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## On Civilizational Strategic Studies

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### Abstract

Given the on-going crises around the world, especially the current war in Ukraine, it has become imperative to analyze the strategic interests of the major geopolitical players in the world. Samuel P. Huntington formulated his controversial “Clash of Civilizations” thesis almost thirty years ago, but this topic has received a resurgence of interest due to Christopher Coker’s research on “civilizational states.” Coker takes this concept a bit further by arguing that different geopolitical actors disagree on how the world should be ordered.

Now is perhaps the most opportune time to examine the relevance of civilizations as well as civilizational theory to the inter-disciplinary field of Strategic Studies. This would bring together insights from such fields as geopolitics, grand strategy, military analysis, and global security analysis to bear upon civilizational science and analysis. This would be further achieved through the study of Civilizational Ontology, to determine how best to understand civilizational contexts regarding geopolitical and strategic actors. It would expand previous research conducted regarding civilizations and threats of “hybrid warfare.”

Although a major goal of this synthesis of Civilizational Sciences and Strategic Studies would be to assist in the proper analysis of on-going current (and possible future) events, it would also be vitally important to the study of historical case studies. Carl von Clausewitz famously declared “War is a continuation of politics by other means.” This paper builds upon the argument that strategy and civilizations are reflections and continuations of one another.

### Introduction

When war broke out in Ukraine in February of 2022, the world was sent into a great state of shock. Suddenly it appeared that the world order that had seemed so secure since the end of World War II was more fragile and was about to break. The war in Ukraine constituted the breaking point for a major re-alignment of world order that had been developing in varying waves since the economic crisis of 2008, the Arab Spring of 2010, and the Russian occupation of Crimea in 2014.

Out of this chaos arose the need for innovative paradigms that could help make sense of the new order of things. No longer could liberal internationalism hold sway over the major world powers as it once had for decades, especially since the end of the Cold War. Although Realists such as John Mearsheimer have become more prominent, there is still intense debate about the continuing relevance of Realism to the current reality.

This paper is intended to participate in on-going discourse by examining the inter-relationship between civilizational theory and the interdisciplinary field of strategic studies. The aim is to continue the work of previous civilizational scholars such as former International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations (ISCSC) president Matthew Melko, who wrote a work concerning the nature of general wars among great powers.<sup>1</sup>

The first president of ISCSC, Pitirim Sorokin also researched the socio-cultural consequences of war.<sup>2</sup> Plus, there has been a previous analysis of “hybrid warfare” and its connection to the comparative study of civilizations. This all demonstrates that the civilizational paradigm offers a valuable outlook for making sense of the emerging geopolitical order. And the outlook can be applied not just to the present-day situation, but even aids in analyzing the geopolitical circumstances of previous historical eras (“strategic history,” as will be explained further in this paper).

With the growing complexity of the 21st century and given the paradox of our globalized world amidst the resurgence of great-power competition, a civilizational approach could prove valuable. Samuel P. Huntington famously tried with his “clash of civilizations” thesis of the early 1990s. This has been further emphasized more recently with scholars such as Christopher Coker of the London School of Economics, who has suggested that a new geopolitical entity, *the Civilizational State*, is set to replace the standard nation-state and forge a new geopolitical order.<sup>3</sup>

Both Huntington and Coker address the elements of international relations and geopolitics in their relationship to civilizations. This is indeed important, but the full-scale study of civilizations from a firmly military and strategic perspective has not been attempted in great depth, although it can be argued that elements of such a study have been made before. The need is paramount considering the on-going conflicts in Ukraine and elsewhere in the world. Furthermore, it can provide a valuable supplement to the already existing and expanding literature on the geopolitics of civilizations.

What is the basic definition of Strategic Studies?

It is always difficult to precisely define any major field of study; but for the purposes of this present essay, Strategic Studies will be defined as *the interdisciplinary study of the application or potential application of military force in historical and geopolitical contexts*. As a result, it may overlap with other complex fields of study such as International Relations, Geopolitics, Military History, Grand Strategy, and Complexity Science.

