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The Element-Based Method of Civilization Study

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Spengler’s “Magian” Classification Applied to an Unrecognized Ecumene: The Near East, 1500 to 0 BCE, The Magian I World-View

A Physics for Civilization

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Call for Papers

International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations

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The *Comparative Civilizations Review* publishes analytical studies and interpretive essays primarily concerned with (1) the comparison of whole civilizations, (2) the development of theories and methods especially useful in comparative civilization studies, (3) accounts of intercivizational contacts, and (4) significant issues in the humanities or social sciences studied from a comparative civilizational perspective.

By “a comparative civilizational perspective” we mean (1) the use of evidence from more than one civilization (the various national traditions of the modern West being regarded, if so desired, as constituents of a single civilization) and (2) a method likely to throw new light either on the origins, processes, or structures of civilizations or on the problems of interpreting civilizations.

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Editor’s Note

Fall 2019

Happily, it appears from recent data published and distributed to the journal that the Comparative Civilizations Review is being widely read. But exactly how many people worldwide are reading the journal? It’s not easy to arrive at a single answer.

Every two months we get a report called “Readership Snapshot.” It is sent to us from Digital Commons, a service of bepress. From the reports, we can see that for three months earlier this calendar year (February, April and June) we had 13,727 full-text-downloads. Extrapolating, that tells us that we have about 55,000 to 60,000 full-text downloads for the year. Plus, we need to add our regular membership readers via the print copies.

Our paper copy readers typically obtain their copies as members of the International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations. But how do our electronic readers get to us? We learn from a recent report that during the period that ran from the end of July 22, 2014 to August 14, 2019 the journal has had 4,406 different “Referrers.”

The top ten of these Referrers over a little more than five years have included, in decreasing numbers, the following, (all over one thousand downloads each):

- www.google.com;
- www.google.co.uk;
- www.google.ca;
- www.google.co.in;
- scholar.google.com;
- scholarsarchive.byu.edu/do/search;
- www.google.com.au;
- com.google.android.googlequicksearchbox;
- scholarsarchive.byu.edu/CCR; and

In just the month of July 2019, there were 357 Referrers. Surprisingly perhaps, a Referrer named Duckduckgo, plus the better-known YouTube, and en.wikipedia were among the top ten, along with many of the Referrers listed above.

A map shows us that for about five years, ending in August 2019, we have been used by 6,880 institutions, most of which are educational in nature.
Thus:

- The top ten downloaders for July are, in order from top down: Stanford, Lanka Education and Research Network, Central Intelligence Agency, Sichuan University, University of Johannesburg, Tenet, Used on the IT Network, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, essensys.Ltd., and University of Cambridge.

- All institutions (not just educational), however, for June of this year have included the following top ten downloaders: Senado Federal (Brazil), Halliburton Company, Changchengkuandai Sy LN, Bilkent University, Missouri University of Science and Technology, NSW Department of Education, University of California San Diego, Oxford University, University of Oregon, and Victoria University of Wellington.

- Finally, for the period from the end of July 2014 to August 2019, the top ten universities undertaking full-text downloads of our journal were, in declining order: Michigan State University, Brigham Young University; The George Brown College of Applied Arts and Technology; University of Toronto; Oxford University; University of California Los Angeles; Bilkent University; Binghamton University; University of Cambridge; and the University of Warwick.

What about the countries of the downloaders? In a July report, we see that the order for that month was: the United States, first, and then: China, India, the United Kingdom, Nigeria, the Philippines, Canada, Germany, Australia and Italy. These were the top ten out of a total of 126 countries.

Overall, since July of 2014, there were 209 countries, led by the United States, and then, in descending order, the United Kingdom, India, Canada, Germany, Australia, China, Philippines, France, and the Russian Federation.

So, can we determine how many individual readers we reach?

It is hard to know. But if we go to a map provided by bepress, and then write in on the left-hand bar (entitled Showing) “Comparative Civilizations Review” and right below it, (after Works) “All Works” and if on the right-hand side we click the link that includes “Jul 22, 2014 – Aug 14, 2019,” a set of numbers, by countries or regions, appear.

On the accompanying map, I have counted roughly 125,000 readers over those five years.
The numbers which can be retrieved are not easy to square. After all, if you type in *Comparative Civilizations Review* on Google, you’ll get 2,800,000 hits as of this writing. It’s clearly over one million readers for the lifetime of the journal. The evidence shows that we have acquired hundreds of thousands of downloaders and many readers since this journal went electronic (in its earliest form, in 2008).

The conclusion: Our founders and the first editors of the journal would be amazed, I think. The editors at the commencement of this journal were Vytautus Kavolis and Edward Leites, and they were co-editors through the spring of 1990.

Here is a link which should take a reader to information on our readership.

At the annual meeting of the International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilization, held in July at El Retiro San Ignacio, The Jesuit Retreat Center, Los Altos, California, many wonderful presentations were given. The title was “Comparison of Civilizations: Ancient and Modern” and the subtitle was “Theories of Civilizational Studies.” All applause must go to the President, Lynn Rhodes, and the Vice President, Michael Andregg, for the organization of the conference.

Next year’s conference is shaping up to be very exciting, as well. It’s the 50th anniversary conference and will be held at the Dimitrie Cantemir Christian University in Bucharest, Romania, June 25 to 28, 2020.

This is a very attractive venue, as can be seen in the terrific pictures placed on the ISCSC website; go to www.iscsc.org.

Dimitrie Cantemir Christian University is one of the largest private universities in Romania, in the heart of Europe. As the website reports: “Professor Momcilo Luburici PhD., and Professor Corina Dumitrescu, PhD., the founders of Dimitrie Cantemir Christian University, have steadily, financially, and energetically supported this private academic entity so as to be included among the most elite higher education institutions in the world. They also chose to name this university after Dimitrie Cantemir, the 18th century prince and philosopher, a representative scholar of the Enlightenment and member of Berlin Academy of Sciences.”

The university has its main headquarters in Bucharest and hosts branches in Cluj-Napoca and Timisoara for faculties dedicated to law and economic studies. There are eight faculties in Bucharest, and they offer undergraduate and graduate programs:
The Faculty of Legal and Administrative Sciences; the Faculty of Tourism and Commercial Management; the Faculty of International Economic Relations; the Faculty of Finance, Banking and Accountancy; the Faculty of Marketing; the Faculty of Education Sciences; the Faculty of Communication Sciences; and the Faculty of Foreign Languages and Literatures (programs for 10 foreign languages: English, French, German, Italian, Spanish, Turkish, Japanese, Russian, Chinese, Arabic, plus Korean (as an optional language).

In addition, the university supports the following technical facilities: twelve modern amphitheaters (with 200 seats) equipped with a range of multimedia facilities: video projector, screen, sound system, Wi-Fi access, sockets for portable equipment; five Information Technology laboratories equipped with computers, interactive SMART boards and educational software; portable video projectors, laptops that can be used by the teaching staff and students; a reading room equipped with computers with access to the library databases; Microsoft Office 365 free access for teachers and students; an integrated audio-video conference system, a web platform that offers the possibility of live webcasting for events within the university; an internal television station that was launched as a channel allowing teachers, students and university visitors to be aware of the latest educational, cultural, or artistic events within the university as well as for broadcasting live events to monitors throughout the university; Internet access with a 100MB guaranteed band; Wi-Fi coverage of the campus; and a relaxation area with Wi-Fi access.

Overall, there are 2,742 seats in amphitheaters and laboratories.

Among the many attractions being prepared for the 50th anniversary meeting will be original theater productions prepared by the Astra Dance Theater of Los Angeles. The theater creates original music to go with the dance and drama. Among the key organizers of the theatre production will be Prof. David Wilkinson, Ms. Sasha Travis, and Ms. Regan Remy, all affiliated with the ISCSC. I hope that we will be putting online a link to wonderful music produced by this company via our website, www.iscsc.org.

The price for accommodations—according to those involved in working out the final details—is going to be extremely reasonable, and many of those attending in California have already indicated that they are anticipating attendance next year in Bucharest.

Also, a joint conference was held in Mongolia in September. The conference was sponsored by the Asia Politics and History Association and the International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations, along with Clarewood University (located in Reston, Virginia), the Blue Banner Foundation, and the Mongolia Society.
The topic was Challenges Confronting Asia Today: Nuclear Proliferation, Environment, Economic, Civilizational. On board from the ISCSC, and reading their papers were President Lynn Rhodes; Prof. Michael Andregg, our Vice President; and myself.

Here’s looking forward to seeing all readers perhaps if not in Mongolia in September then for sure in Bucharest next June.

Joseph Drew, PhD.
Editor
The Comparative Study of Civilizations and its Relation to China

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Chinese scholars have recently expressed much interest in the comparative study of civilizations, lately carried on mostly in the West, but long open to, and increasingly of interest to, diverse perspectives. This essay is intended to suggest a road toward the development of comparative-civilizational studies centered on some questions of both historical and contemporary significance, with particular attention to one question concerning which the initial presuppositions of Western and Chinese scholars, in particular, may be at variance, but where there may be room for the development of agreed empirical-theoretical conclusions.

Arnold J. Toynbee (1889-1975), the leading civilizationist of the 20th century, and one of the founders of the International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations (ISCSC), developed a theory of human history and applied it to the comparative study of civilizations, which he defined as an intellectual enterprise.

A major theme in Toynbee’s work was comparison between the West and China.

Toynbee’s key work was A Study of History, published over a generation, from 1934 to 1954, revised in 1961, and finally revised in 1972.

As stated in the Encyclopaedia Britannica Online Academic Edition (s.v. “Arnold Toynbee”), Toynbee “...examined the rise and fall of 26 civilizations in the course of human history, and ... concluded that they rose by responding successfully to challenges under the leadership of creative minorities composed of elite leaders” and fell when their leaders, intoxicated by their successes, failed to create new responses to the new challenges which inevitably arose in consequence of their very successes.

Toynbee first studied what he labeled the “Hellenic” civilization of classical Greece and Rome, and then what he styled the “Western” civilization of Europe. But after these he gave special attention to what he first labeled the “Sinic” civilization of ancient China and the successor “Far Eastern” civilization of medieval and modern China. (These two he later came to see as better understood as two phases of a single “Sinic” civilization.)

Toynbee’s civilizational theory was developed in three phases, each embodied in book publication. I discuss these phases below. Here I cite only his final conclusions, from the 1972 edition of A Study of History.
“The Hellenic Civilization provides the evidence for a model of continuous development... Chinese history, by contrast, is marked by a pattern of alternating cycles of unity and disunity, order and disorder, progress and decline... The historian’s task is to combine the significant features of these Hellenic and Chinese patterns, creating a realistic model that can be applied to the history of other civilizations” (23).

The Hellenic model defines the transition from local states to a universal state; the Chinese model defines the alternating rhythms of a universal state’s successive lapses and rallies (69). Toynbee’s composite Helleno-Sinic model (64) encompasses both.

In the 1972 edition, Toynbee provided a list of 34 “civilizations of the world, 3500 BC to AD 2000, illustrating the successive phases of their growth.” The “phases” were either “phases of political plurality” or a “universal state phase.” To cite only the best known: Western civilization was always politically plural, and therefore conformed to the Hellenic model; Sinic and Indic civilizations began plural (Hellenic model) but entered a universal state phase and remained there; Egyptian and Orthodox Christian civilizations were in a universal state phase throughout; and Islamic civilization began in a universal state phase but entered and remained in a plural phase.

There is plenty of food for thought here; I’ll narrow the menu somewhat, to a central item, stated as a question. Is Toynbee correct in contending that, until the era of Qin Shi Huang, the history of Sinic civilization is better understood by applying the Hellenic model than the Sinic model?

Toynbee’s argument that this is so can be found in Chapter 7 of the 1972 edition, “Hellenic and Chinese models,” pp. 55-64, and in more detail in Chapters VI 3-5, of the 1961 volume Reconsiderations, pp. 170-209.

And if Toynbee is correct in contending that Chinese history underwent a change of model, or of “stable state,” what accounts for the “change of model,” from the Hellenic to the Sinic, from the norm of plurality to the norm of unity, in Chinese history? And what accounts for the apparent durability of that Sinic model’s pattern of normal-unity in Chinese history since the Qin?

Bibliographic references to Toynbee’s argument are provided below.

I hope that the next ISCSC meeting that may occur in a Chinese venue will inspire some scholars, Western, Chinese, or other, to pursue this inquiry — and then to ask, as a followup: Which model holds more promise for the future of our current global civilization — the Hellenic norm of plurality, or the Sinic norm of unity?
Bibliographic References: The Three Stages of Toynbee’s Theory Development

1. **The first stage** comprises the first ten volumes of *A Study of History*, about 7000 pages in all, published from 1934 to 1954.


   A two-volume abridgement by D.C. Somervell, in more than 1000 pages, was published 1946-1957.


   Somervell’s abridgement was translated into Chinese by Guo Xiaoling and published in Shanghai in 2010, as two volumes of 955 pages.

   Li shi yan jiu / Anuode Tangyinbi zhu; Samowei'er bian; Guo Xiaoling ... [et al.] yi. 历史研究 / 阿诺德·汤因比著; 萨默维尔编; 郭小凌 ... [et al.]译. Di 1 ban. 第1版. Shanghai: Shanghai ren min chu ban she, 2010. 上海 : 上海人民出版社, 2010. 2 v. (955 p.); 23 cm.

2. **The second stage** presented Toynbee’s revisions of his theory, made in response to more than 100 reviews of his work by critics. This was published in 1961 as a 740-page volume titled *Reconsiderations*, as Volume XII of *A Study of History*.

3. **The third stage** was embodied in a single volume: a new edition, revised and abridged by the author and Jane Caplan of *A Study of History*. Unlike its predecessors, this volume was heavily illustrated and designed for a more general readership, though still amounting to 576 pages.


See also:
Arnold J. Toynbee

*A Study of History*
There are many reasons why certain creeds or phenomena from foreign countries remain unknown in the West. They could be almost totally ignored for decades before becoming interesting to the scholarly community and general public until, eventually, works about them become published by the leading presses.

Some explanations are clear, a sort of “self-evident truth”; it takes time before events in distant and exotic lands can attract the attention of Western observers, and it takes time before these events become researched and understood, of course, in the context of Western political culture. One could also say that social scientists need time to master exotic languages, understand the symbols of foreign cultures, assemble the materials, write the text, and find a publisher. This could be the case with some researchers, who spend their entire careers studying the often-convoluted cultural matrices of foreign lands.

Even foreign-born and educated authors would need time for extensive research, writing and finding a publisher. Thus, there is an objective reason for delayed publication. Still, this is not always the case. In some instances, Western researchers have demonstrated exceptional agility in choosing their subjects and writing books, even when dealing with foreign subjects and languages.

Thus, the problem is not always the exotic nature of the land, difficult languages or related matters. Of most importance is to what degree the facts/events correspond to the political needs of the American, Western public in general, and of course the Western elite. If the facts do not fit the preconceived “politically correct” theory, they are often ignored, or marginalized. The fact that the narrative could hardly be related to reality often does not bother the author, publisher or public.

These specifics of Western historiography can be observed in the approach to Eurasianism, a peculiar philosophical-political creed. The goal of this article is to demonstrate how interest in this creed has changed in tune with the evolution of the political discourse or, to be precise, political/geopolitical needs; and how, in general, knowledge is produced in the modern West, especially in the USA.
Eurasianism as Political and Philosophical Creed

Eurasianism emerged among Russian émigrés who fled the Bolshevik Revolution and the subsequent Civil War. Eurasianism was an idiosyncratic creed, different from those creeds which had dominated Russia since the early 19th century.

Members of the Russian intelligentsia had split at that time into two major groups. The first, called Slavophiles, regarded Russia as a part of the Slavic world. The other group, the Westernizers, assumed that Russia belonged to the West and, plainly, was delayed in its development. Most, if not all, of the country’s intellectual/political trends had been related to these two doctrines.

Eurasianism was different from all of them. The major difference was Eurasianism’s approach to Asia. Neither the Slavophiles nor the Westernizers paid much attention to the Asiatic part of the Russian empire and non-Slavic peoples of the realm, most of them Muslim and Turkic from an ethnic point of view. Russian historiography and the general public’s outlook on Asia were usually quite negative, and Russians, at least the Russian intellectuals, viewed Asians in a way similar to Europeans. This was even the case with Slavophiles, who regarded the West as morally “rotten” and primitively one-dimensional, and for this very reason, unable to understand the mysterious Russian soul.

Yet, even Slavophiles had mostly condescending views on Asian, non-Orthodox residents of the empire and from this perspective were not very different from Europeans, who saw their Asian colonial subjects as savages, regardless of, as some of them could state, their benign characteristics.

They could teach Europeans to live in harmony with nature and themselves. They could be courageous and noble and, in fact, have much more moral fiber than Europeans. The legacy of Asian sages and philosophers, especially those from the distant past, could be depositories of mysterious wisdom. Still, the vast majority of Asians were “children,” if one remembers the Kiplingian expression, who must be led by “adults”—Europeans. This was the attitude of the majority of Russian intellectuals.

Even those who approached Asians positively, with a sort of Rousseau-esque sentimentality, saw them as beneath Russians in broad civilizational development, or at least saw them as an alien cultural, ethnic and political force. In their view, Russians were absolutely alien to them. While venturing into the past, the majority of Russian historians also saw nothing promising in Russia’s relationship with Asians. The East was a perennial threat for Russia and competed well with the West as the country’s major enemy.
Eurasianists took a critical view of this assumption. To start with, they proclaimed that Asians inside the Russian empire, and later the USSR, are organically connected with Slavs; at the same time, not just the Western Europeans but even Slavs outside the USSR’s borders are actually alien to the Slavs of the Soviet/Russian empire. Finally, Eurasianists took a fresh look at Russians dealing with Asians in the past, and their view of the Mongol invasion in the 13th century was clearly different from that of both Slavophiles and Westernizers. In Russian historiography, as in the historiography of most other nations, the invasion was a great calamity, possibly the greatest calamity in Russian history.

Eurasianists took a different look at the event.

They proclaimed that Mongol destructiveness was overestimated. In fact, the Mongols were a great benefit to Russian society. Mongols had united all the peoples of northern Eurasia – Slavs and Turkic people first of all – into one state and instilled in them a sense of belonging to one state and a common “Eurasian” culture. The strong power of the Mongol Khans instilled all the residents of the empire with an ideocratic feeling, the sense that each individual lived not just for himself but for a cause, which transcended his personal life.

