understanding flowing from an instant of pure consciousness—a perception which flows sensitively from the soul and will

---

<sup>1</sup>Alvarez, “D. H. Lawrence: The Single State of Man,” *A. D. H. Lawrence Miscellany*, ed. Harry T. Moore (Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1959), p. 343.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 342.



not stand being tamped immediately into a framework and whittled at severely. But we are not merely excusing Lawrence, stating that getting away from sanctioned poetic form is justifiable on any pretext. His struggle to snare "The instant; the quick" is not easy; working up enough poetic intensity in the writing to transfer a feeling which is with one for a moment as part of his deep inner self is no simple task.

The form of a poem is not the only criterion by which it may be judged; this may not be, in fact, the most important aspect for judgment, although without other strengths to offset or to explain, say, peculiarities or deficiencies of form one might certainly discard a poem because of the writer's ineptness regarding form—sloppy rhyme, inadequate meter, common speech. To make a poem succeed, causing the reader to respond, the poet must manage to create a mutual feeling or understanding between himself and the reader. This might be called a kind of compassionate agreement which is based upon feeling arising from reading and comprehending the poet's intentions. If the reader can enter into sympathetic agreement with the poet; that is, if he can concur with the author's attitude toward his subject in the poem—if the reader can also agree that the tone of the poem is appropriate to the subject, then he will be satisfied regarding the poet's honesty and sincerity. On the other hand, if it appears that the author's bearing or posture behind his poem differs from the tone of the poem, one would conclude that—unless the poet has some secondary motive for pretending an emotion—the poet is being hypocritical. For example, a reader who considered the tone of a poem tragic but who also suspected the author's attitude toward the subject to be one of mere frivolity might justifiably feel furious for such hypocrisy. What we are attempting to say, then, is that a poem may seem wanting in form—Lawrence, again, has been criticized for this—but succeed because of its impact upon the intelligent reader, an impact stemming from the author's intense desire to convey the truth. Though we ignore the fact that A. Alvarez defends Lawrence, saying that there is indeed form in his seeming formlessness, we may justify his poetry from this other angle, the aspect of esthetic honesty. If Lawrence is nothing else, he is profoundly earnest in his attempt to capture and convey an insight which he experiences in, for example, "Snake."

Admittedly, "Snake" is lacking in conventional form. It is written in free verse in which the rhythmic pattern seems faltering and uncertain. The images appear strewn planlessly through the poem. It is cluttered with clichés like "undignified haste," "dreadful hole," "finished him off," "writhed like lightning," "stared with fascination." Hence, if one were to judge this poem solely on form, one might, despite Alvarez's defense, look askance at it. Yet the poem is a remarkable achievement. We hesitate to say that it is an accomplishment in spite of its faults, for with Lawrence's intense effort to catch his "instant," the deceptive carelessness of form is hardly a fault after all. Supposing that Lawrence did not know what he was doing in "Snake" would be another matter; the scattered images, the clichés, the free verse would indicate a poet hardly in control of his medium. This is not the case with Lawrence; he is exerting power over his material all the way. And being in control he is able to arouse the reader's sympathies, causing him to enter into sympathetic agreement with Lawrence through his poem.

Pursuing Lawrence's "Snake" further, let us try to determine what he perceived in his "instant." "Snake" is from Lawrence's collection entitled *Birds, Beasts and Flowers*, a group of poems which have been thought of by some as mere vivid fragments of description falling considerably short of the conventional ideal because of carelessness of form. They are much more than this, and one reason they are we have mentioned: Lawrence struggles intensely to relate honestly the feelings which well up in him in an acutely conscious moment; he labors to get as close as possible to what he really feels. In 1923 Lawrence finished this collection in New Mexico. The collection belongs to a larger group of "unrhyming" poems which he began after his marriage and continued until his death. Some critics—Kenneth Rexroth, for example—consider these poems representative of the mature Lawrence in masterful control, or, as Lawrence himself might say, under the control of his demon.

Lawrence, as the story goes, living temporarily in Taormina, Sicily, arose one morning and went outdoors to the water trough for a drink. As he arrived he noticed a snake gliding from a hole in the garden wall. He stood, pitcher in hand, watching the long, yellow snake sip from the basin. The reptile



lifted his head, looked at Lawrence, then drank again. Lawrence recognized the snake as poisonous, felt afraid, and upon overcoming his fear picked up a log and, as the snake returned to its hole, threw the log at it. He missed, but caused the snake to lose its dignity and hurry from sight. The emotion Lawrence had succeeding that of fear was shame for having tried to destroy it. His feeling was that, though the creature was indeed venomous, it was beautiful: kingly. This is, then, essentially Lawrence's experience which resulted in "Snake." But there is more to be appreciated in the poem than the vivid description of an autobiographical incident.

Running through Lawrence's prose works is a theme which might be summed up as conflict between excessively mental man and Lawrence's idea of his counterpart, vital, earthy man. He had in mind that a man or woman functioning only as part of an artificial society dependent upon mind could not fulfill himself. Lawrence discusses in his criticism, for example, the degeneration of the sexual act between man and woman into something dirty as the result of sex being mentalized and not kept (as he might say) in the loins where it belongs. Making an act which should be a natural and beautiful part of the human function something shamefully covert takes from it the joyous spontaneity which it deserves. Our civilization has made intercourse an action to be dwelled upon mentally, nastied, played with to stimulate eroticism. This state, Lawrence would say, is the result of a mechanized civilization in which ultracerebral man has made sex a "dirty little secret." In this modern attitude toward sex there is falseness; for the very naturalness of the act, making of it something mentalized neither before or after, but an instinctive physical function is its truth to nature. And such an acceptance by a man and a woman helps fulfill their relationship. Agreement between Lawrence and T. S. Eliot concerning the degeneracy of man's point of view concerning sexual relations is evident here. Eliot points in "The Wasteland" to the nonexistence of meaning or fulfillment for people because this creative function has sunk to dirty talk and passive boredom. The perversion of this natural act contributes to Lawrence's theme. He rejects the synthetic, sterile modern culture and pleads for fidelity to a living and primitive culture, in which man follows his natural emotions and instincts rather than the machinations of a mind

imbued with the doctrines of contemporary civilization. Lawrence is convinced that the man is not really alive who follows the dictates of his mind alone and represses his natural desires—instincts which filter up from his lower consciousness. He thought the conflict between the cerebral consciousness and natural man could be resolved only by one's following what he called "blood consciousness." In opposition to the mechanized, synthetic society of Lawrence's era as well as today, then, is the natural world in which man following his blood consciousness will become more acutely sensitive to the natural world and the creatures in it as he follows his instincts, forgetting his mental indoctrination.

Now we begin to see in "Snake," as in other of Lawrence's successful poems, why in form they are seemingly careless. In the endeavor to identify himself more closely with the natural world that man is really a part of, Lawrence must, to achieve such an association, write with as much naturalness as possible, getting away from what he would consider man's artificial structuring of words to fit some preconceived goal. Since, as we mentioned, Lawrence was in control of his material and knew what he was about, a poem like "Snake" does not fail from a formal point of view. Lawrence is striving to feel deeply enough to attain some realization from out of an identification through blood consciousness with the world of nature to which Lawrence believes we belong and through which we can fulfill ourselves as, for example, we have discussed in connection with the sexual act. To transfer the received intuition to us, Lawrence forsakes purely formal poetic method and keeps close to his natural feelings, essaying to capture that perception of the moment—and in its securing lies Lawrence's power in, for instance, "Snake."

Now in speaking of Lawrence's identification with nature, we are indeed saying that he is a nature poet. In a sense he is related to a nature poet like Wordsworth, who celebrates nature and man's potentiality for getting close to nature; he is kin also to Emerson and Thoreau, who extolled man's possibility for getting nearer his creator by affiliation with Nature, which is the incarnation of God the Over-soul. In the poems of *Birds, Beasts and Flowers* he often presents the encounter between animal and man in nature, subject matter presenting the opportunity for the usual extension of normal sympathetic



affections creating a bond between poet and reader. However, Lawrence goes beyond the nature poets or the transcendentalists in respect to what he sees in such a meeting in nature: Lawrence discerns not only common ground in such an encounter, but also a conflict between man and nature; he sees that there is an antagonism between man and nature as there is between man and man or man and woman, an effect of man's mental set in the modern world. Lawrence sees further yet: he perceives that man is part of the natural world and that though there is an irreconcilable difference creating conflict, say, between a man and a snake there is also a profound relationship between the two which hearkens back to origins which are mistily antediluvian. In "Snake" Lawrence recognizes that a man and a snake are in some ancient sense related, that there is something to be intuited from this acknowledgment which will help man fulfill himself.

Let us go back to that morning in Taormina when Lawrence kept his rendezvous with the snake. In the poem Lawrence says this of the meeting:

In the deep, strange-scented shade of the great dark carob-  
tree  
I came down the steps with my pitcher  
And must wait, must stand and wait, for there he was at  
the trough before me.

These lines set early a direct, unadorned, dignified mood, giving a reader the awareness that the author is dealing with a large theme. We refer especially to the initial line of the preceding quotation which helps set an atmosphere both intense in its nearness and color, and timeless with that impression engendered by "deep, strange-scented," and gives also the feeling of hot, humid air through which one sees the "great dark carob-tree," a locust tree with brilliant red flowers. And this feeling of dignity and timelessness is augmented by Lawrence's description of the snake.

He reached down from a fissure in the earth-wall in the  
gloom  
And trailed his yellow-brown slackness soft-bellied down,  
over the edge of the stone trough  
And rested his throat upon the stone bottom, . . .

In the hot, quiet, vivid atmosphere the snake moves fluidly as in a dream; for Lawrence—and the reader—it seems as

though there is no motion or time as the snake comes king-like out of nature to the trough. Lawrence feels deeply as though there is something significant in this moment out of time in which there is felt some mutual relationship between him and this antagonist. The poisonous snake can leave him something for his fulfillment. For the moment the snake is as human as he. And Lawrence, feeling this, personifies the reptile in his poem.

He lifted his head from his drinking, as cattle do,  
And looked at me vaguely, as drinking cattle do,  
And flickered his two-forked tongue from his lips, and  
mused a moment,  
And stooped and drank a little more, . . .

It is as though at this instant Lawrence could also say that the carob-tree itself was not an "it" but a "thou," so completely is he in that breathless, timeless moment a part of the natural world through his blood consciousness. Here it seems that Lawrence in that spot of time is an anachronism to modern man, being hylozoistic in his intense perception, giving life to matter, identifying the tree as a living entity, the snake as an equal, even animating the earth: "burning bowels of the earth."

