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The Comparative Civilizations Review publishes analytical studies and interpretive essays primarily concerned with (1) the comparison of whole civilizations, (2) the development of theories and methods especially useful in comparative civilization studies, (3) accounts of intercivilizational contacts, and (4) significant issues in the humanities or social sciences studied from a comparative civilizational perspective.

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Editor’s Note

Spring 2021

We in the United States have been privileged to live recently during a period of immense social and political change. If we turn to our civilization’s intellectual progenitors and see from the perspective of those upon whose shoulders we stand, we can obtain guidance that enables us to explain, or at least place in some meaningful context, these changes in the flow of time.

As Adam Ferguson, the Scottish thinker, wrote, we can look at certain figures, perhaps those more primitive, now departing from the scene, and observe “as in a mirror, the features of our own progenitors.” Are we living on the cusp of a set of sweeping changes which mirror those that scholars of our own civilization have explained? Or is this moment of change merely evanescent, dependent upon the variable whims of a few thousand voters in a half dozen small states?

One can point profitably to many thinkers who explain such periods as the present one. I would note the groundbreaking theories of Claude-Henri, Comte de Saint-Simon. He laid out history as a series of alternations between organic periods and critical periods, the former times during which the social and political institutions are “in harmony with the state of civilization” and the latter times which are transitional, with conflict and change dominant.

For Saint-Simon, “every social regime is an application of a philosophical system and, consequently, it is impossible to institute a new regime without having previously established the new philosophical system to which it must correspond.” He wrote that we need to set aside the “incoherence of general ideas” for “as soon as there is a theory corresponding to the present state of enlightenment, order will be reestablished.” This orderly future, he maintained, would be guided by an intellectual elite built of “scientists, artists, and men of liberal ideas.” Not that far from Plato, perhaps.

Other great social and political philosophers come to mind. One of my favorites from the Enlightenment has long been the Marquis de Condorcet. His book, *Historical Picture of The Progress of the Human Mind*, dealt with the perfectibility of our political and social systems. He saw human perfectibility as available to us ultimately and analyzed history as moving toward the goals of national and class equality. He laid out a series of stages by which mankind would arise from ignorance and tyranny.

We hoped, he wrote, for a future condition of humanity resting on three points: “the destruction of inequality between different nations; the progress of equality in one and the same nation; and, lastly, the real improvement of man.”
A whole series of others come to light, all of whom can contribute to an understanding of the future unfolding before us in the present, as perhaps a new period of enlightenment and progress replaces one of horror and regress. You can think of Locke, Rousseau, Hegel, Madison, Mannheim. To explain the period mercifully now ended, and the difficulty of building a better future, one might quote Georges Sorel. He wrote that “movements toward greatness” were “always an effort, and movements toward decadence always natural.”

The great, if too often ignored, Italian political philosopher Giambattista Vico looked during his life forward to a ricorso, that is, a time of re-running during which history brings to the fore great values from the past. Thanks to the launching of a new national administration here in Washington, perhaps we can rebuild by drawing once again on American history’s major social and political thoughts, from Washington’s advocacy of tolerance, to Lincoln’s new birth of liberty and equality, to Roosevelt’s attention to, and advancing of, the general welfare.

It is at times like this that our study of the emanations of civilization become important. Then, too, we can celebrate with Wordsworth, who wrote in The Prelude of the period of the French Revolution:

Bliss it was in that dawn to be alive … When Reason seemed the most to assert her rights.

You are looking at the Spring issue of the journal. Happily, in addition to a set of insightful articles and reports, as always, we hope, this issue also includes a brand new index. It has been compiled by three wonderful people, outstanding supporters of the IS CSC, great editors Alexandra Travis, Regan Mozingo, and David Wilkinson. This index is our second one; the first, pathbreaking and also wonderful, was authored by our distinguished former IS CSC president, Prof. Michael Palencia-Roth, and run in the Spring 2006 edition, Number 54.

Please note that this index contains four sections of listings: all articles placed in chronological order; articles by authors, listed alphabetically; book reviews by reviewer; and book reviewers by author of the book. In addition, the three editors also report on the ten most popular articles in the journal, based on downloads in recent years.

This wonderful set of indexes will also be placed separately on the website of the IS CSC as an aid to those conducting research in the field of the comparative study of civilizations.
It is my sad duty to report to the readers of the journal the untimely death of one of our stalwart members and most innovative thinkers, Ross Maxwell.

Ross was a presence at the International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations conferences for decades. He and I roomed together many years ago at the ISCSC annual meeting, and I have found him ever since to be the source of a whole series of creative insights into civilization. No one was a finer member of this body, in my opinion.

We will devote space to his intellectual contributions in the next issue, and the editors invite submissions that address the work of this brilliant man. Here is a picture of Ross, from his recent retirement celebration, kindly sent in from San Francisco by his wife, Dr. Phyllis G. Maxwell, herself an author of renown.

In the meantime, the organization is looking forward to the upcoming conference, to be held at the Dimitri Cantemir Christian University in Bucharest, Romania, as summer turns to the fall.

See you then!

Joseph Drew
Editor-in-Chief
Letter from the President

Spring 2021

Civilization at a Crossroads: This is not only the theme of the 2021 ISCSC conference, but something for each of us to consider. We reach decision points of critical thinking especially during extraordinary times. We are now experiencing extraordinary times.

Crossroads can represent choosing between different paths; ideologies; different vocations; studies; choice of spiritual beliefs; distinction of mindset; choosing conflict or peace; passivity or aggression. We will make choices at different junctures when at a crossroads. These are the intersections of our independent and larger societal choices. The crossroads are crucial points where a decision or decisions must be made.

The ISCSC brings together people who write of the many crossroads and impacts of civilizations past, present and future. Our journal, Comparative Civilization Review (CCR), features many of these thoughtful papers and dialogues. Heretofore, we have not benefited from a comprehensive index of papers in the CCR since Spring of 2006.

Why is an index important? When one is searching for information, being able to locate the information, often quickly, can be challenging. Having a structure that organizes the types of information being sought can be invaluable. Due to the skill, insights and hard work of ISCSC members Alexandra Sasha Travis, Regan Remy and David Wilkinson, we now have an up-to-date index for articles in the CCR and it is included in this edition.

There is something reassuring about an index. It is a roadmap of sorts and can help with navigating and making choices. This new CCR index will help navigate the papers and scholarly thought that provides insight into our analysis and descriptions of civilization.

Our complex human societies, the cultural and technological beginnings and evolution of our social structures, religious systems, and environment are strong and will evolve and hopefully provide for our stability and security, not to mention happiness.

Lynn Rhodes
President
Do All Roads Lead to Rome?
Exploring the Underlying Logics of Similar Policies and Practices of Recruiting Barbarian Soldiers in Roman and Early Chinese Empires

Pengfei Su
Pfsu1@hotmail.com

Introduction

There are many similarities between various aspects of the Roman and early Chinese empires, which have been the focus of much academic discussion.¹ A wide range of comparative studies have been carried out and resulted in the publication of numerous research papers.² Scholars have been using different approaches focusing upon different areas to address this very broad comparative topic.³ Detailed analyses were made to compare the two empires in respect to their coinage and monetary systems,⁴ state revenue and expenditures,⁵ elite formation and social class advancement,⁶ and executive decision-making processes,⁷ just to mention a few. In a broader context, the state formation processes of these two empires have been analyzed and compared in light of their parallel movements.⁸

¹ For an overview of academic publications in this aspect, see Walter Scheidel, The Stanford Ancient Chinese and Mediterranean Empires Comparative History Project, https://web.stanford.edu/~scheidel/acme.htm (last visited July 1, 2020, 9:00 pm).
² For collections of the papers presented at such conferences, see e.g. Fritz-Heiner Mutschler and Aachim Mittag (eds), Conceiving the Empire, Rome and China Compared (Oxford University Press, 2008); Walter Scheidel (eds), Rome and China, Comparative Perspectives on Ancient World Empires (Oxford University Press, 2009).
⁴ Walter Scheidel, Rome and China, Comparative Perspectives on Ancient World Empires (Oxford University Press, 2009), at 137.
⁵ Walter Scheidel, State Power In Ancient China And Rome (Oxford University Press, 2015), at 150
Insightful research, for instance, has been done to compare these two empires with respect to their military mobilization policies and to the relationships between their military and civil leadership.9

Both of the demises of the classical empires on the two ends of the Eurasian continent in the early first millennium AD were related to the fact that members of non-citizen or non-subject barbarian10 tribes/polities performed military services in these empires and then mutinied against them. From the previous centuries onwards, both Roman and Chinese empires recruited into their armies tribal or frontier subjects or foreign subjects who had recently migrated into the empires, and the performances of these soldiers were consistently given positive comments by the host empires. During the late Roman Empire, persons of barbarian origin were recruited into the Roman army in increasingly larger numbers and played vital roles in guarding the imperial territories. Eventually it was a group of Germanic military captains who terminated the regime of the Western Roman Empire in 476 AD.

A similar process took place in China during the several centuries before the collapse of the Jin (晋) Empire in north China in 317 AD. From the first century AD onwards, the classical Chinese empire increasingly recruited into its army tribesmen of barbarian origin, who played crucial roles in guarding the Chinese territories. This sort of recruitment resumed on a more profound basis during the first decades of Jin Dynasty (from 280 AD onwards). For example, Liu Yuan (刘渊), a Hun11 tribal leader, used to be a military general and commanded Hun soldiers for a powerful Chinese prince before he mutinied against the empire.12 A good understanding may be gained of the decline and fall of these two classical empires by tracing the origins and developments of their policies on recruiting barbarians, non-subjects or non-citizens into their armies.

---


10 Throughout this paper, the term “barbarian” only means belonging to a community that was not directly ruled by one of the classical civilizations (e.g. Roman Republic or Empire, or ancient Chinese empires), but the term does not in any sense carry any meaning of being inferior, uncivilized, backward or violent. Modern scholarship has convincingly proved that many such reputedly “barbarian” peoples created brilliant achievements in institutional, cultural, technological and other aspects. The uses of the term “barbarian” in this paper are only for purpose of convenient reference to various ancient peoples who were so referred to in ancient texts.

11 Also spelled as “Xiongnu” (匈奴).

12 Liu Yuan’s early career as a Chinese military officer was in parallel to various invading Germanic tribal leaders who once served as Roman military officers.
Before we examine why an ancient empire’s policy on recruiting soldiers from tribal subjects underwent fundamental changes, we need to first understand its military recruitment rules in general, because an ancient empire’s practice in recruiting barbarians or tribal subjects closely followed its overall rationale regarding enlisting soldiers from the society at large.

This paper is organized in the following structure:

Part I argues that a seven-phase evolutionary trajectory of ancient Rome and early Chinese empire in military recruitment policy bore strong resemblances to each other. An analysis of such seven-phase policy transformations indicates that the two empires at their early stages were similar to each other in recruiting mainly from their geographical central regions and their political core elements. The emergence of a professional standing army would naturally come as the next stage for both states. However, the mass conscription system existed for a longer period in China than in Rome due to fierce competitions among the Sinic states during the Warring States period. After universal empires were established in Rome and China, they both resorted to massive recruitment of barbarian tribal soldiers to maintain their military strength.

Although soldiers from various tribal groups were enlisted into the troops of the early Chinese empire to defend its many thousands of miles of northern borderline facing the Eurasian steppe,13 tribal soldiers were recruited not only from the nomadic communities on its northern border but also from the sub-tropical regions in the south.

Part II will discuss the military service obligations required by the early Chinese empires of some indigenous tribes living in the middle range of the Yangtze River Valley. The special legal treatment (including exemptions) these barbarian tribes received from the early Chinese states regarding military service obligations will be investigated in the first case study of Part II.

The second case study in Part II concerns an early Han dynasty death penalty appellate case in which the pre-existing exemption was surprisingly disregarded against a barbarian adult male who had dodged military service, and the case epitomizes a turning-point in the early Chinese empire’s policy on its military recruitment of barbarians.

---

13 For example, in the 2nd century, soldiers recruited from Wuhuan (乌桓) and Xianbei (鲜卑) tribes were defending the Han Empire’s northeastern frontier, soldiers from tribes of southern Huns were defending its due north frontier, while soldiers from Qiang (羌) tribes were defending its northwestern territories.
The third case study describes resistance incidents launched by Beshun tribesmen in the second century against excessive corvee and military service obligations, although they had previously played an indispensable role in supporting the Han Empire’s military actions. Two comparable resistance events in contemporary Roman Empire were described: *Bellum Batonianum* and the Revolt of the Batavi.

Part III summarizes a series of common patterns in the evolution of the two empires’ policies on recruiting tribal subjects. For example, the standing of both empires’ military recruits gradually changed from the society’s politically-franchised classes to its powerless domestic subjects, and then onto its politically-remote frontier subjects; the geographical origins of the military recruits gradually changed from the national’s central regions to its peripherals. Part III explores broader implications of the two empires’ parallel transformations in military recruitment policies, and it is posited that the deeper mechanism of convergent evolution was at work in driving such similar policy transformations in both empires. When the trajectories of the evolutions of various circumstantial social factors were similar in these two classical empires, it naturally followed that their rules and practices on military recruitment would evolve in the same directions.

**Part I: Similar Evolutionary Phases in Military Recruitment Policies**

Generally speaking, the Roman policy on recruitment of soldiers underwent the following stages of transitions, and each of such stages is coded in chronological order from R(1) to R(7):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage</th>
<th>Military Recruitment Policy in Rome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R1</td>
<td>A citizen militia, meeting applicable property qualifications.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2</td>
<td>In the later periods of R(1), military recruitment expanded to include able-bodied men from annexed territories in Italy, plus occasional levy of a universally conscripted mass army.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R3</td>
<td>A nascent professional standing army, with no need for meeting property qualifications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R4</td>
<td>A professional standing army, divided into units of legions and auxiliaries: legionaries were recruited mainly from Roman citizens in Italy, and auxiliary soldiers were recruited primarily from non-citizens in the provinces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R5</td>
<td>Increasingly, legionaries were recruited from non-Italian citizens and non-citizens.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R6</td>
<td>The overwhelming majority of Roman soldiers were recruited from non-citizen provincials and sometimes from barbarians.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R7</td>
<td>A substantial proportion of Roman soldiers were recruited from external barbarians who had recently migrated into Roman territories. Then came the end of the Western Roman Empire.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In the above transformative processes that played out during a period of approximately one millennium (i.e. from Servius Tullius’ reign in the mid-sixth century BC until the demise of the Western Roman Empire in 476 AD), we may observe a trend in which the main sources of Roman military recruits moved step by step (i) from Rome’s political power center to its powerless peripherals and (ii) from Rome’s geographical center to its territorial peripherals.

The above seven-phase model should be distinguished from the nine-phase model posited by Christian Gizewski in his paper published in 1994.¹⁴ First, while Gizewski’s paper discusses the broad theme of state formation in general, this paper addresses the specific topic of military recruitment policy, especially the application of such rules to barbarian tribesmen. Second, territorial annexation/fragmentation is an overarching topic in Gizewski’s paper, while this paper focuses on the analysis of policies that evolved in disregard of territorial status.

Third, in Gizewski’s model, the statuses of Chinese and Roman states evolved in a close parallel in time, while this paper shows there was a longer time difference between each step of their policy transformations.

Similarly, during the early Chinese civilization from the Spring & Autumn period to Han Dynasties, military recruitment underwent the following stages of transitions, with each of such stages being coded in chronological order from C(1) to C(7):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage</th>
<th>Military Recruitment Policy in Early China</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C1</td>
<td>An aristocratic militia, meeting hereditary ranking qualifications.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>In the later periods of C(1), military recruitment expanded to include commoners in the vast rural territories, with no need for meeting hereditary ranking qualification.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3</td>
<td>A nascent professional army, whose soldiers were recruited from the society at large on selective criteria.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C4</td>
<td>Universally conscripted mass army.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C5</td>
<td>The army of the empire was comprised of both conscripted subjects and professional soldiers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C6</td>
<td>The army of the empire was comprised mainly of professional soldiers, many of whom came from low-class provincial backgrounds or frontier barbarian tribes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C7</td>
<td>A substantial number of the Chinese empire’s soldiers were recruited from external barbarians who recently migrated into the territories of the empire. Then came the end of the classical Chinese empire in northern China.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

In the above evolutionary processes that lasted nearly one millennium (770 BC – 317 AD), we can observe a trend in which the main sources of military recruits in early China moved step by step (i) from the Sinic states’ political power center to their powerless peripherals and (ii) from a Sinic state’s geographical center to its territorial peripherals. The basic patterns in the transformation of military recruitment policies in early Chinese states were quite similar to the journey of contemporary Rome. The only key difference seemed to be that early Chinese states each maintained a universally-conscripted mass army (at least in theory) for several centuries while the levy of a universally-conscripted mass army was an ephemeral phenomenon in Rome.

In below sub-sections I.A – I.H of Part I, we will compare each of the seven similar transformational phases that occurred in Rome and early China. I propose that there was always a time difference of two to three centuries between each step of the policy transformations in the two empires. We will see that their transformations were often (although not always) prompted by similar social trends and followed similar logic:

I. A: Comparing Rome’s stage R(1) with China’s stage C(1)

After the military reform of Servius Tullius, the army of early Rome was largely a citizen militia, which was assembled from Roman citizens who had met certain property ownership standards and would be disbanded at the end of each war. The Roman Republic periodically held censuses that registered the property ownership status of their citizens and divided them into six different classes, and members of each of the first five classes were required to serve different military roles with different armaments. Roman citizens who did not meet minimum property qualifications (i.e. proletarii) were not allowed to join the Roman army, while the other classes of citizens were eligible for military service. Eligibility for military services enabled Roman citizens to vote (with different weights) in the Roman legislative assembly comitia centuriata, which decided on issues of war and peace, enacted legislation, elected consuls and praetors, and considered capital punishment appeals.

Young Roman aristocrats with public service aspirations had to complete at least ten years of military services before becoming eligible for public offices. Most politicians of the Roman Republic (including famous orators such as Cicero) had many years of military service or command experiences. In short, it was the active voters and political participants of the early Roman Republic that were serving in the Roman army and fighting its wars, and it was the members of its innermost circle of political elite who were physically commanding the same army in the battlefield.

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15 Livy 1.42.5 – 43.10.
16 For the applicable minimum property qualifications, see Pierre Cagniart, The Late Republican Army (146 – 30 BC), in A Companion to the Roman Army (Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2007), at 81.
17 Polybius, 6.19.5.
The armies of Western Zhou dynasty and the early Spring & Autumn Sinic states were largely aristocratic militias, which were assembled primarily from the male members of the ruling ethnic groups in a polity (such members were called “国人” or “guoren”, meaning “countrymen”), who had been accorded certain official ranks in that polity’s political hierarchical system. Except for direct retinues of the aristocrats, local commoners (who were mostly of different ancestral origins from the ruling groups) did not join the army or participate in any military campaign.

The “countrymen” who were eligible for military services were supposed to be consulted by the body politic at countrymen’s assemblies on issues of national emergency, relocation of state capital, appointment of new rulers, and significant judicial cases. In the standard curriculum for the education that should be received by young aristocratic males, skills in military formations, archery and chariot-driving, which were crucial for military actions of that era, were taught as compulsory courses. Most aristocrats who were active during the Spring & Autumn period seemed to have some military service or command experiences. In short, at this stage it was the direct participants in a Sinic polity’s political life who were serving in the army of that polity and fighting its wars, and it was the members of its innermost circle of political elite who were physically commanding the same army in the battlefield.

I. B: Comparing Rome’s stage R(2) with China’s stage C(2)

During the later periods of R(1), after Rome defeated and conquered adjacent polities in central and southern Italy, Rome expanded the scope of its military recruitment to able-bodied men from the newly-acquired alliance territories (socii), and soldiers from such alliance territories formed their own independent units (alae) while fighting battles on the Roman side.

As a result of the integration with its annexed territories, the Roman Republic kept a huge reservoir of military manpower which none of the neighboring polities could compete against. For example, in 225 BC, based upon the figures provided by Polybius, it was estimated that Rome had a maximum military reserve of 900,000 men, of whom more than a third were Romans (325,000) and the rest were men from the consolidated Roman socii in Italy.

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18 Zhouli, Qiuguan Sikou Fifth (《周礼·秋官司寇第五》), Beijing Normal University Publishing House (北京师范大学出版社) 2019, at p.293.
19 Zhouli, Diguan Situ Second (《周礼·地官司徒第二》), Beijing Normal University Publishing House (北京师范大学出版社) 2019, at p.118.
21 Klaus Bringmann, A History of the Roman Republic, at 34.
Major Sinic states had previously acquired many territorial areas around their capital cities either during the early Zhou period (after the establishment of these states) or during the early Spring & Autumn period, without systematically recruiting military personnel from such annexed territories. From the mid-seventh century BC onwards, however, some of these states (e.g. states of Qi (齊), Chu (楚) and Jin (晉)) began to expand the scope of their military recruitments to men living in such acquired territories and rural hinterlands.

As a result of their integration with the annexed territories, some Sinic polities began to have a huge reservoir of military resources and manpower whose order of magnitude had been unthinkable during a previous era. For example, in 530 BC, the king of the state of Chu claimed that from each of the 4 smaller polities that Chu had acquired in the Central Plains region, he could levy 1,000 chariots.\(^{22}\) Given that the state of Chu acquired a total of approximately 48 lesser states during this period, the scale of its expansion of military resources was huge.

The above expansions were the very first step in a long journey of transformation, in which the main sources of military recruitments in Rome and early Sinic states gradually shifted away from their capital cities and geographical centers and moved step by step onto the relatively peripheral regions.

I. C: Comparing Rome’s stage R(3) with China’s stage C(3)

By the late second century BC, it became difficult for the Roman Republic to recruit soldiers from its wealthier propertied citizens, whose enthusiasm in military services had begun to decline. In 107 BC, Gaius Marius reformed the military recruitment system by abolishing the property qualification so that lower-class plebian and proletarians became eligible for enlistment,\(^{23}\) and ad-hoc service in the Roman army was replaced with 16 years of continuous service. His reform effectively improved the quantity and quality of Roman military personnel and paved the road for a series of Roman military triumphs in the next stage. In particular, his reform initiated the formation of a professional standing army which engaged in rigorous systematic training and drilling all the year round even in times of peace.

His soldiers should be able to march long distances in a day, and in marches they were required to personally carry various heavy weapons, tools, supplies and provisions for many days’ needs.\(^{24}\) They won the nickname of “Marius’ mules” \((\text{muli mariani})\) due to their reputation for strong physique and stamina.

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\(^{23}\) Sallust, The War Against Jugurtha 86.1-4.

\(^{24}\) Pierre Cagniart, The Late Republican Army (146 – 30 BC), in A Companion to the Roman Army (Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2007), at 87.
The early Warring States period witnessed a similar transformation that occurred in China towards the establishment of a professional army whose soldiers were selected from the society at large on strict criteria.

During this period, the state of Qi selected and recruited men who possessed impressive martial arts and soldiers so recruited were rewarded with handsome pay. When enlisting its elite infantry soldiers, the state of Wei required that an applicant should be able to exercise while wearing helmet and three layers of armor and draw a bow with a force of 360 kilograms; he was required to be able to march as long as 40 kilometers within a period of daybreak till midday while carrying a halberd (i.e. an axe combined into a spear), a sword on the waist, 50 arrows with a quiver on the back, and food that could provide for three days’ needs. It seemed as if the state of Wei was unconsciously selecting infantry soldiers on criteria that were similar to those for “Marius’ mules”. Besides, both Marius and the state of Wei endowed land estates to their soldiers who had passed such strict recruitment tests and fulfilled the service tenure.

At this stage both Roman and Chinese states took a crucial step towards instituting military systems that were based on professional standing armies. In both Rome and China, the sources for recruiting soldiers were moving further towards the entire domestic population, regardless of wealth, political power or hereditary status.

I. D: Comparing Rome’s Universal Conscription with China’s stage C(4)

Despite the same type of development as described in above sub-section C, the evolutionary paths of Roman and early Chinese recruitment then temporarily parted ways, in that the latter soon adopted a universal conscription system while Rome resorted to it only on a very occasional basis.

Only in time of military crises did Rome conduct general levies of able-bodied male citizens (sometimes even slaves) on a compulsory basis.

For example, the Roman Republic launched compulsory levies of soldiers in 193 BC (for a campaign against Ligurian mountaineers) and in 171 BC (against an offensive from the kingdom of Macedon). In the Pannonian Revolt that lasted between 6 AD and 9 AD, Augustus not only launched a general levy of free citizens but also ordered emancipation and compulsory conscription of thousands of slaves in order to raise an army. However, such instances of general levies never became the norm in Rome.

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26 See ibid. See also supra note 20, at 241.
In contrast, during the mid and late Warring States period when the seven Sinic states engaged in total warfare against each other, they resorted to universal levies of their able-bodied males to build mass armies. According to the remarks of the famous diplomat Su Qin (苏秦), during this period, from its capital region of the state of Qi 200,000 soldiers could be levied; the states of Zhao, Han and Yan could each enlist several hundred thousand soldiers; the state of Wei kept 200,000 regular soldiers and 300,000 auxiliary soldiers; the states of Chu and Qin each maintained an army of about 1 million men. Each state was able to maintain such huge numbers of soldiers only if it made military service a universal obligation for its able-bodied men. For example, in the crucial war between the states of Qin and Zhao in the Changping (长平) region in 260 BC, the king of Qin ordered that all males aged above 15 in the region near the battlefield should be conscripted into Qin’s army, so that the opponent army of about 400,000 soldiers could be thoroughly encircled. As another example, when the state of Qin launched a decisive war against the state of Chu in 224 BC, Qin’s commanding general made it an imperative requirement that troops of 600,000 men must be mobilized before any attack was launched.

The above difference between Rome and China in relation to universal conscription arose from the fact that except for a few isolated wars such as Hannibal’s invasion of Italy during the Second Punic War, Rome of this era seldom needed to engage in any life-and-death fights with its enemies. After the Roman Republic consolidated its rule over central and southern Italy, it was separated from most of its military opponents by the Mediterranean and other forms of natural barriers. Based upon its sufficient recruitment of citizen soldiers and wise alignment of alliance forces, the Roman Republic maintained a huge reserve of manpower available for military services.

Most of Rome’s neighboring polities lacked any equally systematic mobilization mechanism, and the post-Alexander Hellenistic states frequently relied upon costly services of mercenaries whose number could never afford to be massive. In contrast, due to the peculiar geographical circumstances of China’s central heartland (especially the extreme compactness of the layout of the early Sinic states), the polities of the Warring States were in constant fierce geopolitical competition with their neighboring polities, and the wars of elimination among them worked in a very crude form of “survival of the fittest”. Each polity of the Warring States always had to fight endlessly for its very survival, and many of their peer polities who had failed to mobilize for total wars had been annihilated.

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30 *Ibid* at 452.
Despite the prevalence of universal conscription in China during this period, we should deem it as a deviation from the inevitable evolutionary path towards the establishment of a professional standing army. Once the fierce competition for the Holy Grail of national unification began to subside, the nation would feel a strong push for reverting to the regular path of military professionalization.

I. E: Comparing Rome’s stage R(4) with China’s Transition from stage C(4) to C(5)

Rome’s stage R(4) came naturally as part of Augustus’ political settlement for the Roman army at the end of the Roman civil war. After defeating Marcus Antonius at the Battle of Actium and conquering Egypt, Augustus wanted to prevent rampant wars from erupting again and to demand allegiance from his soldiers. Rome was not facing any strong enemy on its borders, and it was relatively easy for Augustus to demobilize his massive army by allocating land or granting cash to the soldiers. He professionalized and standardized the Roman army within a matter of several years without meeting strong resistance.

In contrast, professional standing armies emerged in China fairly early but took a very long time to become the prevalent system. This transformation took several centuries to complete, and was interrupted in the middle by a universal conscription system that was in active practice for about two centuries. A profound divergence appeared here between the evolutionary paths taken by the early Roman and Sinic states: the Roman state first expanded and consolidated its territories before it evolved into an absolutist Principate, while multiple Sinic states first turned absolutist before they eventually consolidated into a unified empire. Early consolidation of vast territories meant that once civil wars were over, Rome did not have to maintain a universally-conscripted mass army to fight for its own survival and a professional army became the logical choice for Roman military institutions.

Early transformation into absolutist states in China meant that each state had the administrative power to levy a huge number of soldiers and to mobilize enormous resources for fighting heated total wars against each other. As the consolidation of the early Sinic states took place relatively late, the task of building a professional standing army was delayed in China again and again: late Warring states kingdoms would not consider this choice, considering the tremendous military pressures they faced from their peer states; the short-lived Qin empire actively pursued military campaigns on its northern borders against the Huns and marched into the Pearl River Delta to conquer vast areas of territories in southern China; and an enormous amount of manpower was mobilized by the Qin regime into its military system. After the death of Qin emperor Shihuangdi, fierce uprisings broke out against the Qin regime all over the country, which was followed by seven years of civil wars.

31 See supra note 20, at 249.
Even after the Han Empire was established, there existed a high level of tension between the imperial central government and the vassal states in the eastern half of the empire. In the civil war of 154 BC between the imperial government and certain vassal states, the rebelling king of the state of Wu ordered the conscription of all males in his state aged between 14 (which was the age of his junior son) and 62 (which was the age of the king himself) and mobilized an army of over 300,000 men. The quick defeat of the rebellion army within three months at the hand of the smaller number of troops of the central government signified the end of the age of fully-mobilized total wars in classical China.

After domestic territorial consolidation ceased to pose a major threat to the imperial central government, the military recruitment system in China started to converge upon the same trajectory as that of Rome, and some other channels began to play significant roles in military recruitment. Although during much of the Western Han Dynasty the government maintained the universal conscription system, the long pent-up pressure for recruiting soldiers on a professional basis soon started to assert itself, and from emperor Wudi (武帝) onwards the empire heavily utilized troops that were recruited from volunteers. At this stage, the soldiers utilized by the Chinese empire in its military campaigns came from the following channels:

1) Universal conscription

This system was a remnant from the previous total war era, and was kept alive in theory throughout the Western Han Dynasty (202 BC – 8 AD). The general trend during this period, however, was that the proportion of conscripted soldiers declined over time, while volunteers and tribal soldiers became increasingly important sources of military recruitment. Compared with the subjects of the Qin state of the late Warring States era, common peasants of the Han Empire showed much less enthusiasm for participation in military services. Able-bodied commoners who were subject to military service obligations were able to be exempted from a draft after paying a special tribute called “gengfu” (更赋), whose revenues could help the imperial government pay for the services of soldiers who were recruited from other sources.

During much of the golden age of the Roman Empire, military service was voluntary and was generally regarded as an attractive career that provided commoners with prospects for social mobility. During the late empire, however, military service seemed to become much less popular and the empire had to issue legislations to enforce conscription.

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The same practice of tribute payment in lieu of service also was adopted in Rome, albeit at a much later time: after Ostrogoth tribes crossed the Danube in 376 AD into Roman territory and provided ample sources for military services, it became possible for able-bodied men who would otherwise be drafted into the Roman army to avoid such drafts after making a cash payment (adaeratio) to the Roman government.33

(2) Volunteer elite guards

Into the elite troops (called the Northern Army and the Southern Army) that guarded the Han Empire’s capital region, emperor Wudi recruited able-bodied men from farmer families living in the six frontier prefectures to the north and west of the imperial capital region, whose residents had traditionally been known for their valor and hunting skills. These recruits served in the capital region as professional soldiers in imperial guard sections called Yulin (羽林) and Qimen (期门) and, after leaving military services, were able to take important posts in the government. Some of them could be expected to have career paths that were somewhat comparable to those of Praetorian Guards of the Roman Empire.

(3) Volunteer convicts and vagabonds

Among the 25 wars the Western Han emperor launched against the Huns, in at least six wars the Han soldiers were primarily recruited from convicts and volunteers who had been vagabonds or jobless young villains.34

(4) Recruits from domestic tribes

Prior to the issuance of Caracalla’s Edict in 212 AD, soldiers of the Roman legions were recruited from Roman citizens, while soldiers of its auxiliary troops were normally non-citizens (with auxiliary troops often being identified by their tribal or provincial origins) and their soldiers gained citizenship only at the end of their 25 years of service.

In contrast, the early Chinese empire did not create any specific legal terminology to distinguish between (i) its troops whose soldiers were recruited from the subjects under the empire’s household registration system and (ii) the troops who were recruited from tribal entities outside the household registration system.

