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## Civilizational Dynamics of "Hybrid Warfare"

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### Abstract

Since the end of the Cold War, analysts have struggled to make sense of the proliferation of smaller scale conflicts. Several labels have been used to describe this phenomenon, the most recent being "Hybrid Warfare." This paper attempts to analyze them through the perspective of civilizational theory.

Very rarely, however, have the civilizational dimensions to these "Hybrid Wars" been extensively addressed. Considering that civilizations represent collective identities on perhaps the most macro-scale, they play an important potential dimension in this ongoing debate. Avoiding any gross simplified variation of a "clash of civilizations" type thesis, a civilizational perspective into this debate can also shed significant insight into the nature of intra-civilizational conflicts and how they might also overlap with any inter-civilizational conflicts.

A civilizational perspective also raises the critical issue of the persistence of collective identities, even in an increasingly globalized world.

### Introduction

The end of the Cold War not only brought about a marked transition in world order; it also marked a critical transitional moment from modern to "late-modern" forms of warfare. Throughout this time, stretching from the 1990s to the present-day, numerous terms have been proposed to define this phenomenon, among them "New Wars," "Asymmetrical," "Non-Linear" and more recently "Hybrid." Intense debates contend about what are the significant differences between these terms, if any significant differences do exist. However, analysts all seem to agree that the nature of warfare in the post-Cold War world is seemingly more complex and chaotic than during the previous Cold War era. Many have even argued that traditional military theory (represented by Carl von Clausewitz) is absolutely obsolete in this environment.<sup>1</sup>

In parallel to these debates, in the early nineties, Samuel Huntington caused a huge uproar with his analysis concerning what he regarded as a marked transition in global geopolitics, from the age of ideological blocs to the one of a "clash of civilizations."

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<sup>1</sup> Schuurman, Bart. "Clausewitz and the 'new wars' scholars." *Parameters*, Spring 2010, pg. 90.

One marked aspect of this clash concerns what Huntington referred to as “fault-line wars” that primarily are defined as “communal conflicts between states or groups from different civilizations.”<sup>2</sup> Certain parallels to the current rethinking of the nature of warfare are intriguing and do deserve a reexamination in light of subsequent events and research.

Aside from Huntington’s analysis of “fault-line wars,” there has been extraordinarily little if any major attempt to analyze the phenomenon of post-Cold War conflicts through the prism of civilizations or civilizational theory. Most literature related to “hybrid warfare” refers to the tactical or strategic elements, while this paper seeks to analyze these conflicts through the prism of what it can discern regarding civilizational dynamics in the contemporary world.

It is primarily the clashes of collective identities that hold the most proper interest for civilizational-based scholarship, for even the whole “clash of civilizations” thesis is built upon this basic framework, albeit on a macro-scale. A proper civilizational analysis need not be wed to only a macro-scale viewpoint, or at least not on any simplistic model of such.

“Hybrid Wars” and the clash of collective identities need not involve simply the clash of one civilization against another civilization; they may just as well involve clashes within a civilization or rather one faction of a civilization battling within its own civilization as well as battling factions of another civilization. This suggests the multi-faceted nature of these conflicts and how they correspond to the multi-faceted nature of civilizations and collective identities in and of themselves. This overlap implies a certain civilizational ontology to such conflicts. The formal addressing of this element has often been neglected within both the existing body of scholarship and the established civilizational analysis. There are several possible reasons for this, which shall hopefully be addressed to a sufficient extent within this paper. A proper synthesis of the existing scholarships holds much potential for yielding meaningful results into the underlining relationship of war and peace at the present moment in world history and its potential future.

The multi-layered approach necessary for investigating the nature of hybrid wars is a natural fit for a civilizational paradigm. Civilizational analysis also provides a fruitful potential for enriching the scholarship in the field, given its proper interdisciplinary nature. Too often over-specialization in scholarship can hinder investigating complex phenomenon for the varying angles and paradigms necessary for obtaining a proper comprehensive understanding.

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<sup>2</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. Simon & Schuster, 1996. Pg.252.

Humanity at the current moment faces a precarious state of affairs which lays at the very heart of this explosion of hybrid wars. On the one hand, they testify to the endurance of collective identities; however, at the very same time, the existence of Globalization testifies to the reality of cosmopolitanism and a proper engagement with that reality as well.<sup>3</sup> This tension cannot be easily resolved, if such a resolution is even possible. This is not necessarily a reason for despair, for tensions are part of the human condition and can often provide outlets for human creativity.

