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The War Without a Name: The Use of Propaganda in the
Decolonization War of Algeria

Benjamin J. Sparks

A thesis submitted to the faculty of
Brigham Young University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts

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ABSTRACT

The War Without a Name: The Use of Propaganda in the Decolonization War of Algeria

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The Algerian war for independence, 1954-1962, also known as the War Without a Name due to its lack of recognition as a war by the French government, remains an indelible scar on the face of France. The Algerian war represents “one of the most critical moments in modern French history since the French Revolution” (Le Sueur 256), putting into question the motto of the French republic, “liberté, égalité, fraternité”. This thesis will show that although the French won the war militarily they lost the war of ideas, that of propaganda and persuasion. Thus, this thesis will demonstrate that propaganda by the French for the aims of maintaining a French Algeria should have played a larger role than is evident.

The use of propaganda and persuasion dates from the beginning of Greek analysis of rhetoric and has been used in various environments and circumstances throughout the ages in order to persuade the masses towards the opinions and ideals of the propagandist. In Algeria, the message presented by the French through propaganda did not attain the desired result, maintaining a French Algeria. The combination of the Algerian determination for independence and the ineffective propaganda by the French resulted in a humiliating loss for the French forces and the loss of territory deemed integral to French society. After over 130 years of colonial rule, and 8 grueling years of revolutionary war, Algeria received its independence.

Keywords: France, Algeria, War, Propaganda, Decolonization

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1. INTRODUCTION

The Algerian war for independence, 1954-1962, also known as the War Without a Name due to its lack of recognition as a war by the French government, remains an indelible scar on the face of France. The Algerian war represents “one of the most critical moments in modern French history since the French Revolution” (Le Sueur 256), shaking the very foundations of France and putting into question the motto of the French republic, “liberté, égalité, fraternité”.

The use of propaganda and persuasion dates from the beginning of Greek analysis of rhetoric and has been used in various environments and circumstances throughout the ages in order to persuade the masses towards the opinion and ideals of the propagandist. This thesis will show that although the French won the Algerian war militarily¹ they lost the war of ideas, that of propaganda and persuasion, and as a result relinquished to Algeria its independence.

In Algeria, the message presented by the French through propaganda did not attain the desired result, maintaining a French Algeria. This defeat can be attributed to the failure of the propaganda to influence its target audience. This thesis will also analyze the effectiveness of the propaganda during the war. This issue has not yet been discussed and remains open as Nacéra Aggoun has stated, “The verdict on the effectiveness of this propaganda and on the issue of whether or not the Algerian people were receptive to this approach remains open” (198).

¹ The idea that the war was won militarily will not be discussed in this work, but others such as Alexander and Keiger have discussed this and I will base this statement on their previous research. Ted Morgan has stated, “The French might be winning the war on the ground, with its highly effective barriers on the Tunisia and Morocco borders, and its 1959 offensive that broke up large rebel bands” (267). Jacques Ellul said, “Without going into details, I think one could, without being taxed with error, advance the view that at the end of 1958 the war was won militarily” (*FLN Propaganda* 16).

The Algerian war is notorious for its use of guerilla warfare and terrorism, but what remain to be discussed are the uses of propaganda by both the French and the Algerians and the effects of this propaganda on the outcome of the war.

Colonization

Algeria was invaded by the French in 1830 and in 1834 France had annexed the occupied areas. By 1848 Algeria had become an official and integral part of France with the creation of *départements* in Algiers, Constantine, and Oran. The initial conquest of Algeria proved to be a failure in “French policy, behavior, and organization”, but according to the constitutional monarchy under Louis-Philippe, “the occupation should continue for the sake of national prestige” (Metz). According to the French, “Algeria was no El Dorado; in the early years of the French occupation it was not even an inviting land” (Talbot 10). Algeria would remain under colonial rule for the next 132 years, where it would suffer much injustice and inequality.

Algeria differed from the other French colonies in that it was the closest to Metropolitan France; it was merely a day’s journey from Marseille to Algiers. Algeria was also the only African French colony to receive departmental status and because of this it had a large population of European settlers which later became known as the Pieds Noirs; “with nearly 900,000 inhabitants, one third of them Arabs, Algiers was France’s second largest city, bigger than Lyon or Marseille” (Morgan 119).

On June 14, 1830 the French armada landed at Sidi-Ferruch in response to an embarrassing incident where the dey of Algiers “struck a French official for the non-payment of accrued debts” (Gosnell 15). The purpose of this action by the French military was to remedy damaged French prestige, but also stemmed from the yearning to secure North African resources.

On July 14, 1865, a *Senatus Consulte* defined native Algerian Muslims as French subjects but they would not become naturalized French citizens unless they renounced their rights and duties under Muslim law. “All persons were not equally French in colonial society, whether one measured Frenchness by citizenship rights, cultural practices, or other barometers” (Gosnell 218). It was only in the three departmental cities that French rule and identity existed; in the rest of the vast southern country, Arab and Berber identity continued.

The colonial education in Algeria created an inequality amongst the indigenous population. The education directed towards the Arabs and Berbers focused on vocational or agricultural studies, they were taught what to do, not what to know. It was not until 1949 that educational reform changed the school system and Europeans and Algerians shared classrooms.

Algeria’s struggle for independence is a direct result of 130 years of French colonial oppression; “Colonial space represented a blank slate on which French colonial desires could be imposed” (Gosnell 15).

Previous Research/Literature Review

Academic research regarding the Algerian war has only begun to come to light in the past twenty years. Much of the discussion concerning the war focuses on the acts of torture by the French army and the terrorism committed by the Algerian’s. Very little attention has been directed towards the propaganda and its effects during the war. The reasoning for this lack of discussion revolves around the fact that access to French archives for the war remains limited. “Restricting access to archives is one way the French state has been able to occlude the war” (McCormack 138). I will here provide a brief summary of articles and books directed towards this study.

Nacéra Aggoun in “Psychological Propaganda during the Algerian War – Based on a Study of French Army Pamphlets” published in 2003— discusses the use of propaganda through

Army pamphlets produced by the 5e Bureau, the French Army's psychological warfare unit. In her conclusion she states, "the study of the use of propaganda in the Algerian War is significant on a number of levels and contributes a major dimension to the historiography of that war" (199).

Jacques Ellul, a philosopher and sociologist at the University of Bordeaux, has focused much attention on the use of propaganda and the formation of attitudes. Ellul has also written a short booklet on FLN propaganda entitled *FLN Propaganda in France during the Algerian War*, published in 1982 where he discusses the FLN's use of propaganda in métropole France.

Souvenirs and memoires have also mentioned in passing the use of propaganda. In *My Battle of Algiers*, a memoire by Ted Morgan, the author discusses his time serving in the French Army in Algerian war. During part of his time in the war he was assigned as a propaganda officer stationed in Algiers. In his memoire he recounts the events and mentions articles published in the newspapers falsifying stories and events during the war. Saadi Yacef has also mentioned his activities as a leader of the FLN during the Battle of Algiers in *Souvenirs de la Bataille d'Alger*, including his partaking in the nationalist movement which consisted of circulating propaganda among the native Algerians.

Other books are dedicated to imagery during the war and thus include examples of propaganda but with minimal to no discussion or analysis concerning the topic. These books include: *La guerre d'Algérie de la conquête à l'indépendance 1830-1962* by Pierre Vallaud, *The Algerian War and the French Army: Experiences, Images, Testimonies* by Martin Alexander and *La Guerre d'Algérie* by Peter Batty.

In addition to the previously mentioned books propaganda during the Algerian war is briefly mentioned in books discussing psychological warfare, such as *La guerre psychologique* by François Géré and *Psychological Warfare* by Paul Linebarger. Propaganda is not the sole

tool employed in psychological warfare and due to this these books focus much attention on torture and scare tactics rather than the use of propaganda.

Research Methods

In order to illustrate the thesis statement I will focus my attention on leaflets and posters as forms of propaganda. I will analyze the propaganda with an emphasis on semiotics and typography.

Semiotics comes from the Greek word σημεῖον or the transliterated version *sēmeion*, meaning sign. Thus, semiotics is the study of signs and symbols. This is a linking of symbols, signs, and codes to a meaning; a driver who sees a red octagon will stop because there is a meaning, that of stopping, associated with that sign. Some symbols are universal while others are unique to a culture, a peace sign gesture made by raising the pointer and middle finger with the palm facing the one giving the gesture in America is harmless, while in England it is a vulgar symbol.

The more an individual participates in the society in which he lives, the more he will cling to stereotyped symbols expressing collective notions about the past and the future of his group. The more stereotypes in a culture, the easier it is to form public opinion, and the more an individual participates in that culture, the more susceptible he becomes to the manipulation of these symbols. (Ellul, *Propaganda* 111)

Language, according to Saussure, is an essential element of semiology, but propaganda often uses language that contradicts the symbol or sign; “on relève souvent le forçage du message photographique par un texte de commentaire qui ne s’y rapporte pas...Elle procède d’une grave erreur quant à la sémiologie de l’image. Il est impossible de fausser par le texte la signification d’une image. En revanche il est possible de produire ou de choisir d’interpréter” (Géré 236).

In essence, I will focus on the visual nature of these documents. I have chosen to omit such media of propaganda as radio, television and newspapers. This is due to the fact that leaflets and posters were more abundant and more readily accessible by the Algerians and thus had more of an impact on their beliefs and opinions. According to recent studies, “messages are best comprehended and recalled when written” (Myers 243) because the reader is able to read and study the message at their own pace. Aggoun states that, “In addition to the violence of police methods and the use of torture, the development of propaganda and the classic tools offered by pamphlets, posters and handouts were at the forefront of [French] army action on the ground” (193). I have also decided to omit these other forms of propaganda in order to narrow the field of study.

I will begin the initial analysis of these leaflets and posters by focusing on seven elements: source, context, time, audience, medium, subject and mission (Linebarger 43-4). These seven elements help shed light on the nature of the propaganda. When defining the source it is necessary to determine where the propaganda originated, and whether it is white, grey or black. Time is also an essential element to the analysis of the propaganda because the very nature of the propaganda relies on the timing of its release and provides also a context in which the propaganda occurs. Along with time, the audience to whom the propaganda is targeted is essential and can explain the subject. The subject of the propaganda deals with the aims and objectives, in essence what ideal is to be propagated. The mission of the propaganda is the desired end result of the propagandist. With the use of these seven elements, the preliminary analysis of the propaganda is facilitated greatly and an elementary understanding of the propaganda is established. With this initial understanding, a more in depth analysis is begun dealing with semiology, because propaganda is in essence a “deceitful manipulation of

symbols” (Jackall 5). The propaganda will also be analyzed typographically which is the formatting, layout and composition of the text. Finally, the effects and effectiveness of the propaganda will be analyzed.

The leaflets and posters that I have chosen to analyze have been extracted from various sources, most coming from previously published books containing images of leaflets and posters. The images from these books that I have chosen are not treated with any previous analysis but are simply presented as images representing the war. I have limited myself to the material in these books due to the difficult nature in accessing government archives, which to this day are not officially on file or are subject to strict codes of secrecy.

2. BASIC PROPAGANDA TECHNIQUES

Definition

First of all, in a study devoted to the use of propaganda during a period of war, one must understand the definition and nature of propaganda that will be discussed. Propaganda by the masses is commonly understood as a spreading of information for the purpose of persuading opinions and beliefs. In *Propaganda and Persuasion*, Dr. Victoria O'Donnell defines propaganda as “the deliberate, systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behavior to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist” (6).

The most basic function of propaganda is to shape perceptions and, as Hitler stated in *Mien Kampf*, “The task of propaganda is to attract followers” (474). From ancient Greece to Alexander the Great to Julius Caesar to Catholicism to the Crusades and on to the modern era propaganda has attempted to do just this.