33 Gabriela Wesch-Klein, Recruits and Veterans, in A Companion to the Roman Army (Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2007), at 437.
34 Lei Haizong (雷海宗), Zhongguo Wenhua Yu Zhongguo de Bing (中国文化与中国的兵) (Yuelu Publishing House, 2010, at 38 – 39.)
Meanwhile, tribe-based troops often fought as separate units and frequently won accolades from the imperial government due to their bravery and military achievements.

(5) Barbarians that migrated into the territories of Han Empire

Inclusion of external barbarian soldiers showed that the sources of the Han Empire’s military recruitment were moving further away from its political center and deeper into its geographical peripherals.

With the passage of time, channel (1) would disappear, channel (2) would remain but play a less significant role, channel (3) would flourish for some time, the next to flourish would be channel (4), which would be followed by channel (5).

I. F: Comparing Rome’s stage R(5) with China’s stage C(5)

Around its foundation, the legionaries of the Roman Empire came primarily from Italian rural background. After that, the legions increasingly recruited from non-Italian citizens of the provinces. It is estimated that during the reign of Augustus, 68% of legionaries were of Italian origin; by the middle of the first century AD, 48% of legionaries were of Italian origin, and by the end of the first century AD, this proportion had fallen to 22%; in the second century AD, only 2% of citizen soldiers were of Italian origin.35

In parallel, when the Han Empire loosened the system of universal conscription from subjects living in Chinese heartland under the household registration system, it began to recruit soldiers from tribes living in remote peripheral regions of the empire.

For example, into the Southern Army that guarded the imperial capital region, emperor Wudi instituted eight different sections, three of which were staffed by soldiers who had been recruited from indigenous Yue (越) tribes from southern China and Hun horsemen that had defected to the empire, i.e. the Yue Calvary Commandant (越騎校尉), Changshui Commandant (长水校尉) and Hunnish Cavalry Commandant (胡骑校尉). Soldiers in these three sections were part of the major elite troops that closely guarded the imperial central government. The role these tribal soldiers played was comparable to those of the Roman guard units Custodes Germanica, which were recruited from Germanic tribes living on Roman frontier territories and participated in the guarding of the emperors of the Julio-Claudian dynasty.36

35 Keith Hopkins, The Political Economy of Roman Empire, in The Dynamics of Ancient Empires (Oxford University Press, 2009), at 194.
36 Suetonius, Vita Divus Augustus, ch.49.
I. G: Comparing Rome’s stage R(6) with China’s stage C(6)

In both empires of this stage, young men of elite political backgrounds seldom regarded military service as an attractive path for upward mobility, and military services increasingly became the tasks of social groups that were socially unprivileged and geographically peripheral.

In the second century, Roman citizens of Italian origin, who had been the traditional source for recruitment of Roman legionaries, increasingly refrained from serving in the Roman legions, and the Roman Empire had to recruit more and more soldiers from Roman citizens living in the provinces and from non-citizen residents (peregrini) in the vast territories of the empire. For many non-citizen soldiers, obtaining Roman citizenship upon retirement from military service (together with receiving a large amount of retirement payment) was one of their key incentives for joining the Roman army.

For example, due to the rampant epidemic that dealt a heavy blow to some of the Roman territories during the reign of emperor Marcus Aurelius, Rome suffered a tremendous loss of population, as a result of which Marcus Aurelius had to recruit into the Roman army not only emancipated slaves but also Germanic tribesmen who had settled in Roman territory.37

After Caracalla’s Decree in 212 AD abolished the legal distinction between Rome’s citizens and non-citizens, Rome recruited its soldiers without regard to citizen status, so long as a recruited man was a free-born non-slave. By this stage, Italians seldom served in the Roman army, which recruited primarily from low-class provincials.

A similar process slowly unfolded also in the Chinese empire. The Eastern Han Dynasty (founded in 25 AD) abolished the outdated universal conscription system and recruited professional soldiers mainly from low-class provincials and remote indigenous tribes. In 30 AD, various categories of local armies that were previously required to be maintained during the Western Han Dynasty were demobilized. Around 110 AD, the imperial government abolished the longstanding practice of an annual military inspection ceremony presided over by the emperor.38 The prevalent opinion among the literati officials during this period was that the empire should exalt civic virtues and restrain military endeavors. Under normal circumstances, the central government of the Eastern Han Dynasty kept a professional army whose size was drastically smaller than those of the previous dynasty.

37 Karl Strobel, Strategy and Army Structure between Septimius Severus and Constantine the Great, in A Companion to the Roman Army (Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2007), at p. 278.
38 Fan Ye (范晔), Houhanshu, Vol. 60, Biography of Ma Rong (《后汉书卷六十•马融传》), Zhonghua Publishing House(中华书局) 2000, at p.1319.
Typical recruits during this period were vagabonds from urban tradesman families, the procedures for selecting recruits were normally lax, and many soldiers so recruited did not receive adequate training.

Slots for military service positions were often filled by auction and sale to the highest bidders.\(^3\) When the imperial treasury met with fiscal difficulty due to incessant natural disasters and epidemics throughout the country, military expenses and provisions for the central armies had to be cut down accordingly, which further aggravated the decline in the quality of the imperial military system. For example, in the fall of 162 AD, the government announced that only half of the regular pay would be made to the many soldiers in the once-elite central armies who had then become too weak to participate in combat and that such soldiers would be denied the provision of winter-time uniforms.\(^4\)

Given the mounting fiscal pressure and the deteriorating quality of soldiers recruited from within the household registration system, it followed naturally that the East Han Empire resorted to massively recruiting soldiers from frontier barbarians that had migrated and settled in the empire’s territory. Such recruitment would not only substantially lessen the fiscal burden of the government and but also enlist soldiers who possessed horsemanship and fighting skills that were not easily available from recruits from Chinese heartlands.

For example, in the military campaign the Han government launched against the northern Huns in 73 AD, the imperial expedition army included 22,000 cavalry soldiers from Qiang tribes, nearly 10,000 soldiers from Southern Hun tribes, and 11,000 cavalry soldiers from the tribes of nomadic Wuhuan and Xianbei peoples.\(^5\) In the empire’s decisive military victory over northern Huns in 89 AD, the troops that played crucial roles were about 30,000 cavalry soldiers from Southern Hun tribes and 8,000 cavalry soldiers from Qiang tribes.\(^6\)

Closely associated with such heavy reliance upon barbarian soldiers was the Eastern Han Empire’s serious deficiency in domestic defense and its inability to recruit enough capable soldiers from its own heartland.

\(^4\) Ibid at p.205.
\(^6\) Ibid at 543.
For example, when the Qiang tribes rebelled against the empire on many occasions in the second century, the empire was totally incapable of staging effective defenses, and its local governors would promptly escape from their fortresses soon after meeting any military defeat. The Qiang tribes’ invasion army penetrated deeply into the western frontiers of the empire and committed much pillaging.

This exposed the inherent weakness of the East Han Empire’s military system and could be regarded as an omen of the barbarian conquest of northern China that would unfold nearly two centuries later.

I. H: Comparing Rome’s stage R(7) with China’s stage C(7)

At this last phase, a substantial portion of the soldiers in both empires were recruited from barbarians who had recently migrated into that empire’s territories, and both empires seemed to have largely “outsourced” their defense tasks to outsiders.

After Caracalla’s Decree declared all free-born subjects in the Roman territory as Roman citizens, a key incentive for non-citizen Romans to join the Roman army (i.e., winning Roman citizenship) was lost. The Late Roman Empire experienced serious difficulty in recruiting soldiers from its normal citizens. Numerous legal rules enacted during this period showed that Roman citizens resorted to various methods (even self-mutilation) to escape military service. The empire had to adopt novel methods to meet the shortage of military recruits.

From the third century onwards, barbarian troops keeping their pre-existing tribal organizations (called “foederati”) were widely incorporated into the Roman army and largely took over the roles previously played by the Roman auxilia. For example, Caracalla formed cavalry troops composed of Scythians and German tribesmen; he added forces of Germanic people from north of Danube (including Gothic tribesmen) to his field army on the Danube and brought them to Asia for campaigns with Parthians; Valerian brought Germanic forces to Asia in 258 AD; and in the Germanic campaigns of Severus Alexander, Parthian mercenaries fought for Rome as heavy armor horsemen. After the Roman army became deeply barbarized, contemporary Roman authors sometimes used the terms barbarus (barbarian) and miles (soldier) as synonymous.


44 See supra note 37, at 279.

45 Vedran Bileta, The last legions: The “barbarization” of military identity in the Late Roman West, Tabula, br. 14 (2016), 22-42
After barbarian soldiers began to revolt against the Roman Empire in the late fourth century, Roman legions had a hard time suppressing such rebellions. After the Roman Empire suffered from a disastrous defeat at the battle of Adrianople, in 382 AD the Roman Empire and the Visigoths entered into a treaty under which the Visigoths were allowed to migrate and settle in Roman territories as an autonomous community while they became obligated to serve in the Roman army in times of war.\textsuperscript{46} However, soon after the death in 395 AD of emperor Theodosius I who had negotiated the treaty, the same Visigoth tribes rebelled, and the only Roman general who could stage effective defense was Flavius Stilico, who was of half Vandal blood. Most of the soldiers that Stilico commanded were of barbarian origin. After Stilico was wrongfully executed in 408 AD, the family members of his barbarian foederati soldiers throughout Italy were murdered by local Romans, and consequently at least 30,000 of Stilico’s barbarian soldiers mutinied and defected to the side of the rebelling Visigoth tribal leader Alaric.\textsuperscript{47} Deprived of the protection by its foederati soldiers, the city of Rome was unable to defend itself, and it fell to the sack of Visigoth invaders in 410 AD. The countdown to the last days of the Western Roman Empire had begun.

Similar events also occurred in China in the late second century, when the “barbarization” of the Chinese empire’s military force proceeded to a new height and was exemplified in the career of the warlord Dong Zhuo (董卓). As a general of the empire, he spent several decades on its western frontier regions, where he recruited tens of thousands of soldiers from the Qiang barbarian tribes and cultivated close relationships with them. On grounds of such rapprochement, he declined the central government’s attempt to dispatch him to commanding posts in other regions.

After civil war broke out in the empire’s heartland, Dong Zhuo launched his barbarian soldiers to invade its capital regions and committed rampant ransacking and pillaging. Cai Wenji (蔡文姬), a contemporary female poet who lived in the Chinese capital, witnessed and personally suffered from such ransacking, later wrote the following lines:

\begin{verbatim}
To the eastern territory Dong Zhuo’s soldiers are marching down,
with metal armors glittering in the sunshine.
Fragile are the folks living on flat plains,
whilst all invading soldiers are barbarians.
Ransacking the countryside and sieging the towns,
They are destroying and killing wherever they advance...
\end{verbatim}

\textsuperscript{46} Tom Stickler, \textit{The Feoderati}, in \textit{A Companion to the Roman Army} (Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2007), at 505.
\textsuperscript{47} See ibid, at 507; see also Zosimus 5.35.5f.
\textsuperscript{48} Fan Ye (范晔), \textit{Houhanshu}, \textit{Vol. 84}, \textit{Biographies of Ladies} (《后汉书卷八十四•列女传》), Zhonghua Publishing House (中华书局) 2000, at 1892.
If the barbarized troops commanded by Dong Zhuo could be deemed a tool for the barbarian tribes’ invasion into Sinic heartland, then the vandalization committed by his army in the Chinese empire’s capital regions in 190 – 191 AD was comparable to the barbarian sack of the city of Rome in the fifth century. When we extrapolate the above barbarian invasions that were going on in China, we could even infer that the Chinese empire would soon experience the same type of barbarian conquest that the Western Roman Empire experienced in the fifth century. It was largely thanks to the efforts of various Chinese princes that rose to power around 200 AD that the country was saved from the fate of imminent conquest. Just as the Roman Tetrarchy performed fairly well in protecting the Roman border against barbarian invasions, when the Chinese princes established the Three Kingdoms of Wei (魏), Shu (蜀) and Wu (吴) that succeeded the Han Empire, they each took a series of military and political measures aiming at pacifying the barbarian tribes that were previously encroaching upon the territories of the Chinese empire. Unlike the inertia and ineptitude shown by the late Han Empire in dealing with border crises, a much higher level of vigor seemed to be released in each of the three kingdoms in tactically handling the challenges posed by the internal and external barbarians.

For example, after defeating Hun forces in major battles, Cao Cao (曹操), founder of the kingdom of Wei, induced numerous Hunnish tribesmen to migrate into Chinese territory proper, put them under the supervision of Chinese governors but largely retained the autonomy of Hunnish tribes. He also recruited numerous soldiers from the barbarian tribes of Wuhuan and used them for defending his kingdom’s northeastern territory against potential invaders from further north.

It was through a combination of peculiar geopolitical situations and political capabilities that the Chinese empire escaped the fate of barbarian conquest in the early third century and obtained a limited lease of life.

However, it was unable to solve the inherent structural issues that nearly overwhelmed the late East Han Empire: dwindling military effectiveness of the central government, sub-standard qualities of military recruits, combined with large waves of barbarians migrating into the empire’s borders, eager to join the Chinese army or seeking other opportunities. When the same crises emerged again in the early fourth century due to a new wave of barbarian invasion, the rulers of the Jin dynasty would not be as lucky as its predecessors. Soldiers of barbarian origins who served in the imperial army were widely involved in the civil war fought among the eight contending princes in the early fourth century, and in this process they increased their political influence in northern China. Led by a tribal leader named Liu Yuan who previously served as an officer of the imperial army but subsequently mutinied, Hun barbarians marched into the capital city of Jin in 317 AD and ended its rule in north China. This scene would be a rehearsal of what would unfold in the Western Roman Empire in the next century.
In both empires, when the key sources for recruiting soldiers had moved from the empire’s “internal” barbarians to the “external” barbarians who had recently migrated into the empire’s peripheral regions and had barely assimilated into the empire’s mainstream cultural traditions, the life of the aging empire entered its final stage.

**Part II: Case Studies in Indigenous Tribesmen’s Military Service Obligations in Early China and Rome**

**II. A: Two Tribes Exempted from Military Services**

As we can see above, both Rome at stages R(1) - R(3) and early Sinic states at stages C(1) - C(4) relied on their own citizens and subjects as principal sources for recruiting soldiers. Soldiers of the early Roman Republic were recruited from Roman citizens who had met certain property requirements and from allied polities (socii) in Italy that had treaty-based obligations to send troops to fight together with Rome. The key obligation of the subjects in the newly-conquered provinces was to pay requisite types of taxes or tributes.

At comparable stages in China were indigenous tribes which under the control of an early Sinic polity were often given legal exemption from military services.

The discussion in this section will focus on the military service obligations of two indigenous tribes who resided near the Three Gorges region in the middle range of the Yangtze River Valley.

Although this region is located not far from the Sinic heartland of the Central Plains, during the early Sinic dynasties it was home to various barbarian ethnic groups which had kept distinct cultural traits of their own and maintained their own tribal organizations. For example, for many centuries an ancient polity called Ba (巴) resided in the mountainous regions to both sides of the Three Gorges. After the Ba people were conquered in 316 BC, the victorious ruler of the state of Qin kept intact the pre-existing tribal organization of this region; one branch of the Ba people migrated several hundred miles east to Hubei province, and one branch migrated west to Jialing (嘉陵江) Valley and was called Banshun Barbarians (板楯蛮) or Cong (賨) people.

During the Warring States period, although the territory of Banshun tribesmen was put under the control of the Qin kingdom, which was engaged in continuous warfare, Qin rulers did not impose any military service obligations on the members of this tribe. According to ancient historical records, in the early third century BC, in the vast mountainous regions near the homeland of Banshun tribes, a white tiger was reputed to be dangerous and killed or wounded a huge number of humans.
The king of Qin made a public offer that anyone who could kill the tiger would be rewarded with an extremely valuable grant of vassal subjects and money. In response to the offer, a brave man of the Banshun tribe shot dead the white tiger with a strong bow.

However, the initial promise of reward posted by the king was intended for rewarding a regular Qin subject within the Qin’s household registration system and did not contemplate the possibility that the winner would be a tribesman. In order to deliver some reward at all, the king entered with the Banshun tribes into a treaty stipulating, among others: (i) any land owned by Banshun tribesmen should be exempted from tax or tribute, and (ii) a Banshun household should be free from any tax-related governmental survey regardless of however big its size was. The treaty was observed by both parties throughout the period thereafter when the region was ruled by the Qin regime.49

The treaty did not make any requirement on the tribesmen’s obligation for military service and essentially granted them exemption in this respect. As the Qin regime conscripted soldiers from those subjects that were registered in its 20-level official ranking system, it did not enlist Banshun tribesmen who were outside this system.

After the founding of the Han Empire, the new government exempted Banshun’s seven clans from military service obligations, and each household of Banshun commoners was required to only pay 40 cashes of “cong” 帛 tribute in respect of each subject each year.50 This was a quite light burden, given that during most of Han Dynasty, each normal adult subject was required to pay a poll tax of 120 cashes each year.

A similar example was the Ba Barbarians whose homeland was close to Banshun tribes. After conquering the Ba region in 316 BC, the kingdom of Qin retained the pre-existing tribal organizations of Ba Barbarians and set forth preferential policies under which (i) each of their tribal chieftains should pay to the Qin state a tribute of 2,016 cashes each year and an extra tribute of 1,800 cashes every 3 years; and (ii) each common tribesman should each year contribute to the Qin state cloth of about 19 meters long and 30 feathered arrows.51 In return, each Ba tribesman would receive the official ranking of “bugeng” 不更, which was a rather generous grant, given that “bugeng” was the fourth rank from the bottom in Qin’s ranking system and that a normal Qin subject (under the household registration system) had to make substantial military achievements at war in order to win this ranking. What was more important, the grant of this title would exempt Ba tribesmen from the obligation of serving in the Qin’s military forces.

50 Ibid.
51 Ibid, at 1919.
After the founding of the Han Empire, at the request of the local governor, the above pre-existing exemption was officially retained by the new government. Therefore, the death penalty imposed a few years later upon an adult male of another tribe in the same region seemed to be rather controversial.

II. B: Death Penalty Case Relating to Conscription of a Tribesman

The appellate cases that were recorded in bamboo slips and excavated in Zhangjiashan (张家山) in 1983 provided a good snapshot of the judicial cases being handled by the central government of Han Empire during its very first years. Among them, the following case raised the issue of military service obligation for tribesmen outside the empire’s household registration system.

In 196 BC, a defendant named Wuyou (毋优) was arrested and indicted by the local government on the following grounds: he was conscripted by the local government for military service at a certain military camp, for which an official order had been issued, but Wuyou deserted on route and escaped before he arrived at the destination camp to which he had been dispatched. Wuyou defended himself on the legal ground that as he was an adult male of a barbarian tribe, he should be exempted from military service obligation after paying a tribute of 56 cashes to the local government each year, and therefore there was no ground for him to be conscripted.

The magistrate hearing this case stated to the defendant:

“The law stipulates that barbarian adult men can be exempted from corvee-based military services and tax obligations after paying certain amount of tribute money every year. But it does not state that they are exempted from garrison-based military services. Even if the law does stipulate that they are exempted from garrison-based military service after paying the tribute, you became a soldier anyway after you were conscripted. What is your explanation for your absconding without authorization?”

The defendant replied to the magistrate:

"I belong to a barbarian tribe whose members, after paying a special category of tribute in lieu of services each year, are exempted from corvee, taxes and military services. Please consider this and I can explain no more."

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52 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
There were different opinions among the local magistrates who heard the case. Some opined that the defendant was guilty and should be executed, while others opined that he was innocent. Therefore, this case was submitted to the Court Commandant of the imperial central government to seek final judgment. The final judgment issued by the Court Commandant was that the defendant was guilty and shall be executed.\textsuperscript{56}

There was an element of surprise in the final judgment issued by the central government, given that the local magistrate did acknowledge that according to the Han Empire’s \textit{Law on Barbarians}, after paying a special type of tribute (which was only a fraction of the prevalent tax burden for regular subjects of the empire), barbarian adult men could be exempted from taxes and \textit{corvee}-based military services (i.e.徭). At the level of legal technique, it was difficult for us to give a conclusive opinion on whether the final judgment was totally fair for the defendant, since we do not have on hand the texts of the effective laws or statutes that governed this case, said the court. It was possible that one factor might have contributed to the Commandant of Court’s decision: the above-mentioned law might have only exempted barbarian tribesmen from \textit{corvee}-based military services (i.e.徭), without exempting them from \textit{garrison}-based military services (屯), and the unlucky defendant did not have enough legal knowledge to distinguish the niceties of these concepts and their applications.

Meanwhile, in examining this case we need to take into consideration a deep undercurrent that foreboded a shift in the Chinese empire’s policy in the direction of conscription/recruitment of tribal members into the imperial army.

After its re-unification of the country, while the Han Empire was in need of high-quality military recruits, it had to consider a new set of social factors that were unfavorable for recruiting soldiers from regular domestic subjects under the household registration system. In this newly established empire, a huge number of domestic subjects had been exempted from military services. According to the rules set forth by the first emperor Liu Bang, numerous categories of individual subjects did not have to serve military duties.\textsuperscript{57}

\textsuperscript{56} \textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{57} These categories include, among others:
- the dozens of thousands of soldiers who had followed emperor Liu Bang in his battle against the Huns in the winter of 200 BC;
- grassroots bureaucrats in charge of moral education;
- subjects who had received official honors for filial piety or diligent farming;
- disciples of officially-appointed Confucian scholars, and experts in Confucian classics; and
- subjects whose body height did not reach the minimum requisite for military service

See Guo Jian (郭建), \textit{Jin Ge Tie Ma} (金戈铁马) (Changchun Publishing House, 2008), at 10 – 11.
All family members of certain categories were exempted from military service duties as well.58

Due to such a broad scope of exemptions, a substantial portion of the empire’s population (together with their family members) did not have to perform military services. As each of the above-listed categories covered a huge number of subjects, the total number of the subjects required to perform military services was hugely curtailed, and military duties were expected to be shouldered primarily by peasants of middling or lower social status who were inside the empire’s household registration system. However, unlike the preceding Warring States and civil war periods when military feats provided numerous soldiers of humble origins with opportunities for generous rewards and for quick elevation in political status, such shortcuts to social mobility hardly existed in the new empire which had largely pacified its domestic territories. In a changed society where social mobility could be realized from other channels (e.g. expertise in Confucian classics, or training as governmental clerks), military service no longer looked like a highly attractive career, as it once had, for aspiring men within the household registration system. It would be desirable for the empire to find new alternative sources for military recruitment, and enlisting soldiers from tribesmen outside the household registration system emerged as a logical choice.

The big-picture background to this death penalty case was that the Chinese empire had just started to feel the need for recruiting soldiers from barbarian tribes to meet its military needs.

58 These categories include, among others:

- Relatives of the royal family;
- offspring of high-ranking officials who had played crucial roles in establishing the Han empire;
- officers who were above the 9th rank from the bottom in the empire’s 20-level ranking system;
- subjects of the home towns of the empire’s founding emperor;
- prefectural governor-level officials who had loyally followed Liu Bang to central Sichuan region in 206 BC;
- households which herded horses for the government;
- households which were ordered to migrate from the Sinic heartland to settle in the frontier regions;
- descendants of subjects who were above 90 years of age;
- subjects who had donated horses, chariots, slaves or substantial amounts of grain to the government;
- subjects who had purchased senior official ranking status from the government;
- subjects which were in the customary mourning period after bereavement of senior family members.

For policy statements relating to some of the above exemptions, see Ban Gu (班固), Hanshu, Gaodi Annals, Vol. 1 (《汉书•高帝纪第一下》), Zhonghua Publishing House (中华书局) 2000, at 40. See also Guo Jian (郭建), Jin Ge Tie Ma (金戈铁马) (Changchun Publishing House, 2008), at 11.
After Rome entered its stage R(4) and the Sinic state entered its stage C(5), each empire often enlisted soldiers from its provincial and tribal regions. The military systems of both empires each underwent a transition into a professional standing army, and both empires regarded tribal members as good materials for military professionals while the mainstream members of both empires had lost their previous zeal for military services.

It was under the above new social circumstances that the senior judicial officials deliberated upon this defendant’s case, and they came up with a final judgment that would not have been made in the previous era. This was an early sign of a looming future trend for recruiting soldiers from tribal entities, and such trend gradually gained momentum during the following decades. Unfortunately, the defendant in this case had only had a narrow literal understanding of the pre-existing legal rule and was unable to foresee a subtle policy shift to which he would fall victim.

The logic that drove the judicial judgment in Wuyou’s case reasserted itself in the drastic shift in military recruitment policy that would unfold in the mid- and late 2nd century BC.

As the Chinese empire’s war efforts against the Huns intensified, more and more common subjects secured exemptions from military services by either paying special tributes or purchasing official rankings higher than the 9th rank, and increasingly fewer subjects were available for military drafts.59 With the deterioration in the enforcement of the universal conscription system, an acute question arose: from where should the empire recruit numerous high-quality soldiers for its external wars? The answer was provided in a memorial submitted by Chao Cuo (晁错), a senior policy adviser in the imperial central government, to emperor Wendi (reigning during 180 BC – 157 BC):

Barbarians such as Yiqu (义渠) people have now defected to our empire to become naturalized, and their tribes amount to thousands of people. Their diet and skills were the same as those of the Huns. It will be desirable to grant to them hard armor, padded clothes, strong bows and sharp arrows, together with good horses from our frontier prefectures. Through Your Majesty’s clear rules, they will be commanded by wise generals who know their customs and build rapport with their minds. Situations of dangers and barriers will be handled by these barbarians, and situations on passages on flat plains will be handled by our […] domestically-recruited troops.

These two armies will cooperate on external and internal sides, each will apply their own superior skills and will impose their forces collectively in a balanced manner, which will make an ideal strategy.\textsuperscript{60}

Judging from the defense policies that the Chinese empire pursued afterwards, we find that Chao Cuo’s advice was adopted and implemented on a massive scale during the following centuries. The adoption of such policy resulted from the working of multiple factors, including: (i) the empire’s acute need for high-quality soldiers in face of growing menace from nomadic invaders from the steppes, (ii) military actions against such nomadic invaders required a new set of skills that often were not possessed by sedentary peasants who lived in the Chinese heartland under the household registration system, (iii) the Han Empire did not have much incentive to nurture and promote a militaristic culture among its own domestic subjects, (iv) military services ceased to be a highly attractive avenue for social mobility for commoners, and (v) it would be more cost-efficient for the imperial government to enlist tribesman shock troops than to maintain and pay for a large standing army recruited from domestic peasants.

These factors would continue to be at work in the classical Chinese empire until the end of its era in the early fourth century.

II. C: Tribal Insurgences Arising From Military Service Obligations at Stage C(6)

From stage R(5) onwards, the Roman Empire recruited into its supporting troops (\textit{auxilia}) large numbers of non-citizen subjects (\textit{peregrini}) who lived in its outer provinces.

Similarly, at stage C(6), the East Han Empire relied heavily upon the fighting power of barbarian or tribal soldiers in putting down domestic rebellions and defending against external invasion. The experience of Banshun tribe was a good case in point.

With the founding of the Eastern Han Dynasty in 25 AD came the final abolition of the universal conscription system, the full establishment of a professional standing army, and increasing use of military recruits from tribal entities. It naturally followed that at this stage there arose a major demand for soldiers recruited from the Banshun tribesmen, who had gained good reputation as valiant warriors. The superior military qualities of Banshun soldiers were tested and acknowledged in a series of minor wars that broke out between the Han regime and its external invaders:

\textsuperscript{60} Ban Gu (班固). \textit{Hanshu}, Vol. 49, Biography of Chao Cuo (《汉书卷四十九•晁错传》), Zhonghua Publishing House(中华书局) 2000, at 1751.
During the years 107 –113 AD, Qiang barbarian tribes invaded deep into the Han River Valley in central China and pillaged numerous cities. Han troops recruited from Banshun tribes defeated them and annihilated most of the invaders, who felt so awed with Banshun soldiers’ military power and started to call them “divine soldiers”. Due to their fear of the Banshun’s warring power, the defeated Qiang tribes warned their fellow tribesmen not to invade southward again in the direction of Banshun regions.61

In 148 BC, when some Qiang tribes launched another major invasion of Han territories, it was the troops recruited from Banshun barbarians who defeated invaders in a series of battles and protected the Han Empire again.62

In 164 AD, when the barbarians living in Wuling (武陵) Prefecture to the south launched a rebellion, the task of suppressing the rebellion was delegated by the imperial government to General Feng Gun (冯绲), who grew up in the region neighboring Banshun barbarians.

General Feng enlisted from his home region many Banshun soldiers, who, together with the elite troops recruited from another group of barbarians from southeastern China, played instrumental roles in defeating the rebels.63

However, in 179 AD, the Banshun tribes themselves began to rebel against Han government. After Han troops fought the Banshun rebels for several years to no avail, the emperor solicited opinions from a wide range of officials on how to tackle this rebellion. Cheng Bao (程包), a local official whose jurisdiction was near the Banshun homeland, submitted to the emperor a memorandum stating, inter alia:

Although Banshun tribesmen used to be effectively loyal and had no intention to rebel, the magistrates and petty officials governing their counties and villages levied on them excessive tributes in lieu of corvee and military services. The compulsory burdens imposed upon them have been worse than those for serfs, and the floggings they received were heavier than those for prisoners of war. Consequently, some barbarians had to sell away their wives and children, and some even committed suicide. Although they complained to the prefectural officials about their grievances, the prefectural magistrates refused to accept or hear their cases. The emperor was so too far away to hear their complaints. They beat their bosoms in distant valleys with grudge, calling out for Providence. They are saddened by corvee levies and harassed by harsh punishments.

62 Ibid.
63 Ibid.
Therefore, these barbarians gathered in their towns and villages, resulting in a rebellion. Those who have masterminded the event neither harbor sophisticated stratagem nor try to pretend to the throne of the emperor. Now as long as wise governors are dispatched to their region, they will naturally stabilize and there will be no need to send troops to attack them.\textsuperscript{64}

Following Cheng Bao’s counsel, the emperor sent an emissary who announced a declaration of pardon to all the Banshun tribal rebels, and the rebellion quickly subsided.

Heavy use of tribal or barbarian soldiers proved to be a double-edge sword: it could effectively meet a classical empire’s military needs but could also stir up domestic insurgences. Such insurrections could pose serious security threats to the empire because these tribal entities, as vital sources of military recruits, had already possessed military skills that could be as good as other units of the empire’s military forces. However, such clashes with the tribal entities were difficult to avoid, when an empire’s administrative machine took on signs of ineptitude at its declining stage and failed to notice that the tribal entities should be treated in different manners from the purely domestic regions.

Generally speaking, the tribal entities tended to be more sensitive in maintaining their communal pride and were at least one step slower than an empire’s domestic subjects in acquiescing to the more centralized governance methods used by a classical empire.

Due to backgrounds that were comparable to the causes for the Banshun uprising, a number of barbarian rebellions arose in the Roman Empire. For example, \textit{Bellum Batonianum} or the Pannonian Revolt took place in 6 – 9 AD in the western Balkans, and it was caused by Rome’s excessive levy of taxes and forced draft of soldiers for its war efforts in Germania. The tribal leader of this revolt claimed that the revolt was caused by the Roman rulers: they were wolves who ravaged their subject peoples, not shepherds who cared for them.\textsuperscript{65} A more fundamental reason for this revolt was that by this stage many Italians had lost zeal in military service and Rome had no choice but to resort to forced levies of soldiers from its newly-acquired provincial territories.

Another comparable incident was the Batavian Revolt that took place during 69 – 70 AD in the Roman province of \textit{Germania Inferior} (in today’s southern Netherlands). Batavians of this period were reputed to be good horsemen, boatmen and swimmers and were heavily recruited into Roman auxiliary troops in return for the tribe’s exemption from Roman tax otherwise applicable to \textit{peregrini}.

\textsuperscript{64} \textit{Ibid}, at 1920 – 1921.