One could wonder why such views emerged. The reason could be found in the situation on the ground. In the beginning of its history, the USSR was a “rogue state” for practically all the major players, the defeated Germany possibly among the few exceptions. The country was cut both from Eastern and Western Europe and was truly isolated as never before in its modern history.

At the same time, minorities had played a considerable role in the regime’s first years. Jewish commissaires, elite Lettish riflemen, Chinese executioners, and other minorities of the empire, many of them of Asian origin, were visible elements of the political landscape. For many minorities, the Bolsheviks were the force which protected them, and they were anxious to reciprocate. From the very beginning of its existence, Bolsheviks clearly exhibited “Mongolian” features. They were an egalitarian, brutal and totalitarian power, compelling citizens to live for the great goal designed by the state.

And here were the roots of the Eurasian vision of the Mongolian empire as an “ideocratic” state. Eurasianism was a peculiar manifestation of Sovietism and it was not accidental that Eurasianists’ critics called them “Orthodox Bolsheviks.” Eurasianism was practically unknown in Soviet Russia, even among dissident intellectuals, and for an understandable reason: Soviet authorities prevented receiving, or at least severely limited receiving, books from abroad, especially by émigré writers.
Thus, books became practically inaccessible for the majority of Soviets, unless they had access to “spetskhran,” the special holdings in major Soviet libraries. These were closed to ordinary readers, and special letters of introduction were required from one’s university or government office for those who wanted to use them.

There was not much interest in Eurasianism in the West, regardless of the fact that Eurasianists, as many other émigrés of the so-called “first wave,” were quite productive and produced many books and periodicals. There were quite a few works in Russian by those émigrés who criticized the creed. Still, the Western public, with few exceptions, was mostly oblivious to Eurasianism.

The reason was that in the prevailing mood—at least this was the case in the 1920 and 1930—the USSR’s evolution had been placed in the context of Western or Russian history. The Western model, which seemed to dominate throughout the 1920s and 1930s, implied that Russia was basically a Western country, and the Western model was universally applicable. In this context, Bolsheviks were a peculiar modification of the French Jacobins, and would inevitably experience their “Thermidor.” As a matter of fact, the dreams about a Russian “Thermidor/Brumaire” would continue through the 1940s, as demonstrated by the success of Nicholas Timasheff’s book.¹

Moreover, nationalistic Slavophiles/neo-Slavophiles, while confronting the Western model, actually had a lot of similarities with it. This model implied that what was going on in Russia was a peculiar repetition of the Time of Troubles, the chaotic events in the beginning of the 17th century, marked by uprisings, the spread of banditry, general chaos and foreign intervention. The country was in turmoil until the Russian people ended it by willingly electing a new tsar.

Consequently, both Westernizers and Slavophile monarchists often saw Stalin either as a new Napoleon or a new tsar. Eurasianism does not fit well in any of these paradigms, and this explains why very few works on it were published in English.²

Lev Gumilev, who is usually known as “the last Eurasianist,” developed Eurasianism, in his own idiosyncratic form, practically independently from its émigré version. There were clear similarities and differences between pre-WWII and Gumilevian Eurasianism. Both regarded the USSR, or at least the biggest part of the country, as the organic whole. Still, while in pre-WWII Eurasianism all people of the USSR constituted one quasi-nation, Gumilev regarded Soviet Slavs and Turks as being essentially different, still living in the condition of benign “symbiosis.”

² Among these few works was a volume authored by Pavel Miliukov, one of the leading Russian liberal intellectuals and politicians. See P.N. Miliukov, Eurasianism and Europeanism in Russian History, Bonn, 1930.
Gumilev, similar to pre-WWII, found the positive aspects of the Soviet regime in keeping the variety of nations of the USSR together. He accepted the positive side of the regime despite his own predicament: his father was shot, and he spent many years in the Gulag. The interest in Eurasianism became increasingly strong in the 1990s and reached its peak from approximately the late 1990s/early 2000s.

One could indeed state here that Eurasianism became one of the leading creeds and influenced, to varying degrees, the majority of Russia’s leading politicians and thinkers. It also became quite well known to the general educated public. It was not surprising that publications on Eurasianism, mostly in its pre-WWII variation, proliferated in Russia.

There was implicit interest in Eurasianism and related subjects among Russian expatriate scholars who lived and worked in the West and continued to maintain a strong personal relationship with Russia.3

It would be wrong to assert that the creed was absolutely ignored in the West by Western scholars. Still, it was seen as a rather marginal curiosity, and no major monographs in English were published, either on the pre-WWII version, the Gumilev version or on the major protagonists of post-Soviet Eurasianism. The reason was not a lack of information – major works of pre-WWII Eurasianists were available in the West, and a huge amount of literature was published in Russia.

The reason for marginalization was clear: Eurasianism did not fit into the Fukuyamian “end of history,” the triumph of American-type capitalism, which shall be the omega point of all of humanity, including Russia. Western observers approached Russia from this perspective. The very facts on the ground did not bother them at all. Gorbachev and Yeltsin were deeply hated by the majority. Still, in the works of political scientists and historians, both were seen as heroic liberators, loved by the populace.

The economy collapsed, millions were impoverished, while the few tycoons amassed enormous fortunes; whereas most American economists, such as one Swedish-American professor, Anders Åslund, asserted that privatization was a great benefit in itself4 and implied that Russian industrial cities should look like Detroit, the not-so-pretty ruins of which heralded the advent of an advanced “service economy.”

The ethnic strife and war which erupted in post-Soviet space was also ignored or marginalized, for the USSR was the last oppressive empire and its collapse should be hailed regardless of everything.

3 For example, see A.P. Tsygankov, “Mastering space in Eurasia: Russia’s geopolitical thinking after the Soviet break-up,” Communist & Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 36, Issue 1, March 2003.
4 See, for example, Anders Åslund, How Capitalism Was Built: the Transformation of Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, and Central Asia. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
Eurasianism, with a tinge of neo-Sovietism, had addressed these problems and interest in the creed—especially the Eurasianist belief that the USSR was an organic whole which benefited all of its members—was a peculiar form of Soviet nostalgia. And the very nature of this nostalgia contradicted the predominant “party line” that the USSR was a *bona fide* “evil empire” and most, if not all, of its ethnicities should be happy to be free from Moscow’s totalitarian grip.

For these reasons, the study of Eurasianism was marginalized in the West, especially the USA, and the creed was related to “red to brown”—what Communists and Nationalists had been called by their enemies—and a few crackpots such as Alexander Dugin. While interest in Eurasianism in Russia had reached its peak by the early 2000s—and it was related to the peak of nostalgia for the USSR—interest in the creed started to decline sharply in Russia by approximately Putin’s second term.

The reason for this was manifold. Still, the most important reason was the fading away of the Soviet legacy of multi-ethnic “symbiosis.” Moreover, increasingly assertive Russian nationalists led to increasing clashes between ethnic Russians and what they called “people of the Caucasian nationality,” the term often applied to all residents of the Caucasus, regardless of their ethnicity, religion or citizenship.

Later, Central Asians were added to the list of undesirable foreigners, and when members of the Russian elite occasionally used the word “Eurasianism,” it hardly meant friendly “symbiosis” between Russians and the numerous ethnicities of the former USSR, but plainly indicated that Russia should control the area of the former USSR as the 19th century European powers controlled their colonial empires, or commonwealths of dependents.

It also looked quite similar to the American “Monroe Doctrine,” which made the Western hemisphere an exclusive sphere of American influence. This approach has hardly anything to do with Eurasianism, either in the classical or Gumilevian reading. The proponents of Eurasianism also moved away from the original creed. This was the case with Alexander Dugin, who, in the beginning of Putin’s tenure, emphasized the idea of multi-ethnic “symbiosis” as the major element of Eurasianism, and this was the reason why Dugin was especially fond of Nursultan Nazarbaev, Kazakhstan’s president, whom he regarded as the major initiator of Eurasian “symbiosis”/integration in the 1990s and early 2000s.

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Later, Dugin’s interest moved away from the focus on the mighty empire of kindred Eurasian nations which should confront “Atlantism,” epitomized by the USA, to the more Russo-centric and rather parochial nationalism, albeit the elements of Eurasianism continued to be present in his philosophy, together with other creeds.

His emphasis was now on how Russia and the country’s numerous ethnicities could preserve their unique cultures and return to their true selves, their archaic primordial core. The same should be the case for all nations on the planet. At the same time, modern capitalism should be outlawed, and society should return to pre-modern conditions, when the spiritually noble elite ruled, instead of the cynical and shallow capitalists and the middle class, who ruled most of the globe now.

It is true that Dugin supported Russia’s invasion of East Ukraine, but plainly because he became convinced that confrontation with the “Atlanticist” USA and Donald Rumsfeld’s “old Europe,” which forsook its benign Eurasian essence, would spiritualize Russia and clean it up from the cultural pollution of the present and recent past. Still, Putin’s plans were different.

Putin engaged in conflict with Ukraine only because the majority of Russian-speaking East Ukrainians indeed wanted to be closer to Russia than to Kiev; losing the Black Sea fleet Crimean ports would have been a strategic blow against Russia’s geopolitical position. At the same time, there was no desire for further expansion to territories with non-Russian-speaking people hostile to Moscow. Soon after Crimea’s annexation, Dugin’s views of Putin and his regime grew darker.

Still, long before Dugin’s final alienation from the present-day regime, Dugin’s view had little, if any, influence on Russian foreign policy and his connection with the Kremlin was marginal since the early 2000s.

**Dugin’s Rise and Decline in Russia**

Dugin indeed was quite close to the Kremlin in the first couple of years of Putin’s first term. The reason was simple: Dugin’s theory of a grand Eurasian empire and happy “symbiosis” between various ethnicities harkened back to the Soviet era, and support of Eurasianism by the Kremlin created the illusion that the USSR was back.

This was quite important for Putin at a time when he was not sure about the stability of the regime and when nostalgia for the USSR reached its peak. At that time, Dugin could be helpful in leading the masses away from true restoration of the old socio-economic arrangements. Indeed, the specter of nationalization was still haunting the Russian elite, whose interests Putin represented.
Thus, Putin needed peculiar mimicry, and this was why Dugin enjoyed real favor with Putin for a short while. Later, Putin, or at least members of his inner circle, apparently lost interest in Dugin, plainly because the fear of nationalization had subsided, and for the maturing post-Soviet generation, private property had become axiomatic.

Dugin was not of much use for Putin in the new era. Consequently, he might on occasion use Dugin for this or that purpose, but only for a limited time. Dugin and scores of other intellectuals or public figures with similar views could be used on occasion in the same way that universities could use a part-timer to teach a course or two, without it meaning that they are part of the permanent staff, and they are usually dismissed when the job is done.

Indeed, if one would look at the way Putin treats those whom he regards as close to him, one can understand Dugin’s comparative political marginality, even in the early 2000s. Those whom Putin loves, he provides with positions in the bureaucracy, gives money to build think tanks with privileges to serve the Kremlin, encourages to be regularly published in leading newspapers and shown on leading television channels. Finally, he graces them with his august presence, as was the case with Alexander Solzhenitsyn, whom Putin not only visited, but made it clear that the public knew about these visits.

These signs of the Kremlin’s benevolence were indeed clear in the very beginning of Putin’s term, when the Kremlin provided – either directly or indirectly – funds and support for Dugin’s Eurasian movement and later Party. Still, soon after, the Kremlin lost any visible interest in Dugin and his political or quasi-political activity, the Party quickly collapsed and what replaced it – the International Eurasian Movement – was a virtual construction, mostly existing as a website with most of the articles penned by Dugin himself.

The Union of Eurasian Youth, another Dugin project, was actually more of a burlesque political charade, a peculiar carnival show. It was quite possible that the Movement received some funds from pro-Putin businessmen. Still, the funding was apparently quite modest, and the Kremlin played little, if any, role in these financial arrangements.

During the Russo-Georgian War (2008), Dugin was noted for a while. Still, Dugin’s insistence that the Kremlin should send troops to Tbilisi and occupy Georgia was not what Putin and Russian elite desired. Consequently, Dugin was once again moved to the second- or possibly third-tier pool of potential “political adjuncts.” Dugin, however, continued to support Putin and played some role in Putin’s re-election. Rewards followed. Dugin became a professor and the chair of a department at Moscow State University, the leading or at least one of the leading universities in Russia.
Dugin was the best-known professor, or at least one of the best-known, at the university. Still, he was clearly at odds with the majority of the faculty, and he could not have been able to get the job without an approving nod from the Kremlin. Nonetheless, by the beginning of the Ukrainian crisis, Dugin angered the Kremlin once again by his passionate plea to deal harshly with enemies of East Ukraine, and actually start a full-fledged war in Ukraine. As in the case with the Georgian crisis, the Kremlin did not want an escalation, and Dugin, with his pretense that he spoke on behalf of the Kremlin in his position at a leading university, was dismissed from his job. Undoubtedly, the Kremlin sent signals to the university administration.

Later, Dugin was employed by the TV channel Tsargrad, funded by a friendly oligarch. However, the show, with Dugin’s participation, soon became extremely rare, and the Kremlin provided neither funds nor any other encouragement to make show more visible. By late 2017, Dugin himself expressed his deep disappointment with the Kremlin. He stated that for almost 18 years, he had put too much hope in Putin, believing that he would reverse the course of not just recent Russian history, but actually all of modern history, following what Dugin called the “Fourth Political Theory,” which emphasized spiritualization and archaization of society.

Dugin, however, acknowledged that nothing of the sort had happened, and Putin had plainly used Dugin and similar intellectuals to maintain what was defined by Antonio Gramsci, Italian Marxist, as Caesarism.

The system, while pretending to be opposed to the liberal capitalist West, actually followed the “globalism” of modernity and plainly delaying its triumph. Dugin stated that he now had no hope in Putin. One could, of course, note that Dugin had made similar critical statements about Putin in the past and resumed his praise, albeit with reservations, later on. Still, it appeared that Dugin’s disappointment with Putin was deeper than before, and he noted that he had entertained illusions about Putin in the past and had behaved as a child, and that now was the time to be an “adult” and face the unpleasant reality.

Putin’s latest term not only transformed Dugin to an almost political zero (one could wonder if Putin even remembers his name), but also represented a time of sharp decline in public interest in Dugin and similar minded folk among Russian intellectuals.

One should be clear here: the Russian educated public has marginalized Dugin and similar people because they disagreed with Dugin’s critiques of the West. Dugin was blasted as being “reactionary,” “fascist,” and clearly not a supporter of Western democracy. Still, these political labels have hardly prevented Dugin from being highly popular in Russia, and what Russians called the “near abroad,” the republics of the former USSR, in the 1990s and early 2000s.
A good part of the Russian population is quite skeptical of the Western democracies, as a matter of fact, following populist waves in Europe and in the USA.

It is true that now the early fascination with Putin is mostly passé. For the average Russian, Putin did not follow his implicit promise to be the ruler of the people. The Oligarchs continue to prosper, whereas the economic conditions of the majority have hardly improved. For the disenfranchised and economically and socially marginalized new generation of Russian youth, the alternative is not Western democracy as it is visualized by the mainstream Democratic Party in the USA, but radicals of all stripes, including ISIS – as the Russian FSB, the descendant of the Soviet KGB, asserted recently with concern.

The reason for Dugin’s declining popularity in Russia was not in the Russian intellectual elite’s embrace of democracy, but for a different reason: Russian society, including intellectuals, became increasingly Westernized or, to be precise, Americanized.

They might be skeptical, or even cynical, in regard to democratic institutions and see in Washington’s proclamation about Moscow’s imperialism just a Freudian desire to transmit Washington’s intentions to its geopolitical opponents. They could assert that the West in general and the USA in particular should remember that Russia is a huge, nuclear state and has a great culture and a long history, and definitely should have the right to be not just a regional, but a global power, with an appropriate sphere of influence.

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7 One might add here that even here, the liberal elite became increasingly apprehensive about democracy as the rule of the people, plainly because the people transmogrified into “deplorables” could well make “bad” authoritarian choices. Yascha Mounk, a contributor to The New Yorker, the quite prestigious leading liberal publication, published an article with the telling title “Is more democracy always better democracy?” (The New Yorker, 12 November 2018.) The threat to democracy, as he understands it, would not come from tyrants who would emerge as usurpers coming from outside political discourse. The danger comes from the people who, surprisingly, could well be predisposed to alienate easily their inalienable rights and install a tyrant. Thus, one should save “democracy” by restraining or limiting “democracy,” i.e., people’s participation in politics. He implicitly endorses the view that there should be some rules which would make “it easier for legislators to shut the people out – at least a little bit, from time to time. Making it harder for activists to launch primary challenges against incumbents in safe districts, for instance, really would make it easier for Congress to fulfill its constitutional duty of checking an errant executive.” (Ibid.) To demonstrate the point graphically, the illustration in the article represented a benign-looking elephant, the symbol of the Republican Party and, implicitly, “true” democracy. The animal was assailed by vicious pygmy-like people, implicitly all “deplorables,” and instead of crushing them, the animal is not moving, and is implicitly in danger.

Still, the Russian middle class, and the intellectuals’ existential and related behavioristic transformation, have become increasingly Western-oriented; mainstream members of the emerging post-Soviet Russian elite increasingly have grown to resemble their American counterparts. And the environment became radically different from that which nurtured Dugin in his formative years in late Soviet Russia. The description of this milieu, Dugin’s environment and related knowledge production, inevitably leads to oversimplification, and the author is aware of this. Still, it should be noted to understand how Dugin and similar intellectuals are perceived in Russia.

Researchers usually ignore the existential and behavioristic aspects of knowledge production. Still, it is quite important in understanding the internal logic of the narrative. In our view, the internal logic of knowledge production is deeply connected with the application of power. The totalitarian rulers, especially of what could be called Oriental Despotism, such as those in the USSR, China and North Korea, were absolutely alone as Karl Wittfogel noted in his seminal work on Oriental Despotism some time ago.

The ruler has no reference beside himself, and what he himself defined as “sacred text,” e.g. the works of Marx. He does not require election or popular approval, and his work does not need quotations, references to peers and consequently “peer review.” Paradoxically enough, totalitarian rule was the role model of intellectuals, especially dissident intellectuals. The dissident hates power, and at the same time, duplicates power. Similar to the ruler, he is alone, barring a few trusted friends. His text could well ignore any professional rules, at least as they are defined in the West. And he would not care how “peer review” would evaluate his work; for him, institutionalized scholars were not different from those in power and the hoi polloi; all of them are just concerned with their material success, formal approval and cushy jobs.

