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The Walker War Reconsidered

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The Walker War Reconsidered

Ryan E. Wimmer

A thesis submitted to the faculty of
Brigham Young University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

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ABSTRACT

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In July of 1853, Chief Wakara’s band of Utes clashed in a series of violent confrontations with the Mormon settlers. This conflict is known as the Walker War. Many complex factors contributed to this war. After some earlier violence between Mormons and different bands of Utes between 1847 and 1851, the Mormons continued their quick expansion settling on Ute lands. From 1851 to 1853 Mormon and Ute relations continued to decline as Mormons expanded their settlements occupying Ute hunting grounds. In addition to these land encroachments, new laws were enacted regulating trade between the Spanish and Utes by Brigham Young. The most notable regulation on trade prohibited the Spanish and Ute slave trade. All these trade regulations hurt the Ute economy, particularly the most powerful equestrian Ute band, the Cheverets led by Chief Wakara. In the spring of 1853 Governor Brigham Young ordered out the state militia to arrest Mexican traders and to capture Wakara for engaging in the slave trade. Wakara had previously established a friendly relationship with Young and had invited the Mormons to settle his lands in Sanpete. Wakara had become committed to peaceful relations and cooperation with Young and the Mormon people. Wakara remained true to his desire for friendly relations even after seeing his economic status undermined by Mormon settlers. Young as well was committed to staying on peaceful terms with the Utes. Their followers, on the other hand, had difficulties overcoming the cultural divide. After the murder of a member of Wakara’s band in July of 1853 by settler James Ivie, Wakara’s band waged a series of raids against Mormon settlements. Wakara himself, however, was not involved in the war and continually tried to sue for peace. The war has been mislabeled with Wakara’s name; he was not really involved in the violence. Yet it was indeed a war. The war had a great impact on the Mormon settlers. Settlers abandoned their homes and had to move into forts. For the Mormons involved, this conflict was neither small nor inconsequential; it was a major disruption involving a great portion of the Utah Territory.

Keywords: Walker War, Wakara, Mormon/Indian relations, Brigham Young, Utes, Mormons, Cheverets, Wakara’s band, 1853, Utah Militia, Manti, Provo, forts, James Ivie.
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CONTENTS

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS...........................................................................................................v
INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................................................1
CHAPTER 1: LAMANITES.............................................................................................................10
CHAPTER 2: MORMON AND UTE CONFLICTS, 1847-1851.....................................................18
CHAPTER 3: WAR ON THE HORIZON..........................................................................................46
CHAPTER 4: THE WALKER WAR...............................................................................................95
CHAPTER 5: EFFECTS OF THE WALKER WAR.......................................................................159
CONCLUSION.............................................................................................................................167
APPENDICES.............................................................................................................................171
BIBLIOGRAPHY.........................................................................................................................173
ILLUSTRATIONS

Map 2.1: Native American Lands in Utah…………………………………………………………19

Map 2.2: Ute Bands…………………………………………………………………………………20

Appendix 1: Utah Counties and Rivers…………………………………………………………171

Appendix 2: Early Utah Settlements……………………………………………………………172
INTRODUCTION

On July 25, 1853, Brigham Young wrote the following letter to Chief Wakara:

I send you some tobacco for you to smoke in the mountains when you get lonesome. You are a fool for fighting your best friends, for we are best friends, and the only friends that you have in the world….When you get good natured again I would like to see you. Don’t you think you should be ashamed? You know that I have always been your best friend.¹

Just two days later the Utes reported Wakara as saying that “he loves the Mormons and wants to stay with them.”² Both statements were delivered less than a week after the Mormons and Chief Wakara’s band of Utes had become engaged in what has become known as the Walker War.³ Brigham Young’s hopes for the Territory of Utah were to establish Zion and to redeem the Indians from what he considered to be their primitive state. Chief Wakara on other hand viewed the Mormons as business partners able to increase both his economic standing and power among other Ute bands. Although these two men’s goals came into conflict, both leaders were committed to having a lasting and peaceful relationship with each other.

The Walker War was not the first conflict between the Mormons and the Utes in the Utah Territory, but it was the first conflict that was called a war. Despite its importance and the effects it had on the life of Mormons and Utes, there has never been a full analysis of this conflict. Over twenty years ago, historian Ron Walker said that “we still wait for major studies


² George A. Smith to Daniel H. Wells, July 27, 1853, reel 5, UTMC.

of the Walker War. Since that time Robert Carter’s second volume of his history of Provo has been the only significant writing that touched upon the Walker War. There is still no full analysis of the Walker War.

The Walker War is certainly not unknown. Biographies of Brigham Young as well as many Utah, Mormon, and Ute history surveys mention it. Most all survey histories rely upon Howard Christy’s 1979 article. Christy’s argument centers on the Mormon strategy of defense and reconciliation. Christy writes, “Perhaps convinced that previous offensive responses to the Ute threat had been largely unsuccessful, the territorial leadership put into effect a full-scale effort to thwart the 1853 Ute revolt by passive means.” Christy’s article is narrowly focused on Mormon defensive strategies. Furthermore, Christy exaggerates the Mormon tactic of defense. There were several offensive operations conducted on the part of the Mormons similar to

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8 Ibid, 395.
previous violence between the Utes and Mormons. Christy is correct, however, that defense was the primary intent of Brigham Young and Utah militia commander Daniel H. Wells.

There are only four other analyses about the Walker War of notable significance. Peter Gottfredson’s work stood as the best work on the Walker War for years.\(^9\) Gottfredson’s book presents a brief overview of some of the major events of the war without providing much interpretation. Furthermore, it does not provide sources for all its claims.

The first major work on the Walker War was a master’s thesis written in 1955 by Bartley Heiner.\(^{10}\) This work by Heiner stands as the best analysis of the causes of the Walker War as well as the effects of the war. It is one of the only works that touches on the economic hardships the war had on Mormon citizens. Overall it is a short interpretation that overlooks many important details concerning Mormon and Indian relations between 1851 and the start of the Walker War in 1853. Although Heiner mentions issues of land it does not mention some of the more immediate loss of land leading to the war. Nor does Heiner mention trade regulations placed on the Utes other than the slave trade. Furthermore it neglects the Territorial Militia Papers that contain many important insights.

Next is the work of Conway Sonne, who has written the best biography of Wakara.\(^{11}\) Sonne has written a good and basic narrative of the Walker War covering some of the most notable violence. He is also one of the few that has acknowledged Chief Wakara’s hesitancy to revert to violence. Sonne’s work, however, still comes up short in not discussing many of the important details leading to the conflict and he does not discuss how the war disrupted the entire

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territory. Furthermore, like Heiner, Sonne does not utilize the Utah Militia Papers and therefore misses important details.

The most recent and most detailed history of the Walker War is Robert Carter’s *From Fort to Village*. Carter’s scholarship is the most detailed day-by-day account of the Walker War available, but falls short because of the approach he takes. He details the Walker War and how it relates to the history of Provo, which is the principal focus of his book. Carter does not analyze the war and what it meant to the territory or how it relates to the overall picture of Mormon and Indian relations.

What all these works are missing is Wakara’s commitment to remaining on friendly terms with Brigham Young and the Mormons. Wakara occasionally threatened to attack the Mormons, but these threats were never carried out. The threats to attack the Mormons by Wakara generally occurred when the Mormons seemed to be an economic threat or when they would not join Wakara to attack other tribes or bands. Wakara eventually saw the Mormons as business partners and the evidence suggests Wakara invited the Mormons to settle his lands, although he later denied having done so.\textsuperscript{12} Even after violence between the Mormons and Indians from 1848 to 1851 (wherein some of his friends and relatives were killed) Wakara remained favorable to the Mormons. From 1851 to the start of the Walker War relations between Mormons and the Utes spiraled downward, especially with Wakara. The Mormons continually pushed onto Indian lands, regulated trade in accordance with federal law, and outlawed the lucrative slave trade between the Utes and the Spanish. Yet Wakara did not revert to violence. The above authors overemphasize the slave trade as the main issue causing the Walker War, overlooking many other issues that soured relations between Mormons and Utes in

\textsuperscript{12} Wakara’s invitation to the Mormons to settle his lands will be discussed in chapter 2. His later denial will be explored in chapter 3.
the mid-1850s. The road to war was complex with Wakara’s band pushed to a breaking point. That breaking point came when one of Wakara’s band members was killed by Mormon settler James Ivie. Yet even with that catalyst, Wakara desired peace after less than ten days of fighting. Wakara’s band, on the other hand, was pushed too far and carried on the violence for a few months. Wakara and Young seemed to have understood the advantage of cooperation, but the cultural divide between their followers was too difficult to overcome. Violent exchange between the cultures was nearly inevitable.

Although it is well known among historians of the Walker War that Wakara sued for peace during the conflict and that he was among the Navajos for most of the fighting, previous authors have never explored what it means that Wakara was hardly even involved and constantly sought peace during the war that now bears his name. Despite the fact that the war was waged by Wakara’s band, the war has been mislabeled as being Wakara’s war.

Another issue that authors overlook is the personal and economic cost of the war for the Mormons. Heiner only briefly touched upon this issue. The war was exceptionally disruptive to the Mormon settlers and was not a simple series of skirmishes. The Mormons were ordered to move from their homes into forts and to send their cattle north. Journals and reminiscences demonstrate it was an unpleasant time for the settlers.

The Utes doubtless suffered from the Walker War, but due to lack of sources the suffering is difficult to measure. Mormon settlements did, however, have negative economic effects on the Utes and disrupted to their lives from the time they settled the territory.

The war did not change Mormon belief that Native Americans were ancient Israelites in need of redemption. One thing that did change after the Walker War was Mormon tactics on dealing with Indian uprisings. The Walker War created the precedent for building forts and the
goal to act only on the defensive during Indian uprisings.

In addition to the above points, the Walker War is an excellent case study to place the overall picture of Mormon and Indian relations in the larger context of Indians and whites in the American West. Authors Ned Blackhawk, Elliot West, and Patricia Limerick provide models for the overall picture of the American West. How does Utah compare to these models?

The most pertinent model that applies to Utah is Ned Blackhawk’s work that focuses specifically on the Great Basin. For Blackhawk, violence is what weaves the Great Basin’s history together. Violence towards the Native Americans and their response to it remade Indian culture. Blackhawk says, “Violence enabled the rapid accumulation of new resources, territories, and subject peoples.” As time went on, the Utah Utes escalated their use of violence in “response to the settler and emigrant disruptions.” Previous to 1853 the Mormons and Indians had clashed over land rights, particularly in Provo in 1850, but Young’s new policy as stated in July of 1851 that it is easier to feed the Indians than to fight them had momentarily suspended violent engagements. As stated above, from 1851 to 1853 the Mormons had disrupted Ute life even further through continued settlement on the land as well as trade regulations. Naturally the Utes reacted violently to these increased disruptions of their way of life.

With such violence between Mormons and Indians, where does Utah fit in the larger picture of the American West? Blackhawk devotes an entire chapter to the Mormons and Indians concluding that Utah was no different than other western settlements. The Walker War is an excellent case study to test Blackhawk’s view. Was Utah founded upon violence against

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14 Blackhawk, 9-10
the native inhabitants as it was in other places according to Blackhawk? The answer to this question is complicated. While there was violence between the two groups, there were also instances of cooperation. Brigham Young and many Ute chiefs including Kanosh, Sowiet, and Wakara were committed to a cooperative co-existence despite a tense relationship at times. Some of their followers, however, were not as committed to friendly cooperation as others were.

Elliot West’s model focuses on the contest between Euro-Americans and the Native Americans of how to use the natural resources from the environment. The Native Americans saw their own way to use the land and the new ways of life brought by Anglos. West says, “The place, its resources, its alignment of peoples, and especially the timing of the frontiers’ arrival made for a volatile combination.” The different cultures had different “visions” and something had to give. West is referring to the Colorado gold rush, but his model can be applied to the Utah experience. Wakara and his band embraced many elements of the Euro-American way of life, seeing them as trade partners to increase power and status. Wakara’s band had a different vision than did the Mormons that eventually brought them into conflict. Even Wakara’s and Young’s commitment towards peace could not stop these two different cultures from a violent confrontation.

Patricia Limerick’s model is that the American West was a place of conquest against the indigenous people. Furthermore the West was a meeting ground for different ethnic groups “where Indian America, Latin America, Anglo America, Afro-America, and Asia intersected.” The meeting of Anglos, Spanish, and Native Americans all contributed to the complex causes

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15 West, xxii-xxiii.
16 Ibid, xxiii.
17 Limerick, 27.
that led to the Walker War. Limerick also says that conquest involved the drawing of lines on a map that allocated ownership. As will be seen, the advent of the Walker War was preceded by further settlement in Indian Territory. Limerick says, “The contest for property and profit has been accompanied by a contest for cultural dominance.”\textsuperscript{18} Both contests of property and profit were an essential element of the conflict between Mormons and Indians and played a part in the lead up to the Walker War. Utah was a contested region between cultures that ended with a conquest of the Indians. Yet the Mormons themselves were not necessarily the victors. Their culture as well was conquered by the federal government. Neither Mormons nor Indians attained lasting control of the territory.

The reader will see that all three of these models can be applied to the Walker War as well as the overall picture of Mormon and Indian relations in some aspects, but it is much more nuanced than that. The situation between Mormons and Indians was complicated and cannot be simplified by these models. Not all the conclusions of these authors apply to the relations between Mormons and Native Americans.

A full analysis of the Walker War remains unaccomplished. The author does not pretend to think this master’s thesis will fill that hole. A thesis is not large enough to do so. Hopefully, however, it is a beginning in that direction by demonstrating its significance and correcting previous writers’ misunderstanding about it. The reader will see that the Walker War was not a small conflict of small consequence as previous authors have suggested. Previous authors also overemphasized the Walker War’s relation to the slave trade; it was more complicated than that.\textsuperscript{19} There were further land encroachments, laws regulating trade of many kinds, the attempt

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{19} Specifics of how previous authors have downplayed the Walker War and overemphasis of the slave trade being the cause of the war will be discussed in chapter 3 and 4.
to end the slave trade, and the murder of one of Wakara’s band. There will also be a new emphasis on the fact that Wakara was not really involved in the conflict and therefore the war has been mislabeled with his name. Both Young and Wakara were committed to a cooperative relationship. Furthermore it will be seen that Howard Christy’s interpretation that the Mormons acted on the defensive is not entirely correct. The Walker War will also be placed in the overall picture of Mormon and Indian relations as well as the American West
CHAPTER 1

Lamanites

Origins of Mormon Views of Native Americans

During the Utah period of Latter-day Saint history the Native Americans faced the same fate as in other regions of the American West; that is, they were displaced from their homelands to reservations. Still, the Mormon people had (in many respects) unique theological beliefs about the Native Americans. To understand Mormon and Indian relations it is important to discuss early Mormon beliefs about the American Indians.

In 1830 Joseph Smith, the founder of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints and many other splinter churches, published the Book of Mormon. This American scripture is purported to be a history of the American Indians that Smith claimed to have translated from an ancient record kept on Golden Plates.\(^1\) According to the Mormon scripture Native Americans were of ancient Israelite origin. Mormon belief was that the ancestors of Native Americans migrated from Jerusalem to the American continent in 600 B.C. E. This view of Native Americans was not entirely exclusive; concepts set forth in the Mormon scripture concerning Indians were actually popular in the early nineteenth century.\(^2\) Ronald Walker, however, correctly points out that some Mormon beliefs concerning the Native Americans were different.

\(^1\) For an in-depth history and analysis of the Book of Mormon, see Terryl L. Givens, By the Hand of Mormon: The American Scripture that Launched a New World Religion (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

Walker even calls these beliefs “inflammatory.”  The Mormons believed that the Indians would play an important role in the last days and blossom like a rose. The Native Americans would be restored to their homeland, assist in building a New Jerusalem in the United States, and terrorize the American Gentiles if they did not help Israel. Joseph Smith said, “The Book of Mormon is a record of the forefathers of our western Tribes of Indians...The land of America is a promised land unto them.”

Despite these expansive beliefs concerning Native Americans, some beliefs presented in the Book of Mormon can be perceived as racist. Due to rebellion against God, a group of Israelites who migrated to America were “cursed” with a “skin of blackness” and thus became the American Indians, called Lamanites in the Book of Mormon. This curse resembles early American beliefs concerning African Americans’ skin also being a curse. The original Book of Mormon even went as far as to say that when the Lamanites are redeemed they would become a

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4 Walker, 3.

5 See Book of Mormon (afterward BOM), 1 Nephi 14:1-7; 3 Nephi 20:14-17; Doctrine and Covenants of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints 87:5; 45:25-30; Walker, “Seeking the ‘Remnant,’” 4; Dan Vogel points out that the Puritans also had a belief concerning God using the Indians to chastise apostate Anglos. See Dan Vogel, Joseph Smith: the Making of a Prophet (Salt Lake City: Signature Books, 2004), 143-144.


7 BOM, 2 Nephi 5:21. Mormon apostle John Tvedtnes has attempted to claim that the “mark” of black skin and the “curse” on the Lamanites were different. The curse was separation from God whereas the mark was the dark skin. In other words the curse was not black skin and therefore the Book of Mormon does not promote racism according to Tvedtnes. See John Tvedtnes, “The Charge of ‘Racism’ in the Book of Mormon,” Farms Review 15, no. 2, (2003), 183-198. Tvedtnes is clearly wrong, the Book of Mormon states that a curse came upon the “skins” of the Lamanites. See Jacob 3:5 and Alma 3:6.

8 Bushman, 98. For a good study of how Americans justified slavery due to a curse cast upon African Americans, see Stephen R. Haynes, Noah’s Curse: The Biblical Justification of American Slavery (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).
“white and delightsome people.”  

Joseph Smith received an early revelation that the natives would become white and delightsome by polygamous intermarriage between the elders and female Indians.  

In the *Book of Mormon*, however, skin color is not always a standard of righteousness; at the end of the book the dark Lamanites were in a higher spiritual condition than another Israelite group, the white Nephites. 

In the end the Lamanites kill all the Nephites. The Lamanites are, according to Mormon nineteenth-century beliefs, the ancestors of the Native Americans.

Negative views of Native Americans were also contained in an early Mormon hymn, “O stop and tell me Red Man.” This hymn stated that Native Americans wander without a home or God. The song asked the American Indian. “Have you no God;—no home?” The Indian character in the hymn answers that he was once a “pleasant Ephraim,” but then the blessings vanished when man strayed from God. 

The Indian people fell into darkness and wandered to

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12 In the introduction of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints’ 1981 edition of the *Book of Mormon*, the Lamanites are referred to as the “principle” ancestor of the American Indians. In 2007, this phrase was changed to saying the Lamanites were “among” the ancestors of the American Indians. Regardless of what the *book of Mormon* says now, nineteenth-century Mormon belief was that all Native Americans had descended from the Lamanites. See Brooks, 2; Mauss, 41-43; Leonard J. Arrington & Davis Bitton, *The Mormon Experience: A History of the Latter-day Saints* (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), 145-147.

13 Emma Smith, *A Collection of Sacred Hymns for the Church of the Latter Day Saints* (Kirtland, Ohio: Fredrick G. Williams and Company, 1835), hymn #63. This hymn was read during a dialogue called “Dialogue on Mormonism” between a Mr. Matthews, a Mr. Roberts, and an Elder Pierce. In discussing the *Book of Mormon* Elder Pierce stated that he could not better explain beliefs about Native Americans than reading from this hymn. *Times and Seasons* (Nauvoo, Illinois), July 15, 1841. Hymn #63 in David Rogers’s 1838 hymnal followed this same line of reasoning. This hymn says, “The Lamanites shall prosper, / And blossom as the rose, / And despite of darkness, / They’ll raise above their foes.” See David G. Rogers, *A Collection of Sacred Hymns for the Church of the Latter Day Saints* (New York: C. Vinten, 1838).

14 Ephraim was the son of the one the original twelve tribes of Israel, Joseph. Ephraim received the birthright blessing from Joseph in place of his older brother Manasseh (Genesis 41:50-52; 48:13-20). According to
and fro. Then the hymn says, “And long they've lived by hunting, / Instead of work and arts, / And so our race has dwindled / To idle Indian hearts.” The Mormon view of American Indians was that they wasted time hunting, not working, and that the race of the Indians had dwindled. The wish and hope was that Native Americans would receive redemption and live pure religion. A common term used to describe the manner in which early Mormons viewed Native Americans is “noble savage;” the Indians were “noble,” but “savage” nevertheless. Thus while the American Indians possessed glorious promises in Mormon theology there was also an element of racism.

In order for the promises to the Indians to be fulfilled, missions to the natives were attempted in the 1830s. These missions were doomed to failure. While some scholars have argued that the failed missions ended desires to convert the Indians during the lifetime of Joseph Smith, Ron Walker has argued that such beliefs were important throughout the 1830s and early 1840s. Walker says seeking the Lamanite remnant was always a priority. The practice of converting the Lamanites does seem to have all but ended after the failed mission of one of Smith’s earliest associates in his new religious movement, Oliver Cowdrey. Still, Walker is convincing that the Mormon intent to convert Indians never died, especially among church leaders. In fact, it was these beliefs and boasts from Mormon church members concerning the rise of the Native Americans that caused Missourians to become suspicious of an alliance

Mormon belief the descendants of Ephraim will play a key role in the last days in taking the Mormon gospel to the world and gathering the lost tribes of Israel. The Native Americans were, and in many circles of Mormon thought, still are believed to be descendants of both Ephraim and Manasseh. See Mauss, 2-3, 34-35; Brian L. Smith, “Ephraim,” in Encyclopedia of Mormonism: The History, Scripture, Doctrine, and Procedure of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, ed. Daniel H. Ludlow (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1992), 2:461-62.

15 The hymn “O who that search’d in the records of old” also said that the “Lamanites wander forlorn.” See Brigham Young, Parley P. Pratt, & John Taylor, A Collection of Sacred Hymns for the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, in Europe (Manchester, England: W.R. Thomas, 1841), hymn #260.

16 Arrington & Bitton, 146.

17 Walker, 2-3.
between the Mormons and American Indians. The fear of such an alliance was instrumental in causing the hostility shown towards the Mormons in the 1830s in Missouri.\textsuperscript{18} Although Walker believes Joseph Smith proceeded with caution after the perceived persecutions of Missouri, Smith never lost sight of bringing the Indians the Mormon gospel. Walker even argues that the Mormon fixation with the West was partly due to the many tribes of Native Americans living in the western portion of the United States.\textsuperscript{19} Small attempts continued to be made to convert the Native Americans. Canadian convert Isaac Russell tried and failed to raise an Indian colony in Louisiana. In addition, Joseph Smith continued to preach the redemption of the American Indians but taught that the time had not yet come. Yet Smith did begin private attempts to evangelize the Native Americans; Jonathan Dunham preached to several tribes in the late 1830s and 1840s. Furthermore, Joseph Smith met with multiple Indian chiefs, such as the Pottawatamies, while living in Nauvoo. A few Native American converts moved to Nauvoo. Although not on the same level as Missouri, there were also rumors and fears of an Indian/Mormon alliance in Illinois.\textsuperscript{20}

The Mormons believed that their responsibility was not only to bring the gospel to them, but also to nurture them and bring them up from their fallen condition. Armand Mauss excellently captures these diverse views of the Native Americans in early Mormonism:

\begin{quote}
The Mormons thus understood themselves as these nursing fathers and mothers among the Gentiles, and they saw the Indians as “Lamanites,” with all the connotations implied in that term. Like the early American image of Indians, the early Mormon image was ambivalent, even if on somewhat different theological grounds. On the one hand, the Lamanites were remnants of Israel, God’s chosen people, to be redeemed and
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid, 14-19. Also see Arrington & Bitton, 146.

\textsuperscript{19} Walker, 20-21. Walker does point out the fact that after Missouri, the view of the West as a place of refuge became more popular than the idea of the West as a conduit to convert Lamanites.

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid, 21-29. Armand Mauss summarizes and follows Walker’s thesis regarding these early contacts between Mormons and Native Americans. Mauss, 52-56.
gathered in preparation for the Lord’s return, and the Mormons were the nurturing and saving agents assigned the responsibility for this redemption. On the other hand, the Lamanites were a fallen people, degraded by centuries of spiritual apostasy and cultural corruption.²¹

Thus early Mormon views of Native Americans were highly complex. While Mormon conceptions of the natives differed from the views of other Americans, they shared in the political ambivalence towards them.²² Also like other Americans, the Mormons believed it was their responsibility to “civilize” the Indians.²³ Mormons even believed that the U.S. policy of Indian removal to the West came by God’s hand.²⁴ Such divergent views of Native Americans were carried over into the Utah period.

_Mormons Move West_

Through the Ohio, Missouri, and Illinois periods of Mormon history Brigham Young had very little contact with the Native Americans. During the exodus, however, Young began practicing conciliatory policies to avoid conflict with American Indians. In time this would become Young’s preferred approach to Indian policy in Utah.²⁵ Young’s conciliatory policies, however, were not always the reality for Young or the Mormon inhabitants of Utah.

Mormons viewed the West as a sacred place dedicated to Lamanites and Mormons, what Mauss calls “a Mormon version of Manifest Destiny.”²⁶ Brigham Young privately sent

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²¹ Mauss, 51.

²² Ibid, 52.

²³ Arrington & Bitton, 145-146.

²⁴ Mauss, 53.


²⁶ Mauss, 56.
messengers west to obtain permission from the Indians to stay on native lands near the Iowa and Nebraska border. Part of the message sent forth was to inform the natives that part of the Mormons’ mission was to teach the Native Americans concerning the Indians’ Israelite heritage. Young was granted permission to stay on Indian lands from both the Potawatomi and Otoe chiefs. Later, the federal government gave their consent for the Mormons to live on Indian lands in Iowa. In Iowa, Young and his followers had their first experience in dealing with the Native Americans stealing cattle. Lawrence Coates believes at Winter Quarters in modern-day Omaha, Young began “practicing his famous Indian policy which he later summarized in the phrase that ‘it was cheaper to feed the Indians than to fight them.’” Despite Young’s attempts at peace and Indian negotiations, the Omahas continued to raid Mormon cattle. Brigham Young said in March of 1847 that if any Saint shot an Indian for theft the murderer would be turned over to the chief “Old Elk.” Young went on to say that “it was wrong to indulge in feelings of hostility and blood-shed toward the Indians, the descendants of Israel, who might kill a cow, an ox or even a horse.” Young did, however, tell his followers that if the Omahas continued to steal after being warned that the natives should be whipped. Belief in the Indians’ Israelite heritage was doubtless leading Young’s policy towards the Native Americans. Although Young did not want to kill the natives, at this point he seemed to believe in punishing them for their perceived crimes. This continued theft by the Indians surely caused the Mormons to increasingly distrust

27 Coates, 429-432.

28 During this period in Iowa it was generally the Omahas that stole the Mormons cattle. See Coates, 432-433.

29 Coates, 434.

Native Americans. Cattle theft and mistrust would continue into the territory of Utah, leading to conflicts among the two cultures.
CHAPTER 2

Mormon and Ute Conflicts, 1847-1851

The Utes of Utah

Robert Utley writes that despite Indian cultural similarities, Native American tribes were very different and that no tribe typifies the western Indians.\(^1\) This was true of the Utah territory as well. Several tribes lived in the Utah territory. The Shoshones lived north of the Salt Lake Valley; the Goshutes lived in the western desert; the Paiutes occupied a large portion of southwestern Utah; the Navajo occupied the southeast; and the Utes occupied the largest area of present day Utah ranging from the area of Salt Lake and then south almost to the present border and then east into Colorado.\(^2\) It has been generally thought and accepted that there were no Native Americans living in the Salt Lake Valley in 1847.\(^3\) Jared Farmer has challenged the popular perception that Salt Lake was empty; according to him the Mormons viewed unclaimed and unused land as unoccupied, but unoccupied did not mean unpopulated. There were actually several itinerant bands, including two mounted groups of Native Americans in the Salt Lake


\(^2\) See Map 2.1. Also see Leonard Arrington and Davis Bitton, *The Mormon Experience: A History of the Latter-day Saints* (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), 147. Julian H. Steward says none of the names assigned to different tribes are “aboriginal, and none of the groups was a ‘tribe’ in the sense of having awareness of common culture let alone political unity.” The unawareness of each other applies to the time before the introduction of the horse, but the main point here is that Steward believes tribal names to be a white construct of separation. See Julian H. Steward, *Ute Indians: Aboriginal and Historical Groups of the Ute Indians of Utah*, vol. 1 (New York & London: Garland Publishing Inc., 1974), 29. In addition Steward says different tribes are not always easily distinguishable, 30-31.

Map 2.1 Native American Lands in Utah

Source: Map from Forrest S. Cuch, ed., *A History of Utah’s American Indians* (Salt Lake City: Utah State Division of Indian Affairs / Utah State Division of History, 2003), 2.
Map 2.2 Ute Bands

several itinerant bands, including two mounted groups of Native Americans in the Salt Lake Valley.\textsuperscript{4} Although there were tensions with all the tribes of Utah, the most violent conflicts occurred between the Mormons and the most powerful and aggressive tribe of the territory, the Utes.\textsuperscript{5}

The Utes had occupied parts of Utah, Colorado, New Mexico, and surrounding regions for hundreds of years. It is believed they came from Mexico into the southwestern part of the United States in about 1000 A.D. and had become a “recognizable people” between 1000 and 1200 in the southern part of the Great Basin.\textsuperscript{6} By 1300, the Utes occupied the four corners region.\textsuperscript{7} By the time the Spanish established Spain’s northern colony in 1598 the Utes had spread into different bands throughout the Great Basin, the Colorado Plateau, and the Central and Southern Rockies. Ute population estimates at their first contact with the whites range from five-to ten-thousand.\textsuperscript{8} One estimate claims the Utes never numbered more than twelve-thousand.\textsuperscript{9} It is generally accepted that the Utes emerged as a people in the region of southeastern Utah.\textsuperscript{10} Prior to the introduction of the horse Utes lived independently in family groups, but by the time the Mormons arrived they lived in several significant bands and sub-

\textsuperscript{4} Jared Farmer, \textit{On Zion’s Mount: Mormons, Indians, and the American Landscape} (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2008), 50. Farmer referred to these two groups as “Neme-Nuche.”

\textsuperscript{5} Early Mormon settlers generally called this tribe either the “Utes” or the “Utahs.”

\textsuperscript{6} Virginia McConnell Simmons, \textit{The Ute Indians of Utah, Colorado, and New Mexico} (Boulder: University of Colorado Press, 2000), 13-14. Simmons locates the southern part of the Great Basin where eastern California and southern Nevada meet.

\textsuperscript{7} Ibid, 14.

\textsuperscript{8} Ibid, 16.


\textsuperscript{10} Simmons, 14.
groups.\textsuperscript{11} What joined these bands together was their common Numic language.\textsuperscript{12} Large Ute bands that occupied the Utah territory included the Pahvants who occupied the area around the Sevier River; further north around Utah Lake was the largest band of Utah Utes, the Timpanogots. Southeast of the Pahvants were the Moanunts who occupied the area around Red and Fish Lakes. Directly east of the Pahvants were the Sanpits around what is now Manti and Mount Pleasant. East of the Sanpits were the Seuvarits in the vicinity of modern day Moab. Directly east of the Timpanogots were the Uintahs around the Uinta Basin by the Green River. Other bands up and down the eastern edge of modern Utah included the Weenuches, Parianuches, and Yampas whose lands spilled over into modern-day Colorado.\textsuperscript{13} Although these bands had their own territory, Western Utes frequently hunted, gathered, and fished in the lands of other bands, especially in the area of Utah Lake.\textsuperscript{14} The Utes occupied a total of 225,000 square miles in Utah, Colorado, New Mexico, and part of Wyoming. The natural barriers that separated the different bands prevented any central political structure for the entire Ute tribe.\textsuperscript{15}

The different bands of Utes shared common customs and religious, social, and ethical

\textsuperscript{11} Clifford Duncan, “The Northern Utes of Utah” in \textit{A History of Utah’s American Indians}, ed. Forrest S. Cuch (Salt Lake City: Utah State Division of Indian Affairs / Utah State Division of History, 2003), 168.

\textsuperscript{12} Simmons, 15. Also see Farmer, 23-25.

\textsuperscript{13} See Map 2.2; Simmons, 17-19. For more information about the different bands also see Duncan, 174-176; O’Neal, 3; Jan Pettit, \textit{Utes: The Mountain People} (Boulder, Colorado: Johnson Books, 1990), 167-168; Wilson Rockwell, \textit{The Utes: A Forgotten People} (1956; repr., Montrose, Colorado: Western Reflections Publishing Company, 2006), 12. For information about the meanings of the different bands names see William R. Palmer, “Utah Indians Past and Present,” \textit{Utah Historical Quarterly} 1, no. 2 (1928): 35-52. Duncan spells the “Timpanogots” as “Tumpanwach,” Farmer spells the band as Timpanogos, for this thesis Simmons spelling, “Timpanogots,” will be used.

\textsuperscript{14} Stephen P. Van Hoak, “Waccara’s Utes: Native American Equestrian Adaptations in the Eastern Great Basin, 1776-1876,” \textit{Utah Historical Quarterly} 67, no. 4 (1999): 309. Brigham Young also identified the areas the different tribes and bands lived. See Brigham Young to Indian Sub-Agent Henry R. Day, July 21, 1851, U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs, Letters Received by the Officer of Indian Affairs, reel 897, Marriott Library, University of Utah, Salt Lake City (afterward BIA).

\textsuperscript{15} Duncan, 173-174.
beliefs. Some customs such as clothing and food differed depending on geographical location. A band was made up of several families. Each organized band had one or more chiefs or leaders who were generally older members who had proven themselves with sound judgment and leadership skills; leadership was not hereditary. When several bands were joined together, there was one principal chief, one war chief, a hunting leader, and other leaders. The band chief and a council of elders were in charge of deciding where the band would dwell and hunt; this council possessed the highest authority of the tribe. The chief was only able to maintain power as long his decisions benefited the entire tribe. Many times a mediator or interpreter was appointed to negotiate with the white man. The Utes had no formal laws or police force; they relied on the elders to teach the morals of the band.  

Ute bands lived in areas that provided natural resources such as tools, medicine, and clothing. The Utes that lived around lakes depended on fish and all used the bow and arrow to hunt for game. Ute subsistence, survival, and culture depended on a hunter-gatherer lifestyle. Farming was not unknown to the Utes, particularly the Pahvants.  

With the arrival of the Spanish, Ute life changed forever with their adoption of the horse and firearms. The Eastern Utes of New Mexico were the first Utes to gain access to the horse. The horse made the Utes far more mobile, which gave them greater ability to expand their resources. In addition, the horse enabled the Utes to trade with both the Spanish and other

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16 Pettit, 79-81. Also see Rockwell, 44-45; Steward, 34. Robert Utley says that personal influence was the standard for leadership among most western Indian tribes. See Utley, 8.

17 Simmons, 24-25. Utah Lake was the most permanent of any Ute community, Duncan 177.

18 Simmons, 26. Simmons prefers to describe Utes as “gatherer-hunters.”

19 Duncan, 177.

20 Simmons, 29-32.
tribes. Possibly the largest change the horse made to Ute culture is that it made them much more aggressive. With the horse the Utes formed alliances with other tribes to raid and steal from white settlers and enemy tribes. The Utes gained an alliance with the Spanish for a short period that enabled them to push the Comanches south and gain control of the area north of New Mexico.  

The above changes reached the western Utes by at least the early nineteenth century. Evidence suggests, however, that at least the Timpanogots were engaged in trade with New Mexicans as early as 1776. By 1810, Spanish legal restrictions on traders decreased, causing trade in the Utah territory to increase. With the horse, the western bands of Utes were able to increase their hunting ranges and skills, which enabled bands to grow stronger. The Utes were able to travel into eastern lands where they competed with other tribes and became a threat to southern Spanish settlements.

There is division among authors concerning whether or not the Utes developed an aggressive warlike society prior to the arrival of Europeans, but most agree that the Utes became warlike after Europeans disrupted their way of life. Ute aggressions increased towards enemy

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22 Simmons, 47.


25 For more information of how the horse changed western Ute culture, see Simmons, 47-48; Duncan, 174-178; O’Neal, 5-6; Farmer, 27-31; Van Hoak, “Waccara’s Utes,” 309-324; Stewart, 35-40. Stewart says that before the horse there were no clear-cut Ute bands, 35.

26 Duncan, 182. Also see Simmons, 64. Both Simmons and Duncan deny that the Utes became an aggressive warlike society, but both say the Utes became more aggressive. Floyd O’Neal says that the Utes were peaceful hunter gatherers that only became violent after white encroachments, see O’Neal, vii, 2. Wilson Rockwell,
tribes, Mexican authorities, and anyone who was deemed a threat to their survival; Utes learned combat strategies when engaged against tribes such as the Comanches. Jan Pettit says the Utes never “allowed themselves to be forced to turn their backs upon an enemy. The Utes prided themselves on their bravery in battle, although war honors were not part of their culture. Enemy tribes agreed that the Ute was harder to kill than any other Indians.” War became an important means of subsistence for the Utes.

Although the Mormons were the first Euro-American people in the area around the Great Salt Lake to establish a permanent settlement, the Utes were well acquainted with white people—not only the Spanish, but also white fur trappers, mountain men, missionaries, and explorers such as John C. Fremont, Kit Carson, and Thomas Fitzpatrick. Several trading posts were established throughout Ute lands. Forts in and around the Uinta Basin were popular trading posts for the Utes; where they traded beaver, otter pelts, and tanned hides of elk, deer and mountain sheep for guns, ammunition, blankets, utensils, and manufactured goods. When the fur trade declined in the 1830s, the Utes felt angry, having become dependent on white goods. A few Utes became intoxicated and attacked and burned down Fort Uintah and attacked other forts around the Uinta Basin, ending that phase of the fur trade in Utah in 1844. Virginia Simmons says, “By the mid-1840s Utes were angry, ready and willing to do whatever was needed to

However, believes the consolidation of Ute bands made them both aggressive and warlike, Rockwell, 16-17. Stewart claims the Utes were always warlike and that the horse only increased their aggressions, Stewart, 21.