This also implies the need for a definition of the term *strategy* itself, since it is the focus of strategic studies. This is not an easy task as there is a lack of consensus on its exact meaning. Although texts dealing with the conduct of war have been written for millennia (Sun Tzu, Thucydides, etc.), the origins of the term *strategy* are more modern, born out of the rationalism of the 18<sup>th</sup> century Enlightenment.<sup>4</sup> This was the age of military figures such as Frederick the Great of Prussia and later Napoleon.

One major element in Enlightenment theories of strategy was the attempt to deduce abstract mathematical and rational principles that would apply in all situations. This outlook culminated with the writings of the Swiss French strategist Antoine-Henri de Jomini (1779-1869), whose theories dominated 19<sup>th</sup> century military theory. He defined strategy simply as “the art of making war upon the map and comprehends the whole theater of operations.”<sup>5</sup> As a result, potential civilizational considerations are absent from the Enlightenment-era school of thought.

With the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, however, a reaction emerged against Enlightenment rationalism. The rise of Romanticism led to a greater emphasis on history and culture. Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) was deeply influenced by this, and he offered a more historical perspective into strategic theory, providing the foundations for a more civilizational approach.

Clausewitz himself made several references to this perspective in his famous book *On War*, such as this example:

The semi-barbarous Tartars, the republics of antiquity, the feudal lords and trading cities of the Middle Ages, eighteenth-century kings and the rulers and peoples of the nineteenth century — all conducted war in their own way, using different methods and pursuing different aims.<sup>6</sup>

To delve further into the history of strategic theory is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is worthwhile to stress that Clausewitz helped build the foundations for a wider socio-cultural study of strategy that continued throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

This brief overview is meant to summarize the development of strategic theory from a simpler rationalism to a more complex framework encompassing rational, irrational, and non-rational factors,<sup>7</sup> including the recent turn towards socio-cultural dynamics. The further explorations of these developments will be the subject of the next section of this paper.

### **Towards the Strategic Study of Civilizations?**

Thus, the study of socio-cultural dynamics in relationship to strategic theory has become a subject of much scholarship in the past generation or so. Hugh Smith provides a summary of the state of the field of study now:

For the social dimension introduces elements into war that military and civilian strategists often find awkward to handle; military historians may prefer campaigns and battles to behavioral science. Increasingly, however, many analysts of war are now coming to emphasize the social factors in modern conflict — culture, sociology, psychology, anthropology, ethnography and the like... War now needs social science as it once needed physics and chemistry.<sup>8</sup>

The noted strategic theorist Colin S. Gray (1943-2020), considered by many to be the greatest successor to Clausewitz, probably did more than any other scholar to bring the potential civilizational elements into strategic studies. There are two main ideas of Gray that are most relevant here: *strategic history* and the *strategy bridge*.

*Strategic history* is largely defined by its comprehensive overview of historical case studies concerning strategic contexts. Colin S. Gray distinguishes this from traditional military history due to its more theoretical nature concerning the interrelationships between war and various other factors such as politics, peace, socio-cultural factors, and economics.<sup>9</sup>

Colin S. Gray made this observation about the nature of strategic contexts:

[W]e can be certain that all human communities, in all periods of the past, had and were aware they had, a strategic context within which they were (and are) obliged by necessity to operate. Human beings gather in communities for security. This gathering requires political activity, which inevitably leads to anxiety about rival communities. Thus, the need for strategy is born, always and everywhere. World history includes a ubiquitous strategic theme. We have always had a strategic context.<sup>10</sup>

The civilizational implications of this statement are unmistakable. It notes that the study of “human communities” is very much at the heart of the comparative study of civilizations. As a result, Colin S. Gray’s work has helped to generate an entire sub-field dedicated to the study of *strategic history*.<sup>11</sup>

This also helps lead into another major idea of Colin S. Gray, that of the *strategy bridge*, which largely marks the overarching synthesis of various contexts into a coherent strategic whole. This is formulated upon the six main contexts on which strategy operates, that together form the “strategy bridge,” as he termed it. These contexts are:

- Socio-cultural
- Economic
- Technological
- Military
- Geographical
- Historical<sup>12</sup>

Once again, the common elements of the comparative study of civilizations are present here, providing the possibility for further scholarly synthesis between these interdisciplinary fields. It should also be stressed that Colin S. Gray was not alone in marking off these socio-cultural factors as important to strategic thinking and planning.