All of them, in the view of Alexander Zinoviev (1922-2006), mathematician and dissident writer, were animal-type imbeciles, whose views should be ignored.

Zinoviev became known in the West for the publication of his two books, Yawning Heights and Homo Sovieticus. Both presented Soviet society in which the hoi polloi, institutionalized intellectuals and authorities are a bunch of primitive zombies who are “ebantsy” (screwed up), and resemble creatures created by Hieronymus Bosch. There was no opposition between the state and the masses: they were similar to each other. The true intellectual, the man with talent and moral fiber, could hardly prosper in this society.

Zinoviev’s views represent the outlook of many Russian dissidents, and not only them. Indeed, in their view, the very fact that one’s work is published – past the “peer review” of officials/institutionalized experts – and that he receives a cushy job plainly indicates that he either has no real talent or is just prostituting himself.
The true intellectual should live in poverty, engage in manual, low-paying work, live in obscurity and never be published. His manuscript – usually a couple of typewriter-typed copies, the proverbial “samizdat” – could be shared with a few trusted friends or possibly no one. This vision of the world and the role of the intellectual in society was profoundly anti-Social-Darwinist/Calvinist which, in this or that way, permeates the behavior and creates the existential framework for knowledge production in the West, especially the USA.

The elements of this old Soviet model had existed during the early Soviet era and explains why Dugin’s works, published by “on-demand” press, were as popular as those produced by more established publishers. These “on-demand” published books were the direct descendants of the Soviet-era “samizdat,” and the very fact that they were not subject to “peer review” of any type just indicated that the author was absolutely free, expressing himself.

However, with the development of capitalism in Russia in its peculiar form, all of this started to change with increasing stress on the Social-Darwinian/Calvinistic model, which defines the life and model of knowledge production for the majority of Western, especially American, intellectuals.

The new model started to affect Russian intellectuals. It was not just the increasing access to and interest in Western scholarship, but also the desire to study in the West and find a job at American universities. It went along with the desire to publish in English and an increasing awareness of the ranking of the various presses and journals. There was also increasing acceptance of “peer review” practices which indicated that the work is “scholarly,” and therefore quite different in its scholarly value from those which are not “peer reviewed.” All of this influenced Dugin’s perception in Russia.

For most Russian intellectuals it became clear that Dugin’s influence in the Kremlin was zero, and Putin most likely did not even know his name. Moreover, it is quite likely that for some people in the Kremlin, Dugin had emerged as a liability due to his ideological pranks. Affiliation with Dugin did not entail some cushy job in the Kremlin-affiliated think tanks. He also had no university affiliation, and thus his recommendation could hardly secure a job in academia in either Russia or the West. As a matter of fact, it could actually scare off potential employers. And at that point, since most of Dugin’s publications continued to be published “on demand” they are now placed in the conventional American context: they are “vanity press” stuff, and could be dismissed, together with their author.

One shall, of course, be clear: even present-day Russia is not the USA. Moreover, even Europe is not the USA and, at least in continental Europe, there is still a notion, which also has long historical roots, that great minds and unorthodox thinkers could emerge outside the conventional academic box.
Still, in Russia, the trend toward Americanization is clear; and it marginalized Dugin’s role in the intellectual discourse of present-day Russia almost to zero. The same could be said about Eurasianism, the receding light of the dead USSR, based on the “symbiotic” relationship of various ethnicities; this is also almost on a par with the high level of xenophobia “especially toward gastarbeiers from Central Asia.”

Thus, the views of Dugin as the force behind the Kremlin hardly stands the trial of the facts. Nevertheless, the interest in Dugin and related subjects (Eurasianism) in the West contrasts with Dugin’s influence in the Russian establishment, and his role in the country.

Dugin as Rising Political and Intellectual Star

From the beginning of the 1990s, Dugin became increasingly visible in the country’s intellectual circles as one of the founders of the National Bolshevik Party, and as a man who was engaged in quasi-political life. As of that time, he was mentioned in the West. By 2001-2002, Dugin’s influence and political clout had reached its peak. Indeed, by then Dugin had created his own Party, an endeavor hardly possible without the Kremlin’s direct involvement. His Foundations of Geopolitics became a bestseller, and has been accepted as a textbook in military colleges. For some Russian observers, even those who were hardly fascinated with Dugin, he was a rising star. Still, not much about him was published in English. In the West in general, he was seen mostly as a freakish right-wing curiosity, unable or unwilling to adjust his view to the era of “transition,” i.e., the transition from totalitarian “abnormality” to democratic “normality.”

By 2003 or so, Dugin’s romance with the Kremlin was over. His Party disintegrated and he soon was marginalized by the Kremlin. Still, it was at that time that Dugin became increasingly a person of interest in the English-language press, including scholarly ones.

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9 Paul Goble, “Xenophobia among Russians higher now than in 1991, but directed at different targets, Levada Center polls show,” Johnson List, 29 October 2018.
He was often studied, not just as one of the most interesting and prolific Russian philosophers and public intellectuals who could be well studied in the context of Russia’s recent intellectual and political history, but as an increasingly influential person who implicitly guided and inspired people in the Kremlin.

Some Western authors expended considerable energy in unmasking the reactionary essence of Dugin’s philosophy and its increasing influence on Kremlin folk. This was, for example, the case with Andreas Umland, who defended his Ph.D. dissertation at Cambridge University\(^\text{13}\) and started to actively publish about Dugin, presenting him as quite a dangerous chap.\(^\text{14}\) The same could be said about Anton Shekhovtsov, who often collaborated with Umland.\(^\text{15}\)

Other Russia-watchers also became interested in Dugin, seeing him as a rising intellectual and political star in Russia. Dugin’s appointment to Moscow State University was seen not just as an academic appointment case in Russia – but as an important and ominous political sign.\(^\text{16}\) Dugin’s appointment implicitly indicated, in the view of some Western observers, that right-wing imperialists were on the rise in the Kremlin, and that their ideas should be studied in earnest.\(^\text{17}\) Dugin’s importance for Western readers was underscored by the fact that he started to be published in English.\(^\text{18}\)

Despite Dugin’s work at Moscow State University and his never-ending attempts to advertise himself as the guiding light for the people in the Kremlin in general and Putin in particular, Dugin’s influence on Russian politics continued to be miniscule. The same could be said about his influence on Russia’s intellectual life. Even at Moscow State University, most of Dugin’s colleagues – as one professor told the article’s author – looked at Dugin mostly as a peculiar curiosity, out of touch with reality.


It is true that by the beginning of the conflict in Ukraine, Dugin and similar individuals had received a brief blessing from the Kremlin, and this was noted in English-language publications.19

Dugin himself observed the beginning of what he regarded as a new world order, in which his expertise and insight would be of great importance. Still, as was already noted, the Kremlin’s interest in Dugin was brief and then declined sharply and he, together with similar-minded individuals, was demoted in this or that way. Dugin, as was already noted, lost his position as a professor at Moscow State University and this was noted by Western publications.20 Still, the publications which indicated Dugin’s real position were overshadowed by many more publications, which stressed that Dugin continued to be a man of influence who in many ways shaped Putin’s policy. Indeed, Dugin as the man behind Putin would lead Western civilization to catastrophe.

**Dugin as the Man of Extreme Danger to the West**

The beginning of the Ukrainian crisis appeared to have transformed Dugin into the man who actually runs Russia. It was his presence which made Putin so dangerous. “Indeed, Dugin emerged as “Putin’s Rasputin.”21 Here, Dugin was implicitly compared with the Siberian monk who, some historians believed, totally controlled Nicholas II, the last tsar of Russia, and who was, in this reading of events, responsible for the collapse of the dynasty.

It was not surprising that in this interpretation of events, he manipulated Putin almost completely. This was, for example, the case with Anton Shekhovtsov who, together with Prof. Umland, continued to spend considerable time in unmasking Duginism and its dangers for Russia and implicitly mankind,22 and indicated the dangerous spread of Dugin’s ideas.23

Indeed, for a contributor to the influential *Foreign Policy*, Dugin’s nefarious influence could be compared with that of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of ISIS.24

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It was not surprising that Dugin’s writings – he is an extremely prolific writer – were taken seriously. This was the case, for example, with Dugin’s *The Fourth Political Theory*. Here, Dugin, who could hardly be accused of excessive modesty, proclaimed that he had finally revealed the path for all of mankind, which should discard all previously dominant creeds, at least those which had dominated humanity for the last 200 years or so. Dugin’s claims were taken seriously, and *World Affairs*, the well-known liberal American periodical, published a review of them. Curiously enough, it was authored by Israel Shamir, a Russian Jew who upon emigration to Israel – and as one could assume, as an ardent Zionist – became an equally ardent anti-Semite and Holocaust denier.25

Dugin’s philosophical ideas had been continuously discussed with implicit indication that they had direct implication for Russia’s and possibly the global flow of events.26 It is not surprising that Dugin’s claims about his paramount role in the Kremlin’s policy has been taken at face value. Dugin, for example, claimed that the rapprochement between Russia and Turkey was mostly due to his efforts, and the respected *Bloomberg Businessweek* took this claim seriously enough to publish an article about it.27 Dugin’s direct influence on the Kremlin and related Eurasianism’s influence on the Kremlin was a subject of scholarly monographs.28

**Dugin and Eurasianism and Knowledge as a Case of Political Expediency**

How did Dugin and other similar-thinking people seem to become a formidable force behind Putin and make him appear as an almost insanely reckless imperialist who needs to be stopped by any means necessary?


To understand this, we need to return to the beginning of our article, when we noted the interest in Eurasianism in general and Dugin in particular in the early post-Soviet era. In the 1990s, when Eurasianism and Dugin were quite popular in Russia, they were marginalized in the USA, plainly because they did not fit into the prevailing model of the “end of history” – Western capitalist democracy. Russia was weak, almost on the brink of disintegration, and completely powerless. At that point, Western intellectuals ignored Eurasianism and similar political creeds as either absolutely irrelevant or as wishful thinking of marginalized Russians who lamented the end of the empire.

After the 2008 war with Georgia, it was demonstrated that Russia was not a weakling, nor a failing state, and it could defend its interests. By that time, the interest in Eurasianism reemerged even though its representatives, such as Dugin, continued to be seen as crackpots. Yet there were implications that they would be taken seriously, due to their influence upon Putin. Finally, after the conflict over Crimea and Russia’s involvement in Ukraine, Eurasianism and Dugin became an inspiration for Putin.

In this narrative, Russia was not just a strong state, but had other features. It was not just an aggressive but “insane” country. It was engaged or ready to engage in conflicts which could well lead to global war. The Moscow elite thus does not think about the long-term results of its actions and is driven by just the wishful thinking of the leaders or simply by their instincts.

This theory juxtaposed “rational” Washington to “irrational” Moscow, and this was one reason why Duginism emerged as the Kremlin’s guiding light. Actually, it was, in a sort of Freudian way, Washington’s desire to attribute and transmit its own geopolitical behavior, especially in the Middle East, and which ended in spectacular disaster, to its geopolitical rival. The image of “insane” and intrinsically aggressive Russia was a good propaganda ploy and has other practical implications. Europeans should accept the USA’s leadership at a time when the tension between Donald Rumsfeld, Bush’s Secretary of Defense and “Old Europe,” especially Germany, became especially heated. Dugin’s importance for U.S. propaganda was also important for other reasons and was connected with the election of Donald Trump.

Trump’s critics often stated that they could not stand him because of his outrageous behavior and dictatorial propensities. Some, like Prof. Timothy D. Snyder, from prestigious Yale University, implicitly compared him to the Roman Caesars or Mussolini. Some, and this was especially the case during his campaign, compared him to Hitler and predicted the dark night of despotism if the electorate chose him as the next president. The elite’s revulsion was overwhelming. Not only Democrats, but even Republican elites were outraged.
However, a closer look at Trump’s presidency indicates that he had not done anything that had not been done by any other Republican president. He cut taxes, mostly for the rich, from which the economy would hardly benefit in the long run, and engaged in aggressive foreign policy posturing, if not in action, then at least in verbal expression.

Still, the hatred of Trump is much stronger than even for George W. Bush, who started a disastrous war in the Middle East. At least there was not serious talk about his impeachment.

Why was there such dislike of Trump among all segments of the elite? The point here is that Trump’s original popularity was due to serious economic problems. It was the decline of the “real” economy; the production of steel, machines, cars and similar products had reached its peak several decades earlier – and the real income for most Americans had declined sharply since the 1960s.

The elite was able to control the masses, providing some few pre-selected candidates who, while proclaiming their differences from each other, were actually quite similar to each other, for none of them were willing to change the socio-economic arrangements which made this economic decline possible. Trump was elected against the will of the elite, and this election indicated that the “uncontrolled” masses whom Hillary Clinton called “deplorables” could potentially be engaged in socio-economic and political changes against the will of the elite.

And these changes could be violent. As a matter of fact, the influential magazine *The New Yorker* discussed the possibility of a civil war in the USA, a subject absolutely taboo only a few years earlier. Elaborating on the possibility of civil war in the USA, Evan Osnos, a contributor to *The New Yorker*, noted that a visible segment of American society, mostly rich folk, were taking the possibility of civil war quite seriously, and engage in concrete actions to protect themselves in the case of cataclysm.29

While the protagonists of Osnos’ article see clear domestic roots of the potential cataclysm, most members of the American elite hardly think this way. For them, the reasons for a potential crisis are not internal, but external. And the reason for their blindness is clear. Unwilling to change the socio-economic make-up of society and proclaiming it axiomatic—the “end of history” notion—the USA’s elite finds Putin and his associates to be the major reason for Trump’s victory, and the cause of potential problems in the future.

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Putin, in this reading, became increasingly sophisticated and enjoyed almost superhuman qualities. And here, Dugin and similar intellectuals had emerged as the force which made Putin to rule over not just Russia but over the USA, by using Trump as his puppet, and implicitly all over the world. It was they who could wreck the entire Western civilization.

Indeed, in this reading, Putin and implicitly Dugin became somewhat demonic personalities who could almost rule the world in general and the USA in particular, just by creating a narrative different from that of the mainstream; the generation-long domination of postmodernism instilled in quite a few members of the Western elite the idea that socio-economic problems could be bypassed if the elite designed an appropriate “text” which could “deconstruct” any reality, depending on the elite’s interests.

In any case, the “discourse” is the power and, due to modern technology, the wrong “discourse,” one that could be spread from any part of the globe. In this context, Dugin, as Putin’s agent, could influence either directly or indirectly such influential populist American intellectuals as Glenn Beck and Steve Bannon, who could mislead naïve “deplorables,” leading them to the destruction of democracy and its transformation into “populism,” with an authoritarian or even totalitarian tinge.

Conclusion

The goal of our study is not an attempt to relativize the intellectual history, social sciences in general, in postmodernist fashion. Many studies on Eurasianism and its major representatives, Dugin in our case, indeed tried to present reality “as it is,” if one would paraphrase Leopold von Ranke’s expression.

Still, if one would assemble what seem to be the disconnected pieces of the puzzle, the picture becomes clear: the intellectual trends and related picture of reality is often only tangentially related to the facts on the ground. The constructed reality relates not to facts, but to what “consumers,” in the broad meaning of the word, e.g. academia, government, society in general, etc., want to receive from the producers of the narrative.

The case with the image of Eurasianism and its major representative (e.g. Dugin) could be a good example. Eurasianism and Dugin were clearly very popular in Russia in the late 1990s and early 2000s when nostalgia for the USSR and, implicitly, Soviet arrangements, had reached its peak.

At the same time, Eurasianism and Dugin were still rather marginal players in Russia, according to the majority of Western observers, mainly because Russia, together with the rest of the world, were supposed to march toward the Fukuyamian “end of history.” Europeans, especially Eastern Europeans, were already skeptical of this vision. Still, their works were regarded as rather marginal in comparison to Anglo-Saxon scholarship.

By the middle of the 2000s, Eurasian influence in general and Dugin’s influence in particular started to decline sharply, regardless of the Kremlin’s occasional interest in him during the 2008 war with Georgia and the 2014 Ukrainian crisis. By that time Eurasianism in general and Dugin in particular reemerged in English-language publications as being extremely important from all perspectives. The explanation was simple: reassertive Russia would emerge as an “insane” state ready for everything to rebuild their empire and the elite was deeply hostile to the West.

This distortion of reality was not just a Western or, to be precise, American, phenomenon. It could well be found in authoritarian/totalitarian states. Nevertheless, one could assume, the ruling elite of these states suffered less from distorted information than did those in the USA.

The point here is that in authoritarian and totalitarian discourse, there is a clear difference between public and private information. In the USSR, for example, Party officials always publicly proclaimed that all ethnicities of the USSR lived in harmony with each other and all Soviet people felt that they belonged to the same Soviet nation, regardless of their ethnic membership.

The official propaganda also asserted that the vast majority of Soviets were deeply attached to the regime. Nonetheless, the Secret Police undoubtedly provided information to the inner circle of the Soviet rulers that the reality is quite different, and that the relaxing of the iron grip of the Secret Police and Party could lead to dire consequences. Soviet rulers had never been brainwashed by their own brainwashing, and they made a clear difference between public statements and operational philosophy; at least this was the case until Gorbachev.

The story is different in the West; at least this is the case in the USA. The political scientists of the early 1990s who publicly preached the “end of history” and the USA as the paragon of democracy did not change their paradigm in their capacities as government advisors: they repeated the same vision of the past, present and future as they presented in their public lectures, articles and books.
The distortion of reality is here, paradoxically enough, stronger than in totalitarian/authoritarian states. Consequently, distortion of reality could be seen not just in visions of foreign countries but also in their own societies. A good example could be Trump’s election. Until the very last moment, almost 100% of American pundits were sure that Trump, with his clear authoritarian bent and outlandish behavior, would never enter the White House.

When this happened, American political scientists failed to find even a single English-language scholarly monograph published in the last 50-70 years which clearly dealt with the possibility of an authoritarian or totalitarian transformation of the USA. Thus, the study of Western perception of Eurasianism tells us not only about the creed, but in a way, how knowledge is often produced in the West and how Western society works.
Phoenicians: The Quickening Of Western Civilization

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Editor’s Note: This article builds upon a preliminary version sketched out last year and published in the journal on Pages 25 to 40, issue No. 78, Spring 2018. It represents in our view an important addition to scholarship on a significant and foundational topic, one central to the development of Western Civilization and the comparative study of civilizations.