But what with all this is the recognition that Lawrence has which contributes to his fulfillment? Man in his mechanistic, scientific progress has lost his unity with the natural world from which Lawrence would say he has sprung. His "progress" has alienated him from the natural world and from his own natural emotions, drives, instincts so that he is a synthetic creature leaning upon his scientific, mechanically oriented achievements which have become blown out of proportion in their importance insofar as they have reference to a complete life. A line from E. E. Cummings's "Pity This Busy Monster Manunkind" sums this idea up succinctly as he says that "manunkind," a victim of the "comfortable disease" of progress

plays with the bigness of his littleness  
—electrons deify one razorblade  
into a mountainrange; . . .

Thus we see how one-sided we are, rendering adulation to the artificialities of our progress, ignoring nature from which we have sprung. We hardly realize it now, but we are still at the mercy of the seasons despite our technological advancements,



awaiting with blind assurance the coming of a spring allowing crops to be planted, giving us food to sustain life. But how far removed we are from this world of which we are a natural part! We use, for example, a calendar to tell us when spring is coming. Our experience does not tell us, for we are not that closely associated with nature—we must have a synthetic means for reckoning, a calendar. The ancient Aegeans who preceded the “enlightened” Greeks were thought to be hylozoistic: they worshipped inanimate objects, endowing them with life. A tree was to them as alive as the next man. This is to us a crude belief, but these people were as artless as the nature with which they identified themselves. The Periclean Greeks made tremendous strides in cosmology, learning of the intricacies of the heavens, but they were not so natural as the Aegeans, having forgotten somewhat their origins. They could predict eclipses, but they were very mistaken about natural phenomena, believing, for instance, in spontaneous generation. These Greeks must have felt in some degree as we do even today: a man standing at night under the cold, starry sky may shiver in his aloneness, but sitting at the edge of Walden Pond he may feel undisturbed, for here he has the company of living things which are closely related to him. The man will realize that he and perhaps a snake have aspects which are different, inconceivably so, from each other. Yet they both belong to something more comprehensive than themselves. Again, the man Lawrence and the snake have something unfathomably antediluvian in common, and this in that timeless instant is realized by Lawrence: this is a comforting fact, that though the snake be poisonous he is united somehow with Lawrence in that immense class of living things. There is with this the perception that this base—perhaps hylozoistic in a sense—is broad: all living things are on one side of the scale and the stars and missiles are on the other. Man is not the only being endowed with life; he is a creature who has in fact not always been here and who may not always be here. We are not even the only custodians of life; we have to recognize that there are other life forms in this broad base, and in some respects we are akin to them in the sense of misty antediluvian time. A recognition of this kinship as Lawrence knew it at that rendezvous can help man to truly view himself in his rightful place upon this earth. But, as we have said, man’s development in this mechanistic, scientific age has taken

him further away from an association with natural phenomena which would help him to know himself, to live more fully. Rather, man is coming more and more to think in terms of abstractions—to insist upon poetry being constructed according to some conventional abstract form. Man is living less and less in the world of experience, of sights, sounds, blood consciousness.

Men are becoming complete time-clock punchers, walking with eyes upon feet; they are becoming adding machines, efficiency automations, not so much like the animals from among whom they sprung. Even the chair a man sits in he recognizes as a collection of speeding atoms and not as the solid object which it appears to be.

One wonders if all of that which we have developed as the poet himself might, struck Lawrence as he and the snake gazed at each other. No doubt Lawrence at that instant was hardly intellectualizing to himself upon the experience. But the important thing is that the realization was there "On the day of Sicilian July, with Etna smoking, . . ." That impression which we have been elaborating on passed, and

The voice of my education said to me  
 He must be killed,  
 For in Sicily the black, black snakes are innocent, the gold are  
 venomous.  
 And voices in me said, If you were a man  
 You would take a stick and break him now, and finish him  
 off.  
 But I must confess how I liked him,  
 How glad I was he had come like a guest in quiet, to drink  
 at my water-trough  
 And depart peaceful, pacified, and thankless,  
 Into the burning bowels of the earth.  
 Was it cowardice, that I dared not kill him?  
 Was it perversity, that I longed to talk to him?  
 Was it humility, to feel so honoured?  
 I felt so honored.

The perception was there but so was the conflict, built up out of Lawrence's indoctrination—that intellectual idea that a man is unalterably opposed to the reptile, an enemy to it. And in conflict with this indoctrination is the feeling that here is an equal, even a king: Lawrence felt honored to have him at his water-trough. To Lawrence the broad base to which both he and the snake belong matters more than people moving about



upon the face of the earth; the first moment in which he and the snake face each other there is some recognition in his consciousness of that mysterious life existing far below the level of the surface vicissitudes of each day.

The poem, then, is built around a profoundly earnest instant of visionary experience through which Lawrence divines the kinship of himself and the snake, perceiving man's true position in relation to the rest of animate nature—that man is a part of this nature and cannot fulfill himself in the artificial cosmos which he has created for himself, in which he draws further and further from his beginnings. And it is because of this recognition that Lawrence cannot attempt to transfer the experience he had by the use of a structured kind of conventional poetry seeming to him a part of the synthetic life that man has drawn himself into: his poetry must be natural and free to catch that deathless moment which he experienced. After repeated readings of "Snake" one feels that Lawrence succeeded in transferring his recognition to the reader.

And when he had thrown at the snake and had made the reptile depart "in undignified haste" Lawrence felt ashamed.

And immediately I regretted it.  
I thought how paltry, how vulgar, what a mean act!  
I despised myself and the voices of my accursed human education.

And I thought of the albatross  
And I wished he would come back, my snake.

So that he could reaffirm in some way that marriage which he felt so briefly—but deeply—Lawrence wishes the snake to come back. He considers the albatross a symbol in the sense of his having committed a crime against nature of which he will not rid himself until he can somehow exhibit his love and his connection with the animate creature from out of nature that came to meet him and somehow affirm their relationship.

And I have something to expiate;  
A pettiness.

Lawrence's concern was for fulfillment of one's life. A consummation of life does not come through a withdrawal from the world of nature of which man is a part into the world of nonrepresentational design. Fulfillment comes, rather,

through humble recognition that we are a part of the natural organic world—we are not aloof from it. With this recognition comes a greater awareness of one's place and purpose in the world. Such an instant of real, intelligent awareness may come in a moment out of time as one may experience when he is in complete correspondence with the nature to which he belongs. The awareness was with Lawrence upon meeting the snake that morning in Taormina. When one comes closer to understanding Lawrence's purpose in his writing, he no longer rejects such a work as *Lady Chatterly's Lover* because it is obscene. Lawrence's endeavor was certainly not to shock or to stimulate the emotions: his attempt was to show how a life may be fulfilled through realization that man is ultimately a part of nature and that as such he should follow his instincts, his blood consciousness, ceasing to withdraw from the natural world of which he is a part into the inanimate, synthetic, mechanistic world of which we are becoming so much a part.



Great Sun, flame of Christ,  
You have passed through four houses of the Zodiac:  
Through Virgo, where Christ was born of flesh  
From His soul, matched and matchless;  
Through the Waterbearer, when He sorrowed  
In tears, blameless; through the Bull,  
When He offered His body on the gallows.  
Now he enters the house of the Lion  
With a mane of light whose beams  
Enflame the hemispheres, and His voice  
Is the shaking thunder, the roar from the grave  
That brings the world of beasts to the yoke  
Of His redemption.

—Translated by Clinton F. Larson from  
“Theoremes Spirituels” by Jean de la Ceppède

# The Reflections of Brigham Young on the Nature of Man and the State

J. KEITH MELVILLE

## *Free Agency*

"The religious consciousness asserts both the sovereignty of God and the freedom of man," according to Donald MacKenzie; and he added: "It is the task of theology to furnish a *Weltanschauung* consistent with both these positions."<sup>1</sup> The nature of man and his relationship to God are fundamental to the theologian. The nature of man and his relationship to society are basic to the political theorist.

Brigham Young's homilies lacked the sophistication of a philosophical terminology; nevertheless his homely ideas constituted a *Weltansicht* which was not restricted by limits of time nor space. Man's mortal nature, free agency included, was important to Brigham Young in terms of immortality; *tempus* was only a small portion of a linear *aeternitas*.

Brigham Young pictured life as a vision of a stream of water which appears to flow out of a cloud and disappears in another. Man is born, passes along a linear road of time, and dies. The bounds of man's existence appear to be birth and death; but, like the stream, the clouds block an eternal perspective. Brigham Young asked the question: "When was there a beginning?" And he answered: "There never was one; if there was, there will be an end; but there never was a beginning, and hence there will never be an end: that looks like eternity."<sup>2</sup> Parting the clouds which bound mortality, Brigham Young viewed man as a being organized of element designed to endure eternally.<sup>3</sup> He said: "We are all in eternity, . . . it is boundless, . . . and we have never been out of it. Time is a cer-

---

<sup>1</sup>Donald Mackenzie, "Free Will," *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, ed. James Hastings (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1925-27), Vol. VI, pp. 124-127.

<sup>2</sup>Brigham Young, *Journal of Discourses*, II (June 3, 1855), 307.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*, III (June 15, 1856), 356.



tain portion of eternity allotted to the existence of these mortal bodies. . . ."<sup>4</sup>

The pre-mortal existence is a period of organization, growth, and purposeful development. "Our spirits are born of our Parents in heaven, divine, heavenly, angelic," explained Brigham Young.<sup>5</sup> This organization of the spirits from the "intelligence" which is co-eternal with God is for the express purpose of exaltation, to become "Gods, like himself. . . ."<sup>6</sup> The spirits have a degree of free agency, "a certain degree of light, and enjoy a certain glory . . . ,"<sup>7</sup> but full independence of action requires a trial of faith, a probation period of mortality, a knowledge of good and evil commensurate with the knowledge of God.

Brigham Young explained that in the deliberations in the "Council of Heaven" Lucifer, the son of the Morning, proposed a coercive salvation and desired to usurp the honor of God. Christ countered with a proposal which allowed man the independence of choice or free agency and acknowledged the glory of God. Rebellion resulted. Lucifer and one-third of the spirits in heaven intended for this earth "were cast down to the earth. . . ."<sup>8</sup> The enmity and conflict between Satan and Christ were transferred to the earthly setting as the panorama of man's earth life unfolds.

Rejecting the Augustinian notions of Original Sin and Grace, Brigham Young, in the last analysis, reduced Adam's transgression to nothing more than the beginning of mortality. Mortality, because of Lucifer's dominion over the earth, brought with it sin, temptation, weakness, trials, and ultimately "death by sin."<sup>9</sup> This mortal death was anticipated and planned for in the atonement of Christ, bringing to man immortality and eternal life. Rather than frustrating the purpose of life, mortality, with its accompanying death of the flesh, provides the necessary probation for man to prove his worthiness of exaltation.

The intricate unity of a pure spirit from the heavens and the devilish mortal body results in an ambivalence. This warfare

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*, II (October 23, 1853), 8.

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*, IX (July 28, 1861), 139.

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*, III (August 8, 1852), 93.

<sup>7</sup>*Ibid.*, I (July 10, 1853), 351.

