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# Planning Policy and Public Perception in Small-Town Utah

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Planning Policy and Public Perception in Small-Town Utah

Greg M. Platt

A thesis submitted to the faculty of  
Brigham Young University  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of  
Master of Science

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## ABSTRACT

### Planning Policy and Public Perception in Small-Town Utah

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City growth policies codify community values and serve as the basis for enforcement of community standards. If these policies do not match resident preferences for growth, potential exists for communities to grow in ways which make the community undesirable. This thesis examines whether adopted city growth policies match resident preferences in small towns in Utah. Findings include a strong relationship between resident preferences and city leader preferences for growth. Also, city staffs are poor readers of public sentiment relative to growth and growth management. Some cities are more effective in enacting city policies to match resident attitudes towards growth than others, specifically; it seems that cities which have already experienced growth have policies which more closely match resident preferences.

This thesis has relevance to the adoption of city growth policies in rural Utah cities. Since city staffs in small towns tend to be poor readers of resident attitudes, whereas city elected officials are much better readers of public opinion, it is important that city policy be instituted at the impetus of elected leaders rather than on the recommendation of city personnel. Failure to adopt city policies regarding growth may lead to growth which is undesirable to city residents.

Keywords: Planning, Policy, Public, Perception, Rural, Utah, Small-Town, Growth, Attitudes

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## **Chapter 1 Introduction**

In a democratic society, the highest ideal of government is that the people are ruled by laws which are established by the people. In a democratic republic such as the United States, officials rise to political power through an electoral process, and in their office execute the will of their constituents. By this means, all who choose to so do may participate in the organization and civilization of society.

While this process serves well to guide decisions generally, when it comes to specific issues, it is conceivable that the much lauded “will of the people” may be forgotten or even completely ignored. Politicians generally run campaigns based on several issues, and constituents vote for candidates which best represent them. However, only very rarely does any politician represent their voters well on every issue. Particularly if an issue does not raise large amounts of clamor during an election cycle, public officials may be elected who disagree with their constituents on fundamental ideals with regard to that specific issue. Thus, representation of the people may break down when an official believes to have the mandate of the public and extrapolates that mandate to support for the entire platform upon which he was elected. Furthermore, if the politician does not include a position on a specific issue in the campaign platform, it may very well be that public will on that issue is not known or well understood.

One such issue of interest to community planners is public will concerning land use policies. Planners, who are generally appointed as staff of elected city officials, are placed in a position in which their decisions should be guided by policy directives. These policies are set forth by the legislative and executive branches of city governments, usually city councils and

mayors, respectively. However, professional planners are also often called upon by city officials to give their input into shaping city policies, which often leads to the impression of planners' political ideologies into public policies.

When it comes to the application of city policies, planners experience pressures from many sides. Developers, motivated by potential profits, vie for favor of their projects, even to the point of proposing new legislation or amendments to existing laws which would give their project some advantage. Special interest groups may spend time and resources wooing mayors, which translates to pressure on planners to interpret policy in favor of the group's favorite cause. Pressures may also arise in public hearings by neighbors or neighborhood groups which surface to express a NIMBY philosophy, but which will not be seen again until another project is proposed in their vicinity.

These groups, though expressing valid opinions through ordinary and (usually) orderly processes of government, may or may not represent the true "will of the people" or position of majority. In a conversation I had with a fellow planner in Vernal, Utah, he expressed frustration with community residents with regard to attempts allow the development of affordable housing. In one public hearing in Vernal, Utah, a neighborhood group of 40 or so residents readily admitted that the community needed more affordable housing, but brought the lone supporting councilwoman to tears with their adamant demands that any such project be located elsewhere in the city. Other public meetings demonstrated a similar attitude from nearly every sector of the city—the need was great, but it should be built somewhere else.

In the face of pressures from these groups, planners and even elected officials may not know or even suspect what the general public will is concerning land use policies. Especially in

such instances where public will is not known, public policy may stray widely from public support. The question that planners need to ask, then, is whether policies specific to land use are reflective of public will concerning land uses.

This research explores one of those questions relative to land use. Specifically, I investigate whether the policies adopted by cities to promote or control growth reflect resident attitudes towards growth. I hypothesize that policies adopted by local governments with regard to land use do not conform to residents' preferences towards growth policy in small communities.

## Chapter 2 Framework and Literature Review

### Planning theory

The process of planning in any community comes down to a few basic steps. First, the community comes together to identify, communicate, and debate a basic set of ideals or principles upon which the city will be constructed. This construction refers not only to the on-the-ground development of land, but also to the concepts of what kinds of spaces and structures create and maintain an ideal community. Faludi (1973) states that this original ideology “provides the spirit or rationale behind the activity” of planning. In other words, the first step in creating a community is to rationally come to a sense of what the community should be, as envisioned by those who inhabit it.

The next step in the process is to establish a codified set of rules which regulate what types of activities, structures, and spaces are allowed within the community. The legal power to establish this set of rules, generally known as policies, stems from the Constitution of the United States in what is known as police powers. However, these powers subject to various restrictions, including the first, fifth, and fourteenth amendments (Lapping, Daniels and Keller, 1989). Not only do these policies establish what *may* be allowed, they also usually indicate community preferences for development. For instance, a community may require along with the development of a subdivided neighborhood, a community park or other substantial open space.

In addition to establishing these policy rules, other planning tools are often adopted by cities to promote or prevent specific changes in the community. Among these important tools are growth promotional and growth management policies and programs. Growth management

programs, for instance, try to prevent or slow growth, or guide growth to certain forms. This thesis specifically deals with these types of policies.

Ideally, after policies, programs, and other planning tools are created, development continues in accordance with established guidelines. This idealized process, however, rarely continues so simply. As development begins or continues, inevitably there are conflicts between the city, the public, and land developers, as each group or individual comes to realize that a complex world is usually poorly managed by idealized rules. These rules often create situations in which one or many parties' needs are not met.

### **Control Systems**

When conflicts arise between different parties, there are various methods by which they are resolved. Duane (1999), building on the work of many others, establishes a framework for understanding growth processes and control systems, from which this thesis draws heavily. In Duane's analysis he identifies three avenues for exerting control over land use. He refers to them as "Bilateral relational controls", "Rules", and "Trilateral controls."

He indicates that bilateral relational controls are essentially a social system, through which one landowner will exert influence on another via established relationships. This control system prevails in rural areas where social connections are strong, and essentially one-on-one communication can result in ad hoc negotiations which result in equitable solutions for the various parties.

When rural areas begin to grow rapidly, spillover effects increase due to increased development and higher densities, which increases the need for a set of rules. These rules are then applied universally. Generally, this set of rules is the policies discussed above.

The trilateral control system takes over generally when places become more urbanized, meaning densities are higher. Generally, according to Duane, political power also starts to concentrate with certain bodies, and conflicts which arise over land use decisions end up being handled by the court system.

### **Community Values & Bilateral Controls**

When communities are small, or rural, many times community values are fairly well understood through a system of social networking. Because people know each other and share a common bond, the good of the community is assumed to be understood and accepted by all parties. As long as little growth is taking place, fewer and less provocative conflicts tend to arise. As long as this system meets the needs of the community, there is little incentive on the part of the community to codify a set of rules regulating development.

### **Mandating Planning**

Often, under these conditions, a higher authority, such as a State government, will step in and mandate that communities must have a plan in place for dealing with growth issues. Margerum (2002) and Chapin and Connerly (2004) both discuss this sort of top-down approach to the planning process, wherein higher-level political bodies impose requirements for growth controls. The reasons behind State involvement on the local level may vary and may be complex, but the basic ideas are presented by Catanese (1984): promoting quality of life; promoting efficiency; and promoting equity. These values at the State level are intended for the benefit of local communities.

Part of this top-down mandate stems from the experience of larger cities which have growth from earlier-era small towns, and have experienced the growing pain associated with

development which occurred and conflicted with community values, but which legally could not be stopped due to a lack of growth policies. Part may also be attributable to the idea that by planning early, the best practices may be adhered to, promoting the presumable best possible outcomes.

This top-down mandate of plan adoption, if coupled with apathy from a community whose needs are being served by the bilateral control system, may result in an adopted plan which does not reflect community values. Often a boiler-plate version of a plan is adopted by copying a county or other community plan *verbatim*, with little regard for how the new laws will affect the community as it develops. Of course, apathy towards the planning process may not be the only or even primary force at work in this sort of boiler-plate policy adoption process. Often, since communities are small, city resources are stretched to the point that having a professional planner or city attorney on staff is an unjustifiable cost. But since State laws (for example) require the plan be in place, and usually with a deadline, city officials scramble to comply with requirements, but with little concern that the plan will ever actually be required as a growth control measure.

## **Driving Growth**

In addition to the ideas presented in the above discussion on growth controls, Duane also discusses the forces which drive people from urban areas to exurbia. Exurbia, as he defines it, consists of those small communities too far from urban areas to be considered suburbs, but which are close enough, particularly for the wealthy in society, to provide sufficient access to urban areas via long commute or telecommute. The cities studied in this thesis all fall within that distance from larger Utah communities to be potential exurban communities.

According to Duane, forces which drive people to these exurban communities include: quality of life preferences; deconcentration of metropolitan employment; information technologies; globalization of the economy; shift from manufacturing to services; aging of the population; equity gains of urbanites; lower cost of living; decline of metropolitan schools; increase in metropolitan violence; ethnic and racial homogeneity; and recreation and tourism. A discussion of the relative importance of these factors to the communities in this thesis will not be presented here. Rather, this list is presented as potential factors which could drive population growth in the Utah communities in question. Since these factors do exist, in whole or in part, for each community, it is reasonable to expect that these communities either are already growing because of them, or will be at some future time. Thus, planning for future growth, particularly planning for conformity with community values, is of particular importance to Utah's rural communities.

## **Enforcement**

When growth begins, and especially as it becomes more rapid, conflicts between interested parties in these communities increase. Because the policies governing growth and growth management have already been put in place, even if only because of the mandate from the State (Utah does mandate that cities adopt a general plan and a zoning ordinance), those codes are enforceable by the court system. Thus, when growth occurs and conflicts arise, small communities are launched unsuspectingly and often unprepared into a realm of trilateral controls with a set of rules which may not represent the values of that community. If this is the case, then the result is undesired or even undesirable communities wherein locals end up having little control over their communities. That control is, de facto, turned over to those entities which drive growth.

This thesis seeks to identify whether this hypothetical situation may be likely. That is, I'm looking to find whether the policies adopted by cities with regard to growth and growth management reflect community and citizen values or preferences, because if they do not match, the hypothetical may well become real.

### **Potential Differences in Policy Preferences and Adopted Policies**

Much discussion has been presented in the literature surrounding the evaluation of which people favor growth and who favor growth controls. Researchers have presented statistical studies investigating links of any number of variables, such as political affiliation, wealth, and educational background, to growth policies. With regard to these O'Connell (2008) states:

“A city's percentage of college graduates and its degree of environmental activism will more significantly and positively predict the number of smart growth policies it adopts than the city's median income, its percent of residents who are homeowners, and the percent of its residents who are white.”

Portney (2008) agrees, saying:

“Since smart growth policies and programs—those that seek to regulate and manage growth particularly through regulating land use—are consistent with those values, cities with better- (college-) educated populations are more likely to pursue smart growth.”

However, what this research neglects to address is whether the city policies towards growth and growth management reflect the political will of the majority of residents of the city. Though O'Connell and Portney both rely on logical arguments that growth-management reflects the values of the more educated, neither base their claim for support for growth management policy on direct evidence of support for these policies. Both studies assume that if a

municipality favors growth management, the citizenry must also. The converse is also surmised to be true.

However, other explanations may exist as to why city policies have been adopted, which may or may not conform to the preferences of residents. In fact, other research has indicated that perhaps citizens' and elected officials' positions on growth controls differ dramatically enough that citizen groups have sometimes initiated movements to change public policy.

For example, Gerber and Phillips (2005) observed that "boundaries tend to be enacted by citizen initiative when the city council is more professionalized and pro-growth in its orientation." They later state:

"We found that citizens and interest groups turn to direct democracy not out of a preference for extreme or permanent policy change but rather when other methods of altering policy—particularly working through the city council—are less favorable."

If these observations are correct, then it seems that, at least at times, government policies may differ significantly from citizen preferences. In cases where the policy is extreme enough in its divergence from public will, and in cases where a sufficiently educated and motivated public exists, campaigns may be launched to convert municipal policy. However, it is probably safe to assume that these changes lag somewhat behind the actual passage of city policies, which means that for some period; perhaps years or even decades, adopted city policies may actually conflict with citizen preferences.

One author argues that "strong mayors are inclined to be very pro-development, and the fact that mayors are generally elected at-large might re-enforce that tendency" (Clingermayer, 1994). This argument implies that on the whole, communities favor pro-growth policies. However, much of the literature is focused on promoting growth-management policies in cities,

indicating that growth-management is seen by many academics as a better position than pro-growth attitudes. If professional planners are pushing for growth management but communities in general favor growth, a conflict arises between city policies and citizen preferences.

Margerum (2002) found that “There was strong opposition to [Regional Open Space System], particularly in rural areas where a majority of the land was designated for open space.” This statement indicates that in rural or less developed areas, public preferences may lean towards favoring growth and development. Whether or not rural attitudes favor increasing development is not clear and most likely varies greatly from rural place to rural place. However, if it is true, such support for growth may be explained by Chapin and Connerly (2004). They state:

“Recall that minorities, younger voters, and respondents in lower income households perceived less of a need for growth controls in 2001. Intuitively this finding makes sense. These groups are in many cases the "have nots" in Florida. For them, managing growth is not a problem—attracting growth is.”

While intermountain communities do not typically have large populations of minorities or young people, generally speaking, residents of rural communities have less wealth than their urban counterparts. Therefore, it may follow from Chapin and Connerly’s argument, rural “have nots” may also be inclined to desire growth rather than resist it.

### **Rural Resident Policy Preferences**

From a political perspective, a top-down approach would affect these communities even more than urban areas because rural areas, with their smaller populations, have less representation at higher levels of government. If municipal level policy is mandated or dictated by State policies, then the will of the majority in small communities may be trumped by the

political will of those from nearby urban areas. If O'Connell and Portney are correct that better educated people favor growth controls, and urban places tend to have a greater percentage of the higher-educated, then the result is that pro-growth rural residents will have less say over local land use decisions than anti-growth non-residents.

Another indication that pressures promoting growth management policies may come from minority, rather than majority groups, comes in the form of the approach taken by growth management groups. Advocates of management policies seem to favor a top-down approach to growth policy. These groups target State-level policy makers, which are more removed from local influences than city-level legislators. This direction in activism may indicate a failure on the part of these groups to garner support from residents. One study even recommended growth management be dictated at the Federal level (Nelson, 1999).

Margerum (2002) found that satisfaction with planning outcomes by participants in planning generally lessened as review of plans moved to higher echelons of government control. Participants in the planning process, such as developers and citizens, were more satisfied with results when cities made planning decisions than when plans were also reviewed by associations of governments and state agencies. The program he evaluated, which was enacted by an organization of adjacent communities, created a program known as ROSS (Regional Open Space System), whose focus was on land preservation and open space creation. He states that "although there were enough votes on the Regional Planning Advisory Group to get it approved, it was not widely supported."

This distinction between political support by politicians and support from the general public results from the manner in which policy goals were dictated, namely top-down. Howell-Moroney (2007) states:

“When a state adopts growth management, it takes back *absolute* planning authority from locales. State growth management requires local or county governments to prepare comprehensive land use plans, subject to review for consistency with a predefined set of development management goals or state land use plan.”

This argument underlines the idea that the top-down approach of some growth-management advocacy groups is in direct conflict with local preferences, and is meant to undermine the will of the majority in some cases. Where top-down approaches have been successful at modifying growth policies in cities, this question may indeed be the very most important: do city policies reflect the political will of residents?

Some of this research indicates that citizen preferences influence public policy. Other research indicates the opposite that city policies actually conflict with citizen preferences. However, all of these conclusions were simply byproducts of other research, rather than answers to specific questions about whether policy and citizen input conform. My searches for studies relating public policy and citizen preference in a way that directly questions whether city policies match resident inclination, yielded no results. This paper helps to fill this hole in the literature.

### **Identifying Growth-Management and Pro-Growth Policies**

One of the main challenges in categorizing a community as pro-growth or anti-growth, from a policy perspective is in the identification of what policies constitute growth promotion and which attempt to curb growth. The evaluation of city programs is essential in separating a pro-growth community from a pro-growth management one. Therefore, identification of specific policies which promote growth and those which are meant to discourage growth is essential for the purposes of this thesis.

With regard to growth management, Gerber and Phillips (2005) identified several programs and policies which are meant to contain and slow growth:

“The 10 smart growth policies are: (1) an urban growth boundary; (2) an urban service area; (3) a program for the purchase of development rights; (4) a program for the transfer of development rights; (5) other programs to preserve green space, forest, or farmland; (6) zoning to encourage smaller lot size; (7) policies for transit-oriented development; (8) programs for infill or brownfield development; (9) programs for reinvestment in or rehabbing of existing buildings; and (10) zoning for mixed-use development.

Jeong and Feiock (2006) also add that:

“With an impact fee system, the development community is required to pay for growth; that is, impact fees may function as fiscal disincentives by imposing a financial burden on the private sector for the provision of public facilities or infrastructure.”

Research which identifies pro-growth policies is more scant, with fewer programs specifically identified as promoting growth. Loftman and Nevin (1996) indicate that cities which desire growth attempt to attract large-scale projects, such as factories, shopping centers, and convention centers, but do not go into specifics about what types of policies should be passed to recruit large businesses. Rather, the details are left to cities to negotiate on a case-by-case basis, rather than as a policy-based approach.

Purcell (2000) argues that a pro-growth regime is the natural state of any community which has not passed policies to specifically control development interests. Thus, unless a community is specifically oriented for growth management, the municipality favors growth. However, contrary to Purcell’s argument, there is a difference between a city which allows various kinds of development, and a city which actively promotes itself and seeks out development opportunities. Forbes (2006) indicates that cities which want to attract growth will adopt policies such as Enterprise Zones and Redevelopment Zones which leverage funds from local, State or even federally collected taxes to spur economic development. She also indicates

that tax incentives such as lower tax rates or tax credits may be used by communities to incentivize development within the city or to encourage businesses to relocate to the city.

Pro-growth programs, then, due to their variable nature (Loftman and Nevin 1996) are much harder to identify specifically, but can be categorized generally. The categories are: tax incentive programs which give tax relief; tax incentive programs which leverage public funds, such as enterprise zones; and promotional activities, such as master development plans and requests for proposals (RFPs) for economic development.

## **Summary**

In the planning process, local value systems are intended to be the motivation behind policy adoption, with the limitations imposed by the U.S. Constitution and related laws. However, because of the bilateral nature of negotiation with regard to land use which continues in rural areas, and mandated plan adoption from State government, the policies adopted by cities may vary from the preferences of community residents. If this is the case, enforcement of poorly constructed policies could result in communities which are not reflective of community values.