Originally the term in Latin meant to “propagate” or to “sow”. In 1622, the Roman Catholic church took this term and eliminated the neutrality of the word as they established “the *Sacra Congregatio de Propaganda Fide*, meaning the sacred congregation for propagating the faith of the Roman Catholic Church” (Jowett 2). The term propaganda came to have a negative connotation as the Roman Catholics had the intent of spreading their religion and beliefs to the New World while opposing the beliefs of the Protestants. From this point on the term propaganda is used to suggest a negative persuasion:

Propaganda is much more than belief manipulation, thought control, and persuasive language...it plays upon perplexity; it cultivates confusion; it exploits expectations; it poses as information and knowledge; it generates belief systems and tenacious convictions; it supplies ersatz assurances and certainties; it skews perceptions; it

systematically disregards superior epistemic values such as truth and truthfulness, understanding and knowledge; it discourages rationality, reasoning, and a healthy respect for rigor, evidence, and procedural safeguards; it promotes the easy acceptance of unexamined beliefs and supine ignorance. It handles truths and information as mere instruments (Cunningham 176).

The use of propaganda did not begin with the Roman Catholic Church at this time, but sprang from Greek origins with the study of rhetoric.

Source

When discussing sources of propaganda it is important to take note whether the source is white, grey or black. The best way to determine the source of the propaganda is to ask the simple question, “Who has the most to gain from this message?”

The source of white propaganda is truthfully stated and comes from an open and identifiable source. The information contained in white propaganda is generally or most likely accurate. Propaganda from white sources has a tendency to be a gentler mode of persuasion and is most prevalent in public relations where the message is most likely to be accurate.

Black propaganda originates from false sources and its purpose is to spread lies and deceptions; it is in essence “creative deceit” (Jowett 13). The critical element of black propaganda is the willingness of the audience to accept the credibility or power of the source. If the credibility or might of the source is questioned then the propaganda may be ineffective or misunderstood.

Grey propaganda is somewhere in between white and black propaganda; it can be seen as a combination of both black and white. The source of the information cannot be correctly

identified and the accuracy of that information is questionable as well. The information of grey propaganda tends to be fragmented or misleading.

Context

The context in which the propaganda takes place is an essential element because it relates to the prevalent moods of the times and thus the context is an understanding of the social and political climate. In the analysis of propaganda one must understand the cultural milieu of the time; “Propaganda is a unique phenomenon that results from the totality of forces pressing in upon an individual in his society, and therefore cannot be duplicated in a test tube” (Ellul, *Propaganda* vii). Thus, in order to study propaganda it is essential to understand these “forces” which shed light on the nature of the material being propagated.

Time

Linked with the context surrounding propaganda is the time period in which the message is propagated. It is important in the analysis of propaganda to know when the messages are distributed. Knowing whether a propaganda document is distributed at the beginning, middle, or end of a conflict is essential in the analysis of the message. This is because the meaning of the message will most likely be misunderstood by the analyst if the period in which the message is circulated is inaccurate.

Media

The media of propaganda are vast and “where there is a communication channel, there is also a potential propaganda medium” (Jowett 205). The vast array of propaganda media includes: word of mouth, coins, symbols (monuments and statues), *les Chansons de Geste* (*La Chanson de Roland* as propaganda for war and the crusades), leaflets (beginning in the 16th century), playing

cards, books, posters, music, radio, television, movies, photos, etc. Different media produce different effects on a population. Radio, television, and movies will not be as efficient among a poorer working class, whereas, leaflets and posters will be more widely received among a poorer class.

Audience

“The successful propagandist is able to discern the basic beliefs, needs, or fears of the audience and to play upon those” (Jowett 49). The knowledge and understanding of the audience’s cultural and religious beliefs are vital in the creation and analysis of propaganda. This is because propaganda plays on images and symbols that are unique to the targeted audience. As previously discussed it is also essential to understand the audience to which the propaganda is directed because the media used to transmit the propaganda relies purely on the audience.

3. PROPAGANDA IN WARFARE

Propaganda in warfare “commences long before actual hostilities break out or war is declared. It also continues long after peace treaties have been signed and soldiers have gone back to their homes” (Jowett 204). Before the commencement of war, propaganda is a substitute for physical violence, and throughout the war it is an appendage to it. In psychological warfare, “the propagandist is dealing with a foreign adversary whose morale he seeks to destroy by psychological means so that the opponent begins to doubt the validity of his beliefs and actions” (Ellul, *Propaganda* xiii). When the opponent begins to doubt the validity of his actions, one resulting effect is the defection of enemy troops, which during warfare is a desired result of propaganda.

Jowett states that, “the purpose of propaganda is to send out an ideology to an audience with a related objective” (3). Such is the case when a government is attempting to instill a sense of patriotism and support in a war effort, and this is done through language and images, “shaping perceptions is usually attempted through language and images, which is why slogans, posters, symbols, and even architectural structures are developed” (Jowett 6). Thus, in order to shape the perceptions of the masses during warfare the use of propaganda is a vital aspect. According to the Psychological Warfare Branch of the U.S. 5th Army, psychological warfare is “one of its tools for defeating enemies” (Psychological Warfare Branch 7). Harold D. Lasswell states that, “propaganda attains eminence as the one means of mass mobilization that is cheaper than violence, bribery or other possible control methods” (17).

The use of propaganda is not new to the modern era of war, it stems back as far as 490 BC with the Greek struggles against the Persians². The use of propaganda in war continues as can be seen in the Crusades where *les Chansons de Geste* became very popular forms of stories which generally had the intent of propagating the ideas of chivalry. *La Chanson de Roland*, an epic poem of the 12th century, served as a form of propaganda “for the idea of combat in the noble cause and helped establish the romance of all the attendant pomp and ceremony associated with chivalry” (Jowett 65).

More recent examples of propaganda in warfare can be seen in World War I, World War II, The Cold War, The Indochina War, and The Vietnam War³.

World War I

World War I, also known as the Great War or the War to End All Wars, lasting from 1914-1918, made great use of modern mass media in ways that had never been used before. It was during this time period that propaganda achieved greater significance than before, “In no previous conflict had ‘words’ been so important” (Jowett 209). War was no longer simply being waged on the battlefield but had stretched out to the civilian population as a war of words and ideas. Propaganda “was developed and used to bring about cooperation between the industrialized society and the fighting armed forces” (Jowett 162).

Propaganda was used extensively on both sides as ways to encourage the general population to support the war efforts. One way of supporting the war effort was to enlist and

² Themistocles, the Athenian naval commander, provided Xerxes, the son of the Persian king, with disinformation concerning the reliability of his newly acquired Greek soldiers. This disinformation appeared to have come from Xerxes own sources, yet the true creator of this disinformation was Themistocles. Through Themistocles’ use of propaganda, the Persians lost the war and were eventually forced to leave Greece.

³ I am here omitting a brief analysis of propaganda in more recent wars such as the Gulf War, The War in Afghanistan, and The War in Iraq due to their irrelevance concerning the Algerian war, which predates these wars.

much propaganda was directed towards this. When the United States was on the brink of entering the war, the Germans sunk the Lusitania where 128 Americans were killed. The United States did not hesitate to use this as a means to encourage enlisting, a poster that appeared one week after the event stated, “Remember the Lusitania! Enlist To-day”. During World War I the purpose of American propaganda was to sell the war to Americans, to enlist their support monetarily and to arouse hatred for the enemy. In fact, the United States distributed more than 100 million posters and pamphlets during the war (Jowett). World War I used radio transmissions as they had never been used before, and they came to be “considered to be the new medium for shaping public attitudes” (Jowett 162).

World War II

World War I saw a huge rise in the use of propaganda and also caused a great concern about the persuasive powers of the mass media on the opinions and attitudes of the population. Nazi propaganda during World War II played upon these fears. Hitler’s aim in the propaganda campaign was to “avoid abstract ideas and appeal to the emotions” and to “put forth only one side of the argument” (Jowett 237). Here we have a perfect example of creative deceit and black propaganda; the Nazis were not concerned with the validity of the message propagated. Hitler would embrace propaganda so much that he would meet almost every day with his minister in charge of propaganda, Goebbels.

Nazi propaganda was aimed at three main audiences, the native Germans living in other countries, the Nazi party, and the Allied Forces. The propaganda efforts directed towards Germans living in foreign countries tried to alienate them from their new countries implying that their blood heritage was stronger than their ties to their new country. The propaganda towards the Nazi party was aimed at demonstrating the military prowess and cultural greatness of

Germany. The propaganda directed towards these two audiences differed greatly from the propaganda directed towards the Allied Forces.

The propaganda directed towards the Allied Forces is seen as malicious and deceitful. One such example was a billboard placed in northern France that stated, "Soldiers of the Northern Provinces, licentious British soldiery are sleeping with your wives and raping your daughters" (Jowett 14). The French soldiers recognized this as blatant lies and simply replied by painting on the sign that they were from the south and did not care.

The Allied forces used propaganda in warfare as well, as can be seen in the following document by the U.S. Army's combat propaganda team during the war:

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY
APO 464 U. S. ARMY

5 April 1944.

Subject: COMBAT PROPAGANDA

To: ALL CONCERNED

1. Combat Propaganda is a comparatively new weapon of war and, as such, it has had little precedent to follow. Moreover, propaganda is an intangible weapon. It cannot be weighed or measured; nor can its results be evaluated with any considerable degree of precision.

2. But that it can be effective has now been established by actual field experience. The excerpts are taken from field reports in the Italian campaign and are part of that experience. They display nothing spectacular and do not provide a basis for pretentious claims; hence they should create no false illusions.

3. But they do show that properly used, propaganda does weaken the enemy's morale; does make him give up more easily; does cause him to fire fewer bullets at our troops; and on occasions, does persuade him to cross the lines and quit the fight altogether. This report, in brief, seems to indicate that propaganda helps to shorten the war and to save Allied lives.

4. That is why the Fifth Army will continue to use it.



MARK W. CLARK,
Lieutenant General, U. S. A.
Commanding

www.psywar.org

Figure 1

This document shows that the U.S. Army saw the effective nature of propaganda and then justifies its use in the first three statements and then states, “That is why the Fifth Army will continue to use it” (Psychological Warfare Branch 3).

The main propaganda medium used during World War II was the radio, which was very effective. This is due to the fact that the countries that were targeted by the propaganda had a high standard of living and the majority of the population possessed radios in their homes. “International radio broadcasts have at times been a potent force in shaping the world of propaganda in the 20th century, and they are likely to remain so in the foreseeable future” (Jowett 138).

The Cold War

The Cold War, which lasted from 1947 to 1991, continued the use of radio as a means of propagating messages. The Americans used a radio program called the Voice of America, which provided information for those behind the Iron Curtain, but was “ideologically injected to manipulate attitudes toward democracy, capitalism, and freedom” (Jowett 9). Posters were also widely used as a medium of propaganda to bring about fear concerning communism; American propaganda focused on showing communists as murderers and rapists.

The Indochina War

The medium of propaganda during the Indochina War differed greatly from the previous wars discussed here. This is due to the standard of living of the Vietnamese who were the target of the propaganda. Posters and leaflets were more predominant than radio messages. Psychological warfare had evolved and adapted to best suit its needs, so instead of radio messages the French mounted large speakers to airplanes and flew over villages spreading propaganda messages. The Vietnamese attempted the same thing but by simply piling speakers on top of each other and

announcing loud messages. Thus, it can be seen that the media used for propaganda depends greatly upon the audience and resources of the disseminator.

History of the Poster

The poster has been around as a means of communication since antiquity, but became more widely spread with the invention of the printing press and moveable type.⁴ In the sixteenth century posters mainly contained text; illustrations and insignias were rarely used. In 1534, Protestants nailed a poster or a placard on the door of King Francis I's bedchamber, which outraged the king and changed his political views towards Protestants. Then in 1539, Francis saw it necessary to regulate the putting up of posters and it was then forbidden in 1653 under penalty of death to print or display posters without official permission (Müller-Brockmann 26). In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries illustrations became more predominant and were often used by governments in order to recruit conscripts.

