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The subject of this study is only a small part of a larger ensemble—the social psychology of Latter-day Saint converts in a non-Mormon environment. In this vast field many complex aspects can be studied, such as the various backgrounds of future converts, the modalities of their conversions, their integration process into the local LDS unit, their experiences relating to America and the Church in America, and the dynamics of alliance with and alienation from their non-Mormon surroundings. I have limited myself here to one specific contribution, that is, the socio–ideological allegiance of adult LDS converts, from their non-Mormon upbringing until their integration as members of the Church, seen against the historical canvas of the Flemish society. In the interest of brevity, I must present this subject in three heavily thinned-out parts: first, a sketch of the historical background of the Flemish socio–political canvas; second, an examination of the Mormon convert on this canvas before and after conversion; and finally, a tentative interpretation of the socio–ideological patterns.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE FLEMISH SOCIO–POLITICAL CANVAS

For most outsiders the lingual and political situation of Flanders and its immediate surroundings is rather hazy. A plethora of terms has been used to identify the whole or parts of this small region wedged between France and Germany and the English Channel: the Low Countries, the Netherlands, Holland, Belgium, Flanders,

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Benelux, and more. But it is exactly this being inserted in between the old European powers that explains the substituting hegemonies that have reigned here, the wavering boundaries, the many influences on a region where the high and mighty have spread their patrimony and fought out their battles since that period when the Latin and Germanic worlds met here in the time of Christ.

This region owes its peculiarity to the fact that it is Dutch-speaking and Catholic. It did not match with the more Protestant north, although it shared its language; nor with the French-speaking south, although it shared its religion. But in 1830, the very year of the restoration of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Flanders was joined to a French-speaking region, Wallonia, to form the independent kingdom of Belgium—a tiny, artificial country meant to be a buffer-state between its neighbors.

In spite of attempts to have all Belgians accept the national motto "Unity makes power," the religious, social and lingual oppositions were too intense. In a famous letter written in 1913 to the Belgian king, the Walloon politician J. Destrée started out: "Majesty, there are no Belgians." And indeed, though some faithfully and proudly call themselves Belgians, a three-dimensional opposition always and immediately divides all Belgians into a number of compartments. The first dimension is religious: Catholic or non-Catholic; the second is social: employer or employee; the third is lingual: Dutch-speaking or French-speaking. This threefold opposition has left a dominant mark on one hundred and fifty years of Belgian history and is the basis of the formation of political parties. In the early days of Belgian history, Catholic and liberal parties represented the conflict between church and state—the religious dimension of the opposition. At the end of the nineteenth century the socialist party emerged to defend the interests of the proletariat—the social dimension of the opposition. The opportunist Catholic party broadened itself quickly to a Christian–democrat party in order to include also the believing workmen, since the socialist party, like the liberal, sailed an anticlerical course. In the twentieth century a few ethnic parties joined the political debate—the lingual dimension of the opposition. Flanders thus counts a couple of Flemish parties, oriented to the right, grown out of a Catholic basis.

These historical oppositions led to an extreme compartmentalization of the population, since all public sectors are divided into political blocs: the school system, the medical world, the press, the unions, the social security system, sometimes even sports and music organizations know the cleavages into two or even three of the opposing

dimensions. From the day of his birth each Belgian is registered in one compartmentalized bloc or another. However neutral and independent some Belgians may call themselves, the school they send their children to, the newspaper they buy, even the loan they contract, is in fact a choice in the compartmentalization. Even if most people are not involved in conscious ideological debates, they remain conditioned by the structures created by these ideologies.[1]

In Flanders, the Dutch-speaking part of Belgium, which has a population of six million people, the 1978 elections (in Belgium, voting is obligatory) gave the breakdown shown in figure 1:

Figure 1

Flemish voting results (1978)



In this political spectrum, the religious dimension, Catholic versus non-Catholic (essentially socialist plus liberal), is the most obvious because the Catholic sector predominates in Flanders, controlling 67 percent of the school system and hospitals, 64 percent of the social security system, and 68 percent of the press.[2] This, however, does not mean that two-thirds of the Flemish people are active and believing Catholics and the other third are not. The Catholic sector is composed of structures which the Catholic church has engendered but which continue to exist under the heading of a political party. Moreover, many people who align themselves with socialist and liberal structures maintain nominal ties to the Catholic church.

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[1]See the older but still valid analysis by Val R. Lorwin, "Belgium: Religion, Class and Language in National Politics," in Robert A. Dahl, ed., *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966), 147–87.