In reviewing the literature, one large gap seems to be unaddressed: whether the adoption of land use policy by local governments is representative of citizen inclinations. In the research where citizen preferences are considered, the existence of specific types of policies and programs, such as those discussed, is taken as proxy for those preferences. Thus, when correlating statistical data such as income, age, and race with data on political will regarding growth policy, the existence of the policy is regarded as an indicator of local political will. However, as discussed, political campaigns can be complex, and to proclaim a single policy issue to be in accordance with citizens' preferences is probably unjustifiable.


This thesis will therefore add to existing research by specifically investigating whether or not local growth policy reflects local attitudes in a sample of small Utah communities. No other research has confirmed a connection between citizen attitudes and city policies. This research will fill that gap. Should the hypothesis of this research, that local policies do not conform to local opinions in the sample of rural communities, be confirmed in whole or in part, then an inherent flaw in other research which makes the assumption of conformity will also be revealed.

## **Chapter 3 Data & Methods**

### **Data**

Investigation of the research question required two distinct data sets. The first dataset necessary to examine public attitudes towards growth management is one which addresses the questions of which types of growth individuals within the communities favor and which they oppose. The second dataset required is identification of what policies the communities have officially adopted as well as the attitudes towards various kinds of growth that were espoused by the governing bodies of the communities.

The data for this study were collected in two phases. The first dataset, identifying the attitudes of community residents, was collected by Andrew Jackson, working in conjunction with Mountainland Association of Governments in 1998. His association with this group provided the impetus for the selection of communities that received and responded to the citizen survey. This data was collected for another thesis relating public attitudes towards growth and growth management to such variables as community size, distance to major metropolitan areas, residents' age and time in the community, etc. The second data set concerning city policies and elected officials' growth preferences, which I collected in late 2009 and early 2010 specifically for this thesis, was sampled from the same communities in order to take advantage of the data collected in the original set by the MAG (see Map 1). It is important to note that the difference in timing of the collection of the two data sets, as well as the nature of the MAG, means that the communities being studied had access to the first data set for some time before the second survey was administered. This means that the early data may have potentially, and perhaps should have, influenced the attitude data collected in the 2009-2010 dataset.



**Map 1 Location of Included Cities**

## Data Set 1

### *Collection methods*

The first dataset, resident attitudes towards growth and growth management, was administered as a door-to-door survey. The surveys were delivered to residents by members of local Boy Scout troops, and residents would fill out the surveys and return them immediately to the scouts. Since this method of collection would potentially miss some residents who would have liked to have participated, copies of the survey were also provided at local city offices for residents to drop in and fill out for a period of some days or weeks after the initial delivery.

**Table 1 Survey Administration**

<b>City</b>	<b>Population</b>	<b>Households</b>	<b>Surveys Returned</b>	<b>Percent of Population Sampled</b>	<b>Percent of Households Sampled (approximation)</b>
Cedar Fort	341	101	34	10.0%	33.7%
Charleston	378	120	62	16.4%	51.7%
Holden	400	140	83	20.8%	59.3%
Manti	3040	930	487	16.0%	52.4%
Richfield	6847	2166	672	9.8%	31.0%
Salina	2958	808	371	12.5%	45.9%
Santaquin	4834	1304	385	8.0%	29.5%
Wallsburg	274	83	47	17.2%	56.6%

The number of surveys collected varied by city. Cedar Fort, with a population of 341, had the lowest number of surveys collected, at 34, while Richfield, with a population of 6847, returned the highest number (672) (see Table 1). Due to the sampling method, it is likely that the majority of the surveys were administered at a rate of one per household, though occasionally more than one survey may have been submitted by the residents of a single home. Thus, an approximate percentage of households sampled has been included in the table as well.

The overall response rate varied a little between the communities, with between approximately eight and 21 percent of the population responding, or between approximately 29 and 60 percent of households participating. These numbers are based on the population and household numbers given in the 2000 census, which was taken two years after the survey was administered.

### ***Survey Data***

The surveys given to city residents differed from city to city, based on the type of growth that was allowed under the existing ordinance of the time. For instance, in only Manti was a question asked regarding whether residents favored or opposed industrial growth. This study uses the answers to four of the questions posed in that survey, which were given with some variation as follows;

- Our current ordinance allows for residential growth. How do you feel – do you favor or oppose encouraging residential growth in our city?
- Our current ordinance allows for commercial growth. How do you feel – do you favor or oppose encouraging commercial growth in our city?

- Our current ordinance allows for industrial growth. How do you feel – do you favor or oppose encouraging industrial growth in our city?
- Some of the land surrounding [city name] is currently part of the unincorporated [county name] County. It may be necessary to annex additional land into [city name] to accommodate future growth and to plan for future land uses. Do you favor or oppose future annexations of land into the City?

The specific wording of the questions varied from city to city in order to make the questions specific and accurate to the community. For instance some community's allowance for commercial development was limited to downtown commercial, and some questions indicated that the current ordinance disallowed industrial growth, etc. The different surveys were created for each city individually, and when I requested a copy, one was not available of each survey. However, the sample survey provided in the appendix was represented as typical by Andrew Jackson, the original researcher.

In each of the surveys, the answers to these questions were limited to three possible answers: favor, oppose, and undecided. Further elaboration was allowed for in subsequent questions, but those responses are beyond the scope of this thesis, and thus are not included here.

A sample survey is included in Appendix A of this thesis.

## Data Set 2

### *Collection methods*

The second dataset comprises answers to questions relating to established city policies and city official attitudes scores. I collected it via a phone survey with representatives of each city. The original intent of the survey process was to ask the questions directly to whichever person was responsible for planning within the community, whether that individual was a professional planner, city manager or in another position. However, due mainly to the size of the communities, the availability of these professional planners or city managers was limited. Consequently, the official title of the respondent varied widely from city to city. In each case, however, the survey was administered to a person who indicated they were familiar with city policies and personnel and was competent enough to respond to the questions. Table 2 gives information regarding those surveyed.

**Table 2 Survey Respondent Profiles**

<b>City</b>	<b>Position</b>	<b>Gender</b>	<b>Age</b>	<b>Years at current position</b>	<b>Years living in the community</b>
Cedar Fort	Mayor	M	59	8	30
Charleston	Contract Planner/Building Inspector	M	46	9	N/A
Holden	Chairman of Planning Commission	M	62	12	21
Manti	City Recorder	M	64	25	25
Richfield	City Manager	M	69	10	37
Salina	Treasurer	F	31	2.5	12
Santaquin	Secretary to Building Dept.	F	50	3.5	3.5
Wallsburg	Planner at MAG	M	N/A	N/A	N/A

The characteristics of two of the respondents are worth mentioning. First, the planner for Charleston is a contract planner for the city who works as a professional planner in Draper, Utah.

This individual does not live within the community of Charleston. The respondent for the community of Wallsburg is also not a town resident. Rather, he is a planner with the Mountainland Association of Governments, which does planning support for Wallsburg on the rare occasions when development happens within the community. Because of the nature of that relationship, no age or length of time in the position of community was given by the respondent, though he was familiar with the local municipal codes.

Each of the surveys given to the city representatives was identical. However, because of the size of the included communities and the varying levels of planning-specific education, training, and experience, in most cases some explanations of various terms were required to be sure that the questions were well understood.

### ***Survey Data***

Data from this survey were collected in two sections. The first section dealt with specific programs and policies that communities had adopted with regard to growth management. The programs and policies of interest were taken from Gerber and Phillips (2005), Forbes (2006), and Loftman and Levin (1996), as indicated in the literature review portion of this thesis.

Questions were phrased “Does [community name] have an urban growth boundary?”, “Does [community name] have a program for the purchase of development rights?” and so forth.

The second section of the survey dealt with the attitudes of several city bodies towards growth and growth management. These bodies were the Mayor, the City Council, the Planning Commission, and the planning professional. Additionally, the city representative’s perception of public opinions towards growth and growth management was recorded. For each of these bodies, attitudes towards growth were measured with regard to five categories of growth:

residential, retail commercial, office commercial, industrial, and annexation. For each category the respondent indicated the preference of each body. Possible responses were: 1. As much growth as possible, 2. Promote quality growth, 3. Limited, regulated, careful growth, or 4. Minimal or no growth.

It is important to note that the questions being asked regarding the Mayor's, City Council's, and Planning Commission's attitudes were being asked to a single city representative. This introduces a limitation into the thesis because the answers given reflect a potential bias on the part of the city representative who answered the question.

Only one city, Richfield, opted to not respond to any question regarding the Mayor's, City Council's, or Planning Commission's attitudes towards growth. The city manager cited as his reason a desire to not speculate on the positions of city officials lest that speculation be held as the official recorded position of the city leaders in an election. However, the city manager did indicate his perception of public attitudes towards growth. This topic will be examined more in the chapter on Richfield.

## **Methods**

Using the resident surveys from each of the cities I compiled the batches of responses into a single, overall indicator of support/opposition to growth for each city. Another score was needed to quantify whether city policies favored promoting or limiting growth. Using these scores, comparisons were then made using a Paired t-test, a Pearson's Correlation, and a Spearman's Rho Correlation, to judge how consistently city policies match resident preferences towards growth and growth management.

## **Calculating resident score**

The data collected for resident attitudes were trimodal, allowing only for favor, opposition, or undecided, and not quantifying to what degree individuals favored or opposed future growth. It seemed logical, then, in order to create a conglomerated resident attitude score for each city, to simply tally the numbers of individuals from each community who favored and opposed growth. The number of individuals who opposed growth was subtracted from the number of individuals who favored growth. Thus, a positive numerical outcome would show an overall net support for growth, while a negative number would show a net opposition. This number was then divided by the total number of surveys administered in order to show a relative strength.

The range of potential scores for this process is from negative one to one. A city in which every resident polled opposed growth would score a negative one, a very strong opposition to growth. Conversely, a city with strong support for growth, indicated by all residents selecting the 'favor' option, would score a positive one. An equally balanced city would score a zero, with overall opinions split. By dividing by the total number surveys, the influence of individuals who marked 'undecided' is also accounted for. Essentially, an undecided vote is a score of 0, neither opposing nor supporting growth. However, when these votes are included in the divisor, they have an overall moderating effect on the outcome. In a hypothetical situation where half of the residents favor growth and half are undecided, the final score would show a level of support of +0.5.

This process was performed for each question regarding the different types of growth. Thus, a score was calculated for resident attitudes for residential growth, commercial growth, industrial growth, and annexation. These scores were then combined into a final index of overall

resident attitudes by averaging the individual scores. The categorical and summary resident attitude scores are presented in the Table 3.

**Table 3 Averaged resident responses for growth preference questions (Range -1 to 1)**

City	Residential	Commercial	Industrial	Annexation	Overall
Cedar Fort	-.24	.06		.42	.08
Charleston	-.53	-.65		-.34	-.51
Holden	.14	.07		.07	.09
Manti	.39	.76	.45	.45	.52
Richfield	.47	.77		-.32	.31
Salina	.52	.83		.54	.63
Santaquin	-.17	.57		.05	.15
Wallsburg	-.61	-.42		-.23	-.43

In only one city, Manti, were residents asked whether they favored or opposed industrial development.

### **Calculating a city policy score**

Creating an index for the policy environment of each city was a matter of identifying the types of programs and policies which attempt to promote growth, and those which attempt to control growth, and then tallying these programs. This study uses the standards of Gerber and Phillips (2005), Forbes (2006), and Loftman and Levin (1996), as discussed above, for identification of these programs. This formula was then used to calculate the policy score for each community:

$$\frac{a}{b} - \frac{c}{d} = e$$

In this equation, *a* represents the number of policies favoring growth; *b* represents the potential number of policies which favor growth; *c* represents policies which attempt to limit growth; *d* represent the potential number of policies which attempt to limit growth; *e*, therefore, is the city's score for favoring growth or growth management. I developed this formula specifically for this thesis for the purpose of evaluating overall growth management policies and programs, and for comparison between the communities included in this study.

Variables *b* and *d*, the potential policies favoring or opposing growth, which were used as dividers in the formula, were derived by somewhat different manners. While the research on programs and policies which are meant to control growth has identified specific programs and policies, pro-growth research has rather identified types of policies and has not named specific devices. This means that for variable *d*, specific policies, such as urban growth boundaries or urban service areas, could be easily identified and counted. For this thesis, this situation fixed the number of growth management devices at 10, as discussed earlier.

Conversely, counting programs and policies which were pro-growth meant categorizing the programs and then counting the number of categories which were represented. I used three pro-growth categories. This means that a category with more than one program would be counted the same as a category with a single program. For instance, a city which has an Enterprise zone and a Redevelopment Area, both of which are considered programs which leverage public funds for development, would score the same as a city with only an Enterprise zone.

A potential drawback to this categorization presents itself because a city which has just one tax-leveraging program and a tax exemption would have a higher score even though the number of actual programs is identical. This adjustment was necessary because of the lack of identification in the literature of specific devices, and because cities can be, and historically have been, both creative in their implementation of pro-growth programs and in their identification of them by different names. For instance, in preparing to do this research, I learned that some cities refer to virtually identical programs as Redevelopment Zones while others name it an Enterprise Zone. In collecting information on these programs, instead of asking about specific programs, as was done for growth-control policies, city personnel were questioned as to whether any policies or programs had been adopted which used particular techniques. For instance, rather than asking ‘does the city have an enterprise zone’, the question was presented ‘does the city have any programs, like an enterprise zone, which leverages public funds for promoting development’. This allowed the respondent to easily identify the type of program being targeted by the question and thereby allowing them the flexibility to identify programs similar to the example provided, but which might not be called by the same name or even be similar in structure.

While there was good reason for employing this technique of categorizing pro-growth programs, this causes a direct comparison of pro-growth to anti-growth programs to be problematic. The potential anti-growth score would be ten, while the potential pro-growth score would only be three. To balance this discrepancy in differential scores, the total number of possible devices for controlling growth and the total number of possible categories for growth-promoting devices were used as devisors. Thus, a maximum score for both pro-growth and growth management policies would be one, with a minimum set at zero. For instance, a city with

10 growth management policies and programs would score a “1”, and a city with 3 growth promoting policies and programs would also score a “1”.

Additionally, comparisons city to city could be incongruous. A city with five pro-growth programs could score the same pro-growth score as a city with as few as one pro-growth program, depending on the category into which these programs fall. That being said, this seemed the best way to proceed considering the alternative would have been to risk missing discovery of potentially important growth-promoting programs and policies.

Since cities, will generally have both pro-development and growth management programs and policies on the books, it is inevitable that the question will arise whether a particular city is more pro-growth or more growth-management focused, based on codification. To this end, the next step in developing the city score formula was to subtract one score from the other. For convenience with regard to language, it was decided that pro-growth would be positive, while growth management, or anti-growth, would be negative. In the proposal for this thesis, an additional element, the bias of the planning professional, be they a planner, city manager, or other individual who was mainly responsible for planning, was to be included. This was believed to be essential since any professional will, in the process of their duties, favor either growth or growth management. However, in the process of the survey it was determined that few of the communities have a professional staff planner. These services, instead, were supplied by contract planners with little connection to the city, for most of the communities. This element was therefore eliminated because it seemed to be undeterminable.

The final result of this scoring process ends with a score for each city ranging from negative one to one, with zero being essentially a point of balance or neutrality. It is unlikely

that any community will have all the potential policies and programs or categories of programs and policies from either the pro-growth or growth management camps and none from the other. Any score above 0.5 or below a -0.5 is considered to be a strong preference towards the respective extreme. Anything between -0.2 and .2 would be considered weak or neutral. The calculated score for each city is given in Table 4.

**Table 4 City policy growth management scores**

<b>City</b>	<b>Score</b>
Cedar Fort	-0.3
Charleston	.133
Holden	-0.1
Manti	-0.3
Richfield	.033
Salina	0
Santaquin	-.5
Wallsburg	-.4

**Calculating perceived resident score**

Central to the theme of this paper is the idea that local governments enact policies that may not align with those of the citizens of their communities. Whether this proves to be true or not, it is important to examine the motivations of the entities that pass legislation which may or may not be in accordance with public preferences. Various potential explanations may be

presented as to why a policy fails to conform to public ideals. However, the one that should be examined first is the possibility that the governing body simply misunderstands community sentiments. That is to say that through various circumstances, city officials, planning commissions, staff, and even the public itself may believe that the general sentiment is something other than it is.

As a professional planner, the writer has observed through personal experience and through the expressions of colleagues that the public almost always expresses opposition to nearly every development project presented to planning commissions and city councils. This seems particularly true in rural communities where developments of nearly any kind are seen by the commenting public as an affront to a rural lifestyle. Whether this reflects true opposition by the community as a whole or is just multiple manifestations of the NIMBY ('Not In My Back Yard') phenomenon is difficult to determine by professional planners. Indeed, I have even heard some citizens state that they favor a particular project for the city but "not in this neighborhood." That leads to the question: Do cities have an inflated view of the opposition of the public to growth? A literature search on this topic yielded no direct discussion of this topic. In fact, I observed that often growth policy serves as a proxy for public opinion in the literature, with little indication that this could be potentially problematic.

If the general sentiment of the community is misunderstood by the governing bodies, it would seem logical that the policies adopted by a community may actually be at odds with citizen preferences, not from any particular nefarious or backhanded process, but rather from a sincere attempt to create a community that the citizens will desire and in which they will prefer to reside. Since land use decisions are made one at a time on a neighborhood scale, communities are perhaps prone to adopt more growth management policies than citizens would prefer rather

than the opposite. This is because those who support a project are much less likely to voice an opinion in public meetings, or even attend a meeting, than those who oppose it. Additionally, residents are less likely to attend public meetings where decisions are being made for more distant (out of neighborhood) locales, and NIMBY logic tells us that neighbors tend to be more in favor of controls over land in their immediate vicinity.

While this hypothesis—that local and vocal crowds tend to be more anti-growth than the general public, and may influence staff and city officials’ view of public opinion—may seem logical, the logic is far from definitive. Thus, in this investigation, it was necessary to obtain not only the public’s opinion on growth management, but also to identify the city’s perception of public opinion on the matter. To this end, the city representative interviewed for each community was asked regarding each category of growth: From your experience, what is the public’s position on growth (of this type)? I asked for a relative response for this question, as with the other questions, ranging from ‘strongly favor’ to ‘strongly oppose’.

It should be noted that those being interviewed were from a variety of backgrounds. Because these communities are so small, only one of them had a professional planner who worked directly for the city. In some cases the interviewees were contracted professional planners; in other cases they were city managers who managed planning in addition to their other duties; while some others were elected or appointed city officials such as mayors or planning commission members; and still others were staff whose work did not involve planning processes at all. This is important because the variety of experience between, but not within, communities may hamper to some extent the comparability of the responses. Were this methodology to be extended to a broader project, particularly to larger communities, it would be much preferable to have this question answered by professional planners, which would eliminate some variation in

the type of professional experience of the respondent. It might also be useful to ask this question of a variety of individuals within each community.

Once the answers for this set of questions were recorded, each response was converted to a numerical value from 1 to -1, with 1 being strongly favor and -1 being strongly oppose. The answers were then averaged for a total perceived resident score. The scores for each city are presented in the table.