\textsuperscript{65} Dio 56.16.3
With a population of only 35,000, normally about 5,000 Batavians were in active service in the Roman army during this period, which means Batavians bore a very disproportionately heavy burden of military service on a per capita basis. The triggering points of this revolt were the harsh treatment that the Batavian commander Gaius Julius Civilis received from the Roman judicial system and the chaotic situation of the Roman civil war at the end of the Julio-Claudian Dynasty. Its real cause was very similar to that of the Pannonian Revolt, according to Tacitus:

The young Batavians were being conscripted, which was a heavy enough burden on its own, but it was exacerbated by the greed and depravity of the recruiting officers, who called up the old and unfit in order to exact a bribe for their release, while young, good-looking lads – for children are normally quite tall among the Batavians - were dragged off [to gratify the lust of the recruiting officers]. This caused bitter resentment, and the ringleaders of the revolt assembled and got their countrymen to refuse service.  

Despite the initial progress made in the uprising, the Batavian Revolt was eventually suppressed, as a result of which the Batavian were still required to send recruits to eight auxiliary units of Rome. This Roman decision after the revolt showed that by this time it had become impossible for the empire to get away from its heavy dependence upon military recruits from the non-citizens (peregrini).

The situation was quite similar to the Eastern Han Empire, which, despite the revolts by the barbarian tribes against the heavy levies of the imperial government, stuck with a vengeance to its dependence on the barbarian tribes as a vital source of military recruits, until one such source of recruits – Qiang tribesmen on the western frontier – disastrously ransacked the Chinese capital regions under the command of Generalissimo Dong Zhuo.

Part III: Commonality of Convergent Evolution in Policies for Recruiting Barbarian Soldiers

We need to seriously consider the histories of ancient empires from the perspective of evolutionary theory, not as a metaphor for progressive social metamorphosis, but as a pertinent methodology for describing the diversity of social phenomena resulting from a series of unpredictable, highly diverse, many-branched pathways of change and developments. Putting on evolutionary spectacles could open us to brand-new perspectives when examining ancient societal changes that unfolded in different continents over very long time spans.

67 The Dynamics of Ancient Empires (Oxford University Press, 2009), at 26.
In particular, the similar evolutions in ancient Chinese and Roman military recruitment systems (including their gradual shifts towards recruitment of non-subject barbarians) bore resemblance to the biological phenomenon of “convergent evolution”, i.e. mutually-independent development of similar features or functions by species from different lineages (often in different geographical regions).68

Convergent phenomena in societal evolution tend to display themselves on an abstract level and can be more easily discernible when the observer steps back to make a wider observation of the totality of the evolving patterns. A Roman-style pathway in military recruitment was trodden more than once in ancient history. Through the facts as described in this paper, we can discover parallel evolution in Roman and early Chinese empires regarding the relationship between each state and its military recruitment system. In the life-cycle of each empire:

- A citizen/aristocratic militia helped to establish its paternal predecessor state
- A broadly-recruited mass army acted as the mid-wife at its birth
- A professional standing army helped to expand its youthful stature to its most robust shape
- Troops recruited from domestic barbarian tribes served as health-improving supplements for its middle age
- Troops recruited from external barbarian tribes served first as its life-sustaining medicine on deathbed, and then as its gravedigger.

After examining the above overall patterns of evolution, we could discover two other common features in the two empires: (i) over many centuries, the standing of the military recruits gradually changed from the society’s politically-franchised classes to its politically-disfranchised domestic subjects, and then onto its politically-remote frontier subjects; and (ii) the geographical origins of the military recruits gradually changed from the national’s central regions to its external peripherals.

Such convergent evolutions were rooted in similar social forces at work in both empires. At each turning point in the above evolutionary path, the policy makers of both empires seemed to be acting on a rational basis when they revised the empire’s pre-existing military recruitment policy. For example, in each empire, the recruiting of massive amounts of barbarian soldiers was prompted by the following similar changes in its social circumstances:

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68 For the basic paradigm of convergent evolution, see George McGhee, *Convergent Evolution: Limited Forms Most Beautiful*, at 2-3 (the MIT Press, 2011).
(1) As each empire’s frontiers expanded, its soldiers had to endure greater hardships on their expeditions (caused by more hostile natural environment of the locations of services and greater distances between the battlegrounds and the homelands), and were faced with increasingly less opportunities for winning booty and/or materialistic privileges from military services.

(2) As external conquest/annexation of territories became less important in imperial politics, a military career no longer provided the empire’s normal subjects with an attractive route for social advancement.

(3) At the superstructure level, it became more and more cost-inefficient to maintain hundreds of thousands of domestically-recruited soldiers who demanded regular pay and provisions and whose services constituted major disruptions to the empire’s labor-intensive agriculture-based economy.

(4) Troops recruited from barbarian tribesmen tended to possess superior military skills, and the maintenance of such troops put smaller fiscal strain on the empire’s dwindling treasury.

In hindsight, we notice that after the territorial size of a colossal classical empire reached a critical stage, a negative feedback loop would emerge between its territorial expansion and its domestic recruitment of soldiers, and wide use of tribal and barbarian soldiers would be adopted as a logical and convenient solution to break such a negative feedback loop. While such policy of massive recruitment of barbarian tribal members into the imperial military systems served short-term interests well, in the long run it would unconsciously help to dig the graves of the two senile empires on both ends of the Eurasian continent.

Apart from the phenomenon that the patterns of the evolutionary trends in military recruitment policies of both empires were very similar to each other, the timing of the comparable evolutionary patterns in both empires should be examined.

Although the military recruitment system largely evolved in the two empires along the same trajectory and at roughly the same speed, there consistently existed a time lag between their comparable military recruitment practices, and the Chinese evolutionary phases seemed to precede the counterpart’s evolutions in Rome by a period of two to three centuries. For example, the recruitment of standing armies started in China in the late fifth century BC, and the same development began in Rome near the end of the second century BC (i.e. the Marian reforms). Barbarian tribal soldiers became the backbone of the imperial military system in China by the late first century AD, and the same development took place in Rome in the fourth century AD. Barbarian soldiers ransacked the capital regions of the Chinese empire at the end of the second century and again in the early fourth century AD, and the same incidents occurred to the city of Rome in the fifth century AD.
Conclusion

Generally speaking, these two classical empires of Rome and early China, situated on the two ends of the Eurasian continent, having populations of similar numbers and occupying land areas of similar sizes, seemed to evolve in similar directions in various institutional aspects over many centuries. The military recruitment policies (including its application to barbarian or tribal soldiers) can be regarded as a typical example of the two empires’ convergent evolution in numerous institutional aspects.

Despite differences between their institutions at the technical level, striking similarities in their evolutionary trajectories existed at many junctures. There existed an element of symmetry between the evolutionary paths of these two empires. Why such a symmetrical pattern existed at all in the evolutions of the institutions of ancient Roman and Chinese empires could be studied in future research.
Crusading as Philosophical Construct: Thoughts and Actions of Pope Urban II, St. Bernard, and Peter the Venerable

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Abstract

The First Crusade was a penitential Holy War to aid the Byzantine Empire and to liberate Jerusalem from the perceived threat of Muslim occupation. The Second Crusade was also a penitential war, but this time it was to support the territory reclaimed by the First Crusade. Many scholars believe that these were the only relevant goals of these crusades. My focus in this paper is to contextualize the many possible goals for the early crusades, and to understand the necessary and complex rationalization of ecclesiastical leadership. This research is intended to contribute to the development of a more nuanced understanding of the crusades, which in turn may support more productive ways to understand the continuing conflict between Western Civilization and Islam.

Introduction

The crusades have been one of the most enduring events of world history in the eyes of the public, as well as in the halls of academia. The romance of the concept of crusading; heading off to unknown hardship and violence on a mission from God, which will secure redemption and an eternity in heaven, and perhaps more importantly avoid an eternity of agony in hell, is unavoidably powerful. The actions of the crusades laid the foundation for a philosophy of colonization and civilizational misunderstanding that swept the world for centuries. Christopher Tyerman makes the point that “The European dash for empire happily recruited the crusades as exemplars…crusading became reconciled with prevailing politico-historical fashions.”

After the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States, then president George W. Bush recklessly remarked that “you’re either with us or against us in the fight against terror.”

When Bush “vowed to ‘rid the world of evil-doers,’ cautioning that ‘this crusade, this war on terrorism, is going to take a while,’” he did the terrorists a great favor by giving their leadership the perfect platform upon which to validate their movements.3

Unfortunately, the meaning of the word “crusade” is largely misunderstood. As a word associated with the military actions directed by the church, it was not even in existence until nearly one hundred years after the First Crusade. For the Muslim world, the delay was even longer: “It was not until the mid-nineteenth century that the terms harb al-salib (the war of the cross) and al-salibiyyun (crusaders) entered the Arabic lexicon.”4 Akil Awan explains that this occurred as a result of the expansionist, colonialist, undertakings of Europeans who were again conflicting with the Turks.5

There are no church records that report the speeches of the Council of Clermont where Pope Urban II called for the First Crusade. Surprisingly, there are also no official records of his travels during the several months before and after the Clermont meeting, although it is possible to reconstruct some of the details through his letters, limited as they are. Lean Ni Chleirigh writes, “Only three letters of the Pope exist linked to the Crusade.”6 James Brundage points out that, “we have no record of Urban’s thoughts during the spring and summer of 1095.”7 For Bernard of Clairvaux and Peter the Venerable, the challenge of a lack of primary documents is less of an issue. There is a papal bull detailing the call for the Second Crusade.

It is my hope that this research will, in some small way, contribute to the ongoing effort to build understanding of the origins of the continuing conflict between Western Civilization and Islam, and in doing so, support the comprehensive endeavours of the interdisciplinary academic community to ultimately promote positive progress toward a more peaceful and productive global community that will benefit from an enhanced appreciation for and respect of cultural differences.

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4 Awan, p.6.
5 Awan, p.6.
Defining Crusade

When defining crusading as an institution, it is usual to begin with several assumptions, although there are likely to be exceptions that should be noted. For our purposes, the crusades will be actions that officially began with Urban II and the First Crusade in 1095.

There were crusades earlier than this, but St. Bernard and Peter the Venerable had important differences of opinion about what the crusades should be trying to achieve, and how. Historian Paul Chevedden writes that “Modern theories of the Crusades take their bearing from the Jerusalem Crusade launched by Pope Urban II in 1095.”

This assumption provides the context for his definition of crusading: “leaders and organizers of the Crusades were popes, and the institutions of the indulgence, the vow, the Cross, and Crusader privileges were all in place.”

But what did those who participated in the Crusades believe at the time? Again we can cite Chevedden who argues that, “The wars were not the product of discrete individuals preoccupied with saving their individual souls but of an entire society coming together in the latter half of the eleventh century to fulfill a common purpose: liberating Christian people and lands from Islamic domination.”

Jonathan Riley-Smith disagrees and argues that “the crusades were an individual thing, secondarily about service in arms to God or benefitting the church or Christianity. It was about self-sanctification.” Chevedden feels that Riley-Smith’s stance as a Crusade Creationist enabled him to “view[s] the content of crusading analytically, as something that exists independently and can be considered on its own without a context.”

Using this argument the Crusade Creationist “ensures that there is no historical continuity between the situation at the time immediately preceding 1095 and the situation following it; in an instant, crusading appears in an already advanced state.” These theorists “believe that Crusades were governed by a single set of common characteristics attributable to Urban...Some scholars list five core characteristics—usually comprising papal authorization, indulgence, vow, Cross, and Crusader privileges—while others allow for fewer.”

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9 Chevedden, The View, p. 262.
11 Ibid, p. 25.
12 Ibid, p. 29.
13 Ibid, p.3.
14 Ibid, p. 5.
Carl Erdmann and John Gilchrest argue that crusading had been around well before 1095, and that it was mostly focused on the war against heretics.¹⁵

Chevedden further explains Erdmann’s argument that “the root cause of the Crusades is the historical appearance of the unification of holy war with pilgrimage, something that Urban first brought about; the failure of the Crusade enterprise to emerge at an earlier date...is due to the absence of the unification of holy war with pilgrimage.”¹⁶

One of the more challenging aspects of crusading was the justification of military force to be wielded on behalf of the cause of Christianity. Clearly this presented a moral dilemma for church leaders, but Malcom Barber writes in the introduction of Bernard of Clairvaux’s *In Praise of the New Knighthood*, that, “[Pope] Gregory, above all, was responsible for the creation of the idea of the *milites Christi* who could fight material battles on behalf of a holy cause.”¹⁷ This argument supports those who would suggest that crusading extended back before Urban, at least in its planning stages.

### Unification of Holy War and Pilgrimage

A lively area of debate in crusade scholarship is whether or not they were pilgrimages. Lean Ni Chleirigh argues that the evidence for crusades sharing characteristics with pilgrimages does not exist until the late twelfth century.¹⁸ She goes on to explain that it is a result of the crusade chronicles, many of which use the term *peregrini* for the crusaders, that the idea that those who travelled to the Holy Land to liberate the eastern Christians, and Jerusalem, were militarized pilgrims has become a common notion.¹⁹ Erdmann disagrees, saying that “the root cause of the Crusades is the historical appearance of the unification of holy war with pilgrimage, something that Urban first brought about.”²⁰ A clear example of how the pilgrimage idea was present in the Second Crusade was when King Louis, upon arrival in Jerusalem, stopped all progress for his expedition in order to worship at the holy shrines. Only after praying did he take steps to plan the deployment of his military forces.²¹

### Historical Context

What were Urban II’s goals for the First Crusade, and the reactions of St. Bernard and Peter the Venerable to Urban’s strategy and implementation?

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¹⁸ Chleirigh, p.64.
¹⁹ Ibid, p. 73.
²⁰ Ibid, p. 64.
²¹ Brundage, p. 115.
Christopher Tyerman writes of the papacy: “The oldest institution in western Europe in the eleventh century, self-consciously tracing an uninterrupted history back a thousand years…the absence of effective imperial power in Italy had propelled the papacy into a position of temporal authority over the city of Rome and, in theory at least, parts of the central peninsula.”

Based on this analysis of the historical context of Urban’s papacy, the papacy itself had to be an astute participant in the politics of Europe to the greatest extent possible to ensure the survival of the church.

**Europe After the Fall of Rome**

Christianity was well established throughout the Roman Empire by the time of its demise in the west in 476 C.E., and the Church was able to maintain jurisdiction over the administration of spiritual leadership in Europe during the centuries that would pass until the development of strong governments with centralized secular leadership. Roman support of Christianity was not without a cost. The foundational philosophies of the teachings of the Gospels are fundamentally different from those of the Roman Empire. Tyerman writes that the papacy was the oldest institution in western Europe in the eleventh century and was “propelled into a position of temporal authority over the city of Rome and, in theory at least, parts of the central peninsula.” Howe explains that “Western leaders attempting to rebuild Europe were systematically incorporating Roman elements into their material, legal, and spiritual culture.”

The Roman notion of a ‘just war,’ a military action that could be legally permissible, was included in the writings of early Christian leaders such as St. Augustine.

**Proto-Europe**

The most significant historical figure in Europe after the fall of the western Roman Empire and involved in the advent of the crusades was Charles the Great of France. Charlemagne was “crowned the new Roman emperor in the west, inaugurating the Holy Roman Empire, which survived until 1806 when abolished by Napoleon.” Charlemagne promised to provide the military might needed for the papacy to assert authority. Unfortunately, shortly after Charlemagne’s death the political power of the Holy Roman Empire was depleted. It was not until 962 that King Otto of Germany resumed the role of Holy Roman Emperor, once again providing a military apparatus to support the popes. In spite of the commitments of the kings of proto-Europe, most kings actually held very little power. Matthew Innes writes, “local church leadership would typically be princes who would not stand to inherit the family fortune.

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23 Tyerman, God, p.4.
25 Tyerman, God, p.5.
26 Ibid, p. 5.
They [churches and monasteries] were institutions embedded in the localities with which both local and central leaders brokered relationships in the pursuit of political power.”27

By the tenth century, reform movements were well underway on the continent and would follow soon after in England. “Scholars have marveled at the apparent spontaneity of the monastic revival that swept through Europe in the 10th and 11th c.”28 It was this move to reform both the monastic houses and the papacy that would lead to the First Crusade. For Urban, Bernard and Peter the Venerable, “The reforming popes asserted not just the independence of the church, …but the autonomous primacy of the see of St. Peter.”29

**Context in the Christian east – Byzantium**

Sharing a border with the Islamic Civilization had been relatively peaceful for hundreds of years. However, in the 11th century, the Turks entered the Muslim diaspora and things quickly became more urgent for the Eastern empire. Tyer writes, “In the mid-1050s, Turkish tribes led by the Seljuk family had invaded the Near East, becoming then effective rulers in Baghdad. In 1071, the Seljuks invaded Anatolia, defeating and capturing the Byzantine emperor, Romanus IV Diogenes, at the battle of Manzikert.”30 Shortly after the Battle of Manzikert, the Byzantine emperor Dukas reached out to Pope Gregory VII for military support. Gregory attempted to launch what would likely have been considered by future historians to be the First Crusade in 1074, but he failed in his effort. Across the Byzantine Empire territories were lost during the reign of Dukas, but his successor Alexius I was able to reclaim most, but not all. The remaining losses were the impetus for Alexius to reach out to Urban for assistance in 1095.31 It was this call from Alexius that led directly to the launching of the First Crusade.

**Context of the Muslims**

The Islamic Civilization and the western Christian world could not have been farther apart at the time of the First Crusade. The eastern Christian church actually had a mostly peaceful relationship with the Muslims, including in the Holy Land. Churches were present and active, and Christians, as well as Jews and others, lived a secure life within Islamic lands, as long as the jizya, or religious freedom tax, was paid. The Muslim world was in the midst of the “Golden Age” of Islam.

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28 Howe, p.78.
29 Tyerman, God, p.47.
30 Tyerman, God, p.11.
31 Tyerman, God, p. 12.
Scholars debate the exact dates, but it certainly lasted from the inception of the Islamic Civilization in 632 until 1258. Islam had preserved and further developed the wisdom of the Greeks, kept safe by the Persians since the time of Alexander, for over 600 years, all to the eventual, and somewhat ironic, benefit of the West. With a stable, and well-educated civilization for several hundred years, the Muslim world had developed into something very different from the West. Cobb writes, “Its cities were crowded with Muslims, Jews, and Christians of various kinds.”

City centers in Europe were far inferior to those of the Islamic counterparts, “Rome, Milan, Cologne could probably boast populations of only around 30-40,000. In 1100, Paris and London were home to perhaps 20,000. Baghdad at its peak in the late 9th c, may have held 800,000…Cairo 400,000, Cordoba 100,000.”

The Goals of Pope Urban II for the First Crusade

“One popular topic of debate is whether the First Crusade was a crusade at all, or a pilgrimage. Since we have already discussed that the word ‘crusade’ was not invented until late in the 12th century, we can agree that this could not have been Urban’s plan. Christopher Tyerman argues that “Urban called for a penitential holy war, rather than as many have maintained, specifically an armed pilgrimage.” If that was the case then what was the overall goal of the campaign? From Urban’s preaching, H.E.J. Cowdrey deduced that “Urban at all times seems to have preached Jerusalem as the goal of the Crusade, and to have looked upon it as standing at the heart and center of the Eastern Churches which he desired to free from pagan domination.” Chevedden expands this notion and suggests that there were multiple goals: “Crusade of reconquest was to lead to the Crusade of regenerating the Church; and the Crusade of rebuilding the Church was to lead to the Crusade of missionary evangelization.” Lean Ni Chleirigh agrees with this theory, and adds that, “Crusading is not to be understood statically but dynamically.”

33 ibid, p. 21.
35 Gill reports that historian Edward Gibbon argues that the correct Latin for this term is Deus Vult, but that the saying was corrupted by the less literate as they adopted the saying for use in battle. Gill says that the earliest appearance of the phrase was in the *Gesta Francorum*, and Robert the Monk reports that when Urban finished his speech declaring the First Crusade at Clermont that the chant or “It is the will of God” rang out.
36 Tyerman, God, p. 72.
38 Chevedden, View, p. 274.
39 Chleirigh, p. 40.
William of Malmesbury, one of the earliest and best known 12th century historians, proposed a less spiritual plan that was actually “a deal between Urban II and Bohemund of Taranto designed to use the ensuing commotion to secure Rome for one and a Balkan principality for the other.”

Modern scholarly research of primary sources such as crusader chronicles suggests a variety of goals for Urban. Robert the Monk recorded two, “the liberation of the Eastern Christians from Turkish domination…and the need to free Jerusalem.” Robert’s work was the most widely reproduced of the crusade chronicles with over 100 surviving manuscripts. Sweetenham explains that Robert’s most significant addition to the Gesta Francorum “is his account of the Council of Clermont.” Peters tell us that: “The Gesta Francorum et aliorum Hierosolymyanorum, or Gesta, or GF, was written by an anonymous crusader who followed Bohemond…He was not present at Clermont and must have reconstructed the sermon from the accounts of others that he heard…probably written 1100-1101…no later than 1103.” The most important role the Gesta Francorum would play was as a foundation for several other slightly more detailed chronicles. In fact, “the GF says little about Pope Urban’s preaching of the Crusade.” Peters also mentions Fulcher of Chartres, a chronicler who he says “was present at the Council of Clermont in 1095… his ability to organize a maze of complex experiences and motives, make his chronicle perhaps the most readable.” Fulcher, like Robert, was a Benedictine Monk. Both considered the Gesta to be badly organized and written in inferior Latin. Sweetenham writes, “the GF was criticized by contemporaries…its style was seen as crude and unsophisticated.” Thankfully, they both made alterations that included more about Urban’s goals. Urban’s letters are another source that sheds light on a period that is somewhat lacking in documentation.

By comparing a variety of secondary and primary sources, a general understanding of Urban’s strategy begins to emerge. He was primarily engaged in the liberation of the church, but this was achieved in several ways. First, he was focused on freedom from secular control in Europe, which to some extent was achieved by unifying Europeans to join in the fight against the Saracens, under his call to arms. Second, he desired to regain control of the eastern church. Third, he saw the goal of liberating Jerusalem as necessary for the success of the overall campaign. Lastly, on a grander scale, Urban wanted to reclaim much of the territory that was formerly in the hands of Christian rulers but had been lost to the Islamic Civilization over the past several hundred years.

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40 Tyerman, Debate, p. 11.
42 Sweetenham, p. 42.
44 Sweetenham, p. 23.
45 Peters, p. 47.
46 Sweetenham, p. 4.
This included lands in Spain, Northern Africa, Sicily, and elsewhere. Not all these goals were stated in Clermont, but a conglomeration of primary and secondary documents do appear to support this notion.

**Freedom from Secular Interference in Europe**

“The reforming popes asserted not just the independence of the church, …but the autonomous primacy of the see of St. Peter.”

Kings in Europe had little power at the time of the First Crusade. Local lords were constantly at war with each other, and their personal churches and monasteries, which were accumulating great wealth thanks to generous parishioners, were constantly being raided and destroyed by neighboring lords. In Fulcher’s chronicle he reports that Urban’s speech mentioned these quarrelsome nobles, “Let those, he said, who are accustomed to wage private war wastefully even against Believers, go forth against the infidels.” It was hoped that as a residual benefit that civil peace would lead to more effective papal control of the local clergy, and definitely more security for the institution of the Church. Gregory VII saw an opportunity after a revolt in 1076 in Germany. He tried to force Henry IV to change the state-church relationship, ultimately using the excommunication of the German emperor to impress upon him, and the German faithful, the dominant position of the Church. This strategy failed for Gregory, leading to the invasion of Rome by Henry in 1084 and the installation of an anti-pope. “Only after he [Urban II] had launched the First Crusade in 1095 was he able to move back to Rome.” Here Urban achieved the longstanding goal, “for nearly a century the papacy had encouraged efforts to promote civil peace in Europe.”

**Freedom for, and control over, the Eastern Church**

Chevedden writes that, “by the time Pope Urban ascended the papal throne in 1088, a passionate concern ‘to liberate the Church of God’ had already taken hold in the Latin West, and expeditions to achieve this purpose had already been carried out in Sicily, Spain, and North Africa.” This supports the argument that the freedom the Church was pursuing was from more than just secular oversight.

In March of 1095, several months before the Council of Clermont, Urban made the case for intervention in the Byzantine empire.

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47 Tyerman, God, p. 47.
48 Peters, p. 53.
49 Tyerman, God, p. 8.
50 Brundage, p. 16.
51 Chevedden, View, p. 269.
At this point, “Rome was held by the anti-pope Clement III, while pope Urban II was presiding over an ecclesiastical council at Piacenza.”\textsuperscript{52} The chronicler Fulcher reported that “the interior regions of Romania, where the Turks rules over the Christians, had been attacked…The Turks, a race of Persians…occupying more and more of the lands of the Christians…have killed and captured them…laid waste to God’s kingdom.”\textsuperscript{53} H.E.J. Cowdrey makes a different argument, based on a letter written nearly a year after Clermont, “Urban's letter to the Bolognese, written from Pavia on 19 September 1096, contains no such reference to the liberation of all the Eastern Churches, ‘some of you have formed a desire to journey to Jerusalem…Know that we remit the whole penance due for their sins to all who set out, not from greed of this world’s goods, but simply for the salvation of their souls and for the liberation of the church’.”\textsuperscript{54} This single letter does not provide evidence that Urban was not interested in the eastern church. It only indicates his support for making the journey to Jerusalem. Urban would have understood that by coming to the aid of the eastern church his power in Rome would be increased. But based on this letter it would appear that Urban had more in mind than just the liberation of the eastern church.

**Freedom from Islamic Oppression**

Most modern scholars agree that the lives of Christians living in Muslim lands just before the First Crusade were secure and peaceful. In spite of this, given the significance of the Holy Land there was always an underlying feeling that it belonged to Christianity. Muslim influence inside Europe was limited to the southern tip of Italy and Spain, but there were some examples of success for Muslim raiders deeper into the continent. For Urban, an attack on the monastery in Cluny, less than a century before he joined, was likely an event with which he was familiar:

Islamic pirate bases in southern France...about 10 miles from St. Tropez. Andalusian pirates landed there in 889...dominated the central valley of the Rhone. For nearly a century no one could evict them...in 921 travelers were “killed by stones in the defiles of the Alps by the Saracens”; in 923 English pilgrims were “slaughtered in the Alps by the Saracens”; in 929 the Saracens blocked the Alpine paths and turned back many who wished to travel to Rome”; in 936 “the Saracens raided Alemannia and, as they were returning, they killed many who were travelling to Rome”...in 972 they went too far when they captured and held for ransom Abbot Maiolus of Cluny (965-994).\textsuperscript{55}

\textsuperscript{52} Brundage, p. 15.
\textsuperscript{53} Peters, p. 53.
\textsuperscript{54} Cowdrey, p. 187.
\textsuperscript{55} Howe, p. 27.
Chevedden writes that, “by the time Pope Urban ascended the papal throne in 1088, a passionate concern ‘to liberate the Church of God’ had already taken hold in the Latin West, and expeditions to achieve this purpose had already been carried out in Sicily, Spain, and North Africa.” 56 This suggests that the freedom that the Church was pursuing was more than just liberation from secular oversight in France and Germany. The idea of freedom for the reforming popes included, to the extent that it would be achievable, to reclaim territory lost to Islam around the entire Mediterranean.

In 1009 the Caliph in Cairo, al-Hakim, led a military expedition to Jerusalem which was responsible for widespread violence against Christians, and the destruction of holy sites in the city. This event was so significant that the pope at the time, Sergius IV, issued “the so-called ‘Encyclical of Pope Sergius IV’. This document purports to be Sergius's summons to the Christians of North Italy and elsewhere to respond to the destruction of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre at Jerusalem in 1009 by the mad Fatimid Caliph Hakim.” 57 A. Gieysztor argues that the al-Hakim events were “fabricated as propaganda for the First Crusade at the Cluniac monastery of Moissac, near Toulouse; it originated in connection with Urban's stay there in May 1096, ‘to create a respectable precedent.’” 58 Either way, Urban would have known that he could use such a story to increase interest in the liberation of the Holy Land.

Chronicler Robert reported that at Clermont, Urban had made the situation in Jerusalem clear: “Disturbing news has emerged from Jerusalem and the city of Constantinople…that the race of Persians, a foreign people and a people rejected by God…has invaded the lands of those Christians, depopulated them by slaughter.” 59 “Jerusalem…begs and craves to be free, and prays endlessly for you to come to her aid.” 60

**Jerusalem**

Urban would have been aware of the many battles for territory between Christians and Muslims from Spain to the Levant, but he also understood that crusading was dynamic. This dynamic nature required an evolving recruiting message, based at least partly on evolving public opinion, as well as a strategic decision by Urban that the liberation of the church from secular influence would be a starting point for various other goals. Cowdrey agrees that, “Jerusalem and its liberation were central to Urban's plan for the Crusade from its very inception.” 61

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56 Chevedden, View, p. 269.
57 Cowdrey, p. 185.
58 ibid, p. 185.
59 Sweetenham, p. 79.
60 Sweetenham, p. 81.
61 Cowdrey, p. 187.
Here Cowdrey is referring to one out of thirty-two canons of Urban, “If any man sets out from pure devotion, not for reputation or monetary gain, to liberate the Church of God at Jerusalem, his journey shall be reckoned in place of all penance.”

Other Crusades

As important as Jerusalem was, Urban made it clear that those who were fighting in other regions, especially Spain, should continue their work. Urban followed his predecessors by using the Augustinian justification for wars in the name of God. These were “just” wars, fought for territory that was rightly Christian, but had been taken by Muslim invaders. In a letter to aristocrats in Spain, who were successfully waging war against the shrinking Muslim stronghold there, Urban objected to warriors leaving campaigns that are underway to “aid the churches in Asia and to liberate their brothers from the tyranny of the Saracens [because] it is no feat of valor to liberate Christians from Saracens in one place [i.e., in Asia], only to deliver Christians to Saracen tyranny and oppressions in another place [i.e., in Spain].”

Tyer argues that the idea of a Christian reconquest, or Reconquista, was largely propaganda and that Christian raids into Muslim held lands were financially motivated. In the case of Spain, Riley-Smith points out a distinction between the notion of a crusade and a reconquest, but “Urban would never have accepted such exclusive options, because for him the fight against Islam in Spain and the fight against Islam in the eastern Mediterranean were two sides of the same enterprise to liberate territories formerly in Christian hands.”

Justification for Christian Violence

Although there were crusade style actions that preceded him, “Gregory, above all, was responsible for the creation of the idea of the milites Christi who could fight material battles on behalf of a holy cause.” Urban’s predecessor would have “emphasized that enemies must be included in our love for all men and he quoted St. Augustine to the effect that it is more virtuous to love enemies than friends.” Lean Ni Chleirigh writes: “It is likely that they [crusaders] are reflecting a widely held view that the expedition launched by Urban II in Nov 1095 was a new kind of pilgrimage, in which arms could be employed to regain the Holy Places for Christianity.”

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62 ibid, p. 188.
63 Chevedden, View, p. 270.
64 Chleirigh, p. 37.
65 Tyerman, God, p. 13.
66 Chleirigh, p. 41.
67 Clairvaux, Praise, p. 23.
69 Chleirigh, p. 74.
So, while Urban and other popes used St. Augustine’s Roman interpretation of the “just” war, it seems that the participants considered the expedition to be a pilgrimage, which in turn supported their own justification for fighting. Of course, as we have mentioned, Urban made it clear that this was a penitential war, so that was likely more significant for the crusaders understanding of their role and justification.

When examining Urban’s letters over the years between Clermont and his death in 1099, Tyerman sees Urban’s goals clearly:

penitential warfare to rescue Jerusalem and the eastern churches from Islam; the liberation of the eastern church after centuries of bondage…the prospect of the remission of all sins; the obligation to revenge the loss of the Christ’s Holy Land as a debt of honour; realization of papal leadership of Christendom; transformation of a sinful military aristocracy into a godly order.\textsuperscript{70}

Chevedden argues that “The Crusade of reconquest was to serve as handmaiden to the Crusade rebuilding the Church, and the Crusade of regenerating the Church was to serve as handmaiden to the Crusade of evangelization.”\textsuperscript{71} Here we see another example of Urban’s understanding of the dynamism of the crusading concept.