[2]See Mieke Van Haegendoren and Etienne De Jonghe, *Roergangers in de mist: Sociale ongelijkheid en malaise van de besluitvorming in België* (Antwerp / Amsterdam: Standaard Wetenschappelijke Uitgeverij, 1977), 173–76.

Going to church is an elastic notion: the majority of the population go into the Catholic church for their baptism, marriage, and funeral. This means that regular churchgoers will for the most part choose the service of the Catholic sector; but among the adherents to socialist and liberal structures, almost half still have fundamental Catholic habits, without considering themselves Catholic.[3]

This rather heterogeneous situation also leads to a precarious game of overarching concepts. The official cleavage speaks of Catholic versus non-Catholic, for example, for determining the ideological balance in certain institutions. In some cases an individual must clearly state whether he or she belongs to the one or the other spiritual family. But in everyday speech this opposition is often expressed differently; for example, Christian versus non-Christian, believer versus nonbeliever or freethinker. To be Christian or believing means to be Catholic. And non-Catholics are expected to be non-Christian and freethinking. One can see immediately what kind of identification problems this leads to for Mormons.

Some individuals tack about between Catholicism and anti-Catholicism or artificial neutrality; but, in general, societal dynamism makes it so each Flemish citizen knows exactly how to identify himself in his habits, in his human relations, in his organizational ties, in the usual terminology—whether he is for or against, involved or purportedly aloof. Each Fleming knows where he stands among all these familiar symbols which for many decades have made up the group loyalties of the population.

And then amid this historically evolved, constituted order of things, amid these crystallized patterns, someone becomes a Latter-day Saint.

THE MORMON CONVERT AND THE FLEMISH SOCIO–POLITICAL CANVAS

The underlying theme of this analysis is the importance of the societal ties: man needs to belong to a group, an impulse many even call genetic. As a social being, man possesses his personal identity through his alliance with a reference group, and he achieves his personal balance by a constant but mostly unconscious comparison between identity and belonging. One of the aspects of this belonging is the socio–ideological tie, in the sense of a leaning upon a spiritual family. For the LDS converts in Flanders we will consider three

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[3]Van Haegendoren and De Jonghe, *Roergangers in de mist*, 167.

moments in their socio–ideological belonging: (1) at the time of parental education; (2) at the time of acquaintance with the LDS church; (3) at the time of their membership in the Church.

The data are based upon an investigation conducted in January 1981 through anonymous questionnaires sent to all active adult members of five of the thirteen branches of the Flemish mission. The answers received represent 27.8 percent of the total active adult LDS population in the Flemish mission, making the sample representative.[4]

Moment 1: Socio–Ideological Belonging at the Time of Parental Education

Figure 2 shows in a simplified way the answers to the first question on religious educational background.



[4]One hundred and forty questionnaires were sent to the members of five of the thirteen branches in the Belgium Antwerp Mission, which covers the whole of Flanders. Three of these branches had a longer Church history (Antwerp–North, Antwerp–South, and Ghent); two branches had a shorter Church history and are representative of smaller cities, one in the western part of the country (Kortrijk) and one in the eastern part (Hasselt / Genk). These members were all those mentioned in the *Jaaragenda 1980*, published by the Belgium Antwerp Mission, which includes all active and semiactive members. A few of these could have turned inactive in the meantime, but generally speaking the circularized persons were all active LDS. The results thus deal only with active members: it would be interesting to do a comparative investigation dealing with inactive members. Response included 92 persons, or 66 percent, a high ratio for this kind of anonymous correspondence investigation. A calculation based upon the monthly activity report of the Belgium Antwerp Mission in the same period showed that the number of local adult members attending church averaged 330. The sample thus represents 27.8 percent of the total active LDS adult population.

An overwhelming majority were brought up in a religious manner—47.9 + 38 = 85.9 percent—practically all Catholic.[5] Almost half received a strong religious education during childhood.

Moment 2: Socio-Ideological Belonging at the Time of Acquaintance with the LDS Church

This important period in the life of converts may indicate the socio–ideological backgrounds that foster receptivity to the restored gospel, through comparison of the representativeness of LDS convert groups according to their compartments of origin in relation to the total spectrum of compartmentalization in Flanders. The questions concerned in the investigation dealt first of all with the eventual evolution of religious practice. An immediate comparison with the situation in moment 1 is most revealing:

Figure 3

Flemish adult LDS converts

Religious practicing before conversion



[5]The other affiliations, 3.3 percent, represent in the investigation only a few individuals—an Anglican, a Lutheran, and a Jew—all of foreign origin.