The poster continued to develop artistically and was soon associated with art exhibits and sporting events. During the World War I and II the use of the poster changed into a popular medium for political propaganda with such posters as Rosy the Riveter and Uncle Sam declaring, "I want you for U.S. Army". Nazi Germany also thrived on posters during World War II, which portrayed the strength of the army. "L'affiche demeure dans les années cinquante un vecteur privilégié des propagandistes, qu'ils soient gouvernementaux, partisans, ou éventuellement commerciaux" (Gervereau, *La France* 178).

The purpose of posters during wartime is to "speak to us and secretly appeal to weak spots of which we ourselves are not aware...and then channel [our feelings] so that we do what

⁴ Many books have been written on the topic of the history of the poster, I will here give a concise history as it relates to the subject at hand. Thus, I will omit the history of the poster as it relates to advertising and art.

the sponsor of the poster wants us to do” (Gallo 9-10). Posters are most commonly placed in public spaces with a large traffic flow in order to reach the largest percentage of the population as possible.

History of the Leaflet

The distribution of leaflets can be seen as the most productive means of reaching a target audience because it delivers the message directly into the hands of the audience. The use of leaflets is most commonly seen in advertising and psychological warfare where there is a need to get the message to the audience directly and in a timely fashion. The distributor of leaflets in psychological warfare attempts to alter the behavior and opinions of individuals and groups in a war torn society. There are different types of leaflets, strategic leaflets and tactical leaflets. Strategic leaflets aim at the end result of the conflict and tactical leaflets focus on immediate results.

Leaflets, unlike posters, are often distributed by hand or dropped by airplanes, balloons, or helicopters. The beginning of leaflet dropping originates during World War I, where it is estimated that more than 100 million posters and pamphlets were distributed by the U.S., but was more widely used during World War II where they were dropped from bombers or shot into enemy territory by shells.

4. A WAR WITHOUT A NAME

A Brief History of the War

The conflict between France and Algeria, lasting from 1954-1962, was not formally recognized by the French government as a “war” until June of 1999, 37 years after the conflict had ended. It had become an historical blind spot and a war without a name which can be considered one of the longest and cruelest wars of decolonization. The Algerian *Front de Libération Nationale* (FLN) acted as the leading force for Algeria in its struggle for independence along with their military counterpart the *Armée de libération Nationale* (ALN). A growing desire for an independent Algeria had been in the works for many years. With a blossoming of Algerian nationalism after the outbreak of World War I, Algerians were fighting alongside Frenchmen and dying for France, yet the two were unequal, lacking the same basic rights.

November 1, 1954 marked the beginning of the Algerian war with what is now known as the All Saints’ Day massacre. The massacre was conducted by the FLN against French military installations, police posts, warehouses, communication facilities and public utilities in an attempt to incite an open rebellion calling for an autonomous state. The French government, with little intelligence on the issue, immediately blamed the MTLD (Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques) and imprisoned its leaders. These actions left the “FLN with a monopoly on radical nationalism, with the FLN free to proselytize while their rivals languished in prison” (Talbot 37).

The French responded in full force against the revolutionaries after the attack on All Saint’s Day. In the summer of 1954, the French had divided Algeria into six *wilayas* (provinces). Within the year following the initial attacks, three of the six *wilayas* were vacant of revolutionaries and arms; the violence was kept along the eastern *wilayas*. By 1955, France had killed or arrested most of the founders of the FLN (Talbot).

August 20, 1955, Algerian revolutionaries massacred at least 123 Algerians and settlers in the city of Philippeville.⁵ The “ALN regulars pushed before them several hundred peasants whom they had convinced the hour of deliverance lay at hand. Armed with axes, knives, sickles, and such firearms as were available, the peasants set upon settlers and Algerians alike....Some they hacked to death; others they disemboweled; they slit the throats of still others” (Talbot 49-50). This action caused Jacques Soustelle, Governor General of Algeria from 1955 to 1956, to seek more repressive means rather than reforms to control the revolutionaries.

By this point the war in Algeria had become an important political debate. It was considered the most important issue facing the nation and was the result of multiple Prime Ministers resigning, leaving France without a government for 58 days in 1957. During the early months of 1956, precedence was given to crushing the insurgency over political reform, and the policy towards Algeria was declared as pacification, “a euphemism old as the conquest of Algeria for the application of military force” (Talbot 61). Throughout these events, the government maintained that the war in Algeria was merely a rebellion of French citizens and the actions taken were purely used for the maintaining of order.

The government had maintained that France faced a rebellion of French citizens.

Rebelling against their own government put these citizens *hors la loi*. They were outlaws, persons beyond the law yet at the same time subject to it. The government, according to this view of the matter, had sent troops to restore order in North Africa, just as it might dispatch police to quell a riot in Brittany. In Algeria the army was not fighting a war but conducting operations for the maintenance of order. (Talbot 51).

⁵ Philippeville is now known as Skikda and is located 130 miles from the Tunisian border and approximately 50 miles north of the *département* of Constantine.

September 30, 1956, three women working for the FLN planted bombs in three separate locations: a milk bar, La Caf teria, the Algiers airport. These bombs went off around five o'clock killing three and injuring 46, but the bomb placed at the airport failed to explode. These bombings marked the beginning stages of what has now become known as the Battle of Algiers, which lasted until October 8, 1957.

October 22, 1956, in the midst of the Suez expedition, an airplane heading to Tunis containing Ahmed Ben Bella, Mohamed Boudiaf, Ait-Ahmed Hocine, and Mohamed Khider was diverted and redirected to land in Algiers. These men, all leaders of the FLN, had participated in the organization of the All Saints' Day massacre. When they arrived in Algiers they were immediately arrested and transported to France where they remained for the duration of the war.

Though the bombings in the European area of Algiers began the insurrection in the capital city, the Battle of Algiers did not fully take place until January 7, 1957 when Robert Lacoste brought the Tenth Paratroop Division into Algiers. The *paras* as they were known acted as a police force with essentially a *carte blanche* which was granted through the Special Powers law. This law was enacted on March 16, 1956, and grants "the most extensive powers for undertaking any exceptional measure dictated by circumstances with a view to the reestablishment of order, the protection of persons and property and the safeguard of the territory" (qtd. in Talbott 83).

Algiers had been terrorized by the FLN and the *paras* were working for the "reestablishment of order, the protection of persons and property and the safeguard of the territory." Thus, they used torture in order to achieve their goal. The terrorism of the FLN led to the use of torture by the French Army to discover the bombing network and the FLN's

knowledge of the use of torture led them to increase terrorist acts.⁶ As the end of the Battle of Algiers approached the number of terrorist acts decreased greatly in Algiers. The Battle of Algiers has been publicized greatly in books and movies, such as *The Battle of Algiers* by Gillo Pontecorvo, and it is for this reason that this brief history of the war will not discuss this topic in great detail.

May 1958 proved to be a struggle for the fourth republic, as it was on the verge of a civil war with the discussion of the treatment of Algeria at the forefront of the debate:

Within less than a week after May 13, then, all the players in the drama had made their appearance on the stage. The settlers rose against the republic; the army sided with the settlers; de Gaulle declared himself ready to assume power; Soustelle turned up in Algiers; a general strike fizzled out; the government wavered between standing firm against Algiers and giving ground (Talbot 126).

At the end of the May events de Gaulle emerged as the Prime Minister and was put into office on June 1, 1958. De Gaulle realized that an attempt to keep Algeria French was futile but insisted that France maintain sovereignty over Algeria (Talbot 137). Although de Gaulle recognized the futility of keeping Algeria French, Algeria did not receive its independence until 1962.

The end of 1958 signaled an attempt by de Gaulle to work towards peace talks and Maurice Challe replaced Raoul Salan as commander in Algiers. October 23, 1958 de Gaulle offered *la paix des braves*, an attempt for the FLN to lay down their arms and discuss the possibilities for an end to the conflict, but the FLN did not heed the call for peace talks. This failure led to the Challe Offensive, an attempt to chase the ALN back to their mountain hideouts

⁶ As previously mentioned this paper will not focus on the use of terrorism as a means of psychological warfare because this issue has already been discussed in great detail.

and due to the offensive, “guerilla bands did not appear in the countryside in units larger than company size, or roughly eighty men” (Talbot 146).

In August 1959, de Gaulle met with his cabinet in order to discuss a cease-fire with the FLN, which put an end to the Challe offensive, which may have completely destroyed the FLN militarily had it been permitted to continue. De Gaulle later mentioned in an address his plans for the future of Algeria, that of self-determination. Algeria’s future was to be determined by the population of Algeria.

In January of 1960, the general over the *paras*, Jacques Massu, was relieved of his position in Algiers and was recalled to mainland France. Much of the *ultras*, the Pieds-noirs in favor of keeping Algeria French, reacted to the recall of Massu by erecting barricades in the streets of the European quarter with the slogan “Vive Massu” in an attempt to defend the idea of a French Algeria. This weeklong event was known as the *semaine des barricades*. This siege on Algiers was an attempt to subvert de Gaulle’s objectives of rendering self-determination to Algeria. The *Organisation de l’armée secrète* (OAS) was organized in December of the same year in order to continue what the *semaine des barricades* had started.

In June of 1960, the leader of *wilaya* IV, Si Salah, heeded the call of *la paix des braves* and was sent to meet with de Gaulle at the Elysée Palace to discuss a cease-fire, to which other *wilayas* had agreed. After these talks, de Gaulle implored the *Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Algérienne* (GPRA) to conduct peace talks, to which the GPRA agreed and the talks took place on June 25th in Melun, but ended without any results shortly after the talks had begun. When Si Salah returned to Algeria to further discuss the cease-fire with the adjacent *wilaya* he was captured and killed. These events are known as the *L’Affaire Si Salah* because it is believed

that de Gaulle merely agreed to meet with Si Salah in order to further the possibility of peace talks with the GPRA (Talbot 196).

By the end of 1960, de Gaulle had mentioned an Algerian Algeria in many of his speeches (Talbot 182). January 8, 1961 de Gaulle decided that it was time for a public vote on a referendum concerning the “organization of the public authority in Algeria, while awaiting self-determination” (qtd. in Talbot 200). The query to which the voters were to vote affirmative or negative was thus, “Do you approve the bill submitted to the French people by the President of the Republic both ‘both concerning the self-determination of the Algerian populations and the organization of public authority in Algeria before self-determination?’” (qtd. in Talbot 201).

In April of 1961 four generals, Challe, Jouhaud, Salan and Zeller, along with many colonels disgusted by de Gaulle’s treatment of Algeria attempted a *putsch*. The purpose of this *putsch* was to keep Algeria French by defeating the ALN in Algeria and removing de Gaulle from office and starting a new republic. On April 22, 1961 the 1^{er} *Régiment étranger des parachutistes* seized Algiers with only one fatality which is claimed to be accidental. The *putsch* was unsuccessful and only lasted a few days because of wavering military support. The *putsch* had failed and the officers involved were imprisoned. Three of the four generals involved evaded capture and changed their focus to the OAS and continued to disrupt the possibility of peace in an Algerian Algeria.

Algerian independence did not come quickly after the *putsch* had fizzled out. It took over a year for a cease-fire to take place and Algerian independence did not come until July of 1962. The time from the *putsch* to the cease-fire was a very violent period as the OAS and FLN were committing acts of terrorism against each other. With each OAS terrorist act the following FLN

act in response was more violent and then the OAS responded more violently. “French rule in Algeria ended as violently as it began” (Talbot 20).

The peace talks that had failed in 1960 at Melun were continued in Evian-les-Bains where an agreement was made on March 18, 1962 and a cease-fire followed the next day. On April 8, 1962 a referendum was held in France to vote on the Evian Accords, the referendum passed and on July 1, 1962 a similar referendum was held in Algeria where there was an overwhelming approval. July 3, 1962, de Gaulle declared Algeria independent and Algeria officially became independent on July 5, 1962, 132 years after the initial conquest.