<sup>8</sup>*Ibid.*, V (July 19, 1857), 55.

<sup>9</sup>*Ibid.*, IX (January 5, 1860), 103.

within man, which Paul considered, is also identified with the warfare in the universe in which man is placed. Brigham Young said: "God gave Lucifer power, influence, mastery, and rule, to a certain extent, to control the life pertaining to the elements composing the body, and the spirit which God places in the body becomes intimately connected with it, and is of course more or less affected by it."<sup>10</sup> However, Brigham Young, in a Pelagian way, rejected the idea of total depravity.<sup>11</sup> The spirit is not naturally subjected to the power of Satan; rather, it has an affinity to the Spirit of God. As Satan has power over the flesh, God has influence with the spirit of man. These opposite inclinations are not equally balanced. Brigham Young said: "I am satisfied that he [man] is more inclined to do right than to do wrong. There is a greater power within him to shun evil and perform good, than to do the opposite."<sup>12</sup> He added that "it was never designed that he [man] should naturally do and love evil."<sup>13</sup> This is amplified by the following statement of Brigham Young: "In every man there is a candle of the Lord which burns with a clear light; and if by the wickedness of man it is extinguished, then farewell for ever to that individual."<sup>14</sup>

Brigham Young believed that man is sovereign over his own actions; yet he did not rule out the omnipotence of God.<sup>15</sup> He recognized the possibility of divine intervention, such as the religious experience of Paul, but believed the ultimate decisions of life affecting man's eternal destiny are to be left to man. This idea was so important to Brigham Young as he conceived the purpose of this mortal existence that he said that "the consent of the creature must be obtained before the Creator can rule perfectly."<sup>16</sup> Explaining this with eternal perspective, Brigham Young said: "Man is made an agent to himself before his God; he is organized for the express purpose, that he may become like his master. . . . The Lord has organized mankind for the purpose of increasing in that intelligence and truth . . . until he is capable of creating worlds on worlds, and

<sup>10</sup>*Ibid.*, III (March 23, 1856), 277.

<sup>11</sup>*Ibid.*, III (February 17, 1856), 207; IX (March 23, 1862), 246.

<sup>12</sup>*Ibid.*, IX (March 23, 1862), 247.

<sup>13</sup>*Ibid.*, IX (June 15, 1862), 305.

<sup>14</sup>*Ibid.*, IX (January 5, 1860), 104.

<sup>15</sup>*Ibid.*, I (April 9, 1852), 49.

<sup>16</sup>*Ibid.*, XV (August 18, 1872), 134.



becoming Gods, even the sons of God."<sup>17</sup> Believing that "the power of choice all intelligent beings inherit from the Gods of eternity . . . is innate,"<sup>18</sup> Brigham Young concluded: "If you have a blank ticket for the theatre, you may fill it up for the boxes, or the gallery, or the pit just as you please. Your lives must fill the blank, and if you would fill it for one of the best seats in the kingdom, you must live accordingly."<sup>19</sup>

Disagreeing with Socrates and Plato, Brigham Young believed sin was a result of more than just ignorance. Man's power to choose evil, which would ultimately result in his destruction, was part of the plan of life and consistent with the principle of free agency. To express how man could follow a path of life which would end in death, Brigham Young used Jeremiah's analogy of the potter and his clay.<sup>20</sup> Brigham Young said that if the clay continues to mar in the Great Potter's hand, He will cut it from the wheel of life and throw it back into the native element. The second death, or the death of the spirit, is a result of man's decisions to follow the enticement of His Satanic Majesty.

Mortal life has certain eschatological implications which were vital in Brigham Young's mind, though hardly approaching the intensity of the Medieval attitude. Man's conscious actions on earth are intimately connected with the post-mortal existence:

Now understand, to choose life is to choose principles that will lead you to an eternal increase, and nothing short of them will produce life in the resurrection for the faithful. Those that choose death, make choice of the path which leads to the end of their organization. The one leads to endless increase and progression, the other to the destruction of the organized being, ending in its entire decomposition into the particles that the compose the native elements.<sup>21</sup>

Brigham Young held some determinist views in that he acknowledged that man is conditioned by his environment, traditions, teachings, and laws which circumscribe and limit, to a degree, his free agency.<sup>22</sup> He also felt that man can dispose

<sup>17</sup>*Ibid.*, III (August 8, 1852), 93.

<sup>18</sup>*Ibid.*, IX (January 5, 1860), 105.

<sup>19</sup>*Ibid.*, IV (March 15, 1857), 289.

<sup>20</sup>Jeremiah, 18:1-10.

<sup>21</sup>Young, *op. cit.*, I (July 10, 1853), 351.

<sup>22</sup>*Ibid.*, I (September 11, 1853), 74. See also, *ibid.*, III (July 14, 1855), 267; III (August 8, 1852), 80-96.

of his agency through iniquity; when man arrives at a position of total subjection to Satan, he cannot regain his independence.<sup>23</sup> Complete independence of action is an attribute of deity, and only those most valiant during their probation on earth who will be crowned as gods in the Celestial Kingdom will be unfettered.<sup>24</sup>

Mormonism discovered in the individual a god in embryo: a being whose essence is progression and whose eternal existence as an intelligence demands freedom.<sup>25</sup> The compatible aspects of frontier individualism, the "social Darwinism" of the post-Civil War era, or even the transcendentalism of Thoreau or Emerson with the Mormon conception of man were ignored; man was directed toward the community, not because of any supposed organic nature of society, but because of Mormon notions of a literal brotherhood of man and a mundane social experience vital to man's eternal progression. Man's free agency, as conceived by Brigham Young in a moral and religious context primarily, overflows into the area of individual rights in relation to the state and to society. All of man's actions, however, are enveloped in an all pervading "cosmic jurisprudence" which emanates from God and yet binds Him within its natural laws.<sup>26</sup>

### *Natural Rights and Slavery*

Gaylon Loray Caldwell concluded in his study of Mormon conceptions of individual rights that two significant contributions of Mormonism were its "inquiry into the nature of *Man* in a century that doubted his existence," and its "substitution of a theologically-rooted philosophy of history as a basis for a doctrine of individual rights, in a place of a conception of natural law that, when divorced from the Stoic pantheism

---

<sup>23</sup>*Ibid.*, IX (July 13, 1862), 314.

<sup>24</sup>*Ibid.*, XIX (June 17, 1877), 41.

<sup>25</sup>"Man was also in the beginning with God. Intelligence, or the light of truth, was not created or made, neither indeed can be. All truth is independent in that sphere in which God has placed it, to act for itself, as all intelligence also; otherwise there is no existence. Behold, here is the agency of man . . . ." *Doctrine and Covenants*, 93:29-31.

<sup>26</sup>This apparent paradox which is developed without apology by Brigham Young may be explained in his patriarchal concept of deity. Eternity precludes pushing God or the system back to a beginning.



which gave it consistency, could not withstand repeated critical analyses."<sup>27</sup>

Free agency and individual rights were intertwined in the mind of Brigham Young. He asked: "What is the foundation of the rights of man?" His answer followed: "The Lord Almighty has organized man for the express purpose of becoming an independent being like unto Himself, and has given him his individual agency."<sup>28</sup> Man, "endowed with a certain portion of divine intelligence," requires a condition of freedom and independence in order to achieve fulfillment of the purpose of his existence. "When God organized intelligent beings, he organized them as independent beings to a certain extent, as he is himself."<sup>29</sup> Then Brigham Young added: "All intelligent beings are also endowed with certain inalienable rights, privileges, and powers inherent in them."<sup>30</sup> God indeed not only clothes man with free agency between good and evil but is also the source of a body of individual rights, which Brigham Young considered fundamental to man's existence.

If Grotius "kicked God upstairs" and later theorists chose to keep God there, Brigham Young was not at all reluctant to re-introduce Him into the affairs of man as the source of man's rights. Yet Brigham Young included in one of his discourses an explanation of man's rights relative to God and said that "he too has rights," as though there is a cosmic body of law which in turn consigned to God certain privileges, but within limits.<sup>31</sup> In 1870 Brigham Young unreservedly bound God within a system of law, which is indicative of Brigham Young's notions of a "truth," a heavenly system, which is universally applicable:

Well, I will say that our religion is nothing more nor less than the true order of heaven—the system of laws by which the Gods and the angels are governed. Are they governed by law? Certainly. There is no being in all the eternities but

---

<sup>27</sup>Gaylon Loray Caldwell, "Mormon Conceptions of Individual Rights and Political Obligation" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University, 1952), chap. XII. Caldwell's authority for his generalization on the nineteenth century conception of man is Carl Becker, *The Declaration of Independence* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1942), p. 279 where he writes: "Generally speaking, the nineteenth century doubted the existence of Man. Men it knew, and nations, but not Man."

<sup>28</sup>Young, *op. cit.*, II (July 8, 1855), 313.

<sup>29</sup>*Ibid.*, VI (December 27, 1857), 146.

<sup>30</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>31</sup>*Ibid.*, X (June 25, 1864), 333.

what is governed by law. Who is it who desires to have liberty and no law? . . . There must be law, order, rules and regulations; there must be a system of government . . . and they will endure and truth will prevail, and we need not be afraid as to the result.<sup>32</sup>

Rather than accepting the secularization of natural law as a body of law emerging from human nature, Brigham Young visualized a universal system of laws permeating the infinite celestial cosmos. God grants to man his individual rights, but they are in harmony with the cosmic laws which govern God also.

Christ said: "Know the truth, and the truth shall make you free."<sup>33</sup> Man has the responsibility of discovering "truth," which holds man's independence sacrosanct, then applying its principles to his earthly institutions. Brigham Young believed that this had been accomplished, at least partially, in the Constitution of the United States which he held to be a divinely inspired document.<sup>34</sup> With more of an Austinian flavor than might be expected, Brigham Young usually couched his references to individual rights as constitutional rights. The cosmic basis remained, but the practical application in the activities of man's earthly associations as found in a more positive statement such as the Constitution appealed to Brigham Young. Not that he clearly distinguished between legal and moral rights, but as he ticked off the inalienable rights of man as he conceived them, they were drawn from those in the Constitution and generally referred to as such.

It is to be expected that Brigham Young considered liberty of conscience and freedom of religious worship the most basic of all individual rights. Others, such as freedom of speech, freedom of economic pursuits, rights of property and person, right of assembly, and so on were from time to time mentioned in his discourses, but they did not have the intensity of importance in man's salvation as freedom of religious worship. Brigham Young said: "Whether our religion is believed by any other people or not, it is by us, and no power or authority in the government can lawfully or righteously molest us in the peaceable and quiet enjoyment thereof. It cannot be done with-

<sup>32</sup>*Ibid.*, XIV (July 3, 1870), 280, 281.

<sup>33</sup>St. John, 8:32.