### Theoretical Outline of “Hybrid Warfare”

Among the first to analyze the shift in military conflicts in the post-Cold War era was the noted Israeli Martin Van Creveld in his 1991 book *The Transformation of War*. Creveld made the argument that the age of modern warfare, dominated by the modern state, was over. In its place would be a shift to lower-scale tribal-forms of warfare that would become the new norm.

As Creveld starts off his book: “A ghost is stalking the corridors of general staffs and defense departments all over the ‘developed’ world — the fear of military impotence, even irrelevance.”<sup>4</sup>

Towards the end of the decade, Mary Kaldor followed up with her analysis of so-called “New Wars.” Whilst “Old Wars” were characterized by large-scale clashes between states, “New Wars” are often characterized by smaller-scale clashes by varying networks across both local and global contexts fought by varying forces. Examples involve human trafficking, new forms of slavery such as in Libya, Boko Haram, ISIS, al Qaeda and the global narco-traffickers; in addition, there are terrorists, insurgents, and proxy actors such as in Yemen, Afghanistan, and Iraq.<sup>5</sup>

“Old Wars” were predominantly about geopolitical objectives; “New Wars” are primarily about asserting collective identity politics.<sup>6</sup> The parallels to Creveld’s analysis are striking. There was significant debate over the concept of “New Wars” that predominated during the late 1990s and 2000s.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Lee Trepanier. “Introduction” in *Cosmopolitanism in the Age of Globalization: Citizens without States*. Edited by Lee Trepanier and Khalil M. Habib. University Press of Kentucky, 2011. Pg.4.

<sup>4</sup> Martin Van Creveld, *The Transformation of War: The Most Radical Reinterpretation of Armed Conflict Since Clausewitz*. Free Press: New York and Toronto, 1991. Pg. 1.

<sup>5</sup> Mary Kaldor. *New & Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*. Third Edition. Stanford University Press: Stanford, 2012. Pp. vi, 9.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid. pg. 7.

<sup>7</sup> Schuurman, Kaldor "In Defense of New Wars." *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development*. 2013. <https://www.stabilityjournal.org/articles/10.5334/sta.at/> Accessed 3/26/2020

The context of Kaldor's analysis was largely to make sense of the ethnic conflicts in the former Yugoslavia as well as the struggle against terrorism, in the wake of the attacks of September 11, 2001, which often necessitated the use of Humanitarian Interventionism on the part of NATO forces as a response.

Since the 2010s there has been a shift towards a different conceptualization called "Hybrid Warfare." Frank Hoffman was the first to coin the term "Hybrid War" in 2007, arguing that it constituted a combination of actors (both state and non-state) using a mixture of regular and irregular military means to achieve their common strategic and geopolitical objectives.<sup>8</sup>

Although Frank Hoffman was the first to conceptualize "Hybrid Warfare," he certainly has not been the only scholar to write on the subject. Col. John J. McCuen (Ret.) further explains the nature of "Hybrid Warfare" as follows:

Although conventional in form, the decisive battles in today's hybrid wars are fought not on conventional battlegrounds, but on asymmetric battlegrounds within the conflict zone population, the home front population, and the international community population. Irregular, asymmetric battles fought within these populations ultimately determine success or failure.<sup>9</sup>

Unfortunately, a major weakness of "Hybrid War" theory is that there is no consensus about how exactly to define it, and many of the conflicts it seeks to analyze are still ongoing and thus difficult to analyze fully with precision. To avoid this difficulty, this paper largely relies upon Frank Hoffman's original conceptual framework.

While sharing many of the critical characteristics of the "New Wars," there is one significant difference in that the "New Wars" were generally characterized as being conducted outside the sovereignty of the modern state. By contrast, "Hybrid Wars" were characterized as being used by both state and non-state actors, and furthermore derived from a blurring of the distinctions between the two.<sup>10</sup>

Part of this contrast can be explained by considering the contrasting geopolitical contexts of their formulations.

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<sup>8</sup> Frank Hoffman, *Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid War*.

Arlington: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 2007. Pg.14

[https://www.potomacinstitute.org/images/stories/publications/potomac\\_hybridwar\\_0108.pdf](https://www.potomacinstitute.org/images/stories/publications/potomac_hybridwar_0108.pdf) Accessed 3/28/2020

<sup>9</sup> John J. McCuen, "Hybrid Wars," *Military Review*, Mar/Apr 2008, Vol. 88 Issue 2.Pg. 107.

<sup>10</sup> Hoffman, pg. 8.