5. PROPAGANDA FOR A FRENCH ALGERIA

Propaganda during the Algerian war existed on both sides in an effort to influence people's opinions and beliefs. The French propaganda urged the French (in métropole), Pieds noirs (the French Algerians) and native Algerians towards maintaining a French Algeria.⁷ This chapter will be divided into 3 sections and will discuss the diffusion of French propaganda and the different propaganda messages directed towards the French and the Algerians.

Diffusion of French Propaganda

The most popular media of propaganda during the Algerian war were leaflets and posters. These posters were most frequently placed in central spaces where the masses could easily see them, such as busy street corners and on propaganda boards. Figure 2, *Aux urnes citoyens*, illustrates small posters pasted to the wall in the Casbah on the corner of the school urging the population to vote for a referendum on self-determination. Figure 2, *Poster Board*, illustrates a propaganda board by the French directed towards the native population. The message there is directing them essentially to choose between good and bad, where the French represent good, “La France veut ton bonheur”.

⁷ Propaganda by the OAS fits into this category but I have chosen to omit this because the OAS was not necessarily a cohesive unit. Susini, the founding member of the OAS, wrote that “everyone that had access to a mimeograph machine regarded himself as an OAS propagandist” (qtd. in Talbott 218), and Pierre Sergent, who commanded the metropolitan OAS, said of the members of the OAS, “Each believes in *his* truth, in *his* solution that he considers unique. Each jealousy protects *his* boutique and *his* activists like so many treasures” (qtd. in Talbott 219).



Figure 2



Figure 3

Leaflets were often distributed by dropping them from helicopters. The following story comes from Ted Morgan's memoir as a propaganda officer in the French Army, entitled *My Battle of Algiers*, in which he describes how the French military distributed its leaflets:

On Sunday, January 27 [1957], the day before the strike, Brissac awakened me out of a sound sleep at 8 AM and told me to come to the office at once. The first issue of our paper had been printed and was in the kiosques. He had a stack of them in the office and wanted me to take them over the Casbah in a chopper and drop them in the hope that the banner headline, 'Tous à l'école,' would make an impression.

The chopper was waiting on the parade ground of a barracks above the Casbah, and I got in with my papers. 'A little reading material for the *bougnouls*' (an offensive word for Arabs), the pilot said. We hovered over the Casbah, and the people below in the narrow alleys scattered. I started throwing the papers out, but a gust of wind came up and most of them blew out to sea. I watched them fly off, the pages flapping like pelican wings.

I went back to the office and found Brissac composing a leaflet that said: ‘The Algerian Communist Party says *no* to the strike. It is useless, since the United Nations will demand Algerian independence. It is unjust because it will starve the people. The FLN is leading the Algerian people astray.’

‘Just a little disinformation,’ he said. “We’ll get these printed up and they’ll be all over the city this afternoon.’

... At dawn on January 28, a chopper dropped another set of Brissac’s flyers over the Casbah: ‘The FLN demands the closing of stores. The FLN wants to starve the inhabitants of Algiers. Have faith in the forces of order. (145-6)

Officers such as Ted Morgan would also go from village to village sharing propaganda messages directed towards maintaining a French Algeria. In the following image, two officers show a poster to an Algerian village encouraging them to talk or they become the accomplices of the FLN’s crimes.



Figure 4

Propaganda towards the French



Figure 5

Source: White, French

Context: The war is creating a divide in France

Time: 1957

Audience: French

Medium: Poster

Subject: Gain support for keeping Algeria French

Mission: Quell the rebellion to keep Algeria French

Translation: “No more French Algeria...no more France. Union for the salvation and renewal of French Algeria”

In April of 1956 Jacques Soustelle, former Governor-General of Algeria, and Georges Bidault, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, created the *Union pour le Salut et le renouveau de l'Algérie française* (USRAF). The purpose of the USRAF was to help maintain French support

for a French Algeria. On September 16, 1959, the USRAF was betrayed by de Gaulle when he announced his intentions to grant self-determination to the Algerians and an Algerian Algeria. Some of the supporters of the USRAF became members of the OAS.

The grenade in the middle of Algeria is in the process of exploding and as it does so it is tearing apart France and Algeria. One large side effect of losing Algeria for France would be the reintegration of the *Pieds Noirs* into *la métropole*. It is estimated that around one million of these *Pieds Noirs* fled in mass exodus to France with only what they could carry in their suitcases (Meredith 74). Losing Algeria was also not an option for the *Harkis* because they had become traitors to their country by fighting alongside the French and would surely lose their lives.

Algeria is also being shown as being torn apart by the war. The USRAF is attempting to show that if Algeria were to gain its independence it would fall apart politically and economically. The leaders of the FLN in the minds of the French were a bunch of hooligans and criminals and without the support of France the country would fall into a state of extreme poverty.

A loss to Algeria would demonstrate the lack of ability of the French Army to conduct a military operation effectively. France here is shown as in the process of being torn apart, yet the area known as Alsace-Lorraine has already been separated from mainland France. This part of France has changed hands multiple times between France and Germany. The most recent change of hands was at the end of World War II when Alsace-Lorraine was returned to France. This poster is implying that if France were to lose Algeria the loss of Alsace-Lorraine would come quickly.




Figure 6

Source: White, French

Context: De Gaulle in power

Time: 1958

Audience: French and Algerians

Medium: Poster

Subject: Demonstrate that everyone in France and Algeria are French

Mission: Gain popular support against the rebellion

Translation: “55 million French in France”

The text of this document is in the form of the Cross of Lorraine, which was originally the symbol of Joan of Arc because she came from that region. From the Franco-Prussian war until the end of 1918 Alsace-Lorraine was in the hands of the Germans so the Cross of Lorraine became a symbol of regaining territory that had been lost. This was similar during World War II when Alsace-Lorraine was once again lost to the Germans; the Free French Forces used this as

their symbol because it came to represent patriotism. De Gaulle used the Cross of Lorraine as his symbol, representing patriotism and nationalism.

The two cities mentioned, Dunkerque and Tamanrasset, are the furthest cities north and south; Dunkerque is the northern most city in France while Tamanrasset is the southern most city in Algeria. The vertical bar of the cross connects its ends at these two cities implying, through the text, that everything in between is France.

The base of the cross is firmly planted deep within Algeria, representing the essential nature of Algeria to France. Without the base the entire cross would collapse. This could be in reference to the newly discovered oil in the Saharan desert in southern Algeria. With this oil, France would become a very wealthy country, but losing Algeria would result in a loss of control of the oil fields.

The background of the poster shows the outlines of the French kingdom, including mainland France, Corsica and Algeria. Behind this, images of French people are gathered together in unity, carrying French flags. The top of the image contains native French but towards the bottom, closer to Algeria, the individuals are of Arabic descent. Nevertheless, the message is that all of these individuals from Dunkerque to Tamanrasset are French.

Propaganda towards the Algerians

Propaganda towards the Algerians for a French Algeria takes several different forms including documents directly aimed at the FLN, whereas others focus on the general population. Some focus on the defection of troops while others focus on whistle blowing. While the propaganda takes upon itself several forms, the French Army is at the head of this propaganda effort.



Figure 7

Source: Grey

Context: The FLN leaders left for Switzerland to set up a bank account for the FLN

Time: ca. 1956

Audience: Muslim Algerians and those involved in the FLN

Medium: Leaflet/Poster

Subject: Deter the general population from supporting the FLN

Mission: Eliminate money flow to the FLN

Translation: “The murderous Fellagha are stealing your savings. Abroad the leaders of the rebellion are playing with your money”

The Fellagha is an Arabic word that literally means bandit. The armed militants of the anti-colonial movement in North Africa were commonly referred to as the Fellaghas. The top right of the image shows an Algerian shop owner opening his cash box and handing over some of his earnings to the Fellagha; “residents of the Casbah who did not work with the FLN were intimidated into giving money and keeping quiet...the flow of money into the treasury became a fairly accurate gauge of the FLN’s control of the population” (Talbot 80).

The shop owner is shown being forced to hand over the money by two Fellaghas with a crescent and moon arm band on their right arms. The Fellagha on the left is holding the traditional weapon of the Algerian War, the MAT .49. The money appears to be flowing from the top right where the shop owner is to the lower left where the leaders are portrayed drinking and smoking around a table in laughter; the FLN leaders are shown as men without faith or law according to Muslim rule. This diagonal line created by the money appears to be flowing into the glasses and hands of the irresponsible leaders. The curled edges of the money make it appear as if the money is in motion in a constant state of moving from the people’s hands to the tables of the FLN.

The text in the top left corner is in French, whereas, on the bottom left corner the same text is written in Arabic, so as to aim the propaganda at all possible audiences. The source of this propaganda can be seen as grey in that the source from which the propaganda emanates may be from the French government, but the accuracy of the information is questionable.

This propaganda document can be seen as roughly following the constructive poster where “The surface is arranged and formed into geometrically proportioned parts, the lettering is condensed and included in the space as an element of equal importance to the image, the drawing is stylized and strictly divided both vertically and horizontally, and only two colors are used” (Müller-Brockmann 157). This is shown in the following rendering of the image (figure 4). There is a geometrical proportioning of the image where the lettering is concise and of equal importance to the image, while only using two colors.



Figure 8



Figure 9

Source: White, French Army

Context: The FLN are harassing the innocent Algerians

Time: ca. 1955

Audience: Algerians

Medium: Leaflet

Subject: Who will save you

Mission: Rally support against the FLN

Translation: "Who will deliver you from these venomous scorpions?"

This leaflet, distributed by the French Army, is an attempt to influence those who are not actively participating in the rebellion to come to the French side and support the army. This leaflet is asking the simple question, "Who will save you?" The French army here is boasting their military prowess by declaring that they can eliminate the threat, as if they are a superhero and the FLN is the villain.

Fellah in Arabic refers to a peasant or farmer, thus, the innocent Algerian peasant is being threatened by venomous scorpions. Scorpions symbolize danger, pain and treachery because

they often strike without any warning, because of this the FLN are described as venomous scorpions. Each of the four scorpions is wearing a hat stating some of their crimes: *vol, crime, destruction, viol* (theft, crime, destruction, rape).

The border of the document forms a sort of barricade, similar to those that were erected along the borders with Morocco and Tunisia. This barricade along with the four scorpions in each corner is restricting the Fellah so as to appear that there is no escape except through the help of the French Army.

This text is not only written in French, but in Arabic as well so that all of the uneducated Algerian Fellah can understand the message. The most prominent element of this leaflet is the word *qui* (who) which is in essence a cry for help.



Figure 10

Source: White, French

Context: Beginning of the war

Time: ca. 1955

Audience: Algerians

Medium: Leaflet

Subject: Under the French flag we are all French

Mission: Unify Algeria under the French flag

Translation: “One heart, one flag, we are all French in French Algeria”

This leaflet shows an Algerian and a Frenchman holding hands, and both are wearing the same attire except for the turban which sets the Algerian apart from the Frenchman. This leaflet is implying that the only difference between French from *métropole* and a French Algerian is their religion and the turban on their head. The Algerian, not the European is holding the *drapeau tricolore*, which signifies that the Algerian is just as French as the Frenchman while under the *drapeau tricolore*.




Figure 11

Source: White, French Army

Context: Beginning of the war

Time: ca. 1955

Audience: Algerians

Medium: Leaflet

Subject: Encourage whistle blowers

Mission: Eliminate the revolution before it has a chance to come into full swing

Translation: "Let's talk in order to protect our lives"

This leaflet is directed to the native Algerians in an attempt to get them to inform the French army of the rebel's intentions and plans. The text of the leaflet implies that if the rebellion is quelled, peace will be restored and the taking of lives in combat will not be necessary.