27 Simmons, 61-64.
28 Pettit, 15.
29 Rockwell, 18.
30 Simmons, 52-53, 58; also see Rockwell, 62. One the best known contacts between the Utes of Utah Lake and Spanish was the Dominguez –Escalante expedition of 1776. See for example Simmons, 36-43.
31 Duncan, 184-185. Also see Simmons, 54.
protect their land and their way of life from intruders, for more than land had been usurped. Game, wild plants, and sources of water were being lost, too.” And such was the attitude of the Utes at the time of Mormon arrival in 1847.

Wakara and the Utes at the Time of Mormons Arrival and Early Conflicts

At the time the Mormons arrived in the territory Ute bands were divided. One of the most influential groups among the Ute bands was a confederacy established by Chief Wakara. The leaders of this confederation were led by Wakara’s brothers or half-brothers: Sowiet, Arapene, Sanpitch, Tabby, Grosepene, Ammon, and Kanosh. Chief Wakara became known as the war chief of the Ute nation. Sub-Indian agent, Henry R. Day, said that all the Ute bands in his Utah agency recognized Wakara as war chief and Sowiet as the civil chief; but the majority of the tribe obeyed the mandates of Sowiet, including Wakara. Tabby occasionally functioned as a sub-chief to Sowiet. The Ute nation was not always necessarily united in decisions or actions. In fact, it is difficult to determine just how united and organized the Ute confederacy was. Stephen Van Hoak says the Utes were not politically organized at the tribal level but rather

32 Simmons, 64.

33 Ibid, 49. Conway Sonne says the family of Wakara was the predominant Ute family that held key leadership positions among the Utes, such as Sowiet, Arapene, Caloechipe, Grospene, Hankiter, Kanosh, Nephi, Sanpitch, Spoods, Tabby, Tanterbus, and Big Elk. See Conway B. Sonne, “Royal Blood of the Utes,” Utah Historical Quarterly 22, no. 3 (1954): 271-76.

34 Conway B. Sonne, World of Wakara (San Antonio: The Naylor Company, 1962), 16. Floyd O’Neal speculates that Wakara and other Utes may have had Spanish blood in them from possible interbreeding between the Utes and the Spanish, O’Neal, 11.

35 Henry R. Day to Luke Lea, January 2, 1852, BIA. Henry R. Day was appointed in 1851 as an Indian Sub-agent in charge of one of the three Indian Agencies in Utah; Day was placed over the Parvan agency. See Proclamation by Brigham Young, July 21, 1851, BIA. Much of the information Day provided in this letter was simply a more detailed description of the different bands than what Young had written to Day himself when assigning him to the Agency. See Brigham Young to Henry Day, July 21, 1851, BIA.

36 Simmons, 92.
organized at the regional or band level.\(^{37}\) Indian Sub-agent Stephen B. Rose said that although all Utes belonged to the same tribe, they were divided and loyal to their band chief.\(^{38}\) Wakara and Sowiet had their own band of followers. Brigham Young and Indian Agent Jacob Holeman referred to Sowiet as being a chief of the Uintah band.\(^{39}\) Chief Anthro was also a chief of the Uintahs and Kanosh was the predominant chief of the Pahvants.\(^{40}\) Juanita Brooks describes Wakara as being the “war chief of the most formidable group in the Utah area.”\(^{41}\) Although Wakara was a Timpanogot, most of his followers were from the Sanpit band.\(^{42}\) Wakara’s band was in constant fluctuation as some families and individuals joined him only for a season or for only a few hunts and raids.\(^{43}\) Those that joined Wakara’s band included Ute, Navajo, and even Hopi.\(^{44}\) Henry Day said concerning Wakara’s band, “They are called Gho-ver-ets, and known as Walker’s Band.” He said that all other bands gave deference to them.\(^{45}\)


\(^{38}\) Stephen B. Rose to Luke Lea, April 1852, BIA.


\(^{40}\) Simmons, 92.


\(^{42}\) Simmons, 49. According to Jared Farmer, Utes could move from one band to another, see Farmer, 25. Wakara’s father had been killed by Timpanogots after he refused to join a local flight. Wakara killed the perpetrators and fled to live among the Sanpit bands. See Walker, “Wakara Meets the Mormons,” 217.

\(^{43}\) Van Hoak, “Waccara’s Utes,” 323-324.

\(^{44}\) John Peterson, *Utah’s Black Hawk War* (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1998), 67.

\(^{45}\) Henry R. Day to Luke Lea, January 2, 1852, BIA. Wakara’s band is sometimes called the Shiberetches, Cheveritts, Cheverets, Shiverits, Sheverts, and Ashivorits. Most often it was called Wakara’s band. See Peterson, 68 note 89.
Wakara never bowed to white dominance.\textsuperscript{46} What is clear from both published biographies of the Ute chief is that Wakara was an opportunist who did not resist white encroachments except when he felt threatened by them. Wakara’s vision of the future was to use Euro-American settlers to his economic advantage in order to build wealth.\textsuperscript{47} Ronald Walker writes, “Wakara’s interactions with the Mormons may be seen as a case study in attempted cultural adaptation.”\textsuperscript{48}

The status of a tribe or band was greatly influenced by the use of the horse.\textsuperscript{49} Horse ownership created a hierarchy of bands with the equestrians at the top.\textsuperscript{50} Wakara recognized the advantage of the horse and set out to transform his group into a more powerful people. After Wakara attained his leadership position, he withdrew from the scene around Utah Lake where the Timpanogots dwelt and established a nomadic horse-based economy rather than being place-based. Most mounted bands of Timpanogots modified their lives due to the horse but did not abandon their place-based economy. Wakara, on the other hand, embraced equestrianism and nomadism like none other.\textsuperscript{51} Henry Day described Wakara’s band as roaming through all other nations and not being confined to a particular region, unlike the other bands.\textsuperscript{52} Chief Wakara became known for being a brilliant horse thief who brought his nation to the “summit of its

\textsuperscript{46} Sonne, World of Wakara, 2-4.


\textsuperscript{48} Walker, 215.

\textsuperscript{49} Pettit, 42.

\textsuperscript{50} Farmer, 31.

\textsuperscript{51} Ibid, 34-35.

\textsuperscript{52} Henry R. Day to Luke Lea, January 2, 1852, BIA.
power.” Wakara traded horses with the Spanish and became known for notorious horse raids among both whites and other native tribes. 

Wakara commanded one of the most powerful and prosperous bands west of the Rockies ranging from the Pacific Coast to the Platte River, east of the Continental Divide, “following a migratory pattern that circumvented many of the ecological and geographic limitations on successful equestrianism in the eastern Great Basin.” Wakara traded with mountain men and teamed up with well-known white men such as Thomas L. “Pegleg” Smith in horse raids in California. Ronald Walker writes, “By Great Basin Native American standards, Wakara’s wealth and routines were opulent.”

During his years as a horse thief, Wakara learned to divide his forces and attack from different positions. His attacks on ranches became so well organized that he was reported to be in several places at the same time. Daniel Jones described Wakara as being a “great strategist” and “out-generaling” those he met in war. The Ute chief also likely learned warfare from his father. Wakara’s reputation is legendary. Anglo-Americans gave him many different nicknames: “Napoleon of the Desert,” “the Indian Land Pirate,” “Hawk of the Mountains,”

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54 Ibid, 10-13, 32, 35. Mormon and Utah resident, Daniel Jones described Wakara as having “great Skill” in his theft of horses. See Daniel W. Jones, *Forty Years Among the Indians: A True Yet Thrilling Narrative of the Author’s Experiences Among the Natives* (Salt Lake City: Juvenile Instructor Office, 1890), 41-42.

55 Van Hoak, “Waccara’s Utes,” 309. Van Hoak also provides Wakara’s entire migratory patterns.


57 Walker, 219.

58 Sonne, *World of Wakara*, 35.

59 Jones, 41

60 Sonne, *World of Wakara*, 12. Sonne says that the Utes were no strangers to war and that it was necessary to preserve life on the frontier.
“King of the Mountains,” “Mr. Eutaw,” and “Soldan [Sultan] of the Red Paynims.” Those that came into contact with Wakara had diverse descriptions of him: personable, dignified, fearless, crafty, craven, and self-seeking. Wakara was a force to be reckoned with for both whites and other native tribes.

In 1847, church leaders did not want to encroach on Ute lands or “crowd” the Utes until they became better acquainted to avoid hostilities. Within a few days of their arrival in the Salt Lake Valley, the Mormons were caught between the Shoshones and Utes. Both tribes claimed the Salt Lake Valley, and the Shoshones offered to sell the land to the Mormons. The Mormons refused to buy the land, knowing if they did then the Utes and other tribes would demand payment as well. In addition, they reasoned, the land was God’s land and the Indians did not own it anyhow. Brigham Young recommended that the Mormons neither sell nor trade arms to the Native Americans. Young only wanted authorized leaders to trade with the natives, but many Mormons did not obey and were reprimanded for such actions.

The Utes were angry that the Mormons were establishing a permanent settlement. Chief Wakara reportedly advocated an attack on the Mormons before they could establish a settlement. The older Chief Sowiet overruled Wakara and may have had Wakara whipped “to bring him into line with a more peaceful policy.” Although it is difficult to know if Wakara

61 Farmer, 35.
62 Walker, 216.
63 Christy, 36; Campbell, 98.
64 Christy, 36-37.
65 Coates, 434-435.
66 Christy, 37.
67 Campbell, 97-98. Also see Sonne, World of Wakara, 50-51; Hubert Howe Bancroft, History of Utah (Salt Lake City: Bookcraft, 1964), 309.
actually advocated an attack, it is entirely possible that Wakara saw the Mormons as a threat to
his vision and power. Regardless of Wakara’s original intentions, by September of 1848,
Wakara had his first meetings with the Mormons. According to a letter from Parley P. Pratt, the
Indians expressed a desire to become one people with them and for the Mormons and Indians to
live amongst each other. Furthermore, Wakara invited the Mormons to establish a new
settlement among his people to teach them to farm.\textsuperscript{68} It is unknown whether Wakara wanted the
Mormons to settle near his Sanpete headquarters or in “Little Salt Lake Valley in southern Utah”
or both.\textsuperscript{69} Always the opportunist, Wakara viewed the Mormons as a dependable source of guns
and ammunition and as a market for selling horses and captives.\textsuperscript{70} Chief Sowiet as well
expressed friendship and supported Mormon settlement in western and southern Utah, but he did
not invite them to settle his own lands in north eastern Utah.\textsuperscript{71}

Other native bands began to resist Mormon settlement as the Mormons moved outward
from Salt Lake City. Native protest of Mormon encroachments took the form of theft of
Mormon stock. The first confrontation between the Mormons and the Utes occurred in late
February and early March of 1848, not even a year after the Mormons arrived in the Salt Lake
Valley. In late February reports circulated that Indians around Utah Lake had stolen horses and
cattle from the Tooele and Salt Lake Valleys. After a Mormon posse found the Utes they offered
a gun as payment for having killed the seventeen cattle and one horse that were stolen. These

\textsuperscript{68} Parley P. Pratt to Orson Pratt, September 5, 1848, quoted in Walker, 219.

\textsuperscript{69} Walker, 219.

\textsuperscript{70} Van Hoak, “And Who Shall Have the Children?” 12-13. The next chapter will provide more information
about Wakara and the captive slave trade.

\textsuperscript{71} Ibid, 12.
Utes promised to not steal anymore.\textsuperscript{72} This promise did not mark the end of Indian theft of livestock. As the Mormons continued to move further south in the Salt Lake Valley, they came closer to Ute lands. By 1849, the Mormons had moved to the southernmost part of the valley where modern-day Draper sits. Just on the other side of the point of the mountain was the Timpanogots’ stronghold by Utah Lake.\textsuperscript{73}

The first violent battle between Mormons and Indians occurred on March 5, 1849, when a body of Mormons was sent out to locate a renegade band of Utes that had killed and stolen livestock and horses from Tooele and the southern end of the valley. A battle ensued in which six natives were killed.\textsuperscript{74} A Timpanogot Chief, Little Chief, said that this renegade band was related to Wanship’s band of Salt Lake Valley Utes and had disregarded the admonition to not steal Mormon cattle. Little Chief actually recommended the Mormons hunt down and kill them and after the event said the Mormons had acted rightly, but not all Timpanogots approved.\textsuperscript{75} Robert Carter writes, “A smoldering and enduring hatred for white men kindled in the hearts of Old Elk, Stick-in-the-Head, and some of the other Timpanogots who watched from the hillside as the cattle-stealing Indians were relentlessly shot down that morning.”\textsuperscript{76} Soon after this incident, a colonizing party went to establish a settlement in Utah Valley in the heart of Ute lands.

It has been previously argued Mormons were ordered or sent to establish the first settlement in Utah Valley.\textsuperscript{77} According to recent studies, those that settled Utah Valley did so to

\begin{footnotes}
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\item[72] D. Robert Carter,\textit{ Founding Fort Utah: Provo’s Native Inhabitants, Early Explorers and First Year of Settlement} (Provo, Utah: Provo City Corporation, 2003), 51-52.
\item[73] Ibid, 59.
\item[74] Christy, 38. Also see Coates, 437; Campbell, 98; Carter,\textit{ Founding Fort Utah}, 62-67. Robert Carter mentions four having been killed.
\item[75] Carter,\textit{ Founding Fort Utah}, 62, 67.
\item[76] Ibid, 67. Carter identifies Old Elk as the Timpanogots War Chief, 79, 93.
\item[77] Christy, 38; Coates, 437; Campbell, 99.
\end{footnotes}
better their own economic situation and were not called to settle the area.\textsuperscript{78} According to Robert Carter, Brigham Young undoubtedly wanted to eventually colonize Utah Valley, but was not anxious for the settlement as early as spring of 1849.\textsuperscript{79} Although most the settlers that went to Utah Valley did so voluntarily, church leaders did choose certain men to accompany the colonizing party, believing that in order for Mormons to live peacefully among the Utes the settlers had to make an effort to convert the Indians to the Mormon way of life. Among those ordered to go was Indian interpreter Dimick Huntington.\textsuperscript{80} The colonizers moved out on April 1, 1849, and while en route they received a “no trespassing” message. Dimick Huntington assured the tribes that they were not coming to drive out the natives and stressed the economic advantages of Mormon settlement. At last the Utes allowed the Mormons to continue, but they remained angry and suspicious.\textsuperscript{81}

Some of the first issues facing the Mormons in Utah Valley were the violent conflicts between the Timpanogots and Wanship bands. Indian bands were certainly no strangers to violence amongst themselves.\textsuperscript{82} Neither side was able to ally themselves with the Mormons against the other and would not heed Brigham Young’s admonition to get along. In mid-April of

\textsuperscript{78} Carter, \textit{Founding Fort Utah}, xii; Farmer, 63.

\textsuperscript{79} Carter, \textit{Founding Fort Utah}, 71.

\textsuperscript{80} Ibid, 74.

\textsuperscript{81} Ibid, 79. Also see Farmer, 65; Christy, 38. As Ned Blackhawk has argued, the natives became increasingly violent due to encroachment upon their lands. Due to different visions of how to use the land, conflict became arguably inevitable. This pattern of interracial conflict corresponds to Elliot West’s argument as well as Patricia Limerick’s. According to Blackhawk, the coming conflicts among Mormons and Indians were in certain respects unique. Due to Mormons’ own conflict with the federal government, the Mormons themselves were the initial agents of violence in dispossessing the Indians from their homelands; it was not until the 1860s that the U.S. Army became involved. See Blackhawk, 230.

\textsuperscript{82} Robert Utley states that Indian groups bitterly fought each other in prehistoric times, but such hostilities intensified with the appearance of Europeans, 13. Floyd O’Neal claims that Ute bands were generally friendly with each other prior to the appearance of whites, see O’Neal, 3. Regardless of whether or not Utes were friendly with each other or not prior to European contact, by the time the Mormons came the Ute bands had become hostile with each other to some extent.
1849, while the Wanship band was fleeing with some Timpanogot horses, the bands clashed near modern day Ogden and Little Chief was killed. The future of the Timpanogots was left in the hands of other chiefs.

Both Chief Old Elk and Wakara urged local Indian bands to carry out attacks on the Mormons at Fort Utah in Utah Valley in April of 1849. Fearing attack, Young re-established the Mormon militia known as the Nauvoo Legion. Young told the saints in Provo, the Utah Valley settlement, to expeditiously complete a fort and sent leaders to make friends with the local tribes. In May 1849, Young stated that if the old Indians would not enter into the Mormon “new and everlasting covenant” that they would “die and be damned.” Young told church members that if hostile Indians came, they needed to be placed where they could not harm the settlers.

The threatened attack never did materialize and tensions calmed by early May after Huntington had a peaceful meeting with both Old Elk and Wakara. Soon a friendship was established between Brigham Young and Wakara. Young sent a letter of friendship to Wakara on May 14, 1849. Young also addressed Wakara’s earlier invitation to settle Wakara’s land. Young told Wakara he would only settle there with the promise that the Mormons would be “unmolested” by the local Indians. Wakara said he looked at the Mormons as his fathers, mothers, brothers, and sisters. After the meeting Wakara promised Huntington his people would

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83 Carter, *Founding Fort Utah*, 97.

84 Ibid, 99.

85 Christy, 39. The Nauvoo Legion was what the Mormons called the militia they established while living in Nauvoo, Illinois. The Utah’s territorial militia maintained this name.


87 Brigham Young to Wakara, May 14, 1853, quoted in Walker, 221. Also see Christy, 39.
not steal Mormon cattle. On June 14, Wakara came back and again visited with Brigham Young. Huntington acted as interpreter and said Wakara again asked the Mormons to settle his lands in the Sanpitch Valley south of Provo and desired to know when the Mormons would come. Young said explorers would come through in the fall and promised to trade cattle because the Indians could not depend on game alone for food. Furthermore Young said the Mormons would teach them to farm and would provide an Indian school in Salt Lake City. Wakara responded in kind, stating that he wanted their children to be together and that he hated the Mormons to be on poor land; Wakara believed his land would serve the Mormons well. Later in 1849, Young accepted Wakara’s offer. One of Young’s main goals was to transform the Utes from being hunters and gatherers to what he saw as the superior life of agriculture and he likely thought this invitation from Wakara was a chance to do just that. Furthermore, Young hoped that this new colony in the Sanpitch Valley would be the beginning of what Lawrence Coates has called a “peace corps” between the Mormons and the Indians. This was the beginning of Wakara’s desire to live among the Mormons in peace, a desire that continued even through the Walker War.

Although relations between Young and Wakara were good at that moment, relations between them would become tense at times. Shortly before the Walker War, Wakara denied

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88 Walker, 221.

89 Meeting with Wakara, June 14, 1849, p. 89-93, vol. 19, Church Historians Office Journal, History of the Church, 1839-circa 1882, CR 100 102, (afterwards HOC), Church History Library of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Salt Lake City (afterward LDS Archives).

90 Thomas G. Alexander, Utah: The Right Place, 2nd rev. ed. (Salt Lake City: Gibbs Smith Publisher, 2003), 112.

91 Coates, 439. Attempts were made throughout the West to turn the Native Americans into agriculturalists. See David Rich Lewis, Neither Wolf Nor Dog: American Indians, Environment, and Agrarian Change (New York: Oxford University, 1994).

92 Coates, 440.
ever having made the offer for the Mormons to settle his lands. This denial was at the peak of Wakara’s anger towards the Mormons. The evidence for Wakara having invited the Mormons to settle his lands is strong. A letter from Parley P. Pratt recorded the invitation in September of 1848 and, according to Mormon sources and meeting minutes, Wakara said this yet again during meetings in May and June 1849. Furthermore, in February of 1850, a letter from Isaac Morley in Sanpete said Wakara stated, “I want the Mormons to stay here and plant and sow, and do us good, and we will be friends.”

Wakara’s actions afterwards also demonstrate his friendliness to the Mormons as opposed to protesting them settling his lands. On March 13, 1850, after the settlement of Sanpete had begun, Wakara was baptized into the Mormon Church by Isaac Morley. Wakara also desired to be ordained to spread the gospel. Clearly Wakara desired friendship with the Mormons and his invitation to the Mormons to settle his lands demonstrated that desire.

Despite Wakara’s friendly intentions, other Utes began to increase their stealing of livestock due to their anger over the Mormons’ presence. The Mormons also never offered payment for the land. In response to the thefts, the perpetrators were shot by the order of Chief Wakara. Wakara obviously did not want other bands disrupting those he hoped to be his future allies that would further his economic future. Theft of the Mormon livestock, however, continued by the local Timpanogot Utes that did not see the advantage of Mormon settlement.

Mormon and Indian relations took a turn for the worse in August of 1849. John

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93 Isaac Morley to Brigham Young, February 20, 1850, Journal History of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Saints (LDS Journal History scrap book consists of typed entries and Newspaper clippings from 1830 to the present), February 20, 1850, LDS Archives.

94 Sonne, 105.

95 Isaac Morley to Brigham Young, April 17, 1850, quoted in Coates, 440-441.

96 Coates, 441. Coates says the executor was either Walkara himself or his brother.
Stoddard, Richard Ivie, and Jerome Zabriskie killed an Indian the Mormons called Old Bishop after accusing him of wearing a stolen shirt. These Mormons filled Old Bishop’s body with rocks after cutting it open and placed it in the Provo River. Local Utes who were looking for Old Bishop later found the body. The Timpanogots suspected Mormon settlers had killed Old Bishop. According to Ute culture, a murder could be compensated by a payment of goods, animals, or both. Due to the Mormon refusal to turn over the perpetrators, the Utes retaliated by stealing more livestock and corn, killing horses, shooting at Mormons in the fields and threatening to drive the Mormons from the area. Still, friendliness did momentarily prevail and a major violent conflict was averted in October. Young sent a letter on October 14, 1849 scolding the saints for inviting Indians into their homes and allowing their children to play with Indian children. He said that if the Mormons were to have dominion over them “you must not treat them as your equals. You cannot exalt them by this process. If they are your equals, you cannot raise them up to you.” While Young still held the view that the Indians were a people of destiny, he certainly held the common American viewpoint that the Indians and their culture were inferior. Mormon and Timpanogot relations continued to heat up until they reached a

97 Carter, *Founding Fort Utah*, 114-115; Farmer, 67-68; Sonne, 85; Peter Gottfredson, *Indian Depredations of Utah* (1919; repr., Tucson, Arizona: Fenestra Books, 2002), 22-23. Other scholars place this event in January of 1850. See Coates, 442; Christy, 40-41; Campbell, 99; Leonard J. Arrington, *Brigham Young: American Moses* (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1986), 213. Robert Carter explains that George Washington Bean, John Clark, and a miscellaneous newspaper article place this event in August of 1849. James Bean places it in January 1850 and Thomas Orr Jr. says it was when “there was snow on the ground.” See Carter, 119, note 88. Like Carter, this author believes the contemporary evidence given by Bean, Clark, and the newspaper article makes the date of August more likely than the next January. A lesser known version of this story as told by Thomas Orr, said that a treaty had been established with the Timpanogots that the Indians would not molest Mormon cattle and the Mormons wouldn’t kill wild game. According to this version Old Bishop came across these three Mormons hunting a deer and was killed; see Farmer, 68; David Bigler, *Forgotten Kingdom: The Mormon Theocracy in the American West* (Logan, Utah: Utah State University Press, 1998), 69.

98 Farmer, 68.

99 Carter, *Founding Fort Utah*, 142. Also see Farmer, 68.

100 Farmer, 68-69. Also see Carter, *Founding Fort Utah*, 144; Campbell, 99; Christy, 39-40.
boiling point in January 1850.  

The winter strained resources for the Utes with the growing population in Utah Valley and the passing forty-niners. Theft of cattle increased and by the end of January fifty to sixty head had been stolen. The Utes began shooting at the fort and the Mormons refused to allow any Indians to enter. Old Elk, who was suffering from the measles, was thrown out of Alexander Williams’s house when he approached for assistance. After three more cows went missing, the local church members appealed to Brigham Young for permission to attack the Utes. In early January 1850, Young stated his policy not to kill the natives over theft and to act wisely by guarding the livestock properly, but if the Mormons did choose to kill the Indians, Young said they did it at their own risk. Many local church leaders in Utah Valley recommended killing the hostile natives, believing that to be the only way to deal with the situation. The Mormon leader in Provo, Isaac Higbee, argued that all Provo citizens favored killing the Indians. Other Mormon leaders including Apostles Parley P. Pratt and Willard Richards recommended extermination. At last Young was convinced to take violent action and said, “I say go and kill them.” Young ordered all the hostile men to be killed but to let the women and children be saved if they “behave themselves.” Young reached his decision without the knowledge of Old Bishop’s murder. Leonard Arrington says that Young had notions of fairness and forbearance towards the natives, but that he was willing “to chastise and punish severely when necessary.”

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102 Farmer, 69-70. Also see Carter, *Founding Fort Utah*, 144-156.

103 Carter, *Founding Fort Utah*, 156-158; Christy, 41; Farmer, 70-71.

104 Christy, 41.

105 Coates, 443; Arrington, *Brigham Young*, 213; Christy, 41.

106 Arrington, *Brigham Young*, 212.
The final order was issued to Captain George D. Grant from Daniel H. Wells which said to cooperate with Indians in trying to quell the hostilities and to sue for peace, but as “circumstances may require” exterminate those that would not separate themselves from “hostile clans.”

Captain Howard Stansbury of the U.S. Topographical Engineers, who was residing in Salt Lake City at the time, approved Young’s decision. Stansbury himself had livestock stolen by Indians when doing work in Utah Valley in 1849. Stansbury’s Lieutenant, John W. Gunnison, also felt the Mormon use of force was justified calling the Indians “red devils.”

Stansbury offered assistance in the campaign by furnishing arms and offering Lieutenant George W. Howland as adjutant and Dr. James Blake as physician. In addition Stansbury provided arms, camp-equipage, and ammunition. Young announced his decision to attack the natives on February 2, 1850. Daniel H. Wells, the commander and Adjutant General of the militia in the entire territory, oversaw the organization of the necessary companies and personnel to assist those in Provo. Wells’s orders said, “Take no hostile Indians Prisoner. Those friendly, and sue for peace, take them under Guard and place them in the fort, Well guarded, and at no time leave the Fort unprotected.”

The Mormons reached the Ute village on February 8; Huntington attempted to negotiate with Chief Stick-in-the-Head. Although the chief favored a treaty, War Chief Old Elk opened

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107 Christy, 41.

108 Farmer, 71; Carter, *Founding Fort Utah*, 163-165. Ned Blackhawk says that John W. Gunnison, who later became the Captain of the Topographical Engineers in the region, felt that Mormon use of force was legitimate in order to establish political authority. “For Gunnison, violence naturally and justly ordered this new society as Mormons and Indians competed for survival along this distant margin of the nation,” Blackhawk, 233.

109 Carter, *Founding Fort Utah*, 166.


111 Carter, *Founding Fort Utah*, 186.
fire on the Mormons, beginning the Battle of Provo River. The next two days witnessed “the biggest battle fought within the current boundaries of the State of Utah.” The Mormon strategy was to surround the Utes and bombard them with artillery combined with rifle fire to flush them out in the open, making them easy targets. The plan failed because they misplaced the cannons. On the second day of battle the Mormons used batteries made of wood planks that enabled them to advance under some cover. The Mormons were able to take some ground including a log cabin that was previously a Ute stronghold. The next day, February 10, the remaining Utes fled. In the end only one Mormon was killed, nineteen-year-old Joseph Higbee, son of Isaac Higbee. The number of Ute deaths is unknown with reports ranging from ten to twenty. Later Old Elk was found dead, likely caused by both war wounds and the measles.

Old Elk and other dead Indians were then beheaded. For a few days following the battle, the militia pursued the Utes that escaped. Young reiterated orders to grant peace if they desired it, but if they were hostile “pursue them until you use them up. Let it be peace with them or extermination.” The Indians were pursued into the canyons, resulting in seven more dead

[112] Ibid, 173.

[113] Ibid, 67, 158. The Battle of Provo is actually small in comparison to the Bear River Massacre that occurred on January 29, 1863, that resulted in nearly three-hundred dead Shoshoni. Although the massacre is connected to Utah, it technically happened just over the border in Idaho. For an excellent description of this event, see Blackhawk, 259-266.


[115] The above descriptions of the battle comes from Carter, *Founding Fort Utah*, 172-190. Carter speculates that the reason casualties were not higher was due to the inaccuracy of the rifles used, 188-189. Some reports were much higher for the dead, but Carter discredits them believing them to be unrealistic. Virginia Simmons on the other hand places the number of Ute casualties as 70. See Simmons, 92.


[117] Ibid, 222-223; Farmer 75.

[118] Bigler, 72.
Utes, possibly including one woman. In addition, several Utes trying to escape across the frozen Utah Lake were gunned down. Within a few days the expedition was called off and prisoners were returned to Salt Lake City. David Bigler estimates forty Indian deaths combining the battle, those hunted afterwards, and those who died of exposure. The women and children prisoners were divided among the brethren to be used as “servants & children to be taught to work for their living.” Thus ended the Battle of Provo River, which was the final time the Utes tried to fight the Mormons head on. From this time forth the Utes would use guerilla warfare tactics.

Young was disappointed in the Provo saints’ failure to maintain peace. The problems had not been settled and in the coming months violence did not entirely end. In April of 1850, Alpheus Baker was murdered by two Utes. One of the killers, Patsowett, was caught, tried, and executed. Despite violence between the Mormons and the Utes and having lost some friends, Wakara declared himself still loyal to the Mormons; but Wakara said that the Utes of Provo would not accept his counsel and therefore the Mormons would have to fight it out. Wakara again showed his preference for peace with Mormon settlers. Wakara and his band likely still had hope of using the Mormons to increase power among the other bands. Wakara did, however,

119 Christy, 42-43. David Bigler identifies the women having fallen from a cliff while the Mormons pursued the Utes. Bigler, 71.

120 Bigler, 71.

121 Christy, 42-43.

122 Bigler, 72.

123 Carter, Founding Fort Utah, 227.

124 Ibid, 189.

125 Christy, 44. Christy mistakenly calls Baker the first documented murder of a pioneer by Indians.

126 Coates, 445.
have a temporary falling out with the local Mormons due to their refusal to assist him in hunting some Shoshone raiders. Wakara organized an attack on the Mormon settlement in May of 1850 at Provo but called it off due to the protest by Chief Sowiet. A month later Wakara demonstrated he was back on friendly terms with the Mormons when he was ordained an Elder in the Church along with Arapene, Sowiet, and Unhoquitch.

The major issue facing the Mormons and the Indians was one of culture, each side having a different vision of the future and land use. The Native Americans felt the land the Mormons were farming was public. Therefore, they felt justified in gathering the food from the Mormons’ crops. They were, after all, a hunting and gathering culture. Their views of land were totally different. Western Utes migrated and used the land as needed, whereas the Mormons wanted to improve the land by cultivating it. Furthermore, the Mormons’ cattle destroyed the land the natives depended on for food. The Mormons, on the other hand, believed that once they cultivated a piece of land, it was their private property. They believed property was provided by God for Mormon use in their new found Zion and therefore refused to pay the Utes for the land. Farming and grazing livestock were important to the Mormons’ livelihood. The Mormons could not allow the Indians to destroy their way of life any more than the Utes could sit by and watch the Mormons take the land they had lived on for hundreds of years. Violence was inevitable. These cultural barriers were the center of conflict between Mormons and Indians.

Contention over Indian theft in Tooele, about thirty-five miles to the west of Salt Lake

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127 Christy, 44; Gottfredson, 35-36.
128 Journal History, June 9, 1851.
129 Different visions over lands use was one of the main arguments Elliott West made.
131 Coates, 447-448.
City, reached a breaking point in the spring of 1851. It is not clear whether this conflict was against Goshutes, Utes, or both; but the important issue is that it shaped Young’s future Indian policy. Captain William Wright of Tooele wrote to militia commander Daniel H. Wells, saying that they were raising a nine-man detachment to follow after some Indians who had stolen some cattle, but that they lacked provisions. Wells replied that a company of volunteers, under Porter Rockwell, was being gathered to pursue the thieving Indians. Wells permitted the citizens of Tooele to join the expedition. Wells had determined that the Mormons had done all they could to reconcile with the Indians peaceably. To Wells, “forbearance” had ceased to be a virtue among the Indians. Wells ordered Major George D. Grant and forty mounted men to pursue the Indians and to recover stolen stock around Tooele. He ordered Colonel Peter W. Conover to proceed west from Provo to meet and aid Grant’s detachment to provide help. Conover’s mission was to prevent any Indians from escaping as Grant’s detachment chased after them. Strict orders were given not to let any hostile Indians escape to the mountains. William H. Kimball pursued a group of Indians to their stronghold in the mountains west of

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132 Both Lawrence Coates and Howard Christy simply identify this conflict with “Indians” living around Tooele. See Coates, 449-450; Christy, 46-47. Thomas Alexander identifies these Indians as Utes, Alexander, 112. Robert Carter identifies them as Goshutes. See Robert Carter, *From Fort To Village: Provo, Utah 1850-1854* (Provo, Utah: Provo City Corporation, 2008), 69. Historian Edward W. Tullidge details some of the troubles the Mormons and Indians had in Tooele, but he doesn’t identify the tribe. See Gottfredson, 38-42.


134 Daniel H. Wells to Captain Wright, April 21, 1851, reel 4, UTMC.

135 Daniel H. Wells to Captain Peter W. Conover, June 13, 1851, reel 4, UTMC.

136 Daniel H. Wells to Major George Grant, June 13, 1851, reel 4, UTMC. The original order to pursue the natives for having stolen stock from Black Rock came from Brigham Young to Daniel Wells. See Journal History, June 13, 1851. Also see Journal History for June 14, 1851.
Tooele Valley.\textsuperscript{137} In the process of these campaigns several Native Americans were killed.\textsuperscript{138} A white man was also killed during a skirmish.\textsuperscript{139}

In June, Daniel Wells decided that fighting the Indians was too expensive. Wells said the Indians were “poor and ignorant” but that if the same course continued to be pursued it would cost more than the value of the stolen property; all offensive movements were cancelled.\textsuperscript{140} The next month, Brigham Young made the first known public statement that it was cheaper to feed the Indians than to raise an expedition to fight them—echoing the advice of Wells.\textsuperscript{141}

Thus the Tooele expedition was the last attempt at Indian extermination, at least as an official strategy. The new plan for dealing with the Native Americans was a tactic of defense and reconciliation. Wells said that keeping a watchful eye would prevent future Indian depredations.\textsuperscript{142} Wells also issued the same instructions to Major Grant, adding that the saints needed to build forts for safety.\textsuperscript{143} Building forts would play a major role in the Mormon strategy during the Walker War.

Although hostilities and violence had lessened among the Mormons and Native

\textsuperscript{137} Journal History, June 20, 1851; also see Journal History, June 25, 1851.

\textsuperscript{138} Christy, 47-48. The Historians Office reported that Major George D. Grant returned on the 27\textsuperscript{th} of June and said they had killed eleven Indians and burned their beef they had laid out to dry, June 27, 1851, vol. 21, p. 51, HOC.

\textsuperscript{139} Daniel H. Wells to Captain Peter W. Conover, June 13, 1851, UTMC. Also see September, 22, 1851, vol. 21, p. 78, HOC.

\textsuperscript{140} Daniel H. Wells and James Ferguson to Peter W. Conover, June 14, 1851, reel 4, UTMC. Young later in a sermon said the amount lost in the summer of 1851 Indian conflict was $5000 worth of cattle and horses stolen or killed, September 22, 1851, vol. 21, p. 78, HOC; Journal History September 22, 1851.

\textsuperscript{141} Coates, 448-449. Also see Christy, 48. Interestingly a California Commissioner stated these exact sentiments in California in 1851, “It is, in the end, cheaper to feed the whole flock for a year than to fight them for a week.” See Utley, 52.

\textsuperscript{142} Daniel H. Wells and James Ferguson to Peter W. Conover, June 14, 1851, reel 4, UTMC.

\textsuperscript{143} Daniel H. Wells and James Ferguson to Major Grant, June 14, 1853, reel 4, UTMC. Wells also gave orders to Ferguson to send four men to watch the movements of Wakara.
Americans after the Tooele conflict, tensions were still high. The adjutant general of the territorial militia, James Ferguson, wrote General R. Jones in Washington, D.C. and said that the Mormons had done everything they could to pacify the Indians, but that the situation was still precarious.\footnote{James Ferguson to General R. Jones, October 20, 1851, reel 4, UTMC.} Efforts were made to aid the Indians by establishing two Indian farms in late 1851. Howard Christy believes these efforts to aid and pacify the Indians “came too late. The Indians, especially the Utes, declined rapidly as a result of extreme poverty brought on by usurpation of their lands, selective extermination, disease, and starvation.”\footnote{Christy, 35, 49.} Clearly Mormon and Indian relations had been damaged and another future violent encounter was likely. At this point Wakara was still committed to a friendly and cooperative relationship with the Mormons, but relations with Chief Wakara began to decline quickly in 1851. Even with declining relations, Wakara remained committed peaceful relations. Although the Mormons had yet to become a significant threat to Wakara’s power, the next several months would tell a different story. In addition, Wakara and other chiefs’ anger towards land encroachments and killing of their game would continue to surface. Furthermore, Young gave what could have been a challenge to the Utes and their powerful leaders. When speaking of the Tooele depredations in an epistle to the church, he said, “Though, in general, the Indians about the settlements have neither the disposition nor courage to the fight the settlers.”\footnote{September 22, 1851, vol. 21, p. 79, HOC; Journal History Sept. 22, 1851.} Although the chances are slim that Wakara or other chiefs read this, it does demonstrate the low opinion Young held towards the Native Americans in waging war.
Chapter 3

War on the Horizon

From the time the Mormons arrived in the territory relations with the Native Americans had been tense and at times violent. Wakara had threatened to attack, but had become committed to living among the Mormons in peace. Brigham Young and Mormon settlers had yet to become a serious threat to Wakara and his band. From 1851 to 1853 relations with Wakara and other Indian chiefs took a turn for the worse. Continued land encroachments and regulations on trade would challenge Wakara’s Utes’ superiority among other bands. Even with all these disruptions facing Wakara and his band, these issues still did not cause Wakara’s Utes to revert to violence which demonstrates Wakara’s band desire for cooperation with the Mormons. What these issues did do, however, was add logs to an already blazing fire between the two cultures creating a situation where violent reactions by the Utes was possible and even probable. Violent reaction did not come to fruition until after the death of one of Wakara’s Utes, but the issues of land and trade were certainly contributing factors to the event that finally pushed Wakara’s band over the edge. Yet Wakara himself remained committed to peace despite the actions of his band.