A relatively recent field of inquiry, Phoenician and Punic studies covers much the same time and geographical areas as Archaic, Classical, and Hellenistic Greek and Roman history. Adjacent fields include economic, business, writing, agricultural, nautical, and biblical history. Scholarship today is moving beyond the Hellenocentric and Romanocentric viewpoints and the record of Phoenician history is increasingly seen as critical for understanding European origins.

Scholars generally agree that there are two sources of the Western tradition: Judeo-Christian doctrine and ancient Greek intellectualism. There is also recognition that Western civilization is largely built atop the Near Eastern civilizations of Mesopotamia and Egypt, which were among the first in the world. The proximity of Europe to the Near East, hence “near” region, explains cultural interaction. A basic question arises, however, as to which antique people specifically prepared the way for the West to develop. While early Aegean cultures are often viewed as the mainspring, assessment of the growing literature reveals that the maritime city-states of Phoenicia stimulated (Bronze Age) and fostered (Iron Age) Western civilization.

Phoenicia, a small maritime region, lay on the Eastern Mediterranean coast. The Phoenicians, who were Semites, emerged as a distinct Canaanite group around 3200 BCE. Hemmed in by the Lebanon Mountains, their first cities were Byblos, Sidon, Tyre, and Aradus.

The principal axis of Eastern influence, Phoenicia sent forth pioneering seafarers, skilled engineers, gifted artists and artisans, and master entrepreneurs of antiquity.

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1 Xella (2013), 1.
Through a peaceful, long-distance exchange network of goods and ideas, they influenced the trade, communication, and civilizational development of the Mediterranean basin, notably Greece. The height of Phoenician shipping, mercantile, and cultural activity was during the early Greek Archaic period, especially, the Orientalizing phase, c. 750-650 BCE, which appears to have laid the foundations for fifth century BCE Classical Greece. Phoenician mercantilism prompted European state formation in the Aegean, Italy, and Spain.

This past century, anthropologist Ralph Linton, in *The Tree of Culture*, confirmed the influence of the Phoenician thalassocracy -- rule of the sea -- and explained: “Their main role in the development of the Greek and other Mediterranean cultures was as intermediaries between Asia and Europe.” Modern Phoenician studies were launched during the early 1960’s by Sabatino Moscati and the Italian school. During the seventies, there was a focus on the Phoenician expansion.

*The Sea Traders* was introduced by archeologist James B. Pritchard: “They became the first to provide a link between the culture of the ancient Near East and that of the uncharted world of the West...They went not for conquest as the Babylonians and Assyrians did, but for trade. Profit rather than plunder was their policy.” Hans G. Niemeyer edited the educative *Phönizier im Westen*.

Toward the close of the century, *La civilization phénicienne et punique: Manuel de recherché* appeared as a landmark collection of articles in Phoenician-Punic studies. Reviewer Philip C. Schmitz’s concluding comment: “To the general historian, the volume offers an alternative history of the Mediterranean before Rome, balancing the Hellenocentric narratives that have so long determined the shape of ‘Western’ civilization.”

### The Bronze Age: Phoenicia and Embryonic Western Civilization

From the Early Bronze through the Iron Age, North Africa and the whole of Europe were eventually integrated. The world-systems approach emphasizes long-distance trade (land and sea) and communication, and it includes the traditional concept of cultural diffusion.

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3 Niemeyer (2004), 245, notes that the Phoenician expansion does not appear to have had political or military aims; mercantilism requires trust, so it is generally peaceful.
4 Linton (1956), 341.
6 Niemeyer (1982).
7 Krings (1995).
8 Schmitz (2001), 636. Since the mid-1980’s, a trend is for more Classicists to treat Greek and Mediterranean history “as a continuum”: Uwe (2006), 4.
Diffusion involves ideas, technology, goods, and individuals; nevertheless, aspects of culture may be modified or even rejected by local elites and their societies.

By the third millennium BCE, there were two core powers, Egypt and Mesopotamia. “Semi-peripheries” were capitalist polities that linked up and conducted trade between cores and the undeveloped peripheries. Just to the north of the Phoenicia region was the small Canaanite kingdom of Ugarit.

Cyrus H. Gordon affirms that “Ugarit was intimately connected with the Phoenicians, who were spreading Eastern culture wherever possible by sea”; it was semi-peripheral to Mesopotamia. Actually, many scholars treat Ugarit as a purely Phoenician city. Phoenicia proper formed a unique, westward-facing maritime region that served as a semi-periphery of both cores—thus stimulating the rise of a new civilization in the West.

Minoan civilization of the Middle Bronze Age (c. 2000-1450 B.C), combined with later Mycenaean Greek contributions, is duly acknowledged as the forerunner to Classical Greece, which elevated Western civilization. The intensification of Eastern trade on the island, observes Stuart W. Manning, coincided with the early state status and palace-building activity of cities, notably Knossos. From the start of the second millennium BCE, “Crete seems to have been significantly oriented toward the Levant and the Near East, rather than the Aegean.”

Many archeologists agree that the emerging Minoan elite gradually began to import Near Eastern exotic, prestige products and technologies, such as advanced sailing ships. Found within the monumental buildings are exotic materials and luxury products (gold, ivory, and faience); new metalworking techniques are also introduced. Thus, “the evidence may suggest some kind of state-level relations with the Egyptian Middle Kingdom, perhaps via the Levantine coast.”

Architecturally, the palaces are built in the Mesopotamian tradition of organic or informal design, including central courtyards, orthostatic facades, long corridors, drains, and figural painted frescoes.
By importing monumental construction techniques, Minoan elites seem to have been emulating their Near Eastern counterparts.\(^\text{15}\)

L. Vance Watrous points to Near Eastern inspiration for architecture, Cretan hieroglyphic and Linear A (and, thus, Mycenaean Linear B) syllabic writing, clay tablets, and sophisticated sealing practices as major elements in the administrative model.\(^\text{16}\)

Perhaps the leading theory is that the Cretan scripts derive from Old Phoenician.\(^\text{17}\) The Cretan number system used in accounting, notes historian of mathematics Georges Ifrah, has “exactly the same intellectual basis” as in monumental Egyptian notation: the additive principle in base ten.\(^\text{18}\) There is probable similarity of room arrangement between the Minoan-Mycenaean palaces’ archives (libraries) and their counterparts in the Near East.\(^\text{19}\)

Economist Michael Hudson underscores the fact that accounting, along with writing, time (in base sixty), prices, and monetary silver, were first standardized in Sumer for the administration of the commercial sphere.\(^\text{20}\) Archeologists trace clay tablets, seals, and “accounting formats moving up the Euphrates to Sumerian outposts such as Asshur and Mari, and on to Syria, Ugarit, and ultimately Crete and Mycenae.”\(^\text{21}\)

Weights and measures, too, were standardized in these regions.\(^\text{22}\) Consequently, during the later Middle Bronze Age (1800-1600 B.C), the Cretans devised their own uniform system of weights and measures. Equivalences between the Minoan and Levantine weighing systems were also developed, illustrating the regular nature of transactions between Crete and the Near East. Minoan regional trade with mainland Greece for Laurion silver enhanced their Eastern Mediterranean exchanges.\(^\text{23}\)

\(\text{References}\)

\(^\text{15}\) Schoep (2009), 33-34.
\(^\text{16}\) Watrous (1987), 69-70.
\(^\text{17}\) Best (1988), 26: the language of the Minoans remains a mystery; in 1957, the Semitist Cyrus H. Gordon proposed that it derives from Northwest Semitic (signs and syntax), specifically Old Phoenician. Following him are Robert Stieglitz, Jan Best, and others. On the imported Byblos script, see Best (2010).
\(^\text{18}\) Ifrah (2000), 178, 180.
\(^\text{19}\) Staikos (2004), 40-41, 43.
\(^\text{20}\) Hudson (2004), 1-3.
\(^\text{21}\) Hudson (1992), 130.
\(^\text{22}\) Hudson (2004), 1. Beaujard (2011) points out that the combination of writing and standardized weights and measures “represented a powerful tool for rationalizing activities,” 16—that spread westward.
The emergence of the later Middle Bronze to early Late Bronze Age elite at Mycenae took place during the Shaft Graves period. Similar to the Minoan, the Mycenaean elite favored a shift toward Near Eastern luxury products in their cultural development. A. Bernard Knapp notes that within this Orientalization phenomenon, local rulers in Late Bronze Age Cyprus and Mycenaean Greece imported prestige objects associated with Mesopotamian and Egyptian royal ideology.

Glass, an important luxury product, made its debut in the West on Late Minoan Crete. The Cretans earlier learned to manufacture another Near Eastern vitreous material, faience, but there is no evidence that they did glassmaking, only glasswork.

Although the Romans credited the Phoenicians with originating glass technology, it was first invented in Mesopotamia c. 2500 BCE. Around 1550 BCE, New Kingdom Egypt adopted and sponsored primary glass production. Henceforth, the Phoenicians acted as intermediaries to ship both finished merchandise and raw glass on established trade routes to the Aegean.

In economic history, Late Bronze Age political stability, which included royal protections, but also rules, for merchants and traders, spurred commerce. The Phoenician business model of the Bronze and Iron Ages represents an inheritance from Mesopotamia: Sumer to Babylonia to Assyria to the Canaanite city-states on the coast. Thus, mixed enterprise flourished as the crown (public) and merchants (private) each contributed capital to invest in manufacturing and long-distance trade.

Byblites of the Late Bronze Age created a remarkable twenty-two letter alphabetic writing system, known as Phoenician. It was developed out of the Ugaritic script, which, in turn, had developed out of proto-Canaanite. The second millennium BCE, proto-Canaanite linear script, the first alphabet in the world, was invented somewhere in the Levant. Aside from its diplomatic and cultural merits, the commercial value of the Phoenician alphabet aided the region in its rise as a mercantile empire during the Iron Age. Simultaneously, it aided in the ongoing transfer of high culture from the Near East to the West.

Sweeping across the Eastern Mediterranean at the close of the period, c. 1200 BCE, were the invading or displaced Sea Peoples from the Aegean.

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24 Burns (2010), 292,296. For example, the influential gold sheeting technique, applied to jewelry, vases, and prestige weapons, was probably imported from the Levant: Laffineur (2010), 448, 452.
26 Sherratt (2008), 217, 216.
27 Henderson (2013), 173, 203, 8. Ugarit may have also been a center of primary glass production: ibid., 8.
28 Berretta (2009), 8-9.
29 Moore and Lewis (1999), 69-90; Moore and Lewis (2009), 85-90.
The Hittite Empire collapsed, Ugarit was permanently destroyed, and Egypt went into decline, despite the victory of Ramses III. Fortunately, the Phoenician cities survived (one theory is that they allied themselves with the Sea Peoples).\textsuperscript{31} Ill-fated, the Mycenaen palatial society also fell and, thus, Greece entered its “Dark Age.” Western culture was devastated and now largely isolated from the cosmopolitan Near East.

Creating a vast, mercantile network—as well as filling the Aegean vacuum—was Phoenicia. Subsequently, Phoenician civilizational influence spanned (another) thousand years, traversing the Iron Age and impacting the West.

\textbf{Iron Age: Exploration, Mercantilism, and Cultural Influence in the West}

A full millennium, c. 1200 to 200 BCE, is the time scale for the combined Phoenician and Carthaginian commercial empires.

The region of Phoenicia,\textsuperscript{32} part of northern Canaan, held a collection of entrepreneurial city-states. The major Iron Age cities were Tyre, Sidon, Byblos, Aradus, Beirut, and Serapta, with the coastal land and ports extending from Aradus south to Dor (in northern Israel).\textsuperscript{33} Robert Stieglitz remarks that the “internationalism” of the Late Bronze Age was soon “replaced by the flowering of the Phoenician renaissance.”\textsuperscript{34}

Conquered by Alexander the Great during the 330s BCE, the Phoenician homeland cities lost their independence permanently before merging with the Hellenistic world. The collapse or decline of the Late Bronze Age core empires, observes Philippe Beaujard, was followed by a restructuring of the world-system at the beginning of the Iron Age.\textsuperscript{35} Thus arose the Phoenician trade network in the West. Phoenicia was semi-peripheral to both the Egyptian and Assyrian cores. Moreover, Tyre, in southern Phoenicia, its leading polity, would become the economic core of a new world-system in the Mediterranean.\textsuperscript{36}

World historian Jerry H. Bentley points out that maritime commerce \textit{actuated} the economic, social, and cultural integration of the Mediterranean basin. Initiated by the Phoenicians, then followed by the Greeks (who reflected the Phoenician pattern) and Romans, merchants organized networks of exchange and distribution. These networks encouraged the division of labor and the building of states.\textsuperscript{37}

\textsuperscript{31} Bell (2006), 25.
\textsuperscript{32} The term Phoenicia is defined and particularized by Lembke (2006), 228, as a “cultural unit.”
\textsuperscript{33} Bell (2016), 92, 95: from at least the Late Bronze Age, the archeological evidence now shows a common Phoenician material culture inclusive of Dor.
\textsuperscript{34} Stieglitz (1990), 9.
\textsuperscript{35} Beaujard (2011), 19.
\textsuperscript{36} Faust and Weiss (2011), 197-198.
\textsuperscript{37} Bentley (1999), 215-219.
Susan and Andrew Sherratt concur that Phoenician mercantile and cultural activity prompted European state formation: first in the Aegean, then in Italy and Spain.\(^{38}\)

Phoenician influence—economic and mercantile; nautical and long-distance trade routes; exploration and colonization; art and architecture; mining, metallurgy, and glass; salt production; large-scale agricultural; and, cultural, including the West’s (and most of the world’s) alphabet, the book, and literacy—was primarily westerly in direction.

Viniculture was introduced to Europe.\(^{39}\) In sum, they transferred the beneficial elements\(^{40}\) of the urbanized Near East to foster Western civilization. At its height, the Phoenicians’ sea and land mercantile web, which has been described as “hemispheric,”\(^ {41}\) stretched across most of the known world: three continents and two oceans. In fact, much of it was discovered by the sea traders, themselves, in their penetration of new markets.

Early in the first millennium BCE, the Phoenicians set up the world’s first maritime empire: ports, bases, warehouses, and emporia, up to the southern Black Sea and across the Mediterranean basin and beyond. Initially, trading stations were established at strategic geographic and economic locations. Massalia (Marseilles) in France was founded but not permanently settled.\(^ {42}\) Territorial colonies were established in Cyprus, mineral-rich Sardinia and Iberia (Spain and Portugal), the Balearic Islands, Sicily, Malta, and agriculturally-rich North Africa (first Utica and Carthage). Exploration and colonization went past the difficult Strait of Gibraltar or Pillars of Hercules. (Hercules was originally a Phoenician hero.) The Atlantic coasts of Africa and Europe, and, perhaps, the British Isles, were discovered.

Founded by Tyre, in 814 BCE, the traditional date (close to recent archeological evidence), Carthage was itself destined to become a commercial juggernaut in the West. The Phoenicians held both shores of the Pillars, thereby controlling access to the Atlantic. Despite later Greek, and then Roman, competition in the Western Mediterranean, Carthaginian economic and naval dominance continued into the Punic Wars (264-146 BCE).

\(^{38}\) Sherratt and Sherratt (1993), 367, 369.


\(^{40}\) Less favorable elements may be the Phoenician slave trade and, marks Hudson (1992), 128, 138-139, the introduction of credit practices into Archaic Greece and Italy.

\(^{41}\) Moore and Lewis (2009), 110. Therefore, the “shift of world civilization from the ancient Near East to the Mediterranean lands adjacent to Europe…would seem to call for a readjustment of the role played by the Greeks in this world-historic shift of history’s wheel”: ibid., 110-111.

\(^{42}\) Cartledge (2009), 62: the original name Massalia means “settlement” in Phoenician.
Led by Tyre, the mercantile network was headquartered on the eastern shore of the Mediterranean. High-quality cedar and fir forests on the mountain slopes were ideal for building ships, as well as for export or tribute. This geographic location was crucial to the success of the maritime and overland enterprise. Canaan contained excellent harbors, enabling it to be part of the Fertile Crescent. Through it laid the caravan routes that connected to Egypt, Arabia (and through it the Indian market), Asia Minor, Mesopotamia, and, later, to the Silk Road.

When the Late Bronze Age New Kingdom pharaohs conquered Canaan, they protected its growing trade activity at the junction of both land and marine highways. Moreover, under Ramses the Great, at Memphis, the Egyptian administrative capital and site of its main shipyards, a Phoenician commercial enclave was established.

The Egyptians, who respected the shipwright and maritime expertise of the Phoenicians, partnered with them in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean trade routes. During the Iron Age, such relations with Egypt continued.

By 1200 BCE, the Phoenicians were building large merchant ships. In world maritime history, declares Richard Woodman, they are recognized as “the first true seafarers, founding the art of pilotage, cabotage, and navigation” and the architects of “the first true ship, built of planks, capable of carrying a deadweight cargo and being sailed and steered.”

Master shipbuilders, during the Bronze Age, laid a keel and ribs (for strength in rough weather). For sturdy hulls to check wave and hold cargo, pegged mortise-and-tenon joints were developed on the Levantine coast; this method spread westward, and it became standard until the Late Roman period. The hull was rounded for faster movement through the water. The brailed rig sail—so vital, because it enabled tacking against the wind—was likely a Levantine innovation. Transport amphorae that became standardized for volume, in use and imitated for over two thousand years until Byzantine times, were invented in Phoenicia.

In stellar navigation, the North Star was discovered, which the later Greeks called the Phoenician Star; this enabled sailing at night on shorter distance, open-sea routes. The first evidence of maritime law also appears in the Levant.

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45 Bourne (2003).
47 Pulak (2010), 873; Bass (2010), 799-800.
49 Ragev (2004), 352.
50 Wachsmann (1998), 300, 51, 323-325, 332. The first recorded open-sea route on the Mediterranean was Byblos to Cyprus to Egypt: ibid., 295-296.
Iron Age contributions include the art of cartography; the first artificial (and self-cleaning or flushing) harbors, such as those in Sidon, Tyre, Atlit, and Acre; and, the revolutionary bireme war galley.

Around 800 BCE, the Phoenicians found it necessary to protect their interests. The Phoenicians are generally credited with designing a war galley with two banks of oars for speed and maneuverability in battle, the bireme. This concept would dominate throughout the Mediterranean for the next two thousand years.