**Table 5 Perceived Resident Scores**

City	Residential	Commercial – Retail	Industrial	Annexation	Overall
Cedar Fort	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1
Charleston	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1
Holden	-0.5	-1	-1	-1	-0.875
Manti	-0.5	-0.5	-1	-0.5	-0.625
Richfield	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1
Salina	1	0.5	0.5	-0.5	.375
Wallsburg	-0.5	-0.5	-0.5	-1	-0.625
Santaquin	-0.5	-0.5	-0.5	-0.5	-0.5

**Calculating city officials’ scores**

The scoring system used for city officials was identical to the system used for the perceived resident score. That is, a strongly support growth value was scored as 1, and a strongly oppose growth or strongly favor controlling growth was scored as -1. The other possible scores were 0.5 and -0.5. It is important to note that no score of 0 was possible in this system, since there were four possible answers, and no neutral answer was available. This was done intentionally in order to eliminate the tendency of people to choose the middle answer.

Providing no easy neutral answer forces the respondent to think carefully about the question and give a more reasoned, and hopefully more accurate, response. Even with four

possible answers and no neutral value, respondents tended towards the more central responses. However, since there is a lack of evidence to the contrary, I assume that these responses are due to real value judgments, which accurately reflect the positions of the various bodies. Certainly some responses tended towards the more extreme positions of strongly favoring one side or the other.

I asked the same questions to each city representative about the city officials' positions as I asked them regarding public opinions. A full copy of the survey can be found in Appendix A. The questions were posed to the interviewee about each of four persons or bodies: the Mayor, the City Council, the Planning Commission, and the staff planner.

In all but one city, Santaquin, the interviewees responded that no city staff member was specifically a planner by profession under the direct employ of the city itself. Since those planners who do not work for the city directly don't have as large of a vested interest, and some cities had no professional planner, this category of responses was essentially nullified. Two factors result in this nullification; first, the absence of a planner in most cases produces a large difference in professional experience between communities; second, in communities with a directly employed planner, the experience of the planner is different than that of planners who perform contractual work. Considering that only one of the eight communities had a professional planner, two had contract planners, and five had no professional planning services, the differences in planning experiences by the city representatives interviewed are practically incomparable without the introduction of a bias which would be difficult to quantify. Therefore, I determined that the incorporation of the staff planner answer set in the intended formula would have an uneven effect on the city scores, and I eliminated that variable from the formula. The

formula describe above, therefore, does not incorporate the influence of a professional planner, as originally intended.

In one city, Richfield, the city manager responded that he would not put into any kind of record his perceptions of the Mayor's, City Council's, or Planning Commission's positions on any political issue. The manager's responses to the perceived public opinion question, which indicates a perception of a public position much opposed to any kind of growth, indicates that perhaps growth and growth management to be a hot-button issue in the community. If that's the case, it may explain the city manager's hesitation at ascribing a position to public officials whose elections could be influenced by his responses. It very well may be that he feared losing his job with the city if that information were to get out. In any case, the questions regarding city officials' positions are unavailable for the city of Richfield. This is discussed in more depth in the chapter on Richfield.

### **Statistical comparisons**

The examination of the relationship between citizen preferences (what citizens want) and policies (what citizens get), logically begins with the questions: What do citizens want, and what do the policies ascribe? Since growth policies directly control which land uses are allowed in a community, as well as proactive behaviors of city officials and staff to attract or prevent growth, the correlation of citizen preferences and policy proscriptions need to match if the community is to be and become what citizens' desire. Answering those two questions (what do citizens want, what do policies ascribe?) was the original intent of this thesis. However, in the process of planning the research, collecting the data, and interpreting the results, several other questions

worth simultaneous examination presented themselves. For instance, if citizens' preferences do not match policies, could it be that the policies do match what city officials believe citizens' preferences to be? Or, do planning policies reflect the mayor's or city council's preferences?

Answering these questions requires the examination of various relationships. Several categories of comparisons present themselves for examination, and are best viewed in Table 6. This table shows the variety of relationships which can and should be examined from a statistical perspective.

It should be noted that the Mayor's, City Council's, and Planning Commission's preferences are also perception-based in most cases. That is, the interviewee's perception of the Mayor's, City Council's, and Planning Commission's positions may differ from the true positions of the various bodies. Unfortunately, this difference cannot be helped, even in a study of this small size, due to the difficulty in contacting each member of these bodies in each community. Therefore, the perception of the various interviewees, who have substantial contact with each of the bodies and individuals which comprise them, is and must be trusted, even with its inherent limitation.

A statistical examination of these various relationships among the cities is presented in the statistical results chapter. These statistical relationships are limited to the overall scores, from the summation of the growth-preference variables. A more in-depth examination of the relationships specific to each type of growth is presented in each of the city chapters.

The sample size in this paper is quite small. Despite the collection of over 2000 surveys from individuals concerning their attitudes to adopted city policies, the grouping of those individuals limits the effective sample size to eight, which is the number of cities involved.

Because the sample size is so small, the number of statistical degrees of freedom is limited, which means that the potential for finding a statistically significant result is quite unlikely. In fact, given the parameters of this study, a statistically significant result would most likely mean an underlying flaw in the political system, or perhaps even a controlling directive from a higher level of government, such as the State.

**Table 6 Relationship Matrix**

	Citizen's Preferences	Perceived Public Preferences	Policies	Mayor's Preferences	City Council Preferences	Planning Commission Preferences
Citizen's Preferences	X					
Perceived Public Preferences		X				
Policies			X			
Mayor's Preferences				X		
City Council Preferences					X	
Planning Commission Preferences						X

Also, because the sample size is small, a normal correlation test is unlikely to yield a statistically significant result. So, in addition to a Pearson's correlation test, two other statistical tests were added to the statistical analysis. First, as Spearman's Rho non-parametric rank correlation test, and second, a paired T-test is the preferable test for significance. These tests were run for each of the relationships indicated in figure 1. All three tests were used rather than just one because any hint of a statistical relationship in such a small sample size has potentially important implications.

## Summary

This thesis examines the relationship between resident attitudes towards growth and city policies which are adopted to control or promote growth. There are two sets of data, from surveys given to residents and an official city representative, respectively, which are compared. The primary question being asked is whether resident preferences are reflected in city policies.

The first dataset comes from a questionnaire administered directly to city residents. This data examines resident preferences directly. The second dataset comes from a survey to a city representative, and has essentially two sections. The first section is collects quantifiable data regarding the existence of specific policies and programs. The second section is less quantifiable, essentially taking a temperature of the attitudes of city officials. Because the questions are not asked directly to city officials, this data is less direct and potentially more biased than the data collected from city residents. Also, because the questions reflect opinions, this data is less quantifiable than data concerning policies.

These data are then analyzed using Pearson's Correlation, Spearman's Rho Correlation, and Paired t-tests. These tests are described with their results in the next chapter, Statistical Results. Because of varying accuracy of responses to questions, particularly those questions posed about city officials' preferences, there is varying validity among the different tests. The test with the least suspect datasets, and therefore the highest validity, addresses the primary question: whether policy proscriptions match resident preferences for growth.

## **Chapter 4 Statistical Results**

The sample size for this research is limited to eight cities. This small sample size limits the likelihood of finding statistical significance of any relationship. This being the case, this research has more merit as a set of case studies. However, it is still important to run the statistical tests to find if there are any relationships worth noting which may give insight into more general social patterns. To that end, the following statistical tests were run.

### **Paired Samples T-test**

For a small sample size case like this the most appropriate test to run is a Paired Samples T-test. A Paired t-test is used when sample sizes are small, limiting the value of correlation tests, and when there is a single measurement variable and two nominal variables. In this case the measurement variable is the growth-preference score and the nominal variables are the different groups involved. Several of these t-tests were run for the different groups. For instance relationships between public preferences and the mayor's preferences were tested for significance. The full set of Paired t-tests run is presented with the statistical results in Table 7.

For this research there are several relationships which are being tested, which therefore call for several null hypotheses. These hypotheses and the results of the testing are presented below, organized by the relationships being examined. Generally speaking, however, the null hypothesis for each question is that there is no difference between the means. For the main question of concern of this study the null hypothesis is that there is no difference between the policies that the citizens of the community prefer and the policies which the city has adopted.

### **Pearson's Correlation**

While a T-test is designed to test a hypothesis by rejecting a null hypothesis, the test is of limited usefulness. Correlation tests are often used to test the strength of relationships, and can show both positive and negative relationships between two variables. Generally, correlation tests require a sample size much larger than is available in this study to find significance. In spite of the small likelihood of finding statistical significance in the results, a Pearson's correlation was run in order to examine the directionality and strength of relationships between the different variables.

### **Spearman's Rho Correlation**

A Spearman's Rho correlation is much like a Pearson's correlation in both purpose and limits. However, in the process of a Spearman's Rho correlation, before calculations are performed, each of the scores for each variable is ranked relative to each other. This results in a test that is statistically less rigorous and more likely to yield a significant result. This less rigorous test is useful because it can identify relationships more easily in smaller sample sizes, but care should be taken in reporting the strength of the results. Additionally, one limitation of the Spearman's Rho test is that ranking the scores eliminates the negative value of the scores, making negative relationships less likely to surface.

## Relationships Tables

The results from the statistical tests discussed are presented here. Tables 7-10 show the raw statistical results, and specific relationships are discussed thematically below.

**Table 7 Paired Samples Statistics**

		Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Std. Error mean
Pair 1	Policy Score	-.1792	8	.22743	.08041
	Public Score	.1061	8	.40492	.14316
Pair 2	Policy Score	-.1792	8	.22743	.08041
	Perceived Public Score	-.6569	8	.46166	.16322
Pair 3	Policy Score	-.2095	7	.22748	.08598
	Mayor Score	-.0714	7	.51467	.19453
Pair 4	Policy Score	-.2095	7	.22748	.08598
	CC Score	-.2143	7	.67975	.25692
Pair 5	Policy Score	-.2095	7	.22748	.08598
	PC Score	-.2507	7	.68890	.26038
Pair 6	Public Score	.1061	8	.40492	.14316
	Perceived Public Score	-.6569	8	.46166	.16322
Pair 7	Public Score	.0774	7	.42854	.16197
	Mayor Score	-.0714	7	.51467	.19453
Pair 8	Public Score	.0774	7	.42854	.16197
	CC Score	-.2143	7	.67975	.25692
Pair 9	Public Score	.0774	7	.42854	.16197
	PC Score	-.2507	7	.68890	.26038
Pair 10	Perceived Public Score	-.6079	7	.47563	.17977
	Mayor Score	-.0714	7	.51467	.19453
Pair 11	Perceived Public Score	-.6079	7	.47563	.17977
	CC Score	-.2143	7	.67975	.25692
Pair 12	Perceived Public Score	-.6079	7	.47563	.17977
	PC Score	-.2507	7	.68890	.26038
Pair 13	Mayor Score	-.0714	7	.51467	.19453
	CC Score	-.2143	7	.67975	.25692
Pair 14	Mayor Score	-.0714	7	.51467	.19453
	PC Score	-.2507	7	.68890	.26038
Pair 15	CC Score	-.2143	7	.67975	.25692
	PC Score	-.2507	7	.68890	.26038

**Table 8 Paired Samples t-test Results**

	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean	90% Confidence Interval of the Difference		t	Df	Sig. (2-tailed)
				Lower	Upper			
Policy – Public	-.28522	.46404	.16406	-.59605	.02562	-1.738	7	.126
Policy – Perceived Public	.47771	.51966	.18373	.12962	.82580	2.600	7	.035*
Policy – Mayor	-.13810	.54149	.20466	-.53580	.25961	-.675	6	.525
Policy – CC	.00476	.70648	.26703	-.51412	.52364	.018	6	.986
Policy – PC	.04119	.69794	.26380	-.47142	.55380	.156	6	.881
Public – Perceived Public	.76293	.44453	.15716	.46516	1.06069	4.854	7	.002*
Public – Mayor	.14887	.42477	.16055	-.16310	.46085	.927	6	.390
Public – CC	.29173	.48780	.1847	-.06653	.65000	1.582	6	.165
Public – PC	.32816	.50568	.1911	-.04324	.69956	1.717	6	.137
Perceived Public – Mayor	-.53643	.51953	.19636	-.91800	-.15486	-2.732	6	.034*
Perceived Public – CC	-.39357	.59259	.22398	-.82880	.04166	-1.757	6	.129
Perceived Public – PC	-.35714	.60169	.22742	-.78806	.08477	-1.570	6	.167
Mayor – CC	.14286	.32619	.12329	-.09671	.38243	1.159	6	.291
Mayor – PC	.17929	.38052	.1482	-.10019	.45876	1.247	6	.259
CC – PC	.03643	.09419	.03560	-.03275	.10561	1.023	6	.346

**Table 9 Pearson's Correlation Results**

		Policy	Public	Perceived Public	Mayor	CC	PC
Policy	Pearson Correlation	1	.002	-.025	.100	.047	.125
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.996	.954	.831	.919	.789
	N	8	8	8	7	7	7
Public	Pearson Correlation	.002	1	.480	.608	.700*	.662*
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.996		.229	.148	.080	.092
	N	8	8	8	7	7	7
Perceived Public	Pearson Correlation	-.025	.4480	1	.452	.521	.517
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.954	.229		.309	.20	.235
	N	8	8	8	7	7	7
Mayor	Pearson Correlation	.100	.608	.452	1	.887*	.839*
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.831	.148	.309		.008	.018
	N	7	7	7	7	7	7
CC	Pearson Correlation	.047	.700*	.521	.887*	1	.991*
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.919	.080	.230	.008		.000
	N	7	7	7	7	7	7
PC	Pearson Correlation	.125	.682*	.517	.839*	.991*	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.789	.092	.235	.018	.000	
	N	7	7	7	7	7	7

**Table 10 Spearman's Rho Non-parametric Rank Correlations Results**

		Policy	Public	Perceived Public	Mayor	CC	PC
Policy	Correlation	1.000	.000	-.417	.173	.109	.299
	Coefficient		1.000	.304	.711	.816	.515
	Sig. (2-tailed)	8	8	8	7	7	7
	N						
Public	Correlation	.000	1.000	.464	.739*	.775*	.704*
	Coefficient	1.000		.247	.058	.041	.077
	Sig. (2-tailed)	8	8	8	7	7	7
	N						
Perceived Public	Correlation	-.417	.464	1.000	.409	.518	.467
	Coefficient	.304	.247		.362	.233	.290
	Sig. (2-tailed)	8	8	8	7	7	7
	N						
Mayor	Correlation	.173	.739*	.409	1.000	.982*	.954*
	Coefficient	.711	.058	.362		.000	.001
	Sig. (2-tailed)	7	7	7	7	7	7
	N						
CC	Correlation	.109	.775*	.518	.982*	1.000	.972*
	Coefficient	.816	.041	.233	.000		.000
	Sig. (2-tailed)	7	7	7	7	7	7
	N						
PC	Correlation	.299	.704*	.467	.954*	.972*	1.000
	Coefficient	.515	.077	.290	.001	.000	
	Sig. (2-tailed)	7	7	7	7	7	7
	N						

### Policy Relationships

The relationships between policies regarding growth and preferences for growth among the differing bodies are, as a rule, very weak. Each individual relationship is discussed here, but as a category of relationships, finding such weakness is telling. This set of relationships may be the most important, as a group, and is the primary question being researched in this study.

## **Policy to Public**


### ***Policy Score to Actual Public Score***

The t-test for the relationship between Policy scores and Public scores found there was no statistically significant difference between policy ( $M = -.18$ ,  $SD = .23$ ) and public preferences ( $M = .10$ ,  $SD = .40$ );  $t(7) = -1.74$ ,  $p = .126$ .

The p value of the t-test fails to rise to the requisite .1 level necessary to reject the null hypothesis. The null hypothesis in this test is that what the citizens want and what the policies proscribe are the same. We cannot, therefore, say that the policies of the various cities do not match the preferences of the citizens.

However, it is important to note that the score of .126 for this particular t-test comes very close to the .1 level. Considering that the sample size for this study is only 8 cities, the addition of a few more test subjects may have increased the degrees of freedom sufficiently to result in a significant p score.

The correlation tests, the Pearson's and Spearman's Rho, are also not significant, probably due, at least in part, to sample size. The Pearson's correlation showed significance of .996, and the Spearman's Rho 1.000, which are as insignificant a result as is possible. The relationship direction, of .002 for the Pearson's correlation and .000 for the Spearman's Rho, show that the relationship between these two scores, public preference and policy proscription, seem to have little connection. Figure 1 illustrates that weakness of relationships (the figure is essentially the graphic representation of the Pearson's correlation).



**Figure 1 Correlation between Policy score and Public score.**

***Policy Score to Perceived Public Score***


In addition to the actual public preferences, the data that was gathered regarding what the city staff believed public preferences to be was labeled Perceived Public Score. The relationship between those scores is discussed below. The same set of statistical tests were run between the Policy score and the Perceived Public score to examine whether a relationship exists between policies and what staff believe citizens want.

The t-test for the relationship between policy and perceived public preferences found there was a statistically significant difference between Policy (M= -.18, SD= .23) and Perceived Public preferences (M= -.66, SD= .46);  $t(7) = 2.6, p = .035$ . This means that the null hypothesis,

that what staff believes the citizens want and what the policies proscribe are the same, is rejected. Instead, we accept the alternative hypothesis, which is that what the staff believes concerning citizen preferences is not the same as what policies proscribe. This is important because it appears that not only is the relationship between citizen preferences and policies weak, but we can say very specifically that policies do not match what the staff believes citizen preferences to be. Some interesting implications of this result are addressed in the discussion section of this chapter.

The correlation tests for this relationship also show very little connection between the Perceived Public score and the Policy score. This relationship is also slightly negative. Figure 2 illustrates this relationship. However, as with the actual public score, the significances of the tests, .954 for Pearson's, and .304 for Spearman's Rho, are both below the requisite .1, meaning they are not significant. This means that these tests do not show conclusively that the relationship is as weak as it seems to be. Though the significance of the correlation between the two variables is weak, the result from the paired samples t-test informs us that there is actually a difference between policy proscription and perceived public opinion.

Additionally, careful examination of Figure 2 reveals an outlier which, if removed from the sample would result in both a more negative correlation and a closer fitting line, which may yield a more statistically more significant result. The outlier in this test is the city of Salina, where it seems that the staff has a more accurate understanding of public opinion than is typical in the other cities included in this study.



**Figure 2 Correlation between Policy score and Perceived Public score**


For this set of tests it is important to note that the Perceived Public score was gathered from various types of city staff, from contract planning professionals to city recorders, and even an occasional city official. This being the case, the perception of the staff may be, and probably is, different than the perception of the Mayor and City Council. While this may limit the usefulness of the Perceived Public score, the influence of city staff is still important, and the examination of relationships between a staff-generated Perceived Public score and other variables is still enlightening, particularly on a case-by-case basis, as discussed in later chapters.

## Policy to Officials

### *Policy Score to Mayor Score*

The t-test for the relationship between Policy score and Mayor Score found there was no statistically significant difference between policy ( $M = -.21$ ,  $SD = .23$ ) and mayor preferences ( $M = -.07$ ,  $SD = .51$ );  $t(6) = -.68$ ,  $p = .53$ . This means that we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the policy proscription matches the mayor's preferences relative to growth management policies.