Chleirigh agrees and writes: “Crusading is not a finished, ready-made product, but rather a dynamic process that progressively determines itself. Its permanence lies in its capacity to bring forth new and distinctive forms of crusading.”\textsuperscript{72}

It is sometimes difficult to see Urban’s goals as anything other than military in the Holy Land, partly because of the tremendous success of the First Crusade, but more so because he died exactly two weeks after the recapture of Jerusalem. Urban never would have known that his crusade was a success as news would not have reached him that quickly.\textsuperscript{73}

Urban was able to achieve significant progress toward total papal authority. He had planned to stop or at least reduce secular violence against church properties, and to establish papal spiritual and political leadership of the Christian world using the call from Alexios as justification for his call to action. Success in the First Crusade was to include the elimination of secular involvement in the church in Europe and the consolidation of the eastern church with that of Rome, all under the jurisdiction and authority of the Holy See.

\textsuperscript{70}Tyerman, God, p. 71.
\textsuperscript{71}Chevedden, View, p. 278.
\textsuperscript{72}Chleirigh, p. 35.
\textsuperscript{73}Chevedden, View, p. 279.
Although the eastern church has maintained its independence to this day, many of Urban’s goals were realized as a result of the miraculous success of the First Crusade.

St. Bernard of Clairvaux

Bernard could read his audience. He was known as the most talented orator of his time. After only three years as a monk, in 1115, he was sent to start a new monastic house in Clairvaux and to serve as abbot. He was twenty-five at the time. By 1153 his Citeaux monastery was responsible for 70 daughter houses, which in turn would start 94 more. The papal schism of 1130 saw Bernard’s talents in action: “Bernard’s passionate endorsement of Innocent II was a major factor in the French decision to recognize him and reject the claims of his rival Anacletus II.” While he was continually expanding the monastic mission of Citeaux, he led the fight to displace an anti-pope, established the Knights Templar, and was the main promoter of the Second Crusade. But he was not without friends.

Peter the Venerable

Peter the Venerable was elected abbot of the monastic community at Cluny in 1124 at the age of twenty-eight. In contrast to his famous friend Bernard, Peter was more of a traditional monk, working in silence and spending most of his life at his monastery tending to the needs of his monks. Peter and Bernard argued for decades about the merit of their respective monastic communities. Although he spent nearly his entire life within the walls of his monastery at Cluny, Peter is probably most well-known for his work on the translation of the Koran, part of a project that originated with a trip to Spain in 1142. Before this effort there had been no scholarly examination of Islam by the Church, and what little understanding there was of the Muslim world in Europe was ill-informed. Later in his life Peter would revisit his work and offer his own analysis in the hope that his reasoning would be enough to convince Muslims to convert to Christianity without the need for violence.

The importance of these two Benedictine monks, particularly Bernard, in the context of the crusades cannot be overstated. They both had an impact on their era, Bernard far more than Peter, but close analysis of both of their philosophies adds much to our understanding of the crusades. In spite of the failure of the Second Crusade, championed by both Bernard and Peter, these two ecclesiastical scholars are remembered as important forces in the successful development of the church.

75 ibid, p. 5.
Both acknowledged the loss as the starting point for new thinking, and both used this platform to further their own visions for the crusades and Christianity. Significantly, it appears that both of these men modified their positions on the use of violence after the Second Crusade.

As both Bernard and Peter were dedicated ecclesiastical leaders of large and influential monastic communities, their support of papal doctrine would have been provided without hesitation. “Complete rejection of crusading, like overt pacificism, was rare. The Cistercians, one of the more austere of the new closed monastic orders, were in the forefront of crusade preaching between the 1140s and 1220s.”

Unlike in the First Crusade, there was a papal bull issued by Pope Eugenius III in 1146 that declared the intention of the church to initiate a Second Crusade to rush aid to the fallen city of Edessa. Once this bull was issued Bernard and Peter would have committed themselves to the cause.

**Recruiting for the Second Crusade**

Constable writes that: “The most important element in this bull from the viewpoint of crusading theory was its concept of the indulgence, of which the transcendental implications were here fully developed...a clearer idea of the indulgence than Urban.” Eugenius clarified both the goal, Edessa, and the concept of the indulgence. With an established Christian kingdom in the Levant that had come under attack, a papal bull, and a public that was well versed in the success of the First Crusade, there was a system within which Bernard built excitement. For Peter, the needs of the church outside of already Christian lands was different. He was focused on defeating heresies and protecting European Christians from corruption by heretics.

**Peter as Abbot**

When Peter was elected Abbot in 1122 the community at Cluny was in the unusual position of financial duress. His predecessor had been accused of impropriety and excommunicated twice, and a grant from King Henry V of Germany was needed to buy back valuable liturgical garments that were being held as collateral. Some scholars believe that finances necessitated Peter’s trip to Spain in 1142.

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77 Tyerman, Debate, p. 21.
79 Kritzek, p. 3.
80 Scott G. Bruce, Cluny and the Muslims of La Garde-Freinet: Hagiography and the Problem of Islam in Medieval Europe (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015), p. 87
81 ibid, p. 70.
Kritzek writes: “the emperor’s grandfather, Alfonso VI, had pledged to Cluny an annual census donation of 2,000 metcales. Once a major source of income for the abbey, the donation was now far in arrears.”

Others believe that this financial pressure was the cause of his approach to the Jews: “Historians have placed the motives for Peter’s anti-Jewish writings squarely in the context of a serious and ever deepening financial crisis that afflicted Cluny in the early 12th century.” Peter’s writings on Jews were actually representative of his main focus in life—to root out heresy of all kinds to enable ecclesiastical scholars to refute it, thereby strengthening the teachings of the Church. This goal was closely tied to his ability to excel at his role as Abbot, which required him to provide for the needs of his monks. Peter, like Urban and Bernard, was an exegete. He wished nothing more than to quietly analyse and write about the heresies that threatened the faithful.

**Peter and the Jews**

Bruce writes that “Jews…amassed their fortunes through the purchase and sale of precious ornaments stolen from Christian churches.” A combination of financial pressure with the belief that Jews were guilty of profiteering off of the bad fortune of ecclesiastical institutions surely contributed to his 1144 essay, *Against the Long-Standing Stubbornness of the Jews*. He added chapters to this work in 1147 “that stand out in bold relief to the earlier chapters both in the novelty of their content and in the hostility of their tone.” He argues that “the Talmud is a ‘monstrous beast’ *portuentuosa bestia*, that lulls its readers into a bestial stupidity, stripping them of human reason and debasing their intellect until they are nothing more than cattle.”

It seems likely, according to Bruce, that “the tenacity of Judaism within Europe and the success of Islam throughout the rest of the world, greatly concerned Peter.” Peter’s feelings at the time were clear when he asked: “what good is it to pursue the enemies of the Christian faith in far and distant lands if the Jews, vile blasphemers and far worse than the Saracens, not far from us but right in our midst, blaspheme, abuse, and trample on Christ and the Christian sacraments?”

He likely inflated his rhetoric in 1147 as a result of the failed Second Crusade, and his desire to redirect the efforts of western Christianity away from the Levant and back to their own communities.

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82 Kritzek, p. 11.
83 Bruce, p. 87.
84 Bruce, p. 88.
85 Bruce, p. 89.
86 ibid, p. 90.
87 ibid, p. 81.
88 ibid, p. 91.
This idea was the opposite of Urban’s stated goals for the First Crusade. In fact, the horrors of the many European pogroms over the centuries were initiated during the prelude to the First Crusade. Urban spoke out against the killing of the Jews, as did Bernard. Peter did not.

**Peter’s Muslim Project**

The result of Peter’s trip to Spain was a positive infusion of financial assistance from the king, but more importantly, the translation of the Koran into Latin, for the first time. This project revealed the difference in how Peter contemplated Islam and Judaism. Because the Jewish population was interwoven with the Christian world in Europe, Peter saw their teachings, and lifestyle, as a direct threat to Christianity at all times. Regardless of their status as people of the book, Peter believed that the faithful were constantly under direct and indirect attack from the heresies of the Jews. This inspired his aggressive rhetoric against the Jewish people and allowed for a more subtle approach to the distant and unknown Muslims: “the abbot hoped that Muslim readers would come to realize that the Koran was not a divinely inspired text and Mohammed was not a prophet in the tradition of the Old Testament prophets.”

**Crusading Justification and Goals**

Pope Eugenius, like Urban, did not lead or even go on the crusade he called. As with Urban, the work of promotion was left to the local church leaders who would be best suited to make appeals directly to the worshippers they knew so well. Constable writes that: “It is probably, in fact, that Cistercian monks were forbidden by the General Chapter to join the crusade.” In no way did his monastic limitations interfere with Bernard’s role as the most important and successful crusade promoter of all time.

Well before the papal bull of Eugenius, Bernard wrote in 1130: “it would not be fitting to kill the pagans if by some other means they could be restrained from extremely harassing and oppressing the faithful. Now, however, it is better that they be killed than to let them remain a rod of sinners over the fate of the just.” At this point Bernard was not even considering the idea of conversion, but perhaps as a result of the pressure of the papal schism he was moved to justify extreme violence to protect Christianity. It is also possible that he believed that he had just created the ultimate solution to the moral problem of violence in the name of God. Approval was issued for the Knights Templar in 1128 at the Council of Troyes.

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89 Constable, p. 268.
In his book, *In Praise of the New Knighthood*, he writes: “The knight of Christ, I say, may strike with confidence...he is God’s minister...if he kills an evil doer he is not a man-killer, but, if I may so put it, an evil-killer.”

Bernard, as Urban, used Augustinian reasoning to justify the violence of the crusades. In chapter three of *In Praise of the New Knighthood*, Bernard writes: “If it is never legitimate for a Christian to strike with the sword, why then did the Saviour’s precursor bid soldiers be content with their pay, and not rather ban military service to them?”

By the time of the Second Crusade, Bernard’s message had not softened in regard to the use of violence. Epistle 363 instructs the fighters to “utterly annihilate or surely convert” the enemy. Earlier, in 1146, Kedar writes that Bernard “alludes to Saracen conversion as a merely hypothetical possibility...if the Saracens were subjugated to Christian rule as the Jews are, but at the present the Saracens attack the Christians and therefore must be repulsed.” Conversion, we shall see, will become a more desirable goal, particularly after the failure of the military campaigns of the Second Crusade. Kedar continues: “Peter seems to have entertained little hope that a written refutation of Islam would bring about their conversion. Indeed, in a letter urging Bernard to undertake such a refutation, Peter voices the opinion that such a work will be of no use to ‘those lost ones,’ namely the Saracens, but may be helpful to weak Christians who are apt to be seduced by evil.”

Here we see an argument that supports Peter’s desire to protect vulnerable Christians over the idea of converting the “others.” This argument is not directly in opposition to Urban’s mission, but it is a different path that, given the power, Peter would have the energies of the crusades take. At the same time, however, Kedar writes that: “In a letter written to King Louis VII...Peter states that although he is unable personally to accompany the expedition...he expresses the hope that King Louis will destroy the Saracens.” So the question of Peter’s pacifism is answered. But Kedar defends Peter writing: “the espousal of Saracen conversion was Peter’s basic attitude...Peter ‘was willing to allow for the manias of his friends’ hoping that Saracen conversion would become the crusader’s main objective.”

The church’s defense of violence is explained quickly and efficiently in the writings of St. Augustine, St. Jerome, John the Baptist and various other passages throughout the bible.

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92 Clairvaux, Praise, p. 39.  
93 ibid, p. 40.  
94 Kedar, p. 70.  
95 Kedar, p. 60.  
96 ibid, p. 102.  
97 ibid, p. 100.  
98 ibid, p. 100.
But there never was a solution as ambitious, and elegant, as Bernard’s Knights Templar. In 1119, shortly after the official recognition of the Knights Hospitaller in 1113, Hugh of Payns, together with Godfrey, St. Omer and a group of knights requested to provide Hospitaller style support to arriving travelers.\(^99\) Several leaders from the Kingdom of Jerusalem reached out to Rome for recognition as another military monastery. When this request reached Bernard he replied with *In Praise of the New Knighthood*, which he wrote in 1128.\(^100\) His goal for the Templars was to have a monastic community, like the Cistercians, that would be pure of intention and therefore able to kill any perceived enemy of Christianity without sin: “Holy martyrs. Directly opposed to them are the ‘worldly warrior’ who, in contrast to the double protection of the Templar, runs a double risk:” if he dies himself, he suffers physical death; while if he kills another, he dies a spiritual death. The key is ‘right intention’.”\(^101\)

Here is a clear example of one major difference between Bernard and Urban. While Urban was depending on civil unity to provide peace for the church in Europe, and as a result enhanced papal authority, Bernard directly attacked those who were funding local churches, the aristocracy, accusing them of a variety of sins, and of having the wrong intentions even in their crusading activities. Urban’s ‘worldly warriors’ were those who would become the leaders of the Holy Land.

A band of holy warriors was not an original idea. The Knights Templar were based on the precedent of the Hospitallers, who had a proven record of aiding pilgrims in their journey with housing, food, medical aid and armed protection, but there was a significant difference between the two: “The Templars, unlike the Hospitallers, were a direct product of the Crusades.”\(^102\) Malcom Barber agrees: “The Templars are the actual and literary successors of Robert the Monk’s crusaders; in Bernard’s words, they are ‘the picked troops of God’.”\(^103\) Awan writes: “In *Liber as milites temple de laude novae militae*…Bernard of Clairvaux effectively blended together the previously separate professions of monk and knight.”\(^104\)

It was critical to Bernard, however, that the Templars, and importance of the Holy Land, be kept in the proper perspective, “‘[they] needed always to remember that ultimately the temporal glory of Jerusalem should not eclipse its heavenly counterpart, for the one is the figure of the other. In the literal fulfilment of this liberation of Jerusalem, one should not be blind to the spiritual meaning of the texts’.”\(^105\) There were to be difficult times for the Templars in the future, however, due to their rapid success.

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99 Clairvaux, Praise, p.10.
100 Clairvaux, Praise, p.9.
102 Jotischky, p. 85.
103 Clairvaux, Praise, p. 21.
104 Awan, p. 34.
105 Clairvaux, Praise, p. 23.
Jotischky explains that the Templars, as well as the Hospitallers had gained such independence by 1154 that the local clergy, and even William of Tyre, felt compelled to complain directly to the 3rd Lateran Council in 1179. The Templars would only last until the early 14th century, victims of their own incredible financial success.

Pilgrimage

Although the Second Crusade had a more organized and professional feeling, there was still a strong connection to pilgrimage. As the Latin word for crusade had not yet been introduced, it was natural for warriors heading to the Holy Land to consider their journey a pilgrimage.

This perception was supported by the writings of the crusade chroniclers from the First and Second Crusades. “Those gathered at the great Council of Vezelay, in 1146, an anonymous chronicler says, ‘received from Bernard the sign of pilgrimage, as is the custom, that is, the cross’.” Perhaps the most important Second Crusade chronicler, “Odo of Deuil…says that at Paris Eugene granted his ‘blessing and license of pilgrimage.’”

King Louis made it clear that pilgrimage was the foundation of his strategy when upon arrival at Jaffa he delayed military campaigning for nearly three months because: “As a Crusader he had sworn when he took the cross to visit the shrines of Jerusalem.” Bernard had a strong opinion about pilgrimage to the Holy Land that was counter to popular opinion: “The object of monks is to seek not the earthly but the heavenly Jerusalem: and this not by proceeding with (their) feet but by progressing with [their] affections.” Bernard based his opinion of pilgrimage on the teachings of St. Jerome, who said, “it is praiseworthy not to have been in Jerusalem but to have lived well for Jerusalem’. This is an example of how Bernard’s view of crusading differed from Urban’s.

Looking back to the success of the First Crusade, the less successful campaigns stood out clearly, indicating that a consistently professional approach was needed. For the Second Crusade, Bernard toured for months, but his main accomplishment was to convince the kings of France and the Holy Roman Empire to commit to personally lead the mission. Unfortunately, this new approach resulted in a less coordinated effort, mostly as a result of individual egos.

106 Jotischky, P. 87.
107 Constable, p. 239.
108 ibid, p. 263.
109 Brundage, p. 114.
110 Constable, p. 270.
111 ibid, p. 270.
The subsequent failure inspired major changes to the rules of crusading, from Urban’s now seemingly random appeal to lesser nobles, to a more professionally staffed military mission, and even the invention of a word to describe the action.

**Liberation versus Maintenance**

Urban enabled the First Crusade to expand from assistance to the Eastern Church to liberation of Jerusalem, but the reality is that Jerusalem was fine. It was pressure from the people of Europe, and limited direct involvement with the build-up or execution of the First Crusade by the Church, that led to this result. Some scholars point out that the unorganized and mostly unprofessional military campaign in 1096 only could have succeeded as a result of divine intervention. None of the Muslim soldiers would have known to expect such an attack. Even the pope was being updated several weeks after events. It was clear to Eugenius, and maybe even more to Bernard, that this approach would not work a second time. “The Second Crusade, in fact, was destined to be the last Crusade in which the armies were accompanied by large groups of pilgrims and other non-combatants. Henceforth, the Crusades were to become more strictly military expeditions, whose objectives were limited, military ones.”

**After the Second Crusade: Bernard and the Templars**

After the First Crusade, Urban was sadly not alive to witness the success. After the Second Crusade, Bernard was the primary target for criticism because he had been such an omnipresent promoter. William of Tyre later wrote that: “The fiasco at Damascus gave rise to great bitterness. The attitude of the West toward the Crusade and toward those who had played a prominent part in it was hostile and suspicious.” Jotischky writes that the “Templars reputation suffered from their involvement in the failed siege of Damascus in 1148.” Bernard’s nephew, a Templar knight, wrote to him criticizing the European military leaders: “They accomplished no good in the land of the Lord and in their own lands, to which they hastened back; they are doing unbelievable evil.” Bernard did not let the Templars take the blame, and they would continue to expand until their demise in the early 14th century.

Bernard continued to preach that the Holy War was a gift from God to serve as the path of redemption for secular men. This argument would have required extraordinary faith, and skill, to actually use in public after such a rousing defeat in a war that he had previously endorsed as having been called by God. In his *Apologia*, as might be expected, he did not hide from accountability, “I prefer that the murmuring of men be against us rather than against God, if a choice must be made.

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112 Brundage, p. 124.
113 ibid, p. 115.
114 Jotischky p. 88.
115 Clairvaux, Letters, p. 479.
What an honour for me if he deigns to use me for a shield. Willingly I draw to myself then scurrilous tongues of detractors and the poisoned darts of blasphemers so that they do not reach him.”

Urban’s Goal for the First Crusade

Modern scholarship identifies freedom for the Church from secular meddling as the primary goal of the First Crusade, with the liberation of Jerusalem as a secondary goal, for Urban. We have seen that the call from Alexios was the initial motivation for Urban’s call to arms. Even that motivation was not original as Dukas had done the same with Gregory VII in 1074. The idea of establishing papal authority was not new either.

Europe was evolving into its current form. The cultural stability could have begun to create a sense of belonging to a particular place, making those from other places the hated outsiders. When Urban announced the notion of a penitential war, he successfully united Europeans against a common enemy. This served Urban’s needs and consolidated leadership of the western Christian world under the papacy. Unlike Bernard, Urban and Eugenius made it clear that the power to call the crusades was from the papacy, not from God. It was papal authority that acted as God’s voice on earth. Once established, this would give the papacy power over kings and comprehensive freedom from secular involvement in church leadership.

Crusading was also evolving. The announcement almost seems to have been an afterthought, brought up nearly at the end of a week-long meeting of church leaders at the Council of Clermont. As far as we know Urban did little to promote the crusade, but soon found it necessary to denounce unorganized civilian expeditions that were not only terrible failures, but also included the proto pogroms that would continue to plague European Jews until the time of the Nazis.

Europeans were ready for a violent confrontation, and the unifying mission to save Jerusalem, which as far as we know was not even mentioned at Clermont, was part of the dynamic nature of crusading. Urban’s genius was that he was able to use this wave of popular support for Christianity to establish independence for the papacy.

Bernard and Peter

Bernard and Peter made their impression on crusading with both the benefit and burden of hindsight.

116 Clairvaux, Five, p. 51.
After the success of the First Crusade, in spite of the fact that it was fought by secular knights whom Bernard despised for their sinfulness and their vanity, it would have been difficult to argue against additional military action in the Levant when it was necessary. Popular opinion was significantly bolstered by the crusade chronicles which told of the fabulous victory over the Muslims.

Economic pressures continued to inspire hostility toward the European Jewish population, which was a constant reminder of the presence of infidels not only in the Holy Land but also at home in Europe. Jewish financial success and cultural unity created a negative impression amongst the mostly Christian Europeans, and they continued to search for an outlet for their frustrations. When Edessa fell in 1142, it was as if their prayers had been answered. Bernard found himself drafted by the pope to lead the recruiting drive for the Second Crusade.

This was a role he enthusiastically adopted. It suited his personality and his talents as the greatest orator in Europe. The continuing struggle for papal authority also encouraged his efforts. As the hero of the 1130 papal schism, Bernard knew that the power of the papacy was still at risk and that another unifying military victory like the First Crusade would likely bring an end to opportunities to install another anti-pope. After his enthusiasm came the blame for a failed campaign, but he was able to introduce the Templars, making substantial changes to crusading that continued after his death. The Second Crusade was the last of the armed pilgrimages. The Third Crusade was a professionally run military operation, in spite of the horrible result.

Unlike Urban, Bernard’s disgust with the nobility of Europe led him to wish they had been excluded from the penitential war. Their behaviour was not worthy of redemption; they continued with their sinful ways. He was able to pressure the kings of France and Germany to lead their knights, which might have given him some hope that the lesser nobles would be kept under control. While he supported church doctrine that sanctioned violence based on St. Augustine’s integration of Roman law into the church, he also believed that this action was best accomplished by knights would were already pure of heart.

The Knights Templar were modeled on Bernard’s Cistercian house, and were strict observers of the Rule of St. Benedict. In the introduction of In Praise of the New Knighthood, Barber provides an example of the longevity of the controversy surrounding the concept of the warrior-monk: “For many the fundamental incompatibility of the cloister and the sword remained integral to their perception of the world...criticism which, ultimately, would resurface at the vital time of the templar’s trial in the early 14th c.”

117 Clairvaux, Praise, p. 27.
Perhaps the clearest difference from Urban was Bernard’s declaration that fewer Christians and no monks should go on pilgrimage to the Holy Land, even without a crusade. He believed that the journey itself was both a waste of money, which could be better used by the church, and an opportunity to encourage vanity. On arrival home pilgrims were often regarded as if they were saints. This was detestable behaviour according to Bernard. He taught that the spiritual journey of redemption must be experienced from within, whether or not one had been on pilgrimage. Urban was very straightforward about the penance offered by the crusade, although, once again, this was not his invention. He also would have found it politically necessary to have been a strong supporter of the popular pilgrimage experience, as so many of his crusaders were actually on pilgrimage while participating in the First Crusade.

Peter was more of an instigator than an actor. His monastic community, and his fear of those who would threaten Christianity, were both domestic challenges. The trip to Spain, however, was an example of his ability to take full advantage of an opportunity. On his trip to secure the needed finances for the monastery at Cluny he became aware of the success that knights in Castile, Leon and Aragon were having in their many battles with the receding Muslim presence. Able to use his relationship with the king to find the right working partners, he commissioned the translation project of the Koran for the benefit of the Church.

He wanted to study the enemy, but it was never Peter’s intention to fight them, even with a refutation of the teachings of the Koran: “Unlike his forays against heretics and Jews, the abbot of Cluny never intended to write a treatise against Muslim beliefs at all but hoped that one of his contemporaries would do so.”

Bernard would have been Peter’s champion in this effort, but he never delivered a refutation, so Peter chose to do it himself after Bernard’s death. Bruce writes: “Peter did write a polemical tract against Islam in the final year of his life, his pastoral appeal to a Muslim audience was not the first impulse of a tolerant man. Rather, it was a matter of last recourse in the bitter aftermath of the Second Crusade.”

Ultimately it was Peter’s hope that a sufficient refutation would be so powerful that it would convert Muslims. Conversion was not only on Peter’s mind. Kedar writes that: “By 1147 Saracen conversion had become a major objective of the Oriental crusade...seventy years later, at the time of the Fifth Crusade, Saracen conversion is reported to have been presented as the primary goal on the battlefield itself.”

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118 Bruce, p. 74.
119 ibid, p. 74.
120 Kedar, p. 71-72.
Even Bernard had come over to the conversion argument: “In 1152, toward the end of his life, Bernard came to espouse rather forcefully the peaceful conversion of the Gentiles…he deplores the absence of missionary work among the Gentiles and emphatically calls on pope Eugene III to send preachers to them. ‘Are we waiting for faith to descend on them?… Who came to believe through chance? How are they to believe without being preached to?’”

Peter even went so far as to criticize the crusades by saying: “‘I approach you not, as our men often do, with arms, but with words; not with force but with reason; not with hatred but in love.’ Thus, Peter forcefully emphasizes the difference between peaceful persuasion, the approach he adopts in his tractate, and the usual Catholic recourse to violence.”

Perhaps it was these exact words that relegated Peter to the relatively obscure folder of historical figures in the church. Bruce writes: “The power of politics kept Peter from sainthood because he failed to maintain the popular hardline of violence - his direct appeals to Muslims had set him apart from his contemporaries in the minds of modern historians as a tolerant and reasonable voice in the age of the first crusades.” It seems that in the end, the impression of Peter being a man of peace was true, but only in the end.

\[121\] ibid, p. 61.
\[122\] ibid, p. 99.
\[123\] Bruce, p. 72.
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Sustainable Civilization: Informatization Strategy

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Abstract

The article proposes strategic aspirations for the development of sustainable civilization, which are based on organizing the Geoinformatics Steering System, which will monitor civilizations based on established indexes measuring the state of civilization. This monitoring must have a uniform system on many levels of human organization, from the enterprise (company) to regions, countries, continents and the world. The condition for this organization is the creation of the World Civilization Organization because the current efforts of people and countries are chaotic.

Keywords: sustainable civilization, sustainable civilization model, the Triangle of Death of Civilizations, Geoinformatic Management System, World Civilization Organization

Introduction

The global warming challenges topped the list of world problems in the 2020s. To solve this problem, it must be included in the context of a broader, sustainable civilization—one in which nature is to have priority in society's “democracy.” The trend of people settling in megacities is ever becoming thoughtless in practice and effects. In order to remedy the unwelcome consequences of urban congestion and environmental threats, we need to configure a functional plan for the realization of the “green” (wise) city as the nucleus of sustainable civilization. Next a computerized system of monitoring this civilization will be defined/explained/detailed. Terms such as “balanced,” “green” and “wise” when used to describe civilization are synonyms based on the context in which they are used.

1. Configuration of the Sustainable (green-wise) State (CSS)

Intention – To configure efficient and effective means for maximizing sustainability guided by wisdom and adaptive strategy for the wise use of resources and means for the good of humanity.

Strategy – To formulate supplemental alternatives to the online configuration for the application and control of sustainable development of civilization, guided by wise statehood.
The empowerment of knowledge-based society (KS) is glorious.

It is even more important that knowledge-oriented society will be able to wisely choose the correct ("green") options for expediting healthy and sustainable living. The implementation of sustainable development supplemented by the monitoring and corrective role of a facilitative state can make wise civilization a global reality. Fig. 1 illustrates the CSS model.

Fig. 1. The configuration of the sustainable (wise-green) state (CSS)

In the CSS model, the basic applications of computerization are designed for climate control, "green" environment, and social responsibility. These will ensure survivability and reduce calamities that would endanger societies and compromise the fate of people in the vital economic base. For the state to be wise, it must support the development of a wise civilization, the parameters of which are spelled out below.

By wise civilization is meant the use of the following values:

- Nature comes first.
- People are more important than markets.
➢ Human health is more important than money.
➢ Sufficiency and sustainability are more important than performance.
➢ Business serves people, and regulatory measures of a wise state are essential to harmonize business pursuits and public interests.

Capitalism and socialism are based on continuous economic growth, which leads to the depletion of strategic resources. Consequently, it is necessary to develop a policy of Ecologism—a system based on a market economy but regulated by the criteria of sustainable development, which consists of the following subsystems:

- Eco-education - based on eco-knowledge and wisdom.
- Wise society - trained and educated in the field of eco-education and qualified to make wise decisions.
- Eco-democracy - everyone is created equal, but not with the most favorable natural environment.
- Eco-justice - any crime against the law must also be assessed for environmental damage, and possibly punished.
- Eco-infrastructure - should function in harmony with nature and protect it from destruction.
- Deep economy - in addition to business and administrative costs, it includes environmental and social costs to calculate the effectiveness of functioning.
- Deep media - comprehensively and objectively informs the public about the state and the progress made in the field of sustainable civilization.
- Eco-communication - based on techniques friendly to nature and man.

A model of Sustainable (green-wise) civilization is given in Fig. 2.

![Figure 2. Model of Sustainable (green-wise) civilization](image)
The first prerequisite for the planned architecture of the Sustainable (green) civilization is civilians committing themselves to adopt a second layer of complementary civilians-based pseudo-religion called Spirituality 2.0. It does not replace any of the existing Religions 1.0, which would be not only heresy, but an unprecedented revolution whose victory would not be possible but would also be unnecessary and harmful. It is not about the fight against religion, but about its development at the global level and not in individual regions. The 2.0 spirituality would teach complementary morals based on the most important values of many religions 1.0. These values are shown in Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civilization</th>
<th>Values of Contribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFRICAN</td>
<td>Spiritual communication with ancestors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUDDHIST</td>
<td>Morality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHINESE</td>
<td>Respect for seniority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EASTERN</td>
<td>Self-sacrifice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HINDU</td>
<td>Moderation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISLAMIC</td>
<td>Reward and Punishment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAPANESE</td>
<td>Cooperation and cult of nature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WESTERN</td>
<td>Freedom and the cult of technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLOBAL</td>
<td>Free flow of ideas, goods, services, people according to <em>Pax Orbis</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIVERSAL</td>
<td>Wisdom, goodness, access, dialogue, consent, conditional forgiveness, human and civil rights, international law, sustainable development</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The development of a Sustainable (green-wise) civilization will not begin if it remains in the hands of popular contemporary laissez-faire politics. The danger of the fall of civilization indicates the need for a certain dose of social engineering. This would involve a mixed approach, both bottom-up and top-down. The role of organizations such as the UN and government agencies is necessary, as is the participation of NGOs. Even today, every school and university should seriously develop eco-knowledge and wisdom, and train wise graduates. They will be candidates for wise citizens, workers or leaders who will apply wise solutions in their positions that will eventually develop Wise Society and Sustainable (Wise) Civilization.

The proposal to transform modern civilization into a sustainable (wise-universal) one is caused by a structural crisis affecting Western civilization and the global civilization that replaces it. The driving force of these civilizations is the United States, which has entered a structural rather than cyclical crisis. Therefore, the question may be asked: "Can America be fixed? Some believe that if more money is invested in technology and labor costs are lowered in America, the country will maintain economic growth with machines that replace human labor. This advice is wrong; it will exacerbate the crisis of America and Western civilization even more, as indicated by the turbulent years of Donald Trump's presidency 2016-2020.
2. Towards the computerization of wise civilization

The salvation of Western civilization and the entire world civilization in general depends on whether we can break with the development of self-destructive civilization and begin the development of Wise civilization.

In the CSS model, digital storage of cataloged examples of wisdom in matters of developing sustainable (green) solutions is necessary. The question is how to do it? This can be computerized in the format of descriptive sentences and/or in the format of symbols or numbers according to the developed classification of examples of wisdom. This will not happen immediately since one needs many different projects and studies before one would reach the international standard. But one can start with an example of the descriptive format of the wisdom seed of the Polish Revolution in 1980-1989, given in Table 2, where the bold variant was chosen and considered wise.

Table 2. A basis of wisdom of the Polish Revolution - SOLIDARITY 1980-1989

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ELEMENTS</th>
<th>SOLUTIONS</th>
<th>APPLIED KNOWLEDGE</th>
<th>CHOICE OF OPTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problem</td>
<td>Strategy of Revolution</td>
<td>1789 and 1917</td>
<td>Bloody</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Option 1</td>
<td>Military confrontation</td>
<td>Warsaw Uprising 1944 - failure</td>
<td>200,000 killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Option 2</td>
<td>Passive resistance</td>
<td>Gandhi’s strategy</td>
<td>Peaceful victory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Option 3</td>
<td>Underground fighting</td>
<td>Underground fighting in 1939-45</td>
<td>Terror by the occupants - Germans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art of living</td>
<td>Historic legacy and compromise</td>
<td>Failures of Polish Uprisings</td>
<td>Compromise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global context</td>
<td>Advice by John Paul II</td>
<td>Gandhi’s victory in India</td>
<td>Relying on the tested strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainability</td>
<td>Minimalization of losses</td>
<td>Ruined Warsaw and the loss of 30% of Polish material assets</td>
<td>Avoiding the past bad decisions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The hypertext technique makes it possible to move from the collections of Great Wisdom to collections of Great Knowledge or other information collections. Examples of wisdom-based descriptions are given in the colloquial non-structural language from the point of view of Database Management Systems (DBMS). These unstructured text data should be converted to structured data used in the standard DBMS database system technique (e.g. Oracle or IBM DB2). This process is called textual disambiguation, in short known as ETL - from "extract / transform / load" (select / transform / load).