In a parallel manner, Jahara Matisek and Buddhika Jayamaha have proposed the so-called “GRINS” approach to strategy and military theory composed of:

- Geopolitical context
- Regime type
- Ideas
- Nature of Military Organization
- Scientific Knowledge<sup>13</sup>

With both frameworks, it becomes clear that a comprehensive approach that encompasses military, political, and socio-cultural factors is the critical factor to understanding strategy and strategic theory. The comparative civilizational approach overlaps considerably with these same factors. It also has the advantage of being comfortable with connecting vastly differing contexts and fields of study into a coherent whole. Thus, the potential inter-connections between strategy and civilizations presents very probable areas for further research and scholarly exploration. This raises the theoretical possibility of the existence of a possible “Civilizational Mirror” or “Civilizational Bridge” to the “Strategy Bridge.”

Clausewitz famously noted that “war is the continuation of politics by other means,” but perhaps this formulation can be further developed into the argument that strategy and civilizations are continuations of one another. There are potential pitfalls to this argumentation, which will be addressed later, but there are potential possibilities to it as well. One considerable argument is the possibility of civilizations as constituting a “meta-strategic” category in itself.

A little discussion of “meta-strategy” is needed to help flush this argument out further. The inspiration for this term is *meta history*, which the British historian Christopher Dawson (1889-1970) defined as “concerned with the nature of history, the meaning of history and the cause and significance of historical change.”<sup>14</sup> This argument had an influence on Arnold J. Toynbee (1889-1975), who was willing to admit that civilizations are more metahistorical in nature than historical *per se*.<sup>15</sup>

Building upon this foundation, “meta-strategy” can be defined as *the study of the nature and meaning of strategy as well as how different socio-cultural systems think differently about war and strategy*. Pitirim Sorokin briefly examined this issue, arguing how *Ideational* cultures were more prone to religious-based wars (such as the Crusades) whilst *Sensate* cultures were more prone to wars aiming to gain economic and other material advantages.<sup>16</sup>

The present study suggests it is possible and necessary to expand upon this study, which further lends itself to the classic works of Clausewitz and Colin S. Gray, as well as to the growing field of the sociology of war.<sup>17</sup> Another potential source material to build upon is the growing field analyzing the nature of metatheory that especially has had influence within the human and social sciences.<sup>18</sup>

The implications of meta-strategy will have to be more fully developed in future research, but at least the foundations for such are outlined here in necessary length. The overall point is that studies of strategy and civilizations are interconnected and possibly continuations of one another.

### **Civilizational Ontology Revisited**

Study of the connections between civilizations and “hybrid warfare” has led to the development of what is called *civilizational ontology*, that is, proposing how the two frameworks can be understood together. A full revisit of the topic is not necessary, but a quick overview notes that civilizational ontology is comprised of three main elements:

1. *Civilizational Complexes or Civilizational Complexity* is the basic underlying principle involved. Civilizations are complex macro-scale socio-cultural entities.
2. *Intra-Civilizational Encounters*: Due to the inherent complex nature of civilizations, many subgroups and sub-entities within civilizations will internally interact with one another on various levels. This can take the form of both cooperative and antagonistic forms.
3. *Inter-Civilizational Encounters*: Civilizations can and often do interact with one another in external forms as well, but like its internal counterpart, civilizations can take on both cooperative and antagonistic stances.<sup>19</sup>

This framework can be applied to the strategic study of civilizations in a wider sense since it can give analytical applications to the complex realities of conflicts both present and past. The line between inter-civilizational and intra-civilizational conflicts can be blurred based on the specific context under study. The conflicts in Ukraine (both the 2014 and current 2022 matters) present a compelling case study of this since it can be argued that Russia and Ukraine belong (or at least historically so) to a similar East Slavic Orthodox civilizational framework, but at the same time, it can be argued that Ukraine is a far more Western-oriented culture than its Russian opponent. Boundaries between civilizations are not distinct but tend to be gradual and blurry. Even Samuel P. Huntington admitted such in the “clash between civilizations” thesis.<sup>20</sup>

Due to these factors, civilizational cohesion can vary from contexts to contexts. As the famed theologian and international relations theorist Reinhold Niebuhr (1892–1971) noted:

[I]t was tempting to forget that all communities are composed of organic and contrived forms of cohesion. In civilized societies both are necessary. The necessity for both forms is constant, but the proportion between them is variable according to the culture, the degree of education in a nation and the intensity of the means of communications.<sup>21</sup>

This can have significant strategic and geopolitical implications in determining whether certain *intra-civilizational encounters* are more cooperative or antagonistic, and vice versa for *inter-civilizational encounters*. One further advantage to a more civilizational approach to strategic studies is to help move away from the standard state-centric approach of most strategic thinkers.