<sup>34</sup>Young, *op. cit.*, II (February 18, 1855), 175.



out law, and surely the government have no right to make any law concerning it, or to prevent the free exercise thereof."<sup>35</sup>

He recognized that the state might legislate against the religious worship of the saints, which happened in the federal Anti-bigamy law of 1862, but if so it would be unrighteous and illegal.<sup>36</sup> The ideal political institution would have righteous men in government who would be amenable to the revealed word of God. Brigham Young, as the Prophet, Seer and Revelator for the Church, stamped action of the government as unconstitutional as though he should be the final authority, and in light of his views a certain consistency emerges in his attitude. Earthly laws should conform to the eternal laws of the cosmos.

Brigham Young distinguished sharply between liberty and license. He considered laws, both divine and human, basic to a good society. His guide to freedom and liberty was similar to that of John Stuart Mill: the rights of one individual should not infringe on the rights of another. Honesty puts limits to freedom of religious worship. An employee should not take time out from his work to pray. He said: "There are circumstances in which it would be right to restrict a person even in prayer and worship. . . . Men should not be permitted to do as they please in all things; for there are rules regulating all good societies. . . ."<sup>37</sup>

Brigham Young accepted Negro slavery as a constitutionally sanctioned institution until the adoption of the Civil War Amendments, following which his discourses were void of slavery references. Apparently he did not concern himself with reconciling "constitutional and equal rights" with his views that the "slave must serve," and this condition cannot be altered until God decrees otherwise. In 1856 he referred to both polygamy and slavery and said: "It is not the prerogative of the President of the United States to meddle with this matter, and Congress is not allowed, according to the Constitution, to legislate upon it."<sup>38</sup> But in 1863, Brigham Young said the following:

<sup>35</sup>*Ibid.*, II (February 18, 1855), 177.

<sup>36</sup>David G. Ritchie, *Natural Rights* (London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1895), p. 203, found the treatment of the Mormons definitive proof that rights do not exist apart from the will of state. See also J. S. Mill, *On Liberty* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1947), pp. 82, 83, on the Mormons and individual rights.

<sup>37</sup>Young, *op. cit.*, XII (January 12, 1868), 152, 153.

<sup>38</sup>*Ibid.*, IV (August 31, 1856), 39.

If the Government of the United States, in Congress assembled, had the right to pass an anti-polygamy bill, they had also the right to pass a law that slaves should not be abused as they have been; they had also a right to make a law that negroes should be used like human beings, and not worse than dumb brutes.<sup>39</sup>

The second statement was more of a justification for polygamy, however, than a reversal of his earlier position on the constitutionality of slavery.

Brigham Young said, "I am neither an abolitionist nor a pro-slavery man. If I could have been influenced by private injury to choose one side in preference to the other, I should certainly be against the pro-slavery side of the question. . . ." <sup>40</sup> From the human position he pragmatically accepted the constitutional justification of slavery. He also justified Negro servitude as a penalty resulting from the violation of the cosmic system of law. He believed that the curse began with Cain because Cain denied Abel his earthly posterity. Instead of killing Cain, the Lord placed a mark on him and his posterity, withholding the priesthood from the Negroes until "all the other descendants of Adam have received the promises and enjoyed the blessings of the Priesthood and blessings thereof."<sup>41</sup> This curse was perpetuated through the lineage of Ham into the post-diluvian period, and Brigham Young accepted the additional curse of Ham's posterity to be the "servants of servants" until God decrees otherwise. The Civil War would not alter this condition because it was decreed by Almighty. "Can you destroy the decrees of the Almighty? You cannot."<sup>42</sup>

Even though Brigham Young held little immediate hope for improvement in the conditions of the Negro, he held humane views toward them. He considered all humanity the literal offspring of God. The Negro had a soul which was precious in the sight of the Lord, and his master should treat him kindly while at the same time the Negro should serve faithfully. "The conduct of the whites towards the slaves will, in many cases, send both slave and master to hell. The blacks should be used like servants, and not like brutes, but they must serve."<sup>43</sup> Converts to the Church from the slave areas were admonished to

<sup>39</sup>*Ibid.*, X (March 8, 1863), 110, 111.

<sup>40</sup>Young, *loc. cit.*

<sup>41</sup>*Ibid.*, VII (October 9, 1859), 290, 291; II (December 3, 1854), 141-144.

<sup>42</sup>*Ibid.*, X (October 6, 1863), 250.

<sup>43</sup>*Ibid.*, II (February 18, 1855), 184.



allow the slaves to choose their own status. The slave could remain with his master in Utah or if he elected to leave him, the master was urged to let him go with his blessings.

An act passed by the Territorial Legislature and approved by Governor Young on March 7, 1852, legalized Indian slavery in Utah.<sup>44</sup> Contrary to the *prima facie* implication of such a measure, the provision was designed to alleviate the practice of selling Indian women and children to Mexican traders, or as in times of war and famine abandoning those who were a liability. The period of indenture was not to exceed twenty years, and during this time the indentured Indian was to be adequately clothed and fed and even educated until the age of sixteen. Richard F. Burton confirmed the intent and practice of this action when he said: "Slavery has been legalized in Utah, but solely for the purpose of inducing the Saints to buy children, who otherwise would be abandoned or destroyed by their starving parents."<sup>45</sup> The legislation comported well with Brigham Young's policy of treating the Indians kindly and allowing to all humanity the greatest measure of freedom and independence within the bounds of law—human or cosmic.

### *The Right of Revolution*

As the Stoic ideas of natural law could be used to justify obedience to the state or revolution, the cosmic law basis of individual rights conceived by Brigham Young carried with it dual attributes. Brigham Young frequently said his religion was first and foremost with him. He said that whatever his earthly governing position might be, governor, president, or king, "all shall bow to that eternal Priesthood which God has bestowed upon me."<sup>46</sup> However, it did not necessarily follow that overt action should be taken even if a conflict between his two allegiances occurred. Yet the belief in a "higher law" afforded Brigham Young justification for revolution.

Brigham Young believed the American Revolution to be divinely sanctioned and justified in order to further the eternal purposes of man. He said, "We consider that the men in the Revolution were inspired, by the Almighty, to throw off the shackles of the mother government, with her established re-

<sup>44</sup>*Acts . . . of the Territory of Utah*, pp. 171-174.

<sup>45</sup>Richard F. Burton, *The City of the Saints, and Across the Rocky Mountains to California* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1862), p. 243.

<sup>46</sup>Young, *op. cit.*, II (February 18, 1855), 188.

ligion, . . . to bring to pass the purposes of God, in thus establishing a new government upon a principle of greater freedom, a basis of self-government allowing the free exercise of religious worship."<sup>47</sup> At this point at least, Brigham Young did not undertake to identify moral with legal rights for the paradoxical purpose of establishing a legal right of rebellion.

Brigham Young believed religious worship and individual freedom, within limits, are cosmically inviolable; revolution is morally justified when these rights are in jeopardy. He said that any time anyone tried to force him to do anything contrary to his will he rebelled. He concluded that man has an indomitable will which is naturally opposed to tyranny.

When men are infringed upon in their rights and tyrannized over, they are prone to rise in their might and declare, "We will do as we please, and will let you know that we will have the ruling of our own rights and dispositions." Tryannical power may possess the ability to behead them, hang them, or sentence them to prison; but resolute men will have their will.<sup>48</sup>

Not only is it the nature of man to resist oppression, but it is his obligation to take overt action. As the United States became more involved in the slavery issue in the 1850's, Brigham Young asked if there were any temporal means which would save the nation from the "vortex of ruin" into which he believed it was rapidly going. The therapy of Brigham Young was peaceful revolution. He said: "Let the people rise en masse to lay the foundation of a wholesome, independent, free, Democratic (as the people call it), Republican government—a government which, if carried out, will be perfect in itself."<sup>49</sup> If the people should find that they have not been successful in selecting upright men for office the people should arise and hurl the sycophants from office. He said, "Let the people make a whip, if not of good tough raw hide, of small cords at least, and walk into the temple of the nation, and cleanse it thoroughly out, and put the men who will legislate for their good, instead of gambling away their money. . . ."<sup>50</sup> Even though these expressions were used figuratively, Brigham Young believed that God had a hand in all governments, and

---

<sup>47</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 170.

<sup>48</sup>*Ibid.*, VI (June 19, 1859), 332.

<sup>49</sup>*Ibid.*, VII (July 4, 1854), 11.

<sup>50</sup>*Ibid.*



when the government rules tyrannically, the rights of the people are abused, and moral issues are involved, the people are justified in resistance.<sup>51</sup>

Brigham Young believed such a condition had arisen in the debacle known as the Utah War. In this crisis he believed that the rights of his people were at stake, and he concluded resistance of the United States forces was justified. He attempted to justify this resistance on legal grounds. Setting himself up as the final authority on constitutionality, he concluded that the United States force was an unconstitutional mob coming to deny the Latter-day Saints their rights as citizens under the Constitution. He said, "I will desolate this whole Territory before I will again submit to the hellish corruption and bondage the wicked are striving to thrust upon us solely for our exercising our right of freedom of conscience."<sup>52</sup> Prior to this Brigham Young had spoken openly against certain governmental officials whom he considered to be morally contaminating to the community and said: I claim this as a right, as a Constitutional right; I believe it is legal to exercise all the power and influence which God has given be for the preservation of virtue, truth, and holiness."<sup>53</sup> It was in the spirit of this utterance that Brigham Young resisted Johnston's Army.

Brigham Young rode at once the constitutional horse and the cosmic horse to justify his active disobedience to the will of the United States government. His discourses toyed with the idea that possibly this was the moment the Lord desired the "thread to be cut," and the saints should accept this situation and begin immediately to function as the Kingdom of God. However, he said he wanted to know the will of God in the matter. He would fight or run as determined by God. It appeared to be the will of God to fight, and Brigham Young justified war if the cause were moral. But it also was the will of God, apparently, once peace was struck, to continue the evolutionary, not revolutionary, path toward the ideal political institution, the Kingdom of God.

The federal-Mormon controversy over polygamy found Brigham Young engaged in a passive resistance to the United States. Polygamy was a religious tenet to the Mormons. It was

<sup>51</sup>*Ibid.*, II (February 18, 1855), 179-191.

<sup>52</sup>*Ibid.*, V (September 6, 1857), 211.

<sup>53</sup>*Ibid.*, II (February 18, 1855), 175, 176.

odious to many members of Congress and the populace in the United States generally. Brigham Young's position as the conflict grew was based on the constitutional right of religious worship. He considered the Anti-bigamy Law of 1862 unconstitutional. He said that the saints were justified in ignoring the Law of 1862 and that "the anti-polygamy law has yet to be tested, as to its constitutionality by the courts which have jurisdiction."<sup>54</sup> Although refusing to comply with the law on polygamy, he did pursue a lawful challenge of it through the courts. This action was indicative of his usual attitudes of obedience to the state. He constantly professed that the Constitution and the laws of the United States were good—his complaint was with the "damned rascals" who administered the laws.