The vast majority, 71.4 percent, of future converts were not practicing any religion at the moment of acquaintance with the LDS church. Except for the minority of 14.1 percent, who were already reared in a nonreligious atmosphere and stay the same in moment 2, the majority have experienced a strong alienation from the Catholic church before the first contact with LDS missionaries.

Figure 3 only confirms a negative process—the alienation from the external religious experience—erroneously giving an impression of predominant ideological apathy. Besides this purely negative aspect of being loosened, the positive aspect of the loosening forces could be studied as reflecting a more or less ideological justification for the loosening itself. However, this cannot easily be demarcated in its deeper boundaries. In our investigation we searched for indications of this ideological justification in the socio–political leanings of these people before their acquaintance with the LDS church. Such leanings can easily be measured through the affiliation in the compartmentalized medical insurance companies and unions, and in the political elections.

Membership in the medical insurance companies can be viewed as the indicator of an intermediate form between childhood and adulthood: As a newborn baby, one obtains a statutory registration in the parental medical insurance company. Some individuals retain that membership, even if in later years their ideological choice changes; others consciously change from the parental medical insurance company to another. The results of the investigation show the following spread. In Flanders there are four possible medical insurance companies or "sick-funds":

Figure 4



Of the original 85.9 percent who were reared as Catholics (see figure 2), in later years only half are affiliated with the Catholic medical insurance company. One-third of the LDS converts are affiliated with the socialist medical insurance company, while one-fifth prefer the neutral course. The liberal compartment gets very little attention.

To what extent these affiliations represent an intermediate form in an evolution is obvious from the membership in labor unions. People join these organizations voluntarily, usually when they become employees. Of the LDS converts studied, 37 percent are members of a union (in moment 2 as well as in moment 3, without change), spread over the three major compartmentalized groups. There is no neutral union:

Figure 5

Flemish adult LDS converts

Membership in labour unions



The conscious and voluntary non-Catholic affiliation clearly becomes much stronger here. More than two-thirds of union-affiliated people (61.8 percent + 5.9 percent) choose a non-Catholic course, with absolute preference for the socialist union. Since, in Belgian political terms, this course equates with nonpracticing in religion, the results correspond with the already-mentioned tendency of nonpracticing at the time of acquaintance with the LDS church (see figure 3, moment 2).

The choice in the political elections adds a few more possibilities to the ideological spectrum:

Figure 6

Flemish adult LDS converts

Voting tendencies before conversion



The socialist involvement is the strongest, with 30.6 percent. The first three columns represent the anti-Catholic group, and together they hold 45.9 percent of the votes. As mentioned, the Flemish group grew out of a Catholic basis with strong leanings to the nationalistic right, but it cannot be viewed any more as part of the Catholic forces, which stand on their own with 24.7 percent of the votes.

Really revealing, however, is a comparison of these results with the voting results for the whole Flemish population, as presented earlier in the description of Flanders's political canvas:

Figure 7 Flemish adult LDS converts

Voting tendencies of the total Flemish population

LDS converts before conversion



In comparison with the whole population, the future LDS converts show a contrasting pattern: a higher preference for the communist, socialist, and Flemish parties, a lower preference for the liberal and Catholic parties.

Moment 3: Socio-Ideological Belonging at the Time of Membership in the LDS Church

One part of this investigation dealt with the political leanings of converts after they joined the Church, as an indication of their present feeling of socio-ideological belonging. A first question asked the members if they had changed their political choice since joining the Church: 34.1 percent answered that their choice had changed; 65.9 percent that it had not. We then carefully examined the degrees of political stability according to each political party and made a relative calculation of the changes in the political choices according to each party. These smaller shifts to and from each other would take too much time to explain here, and they are not significant in view of the global results, which we present immediately in comparison with the voting tendencies before conversion:

Figure 8



Only the small liberal representation remains constant. A few minuscule milieu parties, classified as "other," gain a few votes. The real movement takes place in the communist, socialist, Flemish, and Catholic parties, which all lose a number of voters when these join the LDS church. Mainly these voters shift to a conscious political negation through abstention. This abstention becomes as strong as the still largest political draw for Flemish Latter-day Saints—the socialist party.