The Greeks perfected the galley as a warship and added a third bank of oars, although many scholars believe that, logically, the Phoenicians actually fashioned the addition, the trireme.

Concurrent with their early first millennium BCE, sea trade in the West was a notable expansion of Phoenician land commerce in Western Asia and Egypt. This transit trade involved manufactured goods, raw materials, and slaves (skilled and unskilled). In southeastern Anatolia, the Phoenician influence upon the Cilician cities was both economic and cultural.

Industry was another key to the success of the mercantile network. Through the Bronze Age both luxury and common goods were produced. Iron Age Phoenicia continued to excel in many industries and decorative arts. The export market in view became the entire inland sea. Additionally, supplying the mercantile network were Phoenician regional craft production centers in Cyprus, Rhodes, Tharros in Sardinia, Carthage, and Gades (Cadiz). Overall, concerning trade in Phoenician handicrafts, comments Piero Bartoloni, “for the proto-historical West they represented the gateway to The East” (p. 78).

The Phoenicians pioneered mass production. Their region, for example, emerged as the leading producer of glass, which now included transparent glass.

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51 Woolmer (2011), 84.
52 Haggi (2010), 283. Harbor technology was transferred to the western colonies, such as those in Sicily, as well as Carthage: Pederson (2011), 41.
53 Woodman (1997), 16-23. The Venetian galley design, in particular, would be adapted to the carrack (see below, note 201), receiving the name of galleon—the trans-ocean-going ship of the early modern European powers: ibid., 21-23, 59-63.
54 Miles (2010), 46-47.
55 Lipiński (1995), 1325-1326. Wolfgang Röllig (1992), 102, 93-97, perceives that beyond Phoenician sea connections to Archaic Greece, Anatolian land routes played some role in the transfer of civilization: Levantine scribes, merchants, and craftsmen apparently carried Mesopotamian goods and thought to East Greece.
56 Braudel (2001), 184-186.
57 Markoe (2000), 149, 171, 152, 186.
58 Bartoloni (1988a), 78.
Finished articles, such as flasks and beads, by the thousands, were shipped across the Mediterranean.\textsuperscript{59} In Spain, wheel-turned pottery was introduced, and it was then mass produced.\textsuperscript{60} The Carthaginians mass produced ships; parts were labeled with the Punic alphabet.\textsuperscript{61}

Their most famous product, the expensive Tyrian and Sidonian purple dye, was exported either as powder or as dyed fabric, especially wool. The Greeks ascribed the ethnic name of Phoenicians (derived from the word \textit{phoinos}, meaning red) probably because of their red to violet cloth. The Royal Purple of the ancient monarchies, as in Rome, became the Western standard of imperial adornment.

The artwork of the Phoenician cities was renowned in ancient times, and it is increasingly respected by experts today.

Besides fine textiles and glassware, other major productions were woodworking with mortise-and-tenon seams; ivory work, often inlaid in furniture; metalwork, including bronze, silver, and gold cups and bowls; and, jewelry. Perfected were the Near Eastern techniques of filigreeing, granulation,\textsuperscript{62} repoussé, and gold sheeting (embossing pertains to bowls).\textsuperscript{63}

By 1000 BCE, iron smelting and ironworking were mastered.\textsuperscript{64}

Manufacturing such a variety of merchandise resulted in the specialization of the workforce.\textsuperscript{65} Since Phoenicia was the ancient world’s trading hub, its highly skilled craftspeople gained knowledge of and worked with all types of materials, techniques, and artistic styles.

Foreign states often called upon its engineers. Hence, both Solomon’s Temple and his palace were constructed by imported Phoenician artisans.\textsuperscript{66} As Byblos and Ugarit had done before, wealthy Tyre, in southern Phoenicia, became the principal east-west center of trade in luxury products and metals.\textsuperscript{67}

\textsuperscript{59} Herm (1974), 80.
\textsuperscript{60} Moore and Lewis (1999), 128.
\textsuperscript{61} Bartoloni (1988b), 76; Lancel (1995), 132.
\textsuperscript{62} Aubet (2001), 79.
\textsuperscript{63} Aubet (1988a), 82.
\textsuperscript{64} Edey (1974), 62.
\textsuperscript{65} Aubet (2001), 80.
\textsuperscript{66} Edey (1974), 58-60; 2 Chron. 2:3-16. As recorded in Ezra 3:7, the Phoenicians were also involved in the \textit{rebuilding} of the temple after the Babylonian Exile.
\textsuperscript{67} Aubet (2001), 82, 79, 80.
As sea merchants in the West, they brought Mesopotamian astronomy and weights and measures, as well as their own Phoenician alphabet: a phonetic code (not a pictographic system) to build words.

This simplified writing system did not require professional scribes as in Egypt or Mesopotamia, and it could be written on a variety of media. A long-distance network of trade involved contracts, correspondence, and record keeping. Transferrable to other languages, the egalitarian alphabet was (and is) easy to learn—in fixed sequence.

En route, the Phoenicians displayed their engineering prowess. Major projects were designed and completed on three continents.

These are illustrated by:

- massive fortifications;
- Mesopotamian-style urban planning;
- an artificial isthmus (Sardinia);
- a causeway (Sicily);
- an artificial channel (Carthage);
- Beirut’s sixth century BCE, earthquake-proof architectural techniques and complex sewer systems (predating those in the Greek world);
- artificial, self-flushing harbors with precision underwater construction of walls;
- multi-story buildings; and, Egyptian-influenced monumental architecture.

Naval allies of the Persians in their wars against the Greeks (500-449 BCE), the Phoenicians rendered engineering service. A notable achievement was the one and one quarter mile canal at Mount Athos for Xerxes’s ships to pass.

Phoenician colonization in the West began on the copper-rich island of Cyprus, only ninety-five miles from the Levant. Commercial relations began during the Middle Bronze Age. Cultural transmission (ex. alphabetical writing) by Phoenician traders intensified in the late eleventh to early tenth centuries BCE.

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68 Bentley and Ziegler (2000), 52.
69 Linton (1956), 112.
70 Markoe (2000), 81, 86-87, 76-77, 178
71 Miles (2010), 92.
72 Hoyos (2010), 73.
74 Haggi (2010), 281.
76 Markoe (2000), 51.
77 Bell (2006), 111-113. After 1200 BCE, the ports of western Cyprus, notes Bell (2016), 94, 100, seem to have served as a platform for Phoenician western expansion.
During the ninth century BCE, when the first colonies were founded, there appeared black-on-red or Cypro-Phoenician fine ware.\(^{78}\) Along with their pantheon, another influence was Oriental (or Phoenician) art and architecture.\(^{79}\) Tyre transplanted the Phoenician business model of international managed trade in the leading colony of Kition (Citium).\(^{80}\)

Crete, rich iron ore, seems to have had permanent Phoenician settlements by the ninth century BCE.\(^{81}\) Excellent Orientalizing bronze work highlights the craftsmanship there. The island served as a Phoenician center for Mediterranean trade in metals and luxury goods (glass, metallic, ivory).\(^{82}\) Eastern products were probably shipped to mainland Greece cities, such as Delphi and Olympia.\(^{83}\) Crete was also on a major Phoenician line to western Italy and points west.\(^{84}\)

On Rhodes, since the Middle Bronze Age, “a gateway into the Aegean for ships sailing westwards from the Near East,” permanent Phoenician communities were established during the eighth century BCE.\(^{85}\) Manufactured for export were trinkets, luxury items in faience, ceramic unguent flasks,\(^{86}\) and silverwork.\(^{87}\)

Preliminary trade with the Euboean Greeks was established during the tenth century BCE. This traffic introduced Eastern prestige goods, such as gold jewelry and fine cloth,\(^{88}\) weight standards,\(^{89}\) and Phoenician alphabetical writing,\(^{90}\) perhaps the first in Greece.

The height of Phoenician shipping in the Aegean was during the eighth and early seventh centuries BCE. Markoe observes the archeological distribution of finished goods, including Egyptian and Assyrian wares, and points to a “Phoenician commercial channel to the Greek mainland.” Direct trade and cultural exchange took place in coastal cities, such as Eleusis, Argos, and especially Corinth.\(^{91}\)

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\(^{78}\) Lipiński (2004), xiv.
\(^{80}\) Moore and Lewis (1999), 110-111.
\(^{81}\) Lipiński (2004), 186-188.
\(^{82}\) Markoe (2000), 172.
\(^{83}\) Hoffman (1997), 259.
\(^{84}\) Markoe (1996), 59.
\(^{85}\) Lipiński (2004), 145-146.
\(^{86}\) Markoe (2000), 171.
\(^{87}\) Markoe (1992), 69.
\(^{88}\) Sherratt and Sherratt (1993), 365. Initial (post-Mycenaean), sporadic trade with Euboea is now fixed in the eleventh century BCE; additionally, the Phoenicians operated in the northern Aegean: Tiverios (2012), 69-72.
\(^{89}\) Kroll (2008), 37-48.
\(^{90}\) Paine (2013), 84.
\(^{91}\) Markoe (2000), 174, 173.
The title of the synthesis *The Orientalizing Revolution: Near Eastern Influence on Greek Culture in the Early Archaic Age* (1992), by Walter Burkert, exhorts Hellas-centered Classicists. Its theme: the formative epoch, from c. 750-650 BCE, known as the Orientalizing period, was decisive.

Under the influence of the high culture of the Semitic East (Assyrian, Phoenician, Aramean), Greece laid the foundations to create a culture that would eventually dominate the Mediterranean—Classical civilization. The most important transmission was the Phoenician alphabetic script (Mycenaean Linear B had died out).92

Along with the concept of the book, Semites contributed traditional Mesopotamian literary forms, techniques, and motifs—besides the Phoenician pantheon—that find strong parallels in Hesiod, Homer, and Aesop.93 Mentioned above are the scientific traditions of nautics, astronomy, and mathematics. Another Eastern, including Phoenician, tradition was fine music: inherited by the Greeks and handed down to the European Middle Ages.94 Phoenicia conveyed the religious-sport festival and athletic stadium (monumental architecture), forerunning the celebration of the Olympic games.95

So, the editors of *Debating Orientalization* reaffirm the centrality of the Phoenicians in the cultural process of Orientalization: defined as the indigenous adoption and reworking of Eastern goods (luxury and common) and ideas. This practice is first seen on Cyprus, then in the Greek, Italian, and Iberian regions.96

The prehensile Archaic Greeks modified the Phoenician alphabet in order to accommodate their vowel-intensive Indo-European tongue, thus forming the basis of all the West’s (Latin and Cyrillic) alphabets. Phoenician letters also served as the number system in ancient Greece. Created by the Greeks themselves, their system employed base ten and the A B C order: numerical values were attributed to letters, from one to nine, in tens to ninety, then in hundreds, and so on.97

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92 Burkert (1992), 5-8, 128-129, 25.
93 Ibid., 29-33, chap. 3. Hesiod lived in Boeotia, and Homer in Ionia, regions with Phoenician influence. The Phoenician deity Europa is mentioned earliest in a work of Hesiod. The Greeks perhaps gave this name to their continent—much of which happened to be discovered by the Phoenicians: Europe: De Rougemont (1968), 21, 24, 6, 31-32.
94 Sachs (1943), 63, 127; Westenholz (2014), 1.
96 Riva and Vella (2006), 13-14. The editors also support the breaking down of the traditional bounds of the term Orientalization to begin in the Bronze Age: ibid., 2.
97 Ifrah (2000), xxi, 220-221, 227, 213. Greek and Latin (originally Phoenician) letters are used across the sciences. Common examples are the number πi (π) and the variables x and y; more recently, DNA sequencing uses the code letters A, C, T, G. Currency symbols, such as the dollar sign ($), also derive from the alphabet. Then there is musical notation and symbols.
Decentralized Greece (similar to Phoenicia) exploited the democratic and “modernizing” potential of the alphabet. Within its emerging city-states, ordinary merchants, artisans, and others—not just the aristocracy—might keep accounts and become literate.98

The alphabetical order (like the numerical) system is how societies organize information. Early examples are the Greek numbering system and the first alphabetization of books cataloged in the library in Alexandria. Beyond literacy and organization, the alphabet stimulates both abstract and rational thought through the phonetic coding and decoding process. As a result, the adoption of Phoenician letters—especially in Ionia and Athens—created an intellectual environment for the development of Greek, and, subsequently, Western science.99

In the Greek language, writes Burkert, there is a “marked presence” of Semitic loan words, thus proving Phoenician cultural influence. These are displayed in the critical areas of writing, commerce, trade, and craftsmanship. Following are selected examples: alpha, beta, gamma, and so forth, are letter names; byblos, the word for book (and later, Bible) since the Greeks imported Egyptian paper from Byblos; mina, the standard unit of weight and currency; kanon, the standard unit of measurement in architecture or measuring rod; titanos, lime, gypson, plaster, and plinthos, clay brick, are new construction terms; gaulos, the word for ship, makellon, market; and, arrabon, deposit.100

Orientalizing art is principally represented by fine metalworking, ivory carving, jewelry (gold filigree, granulation, and so on), ceramics, and the first large-scale architecture. Presumably, communities of resident craftsmen within Greek cities introduced the leading-edge technical skills, styles, and iconography of the industries of their Phoenician homeland: a process of indigenous apprenticeship.101

Greece’s first monumental temples and statuary are based on an Eastern prototype, and they appear during the eighth century BCE.102 Architectural features that were adopted include the Phoenician Proto-Aeolic capital, forerunner of the Ionic capital, and ashlar masonry.103 Greek emulation of the great Near Eastern buildings is evident.104 The Phoenicians also acted as intermediaries to carry Egyptian architectural techniques to Hellas.

98 Muller (1964), 101; Burkert (2004), 16.
99 Logan (1986), 25 (McLuhan quote), 17-21, 187-191, 207, 103, chap. 6. De Looze (2016) examines writings about the alphabet, itself, since Classical Greek times; his main theme is that a powerful “alphabetic culture,” 5, has emerged to shape Western civilization.
101 Ibid., 9-25.
102 Kopcke (1992), 110-112.
103 Morris (1992), 129, 147.
104 Morris (2006), 77.
For the interior of buildings, beyond plaster, other materials used were wood (cedar) paneling, for example, Solomon’s Temple; alabaster slabs; and, stucco (western Phoenician-Punic world). Originally, Phoenicians of the Bronze Age developed lime mortar with hydraulic properties from which the Greeks evolved true cement.\textsuperscript{105} Subsequently, the Romans would produce concrete.

For the genesis of philosophy, the Greeks ascribed Phoenician parentage to both Thales (by Herodotus),\textsuperscript{106} the founder of Western philosophy and science, and, next in importance, Pythagoras (by Neanthes). They lived in sixth century BCE, Ionia, a region of former Phoenician influence.

Modern historians, though, most often reject such claims, because a Greek tradition assigned Eastern characteristics to celebrities in admiration of older civilizations.\textsuperscript{107} Nevertheless, Eric S. Gruen, in \textit{Rethinking the Other in Antiquity} (2011), determines that “the repute of the Phoenicians among Greek intellectuals, in fact, was high.”\textsuperscript{108}

Stoicism, the most important post-Aristotelian philosophical school, dominated in the Hellenistic and Roman periods. Its founder, Zeno of Citium (Kition), lived from c. 335-263 BCE. The Phoenician ancestry of Zeno is not in doubt.\textsuperscript{109} With its doctrines of the Logos, Providence, and a noble ethic, Stoicism served as a preparation among the intellectual class for the acceptance of Christianity in the West.\textsuperscript{110}

Zeno of Sidon (c. 150-70 BCE), a prominent Epicurean, taught Cicero in Athens. He is known for challenging Euclidean geometry in trenchant ways. Likewise, Zeno’s epistemological dispute with the Stoics anticipated John Stuart Mill’s theory of induction.\textsuperscript{111} Thereafter, the Carthaginian philosopher Hasdrubal, in 129 BCE, became head of the Athenian Academy.\textsuperscript{112}

Historian of science Leonid Zhmud comments on the preliminary data used in the first—in the world—mathematical proofs by the early Hellenes. “Semitic borrowings in the Greek related to weights, measures, and practical calculations confirm that this area was open to Oriental influence.”\textsuperscript{113}

\textsuperscript{105} Harden (1962), 141, 136.
\textsuperscript{106} Laertius (1970), vol. 1, 23, 25.
\textsuperscript{107} Zhmud (2012), 74, 84-85.
\textsuperscript{108} Gruen (2011), 119.
\textsuperscript{109} Laertius (1970), vol. 2, 111, 113, 117. Likewise, the early Stoic Chyrssipus of Soli, who systemized the philosophy, was of Phoenician ancestry: Woolmer (2011), 73.
\textsuperscript{110} Copleston (1985), vol. 1, 505.
\textsuperscript{111} “Zeno of Sidon” (2000), 956-957.
\textsuperscript{112} Miles (2010), 352. Another Carthaginian, Herillos (third century BCE), also taught in Athens: Lipiński (2004), 175.
\textsuperscript{113} Zhmud (2012), 250.
A fifth century BCE, contribution, the abacus, “probably reached Greece from Phoenicia.”\textsuperscript{114} This valuable calculating device was in service in the West until the French Revolution.\textsuperscript{115}

The democratic and constitutional Athenian city-state—pivotal to the growth of the Western world—may be another adaptation.

From the Bronze Age onward, observes Markoe, “true city-states” functioned in Phoenicia.\textsuperscript{116} These autonomous, monarchical city-states with their councils of elders and peoples’ assemblies are characterized as proto-democratic. With regard to Greece, some scholars suggest that early experiments in democratic government took place in regions with Phoenician influence. Borrowings of democratic ideas may be seen, for instance, on the island of Kos, and in Ionia, on Chios and Samos. Also, preceding Athens, Sparta had a constitution. Aristotle, in his analysis of the Spartan and Carthaginian (Punic) constitutions, points to similarities: councils and popular assemblies. Thus, Simon Hornblower, Robert Drewes, and others assume that the Spartan system followed a Phoenician prototype.\textsuperscript{117}

Phoenician models adopted or adapted by Archaic Greece, like the alphabet, were crucial to its commercial intercourse with leading societies, along with the development of Western civilization. Generally accepted is that Phoenician standards of weights and measures were universally employed by the Greeks, passed on to the Etruscans and Romans, and inherited by medieval Europe.