The purpose of text disambiguation is to read the raw text - narrative - in order to convert the text into a standardized record in a standard database. Then the text looks like any other analytical database. Other analytical databases can be attached to the analytical database to obtain the effect of the ability to analyze data in structured and unstructured notation in the same question. Each entry in the analytical database can be linked directly to the original source document.
This feature is needed if you ever have a question about the context of the data found in the analytical database, then you can easily and quickly verify it. It is so because the source document describing the basis of wisdom is not modified or changed in any way.

To perform text disambiguation, it is necessary to “map”, i.e., to document relevant parameters that can be specified within the unambiguous text. Mapping directs the obtaining of textual unambiguity as to how to interpret the document. Each document has its own mapping processes. All documents of the same type can be handled by the same mapping. For example, there may be one mapping of wisdom grains related to the transport of environmentally harmful materials, another mapping may relate to documents used in R&D management, etc.

Electronic text is a contribution to the text unification process. There are many forms of electronic text. The actual electronic text of the basis of wisdom can come from anywhere. Electronic text can be in the form of appropriate language, slang, shorthand, comments, database entries and many other forms.

The textual disambiguation of the bases of wisdom should be able to handle all forms of electronic text. In addition, electronic text can be in different languages. The result of disambiguation can take different forms, depending on the types of users.

In the process of disambiguation of unstructured texts, existing taxonomies or the ones developed for the needs of a given collection of Great Wisdom are used. Taxonomies are an important tool in general natural language processing, and in text analysis. For example, an organism may have several levels of meaning such as Animal => Mammal => Primate => Human. Or an IT company => Apple => IBM => Microsoft.

As one can see from the example, the basis for natural language processing (NLP-Natural Language Processing) is text classification. IBM Watson Natural Language Classifier (NLC) is the leader in this respect, allowing users to classify the text of custom categories. Developers with no machine-learning experience (ML-Machine Learning) or NLP can improve their applications using this IBM-NLC service that combines various advanced ML techniques to ensure the highest possible accuracy without requiring large amounts of training data.

3. Indexes of Sustainable civilization as a driving force of its computerization

Gross Sustainable Development Product - measures the cost of growth and development developed by the Global Community Assessment Center and the Society for World Sustainable Development. It is defined as the total value of production in the region over time and is measured using market prices for transactions of goods and services in the economy. It is to replace GDP. Calculations are based on the following indicators:
• Economic effects of degradation or improvement of the environment and health
• Depletion of resources, depreciation or recognition or finding new resources (inventory)
• Impact of human activity on the environment
• Impact of human activity on the availability of resources
• Impact of human activity on economic development

The Sustainable Society Index calculates indicators in three categories: human well-being, environmental well-being, and economic well-being. In total, these indicators are best in Norway; the graphical model of this index is given in Fig. 3. The index for American sustainable society is given in Fig. 4. The index for Poland is given in Fig. 5.

Fig. 3. Index of Norwegian Sustainable Society in 2016. 10-best, 1-worst indicators. The solid line stroke defines the average values for the world.

Fig. 4. Index of American Sustainable Society in 2016. 10-best, 1-worst indicators. The solid line stroke defines the average values for the world.
4. Introduction to the Geoinformation Management System (GMS)

The purpose of this conceptual study is to develop an approach to the Geoinformation Management System with 8D Civilization at all necessary levels of sustainable civilization control — that is, from the global level through the following levels: continental, state, region, and enterprise. It is so because civilization in the field of climate protection and nature has no borders. It permeates across borders with effortless regulation. In addition, the scope of sustainable civilization must include the problem of technology’s attack on traditional man's work methods, which, according to business objectives, should lead to total unemployment (a labor-free economy involving a radical reduction in labor costs) and even to the possible disappearance of the human species in favor of cyborgs.

The logic of the hierarchical approach to GMS Civilization 8D leads to the condition that this system must be designed holistically. This is because uncoordinated solutions carried out by individual levels of control will lead to information and decision chaos, which will only deepen the problem of the crisis of civilization and strengthen the feeling that we are dealing with the "end the world."

Choosing an approach to designing GMS civilization 8D

Designing large and complex information systems can involve three approaches:
• Bottom-up, which results in the implementation of partial systems, forming the so-called information islands, usually at the lower level of enterprises and organizations. This level of system solutions dominates in Poland and those countries that are rapidly developing computerization.

• Top-down, which results in comprehensive and integrated systems that may also apply to the level of enterprises and organizations, for example based on ready-made SAP software. However, these systems are not hierarchical.

• Mixed, involving the replacement of the old partial system by a new comprehensive system, but gradually implementing the old system until the new one is checked and started. Such a system was the Polish National Information System (KSI) implemented in 1971-74.

In the design of GMS Civilization 8D, a mixed approach (i.e., top-down) should be adopted, because it is a hierarchical system and not only local, regional, national or continental, but also global; among other things, monitoring and improving the climate or the use of strategic resources knows no geographical boundaries. And the sustainable development of civilization requires the functioning of supportive multi-area systems with information roots in the lowest forms of human organization. It can be expected that a few well-designed enterprise and organization systems will need to be modernized in a mixed approach, according to a top-down model.

The development of IT applications to date has resulted from the progress of computational technique that dictated systemic solutions. It consisted in the fact that IT specialists designed systems, among others in healthcare, and doctors had to adapt to them. However, it should be the opposite, and the process of designing GMS Civilization 8D should reverse this direction. The IT professionals must design a system based not on what they know or like, but what is required to solve the crisis of civilization — i.e., to be essential for improving the quality or standard of lives. To prove this thesis, the following overview of the development of IT applications will be summarized as follows:

A. Examples of computational techniques that impose its mode of application:

• Weather and agricultural calculations carried out on tables / abacus (Mesopotamia 2700 BC) did not have a major impact on the functioning of primitive civilization.

• Commercial arithmometer conducted on table counting machines, starting from Pascal’s arithmometer known as Pascalin (1652) and then on parallel arithmometer (1694) by Gottfried Leibnitz (1646-1716). Pascal’s arithmometer was initially met with bankers’ sharp opposition since if one of them would break, only Blaise Pascal (1623-1662) would be able to repair it, while others were worried that those devices might introduce unemployment. His arithmometer was not accepted.
Only during the developing Industrial Revolution in the second half of the nineteenth century parallel arithmometers began to favorably support traders (best-selling among those were the Thomas [1820], and later the Odhner [1873] arithmometers) until early to mid-twentieth century.

- Censuses on Hollerith and Powers punched cards (from the second half of the 19th century) have been conducted by almost every country in the world every 10 years, subsequently switching to computers starting from the second half of the 20th century.
- Commercial accounts kept at the cash registers based on the models of the American company NCR (from 1884 until today produced by this company) began to dominate the market to this day. Small companies are still using them, and large ones have gone online.
- Carried out on punch cards commercial transactions have been dominated by the punch card machines manufactured by IBM (since 1924), by the French company BULL (since 1931), by the Czech company ARITMA (before WWII), as well as by the Soviet company SAM.
- Processing of commercial data on computers since the second half of the 20th century has been dominated by IBM computers, and then popularized via numerous computers, both American and European.

B. Examples of a computational technique that must comply with the goals and strategies of users:

- Of course, today every IT system should be designed and implemented jointly with a future user. Often, users think they are unqualified and IT professionals like to impress them.
- Systems of the type GMS Civilization 8D and other such types should have assumptions developed by users, to which designers, programmers, and operators of IT should adapt.
- Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems should have assumptions developed by future users and verified by law to prevent the economy without employees (labor-less economy).
- Internet of Things (IoT) should have assumptions developed by future users and verified by law.

From science fiction to reality - between potential and prudence

The fact that an IT system can "technically" accomplish something does not mean that it is necessary to develop such a system. For example, Ilona Weiss, President of ABC DATA (Onet, 8 July, 2019) says: "AI not only leads to an increasingly deeper automation of various processes, but also more accurate inference and diagnosis. It will become the driving force behind the dynamic development and sale of various types of medical devices and platforms, the services of which will be available to all of us."
Unfortunately, Ms. President forgets that the first AI-based medical expert system was Mycin based on 500 principles developed at Stanford University in the early 1970s (i.e. almost 50 years ago). But it was not accepted because the doctors who used it could not receive insurance for the so-called bad practices. And they still will not get it, neither they nor the IT companies that produce them.

Similarly, 5G can encrypt transmitted data in a 256-bit record whose breaking is supposedly impossible. Hackers who would like to break into these transmissions would have to use quantum computers that are not yet widely available. But for some countries (USA, China, Russia, Iran, etc.) this is a kind of cyberwar weaponry, and access is not a problem. Another problem will be the unreliability of mass IoT networks that will break down or freeze like home computers today, and will not be repaired to "move the stopped city."

The development of computational technique occurs at the speed of development of a science fiction concept. Especially when it comes to computational e-technique (so-called ETO or "digitization"). Table 3 characterizes its introduction periods and consequences for the design of its applications in periods of machine civilization (characterized by its number of spaces - D) attacked by computational technique.

Table 3. Degrees of development of machine civilization attacked by computational technique with respect to geographical considerations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEGREE OF CIVILIZATION COMPLEXITY</th>
<th>SYSTEM RESULT</th>
<th>BENEFIT</th>
<th>SPONSORS</th>
<th>REPERCUSSIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2D (1880-2070)</td>
<td>Paper print-out</td>
<td>Improved bureaucracy</td>
<td>Business and public administration</td>
<td>Reduction of number of clerks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3D (2000-)</td>
<td>Hologram on a screen</td>
<td>Improved security of citizens</td>
<td>Better visualization of geographic assets</td>
<td>Better management of territorial assets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4D (1983-)</td>
<td>4G Wi Fi Internet of people (IoP)</td>
<td>Global communication</td>
<td>Almost every firm and users</td>
<td>Better climate monitoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5D (2000+)</td>
<td>Monitoring of streets and buildings</td>
<td>Improved security of people</td>
<td>City administration, business, hospitals, schools, colleges</td>
<td>Better monitoring of criminals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6D (2020+)</td>
<td>5G fast Wi Fi Internet of everything (people and things) (IoE)</td>
<td>Unreliable machine civilization</td>
<td>Promoted by naive young generation</td>
<td>Labor-free economy, communistic commune supported by governmental universal pay. Useless political leadership</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Comparative Civilization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEGREE OF CIVILIZATION COMPLEXITY</th>
<th>SYSTEM RESULT</th>
<th>BENEFIT</th>
<th>SPONSORS</th>
<th>REPERCUSSIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7D (2030+)</td>
<td>Cyborg, a new race of mankind</td>
<td>Civilization attacked from within</td>
<td>Promoted by greedy Big Business</td>
<td>War old human race vs cyborgs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8D (2040)</td>
<td>Human victorious?</td>
<td>Wise civilization?</td>
<td>Strong legal control of applications</td>
<td>Perhaps old mankind will win with a new mankind?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Analyzing the stages of development of machine civilization is not the subject of this article. The approach here is based on a top-down-bottom-up method similar to climate dynamics. And the purpose of this classification is to awaken responsible people to the fact that enthusiastic rapture of what artificial intelligence can do for humans is interesting but also dangerous. That is because it leads to widespread unemployment (labor-free economy) and communism, where everyone will receive an equal benefit from the state to pay bills. This allowance will come from a fund created by several owners of all robots in the world as taxation for their "extraordinary technical progress." There are already examples of universal support for people not working in Finland and in the city of Stockton, California in the USA (130 km from Silicon Valley), where there is high unemployment and poor workers receive an inverted base salary of $500 per month, except for temporary state insurance for the unemployed.

As for the development of cyborgs, their future is best praised by the most famous American futurologist Ray Kurzweil, claiming that around 2025 computers will think faster than people, thus creating in this way the so-called singularity, referring to the Higgs "divine particle" boson that arose in time $t = 0$ Big Bang of our universe. Similarly, Kurzweil says, will computers lead a new Big Bang to a new species of man? He forgets that quick thinking does not mean wise thinking. Also, why should we allow fast-thinking cyborgs to kill us as we once did when we were a Cro-Magnon? Then, we "got rid of" the Neanderthals in Central Europe. Isaac Asimov already predicted this situation, when in 1940s-50s he developed three laws on how to deal with robots. First, we cannot design robots that will kill us. What is worse, before the machine civilization ends us, we will first finish ourselves because of promoting a lifestyle that will end human civilization. That will be discussed in further sections of this study.

5. The triangle of death of civilization

The public does not notice that modern civilization has led to the creation of the "death triangle of civilization".
It is a combination of population, ecological, and resources bombs. This concept was introduced by Targowski\(^1\) and it is illustrated by the model in Fig. 6. The power of this triangle relies on the interrelationships between bombs.

**Figure 6. The Death Triangle of Civilization**

- **Population bomb** - The biggest threat to civilization is the overpopulation of the small planet Earth. In 2020, the population was 7.8 billion, and is growing annually by about 80 million people, or by the size of two countries such as Poland. In the last 50 years (1960–2020) the world population has more than doubled - from three billion to 7.8 billion people. This is more than what has happened in the last two million years, that is, since we began to behave like people, not hominids. In the third millennium, people reproduce at a rate of 1.2% per year, which leads to a doubling of the current population over the next 58 years, or around 2070. Then there will probably be about 14 billion of us. In recent years, another billion people arrives every 12–13 years\(^2\). The current size of the population should be considered the number one problem of modern civilization. For this reason, an agreement should be reached between organized religious religion, business, and governments regarding the system of controlling the development of the world's population. To date, organized religious religion (especially the Catholic Church) opposes all birth control, but does not feel responsible for the fate of the born. Governments in democratic countries are also passive, not wanting to repeat the alleged mistake China has made to introduce a strict birth control system. However, the role of business is not considered at all.


What is particularly striking in the research on the future of civilization is the passivity of conclusions. They show human helplessness in the absence of any major impact on population formation.

**Ecological bomb** - It results from overpopulation of the planet and from civilization that destroys the natural environment. Overpopulation and the wasteful lifestyle mean that the so-called footprint is too large to keep the natural environment intact. The footprint measures how much land and water a person needs for biological survival, how much space (s)he needs for buildings and roads, and how much fresh air must be absorbed that can emit carbon dioxide (CO2). The size of the footprint varies over time, depending on the dynamics of functioning civilization (its development and fall). This measure assesses how quickly people consume resources and generate waste compared to how quickly nature can absorb our waste and how quickly it regenerates its resources. According to assessments, civilization currently consumes the equivalent of one and a half planet in terms of resources used and the possibilities of our waste absorption. This means that we consume half of the planet's "spare" resources, in other words - we take them from a warehouse that we cannot replenish to the initial level. According to UN estimates, if the current trend of population growth and consumption of strategic resources continues, then around 2030, civilization will need two Earth-type planets to support its functioning. In 2050, however, we will need three of our planets to keep civilization in motion and at the current level of quality of life. Regarding global warming, scientists working for NASA have found that the Thwaites glacier in the west of Antarctica, which the media called 'the holocaust glacier', has become even more unstable. The glacier was “loud” at the beginning of 2019, when NASA found a pit the size of Manhattan. The total melting of Thwaites would raise sea levels by 50 cm, which would soon flood many coastal cities³. What is more, the instability of the ice giant also gives rise to the conclusion that a similar fate awaits other glaciers.

**Depletion of strategic resources bomb** - For 5800 years, or 96% of its existence, civilization operated on the muscles of humans and animals and was not limited by any energy raw materials except caloric (containing protein) food. Since the time of the industrial revolution, i.e. in the last 200 years, civilization has been operating based on internal combustion engines. Thanks to this, it became self-sufficient, extremely comfortable for people, and very productive. The American Petroleum Institute predicts, that if not within 40, then maybe within 50-80 years the oil reserves will run out sometime between 2062 and 2094. At the same time, its price will increase, as mining techniques are becoming increasingly advanced and expensive. A similar fate awaits gas, uranium, and coal reserves.

The first two resources will be enough for the next 40-50 years of automatic civilization, while the coal reserves are larger and will last until 2300. The solution to the automatic civilization’s dilemma of the depletion of energy resources would be human knowledge. And indeed, engineers have developed ways to generate renewable energy based on wind power, solar radiation, and invented biofuels. The reserves of non-ferrous metals, with the largest deposits in China, are similar. Non-ferrous metals are necessary in the production of electronic devices, which are the most characteristic products of automatic civilization, because they control systems that ensure this self-reliance. When these metals run out, then civilization may cease to be automatic.

Conclusions:

➢ The biggest threat to civilization is the overpopulation of the planet, which entails the destruction of the environment and the depletion of strategic resources. Therefore, the world's population should be reduced to an optimal size of five billion in 2050.

➢ The reduction of the world's population should be accompanied by a change in lifestyle, so that the footprints of individual countries return to the permissible levels in 2050, i.e. most countries must get rid of the ecosystem deficit and proceed to its reconstruction.

➢ Contemporary inhabitants of civilization, and especially their opinion-forming centers in the form of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), are well informed and talk about problems of overcrowding, ecology and resource depletion, but politicians elected in cycles for two to four years do not attach importance to this type of information and warnings. Especially troublesome is the fact that they listen not to their voters, but to lobbyists who financially support their careers in various legal forms. Therefore, world policy should be governed by new goals of the twenty-first century.

6. Architecture of GMS CIVILIZATION 8D - world

The current approach to implementing a sustainable civilization is mainly limited to agreements on the limitation of harmful gas emissions to reduce or even maintain the current temperature. For example, the Paris Agreement (2016) has been mainly concerned with the issue that the temperature does not rise by 2°C until the end of the 21st century. Not to mention the lack of a computerized system for monitoring and managing sustainable civilization.

Therefore, until the World Civilization Organization (WCO) and its regional and national branches are established, it will not be possible to develop and manage a sustainable civilization.

The creation of the WOC should not surprise anyone, because similar organizations already exist, such as WTO - World Trade Organization, WHO-World Health Organization, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, UNESCO, UN, World Tourism Organization, International Atomic Energy Agency, ILO-International Labor Office, and many more similar.

Figure 7. World Geoinformatic Management System (GMS)

Fig. 7 shows the architecture of the 8D World Geoinformation Control System for Civilization, which includes the following elements:
➢ Goal - to support monitoring and activities in the development and steering of sustainable civilization
➢ Mission - to ensure the preservation of the human species in a balanced civilization, where work is a means to enrich humanistic human values
➢ Strategy - a top-down approach
➢ Policies - man and his health and nature are more important than money
➢ Creed - man is better than a machine
➢ Scopes of knowing and reacting as subsystems:
  ▪ WATER - potable, agricultural, industrial, and other
  ▪ CLIMATE - temperature, gases, changes, threats
  ▪ NATURE - ecology, animals, greenery, forests, rivers, seas, mountains, glaciers and more
  ▪ RESOURCES (natural); energy, metals, calcium, and others
  ▪ ENERGY (traditional) - combustion, nuclear and renewable energy
  ▪ SOCIETY - population, lifestyle, health, education, construction, work, globalization, mechanization, automation, computerization, artificial intelligence, relations and business goals, and others
  ▪ AREA - land development, urbanization, ecological construction and others
  ▪ WASTES - permanent, organic, sewage, landfills, renewable, and others
  ▪ RECYCLING - types of materials
  ▪ LEADERSHIP - leaders and organizations involved and indifferent to ecology.
➢ Cockpit GMS Civilization 8D (management dashboard), whose users are, among others, The World Organization of Civilizations and is continental organizations that monitor civilizations; American, European, African, Asian, Oceanic and Polar.
➢ World Cognition Database, which is a continental exchange reservoir of knowledge. The cognition scope involves:
  ▪ Big Data - recording processes and events
  ▪ Big Information - calculating changes in processes and events that cause corrective or improvement actions
  ▪ Big Concepts - collecting functioning and innovative ideas, but waiting for implementation
  ▪ Big Knowledge - scientific data, principles, and laws of particular knowledge domains that generate awareness of the situation
  ▪ Big Wisdom - optimal choices for solving problems and making decisions
➢ The World Infostrada Civilization, or the Global Tele-information Network (GAN-GLOBAL AREA NETWORK), which is a private network of WCO and regional national branches. It is not an Internet-based network that does not ensure the security of transmitted information.
➢ Other elements that do not need to be defined in this first conceptual architecture. Further assumptions will be refined in the process of realization of technical projects.
The GMS cockpit will perform e-process and make available all kinds of information about the implementation of unified Key Performance Indicators (KPI). Their calculation, updating and communication to users must be standardized and integrated in aggregations at all levels of this system. Otherwise there will be chaos, which is already taking place, because there are several indicator systems at the enterprise level, which, however, are not logically balanced. That is because there is no World Civilization Organization yet to provide such geoinformatics coordination in World civilization.

World Organization of Civilizations should operate based on the following main principles:

➢ Each state is obliged to be a member of the WOC and its branches because civilization covers entire continents and is not selective. Countries that neglect the sustainable development of sustainable civilization can be a serious threat to other countries that care for civilization, including climate and water, as well as strategic raw materials, etc.

➢ At the very beginning of the WCO, each country pays 1% of its KPB, but multiplied by exceeding the global hectare limit, per ha. Most countries exceed their limit twice, and some emirates exceed it by up to 10 times.

➢ In the event of non-compliance with some countries' goals and strategies, the appropriate policies, procedures, various types of penalties will be imposed. That would be accomplished by adopting the principle that ecology has an advantage over democracy, which disregards its responsibilities to the common planet. Which follows from the principles of Wise civilization.

7. Architecture of GMS Civilization 8D – continent

This architecture is like the architecture of GMS Civilization 8D World (Fig. 7), except that its main users are the countries of the continent. For example, in Europe we are dealing with a European Western civilization, a European Southern civilization, a European Central civilization, a European Eastern civilization, and a European Northern civilization.

8. Architecture of GMS Civilization 8D state – Poland

The architecture of SKG Civilization 8D of the state is shown in Fig. 8. Poland was adopted as an example of this type of system.
Figure 8. State (Poland) Geoinformatic Management System (GMS)

Architecture of GMS CIVILIZATION 8D - region – reminds architecture at the state level, only limited to its regions, and its elements will be the SKG of enterprises, referred to below.


The architecture of the Geoinformatics Management System of 8D Enterprises (organizations) is shown in Figure 9.
10. Bottom-up verification of the concept of sustainable civilization by the city architect Lech Makowski.\textsuperscript{5}

The movement towards sustainable civilization emerged from academic circles that first realized the decline of modern civilization based on the constant growth of population and economy, which is unsustainable. The range of solutions has many options, which are usually hastily defined and implemented that leads to even greater environmental degradation and the decline of civilization. Experienced practitioners involved in urban development are rarely listened to. To them, among others the architect Lech Makowski, who verifies bottom-up the top-down system solutions presented in this study as follows:

- Solar panels and windmills - it turns out that their energy yield is low, and their installation requires colossal tracts of land, which is ecologically damaged, and the production of panels causes great environmental pollution.

\textsuperscript{5} Lech Makowski is a Polish-American architect, a graduate of the Gdańsk University of Technology, who has been implementing architectural projects in Los Angeles for several decades. He is a sculptor and conceptual art painter.
- Windmills are also a big mistake. The efficiency achieved is not proportional to the production costs and materials used. In addition, they cause millions of birds to die annually.
- It would be unfair to say that all this makes no sense, because it is absolutely necessary and sensible to replace the existing energy sources with alternative energies, but this must be preceded by a very thorough design and analysis of effectiveness and side effects.
- Regarding the topic of cities and the slogan 'ecological sustainability', it has already become evident that cities that we often use as examples of urban order cease to be meaningful and functional and lead to one logical conclusion: that there must be mass decentralization of urban structures. A reversal of the centralized concept centers such as New York, San Francisco, Mexico City or even Warsaw. Life in such an environment is becoming a torture and any attempts to solve it are doomed to failure, which was perfectly noticeable during the 2020 pandemic, where the largest number of infections was in the centers of large cities.
- Progress in technologies supporting family life and culture of using free time is best implemented in small groups of people.
- As a result of the progress of automation, robotization and computerization, there is talk of a universal income-subsidy for everyone who will not work because there will be no work. This is nonsense, because there will be products, but there will be no consumers able to buy them.
- As to the topic of overpopulation, proposals for its regulation are unrealizable while pandemics, wars and revolutions remain. In addition, the control method that took place in China in the 20th century did not work. To get a 5% decrease in population in this way in the world, one must wait 50 years. Once President Reagan, when asked what he thinks about abortion, answered in this way, "I noticed that all those who support abortion so much have already been born." Another expert Paul Ehrlich⁶, whom Pope Francis invited to a conference in the Vatican, says that at a certain age, i.e. around 70, they become not only unproductive but also unnecessary. The only reasonable solution would be to regulate birth by improving contraceptives with absolute exclusion of any abortion. The church would have an easier situation to promote the regulation of the population. Disseminated measures would have to be very meticulously checked for side effects. It would be a much slower process, but without tragic and ruthless methods of destroying everything along the way. Since we have come to an agreement on emissions of carbon dioxide and loans, there should be nothing to prevent such an agreement on birth control.
- As for technology and innovation in all industries. In a world where most of the work will be done by robots, there is no need to involve people in any other activity. But where will the financial resources come from for such technological progress?

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⁶ Paul Ehrlich is Bing's Professor of Population Studies and president of the Center for Biology Conservation at Stanford University. He is the author of several dozen books and hundreds of peer-reviewed scientific articles.
Universal pay removes the so-called additional “product” or profit. Since people are paid for not doing so, any increase in their yard will eat yields from the production costs of all factories. This is a bit masochistic. And thus technical progress will stop because there will be no funds to finance it. It seems that at this point the American futurologist Rey Kurzweil “hits his head against the wall.”

- As for “Wise civilization,” I agree that nature comes first. But from the beginning, we have been programmed in human civilization that nature is subordinated to us and is meant to serve us. Unfortunately, as it happens with human nature, we have distorted it in a caricatured way. So the question is whether it would be better to put this matter in such a way that since we are part of nature and we cannot exist without it, whether under pressure or without it, we must keep all the principles of its protection and give it the possibility of regeneration.

- I do not think that we should tolerate or accept all degenerations proposed by demagogues, such as protecting the environment of a single slug at the expense of stopping the construction of a dam that is needed by the local population. The basic principle is the balance of human needs and the needs of nature. There is scope for sensible and impartial scientists.

- As for the "Wise Civilization" political system, the systems that have taken place in the last 200 years have either failed the test or have reached their limits and are leading us to failure. I have the impression that only the federalization of sovereign state units can prevent great conflicts. The example of the United States is just a pattern of such a formation, but its “architecture” should be planned by impartial and recognized experts. Evolution has created a symbiosis between a given environment and a man settled there. It is unbelievable social à la Stalinist in moving entire nations to other places such as Tatars, Chechens, Ingush or starving Ukrainians and other ethnic groups for a total of about 6 million including 1-1.5 killed in the name of an overarching political doctrine. It is senseless to pull individuals or whole groups out of places where their culture, customs and interpersonal relationships grew up.

- One can see conflicts reduced slightly through a hybrid form of syncretism. That is because the preservation of religions practiced in different regions has historical and cultural justification. This problem should be approached from the point of view of ecumenism, tolerance, coexistence and additionally applying regulation of behavior and restrictions in this area. This would be possible when formulating federal legislation. Conflicts usually arise at the intersection of ethnic, state, and religious interests, which should be regulated in a new federalist formation. Here you can quote the thought of C.S. Lewis: “that evil is not that people stop believing in God and they don't believe in anything anymore, but that they are ready to believe in everything.”
• The visions of Huxley's newborn farms of the Bokanovsky Group, deity cults or stupefaction and stunning of all normal human reflexes using the drug "soma" had only the probability of solving problems only among "crazy scientists and politicians."

11. Summary

➢ The use of information systems to manage the sustainable development of the planet Earth requires a planning and design approach - from the top (top-down) because the climate has no boundaries and a solution at the level of the country, region or enterprise, even a very good one, may not be effective in a wider spatial continent or the world.

➢ For such systems to be implemented, it is necessary to recognize the World Civilization Organization (WCO), like the World Health Organization, the World Trade Organization, or many others with similar tasks.

➢ There is the opportunity for a country to be a pioneer of this approach if it creates the National Organization for Civilization (NCO), which will push for the creation of the WCO and ECO (European Civilization Organization).

Bibliography


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7 Bokanovsky's trial is a fictitious process of cloning people depicted in Aldous Huxley's novel "A New Wonderful World" from 1932.
The Phenomenology of Civilization:  
A Dialogue Between Profs. Gabriel Breton and George Drury  
At Monteith College  
Plus, Two Associated Commentaries on Civilization by George Drury

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This dialogue on the nature of civilization took place on the stage at Wayne State University fifty-seven years ago on January 29, 1964, and shortly thereafter. It was part of an interdisciplinary course titled “The Science of Society,” given by Monteith College.

Monteith was a small, experimental interdisciplinary college, funded by the Ford Foundation and established within Wayne State University, Detroit, Michigan. The college began in 1959 and was closed in 1981.

The overall purpose of the experimental college was “to test whether a small college on a large university (campus) for commuters could provide a first-rate education for average undergraduates, support the individual student in his quest to find himself, replenish the vitality of general education, and do these things as effectively as the best private liberal arts colleges.”

Thus, the college itself was launched with the following characteristics in mind (drawn from a larger list of goals):

1. It was to be kept small in size, with a ceiling on enrollment at about 1,200 students.

2. It was not to be an honors college *per se* but would admit any student eligible to enter Wayne State University.

3. Students were to be taught, for the main part, in small discussion groups beginning in their freshman year, with an emphasis on acquiring the art of dialogue - that is, on expression and communication of ideas orally and in writing, with peers and professors.

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1 This is drawn from the Monteith College Archives Collection and may be found at https://reuther.wayne.edu/files/WSR000453.pdf
4. The objectives were restricted to those of imparting a coherent general education across four years on the undergraduate level and developing the student's capacity for independent work and communications.

5. The curriculum was designed to implement the idea that there is a body of knowledge which every educated person should possess. The founders of the college maintained that the primary task of general education is to identify and impart this knowledge.

6. The basic courses were not intended as technical introductions to specialized disciplinary studies. Nor were they to be simply tastes or surveys of the various traditional disciplines. Rather, they were to be truly integrated attempts to ask the large questions that transcend departmental boundaries and to bring to bear evidence, concerns, and methods from a wide variety of sources.²

Research evaluating the ultimate outcomes of the college, undertaken as a study by The Center for Research and Development in Higher Education at the University of California at Berkeley, indicated that, in the end, the graduates of this experimental college resembled more the intellectual profiles of Ivy League graduates than they did those who graduated from large state universities.

The basic curriculum of the college consisted of team-taught one- or two-year sequences in “Humanistic Studies”; “Science of Society”; Natural Science; plus, a Senior Colloquia, and the Senior Essay. The “Science of Society” course was represented by the following diagram of the order and topics covered: Man > Relation > Small Group > Pattern > Little Community > Socialization > Complex Organizations > Work > Social Movement > Civilization. Overall, the assigned readings for the course consisted of material drawn from the disciplines of anthropology, sociology, psychology, political science, and philosophy.

The following dialogue (edited, in part) involved two thinkers oriented to the nature of civilizations.

The first participant was Gabriel Breton, a sociologist and social philosopher. He was a founder of a journal entitled New University Thought (continued as New University Studies). The entire run of 3,000 issues of this journal sold out upon publication, and the journal upped its print run to 10,000 for the print edition.