Much of the discourse of the “New Wars” was situated in the immediate post-Cold War context of American and NATO hegemony that engaged in humanitarian interventions and focused more on the prerogatives of non-state actors. Its paradigmatic example was the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina of the 1990s.<sup>11</sup> By contrast, the “Hybrid War” discourse considers the resurgence of competing great powers (such as Russia, China, India, etc.) and how such powers might exploit irregular and non-state forces to their wider geopolitical ends.

As Alex Deep explained: “The unipolar moment that has persisted since the fall of the Soviet Union has given rise to an international system in which unconventional challenges to the idea of traditional state-on-state war are increasingly prevalent.”<sup>12</sup> Its paradigmatic case study remains the Russian occupation of Crimea in 2014 and the continuing conflict in eastern Ukraine.

One major strength of the “New Wars” discourse was its analysis of the importance of collective identities in such conflicts, and their continual role in a globalized world. With the resurgence of populist nationalism throughout the world in the past decade, this bleeds into the current discourse of “Hybrid War” as well.

A predominant weakness of the “New Wars” discourse was the emphasis of a certain cosmopolitan approach to collective identities (both on the local and especially on the global scale), which almost seeks to disregard the importance such identities hold upon human groupings. Mary Kaldor herself is deeply dedicated to this cosmopolitan approach.<sup>13</sup> Given the geopolitical context of “New Wars” discourse explained above, this made some sense.

By contrast, “Hybrid War” theorists tend to take into more proper consideration the continual reality of great power competition. In another contrast to the “New Wars” discourse, “Hybrid War” theorists tend not to focus so much on the importance of nationalism and collective identity politics, but rather to focus more on the wider geopolitical implications of the rise of powers capable of challenging American and Western hegemony. Nationalism, if addressed, is usually interpreted as one tool of such powers to expanding their spheres of influence.

In a comparable manner, the relevance of civilizations in connection with hybrid warfare has largely been absent from the related scholarship. This is not an easy issue to address, not in the least because it requires discerning the best conceptualization of “civilization” that would be most appropriate for the task at hand. To achieve this goal, a foundational look at the underlining nature or ontology of civilizations is required.

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<sup>11</sup> Kaldor, 2012. pp.32-71.

<sup>12</sup> Alex Deep, “Hybrid War: Old Concept, New Techniques.” *Small Wars Journal*. March 2, 2015. <https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/hybrid-war-old-concept-new-techniques>. Accessed 3/28/2020.

<sup>13</sup> Kaldor, 2012. Pp. 7, 119-151.

## Theoretical Outline of Civilizational Ontology

The dynamics of human identities are complex and operate upon varying levels. This helps necessitate the need for a civilizational paradigm that can carefully consider these complex levels that participate in hybrid wars. Whilst a certain “clash of civilizations” type of scenario is involved here, it does not, however, account for the totality of such realities.

To provide one famous example: the inter-ethnic conflicts in the Balkans of the 1990s were as much a “clash of civilizations” (Western Latin Catholics vs. Eastern Orthodox vs. Islamic) but yet could also be simultaneously interpreted as an intra-cultural clash between different groupings of a fairly common southern Slavic meta-culture (former Yugoslavia in a certain political sense).

This type of dynamic is seen in other examples of hybrid war type conflicts—that the conflicting sides are fighting for distinct identities (even civilizational ones at times), yet at the same time these identities’ characteristics can be very blurred. The current on-going conflict in Ukraine between ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Russians presents a similar perplexing dynamic involving two distinct historical identities that have strong historical ties to one another as well.

This raises a fundamental concern for studies of Civilizational Ontology. *Civilizational Ontology is concerned with the underlining nature of civilizations and seeks to define their fundamental characteristics.*

This can prove to be an elusive task, as demonstrated by the innumerable definitions for what exactly is considered a “civilization.” This difficulty is due to the inherent complex natures of civilizations, which also further necessitate the need for a multi-paradigmatic approach in Civilizational Ontology. This helps establish Civilizational Ontology as a proper over-arching framework to properly synthesize the varying definitions and approaches regarding civilizations.

Due to this multifaceted nature of civilizations, a certain *Civilizational Uncertainty Principle* could be proposed as a foundational starting point for Civilizational Ontology. This *Civilizational Uncertainty Principle* would stipulate that *the more one attempts to precisely define a civilization’s characteristics the less we know of its essential qualities.*

Working on certain metaphors with natural sciences such as physics and astronomy, civilizations can be best understood as constituting cosmologies on their own accord. Pitirim Sorokin spoke of a Socio-Cultural “universe” from which its dynamics could be studied in depth.