Correlation tests run on these scores also fail to show strong relationships between them. A Pearson's correlation shows a weak relationship of .10, but with a significance of .83. The Spearman's Rho rank correlation tests scores a slightly higher .17 correlation, but with only a similarly insignificant .82 significance score.



**Figure 3 Correlation between Policy score and Mayor Score**

Figure 3 illustrates the differences between the scores for the different cities. With the wide variability apparent in these values, it is easy to see why the correlation tests show such little significance. Perhaps a larger sample size would yield a more significant result. Taken together, the results from the t-test and the correlation tests indicate that though we cannot say for sure that mayor preferences differ from policy proscriptions, it is also difficult to say that they are the same, as well.


### ***Policy Score to City Council Score***

The t-test for the relationship between Policy and City Council score found that there was no statistically significant difference between policy ( $M = -.21$ ,  $SD = .23$ ) and city council preference ( $M = -.21$ ,  $SD = .68$ );  $t(6) = .02$ ,  $p = .99$ . In this case, as in the test with the Mayor's preference, the p value does not meet the requisite .10 level of significance, so we fail to reject the null hypothesis, that city council preferences match policy proscriptions.

Correlations for this relationship also show a similar result to the correlations with the mayoral preferences. Both the Pearson's correlation (.05) and the Spearman's Rho correlation (.11) show a weak relationship between the scores. However, both of these correlations score low in significance, as well, with significance scores of .92 and .82, respectively. This relationship is presented graphically in Figure 4.

Thus, as with the mayoral scores, though the t-test tells us we cannot reject the idea that policy matches city council preferences, the correlation data shows us that we also cannot say

conclusively that they do match, either. Once again, a larger sample size could potentially hope to clarify the exact nature of the relationship.




**Figure 4 Correlation between Policy score and City Council score**

***Policy Score to Planning Commission Score***

The t-test for the relationship between Policy and Planning Commission score found there was no statistically significant difference between policy (M= -.21, SD= .23) and planning commission preferences (M= -.25, SD= .69);  $t(6) = .16, p = .88$ . Once again we fail to reject the null hypothesis that policy proscription differs from planning commission preferences.

Correlation tests score similarly to both mayoral and city council preference tests, with a Pearson's score of .13 at a significance level of .79, and a Spearman's Rho relationship of .30 with a significance of .52. Figure 5 illustrates the Pearson's correlation.



**Figure 5 Correlation between Policy score and Planning Commission score**

Once again, as with other city official statistical results, though we cannot say for sure that policies don't match planning commission preferences, the correlation tests also fail to show that a strong relationship does exist.

The statistical tests for these policies to city official and public preference relationships essentially fail to show a significant result supporting either argument; that growth management policies do follow public or city official preferences; or that they do not. A larger sample size is probably needed to find a statistically significant result. However, the failure to find statistical significance does indicate that further research into this question is warranted because, from a political standpoint at least, there should be strong relationship between these groups views and legislative action in the form of adopted city policies and programs.


## **Public Relationships**

### **Public to Perceived Public**

The t-test for the relationship between Public preferences scores, as collected from surveys to city residents, and Perceived Public preference scores, as indicated by city representatives, found there was a statistically significant difference between public preferences ( $M = .11$ ,  $SD = .40$ ) and perceived public preferences ( $M = -.66$ ,  $SD = .46$ );  $t(7) = 4.85$ ,  $p = .002$ . Thus, we reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference between public and perceived public preferences, and accept the alternative hypothesis; specifically, this test shows conclusively that what the public actually prefers differs from what the city representatives believe the public prefers.

The correlation tests between public and Perceived Public preferences show a somewhat positive relationship between public and perceived public preferences with the Pearson's test showing a .448 and the Spearman's Rho scoring a .464. However, the significances of these tests are low at .23 and .25 respectively. A graphical representation of the Pearson's relationship is presented in Figure 6.

Taken together, the non-significant correlations tests and the statistically significant paired t-test show that although, there is a trend in the same direction of public preferences and the understanding of city representatives, there is a real difference between them. This indicates misunderstanding on the part of city representatives (primarily city staff) as to the general position of city residents. This will be discussed further in the discussion section of this chapter.



**Figure 6 Correlation between Public score and Perceived Public score**

Also worth noting is the difference between the relationship of perceived public preferences, which perception comes primarily from staff interactions, and the actual public preferences, as compared to the relationships between the positions of elected and appointed city officials

(mayors, city councils, planning commissions). Each of these relationships, presented in the next section, show higher correlations than are found in the perceived public to actual public preference comparisons. It is worth noting here that elected officials do seem to have a better handle on overall public opinion.


## **Public to Officials**

### ***Public Score to Mayor Score***

The t-test for the relationship between Public scores and Mayor scores found there was no statistically significant difference between public preferences ( $M = .08$ ,  $SD = .43$ ) and mayor preference ( $M = -.07$ ,  $SD = .51$ );  $t(6) = .93$ ,  $p = .39$ . Therefore, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the mayors' preferences differ from the citizen preferences, as a body.

Furthermore, the correlation tests show a fairly strong relationship between Mayor and Public preferences with a Pearson's score of .61 and a Spearman's Rho score of .74. The Pearson's correlation falls just short of being statistically significant at the .10 level at .15, but the Spearman's Rho shows significance, scoring .06. Figure 7 illustrates the Pearson correlation.

Both tests agree, and this is an important finding because these tests, especially taken together, show that the mayor and the public agree on growth management, and possibly other land use issues, generally. Considering the theme of this thesis--that growth management policies should match public preferences--it is promising that public and executive attitudes are fairly well matched. This also holds true for the next test, comparing public positions with the city legislative bodies.



**Figure 7. Correlation between Public score and Mayor score**


***Public Score to City Council Score***

The t-test for the relationship between Public preference scores and City Council scores found that there was no statistically significant difference between public preferences (M= .08, SD= .43) and city council preferences (M= -.21, SD= .68);  $t(6) = 1.58$ ,  $p = .165$ . This test result requires that we fail to reject the null hypothesis (public preferences match city council preferences).

Correlation tests also both confirm the match of the two groups at the .10 level. The Pearson’s correlation, which shows a strong relationship at .70, shows a statistically significant

relationship of .08 (Figure 8). The Spearman's Rho rank correlation shows an even stronger relationship, .78, which is statistically significant at an even higher level, .04.

Again, as with the Mayor-Public relationships, both sets of tests agree, and indicate that there is a match between Public preferences and those of the City Council. This is another important finding of this thesis.




**Figure 8 Correlation between Public Score and City Council Score**

### ***Public Score to Planning Commission Score***

The t-test for the relationship between public preferences and planning commission preferences found there was no statistically significant difference between public preferences (M= .08, SD= .43) and planning commission preferences (M= -.25, SD= .69);  $t(6) = 1.72$ ,  $p = .14$ . Once again we fail to reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference between public preferences and planning commission preferences, though the p-value indicates that this result very nearly statistically significant.

As with the mayor and city council preference correlation tests, correlation between planning commission and public preferences again show significant results. The Pearson's correlation test shows a fairly strong relationship of .66 (Figure 9) between planning commission and public preferences, and the Spearman's Rho shows an even stronger, .70, relationship. Both are statistically significant at the .10 level, with the Pearson's test scoring .09 and Spearman's .08. This indicates that the planning commission, along with the mayor and city council, do have a good understanding of true public preferences towards growth and growth management policy.



**Figure 9 Correlation between Public score and Planning Commission score**

## **Relationships with Perceived Public Scores**


### ***Mayor Score to Perceived Public Score***

The t-test for the relationship between Perceived Public preferences and Mayor preferences found there was a statistically significant difference between perceived public preferences (M= -.61, SD= .48) and mayor preference (M= -.07, SD= .51);  $t(6) = -2.73, p = .03$ . Thus we reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference between the two scores.

However, the correlation tests fail to produce a statistically significant result. The Pearson's correlation (illustrated in Figure 10) shows a fair but statistically insignificant

relationship with strength of .45 and a significance of .31. The Spearman's Rho test also shows a fair relationship of .41, but insignificant, achieving only a .36 significance result.


Earlier tests showed a fairly weak relationship between true public and perceived public variables. Other tests showed a fairly strong relationship between true public preferences and the Mayor's preferences. Therefore, it is not surprising that the relationship between the Mayor's preferences and perceived public preferences would be weak. The correlation tests are weak, and the t-test establishes that the two scores are different.



**Figure 10 Correlation between Perceived Public score and Mayor score**

### ***City Council Score to Perceived Public Score***

The t-test for the relationship between Perceived Public preferences and City Council preferences found there was no statistically significant difference between perceived public preferences (M= -.61, SD= .48) and city council preferences (M= -.21, SD= .68);  $t(6) = -1.76$ ,  $p = .13$ . This test approaches but fails to reach the .10 level of significance required to reject the null hypothesis. Therefore we cannot say that there is a difference between perceived public preferences and city council preferences.



**Figure 11 Correlation between Perceived Public score and City Council score**


Again, as with the mayor correlation tests with this variable, both the Pearson's (Figure 11) and Spearman's Rho tests fail to find a significant result. The correlation values of

.52 and .52 for each test, though fairly strong, only achieve a significance level of .20 and .23, respectively. The relationship between public preferences and city council preferences was shown to be fairly strong. Since the relationship between real public preferences and preferences of the public as perceived by city staff has also been shown to be fairly weak, it is not surprising to find that city council preferences don't match the perceived public preferences.

### ***Planning Commission Score to Perceived Public Score***

The t-test for the relationship between Perceived Public preferences and Planning Commission preferences found there was no statistically significant difference between perceived public preferences (M= -.61, SD= .48) and planning commission preferences (M= -.25, SD= .69);  $t(6) = -1.57, p = .17$ . Thus, we fail to reject the null hypothesis in this case as well. We cannot say there is no difference between planning commission and perceived public preferences.

Correlation tests reveal a similar pattern in the case of the planning commission as they did in the mayoral and city council preference tests. Once again, the Pearson's (Figure 12) and Spearman's Rho tests show a fair strength, .52 and .47, respectively, but at statistically insignificant levels of .24 and .29. As with the mayor and city council, since planning commission scores so closely match real resident attitude scores, it is not surprising that they do not match the perceived public score which does not match resident scores.



**Figure 12 Correlation between Perceived Public score and Planning Commission score**

### **Officials Relationships**

By way of preface to the final three statistical tests, there may be some bias in the following results. When interviewing the representatives from each city in the survey process, the questions would be asked thus: “What is the mayor’s position on growth in the city? Would you say that concerning residential growth, he/she favors: A. As much growth as possible, B. Promoting quality growth, C. Limited, regulated, careful growth, or D. Minimal or no growth?” (Other questions were asked similarly).

Inasmuch as the same question was asked about residential growth, commercial office growth, commercial retail growth, industrial growth, and annexation, and each of these

categories was presented for each of the bodies, mayor, city council, planning commission, and the individual responding, often the responses came back as “about the same.” For instance, the interviewee might respond, concerning the mayor’s position on residential growth “As much growth as possible” and then about the city council “about the same”. This being considered, the previous tests between the scores of the various public bodies and other variables, may essentially be a single set of tests, which could be labeled as “Public Officials” rather than broken out into categories of Mayor, City Council, and Planning Commission. There were some notable exceptions to this trend of “about the same” responses, such as Santaquin, where the City Council was indicated as being divided, and Charleston where the Mayor was perceived as being overall neutral towards growth, but the City Council and Planning Commission were perceived to be more negative.

The high correlation between officials’ scores or even between public scores and each of the official bodies may in fact be due in part to the manner in which the respondents answered the questions. Additionally, there may be some bias in that the city staffer or city official who responded to each question may believe each body’s opinion to be the same as the their own opinion or the same as each other’s. From the data collected, it is impossible to tell whether such a bias exists. However, I must stress that the respondents did not seem to be trying to mislead or even hurry their responses to each question. In fact, in one interview the secretary to the Building Department in Santaquin took the time and effort to elaborate that half of the city council favored as much growth as possible, while the other half favored limited, regulated, careful growth.


Considering these facts, it is possible that a bias exists. However, it seems likely that the positions represented by the respondents are at least their true belief about the positions of the

city officials. Considering the demonstrated difference between perceived public opinion and true public opinion, however, it would be useful in further research to have the responses of one or all the members of each body, whose positions and perceptions of other members' positions may tell a different story than that of a staff member or other city representative.

### ***Mayor Score to City Council Score***

The t-test for the relationship between Mayor preference and City Council preferences found there was no statistically significant difference between mayor preference ( $M = -.07$ ,  $SD = .51$ ) and city council preferences ( $M = -.21$ ,  $SD = .68$ );  $t(6) = 1.16$ ,  $p = .291$ . This result fails to show a difference between mayoral and city council preferences for growth.

Correlation tests show a very strong and statistically very significant relationship between mayor and city council preferences. The Pearson's correlation test shows a strength of .89 at a significance level of .008 (Figure 13). The Spearman's Rho rank correlation shows an even stronger .98 strength at a .000 level of significance. This is most likely due to the bias discussed above.




**Figure 13 Correlation between Mayor score and City Council score**

***Mayor Score to Planning Commission Score***

The t-test for the relationship between Mayor Preferences and Planning Commission preferences found there was no statistically significant difference between mayor preferences (M= -.07, SD= .51) and planning commission preferences (M= -.25, SD= .69);  $t(6) = 1.16, p = .26$ .

Correlation tests for mayor and planning commission preferences, as with city council preferences, were also very strong. The Pearson’s correlation scored a strength of .84 at a .02 level of significance, while the Spearman’s Rho relationship was yet stronger at .95 significant at the .001 level (Figure 14). Again, this is probably due to the bias indicated above.




**Figure 14 Correlation between Mayor score and Planning Commission score**

***City Council Score to Planning Commission Score***

The t-test for the relationship between City Council preferences and Planning Commission preferences found there was no statistically significant difference between city council preferences (M= -.21 , SD= .68) and planning commission preferences (M= -.25, SD= .69);  $t(6) = 1.02, p = .35$ . We fail to reject the null hypothesis that city council and planning commission preferences are the same.

Again, not surprisingly, considering both bodies statistical relationships with the mayors' score, correlation tests showed very strong and statistically significant results. The Pearson's

correlation strength is .99 at a significance of .000 (Figure 15), and the Spearman's Rho rank correlation is .97 at a significance level of .000. As with the Mayor to City Council and Mayor to Planning Commission relationships, this result is probably due to bias from the collection method (surveying a single city representative) and responses ("about the same"). Assuming that differences do exist from body to body, but that city representatives also had a fair handle on city officials' attitudes, it seems likely that a fairly strong correlation would still exist, but not to the level indicated in these tests.



**Figure 15 Correlation between City Council score and Planning Commission score**

## Discussion

### *Statistically Insignificant Tests*

The t-tests mostly fail to show a difference between policies/programs and preferences of public and officials, or in other words, there is no statistical significance to the tests. The correlation tests fail to show a strong relationship between policies/programs and preferences: that is, the relationships are weak, and the significances low. In fact, with regard to policies, the only t-test to show a difference between preferences and policies/programs is between perceived public preference and policies/programs. Considering that there was also a statistical difference between the true public preference and the perceived public preference, the t-tests completely fail to show a statistical difference between policies and the public and public officials. In other words, I cannot say for certain that policies do not represent public preferences towards growth.

However, the correlation tests also fail to show statistically significant relationships between policy and program scores. The relationships they indicate, though not statistically significant, are also weak. It seems that the sample size involved in this study is not large enough to produce significant results, and ideally, this same study should be performed on a larger scale. The individual cases will be presented as a series of case studies in the following chapters. However, though the tests yielded no statistically significant results, the results do produce some important indicators as to the relationships. Policies and programs correlation scores with both citizen and city official preferences seem to be fairly weak, or perhaps very weak. This is potentially a problem because ideally the public's and officials' preferences should be reflected in governmental policies in a democratic or democratic-republican society.

### *Statistically Significant Tests*

For all the differences that seem to exist between policy and public preference positions, there are some strong correlations between groups. Particularly regarding public officials positions relative to each other, and even between these bodies and the preference of the general public, there are strong, and even statistically significant, correlations. That considered, it seems that creating and adopting growth management programs and policies is a politically viable proposition. Understanding why policy adoption lags behind even the identification of public will on the matter (the original survey results were provided to the cities around 1999) is a topic that could potentially be addressed by further research. However, some potential reasons have presented themselves during the process of this research.

First, this may be related to the fact that the cities in this study mostly do not have professional planning staff. Policy creation and adoption can be a complex process, and an untrained staff may not have the skillset required to create policy. It is important to note that not only have staff not brought policy in line with actual public opinion, they have not created policies which reflect the misperception of public preferences, either.

A second possible explanation could be that public opinions may seem to be constantly changing, and basing policy on the changing winds and whims seems both foolish and futile. A third possibility is that in small communities, while the status quo fits resident preferences, there may be a lack of urgency to create and adopt policies. This can, of course, lead to some pain as growth often begins relatively quickly, and will be limited only by policies and not by preferences.

## ***Conclusions***

The correlation tests reveal that city staffers are wrong about what public opinion is, whereas city officials have a better handle on what the community actually wants. This misperception could become a problem if city staff begins to take a bigger role in proposing and/or writing policy for adoption by the city council. If city staff, which does not understand public opinion, begins to write city policies based on perceived public preferences, those policies will be inconsistent with true public perceptions. This is true from an overall statistical standpoint, and seems to be true in nearly every individual community.

Looking at the numbers, in every case the city representatives believe the public to be more negative towards growth than the actual public position is. Harkening back to the hypothesis posed in the Data & Methods chapter, it is reasonable that city staff see public opinion as being more negative than reality. This is based on the idea that staff experience in public meetings, where the constant opposition of those citizens who attend meetings regarding specific projects, gives the impression of an overall opposition to growth.

In spite of a disconnect between staff perception of public preferences towards growth, the mayor, city council, and planning commission all show strong and statistically significant (at or above the .10 level) correlations between their positions and the actual public preference. This suggests that these political bodies are well plugged into public opinion. This is a particularly important finding of this thesis. City staffs believe public opinion to be more negative than is true, but elected officials are better acquainted with public opinion. Therefore, it is essential that elected city leaders be at the forefront of policy creation and adoption, and not city staff. This may be especially true in small communities where city officials are likely to be best acquainted with the public. City staff should be viewed by public officials as a resource for

implementing policies which the officials deem important, and not as advisors as to what policies and programs should be adopted.

There is one caveat to the idea that public officials are better readers of public opinion. That is, if the staff perception of public opinion is skewed, there could potentially also be a bias with regard to the responses regarding the political positions of the elected and appointed bodies. The fact that the staff's perception of the position of public officials (all public officials' scores) is right in line with the actual public position, however, indicates to some degree that the staff does have a decent handle on the officials' positions. Otherwise, it is a highly unlikely statistical fluke that officials' preferences would so well match the public opinion.

For small Utah communities, policy adoption is an important issue. As discussed in the conceptual framework of this thesis, historical uses of bilateral social controls for land uses leave small communities unprepared for enforcement of community values. As social connections decrease because developers in small communities are increasingly not residents of communities, other systems, specifically rules and trilateral controls as discussed by Duane (2004), are used for legal controls. The rules, adopted city policies, and the trilateral bodies, the courts, enforce only through mandate, negotiation generally decreasing over time. Therefore, the codification of community values into a coherent code which will have the desired results for the community is essential.