The most well-known challenge to Wakara’s Utes was the disruption of the Ute and Spanish slave trade. Although the attempt to end captive trading has been exaggerated as being the cause of the Walker War, it was important both economically and culturally for the Spanish and Wakara’s Utes. Therefore sufficient time must be devoted to discussing how old and lucrative the slave trade was.
The practice of slave trading in the Great Basin was a well-entrenched tradition that dated back hundreds of years by the time Mormons arrived. Both Europeans and Indians had “[r]ituals of violence, exchange, and redemption” in their societies at the time of their first contact.¹ James Brooks writes, “Native and European men fought to protect their communities and preserve personal repute yet participated in conflicts and practices that made the objects of their honor, women and children, crucial products of violent economic exchange.”² The Spanish and American Indians had come to depend on both material and human exchange across cultural boundaries; it was their solution to the crisis of their colonial encounter.³

Although captive exchange existed among tribes before the arrival of the Europeans, such human exchanges increased with the intrusion of the Spanish, French, and British; the slave-system among the natives was not sufficient for Spanish demand, especially for work in the

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² Brooks, Captives and Cousins, 3.

³ Ibid, 30-31.
Mexican mines. Indian slaves were employed for labor and also for psychological and sexual comforts. Plains Indians depended on Europeans for agricultural products and trade goods. This dependence “pulled against ties of kinship when captives simultaneously embodied real value in the exchange economy.” For the Comanches on the plains, market values on bison products increased the need for laborers by the 1780s. On the other hand, for the Utes of Utah child captives were most valuable as barter to slaver traders for Euro-American goods. Despite slaves’ economic value, unlike chattel slavery, the main motivation for captives in the southwest borderlands was not to fill units of labor. Rather it was a kin-based system for prestigious social units.

Most slaves were the result of tribal warfare. Other slaves were attained by violent raids between the Spanish and Indian tribes. There were even “Indian slave-soldiers” whose job was to seize slaves. Other times Indians willingly sold their children in hopes that they would have a better life. A letter from the Utah Superintendency said that the Utah Indians

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4 Brooks, Captives and Cousins, 15, 49; Blackhawk, 23-26; Bailey, xiii-xiv, 24, 27; Jones, “‘Redeeming’ the Indian,” 222.
5 Blackhawk, 47.
6 Brooks, Captives and Cousins, 71.
7 Ibid, 71-72, 79.
9 Brooks, Captives and Cousins, 34.
11 Brooks, Captives and Cousins, 51; Jones, The Trial of Don Pedro Leon Lujan, 31-33.
12 Brooks, Captives and Cousins, 53.
13 Jones, “‘Redeeming’ the Indian,” 224. Jones says this was particularly true of Paiutes and Goshutes.
engaged in the slave trade to sustain life.\(^{14}\)

Like horses, captive slaves were an important component of status in the southwest. Brooks says, “Accumulation of wealth in horses, wives, kin, and captive slaves served to enhance family honor and solidify its economic status.”\(^{15}\) The slave system symbolized social wealth.\(^{16}\) Power was also attained through trading captives for European commodities such as guns, ammunition, and livestock.\(^{17}\) Such trade relations became the lifeline of Spanish/Indian relations, changing the Indian economy.\(^{18}\) The most valuable captives throughout the Southwest, including Utah, were women and children; the exchange of women through systems of adoption, captivity, and marriage provided natives and Europeans with widely understood symbols of power in order to penetrate cultural barriers.\(^{19}\)

Just like other tribes of the southwest, the Utes had engaged in the slave economy long before the European arrival.\(^{20}\) During the 1700s, Utes both raided for captives and were raided themselves for slaves.\(^{21}\) The formation of the slave trade in the northern borderlands was different than in other locations in New Mexico. The Utes did not “develop the social relations of production in conjunction with external markets in the same manner as their pastoral or plains

\(^{14}\) Utah Superintendency to Secretary of Interior, March 9, 1852, Bureau of Indian Affairs, *Letters Received by the Officer of Indian Affairs*, reel 897, Marriott Library, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, (afterwards BIA).

\(^{15}\) Brooks, *Captives and Cousins*, 16.

\(^{16}\) Ibid, 31

\(^{17}\) Bailey, xv.

\(^{18}\) Blackhawk, 28

\(^{19}\) Brooks, *Captives and Cousins*, 40; Jones, *Trial of Don Pedro Leon Lujan*, 3. Most the captives were women and children. Women were considered easier to assimilate. See Blackhawk, 46, 57.

\(^{20}\) Brooks, *Captives and Cousins*, 33; Blackhawk, 7.

\(^{21}\) Blackhawk, 45-46.
cousins did.” They also did not elaborate internal social inequality to the same degree as others.\textsuperscript{22} Furthermore, the Great Basin slave trade was not as institutionalized as it was in New Mexico.\textsuperscript{23} Nevertheless slavery became woven throughout the fabric of everyday life throughout the west, including the Great Basin.\textsuperscript{24}

Trade relations began between the Northern Utes and New Mexicans in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Captive slaves were part of these trade networks.\textsuperscript{25} During the last half-century of Spanish rule in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries the slave trade increased among the natives of the Great Basin.\textsuperscript{26} The slave trade continued to expand during the Mexican period of the 1820s.\textsuperscript{27} The expansive horse and livestock raids by the Utes of Utah facilitated taking captives in the early nineteenth century and the slave trade made the Utes well-armed.\textsuperscript{28} The first documented slave trading between the Utes around Utah Lake and the New Mexicans was in 1813 when Mauricio Arze and Lagos Garcia led a trading expedition to the Utah Lake area and returned to New Mexico with slave captives.\textsuperscript{29}

The Great Basin Utes of Utah dominated the non-equestrian Paiutes and Shoshones bringing them into Spanish colonialism by raiding them for captive slaves.\textsuperscript{30} Blackhawk writes,

\textsuperscript{22} Brooks, Captives and Cousins, 149.
\textsuperscript{23} Blackhawk, 143.
\textsuperscript{24} Ibid, 7.
\textsuperscript{25} Brooks, Captives and Cousins, 116-117; Blackhawk, 89.
\textsuperscript{26} Blackhawk, 89, 136, 137.
\textsuperscript{27} Ibid, 133.
\textsuperscript{28} Bailey, 141, 143. Also see Van Hoak, “Who Shall Have the Children?” 4.
\textsuperscript{29} Van Hoak, “And Who Shall Have the Children?” 4. Jose Velásquez specifically identified the Timpanogots as participating in this slave trade expedition. See Blackhawk, 108. Blackhawk gives the date of 1812 for this event.
\textsuperscript{30} Blackhawk, 89, 136, 137.
“Great Basin Indian captives became central to the creation and endurance of the New Mexican—Ute borderlands”; the slave trade was the primary focus of Ute-New Mexican relations for both trade and diplomacy.\textsuperscript{31} Slaves were exchanged for Spanish goods at places such as New Mexican trade fairs.\textsuperscript{32} The Timpanogots, in particular, needed Spanish horses, goods, and weapons. To trade for such goods, the band needed slaves. The slave trade generated tremendous profits.\textsuperscript{33} The Ute raiders took mostly women and children for trade and sometimes for incorporation as well; generally the Ute raiders killed the men.\textsuperscript{34} The trade was not only beneficial to the Utes and New Mexicans, but the weaker band of Paiutes would actually willingly trade their children in exchange for needed food during times of famine and even raided each other to barter children.\textsuperscript{35}

The treatment of slaves that were purchased and placed in Hispanic homes was generally good, but Indian slavery could be intensely brutal.\textsuperscript{36} Blackhawk writes, “The horrors of enslavement included punishments and abuses of all kinds, and the Utes were no more or less violent than other slave powers struggling to survive the maelstrom colonialism.” Such abuses included whippings, burns from heated arrow points, and outright killings.\textsuperscript{37} The age-and gender-based nature of the slave trade naturally led to rape among slaves as well.\textsuperscript{38} Many slaves

\textsuperscript{31} Ibid, 57, 70-71.
\textsuperscript{32} Ibid, 71-72, 89.
\textsuperscript{33} Bailey, 145-146. The weaker Paiutes’ only defense was simply to hide from slave traders. See Van Hoak, “Who Shall Have the Children?” 7.
\textsuperscript{34} Blackhawk, 111.
\textsuperscript{35} Van Hoak, “Who Shall Have the Children?” 7, 14.
\textsuperscript{36} Jones, “‘Redeeming’ the Indian,” 223.
\textsuperscript{37} Blackhawk, 75-76.
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid, 77-79. Also see Jones, “‘Redeeming’ the Indian,” 222-223.
were starved to the point of death. 39 One Paiute woman refused to sell her baby and threw the infant into the river rather than see her child sold into slavery. 40 In the Great Basin, the violence against the Paiutes and Shoshones was severe enough that they were displaced from their homelands; these tribes actually welcomed the settlement of whites as a reprieve from slavery. 41 The Utes used brutal violence to convince Mormons to purchase slaves.

The height of the Great Basin slave trade for Utah’s Utes was in the early 1850s. 42 Trapper Dick Whooten, who was in Utah in 1837 and 1838, said that it was not “uncommon” to see parties of Mexicans buying Indian slaves in the Great Basin. 43 Daniel Jones said that when the Mexicans came to do business with the Indians, slave children were the main commodities being sold. 44

In Utah, Wakara was “lord of the Mexican-Indian slave traffic.” 45 Traveler William Lorton and Daniel Jones both recount Wakara’s activities in trading Indian children to Mexicans. Jones reported that Wakara’s band raided the weaker bands to obtain slaves. Most of Wakara’s trafficking centered on the Great Basin Indians and he often kept women captives as wives. 46

39 Jones, “‘Redeeming’ the Indian,” 223.

40 Blackhawk, 143.

41 Ibid, 148. For more about torture of slaves, see Conway B. Sonne, World of Wakara (San Antonio: The Naylor Company, 1962), 142. In the South, as in the West, men were generally killed in war and women and children were enslaved. To guard against escape, the captors would cut their feet or tendons. See Jones, Trial of Don Pedro Leon Lujan, 20.

42 Van Hoak, “And Who Shall Have the Children?” 4. Lynn Bailey placed the height of the Great Basin slave trade from 1830 to the mid-1840s. See Bailey, 149.


44 Dan Jones, Forty Years Among the Indians: A True Yet Thrilling Narrative of the Author’s Experiences Among the Natives, (Salt Lake City: Juvenile Instructor Office, 1890), 47.

45 Bailey, 150-151. Also see Blackhawk, 140.

46 Blackhawk, 140-141. Also see Jones, Forty Years Among the Indians, 50.
Like other traders, Wakara was also known for committing brutality on his slaves. Stephen Van Hoak assessed, “By modern standards, Waccara and his band were frequently extremely brutal in their treatment of captives, torturing, or even killing the uncooperative, either directly or through extreme neglect and starvation,” but such treatment was normal for Western Ute culture. For the Paiutes, no one was more feared than Wakara.47

Wakara and the Utes had come to depend economically on the slave trade. As historian John Peterson observes, “Wakara’s wealth and power, as well as that of his relatives and the Northern Ute conglomerate in general, was to a large extent based on this [slave] trade.”48 Dan Jones reported that the slave trade was a “very lucrative business” when the Mormons arrived among the Utes.49 The slave trade increased Wakara’s wealth with each passing year.50 The Paiute captives were exceptionally profitable to Utes, New Mexicans, and American slavers.51 As mentioned earlier, Wakara was an opportunist and saw the Americans and Mormons as potential economic partners to increase his own wealth and power. Such economic partnerships included dealing in the slave trade.52

At first the Mormons refused to get involved in the Ute slave trade. The Utes used brutal

49 Jones, Forty Years Among the Indians, 50. Jones says the price Wakara and the Utes charged the New Mexicans for captives was $100 for boys and $150 to $200 for girls. For Jones’ description of the slave trade, see “Brigham Young Opposes Indian Slavery,” Utah Historical Quarterly 2, no. 3 (1929): 81-82. Concerning slave prices, also see Bailey, 146.
50 Sonne, 141.
51 Blackhawk, 142.
52 Ibid, 145.
methods, however, to convince the Mormons to buy the Indian slaves. On some occasions, if a Mormon refused to buy a slave, the Utes would kill the slave in front of them. Wakara’s brother Arapene told some Mormons if they did not buy two children they would be shot at sunset. The Mormons purchased one little girl, but the other was shot as promised. The Mormons were also persuaded to buy three Paiute children in Parowan when in the presence of Wakara himself; the Utes tied the three children to sagebrush “to grub about the ground for edible seeds and grass.” Baptiste killed one captive convincing Charles Decker, Brigham Young’s son-in-law, to buy the other child, who was raised in Young’s home. On another occasion involving Arapene, a slave child was thrown on the ground, dashing “her brains out,” when the Mormons refused to purchase the slave. According to Juanita Brooks, part of the Mormon “tact” in dealing with the Native Americans was to adopt the Indian children when provoked. She also surmised it was necessary for the Mormons in Parowan to buy captives because Parowan was far from Salt Lake City; the small, three-month-old settlement could not afford trouble with the natives.

The Mormons began to buy the slaves and rear them in Mormon homes, although they had no legal grounds to do so before 1852. Sondra Jones classifies the Mormons as “unwilling

53 Bailey, 156. Also see Stephen Van Hoak, “Who Shall Have the Children?” 13.


57 Brooks, “Indian Relations,” 5-6.

participants in the well-established slave trade.” The two main reasons Mormons purchased slaves in Utah were to redeem them, acquire additional family members, and have servants. Other reasons were to save them from torture and death and to provide children when a couple was childless. Stephen Van Hoak believes the motivation behind Mormon adoption was both due to compassion and to Mormon doctrine regarding redeeming the Indians. What seems clear is that the reasons behind Mormon involvement in the slave trade were highly complex. While some might have bought slaves for the purpose of being servants, the more likely reasons were based on theological reasons to redeem them as well as a legitimate desire to save them from harsh treatment.

Although Young was opposed to the Indian slave trade and condemned Wakara and the practice, Young advised the Mormon settlers to purchase the children to educate them and to teach them the gospel that they might become a white and delightful people. Furthermore, Young believed that by nurturing the Indian children in the gospel a righteous and redeemed generation would be raised. Young believed the Mormons were purchasing the slaves’ freedom rather than trafficking in slaves. Young said, “[I]t is not the low, servile drudgery of

59 Jones, “‘Redeeming’ the Indian,” 227-228.

60 Ibid, 233. Jones says on a few occasions some Mormons did purchase slaves for the purpose of transporting them to other locations for trade. This particular article by Jones identifies several differences between the slave trade in Utah and New Mexico.

61 Cannon, 343-345.


63 Brooks, “Indian Relations,” 6-7. For Young’s specific condemnation of Wakara and the slave trade, see Jones, Trial of Don Pedro Leon Lujan, 50.

64 Jones, “‘Redeeming’ the Indian,” 228. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Mormons took Ute women and children to Salt Lake City after the battle at Fort Utah in 1850. The Bureau of Indian Affairs actually planned to investigate the circumstances believing that the Mormons were engaged in slave trafficking. Nothing really came of the investigation. See Edward Cooper to Commissioner of Indians Affairs, Luke Lea, July 10, 1851, BIA. The date of this letter is smudged and difficult to read. It could possibly be January 10 rather than July.
Mexican slavery, to which I would doom them, not to be raised among beings scarcely superior to themselves, but where they could find that consideration pertaining not only to civilized, but humane and benevolent society." Another reason Young may have approved the purchasing of children was that he coveted the friendship of the powerful and influential Wakara; Wakara was even given a certified traveling paper that said he was a friend of the Mormons and indicated his desire to trade horses, buckskins, and Paiute children.

Sondra Jones believes that the Mormons were sincerely concerned about rescuing the Indian children from their captors. She does believe, however, the idea that slaves were being purchased out of captivity was pure fiction. The Indian servants were sometimes abused and were often not sent to school despite an education requirement. On the other hand, a letter from Utah’s Superintendency insisted the Indian children purchased by Mormons fared as well as their own children. According to the research of Brian Cannon, many Mormon families did treat the Indian children as their own. Others treated Indian children as servants. Furthermore there was sometimes rivalry between white and Indian siblings. Stephen Van Hoak also believes Mormon treatment of captives was relatively good and that Mormon treatment of slaves

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65 Brooks, “Indian Relations,” 7. Also see Cannon, 342.


67 Jones, “‘Redeeming’ the Indian,” 225, 229. The idea of saving or redeeming Indians by purchasing captives did not originate with Young. This was also the practice in New Mexico among Catholics. See Jones, “‘Redeeming’ the Indian,” 238-239.


69 Utah Superintendency to Secretary of Interior, March 9, 1852, BIA.

70 Cannon, 347-351.
was in fact better than it was in New Mexico. Therefore there is difference of opinion among scholars of Mormon slave trade practices concerning their treatment of Indian captives. What these opinions demonstrate is that there was diverse treatment among the slaves Mormons bought.

Mormon leaders began to view the Ute and New Mexican slave trade as ultimately cruel, particularly the raiding of Paiute children and their enslavement in New Mexico. They were also concerned about the Ute and New Mexican trade of guns and ammunition from New Mexico for slaves. Mormon leaders feared that armed New Mexicans or Utes could have potentially challenged their sovereignty. Mormons began the march to ending the Ute and New Mexican slave trade. In late 1852, after Spanish trader Don Pedro León Luján and his Spanish trading party were seen in southern Utah, Young ordered sub-Indian agent Stephen B. Rose to end the practice of trading slaves.

The slave trade was not formally illegal in the Utah territory until after the capture and trial of Don Pedro León Luján; Luján had been slave trading with Utah Utes for years. Luján and seven others in his band were arrested for trading without the proper license in December of

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71 Van Hoak, “Who Shall Have the Children?” 16. Van Hoak also says that many children adopted by Mormons went back to the tribe when they got older, not being able to find a mate among the Mormons.

72 Ibid, 17; also see Van Hoak, “Waccara’s Utes,” 321-322.

73 Journal History of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Saints (LDS Journal History scrap book consists of typed entries and Newspaper clippings from 1830 to the present), December 13, 1851, Church History Library of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Salt Lake City (afterwards LDS Archives). The Journal History contains many newspaper clippings from the Deseret News. Occasionally the author will cite the Journal History and the Deseret News when they contain the identical source.

74 Andrew Siler quoted Arapene as stating that Luján had been trading slaves with him for years. See Andrew Siler to George A. Smith, December 18, 1851, George A. Smith Papers, 1834-1875, folder 14, box 4, MS 1322, LDS Archives, (afterward GAS). Also see Siler’s letter to Smith of December 28, 1851, GAS. The party of Mexicans led by Luján was first reported in the territory while Young was in Manti. See Journal History, Nov. 3, 1851. For a personal account about their arrest, see George Washington Bean, “Autobiography, 1897; Book IV, George W. Bean History,” MS 2142, LDS Archives
After a four-day trial, the men were convicted. In January 1852, the Utah legislature formally outlawed the Indian slave trade while at the same time allowing Mormons to buy Indian slaves as indentured servants for a period not longer than 20 years. Brigham Young said, “[U]nder the present low and degraded situation of the Indian race, so long as the practice of gambling away, selling, and otherwise disposing of their children; as also sacrificing prisoners obtains among them, it seems indeed that any transfer would be to them a relief and a benefit.” He also said that many children had been saved from savage barbarity by being purchased into freedom instead of slavery. Although Young praised Mormons purchasing Indian children, he forcefully condemned anyone else trafficking in slaves. Young declared, “This trade I have endeavored to prevent: and this fall, happening to encounter a few of them in my travels, as Superintendent of Indian affairs, strictly prohibit their further traffic.” Young went on to say, “[N]o property can or should be recognized as existing slaves, either Indian or African.”

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75 Jones, Trial of Don Pedro Leon Lujan, 3, 64-69. Sondra Jones details the confusion concerning the legality of the license Luján obtained from New Mexico and she goes into depth about the trial.

76 Ibid, 3-4. For a first-hand account concerning the arrest and trial of Leon, see Jones, Forty Years Among the Indians, 51-52. Also see Journal History, February 10, 1852 and “First Judicial Court,” Deseret News, March 6, 1852.

77 Jones, Trial of Don Pedro Leon Lujan, 82. These laws were passed January 31, 1852 and approved March 7, 1852. See Jones, Trial of Don Pedro Leon Lujan, 156 note 43. Concerning the outlawing of the slave trade, also see Bailey, 157-162; Jones, “‘Redeeming’ the Indian,” 226-229; Snow, 71-72; Orson F. Whitney, History of Utah (Salt Lake City: George Q. Cannon and Sons, 1892), 1:508-511; “Legal Prosecution of Slave Traders,” Utah Historical Quarterly 2, no. 3, (1929): 83; “Utah Laws Against Indian Slavery,” Utah Historical Quarterly 2, no. 3, (1929): 84-86; Brooks, “Indian Relations,” 8; Walker, “Wakara Meets the Mormons,” 234.

78 Journal History, January 5, 1852 and “Governor’s Message,” Deseret News, January 10, 1852. Another law passed prohibited Indian traders or just traders from annoying the citizenry, Journal History, March 3, 1852; also see Journal History, March 7, 1852.

79 Journal History, January 5, 1852 and “Governor’s Message,” Deseret News, January 10, 1852. Despite this statement about African slavery, in 1852 the Utah legislature legalized black slavery. See Jones, Trial of Don Pedro Leon Lujan, 61, 81; D. Michael Quinn, Mormon Hierarchy: Extensions of Power (Salt Lake City: Signature Books, 1997), 272, 275, 286-287. Both Stephen Van Hoak and Leonard Arrington demonstrate that Young’s view on African slavery was varied and at times contradictory. On the one hand Young stated that blacks should not be treated as property but that the black race was cursed and destined to be a servant. See Van Hoak, “Who Shall Have the Children?” 14; Leonard Arrington, Brigham Young: American Moses (Urbana & Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1986), 240.
law was directed at Mexican traders with the goal of halting Indian conflicts perpetuated by the raiding of slaves. After the law was passed the Mormons bought up as many Indian children as they could and this was one of the duties assigned to the missionaries that were later called on missions to the Utah tribes.

The preceding discussion of the Ute slave trade shows how entrenched the practice was and how profitable it was for Wakara and the Utes. The Mormon prohibition against the slave trade was a major blow to the Utes’ economy and particularly to Wakara’s power. Wakara depended on bartering captive children to New Mexicans or Navajos for horses, guns, and ammunition. Stephen Van Hoak says, “By the 1840s, Waccara and his band were a major military, political, and economic factor in the Great Basin, partially as a result of their success at the slave trade.” With Mormon settlement Wakara’s lands became depleted of game and cleared for Mormon occupation. Mormons also inhibited Wakara’s trade for ammunition and guns with non-Mormon traders. These issues led Wakara’s band to depend on the slave trade for wealth. Some slave traffic did continue through 1852 on a small scale, but for the most part, Mexican traders began to gather their slaves from Navajo sources. The expulsion of Mexican traders led to bitter resentment among Indian traders. Furthermore the Mormons grew unwilling to trade arms and ammunition for children. Dan Jones confirmed that outlawing the trade

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80 Jones, “‘Redeeming’ the Indian,” 234-235. The conflict Jones was referring to was intertribal, involving the Utes, Shoshones, Paiutes, and Goshutes.

81 Brooks, “Indian Relations,” 9. For further description of the many Indian children bought before and after the law was passed along with the dynamics associated with purchasing slaves, see Brooks, “Indian Relations,” 34-48.


83 Ibid, 13.

84 Jones, “‘Redeeming’ the Indian,” 237.
“soured” Wakara and his band. The above-mentioned story of Arapene murdering the infant by smashing it on the ground to persuade the Mormons to purchase captives occurred after the anti-slavery laws were passed. Doubtless Wakara and his band were angry. The powerful Ute chief’s pride, power, and economic status had taken a hit. How would Wakara react?

According to the model of Elliot West, conflict between whites and Indians occurred when two different visions of how to use the land collided. This model can certainly be applied to previous conflicts motivated by the killing of game and Mormon cultivation of Indian lands. Although the issue of Indian slavery does not concern the use of land, the model is still applicable in that the visions of the Mormons and Wakara’s band had come into conflict due to different visions. Surely Wakara expected the trade of captive slaves to continue, with the Mormons as a trade partner in the business rather than a hindrance. Part of Blackhawk’s model concerning Utah’s Utes is even more relevant. Blackhawk said the Utes “escalated their use of violence in response to settler and emigrant disruptions.” The anti-slavery laws passed against Mexican traders surely disrupted the life of Wakara and the Utes. It is natural to assume that a backlash at the prohibition of the slave trade would occur. Although both West’s and Blackhawk’s models can be applied to other aspects of Mormon and Indian relations, neither model entirely applies in relation to the outlawing of the slave trade. The Utes did not initially react violently after the passage of the slave laws, and the Walker War was sparked by more than just the slave trade.

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85 Jones, Forty Years Among the Indians, 53.


87 Blackhawk, 10.
Most all historians who have written about the Walker War have addressed the war’s relation to the curtailing of the Ute slave trade. Some authors have exaggerated its relation with the war and have not sufficiently described the other factors. Sondra Jones wrote, “[T]he Utah laws on Indian and Mexican trade placed a stranglehold on an old and profitable way of life for the Utes. Their hostility erupted in July 1853 into what has been called the ‘Walker War.’”\(^{88}\) Carlton Culmsee argued that the prohibition of Indian slavery caused the war.\(^{89}\) Ned Blackhawk as well argued that Wakara increased raids in 1853 due to Mormon efforts to end slave trading.\(^{90}\) Certainly Mormon efforts to stop slave traffic was a factor in causing tense relations between Mormons and Utes, but there were many more logs on this blazing fire than simply the slave trade.

Other scholars have been more cautious in identifying the slave trade as the central cause of the Walker War. Howard Christy does not say the laws against Indian slavery in 1852 caused the war, but rather that it was the renewed efforts of 1853 to stifle the trade that “precipitated” the war.\(^{91}\) David Bigler also says the disruption of slave traffic “precipitated” the Walker War.\(^{92}\) This view is much more accurate than the others stated above, but it still has some problems. The fight against slave trading in 1853 was likely a necessary component leading to the war in that it created suspicion and hostility between Mormons and Indians as well as inhibiting the power of Wakara’s band, but it was not sufficient to start the war.

\(^{88}\) Jones, *Trial of Don Pedro Leon Lujan*, 106. Also see Jones, “‘Redeeming’ the Indian,” 238.


\(^{90}\) Blackhawk, 241.

\(^{91}\) Howard Christy, “The Walker War: Defense and Conciliation as Strategy,” *Utah Historical Quarterly* 47, no. 4 (Fall 1979): 396. These renewed efforts to stop the trade in 1853 will be discussed later.

\(^{92}\) David Bigler, *Forgotten Kingdom: The Mormon Theocracy in the American West*. (Logan: Utah State University Press, 1998), 73-74. Bigler does however say that the main problem between Mormons and Indians was not the slave trade but rather Mormons’ southward colonization, 66.
Other writers have more accurately spoken of the Mormon stance against Indian slave trading as simply a factor in setting the stage for the outbreak of the war. Although these writers are correct, they are simply generalizing the cause of the war briefly because their books are not specifically about the Walker War; they give no detail of the events during the months that led up to war.

Bartley Heiner has written the most complex and accurate account concerning the cause of the war. Heiner categorized four key issues that led to the war: diminishing game on a receding hunting ground, the Indian doctrine of retaliation, minor grievances, and traffic in Indian slavery. The reduction in game did play a role, but the evidence Heiner uses involved events a couple of years prior to the war. Heiner misses some of the more immediate issues of game leading up to the war. Heiner’s reference to “minor grievances” as a cause basically centers on past issues, such as the fact that Old Bishop’s murder had never been properly avenged and that Old Elk was barred from Fort Utah when he had the measles. Although these links are plausible as motives for the war, they cannot be demonstrated. Furthermore, as noted in the previous chapter, Wakara had declared himself still loyal to the Mormons after the battle of Fort Utah. Heiner also mentions Wakara’s frustration with the Mormons for not assisting him in hunting down the Shoshones. Again, this is an excellent possibility but not one easily demonstrated. Heiner gives a decent review of the slave trade and correctly mentions it as only

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95 Heiner details these issues in chapter 2 of his thesis.
one of several factors. The doctrine of retaliation as mentioned by Heiner is accurate. Heiner is more sufficient than other authors in that the cause of the Walker War was very complex and based on more than one factor. Despite Heiner’s strong points he misses many of the more immediate factors that led to the war in months just before the violent outbreak. Most importantly, Heiner never mentions the all-too-familiar issue of land encroachments. Furthermore, as mentioned in the introduction, Wakara himself remained committed to peace with his Mormon neighbors. The reader will see the many issues that can be considered necessary events that led to the war.

1851 and 1852 Tension

In June of 1851 during the Tooele expedition, Chiefs Wakara, Sowiet, Uhhquitch, and Arapene were ordained Elders in the Mormon Church. Despite these public displays of friendship with Wakara and other Ute chiefs, relations between many Utes and the Mormons began to decline soon after the conflict in Tooele of 1851, even before the laws against the slave trade. Pursuing the new plan of reconciliation in June of 1851 Daniel H. Wells ordered Peter Conover to ask Wakara if he wanted the saints to leave Indian lands, and if so, how far away he desired the Mormons to migrate. If Wakara desired the Mormons to leave, then Wells was willing to discuss it. Wells wanted to know if Wakara desired to fight and if the other Ute leaders felt the same. If the other Ute chiefs desired peace in opposition to Wakara, Wells told Conover to recommend that the chiefs leave Wakara. Wells said if Wakara committed depredations against the southern settlements, then he would face a tragic fate. Wells also emphasized he did not wish a quarrel with Wakara, but the Ute chief needed to behave and

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96 Journal History, June 9, 1851.
persuade his men to do likewise. Conover reported back to Wells that Wakara did not want the Mormons to leave but rather to raise grain and be friends. Wakara told Conover that some of the Utes of the area were “mean” and that he had no control over them.

The tone of Wells’s letter is telling in that there was suspicion of Wakara’s involvement in the Tooele depredations. Although Wakara once again expressed his desire for good relations with the Mormons, he may have been angrier than he admitted to the Mormons. Letters between the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Luke Lea, and his agents tell a different story concerning the feelings of Wakara and the Indians of Utah in general.

When the Federal Government admitted Utah as a territory in September of 1850, Brigham Young was appointed as both Governor and Superintendent of Indian Affairs. In the summer of 1851, one Indian Agent, Jacob Holeman, and two Sub-agents, Henry R. Day and Stephen B. Rose, were appointed to oversee Utah’s Indian relations. Holeman and Day were non-Mormon whereas Rose was a Mormon. Young divided the Utah Territory into three different agencies. The first was the Parvan Agency covering west of the Shoshone nation and north of the south line of the Parvan Valley. The second was the Uinta Agency, which included the Shoshones north of Uinta and east of the Great Salt Lake. This agency included the Yampa and Uintah Utes south of Utah Valley. The third was the Parowan Agency, which included the country lying west of the eastern rim of the Great Basin and south of the southern line of the Parvan Valley to the western bounds of the Territory. This agency would have been made up mainly of Paiutes. Day was assigned to the Parvan Valley and Rose to the Uinta Agency.

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98 Peter W. Conover to Daniel H Wells, July 2, 1851, reel 4, UTMC.

99 Proclamation of Brigham Young, Utah Governor and Ex-Officio Indian Agent, Establishing Three Indian Agencies in Utah Territory, July 21, 1851, BIA. Also see “Proclamation,” Deseret News, July 26, 1851.
Parvan agency is the most important for this study. It covered the Sevier Valley and the Tooele area. It also covered the Goshutes and Wanship’s bands near Weber. Most importantly it covered the relevant southern settlements where many of the problems existed between Mormons and Indians. The Parvan Agency encompassed Utah Valley where the Timpanogots were, then south to the Sanpete Valley where the Sanpits lived, and then even further south to the Piede band. Young specifically told Henry Day about the “Cheverets” band, also known as “Walker’s band,” which were mobile and not confined to one place. In addition Young explained that all other tribes appeared to show some deference towards Wakara and his band. These Indian Agents’ reports provide a glimpse into the concerns of the Native Americans of Utah.

Holeman arrived in Utah in August of 1851. Over the next several months he and Day expressed suspicion and disdain for Brigham Young and the Mormons. They did not believe the Mormons were loyal to the United States government. They accused the Mormons of inciting the Indians against the United States and of systematically removing the Indians from their lands. Historian Thomas Alexander says that the two accusations are both “partly true.” The Utes of Sanpete and the Shoshone did in fact lose their lands due to Mormon settlement, but the Mormons had only taken a part of Paiute lands; Mormons actually secured an alliance with them.

Concerning the detailed descriptions given of the Uinta Agency, see Brigham Young to Stephen B. Rose, July 21, 1851, BIA. See also Journal History, July 19, 1851 and July 21, 1851.

100 Brigham Young to Henry Day, July 21, 1851, BIA.

to guard against Ute raiders. Of course this thesis is concerned with the Utes, especially those residing around Sanpete that would have included many members of Wakara’s band. In one of Holeman’s first letters after arriving in the territory he stated that what the natives were most angry about was that the Mormons were not happy with just settling Salt Lake Valley; they were settling all the best lands in the territory. Furthermore they were angry that the Mormons were killing their game and sometimes the Indians themselves. This is what Holeman believed was inciting the Native Americans to anger against any American passing through the territory.

Holeman expanded on this grim outlook a couple of months later, adding that they had not been compensated for the loss of their lands and in many instances had been reduced to a “state of suffering, bordering on starvation.” He reiterated that the Indians were becoming excited over the continued encroachments of the Mormons. He said that the Mormons conciliated the natives at first but that once the Mormons got a foothold on Indian lands, they began to “force their way --the consequence was a war with the Indians, and in many instances a most brutal butchery -- this, they fear will be the result wherever the Mormons may make a settlement.” Holeman believed the Utah Indians needed protection from the government. In that same letter, Holeman accused Young of misusing Government money allotted to him as Utah’s superintendent to buy presents for the Indians to gain permission for more settlements. Later, Holeman stated that Young bought presents for the Indians in order to settle a part of the country where reportedly the natives had objected to any further encroachments. Holeman believed that Young was using his position as Utah’s Superintendent to further the interests of

102 Alexander, 121. For more concerning the tension and conflict between Brigham Young and Jacob Holeman, see Brooks, “Indian Relations,” 15.

103 Jacob Holeman to Luke Lea, September 21, 1851, LNIA.

104 Jacob Holeman to Luke Lea, Nov. 28, 1851, BIA.
his Church by using government funds and then defying the government and the Indians. Holeman’s complaint that Young was purchasing presents to further his settlements actually contradicts his earlier claim that the Mormons did not compensate the Indians in taking their lands; furthermore, the Indians agents themselves such as Holeman gave gifts freely to the Indians. Despite that and the possibility of exaggeration, there is little doubt the natives were angry about Mormon encroachments. They had faced what Holeman called a “most brutal butchery” at the battle of Provo when their relatives suffered severed heads and were gunned down while trying to cross Utah Lake. Although Holeman usually speaks of the Indians in general terms, his comment about the most brutal butchery and statements about wars make it clear he is referring to the Utes of Utah Lake, or Timpanogots. In another letter Holeman specifically identified the Uintahs as being angry at Mormon encroachments. So angry were the Uintahs, according to Holeman, that he believed a war would break out if plans went forward to make another settlement the Mormons were contemplating on Uintah lands. Holeman said Sowiet, chief of the Ute confederacy and of a band in the Uinta Basin, asked for no more settlements, especially by the Mormons. Furthermore, the natives were angry that the Mormons were building a ferry and bridge across the Green River in the summer of 1852. The project was abandoned due to protestations. According to Holeman, an Indian War would surely

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105 Jacob Holeman to Luke Lea, Dec. 28, 1851, LNIA. In many letters, including this Dec. 28 letter from Holeman and Henry Day, they complain about Young’s and the Mormons’ contempt towards the Government and Gentiles (Gentiles is what Mormons called non-Mormons). Both also claim several times that Young exhibited absolute control over the territory and that his followers obeyed without question. Furthermore, they believed that the Government could do little under Utah’s Superintendency as long as Young was in control. Holeman said that Young and sub-agent Rose were secretive and kept things from him. See, for example, Jacob Holeman to Luke Lea, Feb. 22, 1852, LNIA; Henry Day to Luke Lea, Jan. 9, 1852, BIA; Henry Day to Luke Lea, June 2, 1852, BIA; Jacob Holeman to Luke Lea, March 29, 1852, LNIA; Jacob Holeman to Luke Lea, April 29, 1852, BIA; Jacob Holeman to Luke Lea, May 8, 1852, LNIA.


107 Jacob Holeman to Luke Lea, April 29, 1852, BIA.
occur if the project were continued at any point.\textsuperscript{108}

Henry Day wrote similarly concerning his contact with the Indians in the Parvan Agency. He said the Indians, Chief Sowiet in particular, complained that the Mormons had taken their “stocks,” made use of their soil and the little timber they had, and had driven them off their land and continued to drive them a little further each year. They said the Mormons had not treated them well from the time they came into the valley. Day said that they all desired to cultivate the soil, “provided the Mormons would not drive them off their lands.” Day quoted Chief Sowiet as saying, “American_good!  Mormon_no good!  American_friend_Mormon_Kill...If their Great Father [American Government] was so powerful then he would not permit the Mormons to drive them out of the Vallie into the Mountains where they must Farm.”\textsuperscript{109} Although the tone of Day’s and Holeman’s letters demonstrates a possible prejudice towards Young and the Mormons, there is little reason to doubt Native American attitudes were at least similar to their descriptions due to the continued expansion of Mormon settlements. The attitude of Sowiet is the most telling due to his position as the chief of the Ute confederacy. He was the only chief able to contain Chief Wakara from waging war against the Mormons at least twice. Now even Sowiet expressed anger and alluded to a desire to kill the Mormons over their land encroachments. In fact, Day also met with Wakara who expressed distrust of the Mormons in regards to a proposed treaty with the government and other tribes.\textsuperscript{110} Yet despite the expressed anger, neither Wakara nor Sowiet waged war at the time. It does, however, demonstrate the Native Americans were becoming impatient with Mormon settlement.