This would establish the multi-faceted and multi-layered natures of civilizational reality, yet also note the holistic unity at its foundation—albeit a chaotic unity.

The Civilizational Uncertainty Principle should not be interpreted as negating the necessity for precision in defining the characteristics of civilizations, but rather simply stressing the inherent limitations in achieving an over-arching precision. Civilizations do exist and can be defined with a certain amount of precision; yet too much precision can come at the cost of totality. Totality is a necessity for any macro-scale study of reality, and civilizations do represent a macro-scale reality in the human universe. As E.F. Schumacher once explained:

Maybe it is necessarily so that the higher things cannot be known with the same degree of certainty as can the lesser things, in which case it would be a very great loss if knowledge were limited to things beyond the possibility of doubt.<sup>14</sup>

Even given these inherent limitations and uncertainty, certain fundamental characteristics of civilizational ontology can be established. There are two main approaches to analyzing civilizational ontology, which roughly parallels the distinction between substances as opposed to processes that exist within philosophy.<sup>15</sup> They are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but this distinction can pose significant challenges if the goal is to synthesize these two approaches properly because they have differing implications. For example, most conceptions of the “Clash of Civilizations” thesis often exemplify a more substance or essentialist style of analysis.<sup>16</sup>

An issue related to civilizational uncertainty as well as the distinction between substantial and processual approaches regards civilizational borderlines. Patrick Thaddeus Jackson summarized the dilemma:

It is quite challenging to determine where any one civilization ends and another begins, even though every kind of analysis of what a civilization is or does depends, at least implicitly on some sort of boundary-demarkation exercise.<sup>17</sup>

That means borderlines between civilizations can often be blurred. This should not mean resorting to the opposite extreme of arguing that civilizational identities are meaningless and that such borderlines do not exist.

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<sup>14</sup> E.F. Schumacher, *A Guide for the Perplexed*. Harper Perennial; Reissue edition, 2015. Pg. 3.

<sup>15</sup> Peter J. Katzenstein, “A world of plural and pluralist civilizations: multiple actors, traditions, and practices” in *Civilizations in World Politics: Plural and Pluralist Perspectives* edited by Peter J. Katzenstein. London; New York: Routledge, 2010. Pg. 6

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> *Civilizations in World Politics*, pg. 176



Rather, a more balanced argument could present such borderlines as operating on a gradual spectrum of degrees as opposed to abrupt black/white dichotomies. Participants in hybrid wars often resort to such dichotomies to help bolster the distinction of friend and foe.

This presents a challenging complexity to hybrid warfare theory that parallels the challenging complexities of civilizational ontology in general. A resort to a Weberian Ideal Type methodology may be the best resource available to pinpoint distinct characteristics of certain civilizations from one another, yet without sacrificing the honest recognition of the peculiar contingent circumstances involved in each context.

Benjamin Nelson, a pioneering historical sociologist of civilizations, made it a goal of his scholarship to help resolve this exact kind of issue. He famously argued about the existence of “civilizational complexes” and “inter-civilizational encounters” as being at the heart of civilizational analysis.<sup>18</sup> This provides a potential framework to synthesize the substantial and processual approaches more properly. This would involve expanding Nelson’s bipartite model into a tripartite model as follows:

1. “*Civilizational Complexes*” (or “*Civilizational Complexity*”) involve the most basic underlining principle. Civilizations are complex macro-scale social entities.
2. “*Intra-Civilizational Encounters*:” Due to the inherently complex nature of civilizations, many subgroups and sub-entities within civilizations will internally interact with one another on various levels. This can take the form of both cooperative and antagonistic forms.
3. “*Inter-Civilizational Encounters*:” Civilizations can and often do interact with one another in external forms as well, but like its internal counterpart can take the form of both cooperative and antagonistic forms.

This model can help establish the complicated and overlapping nature of civilizational encounters as noted above related to the hybrid wars phenomenon. Hybrid Wars cannot be simply reduced to a simplistic “clash of civilizations” scenario, even if on the surface it might have the appearance of such. Rather, as mentioned in the example of the current clashes between Ukraine and Russia, it can be as much a clash *within* civilizations as a clash *between* civilizations.

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<sup>18</sup> Benjamin Nelson. *On the Roads to Modernity: Conscience, Science, and Civilizations: Selected Writings*. Edited by Toby E. Huff. Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1981. Pg. 90.