The conclusion is paradoxical if superficially compared with the traditional Mormon political image, that is, responsible concern for politics and aversion to socialism and communism. Among the Flemish LDS converts the reverse tendencies, nonconcern and socialist sympathies, together make up more than half of the Mormon electorate.

TENTATIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE RESULTS

Socialist Sympathies

The British citizens of the Victorian era who joined the Church in vast numbers almost all belonged to the working classes of some urban communities. One of the factors in their receptivity to the gospel was their social disposition: the great majority of these people had become alienated or were in a process of alienation from the constituted religious bodies. According to Jabez Bunting, this alienation was partly due to "radicalism, infidelity and socialism."[6] This process of alienation, away from the constituted religions and under the impulse of anticlerical and socializing forces preceding the time of acquaintance with the LDS church, seems a rather important factor in the life of many non-American converts, both in the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries.[7] However, little appreciation has been shown to the forces that initiated or fostered this valuable process in terms of receptivity to the gospel.

Latter-day Saints believe in the value, even in the divine incentive, of certain preparatory forces and circumstances, such as the discovery of America, the Reformation, and the framing of the Constitution. But little mention of other elements is made. It is of course not surprising that in the Church no appreciation is shown for the forces underlying the above-mentioned alienation process, since for the higher socio–economic classes these forces are the tendencies to agnostic liberalism, and for the lower strata to the broad spectrum of socialist movements. Ecclesiastical spokesmen have unanimously

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[6]Jabez Bunting, cited in James B. Allen and Malcom R. Thorp, "The Mission of the Twelve to England, 1840–41: Mormon Apostles and the Working Classes," *BYU Studies* 15 (Summer 1975): 514.

[7]Although more research would be needed, a few well-known LDS converts can be cited: Louis Bertrand, associate of the Utopian Socialist Cabet and editor of the daily *Le Populaire* (see Wilfried Decoo, "The Image of Mormonism in French Literature: Part I," *BYU Studies* 14 [Winter 1974]: 168); Frederik Ferdinand Samuelsen, Social Democrat parliamentarian in Denmark (see personal correspondence with Richard Jensen, 20 February 1981); Arthur Henry King, "If it had not been for Marx, I should not yet be in this Church, if at all" (cited in F. LaMond Tullis, ed., *Mormonism: A Faith for All Cultures* [Provo: Brigham Young University Press, 1978], 356); Seiji Katanuma, "Before joining the Church I was myself a Marxist"(cited in Tullis, *Mormonism*, 357).

spoken out against these forces, which have been easily labeled as the satanic philosophies of freethinkers, atheists, and communists.

However, in the last ten years a few rare voices in the Church—especially F. LaMond Tullis—have called attention to the complexity and the deeply human sources of some of these forces, especially in Latin America and in countries behind the Iron Curtain.[8] A newly emerging consciousness tries to avoid precipitate identifications and global condemnations, to permit a look first at the human reality behind these identifications: humans as children of God and candidates for eternal life, maybe more interested in the gospel because of the forces that alienated them from the constituted religions and that made them sensitive to human needs in terms of social justice.

From a statistical point of view we cannot deny that these forces can have a positive influence on receptivity to the gospel. In Flanders the people with socialist backgrounds are not only more numerous in the Church than in the whole population, but in a comparison of the average time a convert needs to become baptized after the initial contact, we discovered that a practicing Catholic needs an average of 8.5 months, whereas someone already estranged from this experience reaches the baptismal goal in an average of 4.5 months.[9]

It becomes difficult therefore to ignore the meaning of socialism or similar ideological trends in an international Mormon perspective. But the question of meaning must first pass through the question of terminology—which we will not attempt to untangle here. Socialism has different political connotations in Western Europe or Latin America than in the United States. It does credit to our inspired Church authorities that they realize these differences and take them into account.[10]

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[8]F. LaMond Tullis, "Politics and Society: Anglo-American Mormons in a Revolutionary Land," *BYU Studies* 13 (Winter 1973): 126–34; F. LaMond Tullis, "Mormonism and Revolution in Latin America," *BYU Studies* 16 (Winter 1976): 235–49; F. LaMond Tullis, "The Church Moves Outside the United States: Some Observations from Latin America," *Dialogue* 13 (Spring 1980): 63–73. See also Robert R. King on the situation in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe: "The Communist governments have set in motion social and economic changes that are beginning to weaken this link [between religion and nationality]. . . . And by encouraging social, political, and economic change the Communist parties in Eastern Europe are preparing the field for the harvest" (Robert R. King, "Religion and Communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe," *BYU Studies* 15 [Spring 1975]: 346–47). Robert S. Jordan also recognizes proselyting opportunities created by political change. However, he identifies the underlying forces by the ambiguous term *secularization* and views this as only part of "non-communist authoritarian political systems" (Robert S. Jordan with Parley W. Newman, Jr., "The Political Challenges: Mormons, Governments and Politics," in Tullis, *Mormonism*, 298).