At this nexus in Brigham Young's life and ideas he leaves the overt action to God. He said, "I will just say to the nation in which I live, and which gave me birth: The Lord God Almighty has a controversy with you and he will bring you to judgment, and no power can hinder it. It is the decree of the Almighty in the heavens, and will be so."<sup>55</sup> This passivity had earlier been expressed when the Latter-day Saints were subjected to the mob activities in Illinois. At that time Brigham Young recorded in his journal: "I said in relation to the mob burning houses, I was willing they should do so, until the surrounding counties should be convinced that we were not aggressors, peradventure they may conclude to maintain the supremacy of the law by putting down mob violence and bringing offenders to justice."<sup>56</sup> Brigham Young's faith in law, even human law, counterbalanced his ideas on revolution. He believed that somehow the maladministrations, the injustices, the corruption would be handled by God and all would eventually arrive at the bar of justice with God administering equitably the eternal laws of a cosmic jurisprudence and ultimate justice realized.

<sup>54</sup>*Ibid.*, XI (August 19, 1866), 269, 270.

<sup>55</sup>*Ibid.*, XIV (June 25, 1871), 156.

<sup>56</sup>Joseph Smith, Jr., *History of the Church*, Vol. VII, p. 443.



O Phoenix, cherished bird of Arabia,  
You are the symbol of Christ the Hero.  
He, like you, lies unenslaved among the dead.  
You die on a scented pyre;  
He dies on a tree that offers heaven its perfume.  
Your ashes are his marrow;  
You bear your ashes to an altar in the burning desert.  
Christ, so resurrected, against the azure sky  
And the vaults of stars You raise your tree of light.

—Translated by Clinton F. Larson from  
“Theoremes Spirituels” by Jean de la Ceppède

# *A New Emphasis for the American Dream*

WELDON J. TAYLOR

Fear of famine and poverty has had a tremendous impact on the mores of our society. Over the years economic anxiety has been intense and enduring. Driven by fears for the adequacy of food, clothing, and shelter, man has found his greatest motivation in his desire for freedom from want and in the independence he gained from a store of wealth. Indeed, as an outgrowth of this constant need, wealth has become the major symbol of status.

However, two developments in our Western pattern of life will require some modification of our basic motivations. First, our survival today does not depend entirely upon physical sustenance, but upon winning in competition with an ideology that is built on an entirely different value system than our own. Rather than accept the competing system, we prefer not to survive. Second, the drive for wealth, though still powerful, no longer provides the motivation for us to compete successfully with the threat of foreign domination. Hence our survival as a free people is threatened. The following discussion of the evolution of this thinking will attempt to clarify these premises.

## *Conquering the Problem of Physical Needs*

Western civilization has been comparatively successful in conquering the specter of scarcity. There are many reasons for the development of the surplus economy we enjoy today. One view which has considerable support is that our economic progress has been in part the result of the motivation and philosophy that came from what Max Weber called the Protestant ethic.

The banker, Henry Clews, in an address to the students at Yale, effectively defined what is known as the Protestant ethic as follows:

Survival of Fittest: You may start in business, or the professions, with your feet on the bottom rung of the ladder;



it rests with you to acquire the strength to climb to the top. You can do so if you have the will and the force to back you. There is always plenty of room at the top. . . . Success comes to the man who tries to compel success to yield to him. Cassius spoke well to Brutus when he said, "The Fault is not in our stars, dear Brutus, that we are underlings, but in our natures." [sic]

Thrift: Form the habit as soon as you become a money-earner, or money-maker, of saving a part of your salary, or profits. Put away one dollar out of every ten you earn. The time will come in your lives when, if you have a little money, you can control circumstances; otherwise circumstances will control you. . . .

Under this free system of government, whereby individuals are free to get a living or to pursue wealth as each chooses, the usual result is competition. Obviously, then, competition really means industrial freedom. Thus, anyone may choose his own trade or profession, or, if he does not like it, he may change. He is free to work hard or not; he may make his own bargains and set his price upon his labor or his products. He is free to acquire property to any extent, or to part with it. By dint of greater effort or superior skill, or by intelligence, if he can make better wages, he is free to live better, just as his neighbor is free to follow his example and to learn to excel him in turn. If anyone has a genius, for making and managing money, he is free to exercise his genius, just as another is free to handle his tools. . . . If an individual enjoys his money, gained by energy and successful effort, his neighbors are urged to work the harder, that they and their children may have the same enjoyment.<sup>1</sup>

William H. Whyte, in *The Organization Man*, states that each time we eulogize the American dream we describe the Protestant ethic. You will note that as described by Clews, the ethic emphasized the importance of hard work, perseverance, and thrift. This philosophy contained ingredients of rigid discipline. Two other ingredients of his description of the Protestant ethic were especially significant. First, one of its prime ingredients was freedom. Freedom permits the individual the right of choice and freedom of choice is a most significant motivation. Second, the Protestant ethic, since it prompted the individual to gain by hard labor, to accumulate productive capital by saving, was significant in the production of consumable goods for survival. For these reasons the protestant ethic met the needs of humanity and was given the full support of

<sup>1</sup>William H. Whyte, *The Organization Man* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1956), pp. 16-17.

religion. Its virtues have been preached from the pulpit and have become a part of the writings of popular authors. For example, Roger Babson's books *Fundamentals of Prosperity* and *Business and Religion* deal with this theme as do the writings of Harry Emerson Fosdick. The ethic was completely integrated into the religious philosophy common to almost all American Protestant faiths. Religious belief is important in molding a society. As Kenneth E. Boulding states:

Over a broad range of human societies within the extremes of the Eskimo and the desert nomad, if one area is rich and another poor, it is not because of anything inherent in the natural resources or in the genetic make-up of the people, but because of the cumulative effect of certain familial, educational, and religious practices. Thus the forbidding soil and climate of New England provided a comfortable—if not opulent—homeland for the Puritan, while under the Turk, in his unspeakable days, the ancient cradles of civilization became barren and starveling deserts.

Of all the elements of culture which shape economic institutions, religious practices particularly play a key role. . . .<sup>2</sup>

### *New Dimensions for Survival*

If the motivation arising out of the Protestant ethic as described by Clews was significant in enabling us to survive as a leading nation, there are those who hold that it is no longer adequate. In the first place, the motivation was based on a desire for wealth and fortune. This desire is still strong, but the acquisition of wealth no longer completely satisfies. Since physical needs are not so pressing, aggressive wealth seeking does not today have the church's blessing to the same degree as has been true in the past. Churches today do not condemn material success, but they are placing more emphasis on the search for deeper, more lasting satisfactions. In the second place, the complexity of organizational life is such that it is more difficult to see that individual merit is always rewarded with immediate success or that hard work and thrift "pay off" for the individual. Most men today work in organizations, and they are rewarded for those qualities that enable them to rise in the organization. These qualities are harder to define than were the ingredients of the Protestant ethic. Those administering

---

<sup>2</sup>Kenneth E. Boulding, "Religious Foundations of Economic Progress," *Harvard Business Review*, XXX, No. 3 (May-June, 1952), 1.



organizations too often expect compliance, not creative genius or even industry. Indeed, some claim the organization is so structured that merit and hard work are rewarded only occasionally. Other reasons, such as family connections and who you are and know, prompt promotion. Hard work and thrift are still necessary, but other qualities are also important.

The effectiveness of the once-precious motivations of the American dream may be losing their drive. Yet our survival depends upon our ability as a nation to prevent the atrophy which threatens. We do not possess clear-cut and explicit motivations to extend ourselves to the outer reaches of our capacities. The frustrations that arise out of man's hopelessness to get the basic satisfactions from his experience in the organization are stifling the human resources that were inspired by the American dream in the days of the open frontier.

Our survival now depends not alone on our ability to achieve high productivity or to maintain a surplus economy, although this phase of our life's activity cannot be neglected; it depends first upon the successful development of a life which includes experiences that are more basic to ultimate satisfaction than the consumption of creature comforts or the possession of tangible goods, and second, the attractive qualities of this life must be communicated to and shared with the world as a more inviting alternative than the communist philosophy.

Charles Malik phrases it succinctly:

In this fearful age it is not enough to be happy and prosperous and secure yourselves; it is not enough to tell others: look at us, how happy we are; just copy our system, our know-how, and you will be happy yourselves. In this fearful age you must transcend your system; you must have a message to proclaim to others; you must mean something in terms of ideas and attitudes and a fundamental outlook on life; and this something must vibrate with relevance to all conditions of men.<sup>3</sup>

Although it often may be abused, fortunately for our civilization this drive for material goods is still with us. Other nationals, however, experience the drive more sharply. They work longer hours. They endure greater sacrifices than we are

<sup>3</sup>Dan H. Fenn, Jr., (ed.), "The Businessman and the Challenge of Communism," *Management's Mission in a New Society* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1959), pp. 36-37.

willing to endure. As a by-product of our preference for leisure and our freedom from a sharp threat of hunger and exposure, we are growing soft and may thus become easy prey to foes who have been toughened by fighting the constant threat of starvation. They are driven by a much stronger desire for freedom from want than we who are getting used to plenty.

*Need to Feel More Explicitly Our Quest for Freedom*

Our love for freedom may be intense, yet it is intangible. We take freedom for granted. We do not have explicit evidence that it is a quality, a state of being that must be earned by wisdom, patience, anxieties, risks and positive action. Yet if this freedom is preserved, we must maintain our drive to productivity. What is more, *we must discover and make explicit a meaning in life and freedom which includes productivity but also transcends it.*

*Basic Motivation—Survival*

Realistically, we are threatened by a basically different philosophy than that from which the American dream evolved. This philosophy is based on fear, regimentation and force, rather than on freedom, light, and truth. The differences, when we see the issues clearly, are such as to leave us in little doubt as to where we choose. The imminent threat of this philosophy as a dominant force in the world, and possibly in our own country, should, if clearly understood, supply the motivation to transcend ourselves. If we see these issues clearly, the productivity of our industrial empire is only part of the answer. Even if we improve the justice and equity in the distribution of our gifts to the have-not nations, our contribution to the world must include more than the giving of tangible goods. Charles Malik had the wisdom to see that the acceptance of our way of life required something that "vibrates with relevance to all the conditions of man."<sup>4</sup>

*Preserving and Adding to Our Present Gains*

Whatever it is we have to offer the world for the privilege of continuing to live in it must include economic strength and industrial competence. Without these values we and those

---

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*



whose support we choose to win may sink to the desperate level where need for food, clothing, and shelter means more to us than the freedoms we cherish. Certainly we cannot forsake those aspects of the Protestant ethic which encouraged production. A distorted dedication to mundane values of physical survival is the unfortunate state of the greater share of the world's population today. The hope that the dignity of man and the freedom of the spirit to enjoy individual expression will persist depends upon our ability to maintain, with our great productive capacity, a comparatively high degree of independence from physical want. But we also must introduce to others more basic satisfactions that come to man as a result of the joys of being creative and significant to humanity in some useful manner. Since the organization is here to stay, since we depend on it for high productivity, somehow our life in the organization must be made meaningful, significant and even more productive. This achievement is a prerequisite to survival.