² Ibid.
The editors declared that they “desired to live in an intellectual community which does not suffer from internal fragmentation or alienation from the larger society, one which provides constructive social and ideological leadership.” In 1961 he engaged in a fascinating debate with David Riesman in the journal.3

The other discussant was George Drury, a philosopher and social scientist. He received his PhD at the University of Chicago and was widely known as a founder and sustaining force in the movement for democratically-based education. He was a student of the distinguished philosopher Richard McKeon and taught, before Monteith, at the Bishop Sheil School in Chicago; that institution was active in promoting social justice issues and liberal Catholic thought. A charter faculty member of Monteith College, he was invited in 1971 to participate in the founding of Empire State College, and later on he moved to Rochester to be part of the Genesee Valley Center.4

The following slightly edited dialogue is from the files of Dr. Kenneth Feigenbaum, who was also one of the founders of the Monteith College experiment. It is followed by two lectures given by Prof. Drury on the topic.

The Phenomenology of Civilization: An Exchange Between Gabriel Breton and George Drury, January 29, 1964

Gabriel Breton: I suppose you could characterize what I am going to do for just a few minutes, until I yield the floor to George, as a kind of phenomenology of civilization. Now, even if we don’t talk about the underlying material forces — material in the Marxist sense of social, economic, and technological — that either bring about or accompany civilization, it doesn’t mean that we are unaware of their existence or that we ignore them or consider them unimportant. But I think we’ll be saying very little about them.

The reason I said “the phenomenology of civilization” is that I would like to describe the features of civilization that strike one, let’s say, on the surface, as opposed to the underlying forces that either cause or determine or bring about these features or aspects of civilization.

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4 See his obituary at https://obits.democratandchronicle.com/obituaries/democratandchronicle/obituary.aspx?n=george-f-drury&pid=142992228
The two things that I find striking about civilization are that civilized man perceives himself as distinct from nature and that he perceives himself as distinct from his clan or his tribe or his society, his group, which means that a new kind of relationship has developed between himself and nature and between himself and other men.

As a matter of fact, others could probably better describe or characterize the opposite of this in a tribal world; the fact is, for instance, that the tribal man does not really feel a distinction between himself and nature. I don’t think that words like “he feels part of nature” are accurate, for in a certain sense the distinction man/nature doesn’t exist for him, nor do the distinctions individual/group or individual/tribe exist for him.

However, I don’t want to go into that. First, I don’t really know what it can feel like to be in a tribe and not know these distinctions. I have no idea of what the opposite of this could be or feel like, although others have attempted to convey a sort of feeling about this to us.

When man begins developing the notion of nature, that means that he is also developing a notion of the nature of Man (with a capital “M”). Thus, he perceives these two notions as the two terms in an antithesis, or a dichotomy: the notion of nature is also, at the same time, a theory of nature, or at least a theory of the relationship between man and nature.

This distinction, this distance, between man and nature that begins developing in the process of civilization implies reflection. And with reflection come rational principles, abstract principles, reasons, and of course philosophy. And in the sequence, the existential sequences, if you wish, between the motion and the act, in T.S. Eliot’s phrase, falls the shadow. But what falls there is an important moment; it is the moment of choice, or the moment of reflection. This little gap can broaden, become very wide, or it can narrow. The sequence, however, becomes more and more complicated.

This is the characteristic of civilization; you can complicate the sequence between, let’s say, the intention and the result, or the action. However, the fact that you cut the sequence —I’ll repeat Eliot’s terms; I think poetic terms are probably better than any other here — between the motion and the act, the conception and the creation, this brings about the play of the imagination as — is it Huizinga who discusses this? — elements of possibilities, alternatives, choice.

Man becomes preoccupied with this, with what can fill in this little gap. And that’s really when he develops such things as methodologies, codes, styles, rules of etiquette — that is, the manner, the means and the ways of doing things, and ethical principles, ethics. He reflects on the means of doing things and the general style, which is artificial, the general artificial style develops.
Instead of having just a spontaneous ritual of the whole tribe, you have, for instance, the theatre, for which people have written rules, and things like this.

Instead of acting or behaving based on myth, you now behave based on some philosophy.

You can have more than one way of doing things. When you break the sequence, you become aware that there are more ways than one in which something can be done. Then the choice of the way, the choice that you are going to make, is based on, as I say, the philosophy. You now do something because it’s rational, or you do it because it’s refined, or because it’s civilized, or because it’s natural. (Maybe George will talk about that — this business of the natural which automatically implies a theory of nature, or a view of man’s relation to nature.)

I mentioned that man now perceives himself as distinct from other people. What I should say is “distinct from the clan, or from the group,” because he always perceives himself as distinct from other people. But his consciousness in the tribe has not developed to a point of an elaborated notion of “the individual.” As has been noted, in the tribe they didn’t have a word for “self.”

I wanted to say something about the attitude of man towards the stranger, the concept of the stranger. It has been said that in a tribe, the tribal man knows no strangers; the only strangers he ever sees are either dead ones or running ones.

Now, in a civilization — especially a civilization like ours, an urban-type civilization — you meet nothing but strangers of the tribe, where there isn’t anyone that you ever meet who is a stranger; you know everyone and are related to a large number of them. In fact, in an urban setting, you have the exact opposite of that; the great majority of people, probably ninety-eight percent, that you meet, are strangers.

There are, however, ways of dealing with strangers in a civilization: First, you admit the existence of a stranger; and then there are all kinds of ways of dealing with him. This is, I think, probably parallel with what I was talking about when I was saying that man starts thinking of ways of dealing with nature, and it involves things like ethics and rules of etiquette.

**George Drury:** As we examine civilization and its contents, we might describe what I intend to do as trying to reflect on Gabriel’s reflections.

Civilization, I think, strikes Gabriel and me, among others, in a way that perhaps it does not strike those with a different approach. And perhaps our real effort is to associate in a fruitful way these approaches.
Thus, it does not strike us, I think, that civilization is something natural, a kind of natural growth. Now, this might be one view, that after all man is in some sense part of nature, or at least the things he does are presumably — most of the time, and so far as certain limits are concerned, all of the time — within the possible extension of his nature; he is doing, so to speak, what comes naturally.

So, from this perspective, it would be the case that civilization (here presented at the end of our rather long and often wonderful deliberations in social science) should flower somewhat naturally, that there should be, if you will, a continuity, that the growth from tribe to civilization would represent a continuity.

But there might be certain difficulties in taking on intellectually or conceptually, fruitful to social science, this larger magnitude, but after all the line of continuity would be there. In other words, the proper approach to a civilization would be to consider it. And, as with Ruth Benedict and thinkers like her, you do get a great deal from this kind of consideration.

But for Gabriel and me — at least this morning — there is a discontinuity involved in civilization. And the very fact that he this morning turns to the phenomenology of civilization is a sort of indication of that gap, that break, that discontinuity, because to say that things appear certainly says that they are at some distance, that there’s some sort of elongation of what it is that you are concerned with as phenomenon or appearance. If I hold my hand immediately before my eyes, I see neither my hand nor anything else. But if there is some distance created, then there is an appearance, a phenomenon that needs to be accounted for.

Now, in what I hope is not the senescence or old age of civilization, it does strike many thinkers concerned with these problems that this distance is hard to traverse, that it is hard, let us say, to bring our consciousness to join that which appears. Hence Gabriel’s statement that in civilization from this view we are concerned with the features which strike one. I suggest here that features are aspects of appearance. That they should strike one suggests that they are a certain distance off, if only to wind up in order to strike one. Or, as Paul Valery says, the whole business of philosophy is concerned with what transpires between the object and the perceiver. And he says it’s a business which is never finished. And this, I think, is what Gabriel meant by saying that we create the gap and then within that gap we complicate the sequences. And they become ever more complicated. As we try, like Achilles and the tortoise, to cover this distance, we find more and more things intervening.

So, as we consider civilized man, preliminarily, we must develop an essay in aid of an eventual phenomenology of civilization, distinct from nature.
And, as we were saying, distinct from his fellow man. Instead of it being merely a kind of presumption that one’s fellow man is one’s fellow man, the whole attempt is to try to reach him so that he may be indeed a fellow man.

It is suggested that this is a new relation. That is, it is not just continuous in what might be called a kind of natural growth. There is this gap; there is this distance. And, as Gabriel suggested, we try to join the two extremes of this gap, without, hopefully, falling through. But as you know from your reading and your considerations, this is often the dismay, the kind of terror of our time, that reflection instead of being able to join the other is apt to fall through. There is, so to speak, a “hole in the bottom of the ocean”; instead of something, we find that what sustains the sequence between me and the other is a kind of nothingness.

Put another way: In an allusion to Eliot’s notion of between the creation — that is, the tribal, the organic, the living, the consanguineous, if you will, the relations in the sense of blood relations, and so forth — between this and those conceptions or concepts which our consciousness developed, is indeed discontinuity, is indeed a kind of gap.

Man embarks upon the adventure of, let’s say, thinking up things for himself. Instead of, we might say, the dumb raptures (as John Dewey once called them) or the organic experiences of life (this at least is our imagination of the tribal consciousness), instead of that sort of thing we do have this gap in which a number of things can intervene. And instead of dumb raptures we have consciousness, awareness of what we are doing. Consciousness itself might be described, if not indeed defined, as a drawing back, as a pause, as a kind of hesitation. It is as though we step back from life to rehearse what our next step will be.

This has given us the various things that we have, such as tall buildings, speedy modes of transportation and communication, and electric lights. Often, we are self-congratulatory about it. But we realize also that in addition to its glories, modernity also brings, via this very gap, problems which we have somehow to take on, both in knowing the dimensions and character of the gap and in somehow bringing back together or associating these extremes — the creative, organic, tribal life and the life of conception, the life in which Man who has Nature begins to show up. This does not wholly perplex us.

Yet this is the problem: We say that we would have a solution if only we could bring the conceptual, the theoretical, the universalizing, the consciousness, the estrangement, if only we could bring this to join more richly, more appositely, more significantly, with life. We have a nostalgia on the one hand, but on the other we are in concept-land. This perhaps is our modern mood, to shuttle back and forth between the nostalgia for a golden age and the pride which we have in our accomplishments since, as Marx said, we first stepped out of nature and began to make things for ourselves.
This straddling, this shuttling back and forth, at least in imagination, in the play of the imagination, the development of modes, styles, thinking up things, is what we would mean by reflection. And we might say that philosophy, or the phenomenology of civilization as we are here talking about it, attempts to bring our attention to bear upon this gap: to see what is its significance. What are possible tracks by which we could bring the two together again?

We are concerned here in the last of our courses in social science to consider the maximum stretch, if you will, of interaction that is significant to consider. It’s not likely to be the case, if only because we began as behavioral and always maintain that tie, that here at the end of our course we’ll say, in a philosophical fashion known as stoicism, that the human race constitutes one vast whole or unity, not at least in any realistic sense for us as social scientists. This may be one aspect, may be the conceptual side of our ideal.

But none of us as social scientists, having been through Korea, Cornerville, *Two Worlds of Change*, and the rest, has only this concept. This would require delivering up too much of what became so meaningful in our going through various environments or instances or complexes of interactions. That is, none of us at this point, I think, shows much enthusiasm for becoming whiffs of smoke in a kind of dream of universalized man. If we join up with humanity and work towards its greater unity, we want to do this with what we want to take along, namely, what has made us what we are.

We want to carry our values with us, so that while the conceptual or universal appeal is there, there is also the strong and very vital valuing of that which we want to take along with us.

It has been said that the stoic ideal of humanity was so much skywriting. But instead of skywriting, we want something that has a local habitation and a name. (It is undoubtedly the influence of the Clarence Hillberry Theater stage behind us that leads to all the quotations from Shakespeare this morning.)

*So, if we want something definite to be designated when we say civilization, let us indicate those complexes of interaction, those groupings, vast as they are and must be, of human beings living together who have entertained the problems set by the gap between life on the one hand and consciousness on the other.*

I think that Gabriel’s and my reflections say that if the whole that you are going to study is a civilization, then what you will be looking for is a whole containing a gap within it. The gap that we look for is the gap between the natural, the organic, and the conscious, reflective, philosophical, or scientific life.
In keeping with Gabriel’s last point, we can ask: When the strange or the stranger shows up, what sort of accommodation, what sort of arrangement for encountering him, is made? There are solutions in times past which said, well, a stranger shows up and you take him in or take him out. We have certain aspirations to do better than that; we don’t want perhaps so much any longer to try to close the gap by absorbing the stranger. We don’t want to give up the stranger; his strangeness has perhaps become wonder.

How then to bridge the gap? What can be done about it? Experience of civilization leads us to try to take advantage of the gap, to say that this gap which is so much on our minds (or, if you will, in our minds) these days tells us something about ourselves, tells us something about ourselves as human beings. Perhaps it is the case that we don’t want not to close it, since we don’t want to give up the glories of consciousness by a mere return to the tribal, or in Marxian terms, by a return to nature as such.

I suppose that what we are looking for is something to fill in the gap, some kind of medium which will re-join the natural life of man, which remains something that we value, even as we watch it succumb to the productions growing out of our adventure with consciousness. What we seek is closing of the gap which will bring us the benefits of a return to the tribal conditions or to the natural life but with retention of consciousness of where we have been.

**Gabriel Breton:** I want to ask you a question. I want to ask about the attitude that man takes towards nature, or the theory that he develops of nature, which has taken the form of imitation of nature in the case of art.

I should have prefaced this by saying that the methods, the ways that man fills the gap that we have been talking about are based on either his theory of man or his theory of nature—or his theory of both. Now, this theory of nature has been in the case of art for a long time the idea of imitating nature. And in science, especially nowadays, we speak of dominating nature. I want to ask what you make of this.

**George Drury:** Well, I think that if you take the gap from the shore of consciousness and seek to re-join the other shore of life from let’s call it the scientific or rationalistic standpoint — that what you seem to move towards is the notion of art as imagination. In other words, there are more things in heaven and hell than are dreamt of in your philosophy.

On the other hand, if you (I make no claims here; I’m just taking a logical counterpart) take your stand on the tribal shore, as we’ve been calling it, perhaps then you would conceive of art — if you knew about consciousness; maybe this is even your first approach to consciousness—as the imitation of nature.
You might see art as carrying out Aristotle’s notion that we owe a good deal to the earlier mythmakers because, although they expressed themselves in stories, what they did express were many of the truths which Aristotle and his successors have, from their point of view, cleared up a bit by getting rid of all the good things in the story.

Maybe if you and I were to stand midway — if we had whereon to stand, and perhaps my reflections on your reflections and your reflections on my reflections would give us whereon to stand — perhaps what we think of there as filling the gap would be art as expression, art as expressing and making something of our straddling of both the shore of the organic and that of the conscious or universal.

Well, this is what we in broad intention have to say. We didn’t know that it would turn out quite this way.

Some Reflections on “Civilization as Reflection.” By George Drury

In a lecture that I gave to some predecessors of yours I developed the thought that civilization has not only a descriptive meaning but also represents a kind of obligation — without the form of imperialism with which it sometimes has been associated: civilized beings have to take into account, or to envision the taking into account, of the whole wide world. By what terms is this to be brought together and its parts associated, and so forth?

We need a further dimension in which to accomplish this. We need to consider science itself. This is the meaning of the previous remarks, “reflection on reflection.” In a way science reflects the world. So, we might say that we need to consider that account, if only to accommodate it with other accounts that we may encounter.

I might call that, broadly, a kind of logic. When I delivered those remarks, I was thinking in terms of method as being very closely associated with, even conditioning, what your science, your account of the world, or your philosophy might be. At that time what I was concerned with was the possibility of discourse or association between people, thinkers, who would want to take everything into account, who would want to give you “the whole works,” and those with whom I would associate my own views, who were more partial. The latter were more concerned to be busy with the details, leaving perhaps the total account yet to be written up, to come sometime, with the strong suspicion that when this did come it would be more an association than a synthesizing, an englobement, an absorption, or a swallowing up.

I think one of the messages about civilization is that in it we are not so much at business as at play. Maybe this is the element that we are trying to discern. We are looking for room in which play might occur, the play of our accounts with other accounts.
Let us use Isaiah Berlin’s distinction, based on a quotation from Archilochus: “The fox knows many things. The hedgehog [or porcupine] knows one big thing.” It’s a question of how whole, or holistic, views talk to partial views. Whatever may be the ultimate disposition of that problem — that is, how do we get one civilization or one civilized person to talk to another? I think a practical resolution is to decide to carry on the talk, not to cease the colloquy, seek as disinterestedly as possible to describe what the other person is doing.

If we have that proviso, then perhaps we need not be so much concerned about views which attempt to be holistic views, as Gabriel Breton and I were discussing. The problem for foxes would be to avoid being taken in, taken up, absorbed, described, and involved in a kind of big washing machine that they really didn’t want to be involved in after all. But then there was the notion that we both, foxes and hedgehogs, face perhaps the same thing: How to get that partial impartiality, how to get the room from which, let’s say, to bring about peace, which would be one of the things that, if not the fact, of right ought to be a feature of civilization?

After we spoke about “Civilization as Reflection” I began to think not so much of reflection as of a consideration of the logic or the methods to which the scientific or knowledge enterprise was conjoined. In terms that Gabriel and I introduced, the tribal (or to take away the special meanings that that term may have as a classification or tool in some special discipline, the organic) and the conceptual might not so much be themselves our problem; but our reflecting on reflection would rather involve our seeking in each of these for a reflection of the other — that is, some vestige of our having either separated or brought these together.

In any case, they have been looking at each other. Our reason has tried to look at our life or the world. Can we find in each of these something of the other reflected in it? What difference does the presence of the organic make in the conceptual? How is that reflected in this? And in our organic life, how is the conceptual or the rational reflected there?

What I was looking for was whether, at least in principle, we could find the reflection of the organic in the conceptual and the reflection of the conceptual in the organic. We could thus perhaps accomplish, whatever showed up, finding a principle which would be one of power for peace — that is to say, that the reflection in our conceptual accounts, in our philosophies, in our rational constructs, of their origin in the modes of life, in association with which they grew or were produced, might yield some power to reason or give some vitality.

With regard to the organic, we might be able by considering the reflections in it to make it more reasonable, though not in ways which would be destructive of it, since it would be yoked in our view of this to the empowerment of the conceptual.
Thus, we might find some way to avoid what is, in some ways, the biggest difficulty about the organic, namely, its futility. We’re born but we also die. Take the smaller instance that frequently comes to minds of thinkers these days, “women’s work.” You dust, and the dust is all back again very soon. As one of these thinkers says: “We clean the world each day, and it’s pretty untidy and dirty the next day.” This kind of avoidance of futility is at least a problem.

When Gabriel and I were talking about the phenomenology of civilization, we said that while there may be these reflections, there is still a problem of what we called the “gap,” or, in a not unfortunate metaphor, we were talking about two shores.

One of my colleagues has been going around ever since waving to me and saying that he’s on the opposite shore. Well, I told him that I saw La Dolce Vita, too. All right, you can find one shore. Now, the solution of the problem, at least the solution of the problem as you might encounter it here in reflective ways, would be that you would find on the one shore something that you expected to find only on the other. That may not get us all across, but at least it throws a kind of rope bridge across the chasm.

Here we might quote Kenneth Burke: At the end of one of his books he says, “Man is a being who is nervously loquacious on the edge of the abyss.” Well, we might get over at least for a visit to each other’s shore.

Now, this would, as I say, constitute a kind of philosophical solution. The implementation of this may be a matter of the next centuries, who knows? But this is in effect, I think, what philosophically we would be trying to do. In other words, the closing of the gap means that you find something on both sides.

Some thinkers in their discussion of the gap sometimes talk about it as “the absurd.” Well, the absurd literally, I suppose, and radically, would mean that there is no hearing — sourde, meaning “deaf” — there is no hearing from one side to the other. If you can get at least an echo, there may be a chance that you’re in communication with the other side.

Let us try to look at that gap and see whether we can perhaps hear reason from the side of life. Let’s see if from the side of reason, we might not be able to make some sort of discernment or distinguishing of life on the other side. While the gap may remain, still we might be said to have come somewhere in terms of a solution.

Suppose that we talk a bit in terms which in the lecture on “Civilization as Reflection” I make kind of the paradigm.

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5 This observation, made half a century ago, would no longer be delivered today. (Editor’s note).
Suppose we use (since I’ll be talking, or trying to talk, about some French thinkers who are of interest to you to see what they make of the gap) fraternity, equality, and liberty. (See Figure 1.)

Figure 1. The Paradigm

What sorts of reflections are elaborated by those who consider that something needs to be done about joining the fraternal — the organic, the living, the solidary — with the rational — the equal, the precise, the universal.

These thinkers are French, which means that they are apt to be extremely precise and to carry the reasoning to ever finer and more precise points. Second, we are but trying to examine the kinds of reflections that we have been making in connection with civilization considering what Sartre, Camus, and Merleau-Ponty might be said to be doing in this same regard.

Suppose that in terms of these themes or, if you will, in terms of reflection, we take a stand here in “liberty.” We find there is a gap; there is a gap between consciousness and life; there is a gap between the “for itself” and the “in itself.” Having discerned the gap causes us a good deal of excitement, because if there is this kind of gap then there is also a kind of gap, or chasm, or absurdity, or a lack of communication, or even lack of other things amongst us severally. What have these people, to use the title of Marjorie Grene’s book about them, having encountered “dreadful freedom,” to do about it?

This is from Merleau-Ponty’s book called *The Phenomenology of Perception*. He says: “Reflection does not withdraw from the world towards the unity of consciousness as the world’s basis. It steps back to watch the forms of transcendence fly up like sparks from a fire. It slackens the intentional threads which attach to the world and thus brings them to our notice.”

I have difficulty in talking this way about the work of a man — and this quote is from his preface. I’m trying to indicate what he is doing. Maybe the real value here is not so much the exposition but the contrast.
Suppose that having decided to reflect, suppose that having undertaken to reflect on reflection, having said, “We will draw back,” we do draw back. We see what our science and our philosophy, make of the world, or attempt to make of the world.

The thing that Merleau-Ponty is here saying is that a philosopher might try to withdraw back to the unity of consciousness as the world’s basis. You might conclude that Merleau-Ponty is saying, “All right. Suppose I draw back and take my stand and say, ‘Now what about science and the world?’”

Let us say that this generation of philosophers is looking upon, reflecting upon, and thus practicing, civilization.

In an earlier generation sometimes philosophers making this kind of reflection said that everything happens out of and comes out of consciousness. But later reflection, notably by a philosopher that Merleau-Ponty is chiefly concerned to talk about here, Edmund Husserl, said that it isn’t so much the case that we, so to speak, draw back and fall off the edge into nothingness. Husserl says that our proper address to the world — what you encounter if you draw back — is wonder at the presence of the world.

Let us say that having withdrawn back on all this reflecting upon the world, you might say, “Where am I? I’m a kind of disembodied mind floating off not even in space anymore, off in nothingness.”

But that’s not what happens when you stretch a little further. The most important lesson of the reduction (that is, Husserl’s attempt to say, well, let’s make this kind of reflection) is the impossibility of a complete reduction. “There is no thought,” says Husserl, “which embraces all our thought.” The philosopher, in other words, encounters here, you might say, something that won’t go away. The experience for Merleau-Ponty is that the reflection discovers when it is carried out with sufficient thoroughness — this is perhaps not very exciting merely in summary, but it was exciting to Husserl and afterwards to Merleau-Ponty — you find the unreflected discovered by reflection. You have here something more than you had, let’s say, when you just decided to reflect and go off to find out what this adventure might be. “We loosen,” he says, “the intentional threads which attach to the world, and thus bring them to our notice.”

In other words, we’re tied, you might say, to the world; there is an unreflected. (See Figure 2.)
In our attempt at rapid survey, let’s move to a consideration of something by Camus. I know that some of you are reading this author and that some of you have already discussed what I am about to indicate. Camus talks about murder and its relation to rebellion. Camus is saying: Well, we have discovered the gap between equality and fraternity. We put questions, which should be answered by reason, dealing with life. What we find is no answer. We get no response. We encounter absurdity, or this kind of silence. Then he says: Well, what are we going to do about that?

But Camus says: Well absurdity, while it might be a starting point, is not yet all there is. If I encounter absurdity, it is I who encounter it, and there is the matter of my dignity; it would be undignified for me who discovered this to do away with myself. I will carry on the inquiry and see what does in fact show up. In effect, I will rebel. Now, what you might rebel against would be the rational or rationalistic, the formalistic, the arrangements which tend to cookie-cutter us, so to speak, to make us all the same, and thus to be no respecter of our persons, and perhaps to enslave us.

One of the things which he says in that book, The Rebel, which some of you have encountered, one of the things in the many changes that he rings on this theme of the discovery that he makes, one of the many reflections which he makes is one on murder, one that seems particularly clear to me.

Suppose I am a slave and I make the reflection that I, too, am a man: I didn’t decide to kill myself. I have rebelled. What should I do? Well, one of the things — and it seems to me this is a kind of underpinning of Camus’ long reflections — is that I don’t enslave the master in turn. “He rebelled [this is the murderer] in the name of the identity of man with man. And he sacrificed this identity by consecrating the difference in blood.” As a slave I would rebel in the name of identity of man with man, because “…this world has no higher meaning, or if man is only responsible to man, it suffices for man to remove one single human being from the society of the living to automatically exclude himself from it.”
If, in other words, my responsibility is to man. If I decide as a slave to rebel, what Camus is saying is that I had better not carry that rebellion to its ultimate — for all the power and energy that it does muster, because then I really haven’t done anything except change places with the master. In other words, the rebellion is a contradiction, because I rebel against the condition of slavery, but after my rebellion there are still as many slaves and masters as before. Hence my rebellion is no rebellion.

This is why he says that it’s in the void that we begin to discover some texture, that there is some kind of guidance, that there is what he calls a place for thought at the meridian, that there is the mid-point at which our rebellion, and this goes for rebellions both metaphysical, individual, social, and political, we had better consider stopping short of going the whole way. (See figure 3.)

So, it seems to me that here are two reflective thinkers who show us that reflection really involves considering the other two notions of fraternity and equality. Maybe this is what we are suggesting, that as civilized people we do have to consider these other views.

With an emphasis on freedom or liberty as a starting point, this is the way in which they are considered. It’s one thing to say, “Well, I am free. I will carry this as far as it goes.” Merleau-Ponty says that whatever else may be true, there is an unreflected element. We aren’t set free completely. Or, put another way, our freedom is finite. So also here, if we say, or reflect with Camus, that I am the equal of anybody, or my nation or my group is the equal of any, that still in all, if we are really to act and not to do nothing we have to encounter, if you will, the limitation of a logical sort. In a sense, morals encounter an aspect of being which sets up limitations.

Let us consider something similar from Sartre. Sartre wrote “The Question of Method” for a Polish Marxist journal, which had asked for an account of the relations between Marxist thought and existentialist thought. It’s published in his book called The Critique of Dialectical Reason.
He tells this story: About the year 1949 there were numerous copies of a poster which covered the walls of Warsaw. It said: “Tuberculosis curbs production.” Sartre says these posters grew out of the fact that there had been a decision by the government and that this decision was based upon a good enough feeling.

But he says that the content marked quite evidently that man had been eliminated from their thinking about man. That is, the man with the tuberculosis was not mentioned.

Sartre says: “At this point man is eliminated from a science of man which would be purely science. Tuberculosis is the object of a practical science. The doctor knows this and knows how to cure it. The Party determined the importance in Poland of the statistics. They figured out what the incidence of tuberculosis would do to production.”

He writes that what you could read on these posters eliminated the tuberculosis person and refused to him his elementary role of being the mediator, or the bearer, between the sickness and the number of products produced in the factories. And he says this reveals a kind of new and double alienation in a socialist society at a certain moment in its development. The worker, he says, is alienated from the production. And in the theoretical or practical order, the human foundation of our knowledge of man is swallowed up in science.

In other words, there’s a gap here. Here is your worker with the notion of the alienation that he undergoes in working in the factory. Here, on the other hand, is a sign that he’s further eliminated from consideration; he can’t even have his disease. With the notion of production itself, the man who has the disease drops out of the picture and we have only the disease.

Sartre’s further notion is that once you have discovered the gap and even alleviated it you had better hold onto it if you can. You’d better, if you can, perhaps by action, keep it operative. He provides for this in the book in two ways: One, by saying you need to keep reason dialectic, that is, active, subject to the action or practice of man. On the other hand, you’d better realize that practice itself always encounters an inert element unless it be tied up with the actions of human beings.

Thus, you encounter the matter with which you’re working and to some extent you can’t take it over by your action completely.
Hence, in order to maintain freedom, we say, “Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty.”

Maybe we must go on to say, “It is the function of liberty to provide this vigilance.”

Let’s broaden the whole consideration and leave our three thinkers for now. We might say that they have filled out the meaning of “civilization as reflection.” We must consider that there are other things, that in addition to liberty, authentically to consider; you must consider equality and fraternity. But, likewise, if you take your stand in fraternity, then there are considerations in equality and liberty which you must keep also in mind. You must manage all three.

Perhaps civilization is the kind of juggling, which I’ve tried to introduce, at least in a certain frame, here this morning.

“Reflection” in Relation to “Rationality,” “Work,” “Freedom,” and “Power.” By George Drury

“Reflection” is frequently understood, particularly in American usage, as consciousness itself. You might say it is thinking about what we are doing. There is, however, also another meaning of “reflection,” and that is thinking about thinking about what we are doing.

This is the more usual meaning of the term “reflection.” It is the difference between consciousness which accompanies our trying to do responsibly whatever it is that we are trying to do and coming back upon how we are thinking about what we are doing. An example: Suppose you are studying history and you say, “Well, I’m not doing so well as I would like to do in my study of history.” You might then reflect, “How am I studying history? Maybe changing my procedure might make it all ever so much better.”
The themes of this course on “civilization” are:

➢ reflection,
➢ rationality,
➢ work,
➢ freedom, and
➢ power.

These concepts might sound a kind of chord or might constitute a kind of theme upon which variations might take place to our mutual enrichment. What I am going to try to do in this first brush with these themes is to ask what reflection might make of these other themes; what stands it might take, and what discoveries it might unfold to us.

Leon Sirota will talk about rationality. There’s a kind of central persuasion, at least in the West, which he will no doubt allude to, that this is a matter of a good deal of importance. In trying to bring reflection to bear on this, I suffer a certain embarrassment before coming before you. I am tempted to go through a lengthy but interesting trip or journey through the thought of the West developing around rationality and reflections on rationality. But I don’t want to pre-empt what Leon or others will have to say about rationality.

Hence, I thought I might give you reasoning, or rationality, in Aristotle’s somewhat simple sounding statement of the matter. Aristotle says that reasoning is a discovery that certain things, having been laid down, lead to results other than these things but which necessarily result through them. Something being laid down, if it’s reasoning, something follows. All our attention to reasoning is presumably to ensure that consequences are following by necessary connection.

To condense time, let’s enter the time machine. Let’s arrive about the time of Pascal — he lived from 1623 to 1662 — if only to indicate a notion of reflection as a kind of mirror, a notion of the mind in which what would be important is not so much your reflecting but that your mind or intellect contains the reflected. In other words, in one meaning of “intellect” (which has been derived from “to read within”), the notion would be that the universe, the cosmos, the world, would write itself, reflect itself, in the mirror of the mind, and that would be knowing.

When the accent is on the reflected, when one thinks he lives in that kind of world, then reasoning, or the rationality, is probably at its most stable, its most valued. There isn’t too much reasoning about it, because what reasoning does is try to sort out and arrange in consequence or following ways, inferential ways, what is reflected in the mind. Pascal asserted that if you attend to space the universe engulfs you, a human being, as a kind of tiny point. We can bring it in and have reflecting thought. But by thought, he says, we comprehend the cosmos, the universe.
Pascal presents for us this notion of the universe reflected in the mind. But he also has considerable worries, you might say, historic worries, worries which I think we import into our own century from the seventeenth century and find extremely interesting. It is true, I think, that after Pascal many people did think of the universe as rather well constructed according to geometry and written within easily if one didn’t place too many obstacles within the mind.

But what we want to do is, I think, to keep rationality or reasoning as a kind of center, an enclosed part that we won’t enter, since we propose to talk about reflection. It’s true that the mind says, from the time of Aristotle on, that you can’t reason about everything. In other words, everything can’t be a conclusion. Somewhere you must have first premises, first statements, the given.

Reflection is concerned that you don’t exceed your premises, that you do have consequences. It rides close to the process of reason going on. While reflection in its logical concern looks at reason, there is on either side a sort of lingering or a lurking possible consideration: We might call these *whence* what you reason about and *whither*. What do you do with what you reason about? I mean, what practically, or morally?