[9]We should recognize, however, that for these averages the variances were rather high.

[10]For example, various directives for absolute neutrality in countries with leftist tendencies; various public relation offensives through BYU performance groups in communist countries; the decision not to publish in the non-English Church magazines an anticommunist general conference talk by President Ezra Taft Benson (October 1979); "'realist' accommodation between the Church and Communist regimes" (see Ray C. Hillam, "Utopian and Realistic Thought in International Relations: Some Scriptural Prospectives," *Dialogue* 13 [Winter 1980]: 106; see also Bill Heaton, "Mormonism and Maoism: The Church and People's China," *Dialogue* 13 [Spring 1980]: 40–50).

A small digression on the same theme: For a long time we have lived with the intrusive and simplistic representation of ideological confrontation between two blocs—capitalism and communism, or the bloc-dichotomy—as a determinant for the freedom or the prohibition to spread the gospel. But this bloc-dichotomy concept pays no regard to the complex variegations of communist and socialist movements in countries other than the Soviet Union, or to the freedom, including that of religion, these forces may represent versus other ideological factors.

The simple bloc-dichotomy would have us believe that the West European democracies, because they belong to the noncommunist world, are not obstructing preaching the gospel. In his study on "The International System and the Missionary Church," I feel Martin B. Hickman incorrectly makes this generalization.[11] We need in these areas a more differentiated approach. One of the most negative factors in limiting the spread of the gospel has been and sometimes still is the status of Catholicism and the bonds between the Catholic church and the local power structures in certain countries. The loosening of these bonds during the rise of socialist or communist forces provides greater freedom of movement and exchange.[12] The point is that these forces are anticlerical, not necessarily antireligious.

In view of the Flemish statistics, of the historical example of England, and of many similar situations outside the United States, one could even see socialism in its positive connotations as a seal-breaker of deceiving structures and doctrines and as an amplifier of receptivity to the gospel. To paraphrase L. Dwight Israelsen in his statement on America as host society for the Restoration, one might dare to state that socialism is the host ideology for Mormonism in many other places.[13]

Nonconcern for Politics

The second item for interpretation is the phenomenon of deliberate abstention from politics, which abstention grows spectacularly—from 8.2 percent to 26.5 percent—when people become members of the Church, this in spite of the recommendation of Church authorities that members be politically responsible and take a conscious part in political choices.[14] The phenomenon can clearly be imputed to the perturbations which becoming a Mormon causes for the individual in

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[11]Martin B. Hickman, "The International System and the Missionary Church," in *American Heritage: A Syllabus for Social Science 100* (Provo: Brigham Young University Publications, 1976), 607.

[12]See also J. Michael Cleverly, "The Church and la Politica Italiano," *Dialogue* 13 (Spring 1980): 105–7.

[13]L. Dwight Israelsen, "Mormons, the Constitution, and the Host Economy," in *American Heritage*, A-56–76.

[14]For example, Letter of the First Presidency, 29 June 1979.

the presence of the prescriptive and customary compartmentalization. Conversion brings into being a new ideological consciousness that makes it difficult to fit into the existing compartments. This is obvious from the commentaries many members add to the investigation sheets to justify their political or nonpolitical choice.

Some Mormons justify an affiliation toward a certain socio–political group by attaching themselves to a single characteristic of the group. Thus a few declare that they vote for the Catholic party because it fights abortion; others, because it carries the emblem "Christian" on its flag. Several mention that they choose the socialist party because it shows the greatest concern for man as a human being. Still another comments that he votes for a national Flemish party because it is the only neutral party in the religious controversy. One liberal voter states that the people in the liberal party are the best educated, and another that this party guarantees the most freedom.

The feeling of affiliation can also be negatively selective: A few Latter-day Saints remark that they reject the Catholic party because of its outspoken intolerance toward Mormons.[15] One person indicates his aversion to the national Flemish movement because it is fanatical and racist. Among the large number of abstentionists the comments are related: All parties are imposters, corruption is rampant, parties make the country ungovernable. Such statements are sometimes seasoned with chiliastic hope: Mormons can vote only for Jehovah, and the Kingdom of God will do away with all that political poison.