\textsuperscript{108} Jacob Holeman to Luke Lea, Nov. 3, 1852, LNIA; Jacob Holeman to Luke Lea, March 5, 1853, LNIA. The building of this bridge was authorized by the Utah Legislature but vetoed by Governor Young in January of 1853. Journal History, January 6, 1853; January 8, 1853; January 11, 1853; January 17, 1853.

\textsuperscript{109} Henry Day to Luke Lea, January 2, 1852, BIA.

\textsuperscript{110} Henry Day to Luke Lea, January 2, 1852, BIA.
Soon after his arrival, Holeman attended negotiations with subagent Rose held at Ft. Laramie in September 1851 between many different tribes and government officials.\footnote{Journal History, August 12, 1851. Young sent James Ferguson as well. See Journal History, Sept. 30, 1851.}

Unfortunately, the Utah tribes were not included in the negotiations. The Ute bands of Utah did not even attend. Only Chief Grosepene showed up in Salt Lake on the appointed day to travel to Ft. Laramie. The other major chiefs such as Sowiet, Wakara, and Wanship, had sent representatives. As a result of this Young ordered Henry Day to not go but to give them presents.\footnote{Henry Day to Luke Lea, January 2, 1851, BIA. Also see Brigham Young to Luke Lea, Oct. 20, 1851, LNIA; Virginia McConnell Simmons, 
_The Ute Indians of Utah, Colorado, and New Mexico_ (Colorado: University of Colorado Press, 2000), 93. For letter that Day said Young ordered him to give presents to the chiefs who didn’t attend, see Henry Day to Luke Lea, June 2, 1852, BIA. Shoshones from Utah did attend but were not included in the treaty because the commissioner didn’t consider them to belong to the portion of the territory over which they were authorized to negotiate. See Brigham Young to Stephen B. Rose, Oct. 20, 1851, BIA; Jacob Holeman to Brigham Young, Nov. 10, 1851, LNIA.}

Day said:

> The reasons given me by Sow-e-ette, Walker and the other Chiefs why they did not come in and go down, was that they believed it to be a trap set by the Mormons to kill them. They seem to have but little confidence in anything the Mormon people say to them and decidedly stand in much fear of them and from all the Information I could gather not without good cause.\footnote{Henry Day to Luke Lea, January 2, 1852, BIA. Although both Day and Holeman spoke of how forceful the Mormons were with the natives, ironically Day concluded the Jan. 2 letter by saying a treaty needed to be made with these tribes and “then a Delegation sent to Washington, and through the State would add much to give them an Idea of the Power of the Government, and have a much greater tendency to Civilize the Indians than any other course that could be adopted. They have no conception of the population and power of the United States. Christian Missions other than Mormons would also do much to advance these Indians towards Civilization.”}

Wakara, Sowiet and other Ute chiefs did not trust the Mormons and even feared for their lives. Although Peter Conover claimed Wakara was still friendly to the Mormons after the Tooele tussle in the summer of 1851, according to Day and Holeman he was not. Perhaps Wakara did not dare express these negative and distrusting sentiments to the Mormons themselves. In fact, Wakara feasted with the Mormons of Iron County.\footnote{Journal History, November 5, 1851 and “General Items,” 
_Deseret News_, November 29, 1851.} As stated above,
Daniel H. Wells threatened Wakara that if he did not behave himself he would face a tragic fate. Therefore Wakara may have feared the Mormons and put on a façade when in their company. Still, Wakara did not resist Mormon settlement with violence. Most importantly, feelings of mistrust existed on both sides. By late 1851 and early 1852, Mormon relations with the Utes, including some of the most influential chiefs and powerful bands, had spiraled downward according to these Indian Agents.\(^{115}\) On the other hand, Wakara and other Ute chiefs could have been attempting to work each side against the other for their own gain by receiving gifts from both sides for their loyalty. Still, considering Mormon expansion it is likely the Utes were angry even if Holeman, Day, or the Utes themselves were exaggerating Native American anger towards the Mormons.

One thing is certain, the Mormons were pushing further south into Native American territory. Young said on October 23, 1851, “We are extending our settlements south as speedily as possible.” He announced that he was going south to locate the seat of government for Millard County in Fillmore. Furthermore he was announcing a new settlement near the Rio Virgin in the Pauvan Valley, the settlement at modern-day Nephi, and another close by on Pe-teet-neet Creek.\(^{116}\) At the conclusion of the trip south Young said farms had spread across the land as far as possible; surely these farms extended into Indian lands.\(^{117}\) In 1852 Young and John D. Lee

\(^{115}\) There were also other Indian issues facing the territory. In the northern part of the territory and in present-day Nevada a band called the Diggers was creating trouble for emigrants near the Mary’s Rivers. See Jacob Holeman to Brigham Young, April 19, 1852, LNIA; Brigham Young to Luke Lea, March 30, 1852, LNIA; Jacob Holeman to Luke Lea, May 8, 1852, LNIA.

\(^{116}\) Journal History, October 23, 1851; Oct. 24, 1851; “Sketch of Trip to Pauvan Valley,” Deseret News, December 13, 1851. Also see Journal History, Nov. 23, 1851; Nov. 29, 1851; “Presidents Visit South,” Deseret News, Nov. 29, 1851; Brigham Young to John D. Lee, November 22, 1851, Brigham Young Letterpress Copybook Transcriptions, 1974-1978, folder 3, box 1, MS 2736, LDS Archives, (afterwards, BYL).

toured the southern settlements and looked for yet further sites for settlement. Green River was a site Young hoped to settle, believing that thereby the Mormons would gain favorable influence among the natives. In the summer of 1852 Young wrote Bishop T. Lewis that this year’s emigrants would no doubt make additions to the southern settlement. By September 1852 Young wrote Utah’s Washington delegate, John Bernhisel, “The migration are fast pouring into the vallies, a great portion appear to be wending their way to the southern settlements.” The next month in the Church’s General Conference Mormon Apostle Orson Hyde encouraged settlers to go “southward” where there was more room for settlement. By the end of 1852, Fillmore was thriving but the residents desired more settlers so as to outnumber the Indians. The city of Nephi was reported as beginning to extend its borders. Between 1850 and 1852 new southern settlements were established including Lehi, American Fork, Santaquin, Allred’s Settlement (now Spring City), Clover Creek (now Mona), Salt Creek (modern-day Nephi), Fillmore, and other places in the Sanpete Valley. To all these places flowed new Mormon emigrants. All these lands would have been in range of Wakara’s equestrian band.

Young’s take on the expansion and situation with the natives was of course different than Day’s or Holeman’s. Young responded to some of the accusations Jacob Holeman made in his letter of September 21, 1851. Young denied that the Mormons were trying to establish


119 Journal History, August 30, 1852.

120 Brigham Young to Bishop T. Lewis, July 26, 1852, folder 2, box 1, BYL.

121 Journal History, September 30, 1852.

122 Journal History, October 7, 1852.


124 Bigler, 72.
settlements among the Shoshones or the Uintahs. He said that the settlement in Weber was on unclaimed land. Furthermore Young said they had not driven the Indians off their lands, and that the Shoshones and the Uintahs had at times invited them so that they could benefit from Mormon clothing and provisions. Young claimed that the only dissatisfaction he knew of from the natives was of the saints not making the settlements the Indians desired. Yet where the Mormons settled the Indians benefited. Young went on to make the case that the Mormons’ settlements benefited the country. Travelers were able to receive needed supplies in a “civilized society.” According to Young the Indians were better fed and clothed than they had been before. Furthermore the settlements would safeguard the mail from the natives travelling to San Diego. In 1852, Young wrote John Bernhisel that Holeman’s reports regarding Laramie were full of falsehoods. He also alleged Holeman wanted to injure the Mormons by prejudicing the United States Government against them.

There are a couple of possibilities that can explain the disparity between what Young said and what Holeman and Day said concerning the relation between the Mormons and the Native Americans. Young certainly could have been idealizing his relationship with the Indians. In fact, during Young’s trip south to reconnoiter new settlements some Sanpit Utes tried to steal his party’s horses near Chicken Creek in Juab County. They also refused to trade guns and

125 Brigham Young to Luke Lea, May 28, 1852, LNIA. Part of the provisions for the natives Young is referring to could be a house Young wanted built for Arapene. See Journal History, September 10, 1851. A letter from John D. Lee to George A. Smith in June of 1851 said that the Indians in a valley in southern Utah, likely around Iron County, desired a Mormon settlement. See John D. Lee to George A. Smith, June 8, 1851, folder 14, box 4, GAS.


127 Journal History, May 27, 1852; August 28, 1852.

128 Journal History, Oct. 25, 1851; Deseret News Nov. 29, 1851.
ammunition with some natives near Corn Creek.\textsuperscript{129} The party was nervous enough that they reported they were ready and cautious when going through “Indian country” near Parowan.\textsuperscript{130} Despite the parties concerns, they found some friendly Pahvants.\textsuperscript{131} As mentioned earlier, the natives themselves could have been giving mixed signals in an attempt to play the Mormons and the Federal government against each other. If the latter is the case, then Young really believed what he said concerning the positive view of his people’s relations with the natives. In fact, Chief Wakara sometimes gave mixed signals.

In March, Wakara was staying for a couple of days in Parowan. Four Piedes killed an ox and took the beef and ran. Several men pursued them and took them prisoner. When the four tried to escape one was killed and another wounded. These actions by the settlers angered the local natives, who then stole some sheep and horses. The natives killed one of the horses and the sheep and also shot at some herdsmen. Wakara came to the defense of the Mormons and took a pony from the Pide chief. According to Lee, Wakara desired to kill Chief Quonarah and would have done so had not John L. Smith prevented him. The angry Wakara preached to the rebellious Utes and stated he would report their conduct to the “Big Captain” Governor Young. Wakara also shot the pony he had taken from the chief. Lee said the Mormons helped Pide Chief Quonarah slip away believing Quonarah was not guilty of any real wrong. Wakara left the next morning on friendly terms.\textsuperscript{132}

Despite Wakara’s seeming defense of the Mormons, John D. Lee still did not trust him.

\textsuperscript{129} Journal History, Nov. 5, 1851.
\textsuperscript{130} Journal History, Nov. 13, 1851.
\textsuperscript{131} Journal History, Oct. 28, 1851; Deseret News Nov. 29, 1851.
\textsuperscript{132} Journal History, March 13, 1852 and Deseret News, April 17, 1852. Also see letter from John L. Smith to Brigham Young in Journal History, March 14, 1852 and Deseret News, April 17, 1852.
Lee said, “Walker has done some good, still I look upon him and his band as high way robbers.” Young also did not trust Wakara. In the above-mentioned letter where Young made the case for Mormon settlement, he also posed the question: “Would not Captain (Indian) Walker otherwise most likely extend his exploits in seriously annoying the traveling public?” Regardless of whether or not Wakara’s above claims to friendliness were true, Wakara stayed true to peace and non-violence towards the Mormon people, but his relations with the Mormons seemed to have soured. If Young sincerely thought relations with Wakara and other Utes were good other than his mistrust, about the time he was writing his letter complaining about the claims of Holeman he would learn the reality of the situation from Wakara himself.

Wakara met with Brigham Young in the Provo area in late May of 1852 and complained about the availability of food. He said dried bread had made his band sick. According to Wakara the band also had difficulties getting fish due to the settlers’ continually keeping their nets in the water. Afterwards Daniel H. Wells instructed Isaac Higbee to inform the settlers to remove their nets for a while. Later in 1853, the Utah Legislature agreed on an act to prevent the “needless destruction of fish.”

Soon after the above meeting with Young, Wakara moved his band closer to the mouth of Provo canyon where more fish were available. What was a traditional camping area for the band was now a Brother Lemon’s wheat field. Settler James Bean asked that Wakara move so as to not destroy any more wheat. Wakara responded that he would not move without being paid. It

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133 Journal History, March 17, 1852.
134 Brigham Young to Luke Lea, May 28, 1852, LNIA.
136 Journal History, January 4, 1853.
is unknown if Wakara received any compensation, but eventually he moved on.\textsuperscript{137}

Other problems involving land and natural resources were going on in 1852. The establishment of the Allred Settlement by James Allred fifteen miles from Manti was a point of contention. The settlement was placed where a fine spring ran that the local natives had used for years. The Utes feared the possibility of the settlers controlling this water source.\textsuperscript{138} According to John Peterson, by 1852 the Utes had become very agitated by Mormon encroachments on the most valuable lands.\textsuperscript{139} A letter from Anson Call of Fillmore mentioned that the Pahvant Indians were not on friendly terms with the settlers.\textsuperscript{140} Although the reason for unfriendliness is not mentioned, it is highly probable that the depletion of land and resources due to the expanding settlement of Fillmore was the reason they were not on friendly terms. Contests over land and resources were such that Ronald Walker mentions this as the cause for the Walker War.\textsuperscript{141}

Regardless of Young’s true belief, Young’s claim is false that the Indians were not angry about encroachments on their land and killing their food source. The claims of both Day and Holeman were true to some extent even if they had been exaggerating. In the midst of the Utes’ expressed anger over Mormons encroachments the laws against the slave trade were enacted. These laws against Indian slavery disrupted the Ute economy and threatened Wakara’s status and power. This was more logs thrown on an already blazing fire. And yet the slave trade was not the only trade problem facing Wakara. In April of 1852 Brigham Young sent a letter to Wakara

\textsuperscript{137} Carter, 101-102. The Brother Lemon involved was either John Lemon or his brother James. See Carter, 113 note 5.

\textsuperscript{138} Sonne, \textit{World of Wakara}, 146. The Allred Settlement is modern day Spring City.

\textsuperscript{139} Peterson, 63.

\textsuperscript{140} Journal History, March 7, 1852 and \textit{Deseret News}, April 17, 1852.

\textsuperscript{141} Walker, “Wakara Meets the Mormons,” 237.
informing the chief that Indian trade needed to be regularized in accordance with the laws of the United States that said whites could not trade with natives without a license. Young was responsible for enforcing this law. Thus Young controlled Ute trade. Wakara’s power and vision of the future had been disrupted even further. Later a rumor circulated that Wakara had threatened to enter Mormon houses while they were away and take their guns to kill the Mormon settlers if the settlers of Sanpete did not trade “right.”

Peter Conover related a story from 1852 that likely occurred during this time of threats from Wakara. Conover said Wakara came down to Provo with a large force with the intent of “massacring all the Mormons” and to clear them off the land. Chief Sowiet arrived with a force of “friendly” Indians soon after Wakara and warned the Mormons of Wakara’s intentions and to not allow Wakara into the fort. Sowiet said he would fight for the Mormons. This was during the night; therefore, Conover awoke all the armed men in the fort to stand guard and be ready for a fight. Conover does not give many details, but Sowiet and Wakara left together. Once again, Wakara decided on peace despite the fact that his life, power, and status had taken a turn for the worse on account of the Mormons.

In the late spring or early summer of 1852, close to the same time as the previous meeting, Wakara met with Young at Payson and was reported to have been hostile in his feelings due to his declining prosperity. Wakara still did not react violently. Young believed the only reason Wakara did not revert to open hostility was fear of Mormon counteraction. Young tried to heal the situation with gifts, but according to Young Wakara still had hostile intentions.

Rumors began again. This time it was that Wakara was seeking an alliance with the Shoshones

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143 Peter Conover, “Reminiscences [ca. 1880],” typescript by Edyth J. Romney, p. 9, MS 103, LDS Archives. Also Peter Conover “Reminiscences [ca. 1880], Biographical Sketch of the Life of Peter Wilson Conover” photocopy of typescript, p. 9, MS 7720, LDS Archives; Peter Wilson Conover, “Reminiscences [ca. 1910s – 1920s], Sketch of the Life of Peter Wilson Conover as told to Emma Lynette Richardson Conover (Daughter-in-Law),” p. 9, MS 20164, LDS Archives.
to attack the settlers. Nothing came of these rumors and by summer Wakara expressed friendly feelings towards Young and the Mormons when in Salt Lake City. Soon afterwards in September 1852 Wakara and the Utes met under Brigham Young’s direction with the Shoshones and agreed to be peaceful.\footnote{Walker, “Wakara Meets the Mormons,” 234-236; Carter, \textit{From Fort To Village}, 103. Also see Brigham Young to Luke Lea, Sept. 29, 1852, LNIA; Journal History, September 4, 1852. Wakara’s anger in early summer and beyond was no doubt related to trade. In a letter to Brigham Young, Isaac Morley stated that Wakara was angry that Dimick Huntington was disrupting trade with the Americans. See Isaac Morley to Brigham Young, August 12, 1852, “Brigham Young Collection,” fd. 17, box 22, CR 1234, LDS Archives (afterwards BYC).} Young reported he specifically asked Wakara if he desired peace with the Shoshones. Furthermore Young claimed Wakara, Sowiet, and the Utes declared themselves friends of the Mormons and unanimously declared they had no objection to Mormons settling on their lands. Young claimed that the Indians benefited from the Mormon presence by being clothed and fed.\footnote{Brigham Young to Luke Lea, Sept. 29, 1852, LNIA. In addition Young said Wakara apologized to the Shoshones for having taken and killed their horses and said he desired peace with them.}

Although at this point in 1852 Wakara and his Utes seemed to be on friendly terms with the Mormons, it is difficult to know the reality from what they expressed to each other. As stated earlier, there was rampant mistrust between Wakara and Brigham Young along with others such as John D. Lee. Young also did not trust most Indians, he said, “It is not safe to trust too far the savage Indians notwithstanding all their professions of friendship.” Then Young said that the Indians’ predatory habits forced them to steal.\footnote{Brigham Young to Luke Lea, May 28, 1852, LNIA.} To deal with the natives, Young put out an epistle telling those at Fillmore and all other far-away settlements to secure themselves and families from the dangers of the “savage tribes.” He said they were weak mentally and physically and could not be compared with “our advanced stage of civilization.” Therefore, according to Young, settlers must guard themselves against the barbarous and bloodthirsty
Indians by securing themselves in forts. He also asked the settlers to keep a good guard on their stock, keep their guns and ammunition ready to use at an instant, and not to go into the canyons to work without sufficient weapons. In the Church’s General Conference, Young announced that ten-thousand settlers were on their way to the territory who would help make the southern settlements safer from attack. This announcement concerning the coming settlers not only demonstrates Young’s continued fear and suspicion of Indians, but also the continued encroachments and overcrowding of land from the perspective of Indians.

Brigham Young’s attitude and mistrust towards the Indians is clear by his language in multiple settings, but in the above epistle Young expressed some of the reasons he perceived behind their supposed barbarity. Young said the natives were inspired by the powers of darkness and unclean spirits to try to destroy God’s people and God’s Holy Priesthood. Although the Indians were descendants of the prophet Abraham, their ignorance and degradation prevented them from testing the “spirits.” With such attitudes and feelings of mistrust between them, it is difficult to know how genuine the friendly feelings each expressed at the treaty were. Still, it is likely both desired peace.

Despite the above-mentioned tensions between Mormons and many Utes in 1852, the year passed with very few incidents. Dan Jones said, “Nothing occurred in my experience...
during the remainder of the year worth recording. All of the Indians around were friendly toward us, but frequently spoke dissatisfied with the treatment received from some others." In the spring of 1852 Young toured the southern settlements and tribes. In a letter to Thomas Kane, Young said the Indians had abandoned many of their indolent ways and were growing their own food. During the General Conference of the Church in October, Young said that there had been fewer disturbances with the Indians that season and that he had tried to promote peace while among them that past May. Young believed the Indians were learning how to farm and that the treaty demonstrated progress with them. In addition, members of Wakara’s family and band, Arapene and Grosepe, dined at Young’s house in July. The natives around Tooele that had been involved in the last major conflict with the Mormons in 1851 had become friendly and Elder John Rowberry recommended having a treaty with them. By the end of 1852, Young said, “Many hostile bands of the native tribes, have smoked the pipe of peace, and renewed friendly relations, which long before had ceased to exist; which the exercise of a genial influence, by the rapidly extending settlements of the whites, it is believed, may be strengthened, and it is hoped, will be enduring.” Young still expressed the importance of having powder on

151 Jones, Forty Years Among the Indians, 54.

152 Journal History, May 29, 1852.

153 Journal History, October 13, 1852 and “Eight General Epistle,” Deseret News, October 16, 1852. A piece by the editor of the Deseret News said that while other Americans have a lot of trouble with the Indians, Brigham Young was teaching them to farm. Journal History, November 9, 1852 and “Local Correspondence,” Deseret News, December 11, 1852.

154 Journal History, July 4, 1852.

hand in case trouble arose in “a wild, Indian country.”  

1853 Paranoia and Lead Up to the War  

In February of 1853 John D. Lee related a tussle he said occurred the previous December between Wakara and other natives in Iron County. Part of Peteetneet’s band had camped near Parowan with one-hundred horses that ate the settlers’ wheat. President J.C.L. Smith ordered the settlers to treat the horses as strays and place them in the public corral. This action greatly angered the Utes who assembled for battle and apparently would have attacked the fort had they gained the help of the Piedes. Piede chief Onwannup actually ran into the fort commanding his people to follow. The next morning a war chief, Green Jacket, and others requested their horses with the promise to not let them roam the fields any longer. The request was granted and then Peteetneet’s Timpanogot band went to Cedar City to camp for a couple of weeks waiting to “wreak their vengeance upon the native Piedes” who had gathered around the settlement. At the beginning of January the Piedes left Cedar City to meet Wakara who was on his way back from trading with the Navajos; according to Lee half the band was Wakara’s family. They camped near the settlement and showed no signs of hostility. While encamped near Iron Springs the Timpanogot band fell on the Piedes and killed or wounded about twenty men and took the women and children prisoners. According to the Piedes, the band left to trade the prisoners to the Spanish. Survivors of the raid were allowed to build wickiups near the fort. On January 15, Wakara’s brother Ammon arrived and said Wakara was on his way and then went on to Parowan to ascertain the feelings of the citizens towards Wakara. On the eighteenth, another brother of Wakara, called Nephi, also came to determine how welcome Wakara would be in Parowan. Lee

\footnote{156 “Annual Message of Brigham Young Presented to the Legislature of Utah, December 13, 1852.” State Department Territorial Papers, Utah, reel 1, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, (afterward STDP). Also see Journal History, December 13, 1852 and “Governor’s Message,” Deseret News, December 25, 1852.}
answered in the affirmative and on the twenty-ninth Wakara with sixty-nine men arrived and
camped near the fort. They all ate dinner and Wakara asked the natives present to tell their
friends to commit no more depredations against the whites or each other but rather to raise grain.
Lee concluded his report of the gathering by saying, “Some fears of Indian hostilities have been
entertained at Parowan on the return of Walker, but I apprehended no danger from that quarter
whatever.”

Henry Lunt of Cedar City reported peace among the Indians but that the natives
were scared of the whites. He also said that Wakara exhibited a peaceful spirit and had nothing
to do with the attack on the Piedes. Although major trouble was averted between the bands
and the Mormons, what is clear from this exchange is that mistrust and suspicion remained
between Wakara and his band and the Mormon settlers. Yet peace still prevailed.

In Fillmore some powder was stolen and an Indian reportedly stabbed Mormon Peter
Robinson. Young, desiring to keep peace with the natives, recommended to the settlers to “give
an inch or even a foot, to lose a dime or even a dollar rather than endanger their property or
lives.”

Young said to practice patience and forbearance to avoid Indian wars unlike other
 Americans who treated them like dogs. Dimick Huntington settled the dispute at Fillmore.

Despite these tensions between the Mormons and Indians, Brigham Young, John D. Lee, and
Anson Call reported that the natives were peaceful and that there were no problems with the

\[\text{157 Journal History, February 5, 1853 and “Local Correspondence,” Deseret News, March 19, 1853.}\]
\[\text{158 Journal History, February 12, 1853. In this letter Lunt says five Piedes were killed in the attack. In a}\]
\[\text{second letter a couple weeks later, Lunt said Wakara was peaceful, Journal History, February 26, 1853, and “Local}\]
\[\text{Correspondence,” Deseret News, March 19, 1853.}\]
\[\text{159 Journal History, January 15, 1853.}\]
\[\text{160 “Fillmore,” Deseret News, January 22, 1853.}\]
\[\text{161 Journal History, February 9, 1853; February 19, 1853; “Local Correspondence,” Deseret News,}\]
\[\text{February 19, 1853.}\]
natives. This perceived peace changed that next April.

In mid-April of 1853, Wakara was reported in an express from Iron County as having hostile inclinations; Wakara was camped near Parowan at the time. It was reported that Wakara and his band were still upset about the outlawing of the slave trade. The express stated that some passing emigrants traded some guns to Wakara’s band. They also tried to encourage Indian hostilities against the Mormons. Dimick Huntington was sent to defuse the situation. John Steele wrote and gave details of what happened down South. Steele wrote from Parowan that on April 6 a party of California emigrants and some apostate Mormons had stolen a horse which was recovered. The group was reportedly buying slaves as well as selling rifles and powder to the Indians. Furthermore they were trying to excite the Utes against the Mormons. A posse was dispatched after them but they were intercepted by Chief Wakara and about thirty Utes. With rifles pointed at the posse, the Utes informed them they were not to proceed and that the Americans were good but neither the Mormons nor Brigham Young were. Due to being outnumbered, the posse returned to the Parowan fort.

Brigham Young himself decided to inspect the southern settlements; Young’s party left April 20. At Sanpete Young learned that Arapene had become dissatisfied with the Mormons and left, but before departing Arapene had stated he desired peace with the settlers. Young expressed his distrust for the Indians but stated if the settlers followed his instructions they

162 Journal History, February 27, 1853; Journal History, March 6, 1853; Journal History, March 27, 1853.

163 Carter, From Fort to Village, 150.

164 John Steele to Brigham Young, April 10, 1853, fd. 7, box 23, reel 32, BYC.

165 Carter, From Fort to Village, 150. Brigham Young gave an account of his journey in the tabernacle in the Deseret News, May 14, 1853. The date of the sermons was May 8, 1853. In the Journal History the Deseret News clipping appears under the date of April 8. The clipping has “May” scratched out and “April” handwritten in. The date of May 8 makes much more sense. The trip didn’t begin until April 20 as stated in the “General Items,” Deseret News, April 30, 1853; also see Young’s remarks about the expedition, Journal History, May 2, 1853. A typed copy of the sermon also appears in the Journal History under May 8, 1853.
would have no problems. Young said the reason early colonists had problems with the natives was because they were not prepared to deal with them; the Mormons on the other hand were prepared to kill all of them if needed. Furthermore the settlers should live in forts with sufficient guns and ammunition until the settlements were strong enough to defend themselves.\footnote{166}

During the trip an unknown man asked to speak to Young in private. Young told him that he could send a letter to him but refused to meet in private.\footnote{167} Later the individual was identified as the white slave trader Dr. C.A.W. Bowman from New Mexico; he had come to Utah with a band of men to trade. Dan Jones accompanied Brigham Young to Sanpete County where Bowman and his party were making trouble. According to Jones, Bowman was determined to revive the slave trade. Bowman made threats using an extravagant claim that he could bring all the Indians from the mountains to help him and that he had the power to use up all the Mormons. Jones was unable to reason with him. Bowman went on to Utah Valley and “acted in an insulting and threatening manner.”\footnote{168} As part of Bowman’s defiance, he openly traded weapons and attempted to provoke Indian hostilities.\footnote{169} It was also rumored that Bowman had plans to assassinate Brigham Young.\footnote{170}

Dan Jones said concerning the Mexican traders, “It was deemed prudent to bring them in and keep an eye on them, until it could be decided what their intentions were, for at this time it

\footnote{166}“Extracts,” \textit{Deseret News}, May 14, 1853. The address is dated May 8, 1853.  
\footnote{167}Ibid.  
\footnote{168}Jones, \textit{Forty Years Among the Indians}, 54-55. Also see Brigham Young’s statements concerning the actions of Bowman, Journal History, May 2, 1853.  
\footnote{169}Jones, \textit{Trial of Don Pedro Leon Lujan}, 8. Also see Jones, “‘Redeeming’ the Indian,” 237-38; Carter, \textit{From Fort to Village}, 151-52.  
\footnote{170}Heiner, 41.
was seen that a growing spirit of war was upon the Indians, and almost anything would stir them up.\textsuperscript{171} If Dan Jones’s statement was true that almost anything would stir the Indians up, then Brigham Young’s next maneuver would surely have done it.

Brigham Young ordered out the militia to deal with Bowman and the Mexican traders. In an official proclamation Young expressed concern that the “horde of Mexicans” was trying to stir up the Utes and was furnishing them with guns and ammunition. Young declared that his orders were intended to quell the Indians and establish peace. Captain William Wall of Provo was ordered to reconnoiter down south and direct the inhabitants to be on guard against surprise and keep Young informed. The party was to arrest every “strolling Mexican party.” The entire militia was to be ready to march at a moment’s notice. Mexicans in the Territory were required to remain quiet in the settlements and not to leave until advised; officers of the Territory were directed to keep the Mexicans in safe custody and treat them with kindness. All people of the territory were to remain quiet and orderly, but to be on guard against surprise.\textsuperscript{172} Interestingly, this proclamation never actually mentioned concern about the slave trade, but rather about furnishing guns and ammunition; Young certainly did not want the Native Americans to be well armed. Young wrote Isaac Morley on May 7 saying that the Utes’ slave trade would be forcibly opposed to the point of extinction. Young asked Morley to tell Wakara to come and talk with him.\textsuperscript{173}

Orders were then sent out from Daniel H. Wells to the individual militia commanders

\textsuperscript{171} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{172} “Territory of Utah. Proclamation of the Governor,” April 23, 1853, reel 1, STDP. Also see Journal History, April 23, 1853; Deseret News, April 30, 1853, 3. Wells read the proclamation and inspected Wall’s detachment personally at Provo. See Daniel H. Wells to Brigham Young, April 26, 1853, fd. 8, box 43, reel 56, BYC.

\textsuperscript{173} Brigham Young to Isaac Morley, May 7, 1853, quoted in Christy, “The Walker War,” 399.
such as Major Nelson Higgins of Sanpete, Colonel Peter Conover of Provo, and Major David Moore of Weber. The commanders were to arrest all strolling Mexicans and to contain them in their district until further orders. Wells wrote that these traders were unlawfully trading “with the Indians, furnishing them with powder, lead and guns, for which they take in exchange, their children to sell into Mexican bondage, for horses.” He informed them to have all their men ready to march at a moment’s notice.  

A day after the Wall expedition left, Brigham Young personally sent a letter to Captain William Wall concerning the ordered reconnoiter to the south. Wall was to ask Dimick Huntington the whereabouts of Chief Wakara and the condition of the Indians. Young instructed Wall to warn the people of the settlements to be on guard against Indian depredations. Young believed Wakara “is not disposed to live peaceably with his band of Indians while in this territory, but has made his threats to the danger of the Inhabitants.” Furthermore, Young said if “you have an opportunity without to[o] much endangering your command you will take him prisoner with those of his band who are determined to follow him.” Once the violence started in July, the Mormons insisted it was the Utes that declared war on the Mormons. For the Utes, however, the order to capture Chief Wakara could have been considered a declaration of war. It is difficult to know, though, if Wakara and others knew the specifics of the order. What is clear is that Wakara and other chiefs believed the Mormons’ intentions were even worse than

174 Daniel H. Wells to all militia commanders, General Order no. 2, April 25, 1853, reel 4, UTMC; Daniel H. Wells to Colonel Conover, April 25, 1853, reel 4, UTMC; Daniel H. Wells to Nelson Higgins, Special Order no. 1, April 23, 1853, reel 4, UTMC. Sanpete was south of Provo and a part of the Provo Military District. The letter also mentioned that Major Higgins had led an expedition in pursuit of some Indians that had stolen cattle in Manti, a city in Sanpete County. For these orders to David Moore who was the Major of the Weber Military District north of Salt Lake City, see David Moore, “Collection 1843-1921,” MS 6304, LDS Archives.

175 Brigham Young to William Wall, April 25, 1853, reel 4, UTMC. Andrew Love described Dimick Huntington passing through Nephi “to Iron County to talk to Walker about his late menacing position in regard to the Iron Co. posse.” See Andrew Love, “Diary 1852 Sept.-1875 September,” April 18, 1853, MS 1675, LDS Archives.
simply to capture the chief.

William Wall left with forty-five armed men on April 24. On April 25, Wall’s expedition came into contact with an old Ute named Battice near Nephi. Battice claimed he had learned that Young had ordered the militia to kill him and chiefs Wakara and Peteetneet. Wall and the company informed him that the rumor was false; Wall claimed the reason of the expedition was to proclaim peace. Young learned that Battice had ordered all his followers to the mountains. Young believed the chief had taken offense at his proclamation, he being one of those who stole Piede children. This incident with Battice demonstrates the fear the natives had that the Mormons had declared war against the Utes, even if the Ute chiefs misread the Mormons’ intentions. On April 26 Wall’s expedition left for Iron County and Young’s party started up Salt Creek Canyon.

The month of April saw the height of Mormon efforts to stifle the trade. As mentioned earlier, Howard Christy said it was the renewed efforts of 1853 to end the slave trade that “precipitated” the war. Young had ordered Wakara captured and the Utes reportedly believed the orders were actually to kill Wakara and other chiefs. Even then Wakara and his band did not revert to violence and raids. If this war had simply involved the slave trade and Young’s 1853

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176 Journal History, April 24, 1853. Some of the men that accompanied the expedition were Amasa M. Lyman, Charles C. Rich, Erastus Snow, and Judge Snow. See Journal History, April 26, 1853.

177 Report of Captain Wm Wall, Commander of a Detachment of the Nauvoo Legion Cavalry on the Expedition to the extreme Southern Settlement of the Territory of Utah to the Adjutant General Office at Great Salt Lake City, April 24, 1853 to May 11, 1853, reel 4, UTMC. In a history written by Phyllis Ashcroft in 1935, she identified Battice as a brother of Wakara. See “Biography of John Anthony Woolf Jr.,” fd. 34, reel 2, Benjamin Brown Collection, MS 17646, LDS Archives. Phyllis Ashcroft was a granddaughter of Anthony Woolf Jr.

178 May 1, 1853, vol. 23, p. 62, HOC. Also see Journal History, May 2, 1853.

179 Journal History, April 26, 1853. Young was accompanied by church apostles John Taylor, Heber C. Kimball, George A. Smith, and Ezra T. Benson.

180 Howard Christy, “The Walker War,” 396. These renewed efforts to stop the trade in 1853 will be discussed later.
efforts to end it, surely these orders and paranoid beliefs of the Utes in April would have started
the war, but they did not revert to violence. The events of April were simply more logs on an
already blazing fire of frustration for Wakara’s band. The attempts to halt the slave trade
obviously did not give Wakara sufficient reason to revert to war, for violence did not break out
for another two and a half months. What these events do demonstrate is that tensions were
growing and the Utes were becoming more paranoid of Mormon intentions with their false belief
concerning the order to kill Wakara and other chiefs. Furthermore, even with the order against
Wakara, as will be seen below, Wakara expressed his desire for peace.

The paranoia among the Mormons about the intentions of the Utes was also increasing.
On April 28, William Wall was informed that an Indian belonging to Wakara’s band was in the
area, which caused Wall to conclude that Chief Wakara was secretly spying on the expedition.181
Brigham Young’s party discovered tensions and paranoia among the saints and Indians on the
rise as well. Young arrived in Manti on April 27 and was told that Arapene had left angrily the
previous day. Also, that morning all the remaining Indians left the neighborhood in a hurry. At
the Allred Settlement Young said the natives kept the citizens alarmed keeping their guns in
hand all night.182 It is clear evidence that tensions were high among the settlers and natives.
Young advised them to be on guard for Indians.183

Orders to build forts had been implemented in the past and they were yet again. William
Goforth recalled in the spring of 1853 Young counseled those at Alpine to move into forts “on
account of expected Indian trouble.” He said by June a plot of ten acres was prepared for the fort

181 Report of Captain Wm Wall, April 24, 1853 to May 11, 1853, reel 4, UTMC.
182 Journal History, April 27, 1853.
183 Journal History, April 28, 1853.
the women and children were moved to Salt Lake City as well.\footnote{184} Henry Arnold was actually called on an Indian Mission in the spring to help build forts as protection against Indians.\footnote{185} Clearly tensions were so high Brigham Young and the Mormons were expecting trouble to occur at some point. Therefore, part of the purpose of the expedition was to check and report on the southern settlements’ preparation to defend themselves against possible Indian aggressions.

Wall reported that the forts in the towns of Parowan and Harmony were in good condition; the people were also prepared for possible attacks. Not everyone, however, was prepared for attacks. Fillmore was not properly prepared; the fort was out of order and the town lacked ammunition to defend itself.\footnote{186} Brigham Young’s party also found some defensive preparations lacking. Elias Blackburn reported Young as telling the residents in Palmyra that if they did not fort up God would not allow them to stay on the land. Blackburn said no heed “was paid to the Council.”\footnote{187} Daniel H. Wells was also not happy with the preparation of other settlements such as Tooele.\footnote{188}

While Brigham Young’s party began its return to Salt Lake City on April 29, at Manti three Indians crept into the fort. Guards fired at the Indians, who then ran to Father Isaac Morley’s to wake him up and to take him a message from Wakara and Arapene that they wanted peace. Young sent a couple of shirts and tobacco asking that they behave themselves.\footnote{189}

About this same time at Fillmore, William Wall spoke with Pahvant Chief Kanosh.

\footnote{185} “The Life of Henry Arnold (As told by his granddaughter, Mrs. Emma Rich Bingham,” p. 2, MS 1440, LDS Archives.  
\footnote{186} Report of Captain William Wall, April 24, 1853 to May 11, 1853, real 4, UTM C.  
\footnote{187} Carter, \textit{From Fort to Village}, 153.  
\footnote{188} Daniel H. Wells to Captain Wright, April 25, 1853, reel 4, UTM C.  
\footnote{189} Journal History, April 29, 1853.
Kanosh said that Wakara had left Parowan and was heading towards Sanpete. Wall said the band with Kanosh seemed peaceable. He also reported that the Piede Utes by Beaver River and in Harmony were friendly and under control as well. Both the Pahvant and Piedes were apparently afraid of Wakara because he had stolen their children in the past or killed the parent and taken the children to sell to Mexicans. On the way back to Provo, Wall and his expedition stopped again at Nephi City. Wall learned that Wakara had been at Sanpete. Nephi citizens reported that Wakara seemed peaceable, but that he was nervous about the Mormons’ movements.190

Young’s party returned May 2 and William Wall’s command returned a few days later on May 11.191 In the end, the Mexicans did leave without having stirred the Utes up to violence. William Wall’s expedition arrested only three Spanish traders near Payson and turned them over to civil authorities.192 Dan Jones was a member of a party that persuaded some Mexicans to come with them after questioning them about the location of Bowman. About this time, Bowman had an altercation with some Native Americans; apparently Bowman deceived them concerning some promised trade. According to Jones, the Indians ambushed and killed Bowman. Despite rumors that Mormons had killed Bowman, Jones said there was no evidence of Mormon involvement. Jones says the Mexicans left peaceably.193

Brigham Young believed the Wall expedition succeeded in preventing bloodshed.