This is a by-product of the modern age from which strategic theory arose as articulated earlier. This is also often the case in the related field of International Relations.



The study of non-state actors in modern warfare has arisen through the generations of “New Wars” and “Hybrid Warfare” studies,<sup>22</sup> but there is always an underlying antagonistic dichotomy between states that use *regular* military forces versus those of non-state actors that use *irregular* paramilitary forces. While this may be true in many cases, the actual strategic differences between regular and irregular forces may have also been greatly exaggerated.<sup>23</sup>

Civilizational theory can best incorporate both state and non-state actors into a comprehensive framework that can properly analyze their interactions and cooperation at the same time. This can also help explain why in many cases certain state and non-state actors are more willing to cooperate in some contexts but are antagonistic in others. This can be readily studied in the Ukrainian context where both sides have utilized irregular paramilitary forces to assist alongside regular military forces.<sup>24</sup>

These all help demonstrate the usefulness of a civilizational approach to strategic studies. Another advantage will be discussed in the next section since it deserves to be dealt with in greater detail.

### **East versus West: Beyond the Stereotypes**

One major pitfall for cross-cultural research of any kind is too often resorting to racial and ethnic stereotypes. This is unfortunately the case when it comes to comparative analysis of “Western” versus “Eastern” (or Asian) strategic traditions that often prevails within popular culture. The “Western” tradition is often reduced to simply a focus on decisive and direct attacks, versus the supposed “Eastern” tradition that focuses on stealth and deception. Thus, the stereotypical western warrior archetypes are the ancient Greek hoplite or medieval knight, while the stereotypical eastern archetypes are the Japanese ninja or Mongol horse-archer. This also culminates in an endless debate over the merits of Carl von Clausewitz versus that of the ancient Chinese thinker Sun Tzu, and who of the two is the superior one.

The origins of this discussion can be traced back to a few sources. The anxiety over the American defeat in the Vietnam War at the hands of an Asian foe using guerrilla tactics was one factor. The rise of Asian nations as economic superpowers (Japan, South Korea, and currently China) led to further anxiety among Westerners who sought to better understand their economic competitors. There was also the New Age Movement of the late 20<sup>th</sup> century that led many Westerners to being fascinated by Asian religions and traditions.

These factors helped Sun Tzu reach a wider audience in the West in the late 20<sup>th</sup> century and early 21<sup>st</sup> century, and of course this inevitably meant a comparison with Western military theorists such as Clausewitz.<sup>25</sup>

Unfortunately, the fascination with Sun Tzu in popular culture took on a life of its own, even reaching almost absurd levels of idolization of the ancient Chinese theorist as the only major expert on all sorts of life experiences. A report from *VICE* covered this phenomenon and interviewed Dr Derek Yuen, author of *Deciphering Sun Tzu: How to Read The Art of War*, on this question:

“*The Art of War* is often heard of and read but seldom understood in the West.” He emphasizes that this is due to a lack of appreciation and understanding of its Chinese and Taoist context. The West’s understanding of Sun Tzu, he writes, has “never moved beyond facile references to short one-to-two-sentence axioms” — in other words, a completely “superficial” reading.<sup>26</sup>

This also meant that Sun Tzu proved useful for any trendy new idea in military thinking as well. This was especially the case in the endless discussions concerning the “Revolution in Military Affairs” during the 1990s that stipulated that the very character of warfare was changing, and that technology could render standard conventional tactics obsolete. This often coincided with debates about the obsolescence of Clausewitz’s work as being dated to Napoleonic era warfare.<sup>27</sup>

What exactly can be said about the question of Clausewitz versus Sun Tzu? Michael I. Handel has perhaps done the most extensive scholarly research into this question and has come to the overall conclusion that “the logic and rational direction of war are universal and there is no such thing as an exclusively ‘Western’ or ‘Eastern’ approach to politics and strategy.”<sup>28</sup>

I do not argue that there are no differences between Clausewitz and Sun Tzu; of course, there are. Many of these differences stem from the different historical and civilizational contexts in which they lived as well as their different intellectual influences. Clausewitz was deeply influenced by the German Idealism of the early 19<sup>th</sup> century that emerged alongside the tide of the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars. At the same time, Sun Tzu must be understood in the context of the Warring States Period in ancient China as well as the philosophy of Taoism that heavily influenced the text of *The Art of War*.