This is reflective of the on-going processes of Globalization that have produced the possibility for greater interconnections around the world, even producing the possibility for the creation of a world-wide “meta-civilization.” This has had the effect of further blurring the distinctions between “inter” and “intra” civilizational encounters. “Hybrid warfare” can possibly be considered a predominant form of “civilizational encounters” of the contemporary world. It is, so to speak, the other side of the coin of an increasingly globalized world.

The entire nature of the debate concerning the underlining principles of civilizational ontology and analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, which is focused on the relevance of civilizations and civilizational analysis in regard to contemporary forms of hybrid warfare. It is hopeful that a useful preliminary introduction to the relevant issues has been presented to create a workable framework to proceed further in research.

### **Hybrid Wars and Geopolitical Prospects**

The question then arises: what is to be done, or rather what can be done, about the hybrid wars phenomenon? There are no simple or easy answers to such questions, although it must be acknowledged they do raise particularly prominent issues that must be properly addressed. Among them is the harsh truth that warfare is both a potential and an actual reality in our world. The paradox one must contemplate is that peace itself is dependent upon military force to become a reality in the modern world. War thus has not become obsolete, as many such as Steven Pinker have argued, but rather may be the best possible means for securing peace.

This paradox is borne in the issue of deterrence being among the best means for securing peace. During the Cold War, nuclear-based mutually assured destruction (M.A.D.) was a critical factor in preventing direct military conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union.

It can also be argued that the military predominance of the United States over that of any other potential major military rival in the post-Cold War world has been a critical factor in the decline of inter-state wars as well.<sup>19</sup> The conceptual framework presuming that peace and warfare as mutually exclusive is counterproductive for such purposes, especially in the age of hybrid wars which themselves break traditional frameworks for understanding warfare.

This means that “war,” “peace,” and even “deterrence” can and often do mean different things depending upon the historical, civilizational, and geopolitical contexts involved.

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<sup>19</sup> Siniša Malešević. “Is War Becoming Obsolete? A Sociological Analysis” in *The Sociological Review*, 62: S2, pp.65-86. 2014.

The age of hybrid wars would necessitate a different understanding of “deterrence” than what existed in the Cold War. A suitable form of “deterrence” in the age of hybrid wars would include not just nuclear weapons but, as James K. Wither explains, would also have to expand into “the application of specific political, informational, economic, diplomatic” as well as traditional military means.<sup>20</sup>

Hybrid Wars are paradoxically not only a means of deterrence but also a means around deterrence as well. To provide one contemporary example: Russia may not be able to invade and to conquer parts of eastern Ukraine directly, as might have been possible in a nineteenth or early twentieth century context. (Crimea remains the only exception.) Not only could it prove too costly for Russia to mount a direct invasion, but it faces a severe blow to its international reputation as well. However, giving support to pro-Russian paramilitary forces as a means to help extend its geopolitical interests in the region is a more viable option for Russia to pursue. At the same time, such paramilitary forces could use the indirect Russian support to help further their own ends as well within the Ukrainian realm.

As military analysts Michael Kofman and Matthew Rojansky explain, this ultimately leads to a situation where “the unplanned succession of different tools to fit different — often unexpected — operational realities” takes its full effect.<sup>21</sup>

There is the more civilizational-orientated paradigm that enters into this mix as well. Sticking to the Ukrainian example above, Samuel Huntington argued back in 1993 that it provided a potential “clash of civilizations” between the Catholic Uniate West and the Orthodox East.<sup>22</sup>

In light of the current situation, subsequent civilizational analysis proves a certain rethinking of Huntington’s paradigm.

- For one thing, the current clashes seem as much between the Ukrainian Orthodox against the Russian Orthodox—which would indicate an “intra-civilizational clash.”
- Second, the Ukrainian Orthodox and Ukrainian Uniate Catholics seem more united against the Orthodox Russians.
- Third, the Ukrainian Uniate Catholic Church is an Eastern-rite of the Catholic Church, with liturgies and theology remarkably similar to the Eastern Orthodox.

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<sup>20</sup> James K. Wither. “Making Sense of Hybrid Warfare,” *Connections*. Vol. 15, No. 2 (Spring 2016), pg. 86.

<sup>21</sup> Michael Kofman and Matthew Rojansky. “A Closer look at Russia’s ‘Hybrid War.’” Wilson Center. <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/publication/7-KENNAN%20CABLE-ROJANSKY%20KOFMAN.pdf> Accessed 5/20/2020.