190 Report of Captain Wm Wall, April 24, 1853 to May 11, 1853, reel 4, UTMC. Also see Wall’s letter to the editor in the Deseret News, May 28, 1853 and May 11, 1853. Young also related Wall’s report concerning the Pahvant and Pahvant fear of Wakara. See May 29, 1853, vol. 23, p. 76, HOC.

191 Journal History, May 2, 1853; May 11, 1853.

192 Report of Captain Wm Wall, April 24, 1853 to May 11, 1853, reel 4, UTMC. Robert Carter accounts for two more Mexican traders and one American arrested in Salt Lake City. See Carter, From Fort to Village, 153. Daniel H. Wells said there were two Mexicans and one American arrested in Cedar City. See Daniel H. Wells to Brigham Young, April 26, 1853, fd. 8, box 43, BYC.

193 Jones, Forty Years Among the Indians, 55-56.
Furthermore, he said that although the Indians were frightened at first by the sudden armed movements they expressed a desire for peace. Dimick Huntington and George Bean also believed the expedition to have been a success.\footnote{Carter, \textit{From Fort to Village}, 156. The source for Huntington’s views is “Who Knows?” \textit{Deseret News}, May 28, 1853 and Journal History, May 11, 1853.}

Both Young and Huntington had good reason to believe the expedition was a success. The next day on April 30, Isaac Morley said Wakara and four of his men visited him. Wakara said he wanted peace and friendship with him and would not trade with the Spaniards if Young did not want him to do so. He said he would advise the Spaniards not to travel to Utah and traffic in children. Wakara said he “understands now, that the Spaniards makes slaves of them.” He said he wanted to go to Salt Lake City and meet with Young and trade “Skins of various kinds.” Wakara smoked the tobacco Young sent and Morley said “he manifests a very good Spirit.”\footnote{Isaac Morley at Manti City to Brigham Young, April 30, 1853, fd. 4, box 23, BYC.} Even in the face of all these difficulties between Wakara and the Mormons, Wakara maintained his desire to live peaceably among them. Despite Wakara’s letter of friendship, Young’s distrust of Wakara and other Indians was exceptionally high. Brigham Young expressed his distrust and anger about the situation with Wakara in May. He said that those that followed Wakara “who is king of the Indians in these mountains” did so out of fear and not because they loved him. Young went on to say that if Wakara became hostile towards the Mormons “he shall be wiped out of existence, and every man that will follow him.” Young voiced his distrust towards Wakara by saying that it was characteristic of a “cunning Indian” to claim he loved you and to smoke a peace pipe with you when he found he has no advantage over you. Young said he did not trust Wakara’s love any more than he would that of a stranger. He
added, “I shall live a long while before I can believe that an Indian is my friend, when it would be to his advantage to be my enemy.” Young said he did not care if Wakara loved him but that it was sufficient to know Wakara would not attempt to harm the settlements. Although Young was angry at Wakara and seemingly at Native Americans in general, he did say the Mormons suffered even greater atrocities at the hands of white men and that he would rather take his chances by living with the natives. Young still felt it was their duty to redeem these supposedly fallen and cursed people. Young felt the Mormons had not practiced their faith sufficiently and that this was why they had problems with the Indians. Because of the lack of faith, the people must be prepared to fight the natives by building forts and taking other measures.  

Jacob Holeman also believed trouble was brewing with the Native Americans. Holeman wrote the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Luke Lea, to inform him about the situation in Utah. He wrote that it was probable that there would be trouble with Wakara’s band and reported that Wakara had been in league with some Mexican or Spanish traders who were arrested for trading guns and ammunition. It seemed that everyone distrusted or expected future problems with Wakara including Mormons, non-Mormons, and other Native Americans.

In addition to the tension over the slave trade, issues over land continued. About the same time as the expedition against Spanish traders Mormons were settling on farms where they were exposed to attack rather than settling in towns and building fences. The settlers were angry about Indians’ horses getting into the fields. When Indians were asked about the situation, they

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196 Journal of Discourses, 26 vols. (London: Latter-day Saints’ Book Depot, 1854-1886), 1:103-107. A slightly different version of this sermon is also contained in HOC, April 1853, vol. 23, p. 60-a. Both of these documents also contain Young account of his travels down south and proclamation to end the trading of slaves, arms, and ammunition. Also see Journal History, May 31, 1853.

197 Jacob Holeman to Luke Lea, April 29, 1853, LNIA.
would ask, “Whose lands are these you are on”? Anger over land forever festered in the hearts of the Native Americans.

*Wakara’s anger*

William Wall’s conclusion after his expedition was that Wakara “was willing to live in peace, if he can have his own way in stealing other Indian children to sell them to Mexicans for guns and ammunition, or if we will buy these children of him and give him guns and ammunition, to enable him to continue his robberies.” Young would not scale back his policy on Mexican trade nor on his desire to continue the push for more southern settlements.

On July 2 Wakara came to Salt Lake City to meet with Brigham Young, reportedly with a peaceable disposition. The details of what was discussed are lost, but the meeting did not go well. Five days later on July 6 Wakara expressed the specifics of why he was angry to M.S. Martenas, a trilingual veteran of the Taos fur trade who had been familiar with Wakara for nearly thirty years, in an interview arranged by Jacob Holeman. In this interview Wakara denied that he ever invited Mormons onto his lands. He said “he had always been opposed to the whites set[t]ling on the Indian lands, particularly that portion which he claims; and on which his band resides and on which they have resided since his childhood.” Wakara said at first the Mormon settlers were friendly towards the Indians, but after they grew in numbers they began to treat the Indians unkindly and abuse them; this echoes the letters of Jacob Holeman described above.

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198 Jones, *Forty Years Among the Indians*, 55


200 Journal History, July 2, 1853.

Wakara complained that the Mormons had driven his people from place to place, that the settlements were placed on Indian hunting grounds and that the graves of their forefathers had been torn up by the whites. Furthermore the Mormons had driven the “Gosoke” Utes from Salt Lake Valley and now wanted to drive his people out of their lands. Wakara stated he desired to keep Sanpete as his own but was willing to leave Salt Lake Valley since he could not get along with whites. Wakara said he always desired to get along with whites but the whites were never satisfied. Wakara said that if the “Great Father,” the American Government, would not do something to relieve them he did not know what the Mormons would do. Martenas also spoke with Sowiet and Toe-kah-boo. These chiefs also said they were opposed to whites settling their lands and could not live in peace with white people. Martenas ended his statement by saying:

I have been acquainted with his country, and these Indians for upwards of thirty years. I have known Walker, Sou wah reats, and Tookeboos since they were children—I have always been on friendly terms with them—they talk freely with me—and express their feelings and wishes without reserve. One prominent cause of the present excitement is the interference of the Mormons with their long established Spanish trade, and the killing of an Indian trader by the name of Bowman, from Santa Fe, and charging the murder to the Indians. I greatly fear that much difficulty will grow out of the present excited condition of the Indians,—should the Mormons continue their unkind treatment. I have just had a long conversation with the Chief Walker and make the above statement of his feelings with his expressions fresh in my mind.

Wakara certainly could have been trying to play the Americans and Mormons against each other, but there is little reason to doubt the anger Wakara and other chiefs expressed to Martenas. This same anger had been expressed for two previous years to non-Mormon Indian agents. There were many logs on this blazing fire of anger between the Utes, particularly those

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202 Statement, M. S. Martenas, Interpreter, Great Salt Lake City, July 6, 1853, fd. 14, box 58, BYC. Transcription of document by Will Bagley in the author’s possession. Martenas identification as a trilingual veteran of the Taos fur trade comes from Jared Farmer, On Zion’s Mount: Mormons, Indians, and the American Landscape (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2008), 85. Jared Farmer actually spells the name as Marlenas and transcribed the date of the document and interview as July 3.

203 Ibid.
of Wakara’s band, and the Mormons. Wakara had been the most powerful chief commanding the most powerful band of Utes in Utah and Colorado for years. Now a new chief, Brigham Young, had greatly compromised the power and status of the great Wakara. Furthermore he and other Utes had continually become more and more agitated at Mormon encroachments on their lands which destroyed food sources and greatly disrupted their way of life. Another violent outbreak from the Utes had become inevitable. This time it would be Wakara’s band that would lead the charge, but only after one of their own was killed. Even then Wakara would express his desire for peace. His band, on the other hand, had seen enough.
The months from June of 1851 to July 1853 saw a lull in the violence between Mormons and Native Americans, but tensions had increased. In particular, tensions had grown between Chief Wakara and the Mormons. Wakara had seen his land filled up with Mormon settlers, land that he denied having ever invited the Mormons to occupy. Wakara watched as laws and regulations were imposed on different types of trade with the Spanish. He saw what he could have considered as aggressions and an act of war against him as Young ordered out the militia to stop Mexicans from trading slaves and called for his capture. From what Battice said, Wakara even believed Young gave orders for him to be killed. Despite all this, Wakara had not yet reverted to violence against the Mormons. In the past, it seems each time Wakara’s sovereignty and dominating power was threatened, he prepared for attack, but each time he was either talked out of it by Sowiet or changed his mind. The events of 1852 and early 1853 demonstrate Wakara himself was committed to peaceful relations with Mormon settlers. In July of 1853, a member of Wakara’s band was killed by James Ivie. Even then Wakara remained committed to living peacefully with Mormon settlers. Both Wakara and Young seemingly understood the advantage of cooperation and reconciliation. Part of that commitment towards cooperation likely came from Wakara’s embracing certain aspects of white culture; despite his denial in that July, he had even invited the Mormons to Sanpete to teach his people to farm. Young had also become committed to cooperation in always trying to maintain peace in the face of Ute theft of Mormon property. The followers of Young and Wakara, however, had difficulty in overcoming the cultural differences between them. All the recent encroachments onto Ute lands and trade regulations made a violent outbreak nearly inevitable. That breakout in violence disrupted
Mormon lives on a level not yet seen since they came to Utah. For them the Walker War was not simply a series of small skirmishes.

The Beginning of Violence

Soon after Wakara’s meeting with Young and interview with Martenas in early July, General Wells sent orders to General Jedediah M. Grant concerning Brigham Young’s proclamation that measures needed to be taken to suppress the “Indian hostilities unhappily existing in Utah County.” Grant was ordered to have one hundred men ready to march at a moment’s notice.¹ Both Young and Wells knew tensions were high and that violence had become nearly inevitable. A week after these orders, their fears would become reality.

An event occurred between James Ivie and some Ute Indians on July 15 that swept the Mormons into violent conflict with Wakara and his band. The most well-known version of the story comes from George McKenzie as contained in Peter Gottfredson’s Indian Depredations in Utah.² What all previous studies are missing is the version of James Ivie himself. Certainly Ivie’s account would spin the story in his own favor; he was the only eye-witness that left an


² Peter Gottfredson, Indian Depredations of Utah (1919; repr., Tucson, AZ: Fenestra Books, 2002), 43-47. All previous studies of the Walker War of any significance have utilized the story as told by McKenzie. See for example Thomas G. Alexander, Utah: The Right Place. 2nd Rev. ed. (Salt Lake City: Gibbs Smith Publisher, 2003), 113-114; David Bigler, Forgotten Kingdom: The Mormon Theocracy in the American West (Logan, Utah: Utah State University Press, 1998), 75; Robert Carter, From Fort to Village (Provo, Utah: Provo City Corporation, 2008), 163-164; Howard Christy, “The Walker War: Defense and Conciliation as Strategy,” Utah Historical Quarterly 47, no. 4 (Fall 1979): 400; Bartley H. Heiner, “Mormon-Indian Relations as Viewed Through the Walker War” (master’s thesis, Brigham Young University, 1955), 54-56; Jared Farmer, On Zion’s Mount: Mormons, Indians, and the American Landscape (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2008), 85-86; Orson F. Whitney, History of Utah (Salt Lake City: George Q. Cannon and Sons, 1892), 1:513-514. George McKenzie gives the date of this event with James Ivie as July 17, 1853. Nearly all the above mentioned authors other than Robert Carter give that date. Robert Carter gives the date as July 15, see Carter, 163. Carter offers no explanation for why he gives a different date. However, Carter cites a letter from James McClellan to Brigham Young dated July 16 that tells what happened with James Ivie and that it occurred the day before the letter which would have been July 15. He also gives an account by Bishop Charles B. Hancock’s journal from July 16 concerning an attempt at negotiations after the Ivie debacle. See Carter, 166-167. This letter and journal entry confirms that July 15 is the most likely date for the event with James Ivie.
account of the incident.

In 1855, Ivie was a member of a party exploring the Elk Mountain Valley near modern
day Moab. Ivie claimed that in September of 1855 several Native Americans robbed him. He
made an Indian depredation claim in 1889 to the federal government to pay for his lost property.
The government heard Ivie’s case in 1897. Part of the investigation looked into causes of the
Walker War believing that Ivie had provoked the Indians to anger just two years earlier. Ivie
was denied his claim for several reasons, most importantly the federal investigators’ conclusion
he had ―always been a disturbing element among the Indians in Utah. It was he, who, by his
indiscretion, caused what was known as the Walker War, which occasioned the loss of many
lives and an expenditure on the part of Utah Territory of over $2,000,000, and of $53,000 on part
of the United States.‖3

On October 21, 1897 James A. Ivie appeared before A. Mae Spofford, the Commissioner
of the Court of Claims, in Salina Utah. Ivie and other witnesses in the case were all asked
specific questions about the Walker War to try and prove that Ivie had provoked the Indians to
violence against them. In Ivie’s own words, he related the following:

In ’53 there was two Indians and a squaw came into my house wanting to trade
some fish for flour; I was digging a well at that time, my wife came to me and
called me to come out and make the trade; I came out then and went into the
house, and traded flour for those five fish; shortly two other Indians came in with
their guns and bows and arrows in their hands; went into the house and
commenced fighting amongst themselves; one of those Indians caught the squaw
and knocked her down, knocked the blood out of her, and the blood flew over the
house, the Indian; then my wife called on me to protect the squaw, I taken the
Indian and let him out the door; then he drew his bow and arrow on me, presented
it and I caught the arrow and broke it in two; then I struck him with my fist and
knocked him down; he arose with his gun and attempted to shoot me; I caught the

3 “In the Court of Claims of the United States. Indian Depredation…Defendants Requests for Findings of
Fact and Brief,” p. 5, James A. Ivie vs. the United States and the Uncompahgie Elk Mountain Indians, case 707,
Indian Depredation Case File, Records of the U.S. Courts of Claims, RG 123. National Archives, Washington D.C.
The cost of the conflict will be discussed in chapter 5.
muzzle of the gun and broke it in two; having the barrel in my hand, and then I struck him over the head with the gun barrel and knocked him, and he lay on the steps in front of the door; the second Indian drew his gun on me, and it was a flintlock gun and missed fire, and I struck him over the head with the same gun barrel, knocking him down, and falling over the other Indians I had just hit; then the squaw that I was taking her part, she arose to her feet and struck me with a billet of wood across the lip, cutting it through to my teeth; I also struck her with the gun barrel, and she fell across the other two Indians that had fell on the outside of the door; Mr. Kelly, a man by that name, rode up and said he ‘Ivie, you’ve got into a fight, and I’ll stay with ya and see it over with.’ Then I sent my wife and children to her father’s a quarter of a mile away; Mr. Kelly remained with me there for a half hour, waiting for the Indians to recover from their wounds, and then those two Indians who had taken no active part in the fight called on me for a bucket to get some water to pour over those wounded Indians; I gave them a bucket and they carried water and threw over those Indians to bring them to; I stayed there about half a hour waiting for them to come to, and they didn’t come to, and Mr. Kelly and I then went to Springville and left them laying there; those other two Indians went off to Spanish Fork, where Walker was camping with about 300 lodges of Indians; two hours and a half later there was 40 Indians mounted and come over and carried off those wounded Indians, and went back to Spanish Fork. That night those Indians killed a man by the name of Keel, at Payson, shot him when he was on guard.4

The above story is basically the same as the one told by George McKenzie, but McKenzie offered some more details and some differences. McKenzie specified that it was three pints of flour that Ivie traded for the fish. McKenzie identified the Indian that began beating the Indian woman as Shower-O-Cats. He also said that Shower-O-Cats was possibly the Ute women’s husband and was angry about the trade. McKenzie’s version is a little different with regards to what happened after the arrival of Joseph Kelly. He said Kelly tried to revive the two Indians by pouring water on them and then told James and Elizabeth Ivie to flee to Springville before word of what happened reached the Ute camp.5 Both James Ivie and George McKenzie

4 “Deposition of James Ivie,” October 21, 1897, pp. 2-3, James Ivie vs. the United States.

5 Gottfredson, 43-47. Biographer Joseph E. Thiriot wrote that Shower-O-Cats was angry about the number of fish the Ute female traded. See Joseph E. Thiriot, “Life Story of John Clark [ca. 1905],” MS 20021, Church History Library of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Salt Lake City (afterward LDS Archives). In the reminiscences of Peter Conover, he mistakenly said the trade dispute was over a gun. See Peter Conover, “Reminiscences [ca. 1880],” typescript by Edyth J. Romney, p. 9, MS 103, LDS Archives. Also Peter Conover “Reminiscences [ca. 1880], Biographical Sketch of the Life of Peter Wilson Conover,” photocopy of typescript, p.
maintained Ivie acted in self-defense. In the 1897 court case, George McKenzie appeared as a witness and said he did not know what caused the Walker War and that it was only a rumor that James Ivie had “some altercation” with an Indian; McKenzie likely said this to protect Ivie from being conclusively blamed for starting the war. Furthermore he said his knowledge was based on “hearsay.”

The most important detail McKenzie added was Shower-O-Cats died a few hours later. Ivie told a different story of what happened with the Indians he had beaten. Ivie claimed that later he saw the female Indian and her husband at Ft. Bridger when he was living there. He identified these two as the Indians he had fought with in 1853. Both of the Indians showed him the scars on their heads from the hits. When asked about the other Indian he had hit with the gun, he simply said he never saw him again. When pressed on the issue, Ivie admitted that it was reported that the one Indian had died. Ivie never identified either of the Indians as Shower-O-Cats.

Charles B. Hancock, Bishop of Payson, said that James Ivie and his wife agreed they did not want to trade bread for fish because bread was scarce. At last Mrs. Ivie gave in and told the Ute woman if she laid the fish on the table she could take the bread. As soon as the Ute woman

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7 “Deposition of George McKenzie,” pp. 9-11, 19, James Ivie vs. the United States.


9 “Deposition of James Ivie,” pp. 6-10, James Ivie vs. the United States.
did this it apparently angered one Ute male, likely Shower-O-Cats.  

J.P. Humphrey said there were multiple versions of the story of what happened between Ivie and the Indian. Still, the general understanding was the same that the Indian trouble of 1853 began with James Ivie beating an Indian to death to save an Indian woman during a trade dispute. One possible important variant is from Humphrey himself who said that Joseph Kelly possibly assisted Ivie in beating the Indian who later died; both may have done it to save their own lives, but he said that back during the time of the Walker War he had never heard the murder of the Indian described as an act of self-defense. Furthermore Humphrey said that it was the general understanding that both Kelly and Ivie started the Walker War. Lewis Barney as well said the war was started due to the “foolishness” of two or three men; he said because of Ivie the Walker War was thrust upon the settlers. Regardless of the different variants, immediately following the dispute between James Ivie and Shower-O-Cats measures were taken by both Utes and Mormons to settle the dispute.

Charles B. Hancock had three of Wakara’s Utes enter his house on July 16 armed with knives, bows, and arrows. Hancock persuaded them to return to their camp with the promise to come to the Ute camp to negotiate. Hancock went to the camp and had a two-hour discussion with Wakara, Arapene, and others. The bishop promised to ride to Salt Lake and consult with Brigham Young and try to establish peace. Wakara apparently did not want Young to know about the difficulties, but Arapene thought if Young was informed then peace might be possible.

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11 “Deposition of J.P. Humphrey,” October 2, 1897, pp. 5-7, 13-14, James Ivie vs. the United States. Humphrey said on page 13 of the deposition that it was Kelly who reported the story to him. On page 14 however he said he heard the story from both of them. He also said that the people of territory did condemn them both for their actions, p. 15.
12 Lewis Barney, “Autobiography and Diary 1878-1883; 1886-1890,” p. 72, MS 4598, LDS Archives.
Hancock rode back to Payson accompanied by Arapene and others and visited James McClellan. McClellan wrote Brigham Young and related the story of what had happened between Ivie and Wakara’s Utes. He also wrote that the one Ute would likely die. Arapene said that due to the broken gun by Ivie a payment of two rifles would settle the matter, but if the Ute died, then “Ivie’s Blood must atone for it;” nothing else would satisfy the Utes. Arapene also said that no one else would be affected except Ivie. Hancock carried the letter to Salt Lake City. Brigham Young wrote a letter after receiving the note from McClellan to Chief Wakara and Arapene. He reiterated the story of James Ivie. According to the version Young received, the Ivies did not need the fish but offered all the bread in their house. The Indians began to talk without Ivie understanding them and then the one began beating the female. Ivie tried to get the abuse to stop, but he failed. Only after Ivie’s wife and children began to cry did Ivie attempt to protect the Indian woman. To Young, Ivie acted only in self-defense, protecting the woman and himself. Young went on to say, “Now, Wacker, and Arrowpin, whole affair before us eye witnesses to the affray would counsel you to be peaceful quiet and not hasty, angry and for war.” Young ended by expressing his desire for peace.

Despite the violent event, it is clear Wakara desired peace. He did not even want Young to know about it. Arapene also did not necessarily want war, but he did desire what he thought was justice. Even after the Mormons had become a detriment to his power and at the time nearly killed one of his own, Wakara still did not desire war. Neither Young nor Wakara desired this

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13 Hancock, “Journal,” p. 12, quoted in Carter, 166.

14 James McClellan to Brigham Young, July 16, 1853, fd. 4, box 23, reel 32, “Brigham Young Collection,” (afterward BYC), LDS Archives.

15 Carter, 167.

16 Young to Wakara and Arapene, July 1853, MS 2736, Box 1, Folder 3, Brigham Young Letterpress Copybook Transcriptions (afterwards BYL), LDS Archives. Also see Carter, 167.
conflict. There were, however, other attempts on both sides for negotiations, but none of them worked due to some of the hostile feelings between them.

Author Don Carlos Johnson said several Utes went to the house of Bishop Aaron Johnson soon after the dispute with Ivie. The Indians demanded an ox and a gun. Although Johnson was willing to do so the other settlers did not believe they should pay the natives. The Utes then gave a war whoop and headed toward Payson canyon. According to Johnson the Mormon settlers regretted not having made an offer. William Smith, Ransom Potter, and A.B. Wild were dispatched by Johnson to overtake the Indians and offer anything to appease them. The group found the Indians encamped at the mouth of Payson canyon in a “frenzy of excitement.” Indian interpreter William Smith approached the camp and saw the wounded Ute lying on the ground. Smith tried to turn the wounded Indian over but the Ute groaned in pain. In a council Smith asked what they would accept for peace. The Indian council demanded one “beef,” one gun, and a pair of blankets. Smith agreed to the demand and a Ute was dispatched to town for the items, but such items were scarce among the settlers and he was unable to get the commodities; the Ute rode off in anger. Another peaceful envoy was sent after them made up of Stephen C. Perry, James Guyman, Davis Clark, and Greg Metcalf. They were determined to make peace at any price according to Johnson. They found a band of angry Utes. Indian interpreter Greg Metcalf tried to tell them that the Indian was to blame for what happened. They offered an ox, a new rifle, and blankets. All offerings were rejected by the angry Indians. The Indians were temporarily impressed by the Mormons who administered to the Indian, but soon after Shower-O-Cats is said to have died.17

J.P. Humphrey tells a variant to the story. He said Aaron Johnson sent Humphrey and

17 Don Carlos Johnson, A Brief History of Springville, Utah, From its First Settlement September 18, 1850, To the 18th Day of September, 1900 (Springville, Utah: William F. Gibson, 1909), 19-20. Also see Carter, 165-166.
Andrew Wild to Spanish Fork in an attempt to negotiate peace with the Indians. He also described the hurt Indian lying on the ground with seventy-five to one-hundred angry Indian warriors surrounding them. Humphrey said that he and Wild negotiated with the “leader” in the camp who agreed to settle the difficulty for six sacks of flour and two “beeves.” Afterwards the negotiators returned home. Humphrey reported that neither side kept this agreement. Neither Kelly nor Ivie were willing to pay the amount. The Indians then went into Payson Canyon. George McKenzie said that Bishop Aaron Johnson tried everything to settle the trouble with Chief Wakara by offering ponies, beef, flour, and blankets. Wakara would not accept anything unless James Ivie was turned over to the Utes to be tried.

According to George Washington Bean James Ivie was “not disposed to do much” to pacify the Indians. Bean said all the Indians wanted was an ox for compensation; but that did not happen. Historian David Bigler claims that the incident with Shower-O-Cats may have been resolved peacefully had Ivie taken the advice of Aaron Johnson. Bigler says, “But the stubborn settler, not one to take blame for an act he felt was justifiable, stoutly stood his ground and refused. His pride would prove costly for both settlers and Indians.”

The different versions told above demonstrate that the situation was not that simple to resolve for either the Utes or the Mormons. Furthermore, Bigler is making the mistake of not looking at the larger picture but rather looking at it as an isolated event. It is clear that troubles had been brewing for a long time.

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18 “Deposition of J.P. Humphrey,” p. 7, James Ivie vs. the United States. Later in the testimony Humphrey said he did not see Wakara there nor did he ever see Wakara involved in fighting, pp. 14, 17.

19 Gottfredson, 46. The fact that Wakara wanted Ivie tried is further evidence of how Wakara had embraced white culture.


21 Bigler, 75.
period of time and despite the desire for peace among certain leaders on both sides, many of the Utes and Mormons were unwilling to meet the other side’s terms. The Mormons understandably would not turn Ivie over to them for what they believed was an act of self-defense.

Luke Gallup wrote on July 16 in his journal concerning the failure to negotiate: “Some of the whites & Indians it seems have long fostered a spirit of war & now it seems the time had arrived to gratify the same.” Furthermore the situation was also personal for Wakara. Shower-O-Cats was not only a member of Wakara’s band; he was actually a relative. Don Johnson said Wakara was “greatly enraged” by the death.

It is difficult to assess the exact reason why these attempts at negotiations failed. It is entirely possible that due to poverty the Mormon settlers did not feel they could afford to deliver what was asked for. From the different versions, however, it seemed as though the settlers were simply unwilling to pay the Utes. James Ivie clearly believed he acted only in self-defense and was protecting the female Ute. Brigham Young also expressed his belief that it was an act of self-defense. It does not seem the Mormon settlers felt they owed the Utes anything despite Bishop Johnson’s sincere desire to make peace. This was the clear message conveyed by Don Carlos Johnson. George Washington Bean as well indicates that neither Ivie nor Kelly believed that any payment should be made. Both of these men clearly indicate it was unwillingness on the part of the Mormons as why the negotiations failed. J.P. Humphrey, on the other hand, said that Wakara himself would only accept Ivie being delivered for trial as payment. It is not difficult to understand why the Mormons would not be willing to deliver Ivie into their hands to be tried by

22 Gallup, “Reminiscences,” July 17, 1853, quoted in Carter, 166.

23 Nelson Higgins to James Ferguson, March 16, 1853, reel 4, UTMC. Also see Christy, 400.

24 Johnson, 20.
a culture outside American legal tradition. Still, Humphrey indicates unwillingness by the Mormon settlers as well to pay anything at all. It seems clear the Mormons did not believe they owed the Utes anything.

Without any trade agreement, only an eye for eye would be accepted by the Utes as retribution. Anger and tensions between the Mormons and Utes had reached its peak. For the Indians, the death of Shower-O-Cats was the final straw in the Mormons’ disrupting their way of life. Wakara’s band finally possessed sufficient reason to react violently against the Mormons after months of growing tensions. Although Wakara seemed to not want a war, the failure to reach an agreement after the death of Shower-O-Cats was the breaking point. Soon after the war started both Wakara and Young began to express a desire for peace.

Was the Walker War an Actual War?

Many authors trivialize the Walker War. Armand Mauss, David Bigler, and Robert Carter refers to the conflict as the “so-called” Walker War. Lyman Tyler says it was a series of clashes but contends it was “hardly a war.” Howard Christy says, “The 1853 Walker War in Utah was not much of a war by most standards.” Ronald Walker, Richard Turley, and Glen Leonard minimize it by calling the conflict “Indian skirmishes known as the Walker War.” John Peterson writes, “Although the Walker War received much more attention at the

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25 Jared Farmer says in Ute culture murders could be covered with large payments of goods, animals, or both. See Farmer, 68.


28 Christy, 395.

hands of historians than has the Black Hawk War, Brigham Young referred to the 1853-1854 conflict simply as ‘a slight disturbance’ in which a handful of whites and about a score of Indians lost their lives.”

The Mormon witnesses involved in James Ivie’s depredation claim were also asked if the Walker War really deserved to be called a war. John Whorten Clark, attorney for the claimant, believed George McKenzie and others were “rather anxious” to have the conflict declared a war as a way to collect Indian war pensions. He called it the “so-called Walker War” as well. Part of Clark’s conclusion was based on the fact that McKenzie engaged in only one battle.

J.P. Humphrey was asked if the Indians had called it a war. Humphrey responded that the only statement to that effect came from friendly Indians accusing others of being at war. When questioned if he had heard any other Indian call it a war, Humphrey answered no; but he said the Mormons had little contact with the main tribe during the trouble. Humphrey also stated he was never involved in a fight with the Indians and only witnessed one Mormon killed, which was Alexander Keel. The attorney asked, “Then, of your own personal knowledge, you did not know of a war being carried on with the Indians?” Humphrey responded, “I don’t know what else you would call it. They were killing whites whenever they had the opportunity, but they kept so much in the mountains that there was few in proportion of them killed.” Humphrey maintained that although he had only seen one person killed, he knew of others being killed as well as being


31 “Deposition of George McKenzie,” pp. 13-15, James Ivie vs. the United States. For more information on the United States approving pensions and medals to all veterans of Indian Wars, see Gottfredson, 345-350. The affidavits for war pensions as well as Indian War medals are contained at the Utah State Archives. See “Commissioner of Indian War Records Indian War Service Affidavits,” reels 1-11, series 2217, Utah State Archives, Salt Lake City; “Secretary of State Indian War Veteran Medal Records,” reels 1-18, series 2220, Utah State Archives, Salt Lake City. By far the majority of those claiming pensions and medals in these records are those that served in Utah’s Blackhawk War, but there is a significant number of Walker War claims. Some Utah Indian War veterans claimed both the Blackhawk War and Walker War.
told by friendly Indians that twenty-five to thirty Indians were killed. Humphrey was further questioned if any Indian attacked the fort at Springville. After Humphrey answered no, the attorney asked, “That was not very war-like, was it?” Humphrey went on to say that the Indians did not have the power to attack the fort with the constant guard. The attorney, however, believed that from 1848 to 1854 the native force was superior to the whites and therefore could have wiped them out if they so desired. Humphrey said the Indians did not have the “sand” to do it. Therefore, not only do modern writers question calling this conflict a war, but so did these attorneys near the end of the nineteenth century.

The Walker War certainly was small in comparison to much larger wars, especially those involving the United States Army. The Walker War is definitely too small to be included in many scholarly works surveying Indian Wars. Despite the war being small in comparison to other white and Indian conflicts, the attorneys involved in the Ivie depredation case and many modern authors miss the effect the conflict had on the Mormon citizens as well as the Utes. It was a major issue to Brigham Young and those involved. There are many letters and actions of Brigham Young that demonstrate he came to see the conflict as more than “a slight disturbance.” That statement was made on September 30, before the most violent month of the war. The war

disrupted all the settlements north of Salt Lake City and as far south as Cedar City. As will be seen below the Mormons referred to it as a war from the beginning. Furthermore, not all Utes were involved in the war; it was carried on by Wakara’s followers. Therefore the attorney questioning J.P. Humphrey was likely wrong in thinking the Utes had the necessary forces to wipe out major settlements. The following pages will demonstrate the war was no small occurrence to the Mormons involved. Unfortunately, it is nearly impossible to determine the effects the war had on the Utes due to lack of Ute sources. But they too were disrupted by this conflict. Furthermore, although the violence was small in comparison to other conflicts, the Walker War did have instances of brutal violence.

_Wakara’s Band Retaliates_

According to Wakara’s biographer Conway Sonne some “indications exist” that Wakara was cautious about going to war after weighing the chances of victory. Sonne does not document Wakara’s reluctance for war. It does, however, fit Wakara’s behavior and general desire for peace. Sonne says it was Wakara’s “impulsive braves” including Ammon and Arapene who were agitating for war. Sonne says Arapene led part of the band through Payson Canyon possibly without Wakara’s knowledge. In Payson, the Utes killed Alexander Keel on July 18. Arapene told Wakara what had happened. Sonne writes, “If Walker had any hope of avoiding war, it vanished with the shot at Fort Payson. There was no turning back now. The Walker War was on.”

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33 Conway B. Sonne, _World of Wakara_ (San Antonio: The Naylor Company, 1962), 163-164. Leonard Arrington and Davis Bitton also indicate Wakara’s reluctance for war. They write, “Wakara, the powerful Ute leader who had welcomed the Mormons into the region (and had even been baptized and ordained a Mormon elder) found himself unable to control young hotbloods thirsting for retaliation against the white invaders.” See Leonard Arrington and Davis Bitton, _The Mormon Experience: A History of the Latter-day Saints_ (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), 151. But they are not detailed on what it means nor whether or not Wakara ever became involved.
Colonel Conover reported Keel’s death to Wells on July 19 and said Keel was shot dead by one of Wakara’s men while he was on guard. Initial reports said Chief Arapene had killed Keel, but later it was reported that Warronah did so. Years after the event J.P. Humphrey, a member of the Springville cavalry, said he witnessed the death of Keel and that he and others pursued the Indians but lost them up Payson Canyon. Lewis Barney was in Payson Canyon at the mill at the time with his sixteen-year-old son Walter. He said that two Indians came by the mill and threatened that if they killed a “Utah” the Indians would kill them. It was early morning so Barney ran into the nearby cabin to awaken the men and warn them of the coming Utes. By the time the men were getting up the Indians were attacking and firing at them. Barney described feeling the wind of the bullets as they zipped by his head. The women and children hid themselves in the brush. Meanwhile Barney and a Brother Walters ran to warn the nearby settlements of the Indian uprising. The settlements came under great excitement thinking the camp in the canyon had been massacred. Barney said the Indians gathered up all the Mormons’ horses, cows, and stock and began driving them up the canyon. Barney reported to militia commander Stephen Markham that the camp was fine but that the Indians had stolen their animals. Conover reported that twenty-five cattle and nine horses had been driven away.

34 Peter Conover to Daniel H. Wells, July 19, 1853, reel 4, UTMC. Conover also wrote George A. Smith reporting the death of Keel, July 19, 1853, reel 4, UTMC.

35 For the identity of Arapene as the killer, see Journal History of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Saints (LDS Journal History scrap book consists of typed entries and Newspaper clippings from 1830 to the present), July 30, 1853, LDS Archives; Deseret News, “Indian Difficulties,” July 30, 1853, p. 3. For the report of Warronah see Joseph Heywood at Ft. Nephi to Brigham Young, April 22, 1854, fd. 13, box 23, reel 32, BYC.

36 “Deposition of J.P Humphrey,” pp. 2, 4, 9-10, James Ivie vs. the United States. At the time Payson Canyon was often referred to as Peteetneet Canyon and many of the sources used here employ that name.

37 Lewis Barney, “Autobiography and Diary 1878-1883; 1886-1890,” p. 70-71, MS 4578, LDS Archives. Peter Conover also reported that on the way up Payson Canyon, the Indians attacked the sawmill and fired several shots at the surrounding Inhabitants, see Peter Conover to Daniel H. Wells, July 19, 1853, reel 4, UTMC.

38 Peter Conover to Daniel H. Wells, July 19, 1853, reel 4, UTMC. Also see Journal History, July 19, 1853. For a good description of the Ute tactic of steeling cattle, see Heiner, 72.
Azariah Smith was at Nephi at the time of Keel’s death and when the Utes began to steal cattle. He and his men were summoned back to Manti to warn the citizens of the Indian outbreak.39

Andrew Shumway said news about Keel spread like wild fire throughout Payson. Every man and boy in the town was armed because they fully expected to be attacked before morning. The women and children were placed in the school house while the men were posted throughout the town as guard.40

The Indians engaged in other deadly violence soon after Keel’s death. In Nephi the Indians shot and wounded a guard.41 At Sanpete, the Utes fired at some guards striking one of them in the arm and blowing it to “pieces.”42 Near Summit Creek, Clark Roberts was shot in the shoulder and John Berry in the wrist.43 At Summit Creek the Indians also drove out some of the families and took control of their houses.44 One Ute unsuccessfully attempted to ambush and kill a party led by Captain Edson Whipple that was pursuing some Utes for stealing cattle.45

Although Lieutenant Colonel William Kimball said the Utes had determined to “annoy” the settlements, the increase in deadly violence by the Utes can hardly be categorized as simply an annoyance. In the same letter, Kimball described the condition of three guards who were seriously injured.46 J.P. Humphrey said that one of the main incentives on the part of the

40 Andrew Shumway, “A Short Sketch of the Life & History of Andrew Parley Shumway,” p. 20, MS 1677, LDS Archives.
41 George A. Smith to Major Higgins, July 19, 1853, reel 4, UTMC.
42 Major Higgins to James Ferguson, July 20, 1853, reel 4, UTMC.
43 Nelson Kimball to Daniel H. Wells, July 24, 1853, reel 5, UTMC.
44 Journal History, July 25, 1853.
45 Edson Whipple to Brigham Young, July 23, 1853, reel 5, UTMC
46 William Kimball to Daniel H. Wells, July 25, 1853, reel 5, UTMC.
Indians during the Walker War was to steal cattle, but “if opportunity offered” they did not hesitate to kill.47

The Indian hostilities were seen as a war from the beginning by many Mormons and they continued to view it as such in later reminiscences.48 George McKenzie reported on August 15 that the Indians were on the “war path” all over the territory.49 Andrew Love wrote in his diary that on July 18 the Indians killed a man “which was the beginning of a war.”50 George W. Bean wrote that the tussle between James Ivie and Shower-O-Cats “resulted in a great war.”51 Commander of the Juab military district, Captain George Bradley, wrote from Nephi that a group of Uintah Indians passing through the area on July 18 said that “Walker had Declared War with the white settlements.”52 George A. Smith also wrote a letter to Young referring to the coming crisis as a “war.”53 On July 25, Smith warned that Wakara was gathering the Utes for “war.”54 Although the Mormons felt it was the Utes that had declared war, the Indians likely felt the Mormons had declared war by not dealing with Ivie. As stated previously, the Utes could have interpreted the Mormon attack on the Ute slave trade and Young’s order to have Wakara captured as a declaration of war.