#### *A Marked Change in Concepts of Management*

For years we have paid lip service to the satisfactions that come from work and service. Today emphasis on these concepts is viewed in a much more realistic light than expressions of the past which have lost their meaning from over use. It sounds paradoxical, yet the drive for business survival or the drive for the preservation of profits or productivity is literally forcing business management to accept this basic premise: that productivity can best be realized by an honest and sincere bowing to the potential in the individual. This potential can best be released to productive activity by recognizing the dignity of man and his tremendous creative powers. This recognition must be more than the expression of a verbal philosophy. It must be a genuine attitude that is infused into all elements of the organization. The feeling of participation of the individual in the creative processes of the firm is becoming an essential ingredient of economic survival of the firm and the nation in which it operates.

#### *Human Motivations Strategic in Business Success*

The excellence of physical science has made it possible for most productive enterprises to achieve equality insofar as the

technical efficiency of the plant or machines is concerned. The differences that make for success or failure of management depend more and more on the manner in which the people in the organization respond. Even the technical efficiency of the plant itself depends on the creative genius of the engineers who devise it. They respond with more or less creative skill depending on the environment in which they work. *The environment is largely influenced by the quality of the administration. Management experts agree that as administrative officers become more aware of these basic facts, retaining their same technical competence, it will become exceedingly difficult for a management which does not achieve skill in getting its associates to feel a genuine sense of participation to succeed in competition with those who possess such skills.*

#### *Acceptance of Organization and Its Leader by Workers*

Basic to such an attitude, which encourages or stimulates creativity or participation, is an emotional acceptance by the worker of the objectives of the organization. It also implies an acceptance of the leader, his basic philosophy and his long-term goals. There may be minor differences and a great variety of conflicting short-term goals. Out of these differences and conflicts come stimulating experiences and growth. Indeed, creative experience in administration requires the presence of conflict, variety, and differences. Yet if the basic policies of administration are accepted and the goals are agreed upon, the worker discovers harmony in the feeling that these goals and policies are also his own. His voluntary action is in harmony with the goals and thus he feels an integrated sense of participation. The organization is his organization. It matters little to him that it also belongs in the same sense to a thousand others. He discovers more opportunities for creative expression in his own area than he has time for with little danger of conflict with others. As a matter of fact, he sees so many such opportunities and finds them so engaging that time loses its meaning. He is so occupied with his task that he works longer hours than he intends to. He also delights in the productivity of his associates. There is no reason for him to be jealous, because there is no scarcity of such opportunities. There is room for everyone to grow in productivity and stature. In effect, he loses himself. The products of his efforts do not necessarily conflict with



others if the policy and goals of the company are well defined and long term in nature.

*Function of the Administrator—Creation of Proper Environment*

The creation of the environment in which this productive-ness or creativity takes place is the principal function of the administrator. He selfishly avoids those activities and policies which interfere with the effectiveness of his associates because they also are working for the same objectives that he is, and the net gains to all will be greater if there is an appropriate degree of harmony in the organization.

Success in educating the worker to identify himself with the entire organization achieves another goal. The worker sees his work not as an isolated routine, but as a part of a whole. He thus becomes a motivated creator of one part of a whole constantly seeking means of improving his part of the work and hence the end product. The function of the administrator is to impart to each worker a clear visualization of his relationship to the whole. Under proper conditions this contributing experience becomes more meaningful than his compensation, provided he does have adequate subsistence. The sense of harmony which he feels in working with others provides him with even greater satisfaction than if he himself created the whole.

*Productivity Multiplied by Such an Organization*

As we have pointed out before, in our surplus economy, the motivation to obtain physical goods is still strong but is slowly giving way to motivation for something much more satisfying. *Economic salvation will result from an economy in which the major part of the people are motivated by the drive for creative experience within the organization rather than a drive for wealth.* Once this state of being is achieved, subsistence no longer will be a problem. The economy will produce an abundance heretofore undreamed of because of the productivity of creative people. What is true of the firm will be true of the economy. In the competition among nations and firms, those nations which discover and release the creative drive of individuals will be victorious. Their foes will applaud them and follow them rather than plunder them.

*Status of New Ethic in Practical Life*

Does this concept of creative, participating individuals have realistic backing? Is there a possibility of its becoming a practical reality? Does it have the support of speakers and writers as did the original Protestant ethic? Does it have spiritual foundations? Can it be given the blessing of churches? If so, where are the men who, like banker Clews in 1908, today are preaching this new ethic or amendment to the old, as the case may be? The truth is that they exist in abundance. Every one of the hundreds of management conferences expounds the doctrine. As a result of some industrial experiments, the Harvard Business School became aware of the practicability of this emphasis and has done much to encourage its propagation. Although the proponents of the philosophy have come from a diversity of schools and industrial areas, the Harvard Business Review has played a leading role in collecting and publishing papers which presented the thesis of the new ethic. Let us examine the background and setting of just a few of the men who have presented papers and review their statements:

*O. A. Ohmann*

One of the statements which made a significant impact on contemporary thought was in a paper read before a dinner group in 1954 in Cleveland, Ohio, by a psychologist turned businessman. O. A. Ohmann joined the Standard Oil Company of Ohio as assistant to the president after many years as a professor of psychology at Western Reserve University. His paper created such an impact that John D. Rockefeller, Jr., invited him to a dinner with the nation's business leaders in the Waldorf Astoria in New York City to discuss his philosophy.

Ohmann succeeded in phrasing into a profit and loss context the fact that leadership in the business enterprise was more a matter of attitudes than of management science and techniques. He held that the responses of the workers, upon which a business profit depended, were greatly influenced by the attitude which the administrator had toward his employees. He strongly advocated a stewardship attitude where the administrator feels responsible to his employees as well as customers and stockholders. He was so revolutionary as to maintain that the *genuine* authority of the administrator comes from those under him rather than those over him. The emotional



acceptance of him and his program by those under him releases them from the fears and insecurities resulting from his using a *less genuine authority* from above to compel them to do something in which they did not believe and of which they were not a part. They respond with greater creativity and productivity when they understand what they are doing and why they are doing it and are in agreement with purposes and methods.

Ohmann's writings also point to the growing tendency of people to seek for happiness which they are not finding in money nor material goods. The old economic laws which ascribe values to things because they are scarce seem to be operative in our economy of surplus: Goods and things are not as scarce today, therefore, acquiring them yields less comparative satisfaction. This first paper which drew attention to his thinking was entitled "Skyhooks With Special Implications on Monday Through Friday." The term "skyhooks" had reference to values which would transcend the physical goods men consumed and owned. He held that we at our present stage of civilization were yet reaching toward the heavens in search of a value system better than the one we have.

A significant point in his writings was that the basic satisfaction which he termed "skyhooks" could be found in the job itself. His views were that the experience of creating the product was much more significant than the product itself.

Ohmann holds that in bringing about a work environment where this creative experience could thrive, the administrator is strategic. Somehow he must provide the worker with a live conceptual vision of his own contribution and how it relates in a significant and meaningful manner to the work of the entire organization. In his own words the administrator "... defines the goals and purposes of his group in larger and more meaningful perspective. He integrates the smaller, selfish goals of individuals into larger, more social and spiritual objectives for the group. He provides the vision without which the people perish. Conflicts are resolved by relating the immediate to the long-range and more enduring values. In fact, we might say this *integrative function* is the core of the administrator's contribution."<sup>5</sup>

<sup>5</sup>O. A. Ohmann, "Skyhooks With Special Implications on Monday Through Friday," *Harvard Business Review*, XXXIII, No. 3 (May-June 1955), 38.

Ohmann makes frequent reference to long-run goals and short-run goals. He indicates that dedication to long-run goals promotes harmony while our preoccupation with short-run goals results in jealousies, anxiety, and frustration. In quest of long-run goals, many solutions to an immediate problem may be right. In the case of short-term goals, fewer solutions could be acceptable and thus there were more tensions and frustrations. If a management and workers were maturely oriented to long-term goals, most short-term goals would be reached automatically.

Since the publication of the "skyhooks" article, Ohmann has been in popular demand as a speaker and has published widely. His work has been heralded as a significant contribution to management literature.<sup>6</sup>

#### *A. A. Stambaugh*

Ohmann gives credit for the development of the philosophy he has presented to A. A. Stambaugh, a man who has demonstrated its success. Stambaugh, a lawyer, was asked by a law partner to join him in reviving the Standard Oil Company of Ohio. This company was facing failure as a result of the division of the old Standard Oil Company into parts leaving the Ohio Company with no executive leadership. Stambaugh ultimately became the executive officer and was in a large degree responsible for restoring the company to a position of leadership. He had no training in business management—especially the oil business. He credits the success of the company to the response of the employees to his management philosophy.

In spite of the fact that his methods resulted in developing a most profitable enterprise, he places profits in a secondary position when compared to the development of men. He states that "There is no greater nor more satisfying reward than that which comes from discovering and developing men. The possibilities are almost unlimited."

---

<sup>6</sup>"Keeping Centers of Creativity Alive in a Large Organization," paper presented at a meeting of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers, White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia, March 4, 1957. "Search for a Managerial Philosophy," a paper presented at the mid-year meeting of the American Petroleum Institute's Division of Refining, May 1957, head office New York City. For additional papers by Dr. Ohmann see: "The Whole Man On a Whole Job," paper presented to the Annual Pipe Line Conference, Cleveland, Ohio, May 6, 1957.



Stambaugh pictures the industrial organization in which the attitude of dignity of the human spirit prevails as one that is completely democratic. It provides an atmosphere where each employee is stimulated to creative effort and has an opportunity to have his views reach the top. The following quotation provides an example of his philosophy regarding a business organization:

There should be a capillary of ideas from the bottom to the top and from the top to the bottom that creates an atmosphere in which decisions almost automatically announce themselves. There may be the wrong man in the wrong place, a bad policy, or a faulty plan, but if the democratic process is working without restraint, the correction appears without delay. Its therapeutic effect is irresistible. On the other hand, if leadership is dictatorial, possessive, uncommunicative, and concerned only with its own importance, mistakes of whatever kind are embalmed seemingly forever within the organization.<sup>7</sup>

The careful reader may ask the following question: Under a system so completely democratic how can the leader get ideas accepted and adopted that he believes are best for the company and which have identified him as a leader? An efficient organization requires coordinated effort. Certain activities must be synchronized. Such control and coordination requires the discipline of authority and follow through.