This document relies heavily on imagery rather than text. The Muslim informants appear to be more than happy to point out the rebels, while the French Foreign Legion officer appears to

be angry, with the edge of the eyebrow raised, as he looks and perceives the rebels. The rebels in the background almost appear as zombies in the way that they are walking, lifeless and hunched over. The rebels are wearing arm bands on their left arms displaying the crescent and moon, which since the Ottoman Empire represents the Muslim faith and is used to represent the FLN rebels. The children in the image are pointing at the rebels as well; this is in reference to the idea that children are less likely to keep secrets and if the adults do not inform the French, the children will.

The text in French is written in bold and uses the imperative, which is used to give commands or suggestions. Here, the imperative is used as an encouraging suggestion. The same text is written in Arabic at the top of the image. The use of both French and Arabic in this leaflet is so that the message will be understood by everyone.



Figure 12

Source: White, French Army

Context: Rebel Interrogations and torture

Time: ca. 1956

Audience: Algerians

Medium: Leaflet

Subject: Become an informant

Mission: Quell the rebellion

Translation: “Everyone is talking and the rebel is giving up”

The text of this leaflet can be seen as an “if then” statement, if everyone talks then the rebels will have no other choice than to give up. At the same time it is a declarative statement stating that everyone is talking and the rebels are giving up. The use of the text as a declarative statement may ring in the ears of rebels who are unsure about what they are doing and because

they are ill-informed they will give up because they perceive that others are giving up as well. The text is written in both Arabic and French to reach all of the rebels, educated and uneducated.

The two most prominent words of this leaflet are *parle* and *abandonne*. The use of these two words along with the image illustrates the link between talking and the rebels abandoning their ways. This leaflet is an attempt to encourage the innocent Algerians who may know some information to come forward in order to end the violence and destruction. It is propagating the same ideals as the leaflet stating *Parlons pour défendre notre vie* (figure 11).

The FLN rebel has just laid down his weapon of war and is approaching the viewer with his hands raised above his head in submission. On his left arm is the crescent and moon armband typically worn by the FLN soldiers. The armband is facing the viewer of the propaganda in order to identify the individual. Visually this armband is intriguing because if the rebel were to put his hands down, the crescent and moon would be on the inside of his arm. The rebel is shown coming from the barren wasteland behind him. The image is very rigid yet at the same time it is trying to show movement as the rebel is stepping forward and dropping his gun. The rifle that is being dropped by the rebel is an archaic single shot Gras Rifle which was used in the late 19th century. The FLN would use any weapons that they could get their hands on including American and German rifles from World War I. Illustrating the archaic weapon demonstrates that the rebels are not well equipped against the newer weapons of the French.




Figure 13

Source: White, French Army

Context: The war

Time: ca. 1956

Audience: Algerian Muslims

Medium: Leaflet

Subject: Recruit Muslims to join the French Army

Mission: Increase military forces in Algeria

Translation: “Muslim youth, why not you? Join the metropolitan troops. For all information regarding enlistment go to the Gendarmeries, Town Halls, Military Posts and the Special Administration Section. Fully French.”

This propaganda leaflet is aimed towards the native Algerian population with an emphasis on encouraging them to join the French military. The leaflets asks the simple question “Why not you?” and implies that in order to become fully French one must join the ranks of the military and defend France. The source of this propaganda is clear; it originates from the 5e

bureau as is shown by the acronym at the bottom of the leaflet, PsyCAO, which stands for the psychological division of the Corps d'Armée d'Oran (Descombin 31).

The Algerians were encouraged to enlist in the French Army in order to help bring peace to the country. The *Section Administrative Spécialisée*, SAS, created in 1955 was an attempt to place French influence on the Muslim population in rural areas. The SAS in conjunction with providing French influence was also responsible for recruiting and training the *Harkis*. The term *Harki* is an adjective of the Arabic word *harka* meaning movement and is most commonly referred to as Muslim Algerians serving in the French army during the war.

The image on the right of the leaflet shows a native Algerian in his traditional garb wearing a turban transforming into a member of the French military with a *calot*. It appears as if he is moving forward and in essence is progressing towards becoming more French, yet it is showing the dual nature of the role, you can still be a Muslim and participate in the French Army. The coat encompasses both of them showing this dual nature.




Figure 14

Source: White, French Army

Context: The FLN leaders were caught on an airplane heading to Tunis

Time: November 1956

Audience: Fellagha

Medium: Leaflet

Subject: The leaders of the rebellion have been captured and the continuation of fighting is futile

Mission: Termination of the rebellion

Translation: Middle document: “A new Algeria is going to be born. The rebellion is condemned and Ben Bella, Khider, Boudiaf and the others have recognized it. The rebellion has lost the day.

Ben Bella, Khider, Boudiaf and the others have revealed your organization’s secrets and from now on we will now move to strike on it. Fellagha cease-fire, it is in your best interests.

Abandon the errors of your ways. Get rid of your criminal leaders and respond to the call of President Mollet and Resident Minister Lacoste. Adjoul Adjoul, the rebel leader of the Aurès has understood it and has turned himself in. Take back your place among us before it is too late, come work with us in order to realize our communal aspiration in a new prosperous and happy

Algeria.” Right document: “If you don’t believe it, look at them, they are in jail”

October 21 1956, the leaders of the FLN in Algiers were on their way to Tunis to meet with the Tunisian government in order to form a North African union. The leaders included Ahmed Ben Bell, Aït-Ahmed, Mohammed Khider, Mohammed Boudiaf, and Mostefa Lacheraf. On their way to Tunis, the French government intercepted the plane and redirected it towards Algiers. The second the FLN leaders stepped off the plane they were arrested. This was a big day for the French because of the capture of the FLN leaders, yet they had not captured the militants and the FLN leaders became martyrs of the revolution.

The French believed that through the capture of these men they had cut off the head of the revolution and that the FLN had lost the rebellion. This document was released as a result calling for a cease-fire declaring that it is in their best interest to put down their arms. The front of the document with the images of the FLN leaders in prison is used as a form of proof that they had been captured; written in large font above the pictures are the words, “If you don’t believe...look at them.”

The reverse side of the leaflet is very text heavy, whereas the most important elements of the front are the two images of the leaders. The use of bolding and large type font is used to mark the essential elements of the document. The eye is naturally drawn to the largest font in the middle with a declaration for a *CESSEZ-LE-FEU*. The following three lines begin with words written in bold: *abandonnez, débarrassez-vous, répondez*. These three words follow a logical progression towards becoming reintegrated into French society in order to build a new and prosperous Algeria. This document was written both in French and in Arabic, so as to demonstrate to all that the rebellion had lost.



Figure 15

Source: White, French Army

Context: The FLN is using its members to cross the border into Morocco or Tunisia in order to smuggle guns into the country to arm the FLN/ALN

Time: ca. 1956

Audience: Algerians, Tunisians, FLN

Medium: Leaflet

Subject: Preventing gunrunning from Tunisia and Morocco

Mission: Stop the flow of guns to the FLN/ALN

Translation: “Do you still want to experiment with the barricade? This is what you get from messing with it...DEATH”

Only months after the All Saints’ Day massacre in 1954, which marked the beginning of the Algerian war, did gunrunners begin crossing the Tunisian and Moroccan borders. Both

Tunisia and Morocco had gained their independence from France and were willing to aid Algeria in its struggle. Barricades were constructed along the borders in order to inhibit the illegal trafficking of guns. On February 8, 1958, the French Air Force bombed Sidi Sakiet Youssef, a Tunisian village believed to be aiding and embedding the FLN, in order to inhibit the gunrunning and eliminate the FLN guerillas that were supposedly harbored there.

This leaflet attempts to deter current and prospective gunrunners by illustrating the results of an attempt to cross the barricade, the end result being death. The image on the lower left hand side is disturbing, showing the man's leg cut off and caught in the wire hanging above his body. This propaganda leaflet is used as a scare tactic following a logical pattern, if you do x you will get y, as is shown through the use of the arrows.

The typeface is handwritten with a mixture of words in upper and lower cases and uses bolding as a form of emphasis. The keywords in this leaflet are written in all-caps: *veux-tu, barrage, tu gagnes, la mort*. The most prominent word in this leaflet is **LA MORT**, emphasizing the end result.

This document uses the colloquial pronoun, *tu*, instead of the formal pronoun, *vous*. *Tu* is generally used in familiar situations such as with friends and family. Thus, the use of *tu* is an attempt to personalize this advice to them, as if a concerned friend is warning them of the results.



Figure 16

Source: Grey

Context: Competition between the FLN and the MNA for control of the revolution

Time: ca. 1956

Audience: Algerian natives

Medium: Leaflet

Subject: Deter the general population from supporting the FLN

Mission: Eliminate the FLN and the revolutionary movement

Translation: “The jackals are killing each other”

The term jackal is a pejorative term referring to a cruel and bloodthirsty person. The jackal also represents “lust, greed, cruelty and sensuality, in short, all violent feelings and emotions” (Chevalier 548). The French here are not only comparing the FLN to savage animals but to a bloodthirsty group who will kill whomever they want or need. “In wartime, the enemy is often symbolized as subhuman or animal-like to soften the killing process linguistically” (Jowett 295).

This leaflet originates from the French and is attempting to show the disorganization of the FLN and their inability to unite as a single cohesive group; they act as jackals, as is shown in the image in the upper left. The source of this propaganda leaflet can be seen as grey because the source is clear, the French, but the message may not be completely accurate.

The French sat back and watched the rivalry between the FLN and the MNA in hopes that they would destroy each other and in so doing, kill the revolution. By the end of 1956, the MNA had joined forces with their enemies, the FLN, in order to bring order to the revolution (Vallaud 131).

The leaflet can be divided into three separate parts, the FLN, the jackals and the owl, but in essence the jackals in the upper left are portrayed as almost being a reflection of the FLN. The owl appears to be watching over the conflict while wearing a fez cap. The fez cap is most popularly worn in Morocco and Tunisia, and thus the owl can be representative of the FLN's supporters. The owl is shown by the French as representing the Tunisians and Moroccans sitting around watching what is happening.

The text is handwritten in red, the same red that is pouring from the MNA's dead body, as if it is written in blood. The typeface is not merely informing the reader that the Jackals are eating each other, but it is showing the bloodshed.



Figure 17

Source: White, French

Context: *Paix des braves*

Time: 1958

Audience: FLN

Medium: Leaflet

Subject: Defection of enemy troops

Mission: Keep Algeria French

Translation: “Come shape a more French Algeria. This leaflet serves as a travel pass”

There were many leaflets and documents during the war similar to this one that served as a travel pass, or a white flag in the traditional sense. In 1958 de Gaulle, as Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, offered the *paix des braves* which was intended as a means for the FLN to come talk with the French without being attacked. If a member of the FLN were to approach the

military with one of these they were able to become reintegrated into French society without being harmed. This is a very simple leaflet containing minimal amounts of text and a single image of de Gaulle. The use of de Gaulle in this leaflet is to emphasize nationalistic ideals, “l’homme du passé se déclare ainsi guide du futur” (Gervereau, *La propagande* 142).

Face to face contact in propaganda is shown to be very effective in the use of persuading opinions and beliefs (Jowett 292). But, during the Algerian war it was almost impossible for the Algerians to physically see de Gaulle. Thus, the use of de Gaulle’s face on propaganda leaflets was an opportunity for the rebels to have some semblance of face to face contact in an attempt to persuade the rebel’s views.




Figure 18

Source: White, French

Context: *Paix des Braves*

Time: 1958

Audience: FLN

Medium: Leaflet

Subject: Defection of FLN troops

Mission: Keep Algeria French

Translation: "De Gaulle is peace. This document is a travel pass"

This is another document that served as a travel document, or a white flag. The back side of the document, the left image, is showing an FLN militant carrying this very document along the barricades to a French patrolman. The use of the crescent and moon armband informs the viewer that this individual is part of the revolutionary forces. The FLN militant is approaching the French soldier with his archaic M1 Garand behind him. The French soldier is walking towards him with his hand outstretched reaching for the document rather than with his gun

pointing at the FLN militant. There is a direct diagonal line from the hand of the FLN to the outstretched arm of the French soldier. This is an attempt to demonstrate the willingness of the French to accept the defection of FLN troops.