Hudson makes the convincing case that the financial customs of Classical Greece and Rome were not indigenous to Indo-European societies as many assumed previously. Instead, during the Archaic period, largely through Phoenician maritime commerce, financial innovations were diffused to the Greeks and Etruscans, then transferred to the Romans:

- maritime law,
- insurance contracts,
- joint financing of business ventures,
- banqueting (aristocratic symposium),
- deposit (aforementioned \textit{arrabon}) banking, and
- interest-bearing debt.\textsuperscript{118}

\begin{itemize}
  \item Dilke (1987), 21.
  \item Ifrah (2001), 15.
  \item Markoe (2000), 87.
  \item Stockwell (2010), 123-133: the author surveys the literature on this topic.
  \item Hudson (1992), 128, 134-141. Large-scale baking and credit in Classical Greece emerged as a result of the metics or resident aliens: Curtin (1984), 77, thus Phoenicians, in the Near Eastern tradition, were major creditors: Hudson (1992), 134.
\end{itemize}
Finally, the example of Phoenicia’s distant voyages and colonization was followed by the Greeks.\textsuperscript{119} Starting in the eighth century BCE, the Euboeans and Corinthians led the colonization movement. Classicist Richard A. Billows affirms this meant learning the ship construction technology, navigation skills, and the east-west trade routes of the Phoenicians.\textsuperscript{120}

On mainland Italy, Phoenician contact is evident by the tenth century BCE, and regular exchange commenced in the ninth century.\textsuperscript{121} Eighth century BCE, Etruria and Campania hosted the Levantine merchants. A major goal, concurrent with their mining transactions in Phoenician Sardinia and Phoenician Iberia, was to acquire silver and other ores, so abundant in northern Etruria. Mineral rights were perhaps secured through local diplomatic gift exchange. As in Greece, rather than colonies, resident workshops were likely established on Italian soil.\textsuperscript{122}

Etruscan mariners learned from the Phoenicians how to navigate by the stars,\textsuperscript{123} and were probably stimulated to make their transmarine voyages\textsuperscript{124} and establish overseas colonies—thereafter the Romans founded colonies.

The strong Orientalizing tradition (c. 750-580 BCE), touching the whole of Italy, involved both goods and ideas.\textsuperscript{125} This period of economic growth, in fact, marks the beginning of Etruscan civilization.\textsuperscript{126} Wine, a luxury product, was introduced to the Etruscans. They, in turn, shipped the beverage in Etruscan amphorae (imitation of Phoenician amphorae) and domesticated grapevines to southern France. Viniculture thence spread north into Europe, and eventually, the New World.\textsuperscript{127}

Artistically, advanced techniques, new materials, and styles were presented. Examples are fine silver and gold jewelry displaying granulation, filigree, and punch work; engraved and repoussé silver and gold luxury receptacles;\textsuperscript{128} glass vessels;\textsuperscript{129} ivory carvings; and, the first large-scale sculpture (also in Sardinia) and monumental architecture.\textsuperscript{130}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{119} Casson (1991), 170.
\item \textsuperscript{120} Billows (2010), 61-62.
\item \textsuperscript{121} Nijboer (2008), 428-431, 426: the earliest Phoenician imports discovered include musical instruments, faience, gold, and wheel-turned pottery.
\item \textsuperscript{122} Markoe (2000), 179.
\item \textsuperscript{123} Giardina (2010), 6.
\item \textsuperscript{124} McGrail (2004), 138.
\item \textsuperscript{125} Nijboer (2008), 424, 434-451.
\item \textsuperscript{126} Sannibale (2013), 99.
\item \textsuperscript{127} McGovern (2013), 10147-10151.
\item \textsuperscript{128} Markoe (1992), 61-63, 67; Gaultier (2013), 914-919.
\item \textsuperscript{129} Markoe (2000), 157.
\item \textsuperscript{130} Rathje (2010).
\end{itemize}
Structurally, Orientalization is associated with the emergence of cities, urban planning, masonry houses with tile roofs, and wheeled vehicles. Moreover, urbanization coincides with the formation of Italian city-states.132

The architectural traditions of Etruria, largely Phoenician and Greek, were later transferred to Rome.133

Etruscan Orientalizing (as in Spain) is characterized by aristocratic emulation, including the model of the Eastern courts’ stately display.135 Phoenician imports or their imitation include the following:

- “early togas and the use of the color purple,”
- crown,136
- ceremonial axe, scepter,
- horse, chariot,
- throne,
- banqueting equipment, and
- seals.

These Eastern symbols of political authority were passed on to the Romans.137

Subsequently, there arrived Greek colonists and merchants. Spreading Hellenic culture, early in the eighth century BCE, they introduced Greco-Phoenician letters to form the Etruscan alphabet. In turn, it was transmitted and adapted by the Romans as the basic Latin alphabet of western Europe.138

By 800 BCE, the intercontinental mercantile network of Phoenicia took shape, embracing the far west. The scope of commerce was broad. Beyond metals, trade included slaves, pottery, and high-value foodstuff, like olive oil and wine.139

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132 Leighton (2013), 138-139, 142-143.
133 Berry (2013), 700.
134 Riva and Vella (2006), 12.
136 Nijboer (2008), 443.
137 Rathje (2010). Observes Nijboer (2008), as in Greece, the banquet ritual “assisted the exchange of goods and ideas,” 451. Eastern symbols of political rule also spread to the transalpine Celtic princes: Sannibale (2013), 104.
138 Paine (2013), 86-87. Related are the Roman numerals, once prehistoric stick notches, which were assimilated to alphabetical letters in the first century BCE: Ifrah (2000), 187-190.
139 Curtin (1984), 76.
The analysis of Moore and Lewis shows that Tyre’s monarchy and private merchants—a mixed economy with capitalistic features—by 650 BCE, “presided over the most impressive business organization in antiquity...able to internationalize trade and production on an axis stretching from the Atlantic shores of Spain to the shores of the Babylon Euphrates.”

Additionally, West Africa (gold, ivory) became a direct trading partner, and the British Isles (tin), an indirect, overland trading partner.

Gades (Cadiz) in Iberia was founded west of the Strait. The new chronology suggests Phoenician contact in the tenth century BCE, and settlements already in the late ninth century in Iberia’s—Spain and Portugal—Atlantic coast mining region. Colonies with an agricultural dimension spread all across the southern Mediterranean (“Phoenician coast”) littoral of Spain.

There is consensus on the local Late Bronze Age culture; that is, before Phoenician colonization and the introduction of iron, starting in the eighth century BCE. Iberia was proto-urban—displaying simple ground plans in some areas. Likewise, its tribal groups were in a transitional phase toward early state formation. The socio-economic bases were already in place.

Joan Sanmartí, therefore, employs a combined endogenist (internal) and exogenist (external) theoretical approach to change. He acknowledges that “foreign contact had an important role in the evolution of the indigenous societies.” Phoenician activity is associated with the technological change, economic intensification, and increased social differentiation that ushered in Iberian Age centralized polities (states).

Scholarship thus focuses on the Phoenician period as related to the formation of Iberian culture and its first cities, beginning around 600 BCE. The Iberian Orientalizing phase embraced the late eighth and seventh centuries BCE.

Phoenician workshops introduced their repertoire of artistic techniques, materials (glass was imported), and styles for the production of choice goods.

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140 Moore and Lewis (2000), 21, 37, 34.
142 Aubet (2008), 247, 248-250; Pappa (2013), 177-178, 191. Gades (Cadiz), founded by the Phoenicians, is often considered the oldest city in western Europe.
143 Belarte (2009), 105-107.
144 Sanmartí (2009), 50-52.
Technological transfers were iron, metallurgical techniques, the potter’s wheel, and “carts and chariots are the oldest wheeled vehicles in Iberia.” Agriculturally, crop specialization, metal tools, technologies, and commercial (surplus) cereal production were spread by the Phoenicians.

Instituted also were viniculture with wine presses and the Old-World grape; and, arboriculture with the domesticated olive and oil presses, plum, walnut, and almond trees. Livestock introductions include the chicken and donkey.

Architecture and urban planning reproduced a Near Eastern pattern, including monumental structures and civic space. Maria Carme Belarte observes that indigenous peoples adopted certain “new elements, such as a rectangular floor plan, buildings with a complex ground plan, building materials, such as lime, techniques of adobe wall construction, and the like;” she examines the “first urbanism on the Mediterranean coast...the potential role played by the colonial factor—in particular Phoenician commerce,” concluding that it was an important “accelerator of the process.”

Commerce introduced banqueting; transport amphorae; standardized weights, measures, and seals; consistent exchange rates; and, writing. Many examples of Phoenician alphabetical script adapted to the extinct, untranslated, non-Indo-European Tartessian and Iberian languages have been discovered.

Phoenician colonization in Iberia faded with the fall of Tyre to the Neo-Babylonians under Nebuchadnezzar in 573 BCE. Yet, Punic Carthage gradually assumed leadership of the Phoenician cities, and it founded new colonies. Thence, the center of Phoenician mercantilism shifted to Carthage.

Culturally, the principal legacy of the Phoenicians to the West, including Iberia, is the alphabet.

146 Markoe (2000), 186, 157. Mediterranean France received Phoenician, Punic, and Orientalizing Iberian objects from southern Spain, see Dietler (2010), 7.
147 Harrison (1988), 34. The lyre, too, was a Phoenician import: ibid.
148 Buxó (2009), 157-159, 162-165. Also introduced to Iberia were productive types of wheat and barley, as well as oats, millets, flax, and several legumes, such as peas and beans: ibid, 164.
149 López Castro (2008), 97-98.
150 Rodríguez Díaz (2014), 492.
152 Pappa (2013), 81.
153 Belarte (2009), 91, 93, 107.
155 Moore and Lewis (1999), 116.
156 Dietler (2009), 5.
157 Moore and Lewis (2000), 36.
The Romans transmitted to the peninsula the Latin alphabet (and language). For the world economy, centuries of Phoenician and Carthaginian mercantilism incorporated Iberia into the trade routes of the Mediterranean.158

**Development of the Atlantic Façade of Europe**

Beyond the Phoenician-Punic economic, technological, and cultural transformation of the Mediterranean—long a “Phoenician lake” between Indian and Atlantic Ocean operations—is another topic. Receiving less attention is the formative development of the Atlantic façade by a Near Eastern maritime people. Barry Cunliffe, however, credits Phoenician “entrepreneurs from the Mediterranean intent on exploring the commercial potential of the ocean fringe.

In this way, Atlantic Europe, for the first time, confronted Mediterranean civilization.”159

In a recent volume, Celestino (archeologist) and López (Classicist) collaborate to assert that the realm of Tartessos, under the stimulation of the colonizing Phoenicians (Orientalizing Iberia, state development, and alphabetical writing are discussed in the previous section), emerged as a third civilization in the West, along with Archaic Etruria and Greece. Moreover, Tartessos, in southwestern Spain and southern Portugal, became the first literate culture on the Atlantic shore.160

Tyre, during the ninth century BCE, directed far west capital investment and settlement through its family-linked aristocracy at Gades (Cadiz). It was founded as an island colony and industrial center with a port(s) upon the Atlantic. Colonies were also planted well north into Portugal and south about 400 miles to Mogador, profiting from the trade of West Africa and the sub-Saharan.

Partnering with the Tartessian elite, the merchants of Gades negotiated mineral rights and the regional trade network. Southwest Iberia held the most abundant silver deposits known in the ancient world. While there existed protohistoric indigenous mining, the Phoenicians introduced iron tools—announcing the Iberian Iron Age—to replace stone tools, advanced smelting techniques and cupellation, and systematic operations, resulting in a boom of silver production.

159 Cunliffe (2004), 311. The first direct archeological evidence of operations in the Atlantic sphere arises from a late seventh or early sixth century BCE wreck. It is the only Phoenician merchant vessel to be excavated (2007-2011) in the Western Mediterranean. The diverse, four tons of finished goods and raw materials include northwest Africa elephant tusks and Baltic Sea amber: Polzer (2014), 241, 231, 232, 242.
Huelva, also a colony and port, had an important foundry. The Gades shipbuilding industry thrived for seven centuries into Roman times.161

The Gades complex, which would continue to flourish under Carthage and Rome, linked trade between the Mediterranean and Atlantic systems. Early on, fishing—as an industry—was established in the rich Atlantic waters.162 The colony as also served as a regional production center of Eastern luxury objects for export.163

Starting in Punic times, the Gaditanian economy (with its Bay of Cadiz) concentrated on wine, salted fish (another new industry), and *garum* or fish sauce, an important seasoning in the ancient world. Specialized transport amphorae were manufactured for packing these products.164

For Portugal, Ana Margarida Arruda identifies Orientalizing zones with peaceful Phoenician colonization, both coastal and inland, as far north as the Mondego River estuary (Santa Olaia). Specifically, the evidence proves agricultural development and salt exploitation.165 Ideal for maritime-based commerce, the natural anchorages of Portugal could accommodate the large Phoenician-Punic ships. Indeed, an artifact discovery of these vessels, fitted out for the ocean, “would rank among the most important watercraft in the history of seafaring.”166

Up the Atlantic coast, in the northwest corner of Iberia, early Phoenician trade was conducted with the Celts of tin-rich Galicia.167 During the fifth century BCE, perhaps in conjunction with the Carthaginian expeditions to northwest Europe, the Portuguese colonies were reinvigorated (for example, an artificial harbor was constructed at Tavira).

Punic trade and exchange with Galicia became regular. Galician society originally rejected wheel technology for pottery, which was a female task, and the rotary quern stone, but it adopted Eastern jewelry techniques, sculpture (the strongest tradition in the Iron Age of Atlantic Europe), and such.168

On the Iberian Atlantic façade, “Phoenician and Punic sailors named several prominent capes.”

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162 Cunliffe (2004), 48, 30: the tuna shoals about the Canary Islands appear central to this activity.
163 Markoe (2000), 186: some were probably used as diplomatic gifts in exchange for Andalusian mineral rights.
164 Rodríguez-Díaz (2014), 500. Viniculture had been introduced during the Phoenician period.
165 Arruda (2009), 113-130.
166 Wachsmann (2009), 243, 246.
167 Rodríguez-Díaz (2014), 491.
As in the Mediterranean, the Atlantic coastal settlements and harbors (many still in use) were selected for their advantages relative to long-distance maritime commerce.\footnote{González-Ruibal (2006), 34, 135, 133.}

Rome would inherit both the Iberian and northwest African entrepôts and operations on the Atlantic.

In the Punic Atlantic, skilled Carthaginian sailors may well have discovered the Azores.\footnote{Cunliffe (2004), 202. Sent out by Pharaoh Necho II, around 600 BCE, Phoenician sailors apparently completed a clockwise circumnavigation of Africa: ibid., 300. A few scholars, note Moore and Lewis (1999), contend that the Carthaginians discovered the New World.} Seeking to expand its Atlantic markets, Carthage sponsored two recorded voyages of exploration.\footnote{Moore and Lewis (1999), 214-215.}

The fleet of Hanno coasted south, at least to Senegal, and perhaps as far as Cameroon. Himlico, embarking from Gades, sailed north, at least to northern Britany, and quite possibly across the Channel to the British Isles.\footnote{Roller (2006), 27-41. Northern evidence of the Punic language is found in Wales: Holmsted and Schade (2013), 4.}

The broader Atlantic world, says Cunliffe, by 800 BCE, felt a two-fold Phoenician influence.

- One, the creation of market for manufactured goods and precious metals that entered the Atlantic trading networks.
- Secondly, from the port of Gades, the merchant shipbuilding technology of the Phoenicians was introduced. Knowledge of the sail, in particular, may have spread into northwest European waters.\footnote{Cunliffe (2004), 560, 561, 70. For example, Atlantic Late Bronze Age culture, extending north to eastern Britain, incorporated some Phoenician banqueting equipment, such as the roasting spit, into traditional elite feasting: ibid., 281-283.}

Thus, respecting the emergence of the Atlantic Iron Age, c. 600 BCE, Jon C. Henderson suggests that “ship technology, perhaps courtesy of the Phoenicians, had suitably advanced to make long-distance maritime contacts easier and, more importantly, reliable.”\footnote{Henderson (2007), 85-86. During Roman times, in France, Caesar ordered Mediterranean (originally Phoenician-Punic) style war galleys built for military operations, including an armada for his second expedition to Britain in 54 BCE: Cunliffe (2004), 71-72.}
Punic Carthage: Further Contributions in the West

Carthage was founded on the fertile coast of central North Africa in the late ninth century BCE.\(^{175}\)

Strategically, it stood on the axis of the east-west commercial route between the Levant and the Atlantic; likewise, it anchored the north-south route to mainland Italy.

Like Gades, in the beginning, a core mercantile elite from Tyre ruled the city-state. The Phoenician colony’s seventh century BCE, prosperity was based on multidirectional trade and progressive manufacturing, such as ceramics, purple dye, and metalworking. Luxury goods were also created and exported.\(^{176}\) Its forges produced surplus wrought iron and steel.\(^{177}\)

After Tyre fell, during the sixth century BCE, Carthage became fully independent.

The city-state led and expanded the western Phoenician colonies, founded new colonies,\(^{178}\) and acquired the ports of Corsica.\(^{179}\) There emerged a highly diversified economy: shipbuilding; fishing, also in the Atlantic area; mining investment and trade (Punic Sardinian, Punic Iberian); slave trade; wholesale export of foreign commodities; as well as their celebrated agriculture.\(^{180}\) Glasswork and, perhaps, glassmaking were pursuits.\(^{181}\) The aforementioned British tin trade, also a product of earlier contributions from Phoenicia, was expanded and caravan routes reached Egypt.\(^{182}\)

Punic Carthage (550-146 BCE) was a mercantile and political superpower in the West; the republic was on a level with the Eastern powers and Greece.\(^{183}\)

Indeed, the maritime economy of Carthage—the world’s greatest sea power—was based upon and regulated by a system of written commercial agreements. Over 250 years of peace with budding Rome involved four treaties. The first was signed in 509 BCE,\(^{184}\) to become Rome’s earliest authentic record.\(^{185}\)

\(^{175}\) Aubet (2008), 247.
\(^{176}\) Miles (2010), 62, 67, 65.
\(^{177}\) Kaufman (2016), 46-47.
\(^{178}\) Dietler (2008), 8. Still, the fleets of the Phoenician cities were not destroyed, later passing into naval service under the Persians.
\(^{179}\) Hoyos (2008), 12.
\(^{180}\) Markoe (2000), 103-105.
\(^{181}\) Henderson (2013), 222.
\(^{182}\) Moore and Lewis (1999), 217, 214. Land routes to sub-Saharan Africa in antiquity have yet to be proven: Pappa (2013), 174-175.
\(^{183}\) Hoyos (2010), 57-58.
\(^{184}\) Markoe (2000), 54, 102, 190.
\(^{185}\) Wedgwood (1985), 99.
Punic maritime capitalism inherited the Phoenician model of international managed trade with state-owned and private enterprise. Carthage’s business elite performed the banking role: major investment, financing bulk trade, insuring distant voyages, and arranging naval protection of convoys in the form of triremes.\(^{186}\)

Governmentally, Punic Carthage is usually described as an aristocratic republic or oligarchy. The constitution (now lost) reflected the hierarchical and tight-knit business structure of the city-state.\(^{187}\) Gruen notes that the Greeks held the Carthaginian constitution in high regard.