Statistical tests used in this thesis indicate that there are some weaknesses in the relationships between city policies and community preferences. The next several chapters examine these relationships more fully and reveal that in fact some communities do a better job

of matching policies to resident preferences. For those cities where preferences do not match, the adoption of policies prior to conflicts arising relative to development is critical.

The good news is that the statistical tests show that elected officials usually have a good understanding of, and probably share, community values. Thus, they are both well prepared and in a position to establish the policies, that Duane (2004) refers to as Rules, which the trilateral control system (court) uses to enforce community values on future development.

## **Chapter 5 Introduction to City-Level Data**

Though a statistical investigation has been useful and yielded some important results, the statistics only tell part of the story. Also, with a sample size of only eight cities, statistical analysis is not as strong as it could be. So, in the interest of better understanding how well policies reflect resident preferences in the communities involved in this study, the following chapters are dedicated to analyses of individual communities.

During the data collection processes, attitude data were collected with regard to different types of growth, categorized as residential, commercial, industrial, and annexation. For the statistical chapter of this thesis, that data were aggregated into overall attitudes. But in the following chapters the scores are addressed individually to give a clearer picture of the way that both the public and city officials envision future growth in their communities.

Unfortunately, separating policies into categories of pro- or anti- residential, commercial, industrial, etc., proved too complex to be addressable in this thesis. Looking at the complete picture of policies as related to different kinds of growth would be a good topic for further research. However, since classifying policies according to what type of growth they are meant to control was not done for this study, only an overall growth score is available for these cities.

### **Scores and what they mean**

As indicated in previous chapters, survey data was collected from and about residents and public officials of Cedar Fort to quantify attitudes towards growth. The surveys administered to each group were somewhat different. For the residents, Andrew Jackson's original 1998 survey (typical sample provided in the appendix) asked residents whether they favored or opposed

different types of growth, and the residents had three possible answers: favor, oppose, or neither. The surveys were administered door-to-door for residents.

Individual answers from each survey are not provided in this thesis. Rather, the scores from each city are aggregated by category and presented in Table 1. Scores are presented thus, an oppose answer was scored as a -1, a neutral answer a 0, and a favor score was valued as 1 for each resident. Then these scores were averaged together. Communities with more residents who favor growth than oppose growth score a positive aggregated score, and vice versa. More detail will be provided on these scores in the Resident Attitudes discussion of this chapter.

For the public officials, finding contact information for each of the mayors, city council members and planning commissioners proved to be impossible, so the 2009 survey I created was administered to a city representative in each city.

The questions asked (survey provided in the Appendix) also differed for this survey compared with the survey given to residents. Rather than responses being limited to “favor” and “oppose”, the city representatives were asked to qualify their opinion on growth as favoring: A. As much growth as possible, B. Promoting quality growth, C. Limited, regulated, careful growth, or D. Minimal or no growth. These responses were then scored thusly: “As much growth as possible” received a value of 1. “Promoting quality growth” is valued at 0.5. “Limited, regulated, careful growth” scored -0.5. And “Minimal or no growth” scored -1.

Scores compiled in this manner give the same range to both resident and city official responses for ease of comparison. Since resident surveys in the different cities did not all have questions regarding attitudes towards industrial growth, this score is left blank in those communities where no question regarding industrial growth was asked.

When looking at resident attitudes, aggregation of data is somewhat problematic and doesn't reveal the whole story. Questions arise as to the number of surveys that were returned, and the polarization of the opinions expressed. A similar score can arise from large or small numbers of surveys. More problematically, similar scores can arise from high relative numbers of neutral responses or highly polarized responses in similar quantities. For that reason, the aggregated responses are broken out for each city.

## Chapter 6 Cedar Fort

### Survey Data

A total of 34 surveys were returned from Cedar Fort. While this is not a high number of surveys, the total population of Cedar Fort is also small, only 341 (according to the 2000 census). The total number of households from the 2000 Census was 101. This gives a response rate of approximately 10 percent of the population and 33 percent of households.

**Table 11 Cedar Fort Attitude Scores by Growth Type (Range -1 to 1)**

<b>Cedar Fort</b>	<b>residential</b>	<b>commercial</b>	<b>industrial</b>	<b>annexation</b>	<b>overall (excl. industrial)</b>	<b>overall</b>
Public attitudes towards growth	-0.242	0.060		0.424	0.081	0.081
Perceived public attitudes towards growth	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1
Mayor attitude towards growth	-0.5	-0.5	-0.5	-1	-0.667	-0.625
City Council attitudes toward growth	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1
Planning Commission attitudes towards growth	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1
Policy position for/against growth	X	X	X	X	X	-0.3

In Cedar Fort the city representative contacted was the Mayor, a 59 year-old male who had been mayor for eight years and lived in the community for 30 years. Scores collected from both surveys are presented in Table 11.

Cedar Fort is located in Utah County, on the edges of the urban environments of the Salt Lake City and Provo-Orem metropolitan areas. While it is close to these places, it is still a rural part of Utah, and subject to the forces of sprawl and suburbanization from both urban centers. While not exactly an “exurb” as discussed in the conceptual framework of this thesis, it is similar because of its (so far) persistent rural atmosphere and the attraction that it poses to urbanites who can commute from amenity-rich Cedar Fort to the urban job centers.

## **Resident Attitudes**

### ***Residential growth***

Responses to the question regarding preferences towards residential growth were as follows: 11 respondents favored residential growth, 19 opposed, and three neither favored nor opposed, with one not responding. From this, the score of -.24 was calculated. However, it appears from the raw numbers that the residents were fairly polarized.

What the survey does not reveal is the level at which those who favor or oppose residential growth do so; whether they somewhat favor or vehemently oppose is not evident. This lack of detail occurs throughout the responses from the resident surveys, in all growth management questions and in all the included cities.

### ***Commercial growth***

Responses to the question regarding preferences towards commercial growth were as follows: 15 respondents favored commercial growth, 13 opposed, and five neither favored nor

opposed. From this, the score of .06 was calculated. The raw numbers show that residents were more in favor of commercial than residential growth, perhaps because commercial growth is believed to provide jobs in small communities where they are often much needed. Compared to the somewhat negative overall attitude towards residential growth, commercial growth is viewed more neutrally, overall. Still, there seems to be some polarization among residents.

### ***Annexation***

With regard to annexation, resident attitudes were vastly different than with regards to other types of growth. 21 respondents favored annexation of additional lands into the city, seven opposed, and five neither favored nor opposed. This is far less polarized than the other attitudes within Cedar Fort, and actually shifts to being somewhat one-sided towards favoring annexation. The overall score for this question scores .42, a fairly strong positive result.

### **Perceived Resident Attitudes**

In the case of Cedar Fort, the mayor was the point of contact for the survey of public officials' attitudes. This is important in this case because with regard to perceived resident attitudes, it is the mayor's perception of those attitudes that is actually expressed. As illustrated in Table 1, the resident attitudes towards every kind of growth were believed by the mayor to be extremely negative.

When we compare this perceived public attitude to the actual scores, it's apparent that the mayor's perception of public opinion is far off the mark. This gives credence to the idea that the perception of city personnel, whether staff or even elected officials, is highly influenced by those vocal individuals who attend public meetings to oppose specific projects.

Of importance to note in this case, also, is that unlike the speculation proffered in the Statistical Results chapter on public officials generally, it seems that the mayor in Cedar Fort is not as well informed of public opinion as was expected.

### **Public Official Attitudes**

Looking at the attitudes towards growth for public officials, there are a few items worth discussion. First, all of the public officials, both elected and appointed, in Cedar Fort seem to be more opposed to growth than the population as a whole. Considering the polarization apparent within the community as to residential and commercial growth, it may be that city officials have been elected from the portion of the population that is opposed to growth. Furthermore, they may believe that their position is commonly held, and that they have a so-called political mandate in their opposition to growth.

Another observation is that the mayor himself fairly strongly opposes growth in its various forms, and his understanding of the attitudes of other public officials is that they are even more opposed to growth than he is. Considering the amount of interaction that happens on a constant basis between these several individuals, there could be a sort of observed consensus of opposition to growth among the officials that is then projected onto the community at large.

Another potential explanation, and possibly the most reasonable, for the belief that the community is opposed to growth, both overall and with regard to specific types, is that the elected and appointed officials are more influenced by those vocal locals who oppose growth in their neighborhoods. This consistent opposition, expressed on project after project, issue after issue, over years, may give elected officials a biased a view as to the opinions of community residents.

In any case, whether it is due to a mistaken belief regarding public opinion and sense of duty to represent that opinion, or whether it is due to actual opposition towards growth on the part of the public officials, Cedar Fort decision makers are much more opposed to growth than the citizens at large. This is true both for overall scores as well as for each individual type of growth, residential, commercial, and annexation.

## **Policies**

As with the other types of scores, the policy score does not tell the whole story of how a city's policies limit or promote growth. The policy score for the city of Cedar Fort is a -.3. This would be considered a somewhat anti-growth score, not strongly favoring growth controls, but certainly not neutral. However, a look at the policies and programs adopted by the city gives us a clearer understanding of Cedar Fort's policy position.

Cedar Fort has three policies and/or programs in the growth management/growth promotion realm. These are; a program for the purchase of development rights; a program for the transfer of development rights; and, a policy encouraging small lot sizes. From the literature, these are all anti-growth or growth management policies and programs. Potentially, any city could have seven more programs and policies which would qualify as growth management, as well as any number of programs and policies from three categories considered to be pro-growth, as discussed in the literature review and the Data & Methods chapter. Potentially, Cedar Fort could have more strict growth controls, but it is telling that all of the Cedar Fort programs and policies are geared for managing growth, and not for promoting growth.

This indicates that the city is essentially in a growth management or growth prevention mode. If the city were to have a professional staff which was both aware of other growth management policies/programs and able to create them, it very well could be that the growth management score would be higher (closer to -1). In that case, the city's policy score would be more in line with elected officials' positions on growth, though the indication from the number and types of programs is that the city is attempting to side with a growth management position. If this were the case, the city would also be more clearly out of sync with the actual public position, which is less anti-growth, both overall and with regard to each type of growth.

## **Discussion**

With regard to potential growth in Cedar Fort, resident attitudes are somewhat varied. Growth of a residential nature is viewed negatively, indicating that the residents of the city do not want to see the city get bigger. However, with regard to commercial growth and annexation, residents seem somewhat welcoming of growth, perhaps because of what they view as potential sources of income in the form of jobs, or development which may bring money into the community through other avenues.

Annexation may be seen as a tool by which the city can extend its control over adjacent lands, potentially as a tool to prevent residential development near existing neighborhoods. If this is the case, the favorability of annexation as a tool to prevent growth impacts the overall attitude score, making it slightly more positive than it really should be. Either way, it seems that the residents of Cedar Fort are open to economic development, but not to the expansion of the population of the city.

City leaders seem keyed into this bias against residential development, which seems to have spilled over into other categories of growth. City policies also score as being somewhat more negative towards growth than residents indicate they prefer. However, it seems that the policies are directed specifically at residential growth, and therefore, they match up fairly well with resident preferences.

The conceptual framework for this paper posits a situation in which poor codification of community values into growth policies may result in enforcement of a set of rules which undermine the creation of the desired community. For Cedar Fort, the potential for conflicts arising between policies and community values is low, as the policies do seem to match those values.

## Chapter 7 Charleston

### Survey Data

A total of 62 surveys were returned from Charleston residents. The total population in Charleston from the chronologically closest, 2000, census was 378 divided among 120 households. This gives a response rate for Charleston of approximately 16 percent of the population and 52 percent of households.

**Table 12 Charleston Attitude Scores by Growth Type (Range -1 to 1)**

<b>Charleston</b>	<b>residential</b>	<b>commercial</b>	<b>industrial</b>	<b>annexation</b>	<b>overall (excl. industrial)</b>	<b>overall</b>
Public attitudes towards growth	-0.533	-0.65		-0.339	-0.507	-0.507
Perceived public attitudes towards growth	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1
Mayor attitude towards growth	0.5	0.5	-0.5	-0.5	0.167	0
City Council attitudes toward growth	-0.5	-0.5	-0.5	-0.5	-0.5	-0.5
Planning Commission attitudes towards growth	-0.5	-0.5	-0.5	-0.5	-0.5	-0.5
Policy position for/against growth	X	X	X	X	X	0.133

In Charleston the city representative contacted was the Planning Commission Chairman, a 62 year-old male who had been on the planning commission in Charleston for 12 years and had been a resident of the city for 21 years. Scores collected from both surveys are presented in Table 12.

Charleston, Utah, is located in Wasatch County, near both Provo and Salt Lake City. A rural community set in a mountain valley on the east side of the Wasatch Front, it is geologically removed from the urban centers. This barrier prevents Charleston from becoming a suburb of metropolitan Utah, but the amenities provided by the mountain location make it an excellent candidate for development as an exurb, as described by Duane (2004).

## **Resident Attitudes**

### ***Residential growth***

Responses to the question regarding preferences towards residential growth were as follows: 14 respondents favored residential growth, 45 opposed, and two neither favored nor opposed, with two not responding to the question. From this, the score of -.53 was calculated. With regard to residential growth, the residents of Charleston appear to be overwhelmingly against growth.

### ***Commercial Growth***

Responses to the question regarding preferences towards commercial growth were as follows: 10 respondents favored commercial growth, 49 opposed, and one neither favored nor opposed, and two did not answer. From this, the score of -.65 was calculated. It appears from these numbers that, once again, with regard to commercial growth, the consensus of the majority

of residents in Charleston is to oppose. The score of -.65 is the highest score of opposition towards growth from any city in any category included in this study.

### ***Annexation***

With regard to the annexation of more land into the city of Charleston, 18 residents favored annexation, 39 opposed, and five neither favored nor opposed. The score for this type of growth was -.34. While this means that the opposition to annexation is slightly less than opposition to residential and commercial growth, the picture of growth preferences in Charleston are exceptionally clear, overall: the overwhelming majority of residents of Charleston do not want the city to grow.

### **Perceived Resident Attitudes**

In Charleston, the point of contact for responding to the second survey, dealing with city officials' preferences and policy questions, was the planning commission chairman. His perception of overall resident attitudes towards growth, in all categories, was that the residents were strongly against growth. While this perception scores a -1 in each category, and this score is lower than the overall scores for resident attitudes, his perception is nevertheless quite accurate. Resident scores reflect all the responses, are tempered by those few who do favor growth. The commissioner's responses reflect a cognizance of the preferences of the vast majority.

### **Public Official Attitudes**

Public officials' attitudes in Charleston, for the most part, seem to reflect the attitudes of the citizens at large. Though not completely opposed to all growth, the feeling expressed was

that any growth should be very careful, and highly regulated. Excepting the position of the Mayor, city officials scored very closely on growth questions to the attitudes of city residents.

The Mayor did score somewhat differently from other city officials, favoring some quality residential and commercial growth. This, of course, is from the perception of the planning commission chairman, but is assumed to be accurate. The Mayor's somewhat favoring of residential and commercial growth, but equal opposition to industrial growth and annexation, gave him an overall neutral or slightly positive score. (The slight positive score comes if the score on industrial growth is ignored, since no question on industrial growth was actually posed to Charleston residents).

## **Policies**

The city of Charleston has three growth promotion/growth management policies and programs which have been adopted. Two of these, policies to preserve green space and to encourage small lot sizes, are considered growth management policies, which slow or suspend growth. The third is a tax incentive program, which ostensibly is designed to promote certain types of commercial growth.

The overall policy score, .13, reflects the weighting system, where the total growth management policies and programs (2) are divided by the potential policies and programs (10), and where the total pro-growth policies and programs (1) is divided by the potential categories of policies and programs (3). So, in spite of having more growth management policies than growth promotional programs, Charleston scores slightly positive with regard to policies and programs.

In some ways, this may seem unreasonable, that more programs and policies on one side should mean that the city would score more to that side overall. However, the weighted score is

probably more realistic when it comes to actual real-world effects of the policies and programs. Should a business, particularly, or individual want to locate in Charleston, the policies for preserving green space and encouraging small lots are unlikely to dissuade, while the tax incentive program is likely to incentivize that decision.

All these things considered, it seems that city policies are not in line with either residents or elected officials' preferences. This could be due to many different potential explanations, but it seems likely that the lack of a planning professional, with knowledge of the planning tools which could be used to align policies with attitudes, is a major contributor.

## **Discussion**

Growth of every type presented to Charleston residents was opposed strongly. It seems that Charleston residents do not want any kind of change within their community. For the most part, city officials agree with the position of community residents in their views and preferences towards growth. However, examining the codification of those attitudes into city policies reveals the exact problem suggested in the framework of this thesis: poor codification of the community values has resulted in a policy position which is opposite that of the community. When developers target Charleston for development, residents are likely to find that the policies controlling growth in their community favor the preferences of the developer, even promoting development, rather than favoring the residents.

Whether this situation has arisen because of the processes indicated in the conceptual framework, specifically policy adoption on a boiler-plate and stemming from State-mandated policy adoption requirements, or whether it has arisen through some other process is difficult to say, based on the data collected for this thesis. However, it seems likely that when conflicts over

growth do arise, enforcement of existing policies, if not changed beforehand, will result in the creation of a community which does not conform to resident preference.

## Chapter 8 Holden

### Survey Data

A total of 83 surveys were returned from Holden. The population of Holden in the 2000 census was 400, divided among 140 households. This gives a response rate of 20 percent of the population, and nearly 60 percent of households, assuming that only one survey was returned from any one household.

**Table 13 Holden Attitude Scores by Growth Type (Range -1 to 1)**

<u>Holden</u>	<u>residential</u>	<u>commercial</u>	<u>industrial</u>	<u>annexation</u>	<u>overall (excl. industrial)</u>	<u>overall</u>
Public attitudes towards growth	0.138	0.074		0.072	0.094	0.094
Perceived public attitudes towards growth	-0.5	-1	-1	-1	-0.834	-0.875
Mayor attitude towards growth	1	-1	-1	-1	-0.334	-0.5
City Council attitudes toward growth	1	-1	-1	-1	-0.334	-0.5
Planning Commission attitudes towards growth	1	-1	-1	-1	-0.334	-0.5
Policy position for/against growth	X	X	X	X	X	-0.1

In Holden the city representative contacted was a contract planner, a 46 year-old male who had been doing work for Holden for nine years but who was not a resident of the city. Scores collected from both surveys are presented in Table 13.

Holden, Utah, is located in Millard County, along the I-15 corridor that runs north-south through Utah and connects the northern and southern extremes of the U.S. in the west. It continues to be a truly rural community, geographically far removed from urban centers in the State. Growth in Holden is minimal, with estimates from 2000 to 2008 showing a slight drop in total residents. Potential for growth is limited, but, as Duane (2004) indicated relative to similar distant rural communities, with access to a major transportation corridor, Holden could be a site of exurban residential growth.