The image of de Gaulle is the traditional image, representing peace and nationalistic ideals. This depiction of de Gaulle is almost a mirror image of figure 17. De Gaulle desires to bring peace and is willing to put his image on the line in order to achieve this goal.



Figure 19

Source: White, French Army

Context: *La paix des braves*, the Bellouni affair

Time: October 1958

Audience: Outlaw Rebels

Medium: Leaflet

Subject: The outlaws can be reintegrated into French society before it becomes too late

Mission: Cause defection among the rebels

Translation: "To the outlaws who are in the mountains! General Salan has officially decided to engage in combat against those who refuse the pardon granted by himself and General de Gaulle. The generous and strong France will forgive those who come back into its fold but it will abolish those traitors who oppress and terrorize the French population. Bellounis rallied towards France and she forgave him! Bellounis then betrayed her and then she defeated Bellounis! May the death of Bellounis serve as a warning to those who have been led astray by their leaders who have not yet reintegrated into the French community! Soon it will be too late"

This document is addressed to the *hors-la-loi*, or outlaws, “Rebelling against their own government put these citizens *hors la loi*. They were outlaws, persons beyond the law yet at the same time subject to it” (Talbot 51). This leaflet makes reference to the Bellouni affair; Mohammed Bellouni was an Algerian nationalist, a member of the MTLD and a commander over militants of the MNA in Kabylie. After the events of November 1, 1954, he worked with the French Army against the FLN. In 1957, Bellouni stated, “L’Algérie doit dans tous les cas rester liée à la France” (Stora, *Les mots* 21). Thus, Bellouni had rallied towards France but then in 1958 he had some disagreements with the French and was then killed on July 14 1958.

This leaflet uses a specific example in order to demonstrate the validity of the propagandist’s message. When the propagandist is referring to the Bellouni affair he is using logic through “if then” statements; if you comply then you will be forgiven but if you do not comply then you will be defeated.

Pardon is used three separate times while referring to the same thing. Each time the word *pardon* is used it is written in all-caps, emphasizing the willingness of the French to forgive those who have gone against them. The use of all-caps in this document is emphasizing important elements of the propaganda. The use of bolding is also to make that element of the document pop out to the readers. This document is not merely stating that the French are allowing the rebels to come back; that statement was made when de Gaulle announced the *paix des braves*, so this document is stating the validity of the *paix des braves* and sustaining it.




Figure 20

Source: White, French Army

Context: The pacification of Algeria

Time: ca. 1959

Audience: Algerians

Medium: Poster

Subject: To pacify and unite Algeria

Mission: To quell the rebellion and bring peace to France and Algeria

Artist: M. Fontaine

Translation: “The French Army in Algeria: To establish peace and to unite”

This poster is showing the French military goals for Algeria, pacification and unification. As previously stated, pacification is merely a “euphemism [as] old as the conquest of Algeria for the application of military force” (Talbot 61). Thus, through military force the French Army will amalgamate the divide between France and Algeria.

The word *pacifier* is defined here as the use of arms to quell the rebellion, as is shown by the image of a member of the French military. With the image next to the word, the word becomes associated with that image. The same can be seen with the word *unir* which is defined as a coming together of ideas as shown by the handshake. The use of showing an image associated with a word is a common vocabulary learning technique and is defined as binding; “Binding is the term I propose to describe the cognitive and affective mental process of linking a meaning to a form. The concept of binding is what language teachers refer to when they insist that a new word ultimately be associated directly with its meaning and not with a translation” (Terrell 214).

The image in the background is a rough outline of northern Algeria bordered by Tunisia and Morocco. The foreground displays a handshake between a French and an Algerian, the hand on the left is paler, and thus representing the French, whereas, the hand on the right is darker, thus representing the Algerians. The differentiation between the two nationalities can also be seen by the sleeve; the man on the left is wearing a military uniform, whereas, the man on the right is wearing a *thobe*.




Figure 21

Source: White, French

Context: Leaders of the Wilaya and the GPRA are in Tunisia

Time: ca. 1958

Audience: Algerian militants

Medium: Leaflet

Subject: Discourage the combatants from supporting of the GPRA

Mission: Eliminating the military threat of the revolution

Translation: “Algeria: Come over here where the fighting is going on. Tunisia: Sorry, I am too busy”

The *Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Algérienne*, GPRA, was formed in September of 1958 in Egypt by members of the FLN as a diplomatic arm of the already existing FLN. As depicted in this leaflet, the leaders of the GPRA were in Tunisia enjoying themselves while the combatants in Algeria were risking their lives fighting and living in caves for the revolution.

This leaflet uses the same colors as the GPRA and post-independence flag of Algeria, green, white and red; the left side being green and the right side white. The dotted line between the two sides can be seen as the barricades that separate these two individuals and the countries, which in essence demonstrates the dichotomy between the leaders of the revolution and the combatants. The leader of the GPRA is shown lounging on a beach chair under an umbrella drinking champagne while the soldier is stuck living in a cave and making a fire in order to survive.

Visually, the two most prominent words are *Algérie* and *Tunisie*, the font size of the dialogue in the bubbles is much smaller. Using a smaller font size in the dialogue bubbles shows that the message contained therein are not as important as the imagery.




Figure 22

Source: White, French

Context: De Gaulle's Speech on self-determination

Time: 1960

Audience: Algerians

Medium: Leaflet

Subject: We are all French

Mission: Unify Algeria and France under the same flag

Translation: "One heart, one flag, 53 million French"

The difference between this leaflet and the other one declaring the same slogan is that the previous leaflet focuses on the French flag rather than Charles de Gaulle. After 1958 almost all French propaganda during the war involved imagery relating to de Gaulle. This image uses the Cross of Lorraine along with the V-sign to emphasize the nationalistic and patriotic symbolism associated with de Gaulle.

The context of this leaflet is significant; de Gaulle had given his speech on self-determination on 16 September 1959 and desired talks with the FLN. Although De Gaulle had issued his television address on self-determination, he had not quite given up on completely losing control over Algeria; he had suggested such ideas as a dual partnership where France would still play a role, while Algeria would rule itself. This leaflet is an attempt to encourage the population to continue to work with the French and avoid secession claiming that “we are all French.” The purpose of this leaflet is to propagate the idea that de Gaulle has understood the Algerian’s plights and is willing to work towards a peaceful resolution of the conflict.

This leaflet uses prominent landmarks in Algeria and France instead of individuals. The idea of communities working together has become more important than individuals working together. The edifice representing Algeria is a mosque, which is an important and defining element for the Muslims of Algeria. The edifice representing France is the classic icon of the Eiffel Tower with a French flag flying. The trees next to the edifices match the climate of each area and are used to show the diversity of France, while the text states “one heart” and “one flag”, demonstrating that although there are some cultural differences “we are all French”.

6. PROPAGANDA FOR AN ALGERIAN ALGERIA

Propaganda for an independent Algeria began solely with the FLN and Algerians, but towards the end of the war propaganda began coming from both sides in an effort to cede Algeria its independence. With de Gaulle in power and through his politics of self-determination, propaganda from the French would no longer focus on keeping Algeria French, but would focus on de Gaulle's policy of self-determination. "Sous de Gaulle, l'Algérie disparaît dans la propagande. Elle devient un prétexte des affiches" (Gervereau, *La France* 180).

Throughout the war, the Algerians were fighting for their independence; this fight did not only exist through the use of arms, but through the use of propaganda as well. Most members of the FLN participated in propaganda, Yacef Saadi, an FLN leader during the Battle of Algiers, stated, "le F.L.N. n'a jamais cessé d'être lié au peuple par le comité politique: propagande chuchotée ou écrite, collecte de fonds, sélection des candidats pour l'action armée, police F.L.N., etc..." (34).

This chapter will be divided into three parts, the diffusion of propaganda, FLN propaganda and French propaganda towards an Algerian Algeria.

Diffusion of Propaganda for an Algerian Algeria

The diffusion of French propaganda for an Algerian Algeria was very similar to the diffusion of propaganda for maintaining a French Algeria. Posters and leaflets were still used in the same fashion. The diffusion of Algerian propaganda differs greatly from the French because if they were to put up posters, the French government would have taken them down and tortured individuals to determine who had placed and created the posters. Due to this, the counterpropaganda by the Algerians was mostly transmitted underground, by hand or by word of mouth, though there are instances where it was also painted on walls or on streets.




Figure 23



Figure 24

Propaganda towards the Algerians



Figure 25

Source: White, FLN

Context: Algerians enrolled in the French Army are fighting against the revolution

Time: ca. 1959

Audience: Algerians enrolled in the French Army

Medium: Leaflet

Subject: Defection of the *Harkis* from the French Army

Mission: Increase the ALN's military force

Translation: "Harkis! Algerians! Enrolled in the French army... The French army and the European settlers have fired on unarmed Muslim crowds... They have assassinated women, children, and the elderly. Your blood has been spilt... Will you do nothing before these heinous crimes? Don't be accomplices to these criminals! Algerian independence is guaranteed and nigh. Join the ranks of the A.L.N. there is still time."

This leaflet is directed to the *Harkis* but they are not only addressed as *Harkis*, but as Algerians, implying their role as an Algerian in the struggle for their independence. It is in essence asking the simple question “what side are you on, the winning or the losing?” declaring that their independence is guaranteed and near at hand.

This leaflet is text heavy, but still contains a poignant image of the dead bodies of Muslim women, elderly and children, which have been assassinated by the French Army at Sétif in May of 1945. This massacre at Sétif was a *point de départ* that led the rebellion to new extremes; the death toll at Sétif is estimated at 20,000 (Stora *Les mots*, 109). The image used here was in fact censured by the French government during the Algerian war (Gervereau, *La France* 226).

The text plays upon the emotions of the audience as it states that the French have assassinated unarmed civilians and then asks the question, “Allez-vous rester les bras croisés devant ces crimes odieux?” Propaganda “uses language that tends to deify a cause and satanize opponents” (Jowett 294) as is shown in this leaflet. Though this propaganda is an appeal to emotions it also uses some logic implicating that because the French Army has assassinated unarmed civilians and the *Harkis* did nothing to stop the acts they are accomplices as well. The FLN is stating that the *Harkis* are criminals, but there is still time to rejoin the ALN and right their wrongs.

The use of all-caps in this leaflet is used as an attempt to put an emphasis on certain aspects of the message; to further put an emphasis on certain words punctuation and underlining is used as well. There are three instances where an exclamation mark is used and two of those instances are in the first line while addressing the recipients of the message, and the third time is declaring to the *Harkis* that they should not be accomplices to the French Army. The use of

underlining is used four times, putting an emphasis on: *l'armée, les complices, proche, il est encore temps.*

Propaganda towards the French




Figure 26

Source: Gray, the French Communist Party

Context: Legislative elections a little over a year after the beginning of the war

Time: January 1956

Audience: The French population

Medium: Poster

Subject: To remind the general population that during legislative elections the French voted for peace in Algeria

Mission: Move the government to action to bring peace to Algeria

Translation: "12 million French have voted on January 2nd for peace in Algeria. Their will must be respected"

This poster was released just a day after legislative elections on January 2nd 1956, where more than 12 million French voted for peace in Algeria (Vallaud 123). Visually this is an interesting poster because the propagandist is recalling a memory through images, as if it is

saying “remember what you have said, now act on it”. This source of this document is very clear, the Communist Party, it is even stated at the bottom of the poster but the red background is a more visually striking symbol of the communists.