<sup>22</sup> Huntington, pg. 37.

- Fourth, the issue of a united Ukrainian Orthodox Church independent of the authority of the Moscow Patriarchate was a major issue which even resulted in a full schism between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Ecumenical Patriarch in Istanbul in 2018.

The underlining point is that in this example it can be remarkably difficult to determine which civilizations are clashing exactly. This relates to a larger issue of how best to define what “civilization” even means in a given geopolitical context.

Civilizations and geopolitical blocs do not necessarily correspond with one another as Huntington presumed when he articulated his “clash of civilizations” model,<sup>23</sup> almost in a manner of projecting the Cold War model of two monolithic blocs opposed to one another into the realm of civilizations. This approach, while still common at the time of Huntington’s writing, neglects the greater complexity of the Cold War, in which different factions sought to exploit the support of one of the two major superpowers to further their own interests.

This was especially the case in terms of the relationship between the Soviet Union and Communist China, which ended in a bitter ideological split and conflict.

In an analogous manner, civilizations should not be interpreted as monolithic, either. This is not to suggest that civilizations are irrelevant to geopolitics, but that the manner in which they are relevant should not simply be reduced to clashes between groups of differing civilizations. The Ukraine case, as explained above, helps to demonstrate the difficulties that can arise when attempting to impose such a model on actual realities.

In fairness to Huntington, the events in Ukraine transpired long after he first formulated his theories and subsequently never had the opportunity to modify his model to suit the current situation due to his death in 2008. It should also be pointed out that Huntington acknowledges the difficulty of trying to pinpoint the exact boundaries between civilizations,<sup>24</sup> which corresponds to the Civilizational Uncertainty Principle articulated earlier. Nevertheless, these do not negate the significant weaknesses and flaws in Huntington’s model that should be further reexamined in light of current circumstances.

Given these kinds of circumstances in which hybrid wars tend to thrive, peace may not necessarily mean the complete absence of violence but rather the lack of escalation in violence to mutually assured destruction levels of intensity.

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<sup>23</sup> Ibid., pg. 21.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., pg. 43.

Research concerning the violence in the former Yugoslavia had led researcher Yaneer Bar-Yam to conclude that “well defined boundaries that allow for more local autonomy”<sup>25</sup> may be the best means to resolving such long-term tensions between warring groups. These may not necessarily correspond to civilizational boundaries (which are difficult to pinpoint), but no doubt civilizational analysis could play a critical role in helping to discern where those boundaries do exist.

## Conclusion

The analysis of contemporary forms of warfare continues to be an on-going issue. It is vitally important that Civilizational Analysis should play a critical role in helping understand this aspect of our world.

There already exists ample precedence for Civilizational Analysis being applied to the general study of warfare, as Matthew Melko’s example was able to demonstrate.<sup>26</sup> There is also the analogous increase of scholarship related to the subject matter that already exists in the field of Sociology and Social Evolution studies.<sup>27</sup> Therefore, it is not out of the question for Civilizational Analysis to be able to investigate this phenomenon thoroughly as well.

This paper does not intend to present an exhaustive investigation into the matter, but rather seeks to help provide a foundation for further research by civilizational scholars. The subject of contemporary forms of hybrid warfare is complex enough that it could be studied from any number of paradigmatic angles. It would also be paramount to avoid any simplistic definitions of civilizations and applying them in ahistorical and inappropriate contexts.

This was among the fundamental flaws of Samuel P. Huntington’s model, which also emphasized too much the “clash” as well. Contemporary hybrid warfare is more complex than that and may actually include clashes *within* civilizations as much as *between* them. However much we may dislike it, warfare remains a critical part of our world.

It is necessary for civilizational analysts to pay close attention to hybrid warfare if it seeks to better understand the world as it exists.

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<sup>25</sup> Yaneer Bar-Yam, “Solving ethnic violence,” New England Complex Systems Institute (June 15, 2017). <https://necsi.edu/solving-ethnic-violence> Accessed 5/21/2020.

<sup>26</sup> Matthew Melko. *General war among great powers in world history*. Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen Press, 2001.

<sup>27</sup> Siniša Malešević. *The Sociology of War and Violence*. Cambridge University Press, 2010. As well as Peter Turchin, *War and Peace and War: The Life Cycles of Imperial Nations*. Pi Press, 2005.

By doing so, their perspective would be greatly welcomed, since by nature they are comfortable with investigating complex human social groups and behaviors which lay at the heart of the very phenomenon of civilizations.

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