47 “Deposition of J.P. Humphrey,” p. 13, James Ivie vs. the United States.

48 The earliest reference the author has found calling it the “Walker War” comes from 1857. See Madison D. Hamilton of Carson County to Daniel H. Wells, January 10, 1857, reel 33, fd. 17, box 23, BYC


50 Andrew Love, “Diary 1852 Sept.-1875 September,” typescript, July 18, 1853, p. 12, MS 1675, LDS Archives.


52 George Bradley to Daniel H. Wells, July 19, 1853, reel 4, UTMC.

53 George A. Smith to Brigham Young, July 22, 1853, reel 4, UTMC.

54 George A. Smith to Brigham Young, July 25, 1853, reel 5, UTMC; Journal History, July 25, 1853.
Preparations for War

Ned Blackhawk believes that the Ute objective was not to drive the Mormons out. Rather the Utes wanted to “terrorize” them, to destabilize their communities, and to procure stock, cattle, and horses. He also believes the Utes wanted to impoverish the Mormons by targeting mills and crops. Blackhawk’s hypothesis is possible and even likely. In order to carry out this strategy Wakara needed recruits to help him. According to George A. Smith, Wakara was recruiting Uintah Utes to fight by July 18. Chief Sowiet, the well-known Uintah chief, was not involved in the war. It is unknown how many Utes joined Wakara’s followers and from which bands. Wakara’s band was in constant flux with some Utes from different bands joining him at different times. Therefore it is highly likely that the report from Smith is correct. Wakara was probably recruiting wherever he could. According to Edson Whipple, an “express” from Wakara came into Provo causing many of the Indians to flee to the mountains. Whipple believed those that did not flee likely stayed as “spies.” What was in the express or whether or not the Indians fled to the mountains from fear, to join Wakara, or both is unknown. A few days later at Summitville, a Pahvant Indian specifically told George A. Smith that many of the natives in that area had fled out of fear of Wakara.

Wakara was not the only one preparing for the oncoming conflict. The Mormons were preparing as well. In the early days of the conflict the Mormons were determined to pursue the Indians and returned deadly violence of their own when attacked. Andrew Love described how

[56] George A. Smith to Brigham Young, July 25, 1853, reel 5, UTMC.
[57] Edson Whipple to Brigham Young, July 23, 1853, reel 5, UTMC.
[58] George A. Smith to Daniel H. Wells, July 27, 1853, reel 5, UTMC.
some Elders were sent on foreign missions but “the remaining part of Elders in the mountains are appointed missions to the Lamanites with muskets… and good rifles.” Special orders to Colonel Peter Conover said, “Col. Conover will take all possible measures to pursue and capture Walker the chief of the Utahs,” but they were told not to act on the offensive. Stephen Markham was to march in pursuit of Indians engaged in “hostilities” and recover stolen cattle and horses. In addition Markham was to bring the Indians who killed Keel to justice.

Both orders are a bit contradictory in that they were supposed to pursue the Utes to capture Wakara and to bring the murderers to justice but to act only on the defensive. The orders themselves are offensive operations in nature. Therefore, the previous interpretation that the Mormon tactic during the Walker War was one of defense and conciliation is not entirely correct. It was more complicated than that. Generally speaking, however, the intent of both Young and Wells was to act on the defensive. Furthermore, the offensive operations were likely seen as defensive from the Mormon perspective since they believed they had been attacked first.

War

In the early days of the conflict the Mormons executed several offensive operations against the Indians. Citizens at Hamilton Mill returned fire after being attacked and believed they wounded some Indians. The same report stated that at a nearby settlement one Indian was shot while trying to steal horses. G.G. Potter reported that the day after the Keel’s death, four

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60 Special Orders No. 1, July 19, 1853, reel 4, UTMC.
61 Special Orders No. 2, July 19, 1853, reel 4, UTMC.
62 This is the basic argument of Howard Christy.
63 Peter W. Conover to Daniel H. Wells, July 21, 1853, reel 4, UTMC.
Indians charged some Mormons, and he believed, one Ute had been killed. 64 Many other settlements also pursued the Indians as a result of Indian attacks and cattle theft. 65 Also near Nephi, three men were sent after some Indians that were producing smoke signals in the surrounding mountains. The Mormons found the Indians running and fired shots at them, but the Indians got away with some stolen horses. 66

The two largest operations came from Colonel Peter Conover and Colonel Stephen Markham. Colonel Peter Conover rounded up 150 men and Colonel Stephen Markham called out volunteers from Palmyra and Springville to pursue the Utes up Payson Canyon. 67 Major Evan M. Greene reported to Wells that on July 19, Conover and Markham were engaged with the Indians at Peteetneet where he reported six Indians were killed. 68

Conover called out all the Captains and headed towards Payson with his 150 men due to the fear that all of Payson was being murdered by the Indians. Upon arrival, however, they discovered all the Indians had fled to the mountains. Conover’s men stayed the day in Payson in case it was attacked. They then left for Manti fearing the Indians would attack there. Conover and his detachment spent the night at Salt Creek and left for Manti in the morning in accordance with orders given by George A. Smith. Conover reached Manti and placed men on guard during the night. Conover then held a joint council with his company and the Manti Company under

64 G.G. Potter to James Ferguson, July 21, 1853, reel 4, UTMC.
65 See General W. Brady to Daniel H. Wells, July 19, 1853, reel 4, UTMC; Major Higgins to James Ferguson, July 20, 1853, reel 4, UTMC; Major David Canfield to Daniel H. Wells, July 22, 1853, reel 4, UTMC.
66 George Bradley to Daniel H. Wells, July 21, 1853, reel 4, UTMC.
67 Peter Conover to Daniel H. Wells, July 19, 1853, reel 4, UTMC.
68 Major Evan M. Greene to Daniel H. Wells, July, 19, 1853, reel 4, UTMC. Also see Alexander, 114. Azariah Smith reported that a company of 150 men stopped at Manti and sent out scouting parties killing 5 Indians. He is not clear about which company did it. See Azariah Smith, “Journals, 1846-1912,” Sunday, July 24, 1853, p. 81.
Nelson D. Higgins. Soon afterwards the Utes did attack the city simultaneously on all four sides. The guards were able to hold them off and the Utes fled up the canyon and stole some cattle.

The next morning Conover sent twenty-five men in pursuit of the cattle and to find the Indians. Some of the natives were found dressing the beef after having killed the cattle. These Indians reported having seen Wakara and therefore Conover decided to follow after the natives while Higgins guarded the town. Orders then came from Brigham Young to return home. On the way home they were pursued by Indians who tried to stampede their horses by howling. Conover kept a good guard as they camped for the night and then returned home to Provo the next morning. Colonel Conover reported having found a number of butchered cattle in Payson Canyon. Conover promised to await orders from Wells before leading a campaign after the Utes.

Markham’s men pursued Wakara’s band across the mountains north of Manti for having stolen cattle and horses at Spanish Fork, Payson, and Spring City. Markham called out twenty-five men including James Ivie under Captain John M. Higbee to find Walker’s trail. Later Higbee turned command over to Captain “Alec” Williams to continue the pursuit while he returned to report to Markham. During the scouting trip the troops saw smoke rising. They made a charge for the camp and found that fifteen Indians had killed six to eight head of cattle. They were drying the meat when Markham’s militia opened fire at the order of Captain Williams. Ivie reported there were seven or eight Utes killed during the battle. When three to four-hundred of Wakara’s Utes were seen charging forward, Ivie and the others retreated back to

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70 Peter W. Conover to Daniel H. Wells, July 23, 1853, reel 5, UTMC.
Manti arriving at 6 a.m. Ivie made a full report of the occurrence to Markham.\textsuperscript{71}

By the end of these early days of the campaign, possibly eight Indians were killed and others wounded. One Mormon was dead and other Mormons were wounded. Clark Roberts was hurt at Provo, William Jolly was shot through the arm shattering it, and John Berry was shot through the wrist. In addition J.C. Sly was accidently shot at Salt Creek and an unnamed picket guard was shot through the leg.\textsuperscript{72}

Daniel Wells ordered the expeditions of Markham and Conover closed and wrote orders to the settlements asking militia commanders for a return to the policy of defense and reconciliation. All military districts from Davis and Weber in the north to the southern settlements were asked to have militia members report to their posts.\textsuperscript{73} Wells specifically said to “not follow the Indians into the mountains” and to act “wholly upon the defensive.”\textsuperscript{74}

Whereas before the settlements had been urged to build forts, Wells said now it should be “rigidly enforced”; citizens and residents were ordered home so that authorities could carry out their orders. All citizens were ordered to move into forts.\textsuperscript{75} Brigham Young wrote the Commissioner of Indians Affairs, George Manypenny, reporting the Indians had killed one man

\textsuperscript{71} “Deposition of James Ivie,” p. 5-6, James Ivie vs. the United States. Ivie was reported as being on a muster list on July 19 in Payson, Report of Major David Canfield, July 19, 1853, reel 4, UTMC. Ivie’s claim of 300 to 400 of Wakara’s Indians is likely a great exaggeration.

\textsuperscript{72} William Andrews in camp at Corn Creek to Daniel H. Wells, July 30, 1853, fd. 1, box 22, reel 32, BYC. Also see William Kimball to Daniel H. Wells, July 24, 1853, reel 5, UTMC; Report of Major David Canfield, July 19, 1853, reel 4, UTMC. The letter is dated as July 19, but it gives report up through July 28. Under the date of July 24 is the report of Clark Roberts and John Berry being wounded at Summit Creek. For the accidental shooting of J.C. Sly, also see George W. Bradley to Daniel H. Wells, July 22, 1853, reel 4, UTMC.

\textsuperscript{73} General Order, No. 1, from Daniel H. Wells, reel 4, July 21, 1853. “Nauvoo Legion (Utah), Southern Military Department William H. Kimball Detachment, Papers 1853-July-August,” (afterword WHK), MS 17208, LDS Archives. According to the report of Major David Canfield, on July 27 Conover’s men disbanded, Report of Major David Canfield, July 19, 1853, reel 4, UTMC. Also see Journal History, General Order No. 1, July 21, 1853; Deseret News July 30, 1853.

\textsuperscript{74} General Order No. 3, July 22, 1853, reel 4, UTMC.

\textsuperscript{75} General Order, no. 1, from Daniel H. Wells, July 21, 1853, WHK.
and wounded and killed horses and cattle. Young said he hoped using conciliatory policies
would end the hostilities.\textsuperscript{76}

Daniel H. Wells wrote Colonel Conover after Conover had returned to his post and said
Colonel George A. Smith had been placed in command of the southern department of the
Nauvoo Legion with instructions to do what was necessary to protect the settlements. Wells said
if they obeyed then the settlements would be protected. Andrew Love said that as of July 19 the
area south was under military law.\textsuperscript{77} Smith was ordered to meet with the Indians in Provo
Canyon in order to try and use them as friends, runners, and spies.\textsuperscript{78}

The settlements were ordered to build stockyards to protect livestock and grains; all stock
was to be corralled at night.\textsuperscript{79} In fact, in a letter to Stephen Markham, Brigham Young said
building forts was “secondary” to securing grain, crops, and hay.\textsuperscript{80} In addition to securing cattle,
southern settlements were also ordered to send surplus cattle to Salt Lake City for protection.\textsuperscript{81}
The surplus cattle were to be traded for arms and ammunition while others were to be delivered
to the tithing office.\textsuperscript{82}

\textsuperscript{76} Brigham Young to George Manypenny, undated, fd. 3, box 1, BYL. Also see Carter, 167.


\textsuperscript{78} Daniel H. Wells to Peter Conover, July 1853, fd. 4, box 1, BYL. Also see undated letter to Major
Higgins concerning George A. Smith’s appointment as commander of the south, fd. 4, box 1, BYL. Also see
General Orders no. 2, signed by Brigham Young, July 25, 1853, WHK.

\textsuperscript{79} General Order, no. 1, from Daniel H. Wells, July 21, 1853, WHK; Brigham Young to George A. Smith,
July 25, 1853, reel 5, UTMC.

\textsuperscript{80} Brigham Young to Stephen Markham, August 17, 1853, fd. 4, box 1, BYL. In another letter Young was
concerned that leaders were so occupied with building forts they were neglecting their grains and crops. Brigham
Young to Bishops Isaac Houston and Evans and Lieutenants Peterson and Wadworth, August 17, 1853, fd. 4, box 1,
BYL. Also see Brigham Young to Bishop Evans, August 17, 1853, fd. 4, box 1, BYL.

\textsuperscript{81} Daniel H. Wells to William H. Kimball, July 22, 1853, reel 4, UTMC; General Orders 2, July 25, 1853,
reel 5, UTMC; George A. Smith to Daniel H. Wells, July 27, 1853, reel 5, UTMC.

\textsuperscript{82} William H. Kimball to Daniel H. Wells, August 7, 1853, WHK.
In Cedar City settlers also had to ensure their coal was well guarded; a special barricade was built around a coal bed for ten men to guard. Men in Cedar City also guarded lumber and the mill.\textsuperscript{83} They were also to prepare guns and ammunition. No Mormon was to trade with Indians and not to go outside the forts without sufficient guard.\textsuperscript{84} At the fort in Fillmore in the Parowan military district all people were to be taken into custody that were outside the fort after 10 p.m.\textsuperscript{85} Soon after the curfew order, Captain Henry Standage said no one could leave the post or district without permission.\textsuperscript{86} Another hardship facing those in the southern settlements was that they had to ration food to all men, women, and children in keeping with strict military orders.\textsuperscript{87} Brigham Young and the Mormons were taking this conflict seriously.

Every region from north of Salt Lake City to the region south around Cedar City was affected by the Walker War. The Western Jordan and Cottonwood Military Districts, both located near the southern end of the Salt Lake Valley, were ordered to keep guard around the southern end of the Salt Lake Valley. They too were ordered to fort up around their houses as well as to store and guard their grain.\textsuperscript{88} A later letter acknowledged that Cottonwood was less dangerous and permitted people to fortify in their own homes.\textsuperscript{89} Even the residents of Ogden and Weber north of Salt Lake and dozens of miles from the trouble, were ordered to wall up part

\textsuperscript{83} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{84} General Order, no. 1, from Daniel H. Wells, July 21, 1853, WHK.

\textsuperscript{85} Captain Henry Standage to John Thompson, September 11, 1853, reel 5, 1853, UTMC.

\textsuperscript{86} Henry Standage, Fort Fillmore, Orders No. 3, September 19, 1853, reel 5, UTMC.

\textsuperscript{87} Daniel H. Wells to Henry Standage, August 31, 1853, fd. 4, box 1, BYL.

\textsuperscript{88} Daniel H. Wells to Captain Bennion, commander of Western Jordan Military District, July 29, 1853, fd. 4, box 1, BYL; Daniel H. Wells to Major Kelsey, Commander of Cottonwood Military District, July 29, 1853, fd. 4, box 1, BYL.

\textsuperscript{89} Daniel H. Wells to Major Easton Kelsey, August 20, 1853, reel 5, UTMC. Wells also said the forts in Cottonwood would only be temporary.
of the city and build a fort.\textsuperscript{90} Young also said a wall would be built around Salt Lake City six feet thick and twelve feet high.\textsuperscript{91} Although the violence mainly occurred in the vicinity of Provo and south around the area of Manti, the conflict affected the entire territory with expensive preparations. The actions by the Mormons in the early days of the conflict could be interpreted as simply law-enforcement in that they pursued the Utes for theft and committing murder. After the order went out for a massive amount of the territory to build forts and take extra measures to protect property and stock, the conflict had become much larger in scope than simply law-enforcement. These measures were preparations for war.

Some citizens described how the forts were built. George McKenzie said, “The houses were built in fort lines, forming a square, and where there were not houses enough to form a square it was generally filled in with a mud wall, with corrals and enclosures for stock all on the inside of this square.” In Springville McKenzie described the fort as follows: “A fort line was established, all buildings outside of that fort line were torn down, and re-built on the stockade ground, and where there were not enough buildings to fill the line it was stockaded some with timber, and some with mud walls.”\textsuperscript{92} J.P. Humphrey of the Springville Cavalry described the forts as simply a wall around the town 6 to 12 feet high.\textsuperscript{93} At Manti the citizens began tearing

\textsuperscript{90} Major D. Moore to Daniel H. Wells, August 15, 1853, reel 5, UTMC; James Ferguson to David Moore, October 31, 1853, “Nauvoo Legion (Utah) Adjutant General, Records 1851-1870,” (afterwards NAG), MS 1370, LDS Archives.

\textsuperscript{91} Brigham Young to Hosea Stout, September 30, 1853, fd. 5, box 1, BYL; Brigham Young to Brother Cannon, September 30, 1853, fd. 5, box 1, BYL; Journal History, August 23, 1853; Journal History, August 25, 1853.

\textsuperscript{92} “Deposition of George McKenzie,” p. 2-4, James Ivie vs. the United States. McKenzie also said that even before the Walker War all early settlements were built around forts, but that extra preparation were made to protect the territories citizens during the time of the Walker War. For example McKenzie said that before the Walker War most in Springville had moved out of the fort, but the lines of the fort were extended and extra precautions were taken during the Walker War, p. 16.

\textsuperscript{93} “Deposition of J.P. Humphrey,” p. 3, James Ivie vs. the United States.
down their houses and placing them in “the form of a fort around the block north of the stone fort.”

The moving out of homes and relocating to forts is one example of how this conflict affected the Mormon citizens on an individual level. People had to abandon their livelihood by moving from their farms around Provo into town for protection. Private corrals and stacks of hay and straw had to be removed that were outside of the fort line in Parowan. The entire city of Santaquin was abandoned and all the citizens moved into the fort at Payson. All families in central Utah were ordered to move themselves and their houses into the forts at Springville, Payson, and Palmyra. All unsafe and small settlements in Iron County were to be evacuated, with the settlers concentrating in Parowan and Cedar City. Richard Steele of American Fork said, “[A]t some settlements we had to leave our house and commence to live in forts and we had considerable difficulty with them [Indians] and had to tear down our houses and put them up in the fort and build a wall round our houses.” A letter from Cedar City described the removal of eight houses from Harmony; eight families were basically forcefully removed for what was considered their own safety. The same letter described the removal of thirteen homes.

William Henry Adams Jr. said concerning his father, William Henry Adams Sr. of

94 Azariah Smith, “Journals,” July 26, 1853, p. 81.
95 Joseph E. Thiriot, Life Story of John Clark [ca. 1905], MS 20021, LDS Archives. Joseph Thiriot was the grandson of John Clark and wrote this history as his grandfather dictated it to him.
96 Post Order No. 2 at Parowan, August 5, 1853, reel 5, UTMC.
98 George A. Smith to Daniel H. Wells, July 27, 1853, reel 5, UTMC.
99 Daniel H. Wells to William H. Kimball, July 22, 1853, reel 4, UTMC.
101 William H. Kimball to Daniel H. Wells, August 7, 1853, WHK.
Pleasant Grove, that “in 54, on account of the Walker War, all the Families, here and els[e] where in this country, had to fort in, and he had, a pair of Horses, and had to let them go to others, to go after the Indians, and by Riding and poor care, he lost them both, so he had 2 cows l[e]ft so he sold one.” Adams sold his cows to a man in Provo and said “times was hard, for a few years.” Adams Jr., who was 8 years old at the time, described how starting on July 18 the people of Pleasant Grove began tearing their houses down and moving them into the fort. In just six days, all the citizens had moved into the fort lining up their houses and building a rock wall on the outside. He described the summer of 1854 being a time of economic suffering for the settlers on account of the Indian War as well as grasshoppers destroying crops.

William Goforth described having to move “nearly all the houses” at Alpine into the fort. A coral was built in the center to hold all the cattle at night. Albert Merrill lived near Dry Creek and was commanded to move in the houses on two tiers of blocks. That fall he had to tear down the house and obtain another lot to move to. William Dame of Cedar City abandoned his new house of $3,000 in Paragonah to move into the Parowan fort. At Cedar City, George Albert Smith reported that on August 11 the men were quite sick but that the citizens continued to move into the fort. Daniel H. Wells wrote to Mormon leader Willard Richards at Alpine concerning the order for families to move into the city to remain until the men could secure

102 William Henry Adams, “Family History and Reminiscences 1916-[ca. 1931],” p. 21, 23, MS 12112, LDS Archives. The first page specifies that the history is specifically written by William Henry Adams Jr. and says it is written by “my own Memory and what my Father has told me.”
103 Ibid, 23.
105 Albert Merrill, “Biographical Record of Albert Merrill and Family, Together With His Progenitors,” MS 11299, LDS Archives.
106 Walker, Turley, and Leonard, 63.
107 George A. Smith to Daniel H. Wells, August 27, 1853, page 6 of the letter, reel 5, UTMC.
themselves within a fort. Several of these families had arrived but had nowhere to stay. Wells asked that Richards allow them to stay on his pasture and live in their wagons and to have cows for the families.\textsuperscript{108} Henry Lunt of Fillmore said the amount of labor from the old fort surpassed any that had been done before. He said nearly every man was busy enclosing the new fort.\textsuperscript{109} The order to move into forts throughout the territory was of such importance that even Reddick Allred recorded in his diary concerning the order while away on a mission in Hawaii.\textsuperscript{110} By August 13, Azariah Smith said the “whole camp” was now living in the stone fort or log house fort at Manti.\textsuperscript{111} These personal reminiscences demonstrate the hardship the war had on the Mormon citizens.

Living conditions in the forts could be extremely crowded and deplorable. A large immigrating company of Danes was sent to Sanpete to strengthen the settlements. Flora Washburn lived in one room and divided it to take in two married Danish couples. Fredrick W. Cox had two sixteen-foot rooms for his three wives and thirteen children. Cox added another wife that next October. Cox’s daughter described these living conditions:

\begin{quote}
Aunt Emeline’s room was lighted by one small window, one door and an open fireplace, and had room for two beds with the foot boards coming close together. There was scarcely room for her family to gather around the fire opposite the beds. The next room being the corner one had a door facing the east,…Aunt Jemina had two beds in here and Augnt Lydia one. They had no fireplace but used a stepstone for cooking and heating. They did all their work, lived and ate
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{108} Journal History, Daniel H. Wells to Willard Richards, July 31, 1853.

\textsuperscript{109} Journal History, September 25, 1853.

\textsuperscript{110} Reddick Allred, Journal, Aug. 1852-July 1854, October 15, 1853 entry, MS 8795, reel 9, item 1, Daughters of the Utah Pioneers, “Collection, 1828-1963,” LDS Archives. Reddick Allred also includes some of the Mormon deaths by name, such as John Dickson and John Quail.

\textsuperscript{111} Azariah Smith, “Journals,” August 13, 1853, p. 82.
in this same room. Mama had a small bedroom a little more than half way up the side of the fort. In it there was a corner fireplace with room for mother’s half chair where she sat to knit and we gathered around her and the fire.\textsuperscript{112}

The Coxes lived in these conditions for nine years.\textsuperscript{113}

The forts were kept under constant guard. Humphrey said two or more militia members had to stand guard all night and day. He said these constant guarding operations lasted to 1859. Depending on the level of the perceived threat, there were as many as twelve men standing guard at the gates of a fort.\textsuperscript{114} It was not just the men who had to stand guard, but also women. Nancy Higgins recalled that women and girls had to stand guard to give the small number of men in the fort a chance to rest and sleep.\textsuperscript{115} Standing guard not only caused fatigue among the men, it was difficult during the cold months of winter. In October, several men at Little Cottonwood refused to stand guard because of the cold weather.\textsuperscript{116} Standing guard was yet another aspect of this war that weighed on the Mormon settlers.

The war also had many other economic effects for the Mormons. Andrew Shumway was building a farm but it was put on hold due to the Walker War; farming operations were also put on hold near Payson.\textsuperscript{117} Sarah Brown wrote her husband Benjamin who was serving a mission in England and said their son Homer was having a difficult time building a house due to the


\textsuperscript{113} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{114} “Deposition of J.P. Humphrey,” p. 4, James Ivie vs. the United States.

\textsuperscript{115} Nancy Higgins, “A Short Sketch or Synopsis of the Life of Nelson Higgins Son of Daniel and Mary Higgins,” Notebook 1873-1910, MS 951, LDS Archives. The history begins as a history of Nelson Higgins written in first person. Then later the history of Nancy herself begins. The above quote is from her portion.

\textsuperscript{116} Major Easton Kelsey to Daniel H. Wells, October 12, 1853, reel 5, UTMC; Easton Kelsey to Adjutant Office, October 15, 1853, reel 5, UTMC.

\textsuperscript{117} Shumway, 19.
difficulty in acquiring wood. She said the Indians were so “troublesome” that all those needing wood had to go in companies of men.\footnote{Sarah Brown to Benjamin Brown, August 28, 1853. Benjamin Brown Collection, “Benjamin Brown Family Collection 1835-1983,” reel 1, fd 6, MS 17646, LDS Archives.} Lewis Barney said, “Many a precious life was lost, much property lost, much property damaged, and we were forced to abandon the mill…I was then under the necessity of working by days worth for my provisions and clothing to support my family. I also took up a lot and a piece of farming land in Spanish Fork and moved on it.”\footnote{Lewis Barney, “Autobiography and Diary 1878-1883: 1886-1890,” p. 72, MS 4598, LDS Archives.}

The moving of cattle to Salt Lake City was also difficult for the saints. In Cedar City six-hundred head had to be moved, so they divided the herd to ensure the stock would have sufficient guard.\footnote{William H. Kimball to Daniel H. Wells, August 7, 1853, WHK.} Those who drove the cattle had to deal with Utes who wanted to steal them. In September Brigham Young reported several cattle had been lost on the road.\footnote{Brigham Young to Captain I.W. Cummings, September 12, 1853, fd. 4, box 1, BYL.}

A description by Almon W. Babbitt gives an excellent picture of these trying times. In November Babbitt led a company of men south to find a site for a state penitentiary. They were accompanied by newly appointed Indian Agent Edward Bedell and sub-agent Stephen Rose. The party passed by Dry Creek fort and the fort at American Fork. Babbitt described the scene there:

> These places, I believe, have generally been called settlements, and from the looks of the farms and the relics of buildings that have been torn down for the purpose of removal, they have been very flourishing; but at present they throw over the mind a kind of gloom, like all other places and countries where the effects of war are to be witnessed.\footnote{Journal History, November 28, 1853. Babbitt also said he didn’t think the houses were compact enough, making them open for attack.}

Later at Summit Creek, he said, “[W]e found neither Indian nor white man; the whole settlement vacated, the houses either removed or burned by the Indians.”\footnote{Ibid.} For these citizens, it was more
than simply a “so-called” war of minor consequence. The moving into forts and the moving of cattle affected Mormon citizens economically and personally.

Due to the difficulties of these orders, cooperation to obey varied. George Washington Bean said they were all “obliged” to move into the forts during the war.\textsuperscript{124} Nancy Higgins of Sanpete County also said “we all was oblige” to live in forts “to be secure from Indians.”\textsuperscript{125} George A. Smith reported that citizens in the south gathering into forts seemed in a “good spirit.”\textsuperscript{126} Other settlers were not so happy to move. At Nephi, L.B. Foot refused to move into the fort and said he would “guard his own property.” Captain George Bradley said that a consequence of Foot’s decision was the loss of three horses. Four men were sent after the lost property.\textsuperscript{127} John D. Lee wrote from Iron County that he was able to carry out orders of breaking up the settlement without much trouble, but there were a few rebellious “spirits” who were opposed to the orders. Lee said he was determined to carry out the orders even if he had to shed the blood of those apostates. Colonel Little agreed and was willing to use powder and ball against them; Captain Steele said the men of Parowan were ready to back Lee up. Lee said they had peace after that threat.\textsuperscript{128} There were, however, three to four cases of disobedience by the

\textsuperscript{124} Bean, “Autobiography, 1897; Book IV,” 51.

\textsuperscript{125} Nancy Higgins, “A Short Sketch or Synopses of the Life of Nelson Higgins.” The history begins as a history of Nelson Higgins written in first person. Then later the history of Nancy herself begins. The above quote is from her portion.

\textsuperscript{126} George A. Smith to Daniel H. Wells, July 27, 1853, reel 5, UTMC.

\textsuperscript{127} George Bradley to Daniel H. Wells, July 19, 1853, reel 4, UTMC. One of the horses belonged to a Brother Whipple and two were J.W. Stewart’s horses.

\textsuperscript{128} John D. Lee to Brigham Young, September 24, 1853, fd. 4, box 32, reel 32, BYC. Also see Walker, Turley, and Leonard, 63. Some of the disobedience Lee is referring to is likely referring to the order to send surplus cattle north.
beginning of August in Cedar City. Daniel H. Wells said that those who disobeyed orders were to be treated as enemies and orders must be enforced by officers. Even with these strong orders Wells said to only be harsh if it became necessary.

Church leaders in the region north of Salt Lake City around Weber also experienced resistance from the settlers. Daniel H. Wells wrote Major David Moore, commander of the Weber Military District, concerning disobedience. Wells ordered Moore to carry out the orders that had been given. Wells told Moore that if men refused to comply “there is a way to make them” with harsh measures. Wells counseled Moore that leaving stock exposed gave help to the enemy. Wells said that the Indians would not be quelled unless counsel was obeyed. He told Moore that the settlers must move into a fort or be “chastened” until they obey. Furthermore it was “treason” not to do so. A later letter instructed Moore that Brigham Young had ordered those that were disobedient to be placed in irons and ball and chain.

Just like those that refused to move into forts, those who would not move their cattle north were to be treated as enemies. In Cedar City ten or twelve people came out in open rebellion over the issue of hauling off their cattle. They came out with guns swearing they would

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129 Lieutenant Colonel William Kimball to Daniel H. Wells, August 4, 1853, WHK. Letter is not specific about what the disobedience was, it could have either involved moving into forts or the order to move surplus cattle north.

130 General Orders No. 2 from Daniel H. Wells, July 25, 1853, reel 5, UTMC; Journal History, General Orders No. 2, July 25, 1953; Deseret News, July 25, 1853. Also see Daniel H. Wells to Lieutenants’ William Sudweeks and Charles S. Peterson, August 9, 1853, fd. 4, box 1, BYL.

131 Daniel H. Wells to Lieutenants’ William Wadsworth and C.S. Peterson, August 9, 1853, reel 5, UTMC.

132 Daniel H. Wells to Major David Moore, August 18, 1853, David Moore, “Collection.” Some of the letters in this collection spell “Moore” as “More.”

133 Daniel H. Wells to Major Moore, September 1, 1853, Moore, “Collection.” The building of forts and guarding grains are mentioned in this letter, but the main concern over disobedience concerns an order to send Oxen to Ft. Hall due to the deficiency there. Although that order is not necessarily related to the Walker War, the important thing is understanding the punishments that were being ordered to deal with disobedience itself.

134 George A. Smith, Special Order No. 1, August 27, 1853, reel 5, UTMC.
prefer killing their cattle or allowing the Indians to take them than to let them go. Five “rebellious” men were to be brought to “headquarters” for trial. One of the men, Scottish convert and militia Major Matthew Carruthers resigned his commission rather than obey orders to send his cattle north; he was replaced by John D. Lee. Lee threatened to kill those who were disobedient, although no one was ever killed. Dozens of militia members were court martialed. On August 10, George W. Bradley and Nelson Higgins reported three citizens dissatisfied with orders. In Iron County, several people were arrested for “Mutinous” conduct and disobeying orders. Young overturned their arrests due to it being their first offense, but he warned, “Let no person presume that it can be repeated with impunity.” Others were arraigned in court for falling asleep on guard or refusing orders to stand guard. In Provo men were fined for disobedience. Due to the perceived tyrannical rule, thirty-one men and women left southern Utah for California; all were excommunicated.

135 William H. Kimball to Daniel H. Wells, August 7, 1853, WHK. Concerning the arrest of the five men, also see George A. Smith to William H. Kimball, August 8, 1853, WHK. Also see George A. Smith to Daniel H. Wells, August 27, 1853, page 5 of the letter, reel 5, UTMC; Walker, Turley, and Leonard, 63.


137 July-November 1853, UTMC; Walker, Turley, and Leonard, 63. The courts martial were for disobeying orders, neglect of duty, sleeping on guard, etc. See for example, Post Order No. 2 at Payson, August 5, 1853, reel 5, UTMC; Special Order No. 20, Nauvoo Legion, Cedar Fort, August 3, 1853, reel 5, UTMC; Utah Southern Military Department, Cedar City, August 8, 1853, reel 5, UTMC; Cedar Fort, Special Order No. 12, September 2-12, reel 5, UTMC; Cedar Fort, Iron County, Returns of Court Marshal, November 15, 1853, reel 5, UTMC; Fort Parowan, Iron Country, Report of Court Martial, November 16, 1853, reel 5, UTMC; J.A. Little to George A. Smith, Cedar Fort, November 23, 1853, reel 5, UTMC.

138 George W. Bradley and Nelson Higgins to Daniel H. Wells, August 10, 1853, reel 5, UTMC.

139 Daniel H. Wells to LTC James A. Little, August 25, 1853, fd. 4, box 1, BYL; H. Wells to LTC James A. Little, August 25, 1853, reel 5, UTMC. Also see Also see George A. Smith to Daniel H. Wells, August 27, 1853, pages 5-6 of the letter, reel 5, UTMC; Return of Court of Enquiry, August 11, 1853, reel 5, UTMC.

140 John Thompson to James Ferguson, August 19, 1853, reel 5, UTMC.

141 Captain William Wall to Daniel H. Wells, Report No. 2, September 7, 1853, reel 5, UTMC.

142 Walker, Turley, and Leonard, 63. For one of the first reports that some of the “restless spirits” were on their way to California, see Major D. Moore to Daniel H. Wells, October 24, 1853, reel 5, UTMC.
The most notable court martial case involved Colonel Peter W. Conover. Conover was charged with “non-compliance of certain orders.” This included not having sufficient guards to herd the cattle. He apparently let the cattle roam freely and destroy grain. They were also vulnerable to Indians running them off. In addition, he was charged with not moving families and buildings into the fort. Conover was suspended from his command of the Provo military district and was told to consider himself under arrest while he awaited the decision of the general court martial. Captain William Wall took command of the district. In mid-September the charges against Conover were withdrawn and he returned as the commander of the military district around Provo.

Church leaders defended Brigham Young and Daniel H. Wells’ orders throughout the war; they believed disobedience gave power to the enemy. George A. Smith and William Kimball told Young that they believed the policy of gathering in forts was sound and would bring peace to the settlements. Heber C. Kimball believed the Indians were a “scourge” to the saints, but taught that if the people would obey they would be blessed. In October, George A. Smith gave an address condemning those that chose not obey the orders from Brigham Young’s security measures. Smith stated that the settlers were more influenced by Wakara than Young.

143 Daniel H. Wells to Peter W. Conover, August 25, 1853, reel 5, UTMC; Daniel H. Wells to Peter W. Conover, August 25, 1853, fd. 4, box 1, BYL.
144 George A. Smith to Daniel H. Wells, August 25, 1853, reel 5, UTMC.
145 Daniel H. Wells to Peter W. Conover, August 25, 1853, reel 5, UTMC; Daniel H. Wells to Peter W. Conover, August 25, 1853, fd. 4, box 1, BYL. William Wall was sustained as commander Provo military district on August 27. See George A. Smith to Brigham Young, August 27, 1853, reel 5, UTMC.
146 Daniel H. Wells and James Ferguson, Special Order, September 12, 1853, reel 5, UTMC.
147 George A. Smith and William Kimball to Brigham Young, July 28, 1853, reel 5, UTMC.
148 Journal History, Heber C. Kimball address at a special conference, August 13, 1853.
He attributed many of the losses the Mormons had endured to their disobedience. Therefore, the Walker War caused internal conflict due to the life altering orders given. The orders given to deal with the Indians during this conflict were exceptionally trying for the Mormon settlers. It was not an event of small consequence to those involved.

The war’s effects on the personal lives of Mormons involved more than just relocating to forts, movement of cattle, or internal conflicts. Some were called to different locations in order to strengthen weaker settlements. This caused many problems for the citizens. Joel Williams, a member of the cavalry, had to first relocate from Lehi to Nephi to strengthen that settlement. After returning home to Lehi he was then called to Iron County to help strengthen that settlement in November. He took his mother, wife, children, wife’s brother Daniel Thomas, and others. He joined a company with Samuel Rodgers as Captain. He had to skip early farming that year because of the Indians. Instead they had to stand guard at night over the cattle. At Cedar City Williams had to assist in building an adobe wall. He said he spent all winter hauling cattle. John Anthony was called to Iron County for settlement but was then forced to relocate to Nephi and abandon his home. What was left behind was burned by the Indians. George Heber Clark was called to Cedar City with fifty other families to assist in strengthening that settlement due to Indian troubles. His wife and two children had to sell all their property in order to buy a carriage and the necessary equipment for the move south. His son Heber was only two weeks

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149 Journal History, October 7, 1853. Smith said that Iron County had lost up to $25,000.
150 Joel Williams White, “Autobiographical Sketch, [1908],” MS 9610, LDS Archives.
151 “Biography of Sarah Ann Devoe Woolf,” fd. 6, reel 1, Benjamin Brown Collection. The beginning says the biography was written by Phyllis Ashcroft and Mildred Daines in 1935 from information given by members of the family who knew Sarah Ann.
152 Suzanna Mae Clark Gua, “The Migration of the Dalleys,” p. 4, MS 11154, fd. 1, LDS Archives; Suzanna Mae Clark Gua, “Biography of Susannah Dalley Clark,” p. 3, MS 11154, fd. 1. LDS Archives.
old when the move was made. Clark served under Captain Samuel S. White and raised crops to provide for the community. William Stowel, who for part of the war served as a commissary for Peter Conover, was called to move south to strengthen those settlements. He sold his property in Provo and moved to Fillmore. Thus families were disrupted on many different levels and the Mormon leadership took the conflict seriously; it was not a small uprising for them.