Stambaugh's philosophy would recognize three choices for achieving both of these goals. First, the executive would delegate little authority, issue orders and expect obedience. There would be a minimum of delegation or decision making apart from the administrator. He would personally see that the work was done by means of his own authority. Second, there could be rules or guides for action expressed as policies. These policies could be broad and general or narrow and specific but achieve complete coverage of activities. The policies could be phrased by the administrator and be guides for the employees to follow. Third, the administrator would be so effective as a person in getting his basic philosophy accepted and so competent as a teacher in getting his ideas clearly understood that the use of the above two methods, though necessary, would be minimal. Just as basic as the above qualities, the administrator,

---

<sup>7</sup>A. A. Stambaugh, *Successful Leadership* (Salt Lake City: Deseret Book Company, 1961), pp. 36-38.

under the latter method, should have the ability to listen sincerely to the ideas of those beneath him and the moral fortitude and character to modify his own views even though at times it may entail personal embarrassment. Stambaugh would agree that all three of these methods of control must be used in some degree, but he makes it very clear that the executive who is competent in the use of the third method will be the most effective and more likely to be recognized as a great leader.

### *Abraham T. Collier*

Abraham T. Collier is also a lawyer and is at present vice-president and chief counsel for John Hancock Life Insurance Company. He has sensed the necessity for change growing out of our new environment. He has become a prolific writer and a very busy speaker on the subject. His interest in people grew out of his experience as personnel manager of the John Hancock Company before his appointment to his present position.

Collier suggests that the business administrator must win the support of his workers to the extent that they can be effective producers. In order to achieve this goal he "ought to aim at articulating an ideology that, in addition to being an accurate expression of management goals, is a little closer to the personal and even religious aspirations of the people." The ideal which he puts forth is the creative ideal. He states that today business provides an opportunity for men to gain satisfaction beyond sustaining their own lives and holds that every individual has the capacity for creative expression. He points to the fact that more and more tasks are being subjected to mechanical progress and automation leaving for men those tasks which men alone can do because they involve judgment and creative skill.

Another interesting and significant point which Collier makes is that creativity in an administrative program can only thrive where differences are permitted and even encouraged. "One of the cornerstones on which the creative society is built is the incontrovertible fact that men are different, that they cherish these differences, that the joy and fascination of life depends on the existence of differences, and that there are great social values in differences."<sup>8</sup>

---

<sup>8</sup>Abraham T. Collier, "Business Leadership and a Creative Society," *Harvard Business Review*, XXXI No. 1 (January-February 1953), 31.



Collier's presentation implies throughout that it is the basic nature of man to be creative and if he is denied this privilege he is bound to experience frustration. He goes so far as to state "It can be reasonably contended that the great upheavals of modern history—its wars and its revolutions—are not so much the result of differences between people as of the feeling of a nation or a class that its capacity for creative expression is in some way threatened or thwarted. This was one cause of the Russian revolt of 1917, although the revolutionaries themselves later made the great and historic blunder of seeking to abolish conflict by abolishing difference rather than by accepting difference and in that way removing the barriers to creative work."<sup>9</sup>

It is only logical then that the nation which provides men with opportunities for creative expression will continue to thrive. He points out that the ". . . only real and lasting bulwark against Marxism is in the experience of the large body of our workers and our citizens. If that experience is basically creative and satisfying—and it is management's task to see that it is so—the stultifying conformities of the Socialist state will always be bitter to their taste."<sup>10</sup>

Collier describes the creative processes in an administrative society as a process of resolving differences. This process requires a prevailing attitude in which free expression throughout the organization encourages the spawning of new ideas. The creative experiences arise out of the resolving of differences by an effective communication of words as well as feelings and attitudes.

To many readers one of the most significant contributions in Collier's presentation is his relating of the creative experience to the religious experience and the religious experience to God. To illustrate he states ". . . One of the recurring themes in most religions is that God is viewed as the Creator and that creativeness is one of His essential attributes. Another recurring theme is that man's spirit, his conscious 'self,' his unique ability to transcend his material and animal limitations, is the essence of God in man."<sup>11</sup>

While he does not state that man himself might, by the creative process, grow to become a God, to those who believe

---

<sup>9</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 33.

<sup>10</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 38.

<sup>11</sup>*Ibid.*

Godhood may be the ultimate destiny of man, this implication is clear. It is significant to note that he connects work to creativity, creativity to religion and God. This linkage then enables man to see an all-pervasive purpose in his work which embraces religion and God. A man working with a conceptual appreciation of the significance of his job to the lives and happiness of others, and experiencing himself a creative satisfaction, should not only achieve a feeling of personal enjoyment, but he should also acquire a dedication to his work. Such a condition should enable him to multiply his talents and his capacity. Possibly this condition would enable us to discover in man the latent capacity which William James stated that man possessed but seldom used.

In short Collier sees the positive creative experiences as not only the key to personal satisfaction, greater productivity, but as our last and only bulwark against Marxism and the socialist state.

*Stanley F. Teele*

If these concepts, new to business administration, are taking place in business, is education lagging? Education should lead the way with the development of sound theory which should then be tested for its soundness by practical business.

As a matter of fact, education and religion have been discussing these concepts for many years. There have been two principal reasons why they have never made more headway in the practical world. First, business has been too preoccupied with the expedients of making a profit or with the struggle for food, clothing, and shelter, to heed a "philosophy" whose return could not be evident in this year or at least in next year's profit-and-loss statement. This comment is not meant to be critical. Survival until our present era has depended upon the expedients of enough food and clothing. The other reason for the delay in adopting these concepts was that the gulf between education and the practical life was too broad for effective communication. Educators, though aware of the concepts, were not completely conscious of their productive implications. They were not too vigorous in their defense. Businessmen and educators responded to different motivations. They talked a different language. They had not learned to accept each other as significant contributors to the whole of life. This



gulf still exists but one of the most hopeful signs is that it is narrowing. One of the many modern educational movements that have looked at business from a broadened whole view is the development of the case study method. To get educational materials under this method the teachers of the school bridged the gap and went inside the business to study motivations and methods. As a result of years of such study and experiment, business educators developed a philosophy consistent with that we have described.

Stanley F. Teele, until recently Dean of the Harvard Business School, is a fitting spokesman for the educational philosophy that has gained a following throughout the nation. He has defined the goals of education in a much broader context than prevailed in the past. Rather than listing the techniques and routines which might at one time have been considered as education, he names three major quests of business education.

The first is to control and utilize the physical universe and make it serve the needs of men. The second is to teach man to adapt himself positively to a rapidly changing world. The impact of a changing environment can be emotionally frustrating, painful, and upsetting to one who has not learned the art of adjusting himself to more complex levels of living. The third major quest is ". . . the search for ultimate values appropriate and satisfying to the human soul. By ultimate values I mean a man's concepts of the relationship of the individual to others, to the universe, and to God."<sup>12</sup>

Teele holds that only with a mature value system which the individual has developed for himself can he enjoy a sense of serenity and objectivity in a world of turmoil and change. He holds that an attitude growing out of such a spiritual value system is an absolute essential for the administrator of tomorrow.

Teele in another address reflects the same philosophy which has been described in discussing the previous writers. He places emphasis on the job as more important and the product as secondary: ". . . we have been shifting steadily toward a reversal of the words we have continued to use in describing ourselves; we say that our system is great because it has created an incredible standard of living, and has thus provided

---

<sup>12</sup>Stanley F. Teele, "Change, The Business Manager, and Faith," address given to the Brigham Young University studentbody, May 9, 1960, p. 7.

each individual with the possibilities for personal development to the outer reaches of his own abilities; but what we have been doing in our businesses is increasingly attempting to provide each individual with the possibilities for personal development to the outer reaches of his own abilities, and thereby creating an incredible standard of living."<sup>13</sup>

He further affirmed the basic view in a statement made to a group of Harvard Business School alumni in Utah:

[the fact that] . . . ours is an industrial civilization and four out of five of us are employees, working for someone else, means that much of the satisfaction in life must come from our daily employment. . . . It is basically true that man does not live by bread alone; material rewards alone will not provide for most of us full and satisfying lives. . . . For most people, full and satisfying lives derive largely from a sense of significance, a sense of being useful, of making a contribution, of participating fully in the activities of the group. . . . An immense amount of nonsense is spoken, written and believed in this area. Unless the concern for enhancing human dignity in an enterprise is genuine, it is worse than useless.<sup>14</sup>

Again we see that it is the creative experience itself rather than the product of creation that Teele holds as the primary value, placing the "tangible standard of living" in its secondary position. This theme has been receiving significant emphasis at Harvard and other schools of business.

In taking a summary view of the expressions of these four men, it is noted that while they were mature in dealing with theory and intellectual values, they were also practical men with judgment well seasoned by contact with the realities of contemporary business problems. All agreed that our future depended upon our discovery and adoption of a way of life which dignified the individual by providing him with an opportunity for creative experience in an environment where he was a free and participating principal.

### *Conclusion*

A further search would yield a significant number of men and pronouncements supporting the same objectives. A hopeful

<sup>13</sup>Fenn, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

<sup>14</sup>Stanley F. Teele, "The Business Executive of the '60's," speech given to the Harvard Business School Club at the University of Utah, December 1954, p. 4.



sign is that critics are questioning the soundness of these ideas. This process has a tendency to refine, to remove basic weaknesses and to drive the roots of the sound shoot of truth into deeper soil. Indeed one of the signs of strength of the philosophy itself is that in the presence of conflict it has grown stronger and gained a larger following.

One of the basic criticisms that some may have against these concepts is that they provide just another device for exploitation—another method whereby the greedy businessmen may increase their share of the national income, a more subtle technique of manipulating the human spirit for gain. In the first place, it is a definite part of this ethic that motives are vital. The man with selfish motivations will be proportionately ineffective in his attempt to create the desired environment. He will not inspire faith and positive creative qualities. In the second place, if one has an enlightened view of profit one can see that the basic philosophy on which profit is based is our most effective safeguard of freedom.

### *The True Meaning of Profit*

Those who criticize profit base their remarks on two dominant objections. First, the profit system is greedy because it encourages inequality. Second, in some instances the excessive greediness and aggressiveness growing out of the profit motivations subordinate human value to a point where human dignity is violated and debased. The righteous hostility engendered by such actions often has blinded the critics to the fact that such occurrences were the result of failure of the system to operate effectively. They would have us turn to another system without being aware of its evils. Hopefully for our world population, the political experiments that are taking place today provide us with the answers we seek. Such evidence reveals much worse abuses under other systems than the abuses of the profit system.

Basic adjustments must be made in our economy to accommodate the new world of inter-planetary travel and atomic defenses. Such complications make effective competition more difficult to achieve. On the other hand, the means required to make the profit system work more effectively are improving. There are a greater volume and variety of goods and services, thus making it less necessary to accept inferior products or ser-

vices. The means of communicating—the availability of services such as TV, radio, and newspaper—keep the public alert to advantages and abuses. The mobility of people enables them to become better acquainted with alternatives. A sensitive, enlightened public conscience is becoming more effective as a censor group. This group of educated and interested public is the most effective control of abuse. Because of improvements in communication, competition on many fronts is more effective today than it has been at any previous time.