Aristotle, in the *Politics*, delivers praise for the merit-based document. The Classical philosopher compares it with the respected Spartan constitution (mentioned above, Sparta’s may be based upon a Phoenician prototype).

How would the Roman Republic’s constitution compare?

For Hellenistic political thinkers, “Carthage, as is clear, supplied the principal criterion by which to measure success.”\(^{188}\)

The peak of Carthage’s power was during the fourth century BCE. Once dependent on imported food supplies, the metropolis now exported its agricultural surplus, especially wheat. Consequently, Carthage became an agrarian empire, as well as a maritime power. Its prosperity is validated by vast reserves of gold and silver.\(^{189}\) Chandler’s (1987) census for 200 BCE, ranks Carthage and Rome, with populations of around 150,000 each, the largest cities in the West.\(^{190}\)

Carthage was likely the richest city on earth: the view of the ancients.\(^{191}\) The Carthaginian agricultural revolution began during the fifth century BCE.\(^{192}\)

\(^{186}\) Moore and Lewis (1999), 181, 218, 201-212.
\(^{187}\) Ibid., 202.
\(^{188}\) Gruen (2011), 119-120. Indeed, “Carthaginian achievements on the intellectual front indeed earned high esteem in the cultivated circles of Greeks and Romans alike”: Ibid., 137.
\(^{189}\) Markoe (2000), 105, 103: for example, Punic Carthage issued an “extensive gold coinage.” Interestingly, Elayi (2011) observes that invented in Persian-period Phoenicia were the first yearly dated coins.
\(^{190}\) Chandler (1987), 462.
\(^{191}\) Hoyos (2010), 59.
\(^{192}\) Miles (2010), 80-81. Agriculture of the Punic world, stretching to the Atlantic, expanded inland from the original Phoenician cities. Punic settlers, interacting with the indigenous inhabitants, brought iron tools, expertise, technologies, and capital investment, especially for wine, oil, and cereal production. Rural products were exported through the extensive Punic—Carthage and Gades (Cadiz)—maritime network: Van Dommelen and Bellard (2008a), 232-239.
Large-scale and scientific, it embraced the whole range of cereal production; vegetables; animal husbandry; viniculture; fruit, nut, and olive tree cultivation; and, beekeeping.\textsuperscript{193} Irrigation methods from the homeland were employed.\textsuperscript{194}

Mago’s authoritative, twenty-eight volume work on agricultural science and economy was translated by the Greeks and Romans.\textsuperscript{195} Mainland Italy adopted such crops as the olive,\textsuperscript{196} pomegranate, and the fig. Along with Punic Spain, Italy received from Carthage advanced (Levantine) agricultural technology: the \textit{plostellum Punicum}, a mechanical threshing machine.\textsuperscript{197}

Carthaginian nautical achievements loom large in maritime history. Ship construction was standardized: prefabricated components were marked with Punic alphabetical letters, allowing for the rapid assembly of large numbers of craft.\textsuperscript{198}

Ending the reign of the trireme galley, the Carthaginians were the “pacesetters in naval technological innovation throughout the fourth century BC. They had been first to develop the quadrireme…” or polyreme. Thereafter, the Greeks of Sicily introduced the quinuprame; however, the Carthaginians substantially improved upon its oar housing, strength, and width of deck.\textsuperscript{199} Polyremes did not exceed the three banks of oars of the trireme; but, expanded was the number of rowers per oar.\textsuperscript{200}

The giant Imperial Roman round ship for grain appears to derive from the Phoenician-Punic merchant ship.\textsuperscript{201} The Romans also adopted pegged mortise-and-tenon joints for their ships (and oil presses), which they called “Phoenician joints.”\textsuperscript{202} Invented was the dry dock for ship repair.\textsuperscript{203} Designed during the Punic Wars as a “system of optical signaling” were the first true lighthouses.\textsuperscript{204}

Total destruction of Carthage ended the Punic Wars in 146 BCE (the same year that Corinth was also razed to the ground by the Romans).\textsuperscript{205}

\textsuperscript{193} Harden (1962), 139-140.
\textsuperscript{194} Hoyos (2010), 64.
\textsuperscript{195} Lancel (1995), 278. Among Mago’s specialized topics are grafting techniques and cattle breeding: ibid., 276, 279. Hoyos (2010), 65-66: Himlicar was another contemporary writer on agriculture.
\textsuperscript{196} Janick (2005), 255-320.
\textsuperscript{197} Van Dommelen and Bellard (2008b), 13; Lancel (1995), 277, 273.
\textsuperscript{199} Miles (2010), 177-178.
\textsuperscript{200} Paine (2013), 111-112.
\textsuperscript{201} Woodman (1997), 21. The Phoenician-inspired Roman grain ship evolved during the Middle Ages to become a true, full-rigged, maneuverable sailing ship: the carrack, ibid.: 45, 59.
\textsuperscript{202} Sleeswyk (1980), 243-244.
\textsuperscript{203} Miles (2010), 92.
\textsuperscript{204} Giardina (2010), 5-6.
\textsuperscript{205} Wedgwood (1985), 101. Although Carthage lost the Punic Wars (264-146 B.C), the military tactics of Hannibal are studied by modern strategists.
As a result, the libraries of the city were lost; they held, according to contemporaries, books on history, agriculture, and religion.206

Henceforth, Rome annexed the Punic territories in the Mediterranean, North Africa, and Iberia. The future empire gained the vast Phoenician-Punic developed agricultural, industrial, and mining, as well as Atlantic operations. Furthermore, recent studies unveil Carthage as a model of imperialism for Rome: apparent transfers include treaty formulation, military recruitment, tax organization, agricultural exploitation, and naval technology.207

**Roman Carthage: Promoting Latin Christianity**

Julius Caesar launched the rebuilding of the vital ports of Corinth and Carthage.208

Roman Carthage grew into a provincial capital and the focal point of the developing Latin (Western or non-Greek) Church. Earlier, in 64 BCE, Rome annexed Phoenicia. The Phoenicians would be among the first Gentiles to adopt Christianity.209

In North Africa, Punic elites were among the “most upwardly mobile in the empire” and well-established in the Roman senate; the able Septimius Severus rose to become emperor from 193-211 CE,210 and the Severan Dynasty lasted until 235. He likely founded the famous law school in Beirut.211

Carthage, a center of Classical learning, produced the first outstanding Latin Christian author, Tertullian (c. 160-230 CE): the original Western Church father. Tertullian is credited with shaping the theological vocabulary and thought employed in the Latin language.212 The distinguished theologian St. Cyprian became bishop of Carthage in 248 CE. Cyprian suffered martyrdom, just as Saints Perpetua and Felicitas did for their orthodoxy.213

Ultimately, the chief architect of Latin Church theology was St. Augustine (354-430 CE), Bishop of Hippo. Having a Christian mother, St. Monica, in Numidia, his background was Punic; he appreciated the still-spoken language.214

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207 See the overview of Quinn (2017).
208 Wedgwood (1985), 111.
209 Acts 15:3
211 Of Phoenician origin were the prominent Roman jurists Ulpian and Papinian.
213 Barnes (1971), 192, 79.
Augustine was educated and taught in Carthage. Subsequently, St. Ambrose baptized him in Italy, and Augustine began to publish extensively.

A profound influence upon Western civilization, “in order to understand the currents of thought in the Middle Ages, a knowledge of Augustinianism is essential.”

**Conclusion: The Quickening of Western Civilization**

Phoenicia’s cultural interaction with the Occident spanned two millennia.

Led by Bronze Age Byblos, the region originated the true sailing ship, navigation by the North Star, maritime law, and so forth. The voyages of the Phoenicians constitute the “first systematic use of the sea.” Flowing out of their commercial activity of the Bronze and Iron Ages are foundational contributions to the Western world.

As distilled by William H. Hallo, the basic qualities of civilization are cities, capital, and writing. Part of the Fertile Crescent, Phoenicia with its thriving city-states possessed all three elements. Peaceful, long-distance trade and cultural exchange was undertaken. Its merchants, artisans, and agents promoted urban growth, made capital investments, and spread literacy.

All in all, the enduring Phoenician influence—representing the urbanized Near Eastern heritage—both stimulated and fostered Western civilization.

Bronze Age sea trade brought Phoenician merchants to Minoan Crete before and during its height (c. 1950-1450 BCE). Consequently, embryonic Western civilization borrowed important Eastern concepts: monumental building techniques; luxury products of gold and ivory (later, glass); advanced sailing ships; monetary silver; weights and measures; and an administrative model, including clay tablets, seals, accounting methods, and syllabic (perhaps Old Phoenician) writing that became Linear A. The Late Bronze Age Mycenaean Greeks conquered, but also adopted, the Minoan civilization. They absorbed further Eastern refinements (Orientalization), before the downfall of their society, c. 1200 BCE.

The Early Iron Age saw Phoenician expansion in the West. Leadership of the city-states was assumed by Tyre. Tyre’s monarchy (public) and merchants (private) comprised a mixed economy with capitalistic features.

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216 Braudel (2001), 188.
During the tenth century BCE, they began to create an intercontinental mercantile network. Colonies were first planted on Cyprus, then Carthage was founded in 814 BCE; settlements also stretched to the Atlantic coasts of Africa and Europe, which they discovered.

From Greece to Portugal, the Phoenicians bore the cultures of the core Mesopotamian and Egyptian civilizations. Manufactured goods (luxury and common), bulk products, technologies, and information, as well as cultural, architectural, and artistic patterns were transferred across the Mediterranean.

Well before Classical Greece and Rome, there arose macro-trends associated with Phoenicia: globalization, capitalism, and multinational corporations.

In The Origins of Globalization, Moore and Lewis observe that the achievement of Tyre (and Carthage) was to expand world trade and at the same time to shift the center of finance and high culture westward. The Cambridge History of Capitalism is introduced by Larry Neal. He cites the primacy of Phoenicia’s market-driven capitalism and long-distance trade reaching the Atlantic. Moore and Lewis, in Birth of the Multinational, hold forth that the merchants of Tyre created the first multinational business organization on an intercontinental scale.

These trends originated in Mesopotamia, yet it was the commercial activities of the Phoenicians that laid the economic and cultural bases of the Western world. Employing a world-systems approach, the Sherratts delineate the economic growth of the West. They notice that c. 1000 BCE, Europe and its Mediterranean region were in essence prehistoric. Granted, “the centers of future growth were already evident [proto-urban Greece, Italy, and Iberia]; but what articulated them into a single interacting system was the input of capital from the east.”

In sum, drawing territories together were Phoenicia’s large merchant ships, monumental harbors, and urban economy: monetary silver, slavery, and manufacturing. The intercontinental network of the Phoenicians commenced the development of the Atlantic façade of Europe and laid the foundation for the Roman Empire’s Mediterranean as one economic, political, and cultural unit.

Between the protohistoric and Classical eras was the decisive transitional epoch known as the Orientalizing horizon (eighth and seventh centuries BCE).
Phoenician mercantilism, capital, and routes, along with cultural elements, i.e. alphabetical script, encouraged European state formation: first, in the eighth century BCE, Aegean, then in seventh century Italy and Spain.  

Classical historian Burkert identifies the expansion of both maritime commerce and the alphabet (literacy) by Phoenicia as the determining factors that “caused the center of civilization to shift westward from the Near East to the Mediterranean.” First arose the civilizations of Carthage and Greece arose, followed by Etruria, and, finally, Rome. Indeed, from the Phoenicians early Archaic Greece received alphabetical writing—and the book—forming the basis of the West’s alphabets (Latin and Cyrillic); shipbuilding technology, navigation skills, and the example of overseas colonization; and, commercial contracts (also in Italy). Brought to Greece, Italy, and Iberia were weights and measures, monumental art and architecture, and fine luxury goods as models that influenced early European art.

The alphabet is considered the preeminent contribution of the Phoenicians for the establishment of Western civilization.

Clearly, the Greek intellectual achievement would not have been possible, nor could it have been recorded for future generations of literate Europeans without the egalitarian script. Similarly, it allowed for both Hebrew and Greek writing of the Christian Bible. Alphabetical order is used to organize information. Furthermore, the letters are a phonetic code that stimulate both numbering and rational and abstract thought.

Punic Carthage (550-146 BCE) became a mercantile, political, and military superpower in the West. Among its introductions were large-scale agricultural methods and technologies, horticultural specialization, and new crops, as well as nautical innovations. The city-state set a constitutional standard in the ancient world. Imperial concepts were also transferred to Rome. The destruction of Tyre (Alexander) and Carthage (Scipio) included the loss of their records, archives, and libraries. These collections could be substantially older than the Hellenistic library in Alexandria.

Afterwards, Roman Carthage promoted Latin Christianity. Above all, it produced the first outstanding, Tertullian, and the most influential, St. Augustine, Western Church theologians. The Protestant reformers, too, drew heavily upon Augustine’s conservative writings.

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222 Ibid., 367, 369.
To conclude, the Phoenician (Iron Age) specialist, Niemeyer, abstracts how this most ancient people, in effect, sparked Western civilization.

- First, the specific experience of Archaic Greece: the Phoenician transfusion of Eastern goods, technologies, and ideas that, in turn, became the foundations of Greco-Roman civilization.
- Secondly, the pan-Mediterranean influence: “The eminent role played by the Phoenician city-states in the dissemination of urban civilization, in the propagation of technical innovations, in the distribution of new [aristocratic] lifestyle paradigms and ‘modern’ economics.”

The above contributions span David Wilkinson’s central civilization/world-system. Early modern European expansion, followed by Westernization—fittingly with large ships, capitalism, alphabetical writing, and colonization—spread the legacies of Phoenicia.

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226 Niemeyer (2004), 246, 250.
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Chiming the Hours of History: The Historiosophy of Pitirim A. Sorokin  
As a Spring of His Integralistic Sociocultural Paradigm

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"He goes deeper and ultimately higher."  
French pianist Helene Grimaud about Beethoven

“Almost all great sociological systems are a brand of philosophy of history, and …  
most of the great philosophies of history are a sort of sociology of cultural change.”  
Pitirim A. Sorokin

Keywords: System of sociology, integralism, integralistic historiosophy, integralistic  
paradigm of scientific study of structure and dynamics of society, culture, and  
personality, cyclical theory of history, linear theory of history, fluctuational theory of  
history, sociocultural supersystem, recursiveness, macro-level sociocultural entities,  
long-term sociocultural processes, deconstruction of the phenomenon of civilization

Introduction

The purpose here is to present an original rethinking of the genesis, evolution, essence,  
role, place, and significance of the philosophical and historical views of the great  
Russian and American philosopher, sociologist and educator Pitirim A. Sorokin. In  
addition, an attempt will be made to determine their place and role in his scholarly work,  
as well as in the world’s treasury of the highest achievements of the human spirit.

For a number of reasons, the scholarly and philosophical heritage of Pitirim A. Sorokin  
is sometimes viewed and analyzed not in its integrity, multidimensionality, systemic  
complexity, and evolution, but, like an elephant felt by three blind men in the ancient  
Indian parable, the trunk of the colossal animal is mistaken for a hose, the legs are  
likened to columns, and the tail is thought to be a rope. So here, the historiosophy of  
Sorokin is presented in light of its development, in the context of his other sociocultural  
theories, and also as the most important part of a fundamental philosophical and  
ideological paradigm, which he called integralism.
Both integralism as a whole and the integral historiosophy of Sorokin, in particular, are based on sociological, cultural, psycho-neurological and psycho-physiological concepts and theories, which, as they originate and develop, Sorokin outlines in numerous works throughout his half-a-century long scholarly career, and which we conditionally call his system of sociology.

The evolution of Sorokin’s developed historiosophy and the stage of reintegration by him of his scientific and the ideological worldview within the framework of the integralistic paradigm is of particular interest. In this process, the features of integralism are acquired by all his numerous concepts and theories, including his sociology, philosophy, psychology and, first of all, by historiosophy. The latter not only turns out to be Sorokin’s area of primary scholarly interest, but it also gradually absorbs many of his other social concepts and theories.

Based on a thorough analysis of Sorokin’s works, we believe that historiosophy of Sorokin occupies a much more significant place in his developed integralistic scholarly and philosophical paradigm than some researchers of his legacy have assigned it. As the statements of Sorokin himself quite clearly demonstrate, it is inseparably connected with his system of sociology, and both scientific fields, being parts of the integralistic paradigm, are in fact one and inseparable and interconnected whole.

**System of Sociology**

Initially, Pitirim A. Sorokin’s system of sociology was a monumental project to develop the fundamentals of a science of the structure and development of society. He intended to present it in a multi-volume work, to be entitled accordingly “The System of Sociology.” In a sense, this work is the foundation of all his subsequent scientific sociocultural and philosophical constructions. Sorokin planned to publish ten volumes of the “System of Sociology,” but for many reasons (revolution, civil war, emigration, and a number of cardinal revisions of his scholarly worldview) this idea remained unfulfilled, and as of 1920 only two volumes of the monograph had appeared in print (Sorokin, 2008).

The first volume of the System is devoted mainly to the analysis of individual social interactions, while the second one examines the structure and interaction of social groups of various types and levels. In the early years of his scholarly career, Sorokin professed a pronounced positivistic and behavioristic approach towards both the social structure and the sociocultural dynamism of history.

In his early terminology, the first two volumes of the System were devoted to social analytics.
The main ideas of his “social mechanics,” i.e., activities of people under the influence of various environmental factors, as well as their own psycho-neurological and psycho-physiological impulses, were intended for publication in the third volume of the System, which did not appear in print. Nevertheless, he managed to present them in the second part of the “The Public Textbook of Sociology,” published in the same year of 1920. (Sorokin, 1994).