The hand coming from the upper left hand corner is putting a voting ballot into a ballot box, but on the front of the ballot box is a rich image of a French woman and an Algerian woman. The communists are calling the French hypocrites through this poster; the French woman in this image is wearing a *bonnet rouge*, which was a red cap worn by the supporters of the revolution, showing that they were once the repressed but the roles have changed. The Communist party is stating that the French should allow the Algerians to be free, just as they themselves overcame repression and received their independence 167 years earlier. The French Communist Party may have also had ulterior motives; they wanted France to pull out of Algeria so that they could install a communist government. “Interpreters of *la guerre révolutionnaire* insisted that the Algerian revolution played into the hands of international communism. They held, moreover, that the rebellion was plotted, channeled, controlled to a very high degree” (Kelly 164).

The angle at which the French woman is standing is showing here ceding her place to the Algerian woman who appears to be moving to the front of the image; the French woman’s hand is on the shoulder of the Algerian woman, almost as if she is welcoming her to her new place in the world. The two women are also shaking hands, which is seen as a peaceful unification of the two countries.

This poster is as rich textually as it is visually; the most prominent words are explaining what had happened on the specified date, “12 million French”, “for”, “Peace in Algeria”. The coloring of the font is also visually striking because at first glance a reader may only see, “12 millions de Français pour la paix en Algérie”. The entire text is written in all-caps, except for “de”

which is traditionally not capitalized, which is a propaganda technique used to put an emphasis on the issue.



Figure 27

Source: Gray, French Communist Party

Context: National Assembly elections (November 1958)

Time: October 1958

Audience: French and Algerians

Medium: Poster

Subject: Gain support during the elections

Mission: Restore peace and friendship between Algeria and France

Translation: “The French Communist Party: Bargaining for peace and friendship between France and Algeria”

The two children, the future of France and Algeria, are holding a dove symbolizing hope and peace between these two countries for generations to come. The dove is not only symbolizing peace between these countries but a faithful joining of them in friendship, “Christian tradition made the [dove] the symbol of faithful marriage” (Chevalier 307). This

symbolism of faithful marriage would strike true in the hearts of the fervent Catholic French population.

The Muslim woman and child are dominating the image and the French woman and child almost seem to be relinquishing their position and moving over for the installation of the Muslim; the French woman's right hand is in an open gesture ushering the Algerian woman and child to their place in society. This is very similar to the poster by the Communist Party after the legislative elections on January 2, 1956.

The use of blue as the background color for this poster is to signify prosperity. Blue can also signify here happiness and optimism, as if blue skies are in the future along with peace and friendship between France and Algeria. The juxtaposition of white on blue is used to further emphasize the idea of peace. The text on this poster is simple and the larger font size draws the eye naturally to *paix* and *l'amitié*. The text on the bottom right corner simply states the address of the Communist Party and the month and year in which this poster was published.

The Communist Party was not in favor of the war and desired a diplomatic conclusion. Most of the Communist propaganda during the Algerian war focuses on a peaceful resolution to the conflict. With the uprising of the OAS the Communists turned their propaganda efforts towards eliminating the OAS and its supporters who were attempting to subvert the peace talks between the Algerians and the French.




Figure 28

Source: White, L'association nationale pour le soutien de l'action du général de Gaulle

Context: Referendum for self-determination

Time: 1961

Audience: French and Algerians

Medium: Poster

Subject: Vote Yes to the referendum for self-determination in Algeria

Mission: Peace

Printer: Matot-Braine, Reims

Translation: "YES for a New Algeria, YES for friendship, YES for de Gaulle"

De Gaulle has become the image for Algerian propaganda, and such leaflets as those mentioned under the previous chapter focusing on Algerians are now non-existent. "C'est le chef, le libérateur qui est mis en avant, comme en 1961 pour le référendum, où il lève les bras,

avec juste le rappel dans un des trios slogans du ‘oui’ pour l’Algérie Nouvelle” (Gervereau, *La France* 180).⁸

De Gaulle here is raising his hands upwards while standing in front of the *drapeau tricolore* as if he is declaring himself as France’s guide of the future (Gervereau, *La propagande* 142). The repetition of “oui” along with his outstretched hand forming a “V” gives a sense of hope, peace and friendship between Algeria and France through the approval of the referendum. De Gaulle appears as though he is the white part of the flag symbolizing his pure intentions for the future of France and Algeria. Placing de Gaulle in front of the *drapeau tricolore* is also a visual symbol of power and gives him credibility as the protector of France. The poster uses colors, yet de Gaulle appears in black and white. This is done so that the de Gaulle that appears on this poster is the same as the de Gaulle that all French and Algerians have seen on their black and white televisions.

The text of this poster follows a logical progression; a new Algeria equals friendship which has come about through de Gaulle (Gervereau, *La France* 142). The outcome of the referendum on January 8, 1956, resulted in a resounding “oui” for the self-determination of Algeria. De Gaulle became the hero for those hoping for an Independent Algeria, but betrayed those hoping to maintain a French Algeria.

⁸ This poster has received much attention but I have chosen to include it due to its popularity and relevance to the subject at hand.



Figure 29

Source: White, French Army

Context: Evian Accords

Time: 1962

Audience: French and Algerians

Medium: Initially it was a leaflet but then became a poster

Subject: Initiating the phases towards self-determination

Mission: Self-determination

Translation: “Peace in Algeria for our children”

This leaflet became one of the most famous posters of the end of the war⁹. It was initially in a leaflet distributed to the French military outlining the necessary steps to self-determination: cease-fire, transition period, self-determination. The French used this leaflet portraying innocent children in an attempt to convince the rebels to lay down their weapons of war not for

⁹ For copyright purposes, the image of this leaflet in the form of a poster is not shown, but can be accessed at the following website: <http://www.gettyimages.com/detail/2672704/Hulton-Archive>.

themselves but for their children. This image illustrates the importance of bringing peace to Algeria.

The two children, of whom one of them is clearly Algerian, are happy and smiling. The young French boy has his arm around the Algerian girl as a friendly gesture; the young Algerian girl likewise has her arm around the boy. The young boy's arm around the Algerian girl's shoulder is used to illustrate the influence of the French on the Algerians. The boy also seems to be older and looking down on the Algerian, demonstrating the "big brother" role played by the French.

The text is simple yet poignant. The eye is naturally drawn to the picture and then to the text above the image declaring, "For our children". The text is a plea for peace for the children who have lived through the events of the war. Innocent children were harmed during the war as is seen in the following image from an edition of *Paris Match*, so this leaflet was a poignant reminder of the results of the combatant's actions.



Figure 30




Figure 31

Source: White, Gaullists

Context: Voting for the Referendum of 1962, Evian Accords

Time: 1962

Audience: Algerians and French

Medium: Poster

Artist: Darigo

Subject: Pass the referendum

Mission: Bring peace to Algeria and to France

Translation: "Yes to Peace"

This poster by Pierre Paul Darigo, a famous French graphic designer who served in Algeria during the war, is an attempt to encourage the French to vote "oui" for peace on the referendum of 1962 concerning the independence of Algeria. The interesting aspect of this

poster is the fact that neither of these children appear to be of Arabic decent, which is in stark contrast to the poster *Pour nos enfants la paix en Algérie*, it seems as if Algeria has been forgotten (Gervereau, *La France* 181). Because of this lack of Algerian presence in this poster it appears that Darigo is demonstrating that voting “oui” to the referendum will not only bring peace to France and Algeria, but will bring inner peace.

The wheat in the bottom right of the image evokes the emotions of prosperity and nourishment. The three flowers in the bottom right consist of two tulips and a daisy representing the three colors of the republic, “bleu, blanc, rouge”. According to floriography, also known as the language of flowers which was introduced in the renaissance but became very popular in the Victorian era as a means of sending a coded message, states that a blue tulip symbolizes tranquility and peace, a white daisy symbolized purity and a red tulip symbolizes a declaration of love. The combination of the flowers and the wheat are included in the propaganda poster in order to associate the peace brought on by the voting of “oui” for the referendum with the prosperity of peace for the republic.

The most prominent part of this poster is the word “OUI” written in bold and all-caps. The word is written in yellow which is a symbol of happiness and joy, once again leading to the idea that a vote of “oui” for the referendum would bring happiness and joy. “In the pairing of blue and yellow, yellow is the male colour, the colour of light and life, and can never be darkened” (Chevalier 1137). The use of blue as a background helps to bring out the color yellow and the outline of the individuals.

7. CONCLUSION

The analysis and evaluation of propaganda cannot be done through tests because reality can never be duplicated due to the fact that the individual or society is placed in different situations than existed in the original context. Thus, the evaluation of propaganda will be done by determining the intent of the propagandist and then analyzing the effects.

This chapter will be divided into 5 sections. The evaluation of the propaganda will be done by analyzing differences, similarities, patterns and the evolution of the propaganda. The effects and outcomes of the propaganda will then be discussed. Finally the in/effectiveness of French propaganda will be analyzed.

Similarities and Differences

There are similarities and differences in the diffusion of propaganda between the French and the FLN. One of these similarities is the distribution of leaflets and the propagation of messages through word of mouth. The French used word of mouth propaganda by sending propaganda officers to villages throughout Algeria in order to persuade the general population to remain French and to become informants. The FLN's use of propagating messages through word of mouth existed mostly in the Casbah where there was a very dense population of native Algerians. The distribution of leaflets by the French was done by dropping them from helicopters, whereas the FLN passed them from hand to hand. The big difference between the two sides in the diffusion of propaganda is the use of posters by the French. The French would use boards with propaganda attached placed in common areas. If the FLN were to attempt this, the propaganda would be confiscated and destroyed immediately. It is for this reason that the FLN resorted mainly to the use of leaflets and word of mouth.

Propaganda during the war was prevalent and as previously stated, was at the forefront of the action on the ground. The propaganda by the FLN was mostly done through small leaflets, graffiti or through word of mouth; “one did not see it anywhere, it had no visible surface, and yet it existed” (Ellul, *FLN Propaganda* 16). As previously quoted, Saadi Yacef stated, “le FLN n’a jamais cessé d’être lié au peuple par le comité politique : propagande chuchotée ou écrite” (34). As explained by Yacef, FLN propaganda was handwritten or whispered and due to this, there is a lack of physical propaganda emanating from the FLN.

Another difference between French and FLN propaganda can be seen in the messages propagated. At the beginning of the war the French attempted to demonize the rebels and the rebellion, whereas the FLN attempted to glorify their position in claiming that those who had died had become martyrs and heroes: “Mais l’âme de la Révolution algérienne restait vivante au cœur de ce peuple persécuté dont les héros obscurs se comptent par dizaines de milliers” (Yacef 71). The FLN also attempted to demonize the French as is seen in Figure 25, *Harkis!*, showing the massacre at Sétif.

Patterns

Patterns can be found in the propaganda during the war. Such patterns are the use of color and certain colors, the use of specific images, the prominence of the image, the prominence of the text, the amount of text and the text to image ratio.

Most of the leaflets were black and white while the posters dating towards the end of the war were mostly printed in color. There is a pattern in the color scheme of the posters; most contained the color blue, which signifies loftiness and often purity. Yellow was also used when discussing voting “oui” for the referendum. The colors of the *drapeau tricolore*, blue, white and red, were also often used to illustrate French identity.

Specific images were used to evoke certain ideas or thoughts. The use of violent images was used to bring fear to the targeted audience, such as Figures 15, *Veux-tu toujours connaître le barrage*, and 16, *Les chacals se mangent entre eux*. The images used in Figure 15 are intended to be used as a scare tactic in order to deter individuals from crossing the border along Tunisia and Morocco. Peaceful images were used in contradiction to the violent images; they created a positive reinforcement of the idea of a peaceful resolution to the conflict, as is seen in Figure 31, *Oui à la paix*. The image of de Gaulle was also widely used after his coming to power in order to inspire a sense of nationalism and patriotism, making reference to his role in the French Resistance during World War II.