The question I think we might turn to now is how these lurkings — which may become for reflection the whole story — how do they come up for us? In terms of our own experience, I thought I might try concretely to indicate how reflection comes into, it seems to me, our consideration of the notion of civilization.

It occurs to me that a good way to indicate what reflection is might be to have reference to a kind of folk tale — that’s concrete enough. This story concerns the search for the strongest man in Ireland. The searcher goes to a village and he sees a blacksmith who hasn’t any fire in his forge. He’s bending the horseshoes around the anvil and putting the cleats in with his thumbs. And the searcher says, “Well, you must be the strongest man in Ireland.” The blacksmith protests that he is not anything compared to the man who lives a little further along. So, the searcher goes along the road and he sees a man in the fields plowing without horses. He says, “Well, surely you must be the strongest man.” The plowman says, “Oh, no, the strongest man is in the next village, as a matter of fact, at the fair. I’d be there myself except I have all this work to do.” As the searcher gets to the fair, he sees a crowd gathered. He works his way through the crowd, and here indeed is the strongest man, saying, “And for my next trick I’ll grab myself by my belt in the back and hold myself out at arm’s length.” Reflection is somewhat like that.

Maybe the idea can be put very quickly with this quotation from the late nineteenth and twentieth century philosopher Maurice Blondel. I think this very short presentation he makes of reflection will bring out the notion of its power and its interest. He says:
It seems possible to present the different meanings of the term ‘reflection’ in a connected and systematic fashion. In a general way, reflection means [or implies] a double meaning which is spontaneous or voluntary or a kind of folding back on itself or psychic life. This means a kind of apparent or temporary inhibition of what’s going on; we stop and bend back. It constitutes, on the other hand, a kind of new fact, an original initiative force above and beyond the elements which have occasioned it. And this deploys or orients itself in two symmetrically inverse directions.

Insofar as it looks to the antecedent, what went before, the antecedent and effective conditions of either the fact of consciousness or of the given reality which is the object of its study and which it connects up with general ideas or laws, reflection is an analytical retrospect. And this carries itself forward towards the intention and the final concrete singular realization which is the practical term of its complex and total movement, reflection is a prospect.

If the word ‘reflection’ signifies equally these seemingly disparate steps, it is because, although in a usually implicit manner but one which can be made explicit, there is a solidarity between these two steps, these two directions.

Reflection, although it seems to suspend itself between these two meanings so seemingly diverse and independent, is only possible because it tends to constitute in the unity of the subject in which it occurs the solution of the ontological problem and the solution of the problem of destiny, or fate. Reflection is this new dimension, if you will, in our psychic life, and it has these two considerations. In other words, you might say the consideration of the conditions by which I am bound — What am I? — and the prospects of what I might do. And reflection can look in upon this to multiply and to develop some questions to examine.

Reflection finds at least, I think, this complexity when it looks to the question of psychic life. Blondel talks about the unity of the subject, recalling for us one of the things that in our considerations in social science we have found that part of what psychic life has appearing in it is interactively produced.

Here we can go back through George Herbert Mead, Thomas Cooley, and others (social interactionism). Part of what happens in our psychic life as subjects is produced by other subjects. This is a reflection which social science makes. It is also a reflection which even the loneliest philosophies seem likewise to require.

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6 Maurice Blondel was a French philosopher who lived from 1861 to 1949. His most influential work was L’Action, (in English, Action: Essay on a Critique of Life and a Science of Practice) which sought to establish a “philosophy of action” as applicable to phenomenology.
For example, Fichte, who gets pretty much down to the “I” and who says the universe is projected by me so that I may do my duty, my duty being to act freely, says that I’d better find at least one other possible human being to call upon me to be free and to do my duty.

Suppose that we, in any case, say that on one side of reason we do discover the self or an “I”. When reason is in full flower we don’t say, “Well, that’s kind of important.” Maybe, we say, “Of course you reason.” Think of some of the models of, say, nineteenth century science: The thing you should really do is efface yourself before objectivity. Of course, you will be honest in reporting your findings. But the important thing is not you so much as what can be given to reason.

In the book by H. Stuart Hughes entitled *Consciousness and Society*, you will find among other things reference to what he calls the *freischwende* — a kind of free-floating consciousness.7

Reflection discovers this when it begins to be somewhat less confident about the omnipotence of reason. It runs into certain corrections and disappointments; that’s part of the story of Hughes’s book. But he does give you the notion of this.

As we reflected, there are partners in this dance. And one of the things you might hear recalled would be the numerous renditions of this partnership in Simmel. Suppose we say that important in this whole thing will be the subject, the I, the reasoner. Pretty soon you begin to get sort of lippy regarding reason and say, “Reason, you’re not so great after all. Why don’t I take off?”

One way of making it objective, although those who will talk about freedom and power will develop other aspects about this theme, would be to say: “It will be wonderful to join my freedom and power. I need and will command as much power as this somewhat heady or free-floating sense of freedom that I have. I am master of my fate, captain of my soul. I’m monarch of all I survey.” I think sometimes we do get this somewhat heady sense of freedom.

But one of the things in this complex, and one of the things that reflection will say about the situation, is that the problem of freedom — at first blush, you know, we would like to join freedom and power together and empower our freedom — the problem of our freedom ultimately is one of, you might say, being free with regard to our own power. This is one of the early themes in Plato’s *Republic*. Some of us have had discussions on this sort of theme in terms of Jean-Paul Sartre. It’s sort of a theme of the play *No Exit* that there is a freedom and power — and the “and” is difficult to manage.

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Maybe I can make it clear that this isn’t only a question of the factual; matter is also inherent in what freedom is. In other words, I would say that freedom and power might be separated by a kind of gap.

In *Being and Nothingness* Sartre gives an example, a discussion of a man looking through a keyhole and another person coming upon the scene. There is this gap between freedom and power; the other can insert himself. And Sartre says therefore we metaphysically stand up and probably start to talk very rapidly; as a “thing,” so to speak, he looks down upon us, and we are “put down.”

We’re apprehended there and so we spring up to try to regain our freedom. But it is because there is this kind of gap between the two that the other can get in. It’s long developed in the play, but this is kind of the sense of it: Salvation would be to get freedom and power coincident. But that’s the reason Hell is other’s: because there is always this gap.

What I want to indicate is that reflection discovers the “I” of George Herbert Meade. It also discovers a kind of incomparability or incompatibility between freedom and power, which will doubtless have all kinds of manifestations. This is what we try to search for in our study of civilization, to survey the whole scene.

The other theme: Some people might say, as some philosophers do, “Let’s have no nonsense about this. Reason is doubtless only at a disability because it has been rarefied and hasn’t been practically engaged. Let us attach it to work. Let us make of it a practical thing.” You get the phrase: “Man makes himself.”

Well, to change our figure a little bit, that is what we are trying to do via “reflection” or via “civilization.”

Suppose we think of this as a bowl in which we would try to get interaction at its maximum extent. Now, we have already found some difficulties about spreading this consideration. It’s one thing to set up an economic maximum generalization; then we begin to run into the cultural, the social, the political qualifications of that.

It seems to me that in “civilization” we’re trying to take in society as a whole. Suppose you think of it as a liquid and we try to get it all in the bowl. Reflection, I suppose, might be trying to pour it in. Reflection said that reason, which would be the likely candidate for getting the whole covered, has various difficulties. Regarding something else, things keep bubbling up in what we would ideally and rationally try to make the smooth surface of civilization, the whole wide world, society, what you will. And with “freedom and power,” something bubbles up and tends to spill out of our bowl.
So here we’ll say let’s have recourse to “work.” That’s a no-nonsense sort of thing. What bubbles up there?

I think about work as a recourse for the rational that reflection discovers something like this: The no-nonsense sort of thing usually finds as its first object of attack the moral, or the valuable. This is what I think tends to bubble up here and spill over the sides, so that we don’t have it contained in our bowl of knowledge, our conceptual bowl.

This happens with Durkheim, who says that work itself needs to be seen as doubled, or two-fold — with the literal sense of “di-vision” or “to be seen as two”: organic for solidarity, in the sense of di-vision of labor. This happens with Marx, for whom work brings along with it all that still needs to be done besides work, because what occurs, in human terms, or moral terms, the terms in which you say what’s wrong in the diversity by labor, is that man gets cut up.

Can we rapidly translate “work” into a kind of consideration in which you again have a no-nonsense theme, as an important consideration in twentieth century philosophy? Let’s have no nonsense, nonsense in language, the business of philosophy being to examine man’s work, if you will, as exhibited in language. I think here it’s either morals or art or poetry that causes the bubbling up.

Let’s get on with the job, it is said, and that means the job as excluding, let us say, value judgments. But, moral judgments or statements of value get excluded from man’s serious business or work-a-day exercise of reason, and yet these misbehaving value judgments keep coming back.

Another way to indicate this: Let us make “rationality” equal “work.” I think this is, by the way, the kind of issue to which you might see E. H. Carr as one means of access, namely, that having made or established equality, how do we make it mean anything? Reason would ordinarily work in terms of equalities, substitutable kinds of entities, and the rest. But as a project for the solutions of all our problems, it doesn’t always seem to work.

The poetic or artistic issue: A statement from the Journal of Delacroix, the painter, made in 1853. Reason would say, “Let’s finish the job, so that we can write it up, report on it, and take it into account. The artistic or the moral omeriness of man, which seems incorrigible, says: “One always has to spoil a picture a little bit in order to finish it. The last touches which are given to bring about harmony among the parts take away from the freshness. In order to appear before the public, one must cut away all the happy negligences which are the passion of the artist.”
Well, this opposition between, in Blondel’s terms, the retrospective, which says, “Fine, are you finished now? Now we can study it and write it up”—the tension between that and the artist’s saying, “I’ve just begun!” or the moral impetus in man which says, “Just finished? No! I have yet to do!”—this is discovered through reflection. Again, we get bubbling around reason these two kinds of things.

These seem to be radical difficulties in terms of reflection for the other candidate themes for civilization. But how are we to handle the problem of conceiving and dealing with in a significant way the problem of civilization, or the problem of society as a whole?

“Reflection” says, or tries to indicate, when our candidate is “reason”: We haven’t said much about the difficulties of reason, but all of us have these difficulties in our struggles in, and bouts with, the world that we have all come to live in.

Suppose we say that maybe “freedom,” “decision,” is all. Well, radical reflection says that this may appear to be all but making it all is going to be quite a project. The notion that maybe if we all work hard enough and are sober and industrious enough then all will be well, apart from whatever concrete difficulties that we have, seems to encounter a kind of irreconcilability between value, on the one hand, and work as factual or reasonable on the other.

Thus, when we try to put “civilization” in a bowl, it is suggested, it tends to boil over.

We might use as a peroration the juxtaposition in Ecclesiastes or Kohelet of the bowl and the heights of reflection. This is a time when people shall be afraid of that which is high, and fears shall be in the way. I suppose I might fittingly borrow for reflection the slogan: “Courage!”
Letter to the Editor

The Pahlavis and the Other Side of the Coins

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It was with great interest that I read “Political Power of Iranian Hierocracies” by János Jany published in *Comparative Civilizations Review* (83, 2020: 67-102). Writing about Iranian history is not an easy task because historical points of view have been highly politicized. Such is particularly the case when discussing the Pahlavi dynasty, particularly its founder, Reza Shah Pahlavi, and his successor, Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi. It is therefore of major importance to be transparent and, when feasible, to present the varying views and schools of thought which may exist with respect to the Pahlavi dynasty (Khoshnood, 2019).

Jany’s article is one-sided — very biased — regarding certain points that I shall endeavor to clarify by presenting the other side of the coins.

**Point 1.** As a result of Reza Shah’s pro-German policy during the 1930’s, British and Soviet forces entered Iran in 1941, and the Shah abdicated in favor of his son (Jany (2020): 76).

For purely political and ideological reasons, the opponents of Reza Shah and the Pahlavi dynasty have attempted to attribute pro-Nazi sentiments and therefore pro-German policies to Reza Shah. Such attributions could not be more mistaken. That Reza Shah had pro-Nazi or pro-German tendencies is a myth. Based on matters related to national interests, Iran had political and economic ties with the German government, just like the ties which the Swedish government maintained with the Germans during World War II (Åmark, 2015, pp. 350 and 353-355). Even though the reasons for the allied occupation of Iran are complex, scholars have argued that the primary reason for the occupation was to secure the Iranian railway in order to enable it to transport supplies to the Soviet Army engaged, as it was, in its war against Nazi Germany, and to secure the Iranian oil fields (Farrokh, 2011, p. 269).

Regarding Iranian Jews, Reza Shah informed Adolf Hitler that these people were Iranians and that any harm to them would be viewed as a direct offense to the Shah himself. Hitler thus refrained from declaring Iranian Jews to be enemies of the Third Reich (Ross, 2019). As a result of the Shah’s support, the Iranian Schindler, Abdol Hossein Sardari, who was Iran’s consul in Paris during World War II, saved thousands of Iranian Jews from certain death in German extermination camps (Mokhtari, 2012).
That Reza Shah was in no way pro-Nazi was also clearly demonstrated by the way he modernized Iran and treated minorities. Orly Rahimiyan (2012) writes that “the Reza Shah era witnessed the repeal of all of the discriminatory laws applying to Jews. Jews were accorded the right to serve in the military and to enroll in state schools.”

**Point 2. Mossadegh was finally removed from office in 1953 with the help of the CIA, Operation: Ajax (Jany (2020): 76).**

Although it is unfortunately and commonly believed among academics that the CIA, through Operation Ajax, and MI6, through Operation Boot, removed Mossadegh from office, the truth is far more complex. Many scholars either reject the view that the CIA and MI6 contributed in any way to the fall of Mossadegh, or conclude that the roles of the CIA and of MI6 were insignificant (Afkhami, 2009; Bayandor, 2010 and 2019; Cooper, 2011 and 2019; Milani, 2009 and 2012; Mokhtari, 2008; Taheri, 2012; and Takeyh, 2013 and 2014).

There is much more to the story than that of Operation Ajax and Operation Boot.

**Point 3. The 1970’s witnessed an economic boom fueled by rising income from the oil industry, and at the same time, controversies over land reform, which caused millions of people to become unemployed, forcing them to settle in cities to look for jobs, more often than not in vain (Jany (2020): 76).**

Here, it is important to mention that the Iranian economy in 1977, just prior to the unrest that contributed to the downfall of the Shah, was in an impressive state. Iran’s gross domestic product (GDP) was 65 percent larger than that of Korea and 26 percent larger than that of Turkey. Also, when examining GDP rankings, Iran, in 1977, was ranked as the world’s 18th largest economy. Seventeen years earlier, it had ranked as the world’s 19th largest economy (Chamlou, 2019).

In regard to unemployment rates, different sources present different rates. For this reason, it is of utmost importance to consult primary sources. Dr. Jahangir Amouzegar (1992), a prominent Iranian economist and former Minister of Finance and Minister of Commerce in Iran, states in an article that “Most specifically, Iran's prerevolution economy was far from stagnant: It was registering positive growth every year between 1963 and 1977, and unemployment was relatively small and localized.” A year earlier, Amouzegar (1991, p. 59), had stated that “All through the 1970s, even to the very end, there was a shortage of labor in the country, as a whole, of both skilled and unskilled workers. Open unemployment remained very low — at 1 percent of the work force.” He added that “The unemployment rate consequently declined from 3 percent of the labor force in 1976 to 2.9 percent in 1977 […].”

It is thus not correct to write, as does Jany, that “millions of people” were unemployed.
Part 4. Since the army was not in full control of the situation the Shah fled the country the next year and made the way free for Khomeini to return (Jany (2020): 77).

Unfortunately, there is a massive lack of studies as to why the Imperial military failed to gather behind the Shah and to bring order to the country. But to claim that the military was not in full control is wrong. Regrettably, Jany’s article does not present any information about this matter.

Many experts consider that the Islamic revolution was the unanticipated outcome of a joint US-UK effort, encouraged by the West in general or made possible by it. The why’s and how’s of these events are beyond the scope of this brief letter. I refer the curious reader to various sources (e.g. Afkhami, 2009; Cooper, 2011; Evans, 2009; Hanke, 1998; Nahavandi, 2005; Shawcross, 1981). To establish an authoritative basis for my criticism, I refer here to Alexandre de Marenches, head of the French External Documentation and Counter-Espionage Service (SDECE), who informed the Shah that the US president, Jimmy Carter, had determined to overthrow him and replace him with someone else. De Marenches states that he “mentioned to the Shah the names of those in the United States who had been given [the] responsibility of seeing to his departure and replacement” and added that he also informed the Shah that he “had even taken part in a meeting where one of the questions for consideration was, ‘How is the Shah’s departure to be managed, and by whom shall he be replaced?’” (Ockrent, 1988, pp. 125-126)

Even if one assumes that the US and the UK were behind the revolution, other inferences can be made. These can be more clearly understood through the words of the former NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General Wesley Clark, who in an interview with Piers Morgan (2013) stated: “[…] We sent in an American general [Huyser] …to tell the Iranian generals [to] back off. So for about 60 days we kept the military from intervening in Iran. During that period, the revolution coalesced, the military forces fell apart, extreme Islamists took over, and at that point the Carter administration said, ‘oh my goodness, get the general to take control, don’t let this happen.’ And the general said, ‘we waited too long, we have no forces, and a few months later all the generals had been shot,’ and we have Iran today.” In support of this statement by General Clark, Jimmy Carter (1995, p. 457) states: “He [Huyser] had dissuaded some of its [the military] leaders from attempting a coup”.

It would thus, perhaps, be more correct to underline the passivity of the military with respect to foreign interventions.
Part 5. Similarly, advocates of Western thought are believed to be or at least are denounced as Western agents collaborating with foreign powers against Iran, a charge with serious consequences. This reality helps one to understand why leaders of the green opposition demanding more democracy and openness hastened to declare publicly that they respect the underlying principle of the Iranian constitutional system, velayat-e faqih, even though doing so undermines their own program, since this very principle is the most important obstacle in the way of further democratization (Jany (2020): 94).

This paragraph is highly problematic because of its political inferences. Jany states that the leaders of the “green opposition,” its principal one being Mir-Hossein Mousavi, are in reality opposed to the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, but that they are forced by fear of persecution to state otherwise. This very political statement is not at all representative of Mir-Hossein Mousavi’s political views.

Mousavi was not only a close assistant of Ruhollah Khomeini, but he was also the Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic during one of its most difficult periods including an ongoing war with Iraq. Mousavi was also involved in the 1988 massacres of political prisoners which still haunt the regime (Khoshnood, 2020). To believe that Mousavi, as the leader of the green movement, is in reality opposed to the constitution of the Islamic Republic is very wrong. On the contrary, both Mousavi and other individuals in the green movement, just as Jany states, have endorsed the constitution of the Islamic republic. It is very unclear how Jany (2020) can claim to know what the leaders of the green opposition really think. Based on their history as servants of the Islamic regime in Iran and Mousavi’s role in the 1988 massacres, it is fully understandable that they would not only respect but also support the constitution of the Islamic Republic.
In Chinese, the word “catastrophe” is composed of two characters: 危机. The first character represents danger and the second is the symbol for opportunity, suggesting as my son so aptly put it, “We should never let a ‘good’ disaster go to waste.” In much the same light, philosopher David Rosner’s sensible and probing anthology, *Catastrophe and Philosophy*, directs us to observe that, “catastrophes are catastrophes not only because they bring widespread death and destruction in their wake, but also because they fundamentally challenge the basic ‘sense making’ feature of the human mind and our need for a meaningful world.” (Rosner, p. xi) By occurring at the intersection of lived experience and philosophy, catastrophes urge us to rethink the world we inhabit. Rosner’s analysis is well-timed given the social, political, and economic impact of the Covid-19 pandemic that currently grips the world. To be sure, conventional wisdom has it that Covid-19 is permanently changing the way we live our lives. But what exactly do crises like Covid-19, global warming, or the recent fire storms in California, Oregon, and Washington require?

Ultimately, *Catastrophe and Philosophy* does not offer a definitive answer to reality’s complexity. Rather, Rosner suggests the goal of the text is to point out the importance of perspective. It is perspective, he insists, that can reveal commonalities between radically different times and places – commonalities that can afford us a foothold against, “the untenable idea of life and human suffering being ultimately random and amoral.” (Rosner, p. xiii) He observes that by exploring the history of ideas, it may be possible to locate a trail through the tangle of crisis that braves our craving to make sense of experience. (Rosner, p. xi, 323)

To take a case in point, Rosner’s asks us to weigh how the crisis of World War I affected the European consciousness and was reflected in much of the art of the period between World War I and World War II. (Rosner, p. xvi) Consider the three paintings pictured below done by Cubist, Pablo Picasso (1891-1973). These paintings were done over a seven-year period, the last just prior to the First World War which began in 1914. First, there is his traditional painting of Gertrude Stein completed in 1907. This depiction of Gertrude Stein offers few hints of what was to come. The second canvas, “Les Demoiselles d’Avignon,” came after Stein’s portrait.

1Cubism is a movement in art that was initiated by Pablo Picasso and Georges Braque. Picasso and Braque were intent on representing the world in a new way. They rejected the single, objective, or naturalistic viewpoint and used geometric planes and shapes to represent the subject from many different perspectives at once.
It was also completed in 1907, and it is considered a transitional painting, appearing at the dawn of Cubism. “Les Demoiselles d’Avignon” hints at a new intellectual structure, or way of knowing and seeing the world. Again, both canvases were done just seven years before the First World War. Then between 1911 and 1912, only two years before the start of World War I, Picasso completed “Ma Jolie.” While all three paintings portray women, “Ma Jolie” is indecipherable as a depiction of Picasso’s lover Marcelle Humbert (Eva). Although Rosner directs us to explore art produced during the interwar years (1918-1939), the canvases I turn to were completed a little earlier. I contend, however, that these works presage the disruption, breakdown, and destruction of an existing order that occurred as the world marched toward two catastrophic world wars in the span of twenty-five years. Indeed, “Ma Jolie” is a portrait that seems liberated from having to depict recognizable images, a work of art that exhibits “increased tendencies toward fragmentation, distortion, and the dissolution of classical norms.” (Rosner, p. xvi)

Moreover, Picasso’s celebrated piece “Guernica” (see next page) was created to express his outrage about the Nazi’s barbaric aerial bombing of Guernica, a Basque city in Spain. The piece was completed in 1937, twenty-five years after “Ma Jolie” and just two years prior to the start of the Second World War.

Whether or not one sees Picasso as offering a complete worldview, the question is, is it possible as Rosner suggests, to appreciate commonalities joining Picasso’s indecipherable images of “Ma Jolie” and Guernica to that of a radically different time and place?
Take for example the rise of Rome (146 BCE) which marked the end of the Greek city state and saw the growth of disaffection in a new political culture. The new culture was one in which the average Greek citizen was no longer intimately involved in the working of the state or tied into a cosmopolitan Hellenistic world. Rather, average Greek citizens saw themselves as isolated members of large impersonal kingdoms run by professional bureaucrats. As a result, their focus turned inward, leading them to delve into philosophes of despair such as Stoicism, Epicureanism, Cynicism, Skepticism, and Christianity—philosophies offering advice for individuals living in a crumbling world. As attempts to sustain balance by proposing new ways of fulfilling our need for a meaningful world, both Picasso’s Cubism and the early Greeks’ philosophies of despair shared a common origin. One implication of Rosner’s treatment is that the trauma associated with the fragmentation, distortion, and dissolution of the assumptive world transcended time and place.

Rosner’s *Catastrophe and Philosophy* is broken into five sections: The Ancient World, The Middle Ages/Renaissance, Modernity I: Early Period, Modernity II: High Modernity, and Post Modernity. Each section is preceded by a short preface and contains three or four brief essays. For instance, in The Ancient World, research professor Jeidong Ryu at the Theological Institute, Sungkonghoe University, South Korea, explores the Buddha’s search for enlightenment in a world marked by upheaval and suffering. In contrast, PhD student in the Department of Comparative Literature at Harvard University, Sarah Katerina Corrigan, examines the *Book of Lamentations* as a response to a crisis in Jewish history. While, in the section Modernity, David Wilkinson, professor of Political Science at the University of California, Los Angeles, delves into the political ideas of Thomas Hobbes as a reaction to war, famine and dislocation.
In Post-Modernity, David A. Chalfin, who received his A.B. and M.A. in philosophy from Brown University, and a J.D. from Stanford Law School, explores the American rejoinder to the challenge of 9/11 by investigating a select part of the legal response to that catastrophe. Chalfin probes the difference between internalism versus externalism in the law. The upshot of all of this is that *Catastrophe and Philosophy* not only surveys the work of philosophers like Plato, Nietzsche and Wittgenstein, but is also interdisciplinary in that it explores religious texts, literary works, musical compositions and legal decisions.

In that the book recounts philosophical reactions to crises, Rosner advises that philosophy is not just about grasping ideas or abstract theory. Instead, he implies that philosophy is best understood within the context of personal biographies, larger crises, social struggle, or institutional change. (Rosner, p. xi-xii) To be sure, the current Covid-19 pandemic, by destroying the existing order of things, has forced us all to confront a salient fact, as Rosner (p. xiv) himself writes: “Catastrophes reveal cracks in the moral scaffolding of society.”

Professor of Philosophy at Fordham University, John Ross (Rosner p. 193) observes, in a radically different time and place, “Two of the twentieth century’s greatest horrors — World War I and Nazi Germany — both emanated from Vienna.” Mid-nineteenth century Vienna, the capital of the Austrian Empire (later Austria-Hungary), seemed to many an idyllic city. Under the Austrian Habsburgs it became one of Europe’s cultural centers. Its artistic and intellectual legacy was second to none. Moreover, there was nothing unique or unusual about the issues facing the Habsburg Empire that resulted in the horrors of two world wars. For instance, “political oppression, corruption, abuses by the aristocracy, the plight of the working class, poverty, lack of housing and medical care for the poor, religious intolerance, the political and social marginalization of women…” were endemic throughout modern Europe. (Rosner, p.193) And yet, Ross notes, the Habsburg Empire was remarkable in that language and race (anti-Semitism) became focal points of contention. (Rosner, p. 194)

Consider America’s inability to accommodate divisions among its citizens in the midst of a deadly pandemic. Not unlike Vienna, the U.S. has had long existing social and economic inequalities. Today racial discord has increasingly fueled civil disobedience along with acrimony, disruptiveness and violence. Presently however, with hundreds of thousands of US citizens dead as a result of Covid-19, there is little consensus about whether individuals should be required to wear masks, social distance, or simply stay at home. What happens when the political system is itself in crisis, unable to accommodate differences of opinion? British judge and historian Jonathan Sumption (2019, p.88) observes that “the chief function of a political system is to accommodate differences of interest and opinion among citizens.” Sumption insists that when politics fail nations turn to the courts for definitive answers to tough moral questions.
But law, he argues, “exists to protect us from harm not to recruit us to moral conformity.” (Sumption p. 8) Actually, Covid-19 has exposed profound cracks in the moral scaffolding of our society.

In the long run, Rosner’s analysis counsels that we can either seek inspiration for dealing with catastrophe or be crushed by circumstances. In the final chapter of the text, psychologist Marek Celinski contends that the ability to readily recover from the catastrophic surprises that life offers necessitates resilience. Celinski insists: “Resilience develops when we patiently continue our efforts at understanding while being constantly surprised by our inadequacies.” (Rosner, p. 334) Rosner’s *Catastrophe and Philosophy* argues that, rather than seek definitive answers in a crisis, we should strive for perspective or a meaningful interrelationship of ideas. Is it possible then, that appraising a crisis requires conceding, up front, the commonalities between radically different times and places, or that we should never let a “good” disaster go to waste?

**References**

Christopher I. Beckwith. *The Tibetan Empire in Central Asia.*

Reviewed by Constance Wilkinson

*The Tibetan Empire in Central Asia* was brought into being by polyglot polymath philologist MacArthur Fellowship recipient and stupefyingly wide-ranging medieval Central Asian civilizations-ist scholar Christopher I. Beckwith as the "first detailed narrative history of the Tibetan Empire in Central Asia written in any language" (vii). By 1993, Princeton University Press had released a 4th printing/1st paperback edition (with a new afterword by Beckwith), suggesting a widening readership for what some might regard as a rarified subject.

In this compact and densely fact-packed work, Beckwith corrects the record on Imperial Tibet, as emphasized in its inside title page, where it gains a dynamic sub-title: *A History of the Struggle for Power among Tibetans, Turks, Arabs, and Chinese During the Early Middle Ages.*

Who dominates this struggle during the seventh through ninth CE centuries? (Hint: It's not T'ang China.)

Turns out that the imperial subject of this fine book, far from being the weak, culturally derivative, politically inconsequential polity dismissed by historians historically (and to this day) as an insignificant feudal pseudo-state comprised of squabbling tribes of barbaric barbarians, the Tibetan Empire was, *au contraire*, strategic, acquisitive, belligerent, punitive, wealthy-Silk Road-international-trade-oriented from its imperialist imperial beginnings. Imperial Tibet was a force to be reckoned with, feared by its neighbors and feared by them with good reason.

Beckwith mines myriad crucial sources, reading most in their original languages: Tibetan, Chinese, Old Tibetan, Old Turkic, Arabic, Persian. With facts gleaned from disparate sources — official histories, personal accounts, diaries, letters, songs, government records, trade merchant accounts, treaties, pillar inscriptions — Beckwith finds fine threads and weaves them masterfully together into a rich narrative tapestry revealing the rise of Tibet into prominence, then dominance and endurance.

**Chapter 1**

“Entrance into Central Asia” begins with various Central Tibetan warlords fighting for supremacy. At that time, the Tibetan plateau was home to martial polities of varying sizes, held together by comitatus loyalty and personal commitment to a single warlord leader--unto death. (p. 15) One clan prevailed, now known as the Yarlung dynasty.
One of its scions, Songtsen Gampo (who will later be venerated for promoting the spread of Buddhist teachings), is credited with building his father's Central Tibetan kingdom into a Central Asian empire.

A contemporary Tibetan source says⁠¹ that the assassination of Songtsen's father by a rival faction traumatized Songtsen as a young child, fueling a lifelong desire for revenge and power through conquest. Songtsen took the throne in 618 CE, as tsenpo ("emperor") and "began a systematic reduction of all opposition to his rule on the Tibetan plateau." (p. 20)

Having put down "the rebellion that accompanied his father's death by poisoning," (p. 20) Songtsen went on to invade and subjugate his neighbor to the northeast, the Sum-pa, who were vassals of "the shadowy Zhang-Zhung confederation," (p. 14) an adversary nation more powerful than Songtsen, too powerful for him to invade and conquer. To deal with dangerous Zhang-Zhung, Songtsen abandoned invasion in favor of diplomacy through marital alliance: mollifying powerful neighboring countries by offering marriage to a royal princess — "the princess bribe."² Emperor Songtsen sent his own sister Sad³-Mar-Kar to marry the King of Zhang Zhung and off she dutifully went to her remote new kingdom.

The new queen takes Zhang Zhung as a personal insult. Her royal residence is the famous Khyung Lung Silver Palace. "Silver?" A pale pile of dusty rocks. "Palace"? A grubby citadel in ruins. The country? Precipitous cliffs, abyssal ravines. The food is nasty, she's forced to eat fish, her servants are stupid; she can't stand her spouse. That fate has forced her to dwell in such a horrid place is just a bad joke.⁴ Queen Sad-Mar-Kar thinks Zhang-Zhung is nothing to write home about — which doesn't stop her from doing just that. She writes songs⁵ whining about her life and sends them to brother Songtsen. Along with sending him her sad songs (plus a pile of trinkets), Sad-Mar-Kar sends word that the King of Zhang Zhung is coming to nearby Sum-pa. Somehow her trinkets reveal her husband's location and timing and her desire to be free. Songtsen sends his men to lie in ambush, wait for the King, and kill him. And they do.

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¹ Personal communication, Khenpo Chodrak Tenphel, 2020
² A pun by the reviewer alluding to a popular American fantasy fairy tale. However, it is an arrangement that apparently was utilized frequently in Tibetan foreign relations.
³ Transliterated "Sad" is pronounced "say," not "sad."
⁵ Hummel, Siegbert, "On Zhang-Zhung," Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, Dharmsala, India, 2000, p. 111
Having presumably made less sad his sister Sad-mar-kar by bumping off her hubby, having moved seamlessly from normal marital diplomacy to treacherous family treachery, Emperor Songtsen Gampo invades the now-kingless Kingdom of Zhang-Zhung, usurps the throne and adds this powerful country (and its very powerful army) to his growing collection of vassal states. Says Beckwith, "[W]ith this victory, Srong btsan sgampo⁶ became master of the high Tibetan plateau." (p. 20)

Songtsen Gampo invades neighboring Nepal, subjugates it, requests a princess bribe and returns home with a nice Nepalese princess bride.