## **Resident Attitudes**

### ***Residential growth***

Responses to the question regarding preferences towards residential growth were as follows: 39 respondents favored commercial growth, 28 opposed, and 13 neither favored nor opposed, with three not responding. From these numbers, a slightly positive .138 score for residential growth was calculated for resident attitudes. Since the number of neutral responses was a fairly small portion of the total, about 15 percent, this shows a fairly polarized public position, with a small tilt towards favoring residential growth.

### ***Commercial Growth***

Responses to the question regarding preferences towards commercial growth were as follows: 37 respondents favored residential growth, 31 opposed, and 13 neither favored nor opposed, with two not responding. From this, the score of .074 was calculated. Once again,

though the overall score is fairly neutral or very slightly favoring of growth, the population seems to be somewhat polarized on the issue of commercial growth.

### ***Annexation***

With regard to annexation, residents' attitudes results were: 37 residents favored annexation, 31 opposed, and 15 showed neither preference. This is a similar result to the other types of growth. Residents seem to be somewhat divided as to annexing more land into the city, showing an overall more or less neutral annexation score.

### **Perceived Resident Attitudes**

As with all other cities, Holden's perceived resident scores proved to be more negative than actual resident scores. For Holden, residents' preferences were perceived to be somewhat against residential growth, while all other forms of growth were perceived to be highly opposed. Since residents' actual attitude scores have been shown to be somewhat neutral or slightly positive for all measured growth types, this perception is demonstrably inaccurate.

The representative for Holden whose perception of resident attitudes was measured is a contract planner. Since the work is done on contract by a professional who does not live within the community, it seems logical, as expressed in other chapters, that the planner's perception is shaped primarily in public meetings. Since the tendency in public meetings seems to be that mostly those who are opposed to projects attend and comment, and since the community of Holden seems to be somewhat polarized on growth issues, it is reasonable to conclude that the planner's perception that residents prefer limiting growth comes from those formal interactions.

## **Public Official Attitudes**

The planner's perception of officials' attitudes towards growth inform us that the mayor, city council, and planning commission all highly favor residential growth and highly oppose all other forms of growth. Of course, these could be a biased view since, once again, it is the planner's perception and not the officials' actual responses which we have for Holden.

However, assuming the planner's perceptions to be accurate, city officials all favor residential more than Holden residents, and oppose other forms of growth more. This is somewhat surprising, since the results in other cities seem to indicate that, where attitudes are polarized, if officials are swayed by one side or the other, they would be influenced by one side or the other in the same direction for each kind of growth. (This does assume that the same people who oppose commercial and industrial growth and annexation would also be those who oppose residential growth. It is possible that those who favor residential growth also oppose other growth, while those who oppose residential growth favor other growth, but this seems somewhat unlikely.)

## **Policies**

As for policies and programs in Holden, there is only one official policy on the books. It is a program for the purchase of development rights. This program is considered to be a growth control program, but also could be used for other purposes, such as creating public parks. This considered, it seems that Holden City, from a policy perspective, is a fairly growth-neutral place. That is, policies neither favor nor oppose growth, which matches the combined public position on growth, though there is some polarization among residents.

## **Discussion**

For Holden it seems that residents are somewhat neutral towards the various kinds of potential growth in the city. City officials seem to be more resistant towards all types of growth than the public. However, city policies seem to be neutral to slightly negative towards growth. Assuming these measurements to be accurate, it seems that policies are well suited to community preferences, which means that when growth occurs in Holden, it is likely that that growth will conform to resident preferences. It is important to keep in mind, however, that often strong opinions on growth and growth control are not established or do not surface until such time as growth begins. In these moments an apathetic neutral may become an impassioned favor or opposition.

## Chapter 9 Manti

### Survey Data

A total of 487 surveys were returned by residents in the community of Manti. With a population of 3040 among 930 households from the 2000 census, the response rate is approximately 21 percent of persons and 59 percent of households.

**Table 14 Manti Attitude Scores by Growth Type (Range -1 to 1)**

<b>Manti</b>	<b><u>residential</u></b>	<b><u>commercial</u></b>	<b><u>industrial</u></b>	<b><u>annexation</u></b>	<b><u>overall</u></b>
Public attitudes towards growth	0.394	0.762	0.455	0.451	0.516
Perceived public attitudes towards growth	-0.5	-0.5	-1	-0.5	-0.625
Mayor attitude towards growth	1	1	1	-0.5	0.625
City Council attitudes toward growth	1	1	1	1	1
Planning Commission attitudes towards growth	1	1	1	1	1
Policy position for/against growth	X	X	X	X	-0.3

In Manti the city representative contacted was the City Manager, a 69 year-old male who had been working for Manti for 10 years and living in the city for 37 years. Scores from both surveys are presented in Table 14.

Manti is located in Sanpete County, a couple hours' drive from Provo. Historically it has been a rural community, but has also been of cultural importance to members of Utah's predominant LDS church. Its situation makes it an ideal exurb for those urbanites looking for environmentally rich amenities. This exurban nature, as discussed in the conceptual framework, makes Manti a potential target for development.

## **Resident Attitudes**

### ***Residential growth***

Responses to the question regarding preferences towards residential growth were as follows: 289 respondents favored residential growth, 103 opposed, and 80 neither favored nor opposed, with 15 not responding. From this, the score of .39 was calculated. While opinions on residential growth vary somewhat, the overall score suggests that residents favor some residential growth, though probably not as much growth as the city can attract.

### ***Commercial Growth***

Responses to the question regarding preferences towards commercial growth were as follows: 411 respondents favored commercial growth, 46 opposed, and 22 neither favored nor opposed, with eight not responding. The resultant score for resident preferences for commercial growth is a very strong .762. This suggests that Manti residents are very much in favor of commercial growth. Presumably this is because commercial growth promises jobs in a community which needs them.

### ***Industrial Growth***

Data collected on industrial growth shows that among the residents of Manti, 300 residents favored industrial growth, 91 opposed it, and 68 had no preference, while 28 did not respond to the question. This gives industrial growth a favored score of .46, a fairly strong pro-growth stance. As with commercial growth, it is assumed that industrial growth would provide jobs to the community, which may be the driving force behind residents seeing this kind of growth as a positive for their community.

Also of note, Manti was the only city in which data on resident preferences for industrial growth was collected. Since the surveys administered by Andrew Jackson were tailored to each city individually, it is likely that this is the only city in this study in which local leaders were considering whether to allow industrial growth.

### ***Annexation***

With regard to annexation of additional lands into the city, 305 residents favored annexation, 94 opposed, and 69 neither favor nor oppose, with 11 not responding. Once again, the resultant score is a moderately high favorable score of .451. It appears that residents would mostly favor the annexation of additional lands into Manti.

### **Perceived Resident Attitudes**

The representative for the city of Manti, the city manager, reported a perception of resident attitudes towards growth that was much more opposed to growth than the survey of the residents indicated. The manager apparently believes that the residents are more opposed to growth or favor controlling growth, overall and in all categories, more than seems likely from the expressions of the residents themselves.

While overall attitudes towards growth from residents are definitely more supportive of growth than perceived, there are enough voices of opposition towards growth that the perception of resistance is not surprising. Additionally, as previously discussed, while an individual may favor growth generally, when development is located nearby their own property, their voices may join in with the opposition. Thus the opinions expressed most often and most passionately tend to be in opposition to growth, thus influencing the perception of city staff, such as a city manager.

### **Public Official Attitudes**

The city manager of Manti reports that the mayor, city council, and planning commission all highly favor growth, ranking them as supporting as much growth as possible, in all categories of growth, for each body. The one exception was that the mayor was reported as supporting only careful, regulated growth with regard to annexation. This all-out support for growth by city officials seems to match well with the expressions of support for growth of the community.

### **Policies**

The city of Manti has five policies and programs for controlling or promoting growth. Four of these programs are considered to be growth control programs: an urban growth boundary; an urban service area; a policy promoting infill development; and a policy promoting mixed-use development. The fifth policy is a policy for promoting large lot sizes instead of small lot sizes. This policy does not fit neatly into the pre-determined list of policies and programs, neither for promoting growth nor for controlling it. In fact it directly opposes one policy on the growth-control side of the matrix, a program or policy for encouraging small lot sizes.

For the purpose of the statistical analysis, this policy was therefore scored as a negative policy and subtracted from the total number of growth controlling programs. This is not the same as adding this program to the pro-growth side of the equation. For illustration purposes, the following equations lay out the possible ways that this fifth program could be dealt with.

First, the program, which is probably intended to maintain a rural atmosphere, could have been counted as a growth-control program. In that case the formula would be as follows:

$$\frac{0}{3} - \frac{5}{10} = -.50$$

Secondly, the program could have been ignored, and the formula would play out thus:

$$\frac{0}{3} - \frac{4}{10} = -.40$$

Finally, and the way the formula was actually applied, the program was subtracted from the total growth control programs, resulting in:

$$\frac{0}{3} - \frac{4 - 1}{10} = -.30$$

In each of these formulas, there were no pro-growth programs scored because the interview of the city manager indicated no policies or programs had been adopted by the city which qualified as growth-promoting.

In any of the resultant scores, ranging from -.5 to -.3, the total policy evaluation shows the city to be somewhat anti-growth, or growth controlling, rather than growth-promoting. This is surprising considering the level at which both citizens and city officials were measured to be in

favor of promoting growth. It seems that city growth policy is actually out of line with residents' and officials' desires for growth.

Of course, considering the types of policies and programs reported, each one that has been adopted by Manti could be considered quality controls, rather than an attempt to limit growth. From that perspective, these controls could be considered to be supporting the quality growth, which, as a category, was scored as a .5, a score that closely matches resident scores. This represents a potential problem with the methodology of this study, which was not discovered until the analysis phase.

Another issue of potential importance, more so in Manti even than other communities, is the timing of the two surveys. The first survey, collected by Andrew Jackson in 1998, indicated the resident attitudes and preferences for growth in 1998. The second survey, conducted in 2009, over a decade later, indicated the city official attitudes and preference and policy positions of a later date.

From one perspective, this difference between study dates could indicate how well cities have done at implementing policies to reflect residents' preferences, as 11 years is sufficient time to create and adopt policies. (Andrew Jackson indicated that the attitude data had been passed along to the cities, and the city manager at Richfield also indicated that such research had been conducted and was being used.)

However, from another perspective, if local officials are in touch with resident attitudes, as has been indicated, it could potentially be that resident attitudes have changed since 1998, and local leaders have kept up with such attitudes. In this case, the 1998 survey data could be out of

date, and the difference between city growth management policies and resident attitudes could be attributed to inaccurate, out-of-date, data.

## **Discussion**

Residents in Manti seem to highly favor growth of all kinds coming into the city. City officials agree with Manti residents, favoring growth of all types. However, the city policy score indicates that policies will prevent or limit growth within the cities. This may simply be a manifestation of attempts to promote quality types of growth which residents and city leaders alike see as being beneficial to the community. However, as these programs and policies are generally considered to be against growth, citizens may find that the policies have a limiting effect on the growth which they would like to have in their community.

The conceptual framework of this paper supposes that policies which do not match public preferences may result in development which communities see as being disconnected from public desires. It is thought that generally this is manifested in increased development which is opposed by city residents. In the case of Manti, a similar but opposite effect could be witnessed in that growth controls may prevent growth which residents do desire.

## Chapter 10 Richfield

### Survey Data

A total of 672 surveys were collected from residents of Richfield. With a population of 6847 in the 2000 census, these persons divided among 2166 households, the response rate for the community was about 10 percent of persons and 31 percent of households.

In Richfield the city representative contacted was the City Manager, a 69 year-old male who had been working for Richfield for 10 years and living in the city for 37 years. Scores collected from both surveys are presented in Table 15.

**Table 15 Richfield Attitude Scores by Growth Type (Range -1 to 1)**

<u>Richfield</u>	<u>residential</u>	<u>commercial</u>	<u>industrial</u>	<u>annexation</u>	<u>overall (excl. industrial)</u>	<u>overall</u>
Public attitudes towards growth	0.472	0.77		-0.324	0.306	0.306
Perceived public attitudes towards growth	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1
Policy position for/against growth	X	X	X	X	X	0.033

Richfield, Utah, is located in Sevier County. According to census estimates, Richfield is a growing community, up approximately 5% from 2000 to 2008. Housing values and median

age measurements, together with the recent growth indicate that Richfield may already be a growing exurb, as discussed in by Duane (2004).

## **Resident Attitudes**

### ***Residential growth***

Responses to the question regarding preferences towards residential growth were as follows: 423 respondents favored residential growth, 114 opposed, and 117 neither favored nor opposed, with 18 not responding. From this, the score of .47 was calculated. This is a fairly strong positive result, or fairly strongly supportive of residential growth in the community.

### ***Commercial Growth***

Responses to the question regarding preferences towards commercial growth were as follows: 550 respondents favored commercial growth, 50 opposed, and 49 neither favored nor opposed, with 23 not answering. From this, the score of .77 was calculated. This is a very strong pro-commercial growth score. Support for commercial growth is also mostly one-sided, with less than 10 percent of residents opposing commercial growth in the city. In Richfield, as in Manti, the support is assumed to come from a view that commercial growth will bring jobs into the community.

### ***Annexation***

Data collected with regard to annexation in the city of Richfield broke down thus: 141 residents favored annexation, 304 opposed, 58 indicated neither preference, and 169 did not respond to the question. This gives a resultant calculation of -.32. This result, revealing apathy, at least, or outright opposition to annexation indicates that while the residents do want growth within the city, the residents do not want the city to become larger, spatially.

## **Perceived Resident Attitudes**

The point of contact with the city for collecting perceived resident attitudes was the city manager. Interestingly, he refused to make any evaluation of the mayor's, city councils', or planning commissions' attitudes or preferences towards growth. He was willing to give his perception of resident attitudes, and as shown in Table 1, indicated that residents were highly opposed to all forms of growth.

This varies with actual public opinion on the matter, as we've observed. Actual public opinion, according to the first survey, shows that residents are highly in favor of both residential and commercial growth, though they do oppose, somewhat, annexation of additional area.

The city manager also very specifically stated that research had been done as to resident attitudes. My first reaction was to assume that the research to which he referred was the research conducted by Andrew Jackson of the Mountainland Association of Governments, which is the data used in this study. However, since the city manager's perception of public opinion indicates a marked difference from the results of that survey, the assumption that the research he referenced was the same as is used here is probably incorrect.

Assuming that the city manager's perceptions are based on more recent or more accurate research into Richfield resident attitudes, this gives credence to the discussion in the chapter on Manti, that resident attitudes may have changed. If this is true, the fact that attitudes have changed may explain why policies in some of the cities are out of line with resident attitude scores (i.e., the resident attitude scores are wrong, and city policies may be in line with real public preferences). However, this would probably contradict the relatively high correlation of resident and public official preference scores discovered in the statistical analysis section, though

it is also possible that more recent resident data might correlate even higher with the recent public officials' scores.

### **Public Official Attitudes**

As noted, the city manager refused to give any indication of the position that the elected and appointed officials of Richfield held. His stated reason for the refusal was somewhat vague, but indicated that the manager was not willing to make a statement about a political position which might be reported to residents and then, potentially, used against one or some or all of the city leadership. The impression I got from the conversation was that such a scandal could potentially cause the manager to lose his position with the city. This also could indicate that growth or growth management policy may be a hot-button issue in the community of Richfield. All of this is supposition from the conversation I had with the gentleman, and may or may not be accurate. In any case, the result is that no data could be collected concerning the position of public officials towards growth and growth management in Richfield.

### **Policies**

The total number of growth-specific policies and programs adopted by the city of Richfield is four. Three of these policies, an urban growth boundary, a green space preservation program, and mixed-use zoning, are considered growth-controlling programs. The fourth program is categorized as a promotional campaign designed to attract growth into the community. Combined, these policies add up to a virtually neutral city position, scored as .033.

Essentially, one in three potential growth management programs and policies, and one in three potential categories of growth promotional programs and policies are represented. As discussed on the chapter in Manti, two of the three growth-management side initiatives could be

considered useful in promoting quality growth, as opposed to preventing growth. In that case, the overall city score could be considered closer to reflecting the scores calculated for residents' support of growth in Richfield. Otherwise, it would seem that policies and programs which manage growth in Richfield seem to limit growth more than the residents' scores would indicate they would prefer.

## **Discussion**

The lack of willingness on the part of the city manager of Richfield to respond to questions regarding city officials' attitudes towards growth indicated to me that growth and growth policies may be a current hot-button issue for the community. Data collected on resident attitudes indicate a strong preference for growth in the community, with the exception of attitudes towards annexation. Usually I would think of growth as being a highly debated issue when preferences tend towards residents wanting to limit rather than promote growth. This difference could mean any number of different things, from my perception of the meaning of the conversation being incorrect, to a change in resident preferences over the decade intervening between the original collections of resident attitude data to my later survey.

It seems likely, though, that since resident attitudes are somewhat well reflected in city policies and programs, that when growth does occur in the community of Richfield, it will be supported by the population. This means that conflicts are somewhat less likely to arise from changing land uses, and the resultant changes will reflect community values in Richfield.

## Chapter 11 Salina

### Survey Data

A total of 371 surveys were collected from Salina residents. With a 200 population of 2958 in 808 households, the response rate for Salina was approximately 12 percent of the population and 45 percent of households.

**Table 16 Salina Attitude Scores by Growth Type (Range -1 to 1)**

<b>Salina</b>	<b><u>residential</u></b>	<b><u>commercial</u></b>	<b><u>industrial</u></b>	<b><u>annexation</u></b>	<b><u>overall (excl. industrial)</u></b>	<b><u>overall</u></b>
Public attitudes towards growth	0.522	0.831		0.548	0.634	0.634
Perceived public attitudes towards growth	1	0.5	0.5	-0.5	0.333	0.375
Mayor attitude towards growth	1	0.5	0.5	-0.5	0.333	0.375
City Council attitudes toward growth	1	0.5	0.5	-0.5	0.333	0.375
Planning Commission attitudes towards growth	1	0.5	0.5	-0.5	0.333	0.375
Policy position for/against growth	X	X	X	X	X	0

In Salina the city representative contacted was the City Treasurer, a 31 year-old female who had been working for Salina for two and a half years and living in the city for 12 years. Scores collected from both surveys are presented in Table 16.

Salina is located in Sevier County, near Richfield. It has experienced less growth than Richfield, according to census estimates. However, with exurban growth in Richfield and a similar amenity profile, it too may be a potential future site of exurban growth, as discussed by Duane (2004).

## **Resident Attitudes**

### ***Residential growth***

Responses to the question regarding preferences towards residential growth were as follows: 245 respondents favored residential growth, 54 opposed, and 67 neither favored nor opposed, with five not responding to the question. From this, a score of .52 was calculated, indicating fairly strong support for increased growth within the community of Salina. As may be surmised from a score as strong as a .5, the great majority of the citizens of Salina were in favor of promoting residential growth in the city.

### ***Commercial Growth***

Commercial growth support was similar for Salina, if slightly more favorable than for residential growth. 321 residents favored commercial growth, while only 16 opposed it, with 30 marking no preference and four not responding to the question. From this a score of .83 was calculated, the strongest pro-growth score of any community in any category. This score, in fact, is so high as to qualify Salina as nearly completely pro-commercial growth as possible.