Although they issued orders to fort up and to secure property against the Utes, Young and Wells never lost sight of building good relations with friendly Indians and negotiating for peace. Wells ordered the Mormons to allow friendly Indians to take refuge in the forts. Several groups of Utes did stay in the forts. This demonstrates that not all Utes agreed with Wakara’s band waging war against the Mormons.

In September 1853 Brigham Young reported to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs that all Indians in the territory were peaceful other than Wakara and his band. Indian agent Edward Bedell also reported that nearly all Indians in the territory were peaceful. Kanosh, Sowiet, Kanarra, Peteetneet, and other Ute leaders were either opposed to the war, neutral, or made half-hearted gestures of cooperation.

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153 Suzanna Mae Clark Gua, “Biography of George Sheffer Clark,” p. 4, MS 11154, fd 1, LDS Archives. Gua was a granddaughter of George Clark.


155 Daniel H. Wells to Lieutenant Colonel Kimball, July 22, 1853, reel 4, UTMC.

156 William Kimball to Daniel H. Wells, August 1, 1853, reel 5, UTMC. In J.P Humphrey’s testimony he made a point that not all Utes were involved in the hostilities. See “Deposition of J.P. Humphrey,” James Ivie vs. the United States.

157 Brigham Young to George W. Manypenny, September 30, 1853, Box 1, Folder 5, BYL.

158 Edward Bedell to George W. Manypenny, September 30, 1853, Bureau of Indian Affairs, “Letters Received by the Officer of Indian Affairs,” reel 897, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, (afterwards BIA).

159 Sonne, 180
Mormons remained suspicious that the Indians were only “pretending” to be friendly; Chief Sowiet’s family was even shot at when they peacefully approached the fort in Provo.\footnote{Peter W. Conover to Brigham Young, August 9, 1853, reel 5, UTMC.} Like Chief Sowiet, Chief Kanosh expressed peaceful intentions. Again, Brigham Young and the Mormons were suspicious and distrusting. The Church’s First Presidency wrote to George A. Smith, “We are happy to learn that Kan-nosh has returned the Pah-van Indians, and that they are disposed to be friendly; But this is no doubt a ruse to throw the inhabitants off their Guard, that they may get the advantage of them.” The First Presidency reiterated the importance of keeping good guard so as to not be surprised by the Indians.\footnote{Brigham Young, Heber C. Kimball, and Willard Richards to George A. Smith, July 29, 1853, fd. 4, box 1, BYL; Brigham Young, Heber C. Kimball, and Willard Richards to George A. Smith, July 29, 1853, reel 5, UTMC. Young would later have a private meeting with Kanosh on August 23, see Journal History, August 24, 1853.} Although the war was with Wakara’s band, the Mormons distrusted all Native Americans of the territory.

\textit{Attempts at Peace}

Brigham Young and the Mormons continued to try and get messages to Wakara to negotiate peace.\footnote{Nelson Higgins to James Ferguson, August 7, 1853, reel 5, UTMC; George W. Bradley to Daniel H. Wells, August 21, 1853, reel 5, UTMC.} On one occasion Brigham Young sent a letter to Wakara with some tobacco.\footnote{Nelson Kimball to Daniel H. Wells, July 27, 1853, UTMC.} In the letter Young wrote:

\begin{quote}
I send you some tobacco for you to smoke in the mountains when you get lonesome. You are a fool for fighting your best friends, for we are best friends, and the only friends that you have in the world. Everybody else would kill you if they could get a chance. If you get hungry send some friendly Indian down to the settlements and we will give you some beef-cattle and flour. If you are afraid of the tobacco which I send you, you can let some your prisoners try it first and then you will know it is good. When you get good natured again I would like to see
\end{quote}
you. Don’t you think you should be ashamed? You know that I have always
been your best friend.\textsuperscript{164}

The letter was sent with George A. Smith on his southern expedition to deliver the official
general orders throughout the settlements.

As early as July 22, Wakara was said to have gone east, destination unknown.\textsuperscript{165} Around
Summitville Smith delivered tobacco to the Pahvants and explained he had a letter for Wakara.
Smith was told that Wakara was hiding with “the Spaniards at the head of the Severe.” The
Indians reported that Wakara said “that this is his land and does not want to leave it, he says he
loves the Mormons and wants to stay with them.”\textsuperscript{166} This report is very telling. According to
these Indians, Wakara’s concern was over his land, just as Wakara had told M.S. Martenas
earlier that month. Furthermore it seems Wakara desired peace as well, just days after his band’s
violent retaliation over Shower-O-Cats’s death. On August 5, Smith met with two Piede chiefs
at Parowan. They were friendly and said they did not want Wakara and the Mormons to fight.
The chiefs said Wakara “talks good but his men won’t hear.”\textsuperscript{167} It seems clear that Wakara did
desire peace, but that he did not have complete control over all the Utes, whether they were
members of his band or not. A few days later on August 21 at Nephi Smith met with some
Indians that said Wakara and his men had gone to meet the Spaniards to trade “on the Colorado.”
They went on to say that Wyonah was the one carrying on the war; Wyonah was apparently

\begin{footnotes}
\item[164] Journal History, July 25, 1853; Brigham Young to Captain Walker, July 25, 1853, reel 5, UTMC. Letter
is published in Arrington and Bitton, 152.
\item[165] Sonne, 166.
\item[166] George A. Smith to Daniel H. Wells, July 27, 1853, reel 5, UTMC.
\item[167] George A. Smith report of expedition to Daniel H. Wells, August 27, 1853, reel 5, UTMC
\end{footnotes}
angry at the death of some of his “brothers.”

With Wakara desiring peace and departing the territory just days after the start of the violence, it is natural to question Wakara’s role in what has been called the Walker War. It is not even that certain Wakara was involved in the earliest days. He may have left the area by July 22. Then by July 27 he was reported to be hiding among the Spanish. Then a month later he was still gone and out of the picture. The reports that Wakara was gone and that he was seeking peace beg the question of whether the conflict should be labeled the Walker War at all. On the other hand the war was against Wakara’s band. Anson Call, Bishop of Fillmore, said that even in Wakara’s absence his band of Indians seemed to be responsible for all Indian attacks. If it was his entire band then it would seem inevitable the war would bear his name.

It is clear that Wakara desired peace even after having his power diminished by Mormon authority and after the death of a member of his own band who was also possibly a relative. Perhaps Wakara believed that the death of Keel was enough to avenge the death of Shower-O-Cats. Ned Blackhawk speculates that by January of 1854 Wakara realized he could not break fortified Mormon settlements and that other Ute bands had fled rather than joining him and therefore Wakara’s “Utes scaled back their hostilities.” Wakara may have come to this realization even earlier and desired peace in order to once again gain the Mormons as trading partners. It may have taken his angry band longer to realize it was a no-win situation. Yet Wakara’s involvement is questionable from the beginning of the violence. Regardless of Young or Wakara’s desire for peace, the war would continue.

168 George A. Smith report of expedition to Daniel H. Wells, August 27, 1853, reel 5, UTMC. Thomas Alexander says that Wakara went to Arizona for the winter and that Wyonah was carrying on the war, Alexander, 115. However, later Wakara is said to have gone to Uinta Valley as will be seen below.

169 Blackhawk, 242.

170 Ibid, 243.
At the Allred settlement in Sanpete, fifty to one hundred Utes charged down the mountains and drove off two hundred head of cattle.\(^{171}\) J.P Humphrey reported that the Utes killed seventy-five of these cattle in a narrow pass to block Mormons from chasing them down.\(^{172}\) Colonel Conover wrote Brigham Young for instruction about how to deal with the situation.\(^{173}\) Wells counseled Conover to use defensive tactics only. He denied any request to pursue the Indians because he believed it would lend to the loss of men and animals. Wells instructed the settlement to secure what was left because “prevention” is better than the “cure” after the fact. He also scolded Major Higgins, saying that if his men had been guarding as they were supposed to, then this would not have happened.\(^{174}\) Brigham Young agreed with Wells that the Indians should not be pursued.\(^{175}\) In a personal letter to Conover, Young said that it was best to not follow the Indians “into the mountains as that course would only tend to increase their fears.” He instructed Conover to tell the inhabitants in his district to take every opportunity to conciliate the Indians.\(^{176}\) Much like Wakara’s continued desire for peace, Young continued his desire to reconcile with the Native Americans.

Wells ordered the Allred settlement to be evacuated to Manti to strengthen that city.\(^{177}\)

\(^{171}\) Peter W. Conover to Daniel H. Wells, July 29, 1853, reel 5, UTMC. Also see Journal History, July 28, 1853. The Allred Settlement is now Spring City, see Alexander, 114.

\(^{172}\) “Deposition of J.P. Humphrey,” pp. 8, 16, James Ivie vs. the United States. Humphrey also recalled that one man was killed during the raid, but no contemporary source verifies this death.

\(^{173}\) Peter W. Conover to Brigham Young, July 30, 1853, reel 5, UTMC.

\(^{174}\) Daniel H. Wells to Nelson Higgins, July 31, 1853, reel 5, UTMC; Daniel H. Wells to Nelson Higgins, July 31, 1853, fd. 4, box 1, BYL. A letter to Major Nelson Higgins likely from Young but perhaps from Wells prior to the raid expressed concern that the Allred settlement was in danger. James Allred was ordered to move to Manti, but Allred thought he could maintain it and would await orders to him individually to make the move. See letter to Major Nelson Higgins, July 1853, fd. 4, box 1, BYL.

\(^{175}\) Brigham Young to Amasa Lyman and Charles C. Rich, July 31, 1853, fd. 4, box 1, BYL.

\(^{176}\) Brigham Young to Peter Conover, August 10, 1853, fd. 4, box 1, BYL.

\(^{177}\) Daniel H. Wells to Major Nelson Higgins, July 31, 1853, reel 5, UTMC.
Thirty teams of the cattle that were left were taken to Manti. After the abandonment of the Allred settlement, the Utes returned and “plundered” Allred’s father’s house taking furniture and supplies. By September the Allred and Hamilton settlements had been abandoned and the people had found refuge in Manti. In October Brigham Young did allow people who wished to return to the Allred Settlement to move into the log fort there until the settlement could be better fortified. In late November, however, the Allred settlement was declared a “field of slaughter.” In December teams were sent from Manti to assist the move from the Allred Settlement. Families had to be taken in by others as described by Azariah Smith. Once again the Walker War had an effect on people at the personal level.

Elsewhere Indian raids and violence continued as well. On the tenth of August Utes fired upon ten men commanded by Lieutenant R. Burns while encamped on Clover Creek in Juab Valley. Two horses were killed, one horse and several calves wounded, and Isaac Duffin was wounded in the knee. In addition two Indians were killed and three were wounded. Staying true to the policy of defense, Bradley sent more men to guard and assist those that were attacked; he did not order any men to pursue the attackers. Colonel Conover wrote Brigham Young

178 Azariah Smith, “Journals,” Wednesday, August 8, 1853, p. 82.
179 Sanpete Military District to James Ferguson, August 2, 1853, reel 5, UTMC.
180 Journal History, September 2, 1853.
181 Brigham Young, October 3, 1853, fd. 5, box 1, Letterpress, LDS Archives.
182 Letter from Adjutant General Office in Salt Lake City, November 25, 1853, NAG. Who the letter is to and from is confusing. The bottom of the letter says “for” James Ferguson, but also says “to” Major Nelson Higgins of Sanpete. It is signed as being from Daniel H. Wells in one place and Brigham Young in another.
185 George Bradley to Daniel H. Wells, August 11, 1853, reel 5, UTMC.
concerning the incident, adding that five Indians were killed in the tussle. Clearly the Ute
tactic of increased violence against the Mormons was having deadly consequences for the
Indians themselves, but that did not prevent Utes from continuing to raid the cattle drives to Salt
Lake. On August 15 two Mormons, John Dixon and John Quail, were “massacred” and John
Hoagland was “seriously” wounded on the way to Salt Lake City. In reaction to these killings,
Wells and Ferguson ordered patrolling parties around the mountains between Salt Lake and
Provo to “route” the Indians. The Mormon response to the Utes’ increased violence was to
become more aggressive in sending out patrolling parties. Yet their orders were still to protect
the settlements and not to attack. The patrols were to express friendship and peace with the
Indians. In addition, the patrolling parties were to endeavor to carry out the orders without
bloodshed. The detachment sent after those that had killed the above Mormons brought back
the bodies. Another part of the detachment went to Snyder’s Mill and dismantled it finding no
sign of the natives. About the same time the Indians burned several houses in southern
settlements, burned lumber and a mill at Sanpete Valley, and shot at the settlers in Juab.

In addition to the above murders, another report came close to the same time saying that
Corporal John Dickens of the Battalion of Life Guards had been murdered near Snyder’s Mill
east of Salt Lake City. The violence had moved north of Utah County. As with the other
murders, a detail was ordered out with Lieutenant Ephraim Hanks in charge to locate the body as

186 Peter W. Conover to Brigham Young, August 12, 1853, reel 5, UTMC.
187 Special Orders, number 13, August 16, 1853, reel 5, UTMC. Also see Journal History, August 18,
1853; Journal History, August 25, 1853. For a good description of the attack that killed John Quail and John Dixon,
see Sonne, 169.
188 Journal History, August 25, 1853.
189 Journal History, August 14, 1853.
well as to attempt to find the murderers. Part of Hanks’s detachment was to guard Mr. Snyder and his men at the mill until they could make arrangements to leave.

Although Brigham Young was doubtless angry at the situation, he maintained his policy of defense. On August 19, Young sent out a proclamation to the territory that the Utah Indians “have been for sometime, and still are in a state of open and declared war with the white settlers, committing injuries upon them at every opportunity, killing them, driving off their stock, and burning their mills, and dwellings.” Young also said there was evidence that white settlers were still trading and selling guns and ammunition to the hostile Indians. The Governor forbade any and all trading with the Indians, including trade by passing emigrants. The citizens were also not to aid the Indians with shelter, food, or comfort without permission. Young did, however, grant leaders the right to furnish a small quantity of ammunition to “known” friendly Indians to hunt, but to use caution when doing so. The increased violence was obviously causing Young to become stricter. Wells’s original order was to allow friendly Indians into the forts; now Young specifically said the settlers needed permission to admit them. The war was having an effect on both the Mormons citizens as well as the church leadership. Young again ordered all settlements to preserve their lives and property by good security measures and to build their defenses as soon as possible.

\[\text{References}\]

190 Special Orders by Daniel H. Wells and James Ferguson, August 17, 1853, reel 5, UTMC.

191 Daniel H. Wells to Lieutenant Ephraim Hanks, August 18, 1853, reel 5, UTMC.

192 Proclamation of Governor Brigham Young, August 19, 1853, reel 5, UTMC; Journal History, August 19, 1853; “Proclamation of Governor Brigham Young,” Deseret News, August 19, 1853, p. 2. The selling of guns had been a concern for at least a month; several Mormons had been excommunicated for such behavior in Grantsville. See Journal History, July 20, 1853.

193 Brigham Young to Captain H. Standage, August 24, 1853, fd. 4, box 1, BYL; Brigham Young to Major Higgins, August 24, 1853, fd. 4, box 1, BYL; Brigham Young to LTC Jason A. Little, August 24, 1853, fd. 4, box 1, BYL; Brigham Young to Captain George W. Bradley, August 24, 1853, fd. 4, box 1, BYL.

194 Proclamation of Governor Brigham Young, August 19, 1853, reel 5, UTMC.
leaders. The violence was taking a toll on them.

Concern over trade with the Indians among travelers and others caused Brigham Young to order Daniel Ferguson to raise fifty men to go to Green River and Ft. Bridger to prevent Jim Bridger and the mountaineers from trading ammunition with Indians. In addition to collecting the ammunition, the detachment was to collect or destroy “spirituous liquors” that were intended for the Indians and to recover stolen property. They were to arrest all those in violation of U.S. laws. The command was to keep friendly relations with Sowiet’s band if they came in contact with them. They were to try to quell hostilities with the Indians. They were also to maintain good relations with the Shoshone. Lieutenant Colonel William Kimball joined James Ferguson with thirty mounted men. The order to Ferguson was not just to act on the defensive. Ferguson’s detachment was also to rout the Indians from their “lurking places” and “all hostile bands of Indians and seek to recover the property which they have taken from the whites and sustain and enforce the Laws of the United States.” Young seemingly contradicted himself. On the one hand he advised the citizens to not pursue the Indians for lost property, yet he ordered Ferguson to do exactly that. This order demonstrates that the entire war was not defensive. Although defense and conciliation seemed to be the ultimate intent, it seems Young himself had become frustrated with what was going on and therefore ordered an expedition.

195 Brigham Young to James Ferguson, August 20, 1853, Nauvoo Legion (Utah) Battalion Life Guards, “Papers, 1850-1856,” (afterwards BLG), MS 17205, LDS Archives. David Bigler believes this planned raid on Ft. Bridger was partly motivated by Young’s desire to resolve the friction between the Mormons and Jim Bridger, Bigler, 78-79.

196 Brigham Young to Captains of Companies and Brethren Emigrating hither, August 20, 1853, BLG; Brigham Young to Captains of Companies and Brethren Emigrating hither, August 20, 1853, fd. 4, box 1, BYL; Brigham Young to Captains of Companies and Brethren Emigrating hither, August 20, 1853, reel 5, UTMC.

197 Daniel H. Wells to William H. Kimball, August 24, 1853, WHK; LTC William H. Kimball to James Ferguson, August 27, 1853, reel 5, UTMC.

198 Utah Territory, Executive’s Office Department Indian Affairs Special Orders and Instructions to Major Ferguson Commanding Battalion Minute Men, August 20, 1853, fd. 4, box 1, BYL.
against the Indians.

By August 29, Ferguson gained possession of Ft. Bridger. Jim Bridger had fled.\textsuperscript{199} It was believed Bridger may have gone to Laramie and cached his guns and ammunition he had been trading with the Indians.\textsuperscript{200} Brigham Young wrote James Ferguson and told him to collect the contraband items (liquor, guns, ammunition) and leave Ft. Bridger and continue other business. Young hoped Bridger might return and be caught off guard.\textsuperscript{201}

Violence slowed towards the end of August and early September. Officials in Fillmore reported all was peaceful there.\textsuperscript{202} In early September Provo also reported all inhabitants were in the limits of the fort and there appeared “to be a general disposition to carry out the Governors orders.” Despite the positive report some were still angry about having their cattle taken north.\textsuperscript{203} In fact, there were still reports of horse or cattle theft and soon violence continued.\textsuperscript{204}

Orders to secure property and not to pursue or attack the Indians were blatantly disobeyed by certain militia leaders. Perhaps others felt justified by Young’s aggressive orders to Ferguson. Colonel Nelson ordered Captain G. Potter to lead an expedition to recover some property stolen from the Manti Mill, from an Indian camp whose location some friendly Indians claimed to know. The camp was empty and the property was recovered.\textsuperscript{205} Following this on

\textsuperscript{199} LTC William H. Kimball to Daniel H. Wells, August 29, 1853, reel 5, UTMC.
\textsuperscript{200} Daniel H. Wells to Louis Robison, August 31, 1853, reel 5, UTMC.
\textsuperscript{201} Brigham Young to James Ferguson, August 31, 1853, reel 5, UTMC. For a good description of this mission to Ft. Bridger, see Bigler, 78-79.
\textsuperscript{202} Captain Henry Standage to George A. Smith, September 13, 1853, reel 5, UTMC.
\textsuperscript{203} Captain William Wall to Daniel H. Wells, Report No. 2, September 7, 1853, reel 5, UTMC.
\textsuperscript{204} Letter from Fort Parowan to James A. Little, August 29, 1853, reel 5, UTMC; Captain Henry Standage to George A. Smith, September 13, 1853, reel 5, UTMC.
\textsuperscript{205} Nelson Higgins to Captain Potter, September 13, 1853, reel 5 UTMC; Captain Potter to Major Higgins, September 15, 1853, reel 5, UTMC.
September 14, six Indians came with their women to Manti “pretending” to be friends. The local Mormons followed them back to their camp and found stolen property. That evening the Indians were taken down the road and shot.206 Albert Smith said the Mormons also thought they were “spies.” Smith said their fate was decided in counsel; the men were to die and the women were to be taken prisoner. Albert recalled that eight Indians were escorted outside the town and shot in front of his home.207

A letter from Manti provided different details and said only five were killed. The Indians first came in late August and gave up their arms. They were promised if they remained peaceable they could return with their families and work and be protected. Four men, one sixteen year old boy, five women, and four children all gave up their guns. Afterwards some of the Mormon men rode back to the Indian camp and found stolen chickens, a buffalo robe, and some lead. Major Nelson Higgins consulted with Stake President Isaac Morley. Morley believed they should be killed. The four men and the boy were led out, one of the men plead for mercy, and then were shot down. A couple days later, the Indians’ property, wives, and children were sold to the highest bidder. Isaac Morley bid three bushels of wheat for an eight or nine year old girl. A few days later following the Church’s General Conference, Morley confessed it was a grievous sin in the sight of heaven to have sold the children and vowed to rescind the sale. A Mrs. Black at first refused to give up the child she had bought saying she had become attached to the child, but she was forced to rescind the sale.208 The murder and sale of Indians demonstrates that the violence did not only affect the Mormons; the Utes themselves suffered in

206 Smith, “Journals,” Wednesday, September 14, 1853, p. 83.

207 Albert Smith, “Reminiscences and Journals [ca.-1876]-1892,” pp. 60-61, MS 1835, LDS Archives. Albert Smith seems a bit confused. He believed at the time of his reminiscence that Wakara was dead in 1853/54.

208 Andrew Lafayette Siler to Brigham Young, November 13, 1853, fd. 6, box 23, reel 32, BYC.
these aggressions.

On September 14 about seventeen Indians drove off four head of oxen in Red Butte Canyon. Again abandoning orders to not follow the Indians, some Mormons pursued and fired upon them. The frightened Utes fled leaving the stolen cattle. The same day in Fillmore three Utes fired upon and killed William Hatton who was standing guard.\footnote{Journal History, September 13, 1853.} Thus deadly violence was increasing on both sides.

Despite the increase in Mormon aggression towards the Utes, several chiefs expressed friendliness. Chief Antero and Yampa Ute chief White-Eye agreed to have Dimick Huntington and Indian agent Edward Bedell go south to trade with them.\footnote{Journal History, September 12, 1853; Carter, 193.} Robert Carter believes this gesture by these chiefs demonstrates that the Utes were divided in their “zeal for war.”\footnote{Carter, 193.} Cleary the Utes were never really united in the first place. Chiefs Sowiet and Kanosh never favored this conflict and perhaps neither did Wakara.

In September, word came again that Wakara was seeking peace. J.L. Heywood spoke with some Indians around Nephi who had seen Wakara and wrote that the great Indian chief was disposed to peace and had gone to Uinta with most of his band. According to them it was Arapene who would “never make peace but wanted to fight.”\footnote{J.L Heywood to Brigham Young, September 22, 1853, reel 5, UTMC.} Wakara may have been back in the area from Colorado to try and negotiate peace. A letter from John D. Lee two days later on September 24 told a different story. Lee said that Wakara and his band were about 250 miles South East of Cedar Fort. Supposedly he sent Ammon to trade with the Spaniards for powder and to enlist the aid of the Navajos. Two Indian women claimed Wakara planned to attack the

\footnote{209 Journal History, September 13, 1853.}

\footnote{210 Journal History, September 12, 1853; Carter, 193.}

\footnote{211 Carter, 193.}

\footnote{212 J.L Heywood to Brigham Young, September 22, 1853, reel 5, UTMC.}
southern settlements when the snow fell.\footnote{213}{John D. Lee to Brigham Young, September 24, 1853, reel 32, fd. 4, box 23, BYC. Cedar Fort would have been Cedar City.}

It is difficult to ascertain what Wakara’s true intentions were. Both reports make sense considering Wakara’s history. In the past Wakara had wanted to attack the Mormons but was unable to recruit a sufficient force to do so. It is believable that Wakara could have been once again trying to build a big enough force to attack the Mormons. The attempt to get recruits and weapons from Spanish traders could explain his absence. On the other hand, since 1851 Wakara had kept peaceful intentions in the face of the Mormons’ expansion and occupation of his lands and regulation of trade with the Spanish. Furthermore there were already reports of Wakara wanting peace after the war began. It is easy to believe Wakara once again desired peace after the opening days of the war and after Keel was killed in revenge for the death of Shower-O-Cats. Then again it is also possible Wakara was trying to recruit a bigger force in case peaceful negotiations failed again. Or perhaps Wakara was angry at recent developments and had changed his mind about seeking peace and did want to attack with a large force. It is impossible to know for certain. What is certain is that both of Lee’s and Heywood’s reports could not be true at the same time; they placed Wakara in two different locations.

Regardless of which report was true, both demonstrate Wakara was not the one running the war that now bears his name; both reports had Wakara absent from the areas of violence. Whether it was Arapene, Wynona, or individual members of Wakara’s band acting on their own, the violence continued near the end of September. Colonel Markham reported an expedition on September 25 and 26 against a “troublesome” band of Indians in the vicinity of Summit and Willow Creek that had been stealing grain, vegetables, and “various other articles.” The Utes also shot at John Brimhall while he was looking for cattle and robbed a man of his clothing who
was on his way to California. In addition the natives shot at a Brother Wheaton between Payson and Springville. These Ute aggressions could have possibly been in response to the Ute slaughter on September 14. Staying true to the recent offensive operations of the Utah militia, Colonel Conover ordered Markham “to take his men and rout them, and if they would not quit stealing to use them up.” Markham ordered out his men on September 25 to find this band of Indians. Captain C.B. Hancock found the camp that night. The next morning the Mormon militia surrounded the camp. In the confusion the fifteen to twenty Utes ran to hide under the bank of a nearby river. The militia proceeded to fire upon them for a short period of time. During the short battle Hancock was wounded in the back of the head. Markham believed they killed four to five of the Indians but was not certain since they were hidden. The militia members found and recovered eight bushels of wheat, corn, tools, “Irons,” and “various articles” that had been stolen.

A group of Utes responded with their own malicious violence. On October 2 George Bradley reported the “barbarous murder of three of our brethren” that took place September 30. Four Mormons on their way to Salt Lake City from Manti with two wagon loads of wheat were attacked. Three of the bodies were found at Uinta Springs near Nephi by a company headed by Isaac Morley. The bodies were found stripped and one of them mangled. Later details were

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214 Stephen Markham to Daniel H. Wells, September 28, 1853, reel 5, UTMC; Stephen Markham to Daniel H. Wells, October 5, 1853, reel 5, UTMC.

215 Peter Wilson Conover Journal, quoted in Carter, 194.

216 Stephen Markham to Daniel H. Wells, September 28, 1853, reel 5, UTMC; Stephen Markham to Daniel H. Wells, October 5, 1853, reel 5, UTMC.

217 George Bradley to Daniel H. Wells, October 2, 1853, reel 5, UTMC. Also see Goforth, “Autobiographical Sketch,” p. 3; Journal History, October 1, 1853; Journal History, October 4, 1853; Smith, “Reminiscences and Journals,” p. 61. For the exact date of the murder of September 30, also see Journal History, October 15, 1853.
reported demonstrating the brutality of what happened. William Luke was stuck in the head twice with an ax; James Nelson’s throat was cut; and William Reed was shot. Thomas Clark who was not initially found, was discovered in a wagon. 218 Peter Gottfredson said Thomas Clark had been scalped and had his head crushed along with his body cut open and heart taken out. 219 Azariah Smith was with a team bound for Salt Lake on October 1 when they discovered the brutal scene. 220 For the Mormon settlers of Nephi, such actions would not go unpunished.

The morning of October 2, George W. Bradley invited seven Indian men and one Indian woman to the fort at Nephi to talk. Bradley asked the Indians to lay down their arms before entering, but the Utes refused. When Bradley ordered their arms taken, the Indians reacted violently by shooting two arrows and wounding one Mormon in the arm. Bradley ordered his men to open fire, and they killed seven Indians. The woman was taken prisoner. An hour later another Indian with a boy came toward the fort; the Indian was shot and the boy taken prisoner. That evening, a guard shot at and probably killed another Indian. 221

Reports of these murders vary. Gottfredson’s account said a militia company encountered a camp of Indians where a “skirmish” occurred, resulting in the death of eight male Indians and one woman; two Indian boys were taken prisoner. 222 Details from reminiscences and journals tell a much different story. Albert Smith who was with Morley’s company when

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218 Nelson Higgins to Daniel H. Wells, October 5, 1853, reel 5, UTMC. J.P. Humphrey said in his 1897 testimony that their tongues were cut out and that they were buried in the wheat they were hauling from Sanpete. Humphrey mistakenly gives the number as five Mormons being killed on this occasion. See “Deposition of J.P. Humphrey,” pp. 7-8, James Ivie vs. the United States. Peter Gottfredson said Clark was covered by wheat in the wagon, which may explain why he wasn’t originally found, Gottfredson, 75.

219 Gottfredson, 75.


221 Stephen Markham to George W. Bradley, October 2, 1853, reel 5, UTMC. Also see Journal History, October 2, 1853.

222 Gottfredson, 75.
they discovered the corpses of the four mangled settlers said that the “Br[other]” with him determined that all Indians in the town of Nephi should be killed the next day.\textsuperscript{223} Historian David Bigler identified this “Brother” to be Isaac Morley which is highly likely.\textsuperscript{224} Smith said he counseled against such action, but he indicates that the council decided on “execution.”\textsuperscript{225} Martha Spence Heywood said that Morley and Anson Call of Fillmore had determined to commit a “barbarous” act. She said that nine Indians came looking for protection and bread. The Mormons promised it to them and then they “were shot down without one minute’s notice.” She said it caused a great amount of “gloom” on her mind and she considered the treatment inhumane.\textsuperscript{226} According to a biography about John Anthony Woolf Jr., the seven Indians were warned by a runner aware of the above murdered Mormons to not go into town if they “valued their lives.”\textsuperscript{227} The violence between the Mormons and Utes had become absolutely brutal. This conflict was no so-called war.

The Utes responded to the murder of these Indians at Nephi with further violence of their own. A party of Indians on October 4 shot and killed John Warner and William Mills at the grist mill near Sanpete. In addition, the Indians burned the mill and killed some oxen.\textsuperscript{228} The Mormons and Indians almost seem to have become engaged in a blood-feud, killing each other

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{223} Smith, “Reminiscences and Journals,” p. 61.
\item \textsuperscript{224} Bigler, 81.
\item \textsuperscript{225} Smith, “Reminiscences and Journals,” p. 61.
\item \textsuperscript{227} Benjamin Brown Collection, “Biography of John Anthony Woolf Jr.,” fd. 34, reel 2. This biography was written by Phyllis Ashcroft in 1935. Phyllis Ashcroft was a granddaughter of Anthony Woolf Jr.
\item \textsuperscript{228} Nelson Higgins to Daniel H. Wells, October 5, 1853, reel 5, UTMC. Also see Journal History, October 4, 1853. Azariah Smith gives the date of this occurrence as October 15. See Azariah Smith, “Journals,” October 17, 1853, p. 84.
\end{itemize}

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and escalating violence against the other.\textsuperscript{229}

Being unaware of what had really happened in Nephi, the militia commanders Wells and James Ferguson again went against previous defensive orders. They instructed Major George D. Grant to join Higgins and pursue the hostile bands, but Grant and Higgins were also to endeavor to create friendly relations with the natives.\textsuperscript{230}

Neither Higgins nor Grant were able to prevent Ute violence after the brutal murder of eight Utes at Nephi. On October 14 at Santaquin near Summit Creek, some of the inhabitants who were in the garden fields gathering potatoes were attacked by twenty-five to thirty Indians. Fernee L. Tindrell was killed and scalped. The Indians then proceeded to kill some cattle and drove off some oxen.\textsuperscript{231} Jonathan Page said he and Sylvenas Calkins were shot and chased, but managed to get away.\textsuperscript{232} About the same time Stephen Markham’s expedition was attacked while returning from Manti to Palmyra; no deaths were reported. Markham believed that the same band of Indians had carried out all the violence between Manti and Salt Creek from July to October. Markham wanted to know what to do about the situation. Markham was ordered to gather all the “produce” from Summit Creek and Spring Creek.\textsuperscript{233}

George McKenzie was one of Markham’s men who participated in the operation just after the attack at Summit Creek.\textsuperscript{234} He said they were ordered to march to Santaquin to deal

\textsuperscript{229} Back and forth violence corresponds closely with Ned Blackhawk’s model of the Great Basin.

\textsuperscript{230} Daniel H. Wells and James Ferguson, Special Orders number 21, October 5, 1853, reel 5, UTMC.

\textsuperscript{231} William McClellan to Major Stephen Markham, October 15, 1853, reel 5, UTMC; Jonathan Page, “Life Story of Jonathan Sockwell Page Sr. as Told By Himself,” p. 2, MS 10101, LDS Archives; Gottfredson, 78-82.

\textsuperscript{232} Page, 2.

\textsuperscript{233} Stephen Markham to George A. Smith, October 15, 1853, reel 5, UTMC.

\textsuperscript{234} “Deposition of George McKenzie” pp. 4-5, 6-7, James Ivie vs. the United States; “Reminiscences of the Walker War, as told by an old scout, a rider in that war,” Exhibit A, James Ivie vs. the United States. It says the poem is by George McKenzie and recited at the second annual re-union of the veterans of the Walker War,
with some Indians who had been committing “depredations.” Scouts found the camp of hostile natives and Captain Matthew Caldwell ordered a group of men to march towards it. The Indians gave the war whoop when they sighted the soldiers. McKenzie was four miles away with Colonel Stephen Markham when he heard the war whoops. When the soldiers arrived at the Indians’ camp they discovered that some of the Indians did not want to fight. Markham ordered the hostile Indians to leave the camp and lay down their arms. When the hostile natives fired upon Markham’s men instead, Markham told the men to give them “hell.” The shooting went on for about forty-five minutes until the Indians fled. McKenzie said they “sacked” the camp, taking buckskins, robes, bows, arrows, and other possessions. Perhaps to celebrate victory, they daubed themselves with war paint and danced. No one was killed.

In response to the increased violence Mormon families were sent to Sanpete Valley and other places to strengthen the different settlements. Interpreter Dimick B. Huntington was sent to try and stop Indian hostilities. Young said that “we must cease our hostilities” and seek every possible means to reach the Indians with a peaceful message. Young was moving back to his original policies of defense and conciliation. While Young continued to seek

February, 1895, at Springville, Utah Co., Utah.” The poem was presented as exhibit A in the Ivie depredation case and is contained at the end of the Deposition of George McKenzie. McKenzie said the poem is a “true statement” of what happened in this engagement on page 5 of his deposition. George McKenzie described Markham’s regiment in the “fall of 1853.” This deposition was made in 1897, therefore memory is a possible issue. The best candidate for what McKenzie describes as being in the fall of 1853 is this one.

235 “Deposition of George McKenzie” pp. 6-7, James Ivie vs. the United States. It is important to note that McKenzie said it was “rumors” that the Indians had driven the settlers from Santaquin and then stated he had no personal knowledge about why the engagement was called out. In the poem he says it was because the Indians “sacked” the fort at Santaquin.

236 “Deposition of George McKenzie,” p. 6-7 and the poem “Reminiscences of the Walker War,” James Ivie vs. the United States.


238 Brigham Young to Colonel Peter W. Conover, Major Stephen Markham, Major George W. Bradley, and Captain Standage, October 17, 1853, fd. 5, box 1, BYL.
reconciliation with Wakara’s band, at the end of October Young’s attention was diverted to other problems with the Native Americans beyond the Walker War.

The best-known event during the Walker War is the massacre of John Williams Gunnison. Virginia Simmons correctly states that the Gunnison Massacre “has been incorrectly linked to the Walker War.” 239 In a letter to Edward Morten, Brigham Young himself said, “The Massacre of Captain Gunnison and a portion of his party had no connection with the Walker affair, but was the result of the wanton killing of a friendly Pauvan on Corn Creek, last Sept. by a party of emigrants…on their way to California by the South Route.” 240 Although the massacre is not really related to Walker War these murders had the greatest long-term consequences for the Utah Territory that occurred during the conflict, and no history of the Mormon and Indian relations during this period would be complete without mentioning it. 241

Captain John Gunnison was a member of the United States Corps of Topographical Engineers surveying the best place to run the transcontinental railroad. Gunnison and his party of seven were camped on the lower Sevier River in Pahvant territory. On October 26, his party was attacked and killed by local Pahvants. The motivation for the attack may have been the recent killing of a Pahvant by members of passing wagon train. 242 Anti-Mormons believed that

239 Simmons, 95.

240 Brigham Young to Edward Martin, November 30, 1853, fd. 5, box 1, BYL.

241 Alexander, 115.

Brigham Young had perpetrated the murder. The murder of Gunnison was reported on October 30. Henry Standage said a Mormon was among those killed. According to Dimick Huntington, Chief Kanosh was going to break up the party of Indians that had carried out the murder; there was also fear of the party attacking the post at Fillmore. Standage did not think Kanosh knew of the whereabouts of the party. The settlers at Fillmore reported they were doing their best to be ready in the case of an attack.

Luckily for Young, another war did not begin against the Pahvants. Although the number of aggressions decreased, violence continued in November against Wakara’s band. George A. Smith wrote that Indians had committed “depredations” on cattle at Provo and burned some buildings at Summit Creek. On November 7 the Sanpit band burned J.D. Chase’s saw mill near Fort Manti. In addition six horses were stolen that were left out grazing. In addition the Indians burned the rest of the houses that were left at Summit Creek; five or six fires were lit around Payson. In Grantsville, a place located west of Salt Lake far from most of the Indian troubles, local Indians threatened other natives with death if they did not join in robbing the settlers.