If we assume that this is so and recognize the truth that other systems likewise have abuses, the profit system has the basic qualities which will permit the management philosophy we have discussed to work better in our day than will any other system.

Basic to the philosophy we have been discussing are two concepts: "Freedom" and "Participation." Unless a person has freedom to act and to choose, he cannot enjoy the benefits of participation. Vital to every man's life is his career decision. It is important that he be permitted to succeed or fail based on his own skill in making his choice and developing his skill to succeed. Likewise, it is important that he be able to select the goods and services which make up his livelihood. Discrimination, self-reliance, and individuality grow out of a lifetime of these experiences. The market on which the profit system is based permits a maximum of freedom in both of these areas. It permits a maximum of positive participation. The market, although it is impersonal, is a device most sensitive to human freedom. It responds more effectively to human choice than does any other system. It rewards those who are successful in determining human wants and satisfying those wants with a minimum use of resources. Basically, a profit is the result of the enterpriser's organizing human energy, resources, and tools and directing their operation so that the resulting satisfaction will have a money value when measured at the market place which is greater than the money cost of the resources.

When viewed in this sense—if we agree that the choices of the people are sovereign, as we do in a democracy—the operation of a profitable firm has met the test of social desirability. With our limited knowledge today, it is the system most suited to the effective participation and control by the people and for the people. We should recognize abuses, correct them by



enlightened criticism, discriminating market choices, and legislation where necessary. Our efforts to maximize individual participation can best be expressed by preserving in as many places as possible the market system as the arbiter of values.

### *Caution*

Another objection that might be cited by careful-thinking people is that while the views defended here are attractive and true to man's inner drives, they are not practical. This statement contains elements of truth. Although we have been exposed to Christian concepts for two thousand years and longer, man is still selfish. Short-term goals and unethical expedients are more dominant today than ever. Changes will come slowly, for roots in old motivations and practices are deeply embedded and as long as the majority of the people of the world are desperate for a livelihood, unethical practices and selfish motives will constitute a barrier. The signs, however, show progress. Herrymon Maurer, a *Fortune Magazine* editor contemplating the changes, states, "It is conceivable that the large corporation will emerge as a new social force whose basic drive is the creativity of individual human beings."<sup>15</sup>

There are some basic reasons for optimism. First, it must be observed that where food, clothing, and shelter are adequate (and they are becoming so in an increasingly large proportion of the world) the human satisfaction deriving from creative experience growing out of love of work so far transcends pleasure of high level consumption that it will be accepted by a greater number of people. Second, even though we have known that the satisfactions of a creative experience were superior to conspicuous and excessive consumption, we have been forced to emphasize production of material necessities in order to survive. Our age is the first that has freed a large segment of the masses from the necessity of a strong preoccupation with short term expedients so they could look beyond these short term goals and see not only a means of getting the necessities of life, but also the satisfactions of a more meaningful creative experience. This age is the first that could give this more meaningful motivation a practical rationale. Third, as many writers have indicated, the very values which we seek are being

---

<sup>15</sup>Herrymon Maurer, "The Age of Managers," *Fortune*, January 1955, p. 84.

destroyed by another people. By means of strong short-term motivations, this people is becoming physically powerful. This threat should drive us to seek the establishment of these basic long-term values as a means of survival.

The changes may come slowly. The philosophy will have to be refined and re-refined by a spirit of free criticism. Life would be bleak, however, without a hope for the emerging dominance of these values so closely associated with the freedom and dignity of man. On the other hand, problems, challenges, and even setbacks have a positive and resonant line where hope of triumph is strong.





# Brigham Young University Studies

## Index

Volume IV

1961-62

### AUTHORS

- Alley, Kathryn, "Home," poem, 50, Autumn 1961.
- Anderson, Carma de Jong, "New Address," poem, 208, Spring-Summer 1962.
- Andrus, J. Roman, "Study of the Outcomes of College Education in Art in Selected Colleges in Twelve Western States," 53, Autumn 1961.
- Ballif, Arta, "Boy on a Bus," 137, Winter 1962.
- Bernhard, John T., "What Is the Proper Role of the Latter-day Saint with Respect to the Constitution?" 151, Winter 1962.
- Bushman, Richard L., "Inspired Constitution," 158, Winter 1962.
- Cannon, Mark W., "The Constitution and Preservation of Liberty," 152, Winter 1962.
- Clark, Bruce B., "The Spectrum of Faith in Victorian Literature," 183, Spring-Summer 1962.
- Clark, Marden J., "Late on Mother's Day," poem, 148, Winter 1962; "Religious Implications in the Novels of Robert Penn Warren," 67, Autumn 1961.
- Culmsee, Carlton, "Poetry in the Free World," 3, Autumn 1961.
- Dalton, Robert O., "'Snake': A Moment of Consciousness," 243, Spring-Summer 1962.
- Evanoff, Alexander, "The Pardoner as Huckster: A Dissent from Kittredge," 209, Spring-Summer 1962.
- Gibson, M. Carl, "Background to the Theory of Arabic Origins," 219, Spring-Summer 1962.
- Hansen, Klaus, review: Strang, *The Diary of James J. Strang*, 178, Winter 1962.
- Hardy, Douglas, "Influence of Finnish *Kalevala* in the Composition of Longfellow's *Song of Hiawatha*," 140, Winter 1962.
- Harris, John B., (trans.), "Ibsen on Art" (Article by Henrik Ibsen), 43 Autumn 1961; "The Theater" (Article by Henrik Ibsen), 51, Autumn 1961.
- Jones, Daniel J., "Leonardo da Vinci, Pioneer Geologist," 119, Winter 1962.



- Larson, Clinton F., (trans.), "Theoremes Spirituels," poem, by Jean de la Ceppède, 218, 242, 254, 268, Spring-Summer 1962.
- Laycock, Harold, "Music Education in the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints," 107, Winter 1962.
- Madsen, Truman, "William James: Philosopher-Educator," 81, Autumn 1961.
- Mangum, Garth L., "Industrialism and the Role of Government in the American Economy," 172, Winter 1962.
- McKay, Quinn G., "Can You Support the Political 'New Frontier' and Still Be a Good Latter-day Saint?" 164, Winter 1962.
- Melville, J. Keith, "The Reflections of Brigham Young on the Nature of Man and the State," 255, Spring-Summer 1962.
- Nielsen, Veneta, "Response," 13, Autumn 1961.
- Perkins, Van L., "The War-making Power: Congress vs. The President," 25, Autumn 1961.
- Tanner, Obert C., "Plato's Trinity as Problem and Promise in University Life," 17, Autumn 1961.
- Taylor, H. Darrel (trans.), "October," poem, "Sonetos Espirituales," by Ramón Jiménez, 80, Autumn 1961.
- Taylor, Weldon J., "A New Emphasis for the American Dream," 269, Spring-Summer 1962.
- Thomas, Winona F., "Broken Ice," 235, Spring-Summer 1962.
- Watkins, Arthur R., "Foreign Languages: Too Little, Too Late?" 66, Autumn 1961.
- Wirthlin, Richard Bitner, "Economic Power and the Constitution: A Quarter Century of Change," 168, Winter, 1962.

## ARTICLES, FICTION, AND BOOK REVIEWS

- "Background to the Theory of Arabic Origins," by M. Carl Gibson, 219, Spring-Summer 1962.
- "Boy on a Bus," by Arta Ballif, 137, Winter 1962.
- "Broken Ice," by Winona F. Thomas, 235, Spring-Summer 1962.
- "Can You Support the Political 'New Frontier' and Still Be a Good Latter-day Saint?" by Quinn G. McKay, 164, Winter 1962.
- "Constitution and Preservation of Liberty, The," by Mark W. Cannon, 152, Winter 1962.
- "*Diary of James J. Strang, The,*" by Mark A. Strang, review by Klaus Hansen, 178, Winter 1962.
- "Economic Power and the Constitution; A Quarter Century of Change," by Richard Bitner Wirthlin, 168, Winter 1962.
- "Foreign Languages: Too Little, Too Late?" by Arthur R. Watkins, 66, Autumn 1961.
- "Ibsen on Art," by Henrik Ibsen, trans. by John B. Harris, 43, Autumn 1961.
- "Industrialization and the Role of Government in the American Economy," by Garth L. Mangum, 172, Winter 1962.

## INDEX

293

- "Influence of Finnish *Kalevala* in the Composition of Longfellow's *Song of Hiawatha*, by Douglas Hardy, 140, Winter 1962.
- "Inspired Constitution," by Richard L. Bushman, 158, Winter 1962.
- "Leonardo da Vinci, Pioneer Geologist," by Daniel J. Jones, 119, Winter 1962.
- "Music Education in the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints," by Harold Laycock, 107, Winter 1962.
- "New Emphasis for the American Dream, A," by Weldon J. Taylor, 269, Spring-Summer 1962.
- "Pardoner as Huckster: A Dissent from Kittredge, The," by Alexander Evanoff, 209, Spring-Summer 1962.
- "Plato's Trinity as Problem and Promise in University Life," by Obert C. Tanner, 17, Autumn 1961.
- "Poetry in the Free World," by Carlton Culmsee, 3, Autumn 1961.
- "Reflections of Brigham Young on the Nature of Man and the State, The," by J. Keith Melville, 255, Spring-Summer 1962.
- "Religious Implications in the Novels of Robert Penn Warren," by Marden J. Clark, 67, Autumn 1961.
- "Response," by Veneta Nielsen, 13, Autumn 1961.
- "'Snake': A Moment of Consciousness," by Robert O. Dalton, 243, Spring-Summer 1962.
- "Spectrum of Faith in Victorian Literature, The," by Bruce B. Clark, 183, Spring-Summer 1962.
- "Study of the Outcome of College Education in Art in Selected Colleges in Twelve Western States," by J. Roman Andrus, 53, Autumn 1961.
- "Theater, The," by Henrik Ibsen, trans. by John B. Harris, 51, Autumn 1961.
- "War-Making Power: Congress vs. The President, The," by Van L. Perkins, 25, Autumn 1961.
- "What Is the Proper Role of the Latter-day Saint with Respect to the Constitution?" by John T. Bernhard, 151, Winter 1962.
- "William James: Philosopher-Educator," by Truman Madsen, 81, Autumn 1961.

## POETRY

- "Home," by Kathryn Alley, 50, Autumn 1961.
- "Late on Mother's Day," by Marden J. Clark, 148, Winter 1962.
- "New Address," by Carma de Jong Anderson, 208, Spring-summer 1962.
- "October," a poem, "Sonetos Espirituales," by Ramón Jiménez, trans. by H. Darrel Taylor, 80, Autumn 1961.
- "Theoremes Spirituels," by Jean de la Ceppède, trans. by Clinton F. Larson, 218, 242, 254, 268, Spring-Summer 1962.