Carl von Clausewitz and Sun Tzu are both valuable strategic theorists and should be studied together. There is no reason to pit one tradition against the other, much less attempt to arbitrarily determine which one is “superior.”

Studying them together provides a foundation for proper comparative civilizational study of strategy. It is time to move beyond this superficial debate to a more proper scholarly discourse.<sup>29</sup>

## Conclusion

This study is intended to outline the foundations for the strategic study of civilizations, and how such a study should proceed further. There are several reasons for such an endeavor — not the least because it represents a bold new direction for both the comparative study of civilizations and strategic studies, in continuation with the already existing developments in strategic studies. A civilizational approach to strategy, especially influenced by the Integralism of Pitirim Sorokin, would be extremely helpful in moving beyond the stale paradigms that have governed International Relations theory and Strategic Studies for decades.

The on-going conflict in Ukraine has laid to rest much of the presumptions of liberal International Relations theory, especially the notion that globalization and democratization alone would guarantee lasting peace. Realism, whilst making certain useful points, is also trapped within a sensate mindset of material-based power being at the heart of all human action. Constructivism does emphasize the study of ideational factors in international relations, but it can be too incoherent to be viable on its own.

Andrew Latham’s study of late-Medieval warfare and geopolitics based on “holistic constructivism,” however, does provide a useful case-study that presents a “theoretically guided, historically sensitive account of the deep *socio-political character*” of the period.<sup>30</sup> Integralism still provides the best foundation for synthesizing the best of previous theories into a coherent whole that provides the best means to study the complexity of the socio-cultural universe. The new unfolding realities of our current geopolitics necessitates the need for this paradigm shift towards a more comprehensive framework.

Pitirim Sorokin was not alone in proposing this. The political scientist Eric Voegelin (1901-1985) made similar arguments concerning the necessity of new paradigms while still being faithful to classical theorists:

One cannot restore political science today through Platonism, Augustinianism, or Hegelianism. Much can be learned, to be sure, from the earlier philosophers concerning the range of problems, as well as concerning their theoretical treatment; but the very historicity of human existence, that is, the unfolding of the typical in meaningful concreteness, precludes a valid reformulation of principles through return to a former concreteness.

Hence, political science cannot be restored to the dignity of a theoretical science in the strict sense by means of a literary renaissance of philosophical achievements of the past; the principles must be regained by a work of theoretization which starts from the concrete, historical situation of the age, considering the full amplitude of our empirical knowledge.<sup>31</sup>

This explanation by Voegelin helps illustrate both the necessity of fresh new perspectives into the comparative study of civilizations whilst still being faithful to the theories and studies of previous generations of scholars. Development in scholarship need not mean the complete refutation of the past but the further refinement and deepening of its insights considering current circumstances.

As mentioned before, this study is simply meant to demonstrate that the strategic study of civilizations is both possible and valuable. It does not pretend to be a complete overview of the subject matter, for numerous critical issues need to be further addressed at greater depth. One vitally critical issue, for example, concerns the deployment and potential use of nuclear weapons in a strategic-civilizational context.<sup>32</sup>

With the on-going crisis of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, it is important for scholars to formulate the necessary paradigms needed to understand the unfolding situation. This is by no means an easy task, but it is worth an attempt at such. The consequences for failing to understand these strategic and civilizational contexts that present themselves could prove catastrophic. This means that a certain seriousness towards the study of the situation is of urgent necessity. As Sun Tzu rightfully noted: “War is a vital matter of state. It is the field on which life or death is determined and the road that leads to either survival or ruin, and must be examined with the greatest care.”<sup>33</sup>

The foundations for much of the global shock created by the war in Ukraine were laid by the naïve optimism of the 1990s that argued globalization and economic interdependence were critical to long-lasting world peace, epitomized by the spread of McDonald’s fast food to new markets.<sup>34</sup> In the next decade or so, the works of Steve Pinker and other public intellectuals further argued that violence and war were on the wane, mainly due to the onward march of “progress.”