An image is often intended to speak louder than the words written on a leaflet or poster. Due to this, the image is given prominence over the text. This is seen in quite a few of the images that have been analyzed. In Figure 29, *Pour nos enfants la paix en Algérie*, the image of the two children playing in peace is intended to be more powerful than the words and thus the image is placed centrally on the document and takes up most of the space. Figure 11, *Parlons pour défendre notre vie*, along with Figure 16, *Les chacals se mangent entre eux*, are similar in that the image is more predominant than the text.

When the text is intended to provide the primary content of the message it is given prominence over the image. Leaflets are often intended to be text heavy because individuals are able to look over the documents on their own time and at their own speed. These leaflets are not made to be fully comprehended through a quick glance. In contrast to leaflets, posters are intended to have minimal amounts of text but contain symbolic images where the message can be gleaned almost instantaneously. Figure 25, *Harkis!*, is an example of a very text heavy leaflet

where the words are given prominence and the image is only provided in order to reinforce the text.

Evolution of Propaganda

French propaganda throughout the war evolved and changed as the historical context changed. French propaganda during the beginning of the war as mentioned, attempted to demonize the FLN as seen in Figure 16, *Les chacals se mangent entre eux*, and Figure 9, *Qui te délivrera*, where the FLN are portrayed as venomous scorpions. The propaganda then evolved into attempts to encourage informants such as Figures 11, *Parlons pour defender notre vie*, and 12, *Tout le monde parle*. Propaganda directed towards those fighting for the FLN then encouraged them to desert and return to French society as is seen in Figure 13, *Engage-toi*. Later, after the *paix des braves*, leaflets came to focus more on desertion and became travel passes. After de Gaulle's speech on self-determination, propaganda shifted towards a peaceful resolution to the conflict and encouraged a vote of "oui" for the referendums.

Effects of Propaganda

The desired results of the propaganda campaigns of both sides were the same as the military goals; the FLN desired their independence from the yoke of colonialism while the French desired to maintain the status quo. The results of the FLN propaganda were effective and yielded the desired result while the French failed to achieve their goal and eventually granted Algeria its independence. The FLN attempted to gain international support through demonstrating the oppressive nature of their role as the colonized, and this international support was perhaps more important than what happened domestically; and today, through social media, is what empowers modern day revolts against oppression. This international support aided their attempts to accomplish the fight for independence.

Propaganda alone may not have the ability to change attitudes and opinions; it is the dialogue conducted between individuals concerning the message which influences the changing of behaviors and attitudes. It is expected that propaganda would have had a greater influence on the outcome of the war, but what is often overlooked is the importance of dialogue in propaganda. The FLN was able to get the international community and eventually the French general population to create a dialogue discussing the ending of colonialism and an Algerian Algeria. It is this dialogue which aided the Algerians in their cause even though the propaganda messages themselves may not have directly changed behavior.

In/Effectiveness of Propaganda during the War

In order for the French to win the war they needed to have won the war of ideas and destroyed the FLN's support, "Pour l'armée française, il fallait détruire le F.L.N. et l'A.L.N., en détruisant en même temps leur soutien populaire" (Yacef 32). The only effective way to eliminate popular support was through propaganda. The French put a lot of effort in attempting to do this, as is seen through the analysis of propaganda in the previous chapters. The question then remains "why was this propaganda not effective?"

First of all, what makes propaganda effective? In order for propaganda to be effective, the propagandist's message must be accepted and integrated into the lives of the target audience, it has to appeal to their senses. If the message fails to reach the target audience and instigate a change in opinions and beliefs then it is considered ineffective. The source, context, time, audience, and medium of the propaganda are all essential elements that lead to the effectiveness of propaganda. If even one of these elements is inaccurate then the message is likely to be looked over and deemed as erroneous. There is also much research showing that one-way

communication, if not backed by force, is not ultimately effective in changing attitudes—only in gaining awareness.

According to Jacques Ellul, French propaganda during the war was ineffective. He states, “Indeed the only part of it with any effect from 1957 to 1960 was that which influenced young people to join the military in Algeria. In consequence the only useful purpose served by it is that of standing as an object lesson in failure to qualify as real propaganda” (*FLN Propaganda* 15). French propaganda in Algeria had created a boomerang effect, meaning that “knowing that someone is trying to coerce us may even prompt us to react in the *opposite* direction” (Myers 218). This boomerang effect reinforces preexisting opinions and beliefs rather than changing them, it in fact instigates anti-conformity. “The theory of psychological reactance—that people act to protect their sense of freedom—is supported by experiments showing that attempts to restrict a person’s freedom often produce an anticonformity ‘boomerang effect’” (Myers 218).

French propaganda can also be seen as ineffective due to the lack of an ideology that appealed to the Algerians. Through the revolution Algerians would gain rights and freedoms which they had been refused. If the revolutionaries were to put down their weapons of war and work towards peace in a French Algeria, nothing would have changed, nothing would incite them to do so. They had been oppressed for so long that a return to the status quo was not an option, thus the message of a French Algeria propagated by the French was ineffective.

The Algerian’s saw their cause as just, an attempt to rid them of an unjust and oppressive colonial system. But, it was not until 1956 that support for the Algerian nation became a widespread ideological thought, “[Ferhat] Abbas once wrote, in an oft-quoted passage: ‘I will not die for the Algerian fatherland, because it does not exist...In any case no one believes seriously

in our ‘nationalism’” (Ellul, *FLN Propaganda* 10). After 1956, support for Algerian nationalism grew exponentially; Abdelhamid Boudiaf in a letter dated March 5, 1959, states:

Il y a une idée générale qui ne doit pas être sous-estimée : c’est la détermination du peuple algérien de se débarrasser du colonialisme, ce qui met en relief que ni la répression féroce, ni les erreurs des dirigeants, ni la mauvaise organisation, ou la non-organisation de l’octroi et l’acheminement des armes et munitions, n’ont entamé la volonté de lutte du peuple. Elle est là, on la rencontre chez les djoundi, le paysan, la femme, le berger. Et c’est cette volonté qui soutient à l’intérieur l’esprit de lutte. Elle est la plus déterminante de tous. (Harbi 235)

Thus, it is the determination of the Algerian population to liberate them from the colonial system that hindered the effectiveness of French Propaganda. Aït-Hamouda Amirouche, an ALN General in the Kabylie, has also stated the importance of independence for the Algerian population:

To the Algerian, the Algerian war is not an armed conflict the same as any other. It is a sacred war that puts into question his entire being, his very existence, and the foundation of that existence and not only certain modalities of that existence.

This translates into a human attitude and into language. Their consciousness [conscience aiguë] of their situation adds to the extreme susceptibility of Algerians, to their excessively proud character [leur caractère ombrageux], something tight and strained.

In this debate, France does not run the risks of disappearing. For Algeria, on the contrary, which has already sacrificed hundreds of thousands of its own, it is really a matter of *being* or not *being*. This alone is enough to create a distance that is difficult to do away with between the French and Algerians. (qtd. in Le Sueur 193)

The Algerians will go to extremes in order to achieve their goal, independence, due to the “sacred” nature of the war. Cultural divergence theory plays a strong role in this, as well. That says that messages coming from foreign sources are viewed skeptically by domestic audiences anyway – and we tend to prefer our own messages. As partly discussed in the nationalism discussion above, when the French were trying to win support of the Algerians, they were always the outsiders, even when they had the power. Once that started to break down, I’m not sure what, if anything, the French could have done to win back the hearts of the majority of Algerians.

The ineffectiveness of French propaganda can be linked to the fact that anti-colonial sentiment had been propagated and persisted among the Algerians for a while. From the 1920’s and 30’s the Algerian nationalistic movement began, and in 1943, Ferhat Abbas issued the *Manifeste du Peuple Algérien*, declaring the end of Algerian support for assimilation into French society. This is similar to the reason why the German’s continued fighting relentlessly at the end of World War II, it was a result of “Nazi education—in other words, propaganda, propaganda that exalted sacrifice, war, military values, faith in the führer, the common weal, the superiority and invincibility of the German race. Such propaganda had begun fifteen years earlier, *i.e.* had had time to take effect” (Ellul, *Propaganda* 284). Similarly, the idea of an Algerian Algeria had begun years before and had time to take effect and mature in the minds of the general population. Even though the general population did not believe in their nationalism until 1956, as previously stated, the idea had time to ferment and gain ardent supporters.

While France was adamant that the conflict in Algeria was an internal matter, the Algerians were attempting to gain support on the international level through anti-colonialist propaganda. The United States itself was involved in questioning whether this was an internal matter or an international concern. Desiring to respect its longest ally while still defeating

imperialism and bringing freedom to all as is shown in a speech by John F. Kennedy on July 2, 1957, entitled, “Imperialism—The Enemy of Freedom”. Algeria also gained support from the United Nations whose policies and views were in opposition to colonialism. The French argued that Algeria was an integral part of France while the United Nations simply saw it as a colony. “The war and colonialism had demonstrated that the French were lost in Eurocentric rhetoric and concerned only with the war’s effect on the French conceptions of selfhood” (Le Sueur 183).

The combination of the Algerian determination for independence and the inability of the French to persuade the masses resulted in a humiliating loss for the French forces and the loss of territory deemed integral to French society. After over 130 years of colonial rule, and through 8 grueling years of revolutionary war, Algeria received its independence.

APPENDIX

Important Dates/Chronology of the war

June, 18, 1954	Pierre Mendès-France becomes Prime Minister
November 1, 1954	The FLN launches armed rebellions throughout Algeria calling for an autonomous state
February 23, 1954	Edgar Faure becomes Prime Minister
January 26 1955 – February 1, 1956	Jacques-Emile Soustelle, Governor General of Algeria
August 20, 1955	Massacre at Phillipeville
November 29, 1955	Prime Minister dissolves the National Assembly and calls for new elections
January 31, 1956	Guy Mollet becomes Prime Minister
February 1, 1956 – February 9, 1956	Georges Alber Julien Catroux, Governor General of Algeria
February 6, 1956	Guy Mollet visits Algeria and is attacked by a mob
February 9, 1956 – May 14, 1958	Robert Lacoste, Governor General of Algeria
March 16, 1956	Special Powers Law giving the executive virtually unlimited power
August 20, 1956	Soummam Congress
October 31, 1956 – November 6, 1956	Suez Expedition
End of 1956	400,000 French soldiers in North Africa
January 7, 1957	The Tenth Paratroop Division enters Algiers
January 28, 1957	General 8 day strike
January 7 – October 8, 1957	Battle of Algiers
June 12, 1957	Maurice Bourgès-Maunoury becomes Prime Minister
November 6, 1957	Félix Gaillard becomes Prime Minister
February 8, 1958	French Air Force bombs a Tunisian village known to be aiding the FLN
May 13, 1958	Pierre Pflimlin becomes Prime Minister Committee of Public Safety created
May 14, 1958	De Gaulle declares that he is ready to assume the powers of the republic
June 1, 1958	Charles de Gaulle becomes Prime Minister
September 19, 1958	The FLN becomes the <i>Gouvernement provisoire de la République algérienne</i> (GPRA) with Ferhat Abbas as president
October 5, 1958	5 th Republic is formed with a new constitution
October 23, 1958	De Gaulle offers <i>la paix des braves</i>
December 21, 1958	De Gaulle becomes the first president of the 5 th republic
February 6, 1959	Beginning of the Challe Offensive
January 24, 1960	La semaine des barricades (The barricades week)
June 1960	Si Salah Affair
December 3, 1960	Organization of the Organisation de l'armée secrète (OAS)
January 8, 1961	Referendum concerning the organization of public authority in Algeria and self-determination

April 21-26, 1961	The Coup d'Etat d'Algiers also known as the Putsch d'Alger
March 18, 1962	Evian Accords
March 19, 1962	Cease Fire
July 3, 1962	De Gaulle declares Algeria independent
July 5, 1962	Algerian Independence

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