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243 Alexander, 115. Also see John M. Bernhisel to Brigham Young, January 13, 1854, fd. 15, box 60, reel 60, BYU.

244 Henry Standage to James Ferguson, October 30, 1853, reel 5, UTMC. Also see Erastus Snow and Franklin D. Richards to Brigham Young, October 29, 1853, fd. 18, box 41, reel 55, BYC; Brigham Young to Captain R.M. Morris, U.S.A. Exploring Expedition in Camp Fillmore, October 31, 1853, box 50, reel 63, BYC; Brigham Young to Dimick Huntington, October 31, 1853, box 50, reel 63, BYC; Governor’s Office of the Utah Territory to the Editor of the Occidental Messenger, November 1, 1853, box 50, reel 63, BYC.

245 George A. Smith to Brigham Young, November 14, 1853, LDS Archives, “Brigham Young Collection,” fd. 5, box 42, reel 55, BYC.

246 Journal History, November 23, 1853; Major Nelson Higgins to James Ferguson, December 7, 1853, reel 5, UTMC. It is difficult to read the date of when the horses were stolen. It could have been either November 5 and 6 or December 5 and 6.

247 Journal History, November 13, 1853.

248 Captain John B. Walker to Daniel H. Wells, November 7, 1853, reel 5, UTMC.
head of stolen cattle; they also killed two.\textsuperscript{249} The last serious Ute attack occurred on December 2 when several Indians attacked the employees at the Provo gristmill and wounded some of them. The band also killed some horses and stole some property. George A. Smith ordered George Bean and twenty-five men to chase the Indians and recover the property.\textsuperscript{250} The last two events of the war of any significance were the burning of the Allred Settlement on January 6, 1854 and the theft of sixty to eighty cattle near Spanish Fork on February 26.\textsuperscript{251}

Several factors may have contributed to the end of violence. One is Dimick Huntington’s attempts to reconcile with the Utes. The natives at Payson and Fillmore who listened to Huntington expressed friendliness.\textsuperscript{252} Huntington reported on December 18 that he had met with several Utes from the Uinta Valley and that they desired peace.\textsuperscript{253}

Along with other Indians desiring peace, reports indicated again that Wakara was again asking for peace. Ute leader Ammon came to Parowan on November 28 and visited Willard Richards and Erastus Snow. Ammon sued for peace on behalf of Wakara.\textsuperscript{254} Just a few days earlier on November 16 Almon W. Babbitt and company interviewed some Pahvants at Fillmore. They said that Wakara had gone south to winter with the Navajos and that he was not mad, but Wakara’s brothers were angry and did not want peace.\textsuperscript{255} For the fourth time Wakara was

\textsuperscript{249} Peter W. Conover to Daniel H. Wells, November 14, 1853, reel 5, UTMC.

\textsuperscript{250} George A. Smith to Daniel H. Wells, December 2, 1853, reel 5, UTMC; Journal History, December 2, 1853.

\textsuperscript{251} Christy, 415.

\textsuperscript{252} Journal History, December 1, 1853.

\textsuperscript{253} Journal History, December 18, 1953.


\textsuperscript{255} Deseret News, December 1, 1853, 3; Journal History, November 28, 1853.
reportedly asking for peace. Despite contradictory reports that Wakara was looking for recruits to attack the Mormons, there had been several reports that he wanted peace since July. Brigham Young was told at the end of November that Wakara and his band had disagreed among themselves and split up; part of them had gone to the Yampah River to hunt and did not want to return until they learned the Mormons wouldn’t kill them. Wakara and the other part of the band had gone to “winter among the Navajos.”

It seemed peace had finally been reached.

Brigham Young wrote John Bernhisel at the end of December and said he believed the Indians would remain quiet if the Mormons were able to communicate their desire for peace. Furthermore if the territory could acquire more Indian sub-agents, Young believed that the Indians could be better taught how to farm and peace would be achieved.

Although Young wanted peace, behind the scenes he was trying to extinguish Indian title to lands the Mormons had settled through legal means and with federal help. John Bernhisel wrote George Manypenny near the end of December asking that some legislation be passed to deal with the Utah natives. He said Utah had sprung up in Indian Territory among Indian wigwams with growing cities and flourishing settlements. Bernhisel went on to say that the trail of the Indians had become the highway to the Pacific and had many trading posts for emigrants. Therefore the Indian title to the land needed to be extinguished. He said the Mormons were not able to deal with the Indians and needed the government to relieve them. The avenues Mormon leaders were taking to gain control of Indian lands likely occurred without the knowledge of the Native Americans of Utah.

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256 Brigham Young to Edward Martin, November 30, 1853, fd. 5, box 1, BYL. For reports of Wakara leaving to live among the Navajos, also see Journal History, November 28, 1853.

257 Brigham Young to John Bernhisel, December 28, 1853, fd. 4, box 60, reel 70, BYC.

258 John M. Bernhisel to George W. Manypenny, December 22, 1853, BIA.
Peace for the moment seems to have been reached. In late January Brigham Young said, “At present, our Indian difficulties are at an end, as part of Walker’s band are in the Uinta Valley, blocked by snow, and Walker and the balance are among the Navajos.” John D. Lee wrote from Cedar Fort that no more depredations had been committed against the Mormons aside from a couple stolen horses that were recovered. Orson Hyde wrote that Sowiet’s band was willing to trade but not Wakara’s; they were afraid of the Mormons. Wakara himself was still with the Navajos. At the end of January Young reiterated his desire for conciliation with the Indians, but he said if they resumed their hostilities in spring they would be chastised severely. Vigilance was maintained and orders continued concerning guarding and completing forts.

Wakara and other chiefs expressed desires for peace again in 1854. Chiefs Ammon and Migo said they were ready to lay down their arms. Wakara had returned from the Navajos and petitioned for peace in March and again in May. Brigham Young responded to Wakara’s peaceful petitions. Sometime in the early spring Porter Rockwell, George Washington Bean, and others were called by Brigham Young to “take Chief Walker in hand & keep him favorable if possible.” In April the group met with Wakara and said he was “very cross” and had many

259 Brigham Young to Orson Pratt, January 31, 1854, fd. 6, box 1, BYL. For winter being the reason depredations had stopped, see Brigham Young to John Bernhisel, January 31, 1853, fd. 6, box 1, BYL.

260 John D. Lee to Brigham Young, January 21, 1854, fd. 15, box 23, reel 33, BYC. Lee did write in this letter that there was trouble and violence between the Piedes and Pahvants.

261 Orson Hyde from Ft. Supply to Brigham Young, January 11, 1854, fd. 21, box 39, reel 53, BYC. He also reported that Sowiet’s band said that Wakara’s band had with them forty head of cattle and eighty horses they had stolen from Mormon settlements.

262 Brigham Young to Thomas Kane, January 31, 1854, box 15, reel 10, Thomas L. Kane Collection 1762-1982, MS 16717, LDS Archives.

263 John D. Lee, Post Order No. 2, February 10, 1854, reel 5, UTMC.

264 Alexander, 116.
complaints against the Mormons, but according to Bean they were able to soften his “warlike spirit.” Bean and the others traveled north with Wakara for several days and camped at Chicken Creek. Bean wrote Young and told him what Wakara had demanded. He wanted two oxen, flour, whiskey, guns, and ammunition. Furthermore he wanted to send Ammon to get some children to sell to the Mexicans. He also wanted to know how many cattle and horses the Mormons would give yearly for the next twenty years for portions of his land. Wakara’s demands say a lot about his disposition. Wakara still desired to use the Mormons for his own wealth and power, which may be one reason why he never wanted the war nor really became involved. Yet he seemed to be using the war to his advantage in making demands. Rather than just desiring the Mormons as trade partners, he wanted cattle and horses for portions of his land. Furthermore he still desired to engage in the slave trade and was using that as part of the negotiations. Another possibility is that Wakara had discovered through the Walker War there was no way the Mormons were going to be removed and therefore was trying get what he could from them. Given Wakara’s past history he seemed to understand the advantage of peaceful relations with the Mormons, but that desire would not stop him from taking advantage of the situation to gain supplies.

William Wall reported that Wakara was heading north and that most of the Indians with him seemed friendly, but others around the area continued to threaten theft and violence.


266 George Washington Bean to Brigham Young, May 1, 1854, fd. 7, box 23, reel 32, BYC. Bean reported other chiefs as being friendly such as Uintah, Battice, Grospene, Sanpitch, and others. Concerning the friendly Indians, also see Joseph Heywood at Ft. Nephi to Brigham Young, April 22, 1854, fd. 13, box 23, reel 32, BYC. Although Heywood reported most Indian chiefs as being friendly, he was reportedly told that Wakara was planning an attack with the help of some Spaniards. Considering Bean’s letters, this is not likely accurate. On the other hand, Wakara had given mixed messages in the past.

267 Major William Wall and J.N. King to Brigham Young. May 1, 1854, reel 5, UTMC.
Brigham Young came south and found a friendly enough Wakara. Both of them traveled to Iron County and returned together; Wakara’s men then made camp near Nephi. Andrew Love recorded in his diary that on May 6 Wakara came to Nephi and had dinner with local church leaders and that all was peace. Wakara had also entered the city of Fillmore and professed a desire for a “lasting peace.”

On May 8, Brigham Young called a meeting at Springville to raise cattle for Wakara as part of the peace treaty. Young left for Wakara’s camp on May 11 and said “he will have peace if it costs $10,000 Dollars this season.” Church leaders Heber C. Kimball, John Taylor, Wilford Woodruff, Parley P. Pratt, Ezra T. Benson, George Albert Smith, and Erastus Snow accompanied him. The meeting between Brigham Young and Chief Wakara took place at Chicken Creek in Juab County. Nunes Carvalho, who was an explorer who had accompanied John C. Frémont on a couple of expeditions, arrived in Utah in February and observed Young’s visit with Wakara. Young delivered an ox to Wakara, they smoked a peace pipe, and expressed friendship. Eli Bell described Wakara as being a bit uneasy at meeting with Young at first but then relaxed after he decided to meet with Young and talk. Bell said Young gave Wakara

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270 Letter is to “Dear Brethren” with no signature at bottom, April 1, 1854, fd. 6, box 1, BYL.

271 Eli Bell, “Diaries, 1854-[1864],” p. 5, MS 4040, LDS Archives.

272 Love, “Diary 1852 Sept.-1875 September,” May 11, 1853, p. 18. For Young’s quote concerning spending $10,000 for peace, also see Bean, “Autobiography, 1897; Book IV,” p. 54.

273 Account of Nunes Carvalho, in Among the Mormons, ed. William Mulder & Russell Mortensen (Lincoln/London, Nebraska: University of Nebraska, 1958), 266-271.
thirteen head of cattle, several sacks of flour, and some potatoes.\textsuperscript{274} In addition to presents Young purchased an Indian child from him.\textsuperscript{275} In attendance were many of the important Ute chiefs connected to Wakara and his band such as Arapene, Ammon, Sanpitch, and Tabby.\textsuperscript{276} Later Young wrote a letter and said the Indians at the meeting were friendly.\textsuperscript{277} The meeting seems to have been more of a formality between Young and Wakara in order to once again officially extend friendship to each other. The violence had ended months earlier.

Thus the Walker War officially ended. Twelve Mormons had been killed not including the seven of Gunnison’s party and approximately twenty-four to thirty-four Utes had died.\textsuperscript{278} To the territory of Utah, this war was not of small consequence. The Mormons’ lives had been disrupted personally and economically at a level unprecedented since their arrival in 1847. Not until the Utah War would the territory face similar disruptions. The Utes on the other hand had faced disruptions since the time the Mormons arrived. Particularly the powerful band headed by Wakara had faced economic and personal disruptions at the hands of the Mormons. Furthermore Wakara and his band had found their dominance of the territory challenged. It was inevitable that anger would flare up and result in violence.

\textsuperscript{274} Bell, “Diaries, 1854-[1864],” p. 5. In the account of the meeting from Silas Smith, he said Young gave fourteen head of cattle, 500 pounds of flour, blankets, and other items. See Silas Smith, “Journal 1854 May-1855 June,” May 11, 1854, MS 18803, LDS Archives.


\textsuperscript{276} “Deposition of J.P. Humphrey,” p. 6, James Ivie vs. the United States.

\textsuperscript{277} Brigham Young to John Bernhisel, May 31, 1854, fd. 4, box 60, reel 70, BYC.

\textsuperscript{278} The number of Mormons dead is easy to determine. The Ute deaths are harder to quantify absolutely. The number of Utes dead is based on the author’s best estimate based on the contemporary reports from the militia commanders. Author Virginia Simmons said “about a dozen white people and a great many more Utes died,” Simmons, 94. Clifford Duncan said “twenty whites and many more Utes were killed,” Clifford Duncan, “The Northern Utes of Utah” in \textit{A History of Utah’s American Indians}, ed. Forrest S. Cuch (Salt Lake City: Utah State Division of Indian Affairs / Utah State Division of History, 2003), 188. Duncan’s number of twenty whites was likely counting the Gunnison massacre. It is unknown how Duncan and Simmons determined “many more Utes Killed.”
Although the war was not as violent as other conflicts between whites and Native Americans in the American West, the violence was at times brutal and had a great effect on those who experienced it. Violence proceeded back and forth like a blood feud. Yet despite the violence, both Brigham Young and Chief Wakara both were determined to co-exist peacefully. Although Wakara’s power and prosperity had been undermined by Young and the Mormons, Wakara himself was committed to maintaining good relations. Wakara had threatened to attack the Mormons prior to 1853, but none of it materialized. After Wakara attained peaceful relations with the Mormons, he was committed to keeping that peace despite becoming angry at times. Even after the death of Shower-O-Cats and the initial violence between Mormons and his band, Wakara was reluctant to go to war and quickly sued for peace. Wakara asked for peace but other members of his band were too angry. Wakara’s role in this war was small; he may not have been involved at all. There were consistent reports throughout the war that he desired peace. Although this war seems to have been mainly carried on by Wakara’s band, Wakara himself was hardly involved. This war has been erroneously called the Walker War. Wakara would continue to have a shaky relationship with Young and the Mormons, but he was committed to having a peaceful relationship with his Mormon neighbors.

Death of Wakara

In the summer of 1854 war nearly broke out again against Wakara’s Utes. During Wakara’s stay near Nephi he became “alarmed” by the rapid building of a wall around the city. Wakara said the wall would shut him out from his white friends and that the only way to get a biscuit would be to have it thrown over the wall to him. He forbade the construction to continue. President Young wrote a strong letter back telling Wakara to mind his own business and that if
he continued to make trouble he would suffer for it. When Bean read the letter to Wakara he acted angrily by snatching the letter away and trampling it on the ground threatening that “war would commence that very day.” Wakara then ordered his men to move to the mountains which began soon afterwards. Bean told Wakara he was sorry and would have to tell Brigham Young “how his advice had been treated.” Bean and Porter Rockwell found themselves surrounded by fifty of Wakara’s men who proceeded to boast about all their exploits “during the last two or three years in killing Mormons & what he could do.” Wakara’s men began to “twang” their bow strings in what was likely an act of intimidation. Wakara then asked what was going to be done with the guns and other trade items that were in the nearby wagon. When Wakara was told they would be taken back with them Wakara again became angry and said he must have them. Two other Utes who were there, Washear and Squash, told Wakara that he was talking like a fool. One of these Indians told Wakara they were with Bean when Young gave him the letter and assured Wakara that Young was not angry but only desired Wakara to “do right” and not act “foolish.” Bean’s men were able to slip away as Wakara and the other Utes argued and were able to travel the mile back to Nephi unmolested. Just before they started off Bean, saw Wakara walking with Squash. This caused Bean to believe Wakara was repenting. Later Bean met with Wakara and found that his anger had passed. Wakara asked Bean and his party to accompany him to Sanpete valley to trade. Bean and his men took Wakara into their wagon and headed out.

In October of 1854 Wakara passed over the mountain towards Navajo country again. He never again traveled further north than Fillmore. During a game near Fillmore a blood vessel

279 Major George W. Bradley to Daniel H. Wells, June 17, 1854, reel 4, UTMC; Bean, “Autobiography, 1897; Book IV,” p. 53-54. For a more detailed analysis of this situation in Nephi, see Carter, 206-210.

apparently broke in Wakara’s neck causing him to become ill. Even towards the end of his life Wakara desired a good relationship with Brigham Young, he asked David Lewis of Fillmore who had brought presents from Brigham Young if “Brigham talked good.” Lewis assured Wakara that Young “talked very good” and might be able to accompany him on his next trip south.281 The next morning on January 29 at Meadow Creek Wakara died of what was said to be “lung fever.” He died on good terms with Young. Two Paiute women, three children, and twenty horses were killed as sacrifice. In addition a boy of ten or twelve years old was buried alive with him to watch over the body; thus ended the era and reign of Utah’s most powerful and famous Ute chief.282

281 Sonne, 218-220.

282 Journal History, January 29, 1855. Also see Sonne, 220. The Journal History reported that two Paiute children were killed prior to his death but that did not bring relief to him. When nearly dead he told his people to not kill horses or any Paiutes.
Chapter 5

Effects of the Walker War

It is impossible to determine the exact amount of money the war cost the Mormon citizens. Thousands and thousands of dollars were claimed for damages as well the amount it cost to carry out expeditions. It is difficult to know if all the costs were legitimate or simply citizens and territorial officials capitalizing on the situation and attempting to get money from the United States Government. What cannot be doubted is that the movement from homes to forts, loss of cattle, and delayed production of materials and public works did have a major effect on the territory.

Although most of the concerns can be tallied monetarily, some of the effects cannot be reduced to dollars and cents. For example, Brigham Young said the Fillmore settlement remained small due to the fact that the Indian troubles “retarded” population growth. In early 1854 telling him that Utah’s settlements were prosperous but that the Indian “disturbances retarded operations last season.” In December of 1853 Brigham Young gave an address to Utah’s legislature that catalogued some of the war’s tangible and intangible costs. Concerning Iron County Young said that due to the Indian disturbances “little has been done in making Iron, although the preparatory work is considerably advanced.” The report continued, “[The] same warfare has also impeded the public works at Fillmore…The further prosecution of those works will have to be done at the expense of the public funds of the Territory, unless Congress shall see proper to extend her liberality by any additional

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1 Brigham Young to S.G. Kinney, January 31, 1853, fd. 6, box 1, MS 2736, Brigham Young Letterpress Copybook Transcriptions (afterwards BYL), Church History Library of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Salt Lake City (afterward LDS Archives).

2 Brigham Young to Thomas Kane, January 31, 1854, Thomas L. Kane Collection 1762-1982, box 15, reel 10, MS 16717, LDS Archives.
appropriation.” With the exception of the slow progress on the Jordan Bridge little had been
done for public improvements due to the people being exclusively engaged in tearing down
houses and building forts and defenses against the natives. The report pleaded for taxes to be
lightened due to the burden borne by the citizens in protecting themselves from Indian hostilities
at their own expense. Young said militia members had served “severe” extra duty to secure the
settlements from the natives. Young said militia members had served “severe” extra duty to secure the
settlements from the natives. Therefore many problems the war created for the territory cannot
really be measured monetarily.

Moving into actual expenses in his address, Brigham Young said, “Much property has
also been destroyed, and much time spent in guarding, on expeditions, carrying expresses, &c.
and between 350 and 400 head of cattle and horses, have been killed and driven off.” Losing so
many cattle was a major monetary loss for the settlers. Young also said it cost $200,000 to tear
down houses and build forts. Young said to make the ditch and wall all around Salt Lake City
alone would cost $4,000. During the James Ivie depredation claim case mentioned in chapter 4,
court officials said that the Walker War expenditures for the Utah territory totaled $2,000,000. The
LDS Church History Library contains dozens of damage claims to the government. The
claims include the cost of tearing down and moving houses, damages to property, cost of guard

3 Journal History of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Saints (LDS Journal History scrap book consists of
typed entries and Newspaper clippings from 1830 to the present), December 13, 1953, LDS Archives

4 Journal History, December 13, 1853.

5 Brigham Young to Hosea Stout, September 30, 1853, fd. 4, box 1, BYL.

6 “In the Court of Claims of the United States. Indian Depredation…Defendants Requests for Findings of
Fact and Brief,” p. 5, James A. Ivie vs. the United States and the Uncompahgie Elk Mountain Indians, case 707,
Indian Depredation Case File, Records of the U.S. Courts of Claims, RG 123, National Archives, Washington D.C.
The figure of $2,000,000 is also the price Eugene Campbell gave for the Walker War, Eugene E. Campbell,
Establishing Zion: The Mormon Church in the American West, 1847-1869 (Salt Lake City: Signature Books, 1988),
110.
duty, and many other expenditures.\textsuperscript{7} The claims exceed $200,000. In addition to these claims, there was another claim that totaled nearly $115,000 in damages and losses due to Indian depredations from July 1853 to August 1856 sent to the Office of Indian Affairs.\textsuperscript{8}

Some Mormons filed their own personal depredation claims with the government. Robert Keyes Sr. claimed a total property loss of $3,769 that included horses, cows, grain, corrals, outhouses, a shop that was burned, and destroyed fences in Iron County.\textsuperscript{9} William P. Smith claimed the loss of ten cattle and two mares in Beaver during the Walker War valued at $800.00.\textsuperscript{10} Nelson Higgins also personally claimed $4,560 for lost property and animals, but it is unclear if this claim went to trial.\textsuperscript{11} Doubtless there were more personal claims taken to court.\textsuperscript{12} According to Eugene Campbell none of the personal losses was ever compensated.\textsuperscript{13} John Bernhisel said the “Commission of Indian Affairs is very averse” to paying depredation claims in the states or territories.\textsuperscript{14} This was not the case with payroll claims for expeditions during the

\textsuperscript{7} Box 58, fds. 11-18, reel 69, CR 1234 1, “Brigham Young Collection,” (afterward BYC), LDS Archives.

\textsuperscript{8} Leaves of Bills for Losses Sustained Through Indian Depredations in the Territory Since July 1853, August 18, 1856, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Letters Received by the Officer of Indian Affairs, reel 898, Marriott Library, University of Utah, Salt Lake City. Also see Virginia McConnell Simmons, The Ute Indians of Utah, Colorado, and New Mexico (Colorado: University of Colorado Press, 2000), 94.

\textsuperscript{9} Robert Keyes vs. the United States, Ute, Paiute, and Navajo Tribes of Indians, case 1056, Indian Depredation Case File, Records of the U.S. Courts of Claims, RG 123, National Archives, Washington D.C. The above total is what he claimed he lost in 1853, he also claimed other losses. Keyes lost his case.

\textsuperscript{10} William P. Smith vs. the United States, Ute, and Paiute Tribes of Indians, case 1059, Indian Depredation Case File, Records of the U.S. Courts of Claims, RG 123, National Archives, Washington D.C. Smith lost his court case.

\textsuperscript{11} Nelson Higgins, “Papers 1836-1909,” MS 4713, item #6, LDS Archives.

\textsuperscript{12} There are over 1,000 boxes of depredation claims at the National Archives. The register for these documents is poorly organized by the name of the claimant. According to the register there are only nine depredation claims on record against the Ute Indians. The two cases above were not part of those nine and were found by accident. In addition, several Utah Blackhawk War depredation cases were found by the author against the Ute Indians that are not part of the nine depredation claims identified by the register.

\textsuperscript{13} Campbell, 110.

\textsuperscript{14} John Bernhisel to Brigham Young, January 17, 1857, fd. 1, box 61, reel 71, BYC.
Walker War; the government at least agreed to pay some of those claims.

In Brigham Young’s August 19 proclamation he ordered officers to keep an account of all expenses. In Young’s December address he said he expected the high amount of expenses would be reimbursed by the federal government, but he complained the government had not paid for any expeditions to suppress Indian hostilities. At the end of December, Young wrote Utah delegate John Bernhisel, “If Department of Indian Affairs complain of our bill they must remember that we have had exciting times the past season and considerable expenses was necessary. We shall expect that the war department will fork over for the suppression of Indian hostilities, the more especially as we have hopes of their being ended.” In the coming months the Mormons gathered together payroll claims to send to Washington for compensation.

The National Archives in Washington D.C. houses the collection of these many payroll claims that came from the various military districts of the Utah Territory. There were twenty-two payroll lists from different divisions of the Utah militia for expeditions totaling nearly $51,000. There were also several claims for supplies used during expeditions in the Walker War including subsistence, forage, oats, corn, and coffee. These claims total nearly $33,000. Some of the twenty-two rolls were rejected and others recognized. There is no indication of why some


17 Brigham Young to John Bernhisel, December 28, 1853, fd. 4, box 60, reel 70, box 60, BYC.

18 See for example Phineas W. Cook to Brigham Young, February 22, 1856, fd. 17, box 24, reel 34, BYC; William Dame to President Young, May 17, 1856, fd. 17, box 24, reel 34, BYC.

were rejected but John Bernhisel wrote in February 1855 that some of them were not “authenticated.”

As part of the collection there is a “Recapitulation” of expenses during the Walker War for $76,017.40 which is what would finally go before congress.

As early as January of 1854, John Bernhisel said he was already taking steps to procure an appropriation to reimburse the territory for expenses incurred for the suppression of Indian aggressions. By June Bernhisel asked for both expenses incurred as well as payrolls.

By December of 1855 the expenses incurred in suppressing Indian aggressions were presented to the Secretary of War, Jefferson Davis. By April of 1856, the vouchers were still before the Committee on Military Affairs and by June they still had not been considered. In August, the above mentioned recapitulation of expenses and payrolls totaling $76,017.40 did not pass the House of Representatives. It was passed over again in 1857 and 1858.

Finally on January 20, 1859, Bernhisel wrote Young, “I have the gratification to inform you that they agreed to report a bill appropriating seventy six thousand dollars and upwards to reimburse the Territory of Utah for expenses incurred in suppressing Indian aggressions in the

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20 John Bernhisel to Brigham Young, February 3, 1855, fd. 18, box 60, reel 70, BYC.

21 “Recapitulation of Expenses incurred by the Territory of Utah in Sundry Expectations made by the Nauvoo Legion against Indians in 1853 as per Pay Rolls,” item 5, Records of the Adjutant General’s Office. The document says it was approved by Daniel H. Wells September 11, 1855.

22 John Bernhisel to Brigham Young, January 13, 1854, fd. 15, box 60, reel 70, BYC.

23 John Bernhisel to Brigham Young, June 14, 1854, fd. 16, box 60, reel 70, BYC.

24 John Bernhisel to Brigham Young, December 18, 1855, fd. 16, box 60, reel 70, BYC.

25 John Bernhisel to Brigham Young, April 17, 1856, fd. 19, box 60, reel 71, BYC; John Bernhisel to Brigham Young, June 17, 1856, fd. 19, box 60, reel 71, BYC.

26 John Bernhisel to Brigham Young, August 17, 1856, fd. 20, box 60, reel 71, BYC. Bernhisel also asked in this letter for Depredation Claims to be sent so they could be filed in the Indian Office.

27 John Bernhisel to Brigham Young, March 10, 1857, fd. 1, box 61, reel 71, BYC; John Bernhisel to Brigham Young, June 29, 1858, fd. 2, box 61, reel 71, BYC.
The Chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs reported the Bill to the House that session. This time the House refused to hear transactions related to the territorial business.

On March 23, 1860, Edward Stanton from the Committee on Military Affairs made a report to the House concerning what was now H.R. 435 concerning the Walker War expenses. The Committee on Military Affairs reported their belief that the action of the territory against “various Indian tribes” in 1853 for hostilities was a necessary action. The report continued, “As there is no evidence before the committee tending to show that these expenses were unnecessarily incurred, the committee feels bound to recognize the liability of the claim.” The committee, however, did not “recognize the obligation of this government to pay, for military services or supplies, the prices and amounts, prescribed by the State or territorial laws and authorities.” The committee therefore reduced the claim by $22,505.20 bringing the total down to $53,512.20 to be paid to the Territory of Utah. The bill was approved February 27, 1861.

The sum of $53,512.20 is not only below the claimed amount for payrolls, it is far below the damage claims that apparently equaled $2,000,000. Fifty-three thousand dollars would have barely even dented the amount the war cost according to those involved. Furthermore, it is unclear if the agreed payment was ever even issued.

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries there were apparently more inquiries

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28 John Bernhisel to Brigham Young, January 20, 1859, fd. 2, box 61, reel 71, BYC.

29 John Bernhisel to Brigham Young, February 1, 1859, fd. 2, box 61, reel 71, BYC. The bill was H.R. 837 to reimburse the Utah Territory for $76,017.40 at the thirty-fifth Congress, second session, see “H.R. 837…A BILL To reimburse the Territory of Utah for certain expenses incurred by the Territory in the suppression of Indian hostilities in the year eighteen hundred and fifty-three,” fd. 2, box 61, reel 71, BYC.

30 John Bernhisel to Brigham Young, February 29, 1859, fd. 2, box 61, reel 71, BYC; John Bernhisel to Brigham Young, March 4, 1859, fd. 2, box 61, reel 71, BYC.

31 “Utah—Expenses Incurred in Suppressing Indian Hostilities,” March 23,1860, item 22, Records of the Adjutant General’s Office. A note on the document says the bill was approved February 27, 1861.
concerning payment for the Walker War. In a letter from the Treasury Department in 1898 to William A. Smith the department responded to such inquiries. The letter said that the “recognized” rolls of service were believed to be legitimate and satisfactory evidence of service. The letter, signed by a P.B. Dalton, said, “It appears, that an act of congress approved February 27th, 1861, appropriated a sum of money to reimburse the Territory for payments made to the soldiers in question, but for reasons not known to the Treasury Department, the money was turned into said Treasury.” Over twenty years later, after laws were passed guaranteeing pensions and medals to Indian War veterans, there seemed to be yet more questions concerning the payment promised to Utah in 1861.

To receive pensions, the soldier had to be mustered into the service of the United States. A letter was written from the Adjutant General that stated Captain C. Hancock’s Company of Cavalry was never mustered into service of the United States. The letter went on to say, “This force [Hancock’s] was not mustered into the military service of the United States, but the members thereof, were paid by the territory and the territory was reimbursed therefore by the United States under an act of Congress…approved February 27, 1861.”

Three letters that said Peter Conover’s company was also not mustered into the military for service as well as one about Robert T. Burton himself also said that the territory was reimbursed by the bill approved in

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1861.\textsuperscript{36}

It is difficult to determine with the contradictory evidence if the Utah Territory was ever reimbursed by the government. Even if the losses and cost of the war were exaggerated in the $2,000,000 estimate, the promised reimbursement of $50,000 would have likely not covered the real cost and even that small amount may have never even been paid. Therefore the Walker War was costly for the Mormon people and the economic repercussions were huge.

The effects on the Native Americans cannot be forgotten either. Although it is difficult to put a dollar figure on what exactly was lost during the Walker War, the overall effects on them came from Mormon settlement itself. Trade was regulated, the slave trade with the Spanish was outlawed, and of course their lands were lost. The Walker War was just another conflict that moved them further to the final ending of their own way of life.

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{36} The Adjutant General to the Commissioner of Pensions, May 28, 1919, item 23, Records of the Adjutant General’s Office; The Adjutant General, H.P. McCain, to the Commissioner of Pensions, May 28, 1919, item #23, Records of the Adjutant General’s Office; The Adjutant General to the Commissioner of Pensions, September 29, 1919, item #23, Records of the Adjutant General’s Office. For Robert T. Burton see The Adjutant General to the Commissioner of Pensions, July 26, 1918, item #24, Records of the Adjutant General’s Office. There were apparently more payrolls for expeditions sent concerning payment for the Walker War. There is one document that still exists for Captain Abram Day’s Company stating it was called out from July to October of 1853. This document is marked March 2, 1916, and simply asks that it be filed for future reference. Andrew Leslie, the only one left alive that was in the company, certified that the list was correct. See “Payroll of Capt. Abram Day’s Company,” Misc. Gao Records—Claims of Utah Militia for Expenses Incurred in Suppressing Indian Hostilities, CA. 1850-58, Records of the Accounting Officers of the Department of the Treasury, RG 217, National Archives, Washington D.C.}
Conclusion

Conflicts Continued

Mormon and Indian relations remained uneasy similar to a bad marriage. It is easy to see the end of the Walker War as simply another lull in violence. Thomas Alexander writes, “Although the negotiations at Chicken Creek ended the immediate conflict, they solved none of the underlying issues.”\(^1\) Although, the Utes ultimately accepted the end of the slave trade in Utah with the Spanish, the issues of land did not end. In the beginning of 1856, what is known as the “Tintic War” was launched, named after Chief Tintic. This war occurred during a drought when many Utes were starving. The Utes once again increased their theft of cattle for food.\(^2\)

Then in 1865, the Blackhawk War began. This war was led by Chief Antonga, also known as Chief Blackhawk, who was the new leader of Wakara’s band, the Cheverets. Blackhawk learned the arts of war from Wakara himself.\(^3\) The Utes raided livestock to be sold in a complex trading system that involved Spaniards and Anglos ranging throughout the western region in Colorado, New Mexico, Nevada, and Wyoming. This war was the bloodiest and longest conflict among the two cultures resulting in at least seventy white deaths and perhaps twice that many Native American fatalities. Like the Walker War, John Peterson says, the “war had a tremendous impact on both societies.” Also like the Walker War forts were built and settlements abandoned. The Walker War had set a precedent for how the Blackhawk War was waged by the Mormons. The Blackhawk War raged from 1865 to 1872.\(^4\)

\(^1\) Thomas G. Alexander, Utah: The Right Place. 2nd rev. ed. (Salt Lake City: Gibbs Smith Publisher, 2003), 116.

\(^2\) Ibid, 116.

\(^3\) John Alton Peterson, Utah’s Black Hawk War (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1998), 67-68.

\(^4\) Ibid, 1-3.
until the federal government successfully removed the Native Americans to reservations. It could be argued that the Mormons and Indians were in a long conflict ranging from when the Mormons arrived until the Indian removal with increased violence at different times, similar to the modern Israeli/Palestinian conflict. Leaders such as Brigham Young and Wakara attempted a cooperative relationship, but their followers had difficulties overcoming the cultural differences.

*Legacy of the Walker War*

The Walker War can no longer be considered a small so-called war. Certainly the overall violence and death toll were small when compared to other western Indian wars. Still, the war had a definite effect on the Mormon settlers both personally and economically. The Utes too were impacted by the war; it seems to have been the final factor that led to the end of the slave trade with the Spanish. Furthermore the war demonstrated Mormon dominance and showed the Native Americans could do very little to prevent further settlements. The war also had instances of brutal violence on both sides that doubtless had negative psychological effects on those involved. The Utah territory had not previously seen that level of violence between the Mormons and Indians. Only the 1850 Provo battle compares, but that was a much shorter altercation with fewer deaths. The Mormons also had not seen such a disruption of their lives in having to tear down houses, move into forts, and move their cattle north. Not until the Utah War of 1857 did Mormons see another event that disrupted their lives to that degree.

By peeling back the layers of Wakara’s relations with Brigham Young and the Mormons from before and after the Walker War, a new picture of this great Ute chief emerges. Wakara had instances early on where he threatened violence against the Mormons, but no such attack ever materialized. Wakara had come to see the Mormons as an asset and was committed to
peace with them even after seeing his lands dwindle and his economic world buckle under new laws and regulations. Much like Brigham Young, Wakara was committed to peaceful relations and cooperation. Even during the Walker War itself, Wakara was constantly making appeals for peace but could not control his bands’ anger toward the settlers. Wakara may have been involved in the decision to react violently, but even that is questionable. For certain he was hardly involved in any of the violence, having left the territory in the early days of the war. Although this war was against Wakara’s band of Utes, it was not Wakara’s war. This war should not bear his name; rather it should more appropriately be called the Cheveret and Mormon war. It was not Wakara’s war any more than it was Brigham Young’s. Brigham Young himself was more aggressive in this war than was Wakara. Still, both men were committed to a peaceful relationship, at least most of the time. Both had to deal with the cultural conflicts between their people.

How does the Walker War fit into the larger picture of the American West? The Walker War fits the argument Elliott West used for the Colorado region in some aspects. The Mormon citizens and Utes did contend over the land and how best to utilize its resources. The Walker War demonstrates there were instances of violence between Mormons and Indians which similarly fits Blackhawk’s interpretation of the Great Basin. When looking at the details, however, the situation was more nuanced than either Blackhawk’s or West’s interpretations. In fact human relations can never be neatly categorized. Brigham Young and Wakara were committed to a peaceful co-existence. Other Ute chiefs such as Sowiet and Kanosh were committed to friendly relations as well. Yet at other times Young’s relations with these chiefs were tense. Wakara was committed to cooperation, but he also made violent threats and was contradictory in what he told non-Mormon Indians Agents and Mormons concerning his feelings.
towards Mormon settlers. He was committed to peaceful relations with Mormon settlers and inflicted brutal violence on the Paiutes by raiding them for slaves. Wakara cannot necessarily be labeled as either peaceful or violent and neither can Brigham Young. Young said to exterminate hostile Indians and then said it is better to feed them than to fight them. Young would say act only on the defensive and order defensive preparations and then he would order offensive operations against the Indians. James Ivie had a fight with two male Indians and one female and killed one of the men that contributed to the start of a war. Yet according to the story Ivie related during his court trial he met the surviving Indians he had beat with the gun. There didn’t seem to be any animosity between them and the Indians showed him their scars. Mormon and Indian relations cannot be labeled as either violent or peaceful. It is far too complicated to do so.

Was the territory a place of conquest as Patricia Limerick argued for all the American West? Native Americans were certainly conquered by whites and moved to reservations just like in other regions. Therefore, from the Native American point of view, Utah was most certainly a place of conquest by whites and the Walker War was part of that conquest through violent means. The Mormon wish of having the Native Americans removed to reservations was eventually fulfilled. Although the Mormons were not driven from their homes in Utah as were the Indians, they did not achieve their desires in the end either. The Mormons stood apart from other regions in many ways in their desire to build a theocratic kingdom of Zion in the American West. Although the Native Americans suffered the worst conquest in the end, the Mormons themselves were conquered by the federal government. Their desire to create Zion ultimately failed.
Appendix 1

Utah Counties and Rivers

Appendix 2

Early Utah Settlements

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