Such intellectual hubris was critical to the blind spots towards the coming crises that culminated in the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Thus, the strategic study of civilizations is not intended to glorify war and violence, but rather be a source of sober analysis of an unfortunate but still persistent reality of our world. Even Pitirim Sorokin warned during the height of the Second World War that sentimentality about peace and armistices was not enough to help secure true lasting peace for the world.<sup>35</sup> Only by studying and understanding war and strategy in depth can it be placed into proper context and assist in avoiding unnecessary bloodshed when possible. It is therefore wise to reject the two extremes of war-mongering and sentimental pacificism.<sup>36</sup> War is a profoundly serious matter and should not be taken lightly. As Sun Tzu famously cautioned: “But a kingdom that has once been destroyed can never come again into being nor can the dead ever be brought back to life.”<sup>37</sup>

## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> Matthew Melko. *General war among great powers in world history*. Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen Press, 2001.

<sup>2</sup> Pitirim Sorokin, *Man and society in calamity; the effects of war, revolution, famine, pestilence upon human mind, behavior, social organization, and cultural life*. New York: Greenwood Press, 1968.

<sup>3</sup> Christopher Coker, *The Rise of the Civilizational State*. Polity, 2019.

<sup>4</sup> Colin S. Gray, *The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice* (Oxford University Press, 2016), pg. 6; Lawrence Freedman, --- *Strategy: A History* (Oxford University Press, 2015), pg. xii.

<sup>5</sup> Henri de Jomini, *The Art of War* at <https://www.gutenberg.org/files/13549/13549-h/13549-h.htm>. Accessed 10/10/2022.

<sup>6</sup> Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton University Press: Princeton, New Jersey. 1976. pg. 586.

<sup>7</sup> Christopher Bassford and Edward J. Villacres, “Reclaiming the Clausewitzian Trinity”, <https://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Bassford/Trinity/TRININTR.htm>. Accessed 10/17/2022.

<sup>8</sup> Hugh Smith, “Clausewitz as Sociologist”, *Military Strategy Magazine* at <https://www.militarystrategymagazine.com/article/Clausewitz-as-Sociologist/>. Accessed 10/10/2022.

<sup>9</sup> Colin S. Gray, *War, Peace and International Relations: An introduction to strategic history*. Routledge; second edition, 2011. Pp. 1-1.5

<sup>10</sup> Colin S. Gray, “Strategic History”, *Military Strategy Magazine* at <https://www.militarystrategymagazine.com/article/Strategic-History/>. Accessed 6/13/22.

<sup>11</sup> Geoffrey Sloan, *Geopolitics, Geography and Strategic History*. Routledge, 2018.

<sup>12</sup> Colin S. Gray, *The Strategy Bridge*, pg. 39

<sup>13</sup> Jahara Matisek and Buddhika Jayamaha, *Old and New Battlespaces: Society, Military Power, and War*. Lynne Reimer Publishers, March 2022; pp.25-31.

<sup>14</sup> Christopher Dawson, “The Problem of Metahistory”, *Dynamics of World History*. Intercollegiate Studies Institute; 2002. Pg. 303.

<sup>15</sup> Arnold J. Toynbee, *A Study of History - Reconsiderations Vol. 12*. Oxford University Press, 1961, pp. 227-229.