When equally acquisitive Emperor Taizong of T'ang China invades the A-zha region, a NE buffer state between Tibet and China, Emperor Songtsen asks his new next-door neighbor to give him an imperial princess.

Now, the heqin⁷ princess bribe system involves a lesser power offering a princess to a greater power, as a bribe, to ensure peace. On these grounds, perhaps, assuming that his empire is superior, the T'ang emperor refuses to cough up a princess.

In response, Beckwith reports, Tibetan Emperor Songtsen promptly “strengthened his army with Zhang-Zhung troops and attacked and easily defeated” (p. 22) the [T'ang China vassal kingdom of the] A-zha in 637 (an area near Ko-Ko-Nor situated near a crucial and profitable trade route controlled by T'ang). Beckwith explains that "[The Tibetan Emperor] followed up this success [in 637] by subjugating two powerful [nearby] tribes:" the Tanguts and the Po-lan. (pp. 22-23)

"Having established himself as an enemy to be feared, Srong btsan sgampo⁸ raided the Chinese border town of Sung chou⁹ on September 12, 638." (p. 23) Emperor Songtsen's army easily defeated the "Chinese force sent against him by the commander in Sung chou, and he [Songtsen] incited the local Ch'iang tribes to revolt against their Chinese masters." (p. 23) The Tibetan emperor let it be known that should he not receive a T'ang imperial princess, he, Emperor Songtsen, would lead his vastly superior Imperial Tibetan army deep into China and wreak havoc.

This threat, backed up by his recent demonstrations of martial art, does the trick, demonstrating who is and who is not the top dog emperor.

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⁶ Beckwith's transliteration of Songtsen Gampo.
⁷ Heqin, also known as marriage alliance, refers to the historical practice of... marrying princesses—usually members of minor branches of the ruling family—to rulers of neighboring states.¹ It was often adopted as an appeasement strategy with an enemy state too powerful to defeat on the battlefield. The policy was not always effective. It implied an equal diplomatic status between the emperor and the ruler of the other state. As a result, it was controversial and had many critics.
⁸ Songtsen Gampo.
⁹ Songzhou, in Sichuan.
T‘ang emperor Taizong gives up, gives in, and gives away to Emperor Songtsen a nice new T‘ang princess bride (p. 23) bribe so that the Tibetan Emperor Songtsen will take his big fat army back to wherever it came from. This princess agreement does work for the next decade, during which Tibet continues to invade and conquer other countries but keeps the peace with T‘ang.

In 650, Songtsen Gampo died. Nevertheless, Tibetan expansionism continues to be the rule, whether the ruling ruler is an actual emperor or a bellicose Minister or Regent (who governs when a given emperor is too old or too young or too something.) For a supposedly buddhadharmas-preading country, Imperial Tibet seems to do nothing much except invade, invade, invade, and, mostly, conquer:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Attacker</th>
<th>Attackee</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>656</td>
<td>Tibet</td>
<td>Lesser Bolu &amp; Bailian (control NW silk road trade)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>660</td>
<td>Tibet</td>
<td>A-zha/T'u-yu-hun (control NE silk road trade route)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>662</td>
<td>Tibet &amp; allies</td>
<td>T‘ang army in NW says it's too tired to fight Tibet, so runs away</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>663</td>
<td>Tibet &amp; allies</td>
<td>Gilgit/Wakhan/Balur (control NW silk road trade route)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>663</td>
<td>Tibet</td>
<td>invade A-zha/T'u-yu-hun. (NE route)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>667</td>
<td>Tibet</td>
<td>W. Turkic tribes become vassals of Tibet (NW)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>668</td>
<td>Tibet</td>
<td>erects fortress in A-zha near T‘ang border (NE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>670</td>
<td>Tibet &amp; allies</td>
<td>take Tarim Basin/T‘ang loses its Four Garrisons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>670</td>
<td>Tibet</td>
<td>crushes T‘ang army at Wu Hai/Koko Nor (NE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>670</td>
<td>Tibet</td>
<td>defeats T‘ang army at Tafei Ch‘uan/Koko Nor (NE)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

"This military disaster marked the end of two decades of Chinese domination of the Tarim Basin...The first period of Tibetan domination over the Tarim states and neighboring regions had begun." (p. 36)

Chapter 2

“The Tibetan Empire in the Western Regions” begins with sad, shocked T‘ang China trying to recover from the "great defeat of the Chinese imperial army which had been sent in 670 to the Koko Nor to crush the Tibetans [emphasis mine] and recover the Four Garrisons."(p. 38)
During T'ang's 670 attempt to recover their valuable Four Garrisons and crush the Tibetans, kicking them out of the Tarim Basin, the Chinese had faced a Tibetan army of 200,000 (at Wu Hai) and a 400,000-man Tibetan force (at Ta-fei Chu'an). In 677, the Tibetan emperor dies, and another succeeds him and there's another minister-regent. But it doesn't matter much who's calling the shots — expansionist Tibet’s gonna be expansionist Tibet. In the far west, the Tibetans now are invading Turkistan; in the east, Tibet starts raiding T'ang's fortified Chinese prefectural capitals: Shan chou, K'uo chou, and Ho chou, among others. In response to the outrage of constant raiding, T'ang China put together an expeditionary army specifically to punish Imperial Tibet. Interestingly, that T'ang army never goes anywhere.

"By the end of 677, Tibet had established control over the whole of the Tarim Basin and the neighboring mountainous lands to the southwest." In the summer of 678, a yet another new T'ang expeditionary army is assembled to deal with those pesky Tibetans, and a new T'ang general is named, and he and his army do go somewhere, specifically to Shan chou, where T'ang prevailed in a small skirmish. However, later that year, on October 3, 678, there occurred not a skirmish, but a massive battle between Imperial Tibet and Imperial China around the Koko Nor area, which ended in yet another massively disastrous military defeat for T'ang.

Meanwhile, expansionist Tibet keeps on expanding when it can, and when it can't, still keeps on trying:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>680</td>
<td>Tibet captures the Anrong Fortress in Sichuan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>681</td>
<td>Tibet invades the Qinghai region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>685</td>
<td>Another T'ang army is raised to attack Tibet. It never leaves China.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>687</td>
<td>Tibet invades the Turkic country of Guzan (Kucha) in the West</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>687</td>
<td>A Chinese general chosen to lead an army against Tibet. Attack is cancelled.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>687</td>
<td>Tibet re-takes control of the Western regions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>689</td>
<td>T'ang attacks Tibet near Kongol and is defeated at Yin-chih-chia River</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>690</td>
<td>Tibet defeats T'ang army at Issyk-kul (now in Kyrgyzstan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>691</td>
<td>T'ang raises army to attack Tibetans at Wu-wei. T'ang army is recalled.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10 See the 2020 Conference on Social Sciences, Education, and Management, which one declines properly to cite lest it draw attention to a seemingly still-sensitive topic. Google, Ta-fei-chu'an/Da-fei Ch'uan and Tubo/Tibet (41). Oddly, the outcome of this battle sticks in China's current craw, inspiring scholarly papers that try to T'ang-splain away Tibet's victory and China's terrible defeat ("Not our fault! Bad place! Stinky! Too cold! Too high! Bad sickness, big miasma, holey socks!")
Internal political collapse in Tibet, however, leads to weakness that is noticed by T'ang. An expeditionary army is raised, and striking swiftly to dispatch a wounded enemy, T'ang attacks the Tarim Basin.

Chapter 3

"The Arabs and Western Turks" begins with the sudden and successful Chinese re-capture in 694 of what had once been T'ang's celebrated Four Garrisons, after 22 years of failed attempts. (p. 55) Despite serious internal strife, conflict between the young Tibetan emperor and his experienced Gar clan Minister, Tibet manages to pull itself together, and, in 696, the (Tibetan) empire strikes back. A bloody battle takes place between T'ang and Tibet in which the Tibetans are once again victorious. The battleground near T'ao chou acquires a new name due to the carnage — "Tag La Gya Dur" (Tib.) or "Tiger Pass Chinese Graveyard." After this, "Tibet was able — from a position of strength — to send an embassy to the T'ang court with a peace proposal — a political marriage." (p. 58) Once again, at T'ang's expense, Tibet's military superiority enables it to play the princess bribe card—and win.

However, the long-simmering antipathy between the Tibetan emperor and the long-powerful Gar clan had not dissipated. In 697, with war minister Gar far from Central Tibet, subduing T'ang's vassals in A-zha, the Tibetan emperor invited the leaders of the Gar clan to a hunting party. Over two thousand came. The emperor had all of them executed. (p. 60) Thus "[t]he house of Gar was crushed." (p. 61) What was someone saying about bringing the Buddhist teachings to Tibet? Never mind.

Despite the evil karma resulting from the emperor's decision to execute two thousand innocent Tibetans, somehow some Tibetans remain, undaunted, un-assassinated; the Tibetan emperor orders his military to launch a series of raids on the eastern border, targeting T'ang military prefectures and cities. In the far west, the Tibetans join with Arab forces to oust T'ang.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>700</td>
<td>Tibet raids Ho chou, Liang chou, Ch'ang-sung hsien.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>701</td>
<td>Tibet &amp; E. Turk allies raid Liang chou. Again.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>701</td>
<td>Tibet raids S'ung chou, T'ao chou.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>702</td>
<td>Tibet raids S'ung chou, T'ao chou.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>702</td>
<td>Tibet raids Mao chou.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>703-4</td>
<td>Tibet subjugates the Mywa of Nanzhao on Tibet's SW border w/ T'ang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>704</td>
<td>Tibet &amp; W. Turks attack Tirmidh in Tukharistan - control N/S routes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>710</td>
<td>Tibet demands gift of NE land from T'ang and receives land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>710</td>
<td>Tibet builds a bridge over Yellow River on its new land gift</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>710</td>
<td>Tibet stations 2 armies on Tibet/China border on its new land gift</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>714</td>
<td>Tibet begins raiding Chinese border posts along river</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The events of 715 clearly indicate that a milestone in Eurasian history had been reached. The Arabs from the west, the Chinese from the east, and the Tibetans from the south — the three greatest expansionistic states of early medieval Asia — had converged. (p. 83)

Chapter 4

“The Turgis Alliance”: Beckwith opens this chapter remarking that "it is a testament to the weakness of T'ang in comparison with their self-portrait in dynastic histories, that they could not seriously alter the course of events in Eurasia during the eighth century. In the end, the proud Chinese had to accept the fact of equality with their neighbors." (p. 84) Especially when their neighbors kept on attacking them, and especially Imperial Tibet.

In the northeast, the Tibetans continued their raids on vulnerable T'ang outposts; in the west, the Tibetans, Arabs, the Turgis Confederacy, Uighurs, Eastern Turks, and T'ang continued duking it out for control of the Tarim Basin, with losses on all sides, and frequent shifts of alliances. There's just no stopping these Tibetans.

Chapter 5

“T'ang China and the Arabs”12: In 737, T'ang China under emperor Hsuan-tsung broke a 7-year peace treaty with Tibet by invading northeastern Tibet and decisively defeating them. In the west, Tibetan-Turgis allies joined forces against intrusive Arabs. Many T'ang victories started to occur (probably because the Gar clan had been annihilated — they had been very famously skilled soldiers).

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>714</td>
<td>Tibet offers peace but T'ang refuses so Tibet raids T'ang cities and border posts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>715</td>
<td>Tibet allies with Arab forces to attack T'ang vassal Ferghana</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11 727 Tibet & allies attack Kucha
    Tibet and allies attack Kucha, Gua zhou and Su zhou
12 730 Tibetan Army is in Turkharistan, the far west
734  T'ang and Tibet set a boundary at Chiling Mountain
737  Tibet conquers Lesser Bolu
741  Tibet attacks Qinghai, then sacks the Stone City
745  T'ang attacks Tibet and suffers defeat
749  T'ang attacks Tibet and suffers heavy casualties
Despite having to endure more and more military defeats, the Tibetan Empire continued to cause problems for T'ang. For example, Beckwith points out that "[d]uring the winter, when Chinese armies were largely immobilized, the Tibetans seem to have had complete control of the area…the Tibetans would wait until the grain grown by the Chinese was ripe; then they would raid and collect it. The T'ang authorities were so helpless to stop this (it happened every year) that the local Chinese nicknamed the area "Tibetan Grain Estates." (p. 129)

Chapter 6

“The Late Empire” begins with increasing losses for Imperial Tibet, that is, until the An-Lushan rebellion in 755, which required T'ang to withdraw its military from all its various faraway posts: in the west, the north, the northeast, opening the door for Imperial Tibet to sweep right back in. Which they do. By 763, the rebellion is still going strong, Tibet has re-gained its territories, and a strong and confident Tibetan Army sweeps into the "T'ang capital city, Ch'ang-An, and takes it over, installs a Tibetan puppet as emperor, and then the Tibetans leave to begin re-taking their former territories. And they do.

I could go on, because there is more, and more, but I recommend you acquire this book so you may read it yourself and savor it. It's a great book. It has kept my mind boggled happily for months and as I write this, my wonderment continues to increase.

I've become undaunted by learning A-zha in Tibetan is also known as Togon in Tibetan and is also known as Tu-yu-hun in Chinese and also known as A-chai in Chinese. A-zha is Togon is T'u-yu-hun is A-chai. And so on.

13757 Tibet conquers Shanzhou
763 Tibet conquers Kharasahr, invades T'ang with 100K army
765 Tibet invades Tang 70K army and takes Liang zhou
766 Tibet conquers Ganzhou and Suzhou
776 Tibet conquers Gauzhou
781 Tibet conquers Hami
783 Tibet & China sign treaty of Qinshui
784 China breaks treaty
786 Tibet conquers Yanzhou and Xiazhou
787 Tibet captures Dunhuang and Kucha
789 Tibet attacks Lonshou, Jingzhou and Bingzhou
790 Tibet conquers Tingzhou
792 Tibet conquers Gaochang and Khotan etc.
Beckwith's book has made me wonder how, from Central Tibet, the Tibetan Empire could possibly keep track of battles on its eastern border with A-zha/T'ang China, as well as in the desert-y middle Tarim Basin/Four Garrisons, as well as the really faraway Pamir-Gilgit-Karakorum mountain passes, simultaneously. Not to mention Nanzhao, in the south. Turkestan. That's a lot of territory to take and keep or merely keep track of.

Beckwith's book made me wonder what happened to all those pacific meditative Buddhist teachings lovingly imported to Tibet by Tibetan emperors whilst engaging in almost perpetual warfare and the occasional outright massacre.

It made me amazed that the conventional historians' view of imperial Tibet as being a backward backwater still prevails. Curious civilizationists who acquire Christopher Beckwith's excellent book will enjoy the wrongly-written record of Imperial Tibet in Central Asia being corrected.
“Politics is a strong and slow drilling of hard boards.” (Die Politik bedeutet ein starkes langsames Bohren von harten Brettern…. ) This is a quote from the work of one of the most famous sociologists ever, German Professor Max Weber. In 2010 a new edition of his work Politics as a Vocation was published in Berlin, Germany. It is the first in a planned series of new editions of works of the great German sociologist including Staatssozioologie (Sociology of the State) and Wirtschaftsgeschichte (General Economic History).

Max Weber was born in 1864 and passed away in 1920. His works have had a considerable influence on 20th-century sociologists. Weber opposed the orthodox Marxist view that economics was the primary societal determining factor. In contrast he stressed the plurality and interdependence of causes — religious values, ideologies, and charismatic leaders — in shaping societies. Max Weber is today probably mainly remembered internationally for The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, with its thesis of the connection between the ascetic ideal fostered by Calvinism and the rise of capitalist institutions.

The Reformation was a critical period in European history that saw a reorientation of basic cultural frameworks of spiritual direction and human outlook, destined to have a great impact on economic life as well as other aspects of modern culture. Weber tended to view Protestant rationalism as one further step in the series of stages of increasing rationalization of every area of modern society.

Politics can be defined in many ways, one being that it is the leadership or influencing the leadership of a political association or a state.

What is a state? It is a community that claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of force within a given territory. The elite in that community needs continuous administration, requiring obedience to those who hold power. The decisive means of politics is violence (“Für die Politik ist das entscheidende Mittel: die Gewaltsamkeit.”) (p. 57) So the elite must control the material goods necessary for the use of the violence needed. (This is a view from 1918. It should be noted that violence is playing a minor role in twenty-first century European party politics.)

If a politician lives for politics, he either enjoys power or serves a cause. The politician who lives off politics makes it the permanent source of income. A political organization is thus needed for the struggle for power. These organizations have developed into modern parties.
There are basically two categories of politicians: administrative officials and political officials. In reality, ministers (political officials) are less in control than the heads of divisions in ministries, who are long-term, administrative appointees.

Political leaders in the West are often demagogues. They have existed since the creation of the constitutional state and certainly since the establishment of democracy (see for example p. 28 in the new German edition).

The politician must have passion, a feeling of responsibility, and a sense of proportion. Passion means a sense of matter-of-factness, of passionate devotion to a cause, to the god or demon who is its overlord. Responsibility to the cause must be the guiding star of action. For this, a sense of proportion is needed. Warm passion and a cool sense of proportion must be forged together in one and the same soul.

The politician must combat vanity in order to be devoted to his cause, and must preserve some distance, not least from himself. Lack of objectivity and irresponsibility are the two deadly sins of politics; vanity, the need to personally stand in the foreground, can make the politician commit these sins.

“Politics as a Vocation” was one of two public lectures by Max Weber given in 1918 after the allied victory over Germany in World War I. In the lecture he said he was concerned with charismatic leadership of the demagogue in parliament:

Men do not obey him by virtue of tradition or statute, but because they believe in him... [their devotion] is oriented to his person and to its qualities. The demagogue cannot do it alone. He needs a staff and a bureaucratic organization to dominate effectively.

In the past the highest leader was forced to work through and with men who had their own power centers, which they controlled. So he had to work to “expropriate” the power of these men and replace it with bureaucrats who worked for him.

Weber continues by describing professional politicians, who are prominent in democracies.

Only independently wealthy men can live for politics. Poor men can also be professional politicians, but it must then be possible to make a steady income.

For loyal service offices of all sorts — in parties, newspapers, cooperative societies, health insurance, municipalities, as well as in the state positions — are given out by party leaders. Struggles within political parties are both for the patronage of office, but also struggles for objective goals.
Weber describes the weakness of the German system of government under the emperor before 1918 as having relied too much on bureaucrats and not allowing for the influence of politics:

Der echte Beamte – das ist für die Beurteilung unseres früheren Regimes entscheidend – soll seinem eigentlichen Beruf nach nicht Politik treiben, sondern: “verwalten”, unparteiisch vor allem, - auch für die sogenannten “politischen” Verwaltungsbeamten gilt das, offiziell wenigstens, soweit nicht die “Staatsräson”, d.h. die Lebensinteressen der herrschenden Ordnung, in Frage stehen. Sine ira et studio, “ohne Zorn und Eingenommenheit” soll er seines Amtes walten. Er soll also gerade das nicht tun, was der Politiker, der Führer sowohl wie seine Gefolgschaft, immer und notwendig tun muss: kämpfen.

[The proper civil servant (this is crucial for assessing our former regime) is not supposed to pursue a policy of his own, but rather to "manage," impartially above all. This applies even to so-called "political" appointees, officially at least, unless the “raison d’état”, i.e., the vital interests of the ruling order, are in question. He is to hold office sine ira et studio, “without wrath and without bias.” He is not supposed to do what the politicians, the leader and his followers, must always and necessarily do: fight!] (p. 27)

Weber underlines that the bureaucracy needs to be under the control of politicians since it lacks any sense of direction or purpose. Weber notes that choosing the career of a politician can lead to power. So the politician must ask himself if he can do justice to the responsibility of power. So what kind of a man must one be if he is to be allowed to put his hand on the wheel of history? He must have devotion to a cause and coolness in choosing effective means to the end and must be undistracted by personal vanity.

Weber believed that different life spheres have different moral laws, which may come into conflict. So what is wrong elsewhere in life may not be wrong in politics. It might therefore not be wrong for a politician to lie his way into office.

No doubt some of the observations by Weber in Politik als Beruf are obsolete in the twenty-first century but it remains a very interesting and entertaining work.

A personal favorite quote of mine is:

Zwar die Gefolgschaft des Kriegsfürsten fragt ebensowenig nach den Bedingungen normaler Wirtschaft wie die Gefolgschaft des revolutionären Helden der Strasse.
Beide leben von Beute, Raub, Konfiskationen Kontributionen, Aufdrängung von wertlosen Zwangszahlungsmitteln: - was dem Wesen nach alles das gleiche ist.” [Certainly, the warlord's followers ask just as little about the conditions of normal economics as the followers of the revolutionary hero of the street. Both live from booty, robbery, confiscations, contributions, the imposition of worthless means of compulsory payment: - all of which are essentially the same.] (p. 16)

This comment was made in the era when not only Germany was the victim of communist civil war. Other countries suffered too from communist armed revolts that continued for many years in the 1920s. The worst threat was over in 1920 when the Russian communist armies were stopped at Warsaw from overrunning Western Europe. This Polish military victory (now often forgotten) certainly saved Germany from a communist dictatorship although communist revolts continued in the country for a few more years.

Reviewed by Stephen T. Satkiewicz

The Russian revolutionary Vladimir Lenin is once quoted as saying, “*There are decades where nothing happens; and there are weeks where decades happen.*” There should be a parallel statement about how some books state extraordinarily little in multiple pages, but others speak volumes in mere sentences. A good example of the latter would be *Macrohistory and Globalization* by another Russian: Leonid Grinin.

Leonid Grinin is Senior Research Professor at the Institute for Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences in Moscow as well as Deputy Director of the Eurasian Center for Big History & System Forecasting. He is also Editor-in-Chief of *Social Evolution & History* and the *Journal of Globalization Studies*. He is a principal representative of the Russian school of Big History alongside Andrey Korotayev, Dmitri Bondarenko, and the late Akop P. Nazaretyan.

Big History is an emerging field founded by David Christian and “*seeks to understand the integrated history of the Cosmos, Earth, Life, and Humanity, using the best available empirical evidence and scholarly methods.*”¹ The research of the Russian school of Big History tends to focus on long-term social evolutionary processes studied through advanced mathematical modelling. Its research tends to overlap more with the emerging field of Complex Systems Theory and Analysis. The influence of Anthropology is also heavily present in the field, more specifically the works of C.R. Hallpike and the late Robert L. Carneiro (1927-2020).²

Perhaps the most distinguishing mark of Grinin’s scholarship in the field is his greater focus on more deeply theoretical and philosophical issues. These disciplinary issues are necessary in order to properly understand Grinin’s arguments in the book.

The book is divided into two main parts. Part One seeks to examine the theoretical foundations for Macrohistory as well as to analyze particularly important themes of the field, namely the rise and evolution of the state and political societies. Grinin at the beginning defines *Macrohistory* as “*history on the large scale, sometimes telling the story of whole civilizations, sometimes of the entire world, but sometimes of particular dimensions of historical process.*” (p. 5)

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It is in this section that Grinin makes his only explicit references to civilizations as a concept on page 19, in the context of distinguishing it from other related concepts such as “World system” or his preferred one of “Humankind.” Grinin states that he does not negate the concept of civilizations, but only notes its limited use in the context of this particular study. Nevertheless, the author does make some important theoretical points to consider about the vast array of various levels of analysis on how different paradigms are better suited for certain contexts than others. Grinin’s elaboration on the distinction between historical processes and periodization is one example of this being potentially helpful to civilization studies.

In the second chapter of the book, Grinin tackles the persistent issue of “the Role of an Individual in History” or in more technical terms the structure versus agency debate. In a mere twelve pages (pp. 47-59), Grinin provides the reader with a brief history of the philosophical debates on this all the way from Antiquity to the modern period. The next chapter deals with “the Evolution of Statehood,” which is where Grinin outlines his theory of “politogenesis” concerning the rise, evolution, and fall of states, empires, and civilizations. This is perhaps the more familiar territory for comparative civilizational scholars. Grinin, as is his great strength as a scholar, does not resort to any simplistic models but rather does well to engage and introduce the reader to a vast array of academic debates from the rise of complex chiefdoms (a field pioneered by Robert L. Carneiro mentioned earlier) to even outlining his own “typology of early states” that almost seems like an indirect homage to the kinds mentioned by Plato and Aristotle in their political treatises.

Part Two of the book delves into the various issues surrounding the social phenomenon of Globalization, namely its economic and political aspects. Grinin provides a working definition of Globalization as “a process as a result of which the world becomes more connected and more dependent on all its subjects.” (p. 214) The main principal aspect of this process is the reduction of sovereignty for individual nation-states, a point that Grinin expands upon to considerable lengths in the book (including yet another brief history of the concept of sovereignty). Of course, Grinin does not dismiss the state as completely irrelevant or obsolete, but rather its role will be transformed in light of the recent processes of global inter-connectedness. There is also the tricky issue of nationalism, which has seen a resurgence within the last decade or so, which Grinin argues is the other main result of Globalization besides growing inter-connectedness and reduced sovereignty of the state. This is not a paradox to Grinin, who insists “nationalism is gaining strength because states are weakening as systems.” (p. 224) In light of recent events following the publication of the book (from Brexit, the 2016 American Presidential election, and the current issue of vaccine nationalism dealing with the on-going pandemic), it is an argument that should be taken seriously.

So overall, Grinin’s book is very much a tour de force that seeks to cover many topics in one mere book that would normally occupy several volumes.
Thankfully, any intimidated reader can rest assured that Grinin does provide a sufficient summarization of these issues as well as proper references for further in-depth analysis of the scholarly fields involved, which stretches up to fifty-six pages at the end of the book (pp. 259-315). However, the paradox maybe that Grinin’s achievement is also its greatest weakness: on the one hand it tackles so many complex topics at once, often to varying levels of depth that can be both overwhelming for those not familiar with the subjects at hand or underwhelming for those who are. Perhaps it is best used as an intermediate level text: best for those who are somewhat familiar with the issues and texts addressed.

Perhaps a few comments are needed concerning the wider issue of the field of Big History. As noted, this book is written within the context of the field and as such follows the methodologies based around more natural sciences and advanced mathematical modelling. This is quite a contrast to the more traditional humanities and social scientific-based methodologies used for historical as well as comparative civilizational analysis. This is perhaps the most controversial aspect of the whole field, and it is not an easy issue to resolve in a few comments.

While the merit of its methodologies can and should certainly be debated, the great merit of the Russian School of Big History is that it helps demonstrate that new areas of research related to comparative civilizational analysis are emerging outside the traditional fields. It should also be noted that the Russian School does distinguish itself from more crude forms of social evolutionary theories that literally seek to explain societies through biological evolution (famous examples like Richard Dawkins) by marking both significant similarities and differences between social and biological evolutionary processes. It may be wise to at least be cautiously open to engagement with these emerging fields, even if from a more critical standpoint.3 Perhaps a good place to start for those scholars interested is Macrohistory and Globalization by Leonid Grinin.

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3 ISCSC member Vlad Alalykin-Izvekov makes his own comments on Big History in "Letter from Germany and Russia," Comparative Civilizations Review: No. 78, Spring 2018, Pages 56-59.
CCR Style Guide for Submitted Manuscripts

Begin the document with title, author’s name, author’s position (e.g. professor, lecturer, graduate student, independent scholar), author’s academic department and affiliation (with city and state location or equivalent), and the author’s email address.

All manuscripts must include an abstract containing a maximum of 150 words. Please supply up to five keywords. The word Keywords should be italicized and followed by a colon; the words themselves should be separated by a comma and should not be italicized; no period at the end of the list. This paragraph should be placed at the end of the abstract, preceded and followed by a line space.

Do NOT include page numbers, headers, or footers. These will be added by the editors. Do NOT utilize automatic formatting for paragraph indents or for space following subheads and paragraphs.

Write your article in English. Submit your manuscript, including tables, figures and appendices, as a single Microsoft Word file. Page size should be 8.5 x 11 inches. All margins (left, right, top and bottom) should be 1-inch, including your tables and figures. Single space your text. Use a single column layout with both left and right margins justified. Main body text font: 12 pt. Times New Roman. If figures are included, use high-resolution figures, preferably encoded as encapsulated PostScript. Maximum length of article should be 20 pages including endnotes, bibliography, etc.

Do NOT indent paragraphs. A line space should follow each paragraph. Subheads are in bold, flush left, separated by a line space above and below. Long quotations should be placed in a separate paragraph with a .5-inch hanging indent, no quotation marks, and preceded and followed by one-line spaces.

Except for common non-standard English terminology, the use of non-standard English terms should be avoided. Authors should use proper, standard English grammar. Suggested guides include The Elements of Style by William Strunk, Jr. and E. B. White, and The Chicago Manual of Style, University of Chicago Press.

Underlining in the text is discouraged. Whenever possible use italics to indicate text that you wish to emphasize. Use italics for book titles, movie titles, etc., and for foreign terms. Using colored text is prohibited. However, we encourage authors to take advantage of the ability to use color in the production of figures, maps, etc. To the extent possible, tables and figures should appear in the document near where they are referenced in the text. Large tables or figures should be put on pages by themselves. Avoid the use of overly small type in tables. In no case should tables or figures be in a separate document or file. All tables and figures must fit within 1-inch margins on all sides, in both portrait and landscape view.
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In October 1961, in Salzburg, Austria, an extraordinary group of scholars gathered to create the International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations. Among the 26 founding members from Austria, Germany, France, Switzerland, The Netherlands, Spain, Italy, England, Russia, the United States, China and Japan were such luminaries as Pitirim Sorokin and Arnold Toynbee.

For six days, the participants debated such topics as the definition of “civilization,” problems in the analysis of complex cultures, civilizational encounters in the past, the Orient versus the Occident, problems of universal history, theories of historiography, and the role of the “human sciences” in “globalization.” The meeting was funded by the Austrian government, in cooperation with UNESCO, and received considerable press coverage. Sorokin was elected the Society’s first president.

After several meetings in Europe, the advancing age of its founding members and the declining health of then president, Othmar F. Anderle, were important factors in the decision to transfer the Society to the United States.

Between 1968 and 1970 Roger Williams Wescott of Drew University facilitated that transition. In 1971, the first annual meeting of the ISCSC (US) was held in Philadelphia. Important participants in that meeting and in the Society’s activities during the next years included Benjamin Nelson (the Society’s first American president), Roger Wescott, Vytautas Kavolis, Matthew Melko, David Wilkinson, Rushton Coulborn and C.P. Wolf. In 1974, the Salzburg branch was formally dissolved, and from that year to the present there has been only one International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations (ISCSC).

The presidents of the ISCSC are, in order: In Europe, Pitirim Sorokin and Othmar Anderle; in the United States, Benjamin Nelson, Vytautas Kavolis, Matthew Melko, Michael Palencia-Roth, Roger Wescott, Shuntaro Ito (from Japan), Wayne Bledsoe, Lee Daniel Snyder, Andrew Targowski, David Rosner, Toby Huff, and current president Lynn Rhodes. To date, the Society has held 47 meetings, most of them in the United States but also in Salzburg, Austria; Santo Domingo, The Dominican Republic; Dublin, Ireland; Chiba, Japan; Frenchman’s Cove, Jamaica; St. Petersburg, Russia; Paris, France; New Brunswick, Canada; Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; and Suzhou, China.

More than 30 countries are represented in the Society’s membership. Its intellectual dynamism and vibrancy over the years have been maintained and enhanced through its annual meetings, its publications, and the participation of such scholars as Talcott Parsons, Hayden White, Immanuel Wallerstein, Gordon Hewes, André Gunder Frank, Marshall Sahlins, Lynn White Jr., and Jeremy Sabloff.

The Society is committed to the idea that complex civilizational problems can best be approached through multidisciplinary analyses and debate by scholars from a variety of fields. *The Comparative Civilizations Review*, which welcomes submissions from the Society’s members as well as other scholars, has been published continually since its inaugural issue in 1979.

Prof. Michael Palencia-Roth
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