## ***Annexation***

With regard to annexation in the city of Salina, 236 residents supported, 42 opposed, with 76 marking no preference, and 17 not answering. This, once again, scores a very high .63 in favor of growth via annexation by residents.

## **Perceived Resident Attitudes**

Salina is one community where it seems likely that the city representative, in this case the city treasurer, has a fairly good grasp on resident attitudes regarding growth and growth management issues. Though overall the score of perceived public preferences were lower than actual public preferences, the differences were slight and probably due, at least in part, to the scoring schema, allowing only for quantum shifts in valuation, whereas the aggregation of public scores allowed for much more variation in the final score. In any case, the perceived public scores in Salina were very close to the actual public scores.

The one exception to this statement was with regard to annexation, the city representative believed the public to be more reserved about allowing for it than the public actually was. This may come because of the wording of the choices that were given to the city representatives, and then the method of scoring the choices. In this case, the choice selected by the city representative was that she believed people would favor “limited, regulated, careful growth”, which was scored as a -.50. In this situation, just because the citizens would highly favor annexation, this does not preclude that they would prefer to have it be, for example, careful or limited. Thus, the real differences between the support indicated by the public and that perceived by the city representative may be overstated in the measurement.

Also worth noting is that this interview was of a city employee who was the most disconnected from growth and planning issues of any of the representative interviewed in this study. The degree of accuracy between this representative and the public may be attributable to the lack of influence from public meetings, particularly planning commission meetings, directly connected to growth and development issues.

### **Public Official Attitudes**

Public officials in the city of Salina also, as perceived by the city representative, scored as highly supporting the various types of growth. They were perceived as somewhat opposing annexation, which may be attributable to the same phenomenon as was discussed with regard to public opinion on the same matter. Thus, a more accurate overall score for public officials may be somewhat higher. In any case, disregarding annexation, public officials seem to be well connected to and of the same opinion as the general public with regard to growth: that is, they favor growth in Salina.

### **Policies**

Salina, in terms of population, is one of the medium sized communities included in this study. It was the fourth largest in size (of eight), with a population nearing 3000. The largest community included had approximately 6000 residents, and the four smaller communities had populations of 400 residents or below.

Surprisingly, Salina was also the only community which had not adopted any growth promoting or growth managing policies or programs. As has been discussed before, the lack of programs most likely indicates the need for professional planning services, either by direct or

contract employ, to develop policies and programs which will enact the public desire to attract growth to the city.

## **Discussion**

Salina residents came out strongly in favor of growth within their community. City officials seem to be right on board with residents on this issue, as well. However, there are no city policies on the books to promote growth within the community. As discussed with both Manti and Richfield, this lack of city policies which reflect community values is not likely to result in the construction of a community which is out of line with resident desires, but rather the lack of desired growth in the community. Thus, the disconnect between community values and policies still exists, but with a different set of consequences than was expected.

## Chapter 12 Santaquin

### Survey Data

A total of 385 surveys were collected from Santaquin. The 2000 census population of the community was 4834, with 1304 households. This makes the response rate of Santaquin eight percent of the population and nearly 30 percent of households.

**Table 17 Santaquin Attitude Scores by Growth Type (Range -1 to 1)**

<b>Santaquin</b>	<b>residential</b>	<b>commercial</b>	<b>industrial</b>	<b>annexation</b>	<b>overall (excl. industrial)</b>	<b>overall</b>
Public attitudes towards growth	-0.174	0.568		0.056	0.150	0.150
Perceived public attitudes towards growth	-0.5	-0.5	-0.5	-0.5	-0.5	-0.5
Mayor attitude towards growth	0.5	0.5	0.5	-0.5	0.167	0.25
City Council attitudes toward growth	half .5, half -1	half .5, half -1	half .5, half -1	0.5	0.5	-0.25
Planning Commission attitudes towards growth	-0.5	-0.5	-0.5	-0.5	-0.5	-0.5
Policy position for/against growth	X	X	X	X	X	-0.5

In Santaquin the city representative contacted was the Building Department Secretary, a 50 year-old female who had been living in and working for Santaquin for three and a half years. Scores collected from both surveys are presented in Table 17.

Santaquin, Utah is located in Utah County along the Wasatch Front. It differs from most of the other communities included in this thesis, excepting Cedar Fort, because of its location along the Wasatch Front. It, like Cedar Fort, is located within the same valley as the major Utah metropolitan area of Provo, and is close enough that it could be swallowed up in the urban sprawl and suburban development that has continued along the Wasatch Front for the past few decades. Its location makes it a prime target for growth, which will probably soon change it from a rural to suburbanized area.

## **Resident Attitudes**

### ***Residential growth***

Responses to the question regarding preferences towards residential growth were as follows: 121 respondents favored residential growth, 187 opposed, and 72 neither favored nor opposed, with five not responding. From this, the public opinion score for residential growth was calculated to be -.17. This is a neutral or slightly negative score, indicating that the community as a whole is open to some residential growth, but probably with limitations. Looking beyond the score at the numbers of persons favoring and opposing residential growth, we also see a community which is somewhat polarized with regard to residential growth.

### ***Commercial Growth***

Responses to the question regarding preferences towards commercial growth were as follows: 280 respondents favored commercial growth, 54 opposed, and 36 neither favored nor

opposed, with 15 not responding. From this, the score of .57 was calculated. This type of growth, as opposed to residential growth, was far less polarizing among the residents of Santaquin. As has been discussed in other chapters, favor for commercial growth may also be linked to the promise of good jobs which comes with this growth, and which is often desired by the residents of smaller communities.

### ***Annexation***

Regarding annexation of additional land into the city, residents' responses indicated that 143 favored annexation, 123 opposed, 89 indicated no preference, and 30 did not answer the question. From this, a score of .06 is calculated, indicating overall neutrality to the issue. However, there was some polarization on this issue, especially as compared to commercial growth, though the increases in no preference responses and unanswered questions also indicate some increase in apathy towards this issue.

### **Perceived Resident Attitudes**

As in all other cities, the perception of attitudes towards growth and growth management by the city representative indicates that public attitudes are more limiting of growth than actual public responses demonstrate. Since the city representative in this case is the secretary to the building department, it is reasonable to assume that some flavoring of her perception is due to the expression of opinions by those who oppose various projects in the city, as has been discussed in other chapters.

### **Public Official Attitudes**

The positions on growth by the various bodies of public officials, as understood by the city representative were more varied in this case than was common in other cities. This

perception may have something to do with the fact that this city representative was the only one whose day-to-day responsibilities are entirely immersed in building and planning issues.

The mayor was reported as being more or less in favor of growth, excepting annexation. The planning commission, on the other hand, was reported as being more or less in favor of limiting and carefully controlling growth, with regard to both residential and commercial growth. And the city council was indicated to be half somewhat in favor promoting growth, and half opposed to growth, regarding both these kinds of growth. Both of these bodies were reported to be hesitant towards annexation.

In some ways, considering the polarization on residential growth and annexation, it seems logical that the mayor and half the city council would be on one side of the issue; while on the other side is found the other half of the city council and the planning commission. However, the public was also much more in favor of commercial growth than any of these bodies, and it seems that perhaps city officials are not aware of that preference within the community.

## **Policies**

The community of Santaquin has five policies and programs directed at controlling growth. These programs and policies are: a program for transfer of development rights; a policy for green space preservation; a policy encouraging transit-oriented development; a policy encouraging infill development; and, zoning for mixed-use development. These programs and policies are all considered growth-managing or growth-limiting, rather than growth-promoting. Santaquin also had the highest total number of programs of any city. Since none of the programs are oriented towards promoting growth, Santaquin also scored the most strongly towards growth-management of any city in the study.

Considering that public opinion is fairly neutral to growth overall, and considering that public opinion also fairly strongly favors commercial growth, it seems that this policy preference towards management is somewhat out of sync with public opinion. However, as has been discussed in other chapters, those who oppose development are more often heard in public meetings than those who favor development. Especially in a community with some polarization, as has been demonstrated to be the case in Santaquin, it is not surprising that city policy seems to side with that more vocal segment of the population.

## **Discussion**

As with Cedar Fort, attitudes towards growth in Santaquin are a mixed bag. It seems that residents are somewhat resistant towards residential growth. However, with regard to commercial growth, residents are fairly strongly in favor of growth. The discussion from the Cedar Fort chapter seems to also apply here; specifically, it seems that Santaquin residents want the community to stay small, but also want the economic advantages that come from commercial development.

It seems, however, that the bias against residential development has also flavored city officials' attitudes towards other types of growth, specifically commercial. Considering the strong link in Santaquin between city officials' attitudes and policies, it seems likely that growth controls have been put in place to enforce city officials' (and perceived residents') preferences for growth. This creates a real difference between policy proscription and community values as expressed in the 1998 attitude survey. Once again, the processes discussed in the conceptual framework of this paper create a disconnect between community values and adopted policies, but in this case, with opposite effects: the desired outcome of a growing community is inhibited by policies which seek to prevent growth.

## Chapter 13 Wallsburg

### Survey Data

A total of 47 surveys were collected in Wallsburg. With a population of 274 and 83 total households, the response rate is 17 percent of residents and 57 percent of households. As with other small communities included in this study, the total number of surveys is small, but relative to the population, the sample is reasonable and presumed to be representative.

**Table 18 Wallsburg Attitude Scores by Growth Type (Range -1 to 1)**

<b>Wallsburg</b>	<b><u>residential</u></b>	<b><u>commercial</u></b>	<b><u>industrial</u></b>	<b><u>annexation</u></b>	<b><u>overall (excl. industrial)</u></b>	<b><u>overall</u></b>
Public attitudes towards growth	-0.617	-0.426		-0.234	-0.426	-0.426
Perceived public attitudes towards growth	-0.5	-0.5	-0.5	-1	-0.667	-0.625
Mayor attitude towards growth	-0.5	-0.5	-0.5	-1	-0.667	-0.625
City Council attitudes toward growth	-0.5	-0.5	-0.5	-1	-0.667	-0.625
Planning Commission attitudes towards growth	-0.5	-0.5	-0.5	-1	-0.667	-0.625
Policy position for/against growth	X	X	X	X	X	-0.4

In Wallsburg the city representative contacted was a planner at the Mountainland Association of Governments, the local AOG (Association of Governments), a male who declined to give an age, who had recently been given responsibility for offering AOG planning services to the community, but who had never lived in the community of Wallsburg. Scores collected from both surveys are presented in Table 18.

Wallsburg, like Charleston, is a rural community in Wasatch County, located on what is often referred to as the Wasatch Back, or the back side of the Wasatch Front. It is an amenity-rich area, close to Park City and Heber, both of which are growing exurban locales. Considering recent trends in development, Wallsburg is likely to be a prime area of exurban development in coming years.

## **Resident Attitudes**

### ***Residential growth***

Responses to the question regarding preferences towards residential growth were as follows: six respondents favored residential growth, 35 opposed, and six neither favored nor opposed. From this, a score of -.62 was calculated. This is a strong opposition to growth, with the vast majority of residents apparently favoring the prevention of the expansion of the rural community.

### ***Commercial Growth***

Responses to the question regarding preferences towards commercial growth were as follows: 12 respondents favored commercial growth, 32 opposed, and three neither favored nor opposed. From this, the score of -.43 was calculated. Once again it appears that residents of

Wallsburg are quite resistance to growth within the community, in this case commercial. Unlike some of the communities in the study, Wallsburg appears to be mostly united, rather than polarized in sentiment.

### ***Annexation***

With regard to annexation, the residents of Wallsburg were recorded as 16 in favor, 27 opposed, and four showing no preference. The average score is calculated to be -.23. While this is somewhat weaker than the opposition to other growth types, this score completes the picture of overall opposition to growth in Wallsburg.

### **Perceived Resident Attitudes**

Perceived resident opposition to growth closely mirrors actual opposition to growth in this community. The representative who evaluated residents' and public officials' positions relative to growth was not a resident of the community or a direct employee thereof. Rather, he is a planner for the Mountainland Association of Governments who offers planning services to the community of Wallsburg.

As has been addressed in other communities in this study, often these types of observers perceive public opinion to be more negative than is the case according to survey measures. However in this case, where public opinion does tend towards opposition to growth, that perception seems to be accurate. This could be a product of a particularly good understanding of public opinion on the part of the city representative in this case. It could also be happenstance that the opinions most often heard in public meetings also are held by the majority of the residents of the community.

## **Public Official Attitudes**

The reported preferences relative to growth of the public officials also closely match the preferences of the community residents. The only score which appears to be perceived as much more negative for the city officials (as well as for the perceived resident score) than for the community at large is the opposition to annexation. The community, according to the survey, is opposed, but less strongly so, than is believed to be their position and the position of the city leadership.

## **Policies**

All the policies and programs adopted by Wallsburg are considered to be growth-management type initiatives. They are: a program for the purchase of development rights; a program for the transfer of development rights; a policy for preserving green or open space; and a policy encouraging smaller lot sizes. The overall policy score for the city is -.40, which also closely matches the preferences of both the public and city officials.

## **Discussion**

Wallsburg is one of the few examples in this thesis of places where city policies and programs closely match resident preferences for growth management. Harkening back to the conceptual framework presented in chapter two, the biggest problems will surface where policies are adopted by cities through processes which don't incorporate the identification and codification of public value systems. In this case, either by design (more likely) or happenstance, since policies do match public value systems, growth conflicts are likely to be resolved in ways which reflect community values. In other words, since policies in Wallsburg match the community values, growth in the community will likely occur along lines which reflect the wants and needs of its residents.

## **Chapter 14 Summary & Conclusions**

### **Recommendations**

Some surprising results came from this study. While I hypothesized a weak link between citizen preferences and city policies, and while the statistical tests failed to show conclusively whether the links were strong or weak for the main question being addressed, what I had not anticipated were some of the results that came from the other questions. Specifically, I had not expected to find such highly and significantly correlated relationships between public officials' and residents' scores. This suggests that perhaps the implementation of these officials' preferences would bring city policies in line with public preferences. Further research could continue and perhaps more accurately investigate these leader-specific preferences by interviewing multiple city leaders from more communities to see whether the opinions projected by city personnel onto the leaders are accurate. Indications from this study suggest some degree of accuracy, but cannot establish that definitely.

The primary question of this thesis, whether resident attitudes are reflected in city policies, is another potential area for more research. Probably due to sample size more than anything else, statistical tests failed to prove that there was a difference between resident attitudes and policy proscriptions. However, correlation tests, both parametric and non-parametric, also indicated, but did not establish definitely, that policies do not match well with public opinion. An extension of this type of study to many more communities could serve to more definitively answer that question.

For such a study, one other recommendation presents itself in the methodology of this thesis. The set of answers provided in the second survey intentionally excluded a middle score

so as to force answers to either pro-growth or pro-management. While I stand by this decision, the scoring of the answers became problematic. The conceptual difference between the two middle answers “promote quality growth” and “limited, regulated, careful growth” is somewhat small. However, this was the biggest difference from a scoring perspective, as “promote quality growth” was scored as a positive .5, while “limited, regulated, careful growth” was scored as a negative .5. A different scoring range, between 0 and 1, for instance, may be more appropriate, where 0 would be “Minimal or no growth”, and 1 would be “As much growth as possible”, with other answers spread evenly between.

### **Important Findings**

The assumption in the American system of government is that the will of the people is represented in the policies and programs that are adopted by all types of governments at all levels from small towns and counties to States to the Federal government itself. However, when it comes to specific policies, often there are questions as to whether government policies at all levels, even at the scale of small towns, are reflective of citizen opinions and preferences.

In small towns, factors influencing policy adoption may be out of sync with the theoretical planning process. In theory, community values and preferences are identified, and then policies enacted in accordance with those values. However, in small towns, conflicts over land uses are often resolved by bilateral social interactions, wherein one-on-one negotiations often result in equitable solutions for all parties. This type of interaction may lead to a lack of necessitation for the development of well-considered rules which can be enforced when conflicts regarding land use rise to levels beyond the powers of friendly negotiation to resolve. So when

these conflicts do arise, which they inevitably do when growth accelerates, the lack of codified rules may and probably will result in the enforcement (often by courts) of development rights which conflict with community values.

This thesis has examined how well city policies match public will by ascertaining public opinions through direct survey and then evaluating whether the policies and programs adopted by the cities match those expressed opinions. It seems only logical that if city governments are out of touch with public opinions in small towns where people know each other, the chances of larger places having a good handle on public opinion are small.

The following are the most important conclusions reached and presented in this thesis. First, while from a statistical perspective we can't say for sure that policies don't match public opinions, the statistical test also show very little promise that the two are very well correlated, either. A look at individual cities reveals that these statistical results are far from the whole story, however. The cities themselves performed at different levels, with some cities' policies matching resident preferences quite well while other cities' policies do not match. This throws off the statistical result. Differences between cities which may explain why some do better than others on this score may come back are not fully investigated, but it seems somewhat likely that recent growth trends and citizen responses to growth in and around individual cities may motivate policy initiation.

. The process of matching policies to community values can be quite difficult, it seems, as varieties of opinions, even in small communities, surface, often polarizing and splitting public opinion into different camps. That is, public opinion is rarely a consensus that can be

represented by the common, singularized term, but really should be expressed as “public opinions”.

For this thesis, policies and programs were categorized as pro-growth management or pro-growth. However, for those communities where there are no policies or programs at all, it may be more reasonable to say that the city is more pro-growth. Considering that most planning tools are designed to control growth, the lack of these tools in policy form could in itself be considered a pro-growth expression. Communities which adopt proactive growth attraction policies should definitely be considered pro-growth, but those who simply allow growth are not necessarily neutral on the matter. Thus, in this thesis, for communities with a neutral policy score where residents clearly favor growth, the methodology of the statistical tests may be flawed since lack of growth management policies signals a pro-growth position. This perspective gives a better understanding and probably more accurate fit to the pro-growth side of the spectrum.

Second, in spite of what can only be assumed to be the best efforts of professionals in the planning community, it seems that employees of communities have a hard time accurately identifying public sentiments. Experience tells us that the day to day duties of planning professionals and other city employees most often bring them into contact with a large number of people who oppose development, either altogether or with regard to specific projects. It seems that people rarely show up to support, but rather mostly show up to oppose. This is particularly true during public meetings. Those interactions, it seems, flavor the understanding of planners in such a way that it they believe public sentiment to be more, and sometimes much more, opposed to growth and development.

Third, political leaders, on the whole, seem to be much better acquainted with actual public opinion than staff. Perhaps due to their level of involvement with the communities outside of the formal city office setting, elected and appointed community leaders show a statistically significant and moderate to high correlation between their preferences regarding growth and growth management to citizens' preferences. Therefore, it is important that policies created for and adopted by cities be done at the impetus of city officials rather than city staff.

In addition to these overall findings, which focus primarily on statistical findings, examination of individual cities informs us that some cities do a better job of establishing policies in accordance with community values. Specifically, Cedar Fort, Richfield, and Wallsburg seem to have adopted city policies which reflect citizen preferences. Considering the potential problems which may occur should policies not match community values when growth leads to conflict, it is particularly important for small towns to identify community values and establish coherent policies early in the process, before conflicts arise. To that end, it seems that higher echelons of government, in this case Utah's State laws, require the adoption of planning tools. It is of utmost importance, however, that general plans and zoning ordinances which cities adopt be specifically linked to community preferences and written specifically for the individual community, rather than just adopted from a boilerplate ordinance copied from other communities.