- <sup>16</sup> Pitirim Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Dynamics Vol. 3*. The Bedminster Press: 1937. Pg.373.
- <sup>17</sup> Siniša Malešević. *The Sociology of War and Violence*. Cambridge University Press, 2010.
- <sup>18</sup> One example is Roy Bhaskar's *Metatheory for the Twenty-First Century: Critical Realism and Integral Theory in Dialogue*. Routledge; 2015. Another example is Scott Hamilton's "A genealogy of metatheory in IR: How 'ontology' emerged from the inter-paradigm debate." *International Theory*, vol. 9, no. 1, 2017, pp. 136–170., doi:10.1017/S1752971916000257.
- <sup>19</sup> Stephen T. Satkiewicz, (2020) "Civilizational Dynamics of "Hybrid Warfare"," *Comparative Civilizations Review*: Vol. 83 : No. 83, Article 17. Pg. 157.
- <sup>20</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. Simon & Schuster, 1996. Pg. 37.
- <sup>21</sup> Reinhold Niebuhr cited in Geoffrey Sloan's *Geopolitics, Geography and Strategic History*. Routledge, 2018; see pg. 20.
- <sup>22</sup> Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*. Stanford University Press; 3rd edition 2012; Satkiewicz, "Civilizational Dynamics of 'Hybrid Warfare'", pp. 152-154.
- <sup>23</sup> Stephen Biddle, *Nonstate Warfare: The Military Methods of Guerillas, Warlords, and Militias*. Princeton University Press, 2021; pp. 1-10.
- <sup>24</sup> In the case of Ukraine, the most famous example is the nationalist Azov battalion. For the Russian side, aside from the pro-Russian separatist forces, there is also the paramilitary Russian Imperial Movement. Both have made headlines for supposed ties to international extremists – see *A Transnational History of Right-Wing Terrorism: Political Violence and the Far Right in Eastern and Western Europe since 1900*, edited by Johannes Dalfinger and Moritz Florin. Routledge, 2022; pp. 164, 165, 260.
- <sup>25</sup> Lawrence Freedman goes into more detail about the origins of the popularity of Sun Tzu in *Strategy: A History*. Pp. 508-511.
- <sup>26</sup> Cited in Natalie Wall's "How Sun Tzu Became a Rise-and-Grind Icon" at <https://www.vice.com/en/article/akegw8/how-sun-tzu-became-a-rise-and-grind-icon> accessed 10/17/2022. Proving further the superficiality of the popular culture use of Sun Tzu, *VICE* also hosts an article by Nick Greene titled "I Used Sun Tzu's 'The Art of War' to Lower My Internet Bill" at <https://www.vice.com/en/article/zm3da5/i-used-sun-tzus-the-art-of-war-to-lower-my-internet-bill>, accessed 10/17/2022.
- <sup>27</sup> Andreas Herberg-Rothe, "Clausewitz or Sun Tzu – Paradigms of warfare for the 21st century" at <https://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/Other/Herberg-Rothe-Andreas/Clausewitz-or-Sun-Tzu-%E2%80%93-Paradigms-of-warfare-for-the-21st-century>, accessed 10/17/2022
- <sup>28</sup> Michael I. Handel, *Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought*. Third and revised edition. London and Portland: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001. Pg. 3
- <sup>29</sup> The continual relevance of Clausewitz to contemporary strategy is beyond the scope of this paper, but Lennart Souchon's *Strategy in the 21st Century: The Continuing Relevance of Carl von Clausewitz* (Springer, 2020) is a useful detailed study of this question. In the *Preface* the author admits to extensive study and admiration of Sun Tzu's work (pg. x).
- <sup>30</sup> Andrew Latham, *Theorizing Medieval Geopolitics: War and World Order in the Age of the Crusades*. Routledge, 2016; pg.16, 42.
- <sup>31</sup> Eric Voegelin, *The New Science of Politics: An Introduction*. University of Chicago Press, 1987. Pp. 2-3.
- <sup>32</sup> Acknowledgement to Michael Andregg for bringing this issue to the attention of the author during the ISCSC conference in Monmouth University in July 2022.
- <sup>33</sup> *The Book of War: Sun-Tzu's "The Art of War" & Karl Von Clausewitz's "On War"*. Modern Library; 2000. Pg. 73.

- 34 Paul Musgrave, "The Beautiful, Dumb Dream of McDonald's Peace Theory" at <https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/11/26/mcdonalds-peace-nagornokarabakh-friedman/> accessed 10/24/2022.
- 35 Pitirim Sorokin, *The Crisis of Our Age*. One World Publications; 2nd Revised edition, 1992. Pg. 178
- 36 This issue is addressed in greater detail in Satekiewicz, Stephen T. "War as a Complex Reality: Comparative Analysis of the Studies on War and Peace by Clausewitz and Pitirim Sorokin." *Biocosmology – Neo-Aristotelianism*, Vol. 10, Nos. 3&4, Summer/Autumn 2020.
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