All in all, this diversity is more a chaotic search for identity. But one of the problems that makes some of these individual positions so categorical in their uncertainty is a faltering and contradictory assessment of the place of the Mormon community in relation to the prevailing ideologies. The historical perspective helps us to understand the problem, which is the evolution in the identification of the ideologies surrounding the Church. Members who joined twenty years ago have known the outspoken anti-Catholicism typified by the first edition of *Mormon Doctrine*, in which the Catholic church was referred to as the Church of the Devil. Members who join now receive a more diplomatic explanation of the "Church of the Devil," and they hear the proud news releases of positive contacts with other churches.[16] In a similar perspective, the altering image of America—once the society of the

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[15]This charge is related to a 1979 case when two Flemish LDS schoolteachers working in Catholic schools were dismissed because of their religious convictions.

[16]For an analysis of a comparable evolution in the RLDS church, see Howard J. Booth, "Shifts in Restoration Thought," *Dialogue* 13 (Fall 1980): 79–92.

promised land, of golden dreams, now stained with Vietnam, Watergate, El Salvador, CIA—raises a malaise over the classical confusion between Mormonism and capitalism or between Zion and the United States.[17] Even more critical in the same sphere is the rupture that "socialist" Mormons can painfully experience between (1) themselves as inveterate opponents of a complacent bourgeoisie, sympathizers with the underdog, and (2) the affluent middle class, the cult of success which American Latter-day Saints project in Church publications and films.[18] Finally, regarding the positive or negative identification of socialist tendencies, recent voices and events point out that here also, after the traditional and global LDS condemnations of socialism and communism, a turn of the tide may come into view on a still misty horizon.

The consequence of all these apparent hitches and contradictions is that a large group wearily chooses political noninvolvement, and that among the others no one can feel fully at home in one of the traditional compartments. This leads to a breach position with society—a phenomenon which the interpretation of certain scriptures and statements encourages. Objectively seen, this breach position has a positive side contributing to the unity of the local LDS community. For many, neutrality toward, and even repugnance to, the political arena is an insurance of brotherhood in the gospel. In the same vein, those who still have a political preference never talk about it: by tacit agreement the subject is taboo. This is the sphere which Hugh Nibley so aptly describes as "beyond politics."[19]

But this triggers a last consideration. One of the greatest concerns for the spreading of the gospel is the participation of local members in active missionary work. The facts reveal that in spite of all the encouragements and challenges, the initiative to do missionary work is not easily taken by most members in Flanders, nor elsewhere in similar socio–psychological situations. Many factors play their role in this, but one is probably the breach position with the surrounding society: many members unconsciously experience the initiative to introduce the gospel as a betrayal of the conventional and time-honored symbols and boundaries of the fixed compartmentalization. But more than this, they unconsciously hesitate to become responsible for

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[17]On this theme, see Gustav H. Blanke, "God's Base of Operations: Mormon Variations on the American Sense of Mission," *BYU Studies* 20 (Fall 1979): 83–92; Garth N. Jones, "Expanding LDS Church Abroad: Old Realities Compounded," *Dialogue* 13 (Spring 1980): 8–22; John L. Sorenson, "Mormon World View and American Culture," *Dialogue* 8 (Summer 1973): 17–29.

[18]See also J. K. Davies, "The Mormon Church: Its Middle-Class Propensities," *Review of Religious Research* 4 (1962): 84–95.

[19]Hugh Nibley, "Beyond Politics," *BYU Studies* 15 (Autumn 1974): 3–28.

implicating another person in what they themselves often still experience as a traumatic quest for identity. This explains why, on the other hand, most members find no difficulty whatsoever in actively and enthusiastically helping in missionary work, once the first contact has been made by someone else.

The solution to this problem of taking the initiative probably does not lie in still more admonitions and challenges to the members, since this mainly increases the malaise of fear and guilt, but in a broader forum of balanced information on the Church in the world, in the fostering of a confident relation between members and the daily aspects of life, and in the building of bridges to the existing compartments. In such and other ways members could be helped to experience Mormonism less as a new compartment on the canvas, an essentially differentiating function, and more as a suprasegmental force, functionally separated from the compartments but needfully present in each of them through the Church's individual Latter-day Saints and through its universal message of salvation.

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