## **Conclusion**

Development is an important issue in small communities. Decisions regarding growth and growth policies are highly debatable. Closely held values are particularly strong in the minds of small-town Utahns. Historic methods of dealing with conflicts arising from development, known as bilateral or social controls, are unlikely to suffice, especially as growth

accelerates. Since trilateral control systems, involving the judicial system, are bound to enforce the policies adopted by communities, it is essential that community values be well codified in those policies. This thesis finds that some communities have been able to put growth policies in place which match resident preferences, while other communities have failed to do so. However, this research also indicates that community leaders are well acquainted with residents' attitudes, and application of policies in conformity with their own preferences will usually result in a policy regime which matches the communities' values.

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## **Appendix A: Sample Survey of Resident Attitudes**

## Alpine General Plan Survey 2005

This is an anonymous survey. You will not need to give your name, address or phone number. As you may be aware the Alpine Planning Commission and City Council are working on an update of the General Plan for the City. The General Plan will be used to guide the City for the next 5 to 10 years. The General Plan and Zoning Ordinance will be used to regulate the development and use of land. Citizen input is essential for the new plan to meet the needs of the City. The Planning Commission has put this survey together to receive citizen input. Citizen input will also be received at public meetings, open houses and public hearings, before any decisions are made by the City Council. Please check the Newslines and City website [www.alpinecity.org](http://www.alpinecity.org) for updates about the General Plan.

Please take a moment to make your opinions known to the Planning Commission and City Council by completing the following survey. **Please** fill in the bubble next to your answer.

1. What is the main reason you decided to live Alpine?

2. How long have you lived in Alpine?

- Under 1 year
- 1-5 years
- 6-10 years
- 11-15 years
- 16-20 years
- 21-25 years
- 26-30 years
- Over 30 years

3. Which part of Alpine do you live in? (See map)

- Northeast  Northwest  Downtown area
- Southeast  Southwest

Recognize that while many of us like things to stay as they are, change will eventually come. People will sell land. Others will want to develop theirs. Our challenges as a City will be to guide change in such a way that the quality of life we all enjoy can be preserved. Therefore, think carefully as you answer these questions, your answers will have much to say about what our future will be like.

4. Our current ordinance allows for residential growth. How do you feel -- do you favor or oppose encouraging residential growth in the City?

- Favor  Oppose  Undecided

5. Our current ordinance allows for limited downtown commercial growth. How do you feel -- do you favor or oppose encouraging commercial growth in the City?

Favor  Oppose  Undecided

6. If you favor commercial growth, where in the City would you like to see that growth occur and what types would you like to see? Choose as many as necessary.

Westfield Rd Area  Canyon Crest  Alpine Hwy Area

Downtown Area  Healy Blvd Area (South of Roundabout)

Types of Commercial--You may choose more than one

Gasoline  Doctors  Automobiles  Entertainment  Other

Groceries  Hospital  Appliances  Video Rentals

Hardware  Dental  Clothing  Gifts

Dining Out  Banking  Insurance  Guest Lodging

Prescriptions  Auto Repairs  Furniture  Rec Center

8. Currently, our ordinance does not allow industrial growth. How do you feel -- do you favor or oppose encouraging industrial growth in the City?

Favor  Oppose  Undecided

9. If you favor industrial growth, where in the City would you like to see that growth occur and what types would you like to see? Choose as many as necessary.

Westfield Rd Area  Canyon Crest  Alpine Hwy Area

Downtown Area  Healy Blvd Area (South of Roundabout)

10. Types of Industry--You may choose more than one.

Hi-Tech  Manufacturing  Lumber  Food

Small-Light  Auto Repair  Recycling  Other

Clothing-Sewing  Tourism  None

11. Some of the land surrounding Alpine is currently part of the unincorporated Utah County. It may be necessary to annex additional land into Alpine to accommodate future growth and to plan for future land uses.

Do you favor or oppose future annexations of land into the City?

Favor  Oppose  Undecided

12. If you favor annexation, where should the City concentrate annexation efforts?

East to the US Forest  West to Highland  North to Draper

13. Do you feel there is a need in Alpine City for a retirement community?

No Need  Some Need  Great Need

14. Do you feel there is a need in Alpine City for Condos?

No Need  Some Need  Great Need

15. Do you feel there is a need in Alpine City for Twin homes?

No Need  Some Need  Great Need

16. Do you feel there is a need in Alpine City for Apartments?

No Need  Some Need  Great Need

17. Below are a list of concerns that the City should be sensitive to in planning future growth. Please rank them in order of importance to you, with 1 **being most important** and 9 being least important. **Note: EACH NUMBER SHOULD ONLY BE USED ONCE FOR THIS QUESTION.**

Traffic Management

Most Important  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 Least Important

Development of parks and recreation

Most Important  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 Least Important

Noise Pollution

Most Important  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 Least Important

Preservation of Agriculture

Most Important  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 Least Important

Loss of rural lifestyle

Most Important  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 Least Important

Increase tax base for community projects

Most Important  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 Least Important

Affordable housing

Most Important  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 Least Important

Protect Animal Rights

Most Important  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 Least Important

Hillside-Open Space Protection

Most Important  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 Least Important

18. Please rate, (1,2, 3,4, 5, 6,7, 8 or 9) in order of importance, which type of infrastructure you feel would be most impacted by growth. The **most impacted should be 1** and the least impacted should be 8. Note: **EACH NUMBER SHOULD ONLY BE USED ONCE FOR THIS QUESTION.**

Water Most Impacted  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 Least impacted

Sewer Most Impacted  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 Least impacted

Streets Most Impacted  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 Least impacted  
Need for Sidewalks

Most Impacted  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 Least impacted

Trails Most Impacted  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 Least impacted  
Parks and Recreation

Most Impacted  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 Least impacted  
Garbage Collection

Most Impacted  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 Least impacted  
Pressurized Irrigation

Most Impacted  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 Least impacted  
Recycling

Most Impacted  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 Least impacted

19. Are you in favor of curb, gutter and sidewalk in existing residential areas where there is currently no curb, gutter and sidewalk:

Favor  Oppose  Undecided

20. Do you favor or oppose a Special Improvement District (Where individual property owners are responsible, **not** the City as a whole) to pay for the installation of curb, gutter and sidewalk?

Favor  Oppose  Undecided

21. Bonding is one way that cities and towns pay for major improvements. Bonding is when the City borrows money and promises to pay back the loan with future tax dollars or user fees.

Bonding may or may not require tax increases. Do you feel the City should bond for:

The improvement of existing or future parks and recreation facilities?

Favor  Oppose  Undecided

Road and Sidewalk Improvements?

Favor  Oppose  Undecided

Protection of Open Space and Hillsides?

Favor  Oppose  Undecided

Expansion of the Cemetery?

Favor  Oppose  Undecided

Recreation Center/ Swimming Pool?

Favor  Oppose  Undecided

Skate Park?

Favor  Oppose  Undecided

Creation of City Library?

Favor  Oppose  Undecided

22. The current minimum residential lot size in Alpine is 10,000 square feet. (Approximately 114 acre) What minimum lot size do you suggest?

Less than 10,000 sq. feet  10,000 sq ft (114 acre)  More than 1 acre

20,000 sq ft (112 acre)  40,000 sq ft (1 acre)

23. Animal rights, including large animals and household pets, are currently are permitted, with conditions, throughout Alpine. Are you happy with the current zoning for keeping animals?

Yes  No

24. How do you feel about the current enforcement of leash laws?

Needs Better  Enforcement is Adequate  is too Harsh

No Comment

25. How important is historic preservation in Alpine to you?

Very Important  Little Importance

Somewhat Important  Not Important

26. Which historic sites are important? Check all that apply.

City Hall  Downtown  Pioneer Homes  Other

Cemetery  Relic Hall  Lambert Homestead

27. Are you happy with the way public meetings are posted and advertised?

Yes  No

28. Are you happy with the way City events (Memorial Day Services, Family First) are posted and advertised?

Yes  No

29. The following is a list of city-wide activities or services. Please indicate the City's performance in the following areas:

- City Administration . .  Excellent  Very Good  Good  Fair  Poor   
Unacceptable
- City Office Staff . . . . .  Excellent  Very Good  Good  Fair  Poor   
Unacceptable
- Code Enforcement . . .  Excellent  Very Good  Good  Fair  Poor   
Unacceptable
- Streets. . . . .  Excellent  Very Good  Good  Fair  Poor   
Unacceptable
- Cemetery. . . . .  Excellent  Very Good  Good  Fair  Poor   
Unacceptable
- Culinary Water. . . . .  Excellent  Very Good  Good  Fair  Poor   
Unacceptable
- Sewer. . . . .  Excellent  Very Good  Good  Fair  Poor   
Unacceptable
- Pressurized Irrigation. .  Excellent  Very Good  Good  Fair  Poor   
Unacceptable
- Law Enforcement. . . .  Excellent  Very Good  Good  Fair  Poor   
Unacceptable
- Fire Protection. . . . .  Excellent  Very Good  Good  Fair  Poor   
Unacceptable
- Animal Control. . . . .  Excellent  Very Good  Good  Fair  Poor   
Unacceptable
- City Parks. . . . .  Excellent  Very Good  Good  Fair  Poor   
Unacceptable
- Recreation Programs. .  Excellent  Very Good  Good  Fair  Poor   
Unacceptable
- Building and  
Development Dept. . . .  Excellent  Very Good  Good  Fair  Poor   
Unacceptable
- Garbage Collection. . .  Excellent  Very Good  Good  Fair  Poor   
Unacceptable
- Library/Bookmobile. .  Excellent  Very Good  Good  Fair  Poor   
Unacceptable

Street Lights. . . . .  Excellent  Very Good  Good  Fair  Poor   
Unacceptable

Senior Citizen

Opportunities. . . . .  Excellent  Very Good  Good  Fair  Poor   
Unacceptable

Utility Billing Options.  Excellent  Very Good  Good  Fair  Poor   
Unacceptable

City Website. . . . .  Excellent  Very Good  Good  Fair  Poor   
Unacceptable

30. Should the City strongly enforce the laws against storing junk vehicles on private property?  
 Strongly Agree  Agree  Disagree  Strongly Disagree

31. Should the City encourage more cultural events in the City?  
 Strongly Agree  Agree  Disagree  Strongly Disagree

32. Should the City encourage curbside recycling?  
 Strongly Agree  Agree  Disagree  Strongly Disagree

33. If you are in favor of recycling would you pay an additional fee for this service?  
 Yes  No

34. In which of the following locations do you purchase the majority of the following goods and services? Mark as many as apply.

a. Gasoline . . . .  Alpine  Highland  Lehi/AF  Other Utah Co  SL County   
Internet

b. Groceries . . .  Alpine  Highland  Lehi/AF  Other Utah Co  SL County   
Internet

c. Hardware . . .  Alpine  Highland  Lehi/AF  Other Utah Co  SL County   
Internet

d. Dining out . .  Alpine  Highland  Lehi/AF  Other Utah Co  SL County   
Internet

e. Prescriptions  Alpine  Highland  Lehi/AF  Other Utah Co  SL County   
Internet

f. Doctors . . . .  Alpine  Highland  Lehi/AF  Other Utah Co  SL County   
Internet

- g. Hospital . . . .  Alpine  Highland  Lehi/AF  Other Utah Co  SL County  Internet
- h. Dental . . . . .  Alpine  Highland  Lehi/AF  Other Utah Co  SL County  Internet
- i. Banking . . . . .  Alpine  Highland  Lehi/AF  Other Utah Co  SL County  Internet
- j. Auto repair . .  Alpine  Highland  Lehi/AF  Other Utah Co  SL County  Internet
- k. Automobiles  Alpine  Highland  Lehi/AF  Other Utah Co  SL County  Internet
- 1. Appliances . .  Alpine  Highland  Lehi/AF  Other Utah Co  SL County  Internet
- m. Clothing . . .  Alpine  Highland  Lehi/AF  Other Utah Co  SL County  Internet
- n. Insurance . . .  Alpine  Highland  Lehi/AF  Other Utah Co  SL County  Internet
- o. Furniture . . .  Alpine  Highland  Lehi/AF  Other Utah Co  SL County  Internet
- p. Entertainment  Alpine  Highland  Lehi/AF  Other Utah Co  SL County  Internet
- q. Video Rental  Alpine  Highland  Lehi/AF  Other Utah Co  SL County  Internet
- r. Gifts . . . . .  Alpine  Highland  Lehi/AF  Other Utah Co  SL County  Internet
- s. Guest Lodging . . . . .  Alpine  Highland  Lehi/AF  Other Utah Co  SL County  Internet
- t. Rec Center . .  Alpine  Highland  Lehi/AF  Other Utah Co  SL County  Internet
- u. Other . . . . .  Alpine  Highland  Lehi/AF  Other Utah Co  SL County  Internet

35. Do you favor or oppose trails in residential areas in Alpine City?

Favor  Oppose  Undecided

36. How often do you use the Alpine City Trails?

- Once a year  Three times a year  Once a month  
 Twice a year  Four times a year  Once a week or more

37. What impact do you feel the Alpine City Celebrations (Alpine Days, etc.) have on the community?

- Strong Positive Impact  No Impact  Strong Negative Impact  
 Positive Impact  Negative Impact

38. How do you hear about what is happening in Alpine?

- Alpine Newsletter  Word of Mouth  Other  
 Alpine Website  Daily Herald  
([www.alpinecity.org](http://www.alpinecity.org))  Lone Peak

39. Should Alpine continue to publish a newsletter for its citizens?

- Yes  No

40. What recreation opportunities would you like to see that are currently not provided?

- Arts  skateboarding  Concerts  
 Crafts  Rodeo events  Other  
 Senior Citizens Activities  Organized Parkplay  
 Swimming Pool  Outdoor Movies

Now just a few questions for statistical purposes... We know these are personal questions, but they help us when the City is applying for grants or complying state and federal laws. Thank you for your assistance.

41. Do you own or rent the home you live in?

- Own  Rent

42. If you own your home is it paid off?

- Yes  No

43. Do you have an accessory apartment?

- Yes  No

44. If yes, Is your accessory apartment currently occupied?

- Yes  No

45. How many people live in your house?

1  4  7

2  5  8

3  6  9 or more

46. What is your current marital status?

Single  Married  Divorced  Widow/Widower

47. Are you currently employed?

Yes  No  Retired

48. Where do you work?

Alpine City  North Utah Co.  Retired

Salt Lake County  Orem/Provo  Other

49. If not, how far do you commute to work one way? If more than one family member works mark all that apply.

I work in Alpine  11 to 20 miles  Out of State

under 5 miles  20 to 60 miles

5 to 10 miles  over 60 miles

50. Which category best describes your age?

Under 20  35 to 39  55 to 59

20 to 24  40 to 44  60 to 64

25 to 29  45 to 49  65 and older

30 to 34  50 to 54

51. Please indicate your household income level. This information is important when applying for certain types of grants and funding for the City.

under \$30,000  \$90,001 -- \$100,000  \$160,001 -- \$170,000

\$30,001 -- \$40,000  \$100,001 -- \$110,000  \$170,001 -- \$180,000

\$40,001 -- \$50,000  \$110,001 -- \$120,000  \$180,001 -- \$190,000

\$50,001 -- \$60,000  \$120,001 -- \$130,000  \$190,001 -- \$200,000

\$60,001 -- \$70,000  \$130,001 -- \$140,000  Over \$200,001

\$70,001 -- \$80,000  \$140,001 -- \$150,000

\$80,001 -- \$90,000  \$150,001 -- \$160,000

52. How many are working in your family to make the income listed above?

0  1  2  3  4  5+

53. Please figure the percent of your household income which goes towards housing costs. On the chart below, identify your yearly household income and the approximate amount you pay for housing (i.e. house payment or rent + utilities, taxes, etc.) per month. Please write the percentage category you fall into at the bottom. Example:

If your yearly income is \$55,000 and you pay \$1,375 for housing --you are in the 30% category and you would fill in the 30% bubble. If you have no payment or rent fill in the 0% bubble.

Income

Under \$35,000

45,000

55,000

65,000

75,000

85,000

95,000

105,000

145,000

185,000

225,000

265,000

305,000

345,000

385,000

425,000

465,000

505,000

Percent

0%  10%  20%  30%

5%  15%  25%  35%

40% or more

What do you like about Alpine?

What do you dislike?

What would you like to see stay the same?

If you could add one thing to the City, what would it be?

Thanks you for your time. Please list below any other information that you would like to city Council and Planning Commission to know when they are preparing the General Plan and Zoning Ordinance. We appreciate your input.

Comments:

## **Appendix B: Survey of Community Representatives**

Interviewee position:

Gender:

Age:

Length of time at job:

Length of time in community:

1. Do you have any of the following programs/policies:

An urban growth boundary					Yes no
An urban service area					Yes no
A program for the purchase of development rights					Yes no
A program for the transfer of development rights					Yes no
Other programs to preserve green space, forest, or farmland					Yes no
Zoning to encourage smaller lot size					Yes no
Policies for transit-oriented development					Yes no
Programs for infill or brownfield development					Yes no
Programs for reinvestment in or rehabilitating of existing buildings					Yes no
Zoning for mixed-use development					Yes no

2. Do you have any programs or policies which fall within the following categories:

Tax incentive (tax break) programs for attracting growth		Yes no
--	--	--------

Programs:

Tax incentive programs which leverage public funds, such as enterprise zones		Yes no
--	--	--------

Programs:

Promotional activities such as master development plans or RFPs for promoting economic growth.		Yes no
--	--	--------

Programs:

3. What is the mayor's position on growth in the city?

Residential	Commercial - Retail	Commercial - Office	Industrial	Annexation
As much growth as possible				
Promote Quality Growth				
Limited, regulated, careful growth				
Minimal or no growth				

4. What is the city council's position on growth in the city?

Residential	Commercial - Retail	Commercial - Office	Industrial	Annexation
As much growth as possible				
Promote Quality Growth				
Limited, regulated, careful growth				
Minimal or no growth				

5. What is the Planning Commission’s position on growth in the city?

Residential	Commercial - Retail	Commercial - Office	Industrial	Annexation
As much growth as possible				
Promote Quality Growth				
Limited, regulated, careful growth				
Minimal or no growth				

6. What is the main planning professional’s (Planner, Manager, etc.) position on growth in the city?

Residential	Commercial - Retail	Commercial - Office	Industrial	Annexation
As much growth as possible				
Promote Quality Growth				
Limited, regulated, careful growth				
Minimal or no growth				

7. From the planning professional’s experience, what is the public position?

Residential	Commercial - Retail	Commercial - Office	Industrial	Annexation
As much growth as possible				
Promote Quality Growth				
Limited, regulated, careful growth				
Minimal or no growth				

8. How important is the promotion of Economic Growth to your Mayor?

Very Important		Important		Marginally Important		Not even on the Agenda
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9. How important is the maintaining of a rural atmosphere to your Mayor?

Very Important		Important		Marginally Important		Not even on the Agenda
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10. What is the city doing to promote/prevent economic growth?

11. What is the city doing to promote/prevent residential growth?