The turbulent events of the beginning of the 20th century introduced radical corrections into the plans of a young, but already widely known scholar. For example, in the years 1921-1922 Russia was gravely threatened by a famine, which reached an unprecedented scale and claimed several millions of lives. This colossal disaster prompted Sorokin to expand the second part of the “Public Textbook of Sociology,” now containing an analysis of the phenomenon of hunger.

He wrote that:

Having published my two volumes of the *System of Sociology*, I postponed the writing of the third volume in order to study at first hand phenomena typical of the Revolution, and to note them in such form as to make their investigation easier in normal times.

With my students and collaborators, and in close co-operation with the academicians Pavlov and Bekhtereff, I began an investigation of social changes, social groupings, and regroupings in our society. Included was the study of time-budgets of our fellow-men, and the comparative force of different factors in determining human behavior.

The behavior of the people around me was stripped of inhibitions which in normal circumstances disguise its mechanism and make difficult its determination.

As the principal object of my study, I took the influence of hunger upon human behavior, social life, and social organization. In the study of this problem, I had had personal experience, and the benefit of personal contact in my own environment. The influence of food and acute want of food on human behavior had never before been seriously investigated. (Sorokin, 1950: 283-284).

In turn, the last chapter of “Hunger as a Factor” became a separate large volume. Entitled “The Sociology of Revolution,” it was written in 1923, when Sorokin was already in Czechoslovakia.

The devastating cataclysms of the First World War, the Russian Revolution and the subsequent Civil War radically changed his scholarly outlook.
The results of Sorokin’s many years of efforts to reintegrate his views on sociocultural development within the framework of the new, integralistic paradigm are now known as the four-volume work Social and Cultural Dynamics (Sorokin, 1991), although its roots can be traced to the “System of Sociology,” and to such specialized works, as, for example, “Principles of Rural-Urban Sociology” (1929) and “A Systematic Reading Book on Rural Sociology” (1930-1932).1

These large-scale works were based on a vast amount of historical material and contain detailed analyses of both the structure and the dynamics of the development of an agrarian society, as well as agrarian-urban relations. Being, in essence, a comparative agrarian-urban philosophy of the history of humanity, they represent a kind of testing ground where Sorokin developed concepts and theories of such future classical works as “Social and Cultural Dynamics” and “Society, Culture and Personality.”

And so, in the preface to the first volume of “A Systematic Source Book in Rural Sociology” the authors state: “Human society throughout its history - in its origins, forms, activities, processes, growth, and evolution – has been so largely under the pressure of agricultural and rural forces that up to the present sociology as a science of society has virtually been the sociology of rural life. (Sorokin, Zimmerman, Galpin, 1965: VII).

The works also introduce such key concepts as the formation of the integralist paradigm, social stratification, social mobility, and authoritarian, contractual and family-based types of social relations. Unique in their shocking truthfulness, scientific depth of content, and transparency of presentation, Sorokin’s works allow us to witness events of the turbulent beginning of the twentieth century, as well as to look into his creative laboratory.2

Pavel P. Krotov observes that “In numerous works analyzing the scholarly legacy of Pitirim Sorokin, his autobiography, as a rule, remains outside the interpretation of a shift in his philosophical paradigm.”

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“A Long Journey,” published in 1963 in the USA, is perceived by many researchers, including biographers, only as a classic memoir. Nevertheless, the autobiography of Pitirim Sorokin can hardly be attributed to historical memoirs, although the list of historical facts in the text is enormous. In addition, the author was a direct participant in the crucial events in the national history.

It would also be insufficient to define the “A Long Journey” as a scholarly memoir, despite the fact that Sorokin here gives a detailed description of almost all of his works. The autobiography reflected scholarly discussions that largely determined the development of modern domestic and American sociology.

From my point of view, the interpretation of “A Long Journey” as a scholarly research, in which Sorokin analyzes the transformation of his worldview and his personal history, based on the postulates of the late-stage concept of “creative altruism,” opens up new possibilities for a deeper understanding of the book and Sorokin - the scholar.3

With publication of such fundamental works as “Society. Culture. Personality,” “Modern Historical and Social Philosophies,” “Crisis of our Time,” “Pitirim A. Sorokin in Review,” “The Basic Trends of Our Times,” “Sociocultural Causality, Space, Time” and, in particular, the last major work of the thinker, “Sociological Theories of Today,” Pitirim A. Sorokin actively continued his search for the ultimate truth about the sociocultural universe. In a certain sense, the scholar continued to work on his system of sociology for the rest of his life. Having incorporated many aspects of a scientific analysis of the structure and development of society, it became the foundation, a cornerstone of the colossal edifice of the integralistic paradigm of scientific study of the structure and dynamics of society, culture and personality.

Since the developed historiosophy of Sorokin is a part of his integralistic philosophical and scientific paradigm, let us turn to its genesis and evolution.

**Integralism**

In our previous works (Alalykin-Izvekov, 2017), we have considered both the genesis and the evolution of the scholarly and the ideological paradigm of Sorokin and offered the following chronology of its periods:

1) Christian-Ideational (1889-1905).
2) Positivistic-Behavioristic (1905-1920).
3) Transition from Positivism to Integralism (1920-1937).

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4) Integralistic (1937-1940s).
5) Visionary (first half of the 1940s).
6) Altruistic (second half of the 40s - 50s.).
7) Generalizing (60s).

From the point of view of the evolution of Sorokin’s developed historiosophy, the stage of recreation by the thinker of his scholarly and ideological “picture of the world” within the framework of the integralistic paradigm deserves special attention. This process coincides in time with a period of work on his fundamental work “Social and Cultural Dynamics.”

In this process, the features of integralism are acquired by all numerous concepts and theories of Sorokin, including his sociology, philosophy, psychology and, first of all, his historiosophy. In fact, his historiosophy not only turns out to be the area of his primary scholarly interests, but it also gradually absorbs many of his concepts and theories. According to Nikolai F. Zyuzev, the root of Sorokin’s integralism is in his integralistic theory of truth and cognition. “Pitirim A. Sorokin’s integralistic epistemology combines all forms of knowledge - empirical, rational and intuitive, and in it its decisive advantage over any one-sided theory of knowledge.” (Zyuzev, 2004: 150-152).

Sorokin himself postulates his views as follows: “... the integral truth is not identical with any of the three forms of truth but embraces all of them.

In this three-dimensional aspect of the truth of faith, of reason, and of the senses, the integral truth is nearer to the absolute truth than any one-sided truth of one of these three forms.

Likewise, the reality given by the integral three-dimensional truth, with its sources of intuition, reason and the senses, is a nearer approach to the infinite metalogical reality of the coincidentia oppositorum than the purely sensory, or purely rational, or purely intuitional reality, given by one of the systems of truth and reality. The empirico-sensory aspect of it is given by the truth of the senses; the rational aspect by the truth of reason; the super-rational aspect by the truth of faith.

The threefold integral system of truth gives us not only a more adequate knowledge of the reality, but a more valid and less erroneous experience, even within the specific field of each system of truth.” (Sorokin, 1991: 690-691).

Traditionally the “Bible” of Sorokin’s integralism is considered his four-volume monograph “Social and Cultural Dynamics: The Study of Change in the Basic Systems of Art, Truth, Ethics, Law and Social Relations.” Clearly, the key words here are dynamics and change.
Thus, the first two volumes of “Dynamics” are devoted to the change in the above-mentioned cultural systems, in the third volume the change in social systems is analyzed, while in the fourth volume Sorokin’s analytical apparatus is being presented.

Sorokin himself testifies: “Volumes One, Two, and Three, taken together, constitute a preliminary study of cultural and social dynamics. In Volume Four I will present in a more finished and more fully analytical form, a systematic theory of social and cultural changes, as well as a formulation of the guiding principles of sociological methodology.” (Sorokin, 1937, v. III: VI-VII).

Therefore, in “Dynamics” Sorokin presents the sociocultural dynamics of development of society from the point of view of his integralistic paradigm. Where do we look for his structure of society in its developed, integralistic representation? As we remember, Sorokin outlined the structure of society in his “System of Sociology” published in 1920. However, the “System of Sociology” was written from the positivistic-behavioristic point of view.

Apparently, the most comprehensive statement of Sorokin’s integralistic paradigm is reflected in his monograph “Society, Culture, Personality: Their Structure and Dynamics. The System of General Sociology” (Sorokin, 1947). Here, he unfolds in front of the reader a wide panorama of the sociocultural universe, accompanied by the fundamental and interdisciplinary scientific analysis.

As the title of the book clarifies, the integralistic sociocultural paradigm (and, therefore, historiosophy) of Sorokin is built on the triadic basis of indivisible (except for the purposes of scientific analysis) unity of society, culture, and personality.

Next, Sorokin profoundly analyzes the structure and dynamics of development of a society via the connection of three main components of the sociocultural universe, and he also presents the most general, universal trends, patterns and laws of social development derived from this analysis. He always emphasizes in his writings that the unity of society, its members, and its culture is inseparable and, with necessary assumptions, is possible only for purposes of scientific analysis.

He, for example, writes in the third volume of “Dynamics” that “Whereas Volumes One and Two deal mainly with fluctuations in the field of cultural processes, this volume concentrates on those in the field of social phenomena. Cultural and social are two aspects of a single, indivisible reality; but for the purposes of analysis they may be conditionally divorced and studied separately.” (Sorokin, 1937, v. III: V).

All numerous works of Sorokin’s developed period confirm, complement and illustrate his integralistic paradigm of cognition and analysis of society, its culture and its main creators and builders - individual persons.
In front of the reader is a kind of generalizing work that includes all the components of his integralistic scientific and ideological paradigm, which literally bursts forth from descriptions and definitions of hundreds of thousands of small and great sociocultural phenomena and processes. Literally each of them is immediately brought to the level of universal philosophical and historical conclusions and postulates.

A prominent scholar of Sorokin’s legacy, Barry V. Johnston, also concludes that the monograph “Society, Culture, Personality” is a generalizing work, one which synthesizes and reflects the integralistic paradigm of the sociocultural universe in its entirety, versatility, and consistency.

He observes: “Sorokin takes his next theoretical step in Society, Culture and Personality: A System of General Sociology. Much of this volume integrates earlier works. The discussion of society and culture draws heavily on Dynamics, while the resulting generalizations point to problems described in “Crisis of Our Age.” The “news” is in the sections on personality, where Sorokin brings the systems together and focuses on social organization and the development of the self.” (Johnston, 1995: 170).

As part of his integralistic paradigm of scientific study of the structure and dynamics of development of society, culture, and personality, Sorokin not only comprehensively analyzes the past, the present and even the future of the sociocultural universe, but he also offers deeply original and truly effective solutions to existential problems of rapidly globalizing humanity. That is why his integralistic paradigm represents a reliable scientific basis for the rapidly developing, now numerous new areas of research of macro-level sociocultural entities and long-term sociocultural processes.

This includes, for example,

- *comparative study of civilizations* (William McNeill, Carroll Quigley, Andrew Targowski, David Wilkinson, and others),
- *noospheric studies* (V. Vernadsky, T. Chardin),
- *culturology* (Y. M. Lotman, etc.),
- “*Big History*” (David Christian, and others),
- *world history* (D. Diamond, F. Fernandez-Armesto, and others),
- *world-system theory* (I. Wallerstein and others),
- *globalistics* (Andrei V. Korotaev et al.,
- *The School of Russian Cyclism* (Yuri V. Yakovets and others), and
- *Biocosmology - Neo-Aristotelism* (Konstantin S. Khrutsky), etc.
The author of this paper has developed and proposed a number of related concepts, theories and paradigms, for example, the concept of *civilizational science*; the concept of *philosophy of civilization*; the concept of *fluctuational theory of history*; the concept of *macro-level sociocultural entities*; the concept of *long-term sociocultural processes*; the concept of *deconstruction of the phenomenon of civilization*, and others. (Alalykin-Izvekov, 2017).

**Historiosophy**

In the preface to the four-volume edition of “Social and Cultural Dynamics,” Sorokin shares with us his thoughts on his large-scale historiosophical concept:

> Of all the semi-historical disciplines that it resembles, it is the closest to what is often called the philosophy of history. Since almost all the great sociological systems are part of the philosophy of history, and since most of the great philosophies of history are a kind of sociology of cultural change, I have no objection to the use of this name by those who are interested in defining this work.4

At first glance, this phrase is somewhat mysterious in its recursive nature. However, upon reflection, we can try both to find the key to deciphering it and to determine the place of Sorokin’s historiosophy in his integralistic paradigm rather accurately. Unlike the “individualizing” (i.e. descriptive, for example, history) social sciences, Sorokin considers sociology as “generalizing,” (i.e. exploring the most common patterns of the phenomena under consideration). (Sorokin, 1992: 543).

Consequently, under “sociology of cultural change,” he has in mind the most general laws of the cultural development of society, or, as he puts it, the constant and inevitable change of cultural systems and supersystems. Further, this statement also indicates that, from the point of view of a scientist, almost all great philosophies of history include a sociological system, that is, one or another paradigm of the social structure and development of society.

As a matter of fact, Sorokin himself willingly provides us with the key to a true understanding of his integralistic historiosophy, and to its place and role in the integralistic scientific and philosophical paradigm. In private correspondence from the year 1954, he notes:

4 Sorokin P.A. Social and Cultural Dynamics. Volume I. 1937. p. IX.
As to the enumeration of my specific contribution to sociology, in brief they are as follows:

Systematic theory of social mobility, corroborated by an enormous body of empirical evidence. My monograph on Social Mobility still remains the only existing monograph in the field.

Logical and empirical consistent system of sociology as science. It is more systematic in its logical and empirical system than any other sociological system of the past two or three decades.

Logical and empirical system of social and cultural dynamics, or of philosophy of history. This system has already entered the annals of History side by side with the systems of Spengler, Toynbee, and a few others, as possibly the most significant contribution in this field.

Theory of social class, particularly of agricultural class and rural Sociology
Discovery, formulation, and confirmation of the law of polarization
Discovery, formulation, and confirmation of the law of fluctuation, governmental regimentation, and control.

Exhaustive study of the vital, moral, mental, religious, artistic, and other fields of calamities and catastrophes.

A systematic theory of revolution and wars, together with the first empirical investigation of all wars and of the revolutions from the 6th Century B.C. up to the present times. My investigation of revolutions and their dynamics and causes remains still the only existing investigation of all the internal disturbances from the 6th Century B.C. up to the present time.

A thorough-going criticism of the fallacies in the existing sociological, psychological and other theories.

First attempt at a scientific study of the phenomena of creative love. The enclosed leaflet gives you an idea about this phase of my work. Then in the volumes of my work there are formulated, and possibly discovered, several other uniformities in social and cultural life, but in a short letter these uniformities cannot be enumerated.5

5 From the letter to: Mother Olowienka, Feb 10, 1954. Electronic source: http://cliffstreet.org/index.php/theories
At first glance, including historiosophy in the framework of his purely sociological research, the sixty-five-year-old scientist takes out of the brackets of such, in fact, its most important provisions. We, however, believe that in fact Sorokin thus incorporates both the system of sociology and historiosophy into the general context of its integralistic paradigm. Within such an interdisciplinary understanding, his historiosophy outgrows the seemingly “sociological” framework he has given to it, and it becomes one of the most important components of his integralistic scientific and ideological paradigm.

According to Sorokin, the history of any organized group (and societies are a variety of such) is finite, i.e. in the end, cyclical. Any society, generally speaking, goes through the stages of its emergence, formation, flourishing, crisis, decay, and, ultimately, disappearance. On this conceptual basis lie the civilizational theories of Nikolai Y. Danilevsky, Oswald Spengler, and Arnold Toynbee.

As for cultures, according to Sorokin, they, in a way, plug in one into another, often inheriting the most resistant and viable elements of their distant predecessors. Therefore, surviving the societies in which they originated, the truly great cultural systems can exist for quite a long time. Sorokin thus avoids the one-sided, monistic approach characteristic of some philosophers of history, and, therefore, his work can be considered rigorously scientific.

Arnold Toynbee believed that the essence of Sorokin’s philosophy of history could be grouped under the following five headings:

1) the idea of cultural integration;
2) the theory of social and cultural change;
3) the identification of three cultural supersystems or lifestyles through which or around which cultures are integrated;
4) the idea of alternating these three lifestyles over time, as well as an analysis of this process; and
5) his concept of the relationship between types of culture and personality types. (Zimmerman, 1968: 31-32).

It is obvious, however, that these provisions do not encompass all aspects of Sorokin’s historiosophy, which includes a colossal number of categories, concepts, and theories of the structure and evolution of the sociocultural universe. It is easy to see, for example, that all original and fundamentally substantiated theories of social conflicts and crises, which include theories of revolution, war, famine, epidemics, disasters and many other crisis sociocultural phenomena, constitute an organic part of Sorokin’s philosophy of history.
Sorokin’s historiosophy undoubtedly includes the discovery by of a principle of limits, a principle of immanent change in the sociocultural system, a principle of polarization, a principle of strengthening and weakening of social control, a principle of convergence, a principle of fluctuations between self-regulation and environmental modification, a principle of fluctuations in the size and stratification profile of groups, and many other fundamental propositions and patterns. It certainly ought to include all of his sociocultural and psychosocial theories, for they constitute the foundation on which he draws his insightful conclusions, conclusions and diagnoses.

It also ought to include Sorokin’s conclusion that a society going through a period of severe turmoil is likely to suffer from a crisis of its fundamental values. Another example is his scientific research of the phenomenon of creative love. Actually, the research itself was undertaken in order to find and develop a means of solving or alleviating eternal problems of humankind — wars, revolutions, mass migrations, epidemics, famine, etc.

Thus, the matter of determining the boundaries of the Sorokin’s historiosophy within his philosophical and scientific paradigm is resolved both naturally and logically. For the purpose of its illustration, we would offer an “architectural” analogy, and compare Sorokin’s integralistic paradigm to the colossal building of a medieval cathedral. As we have already mentioned, the scientist continued to work on his system of sociology for the rest of his life.

There are multiple aspects of the scientific analysis of society, the bases or cornerstones for the entire integral scientific and ideological paradigm of Sorokin. Resting on the solid foundation of his sociological, cultural, psycho-neurological and psycho-physiological concepts and theories, that is, the Sorokin System of Sociology, his historiosophy represents, metaphorically speaking, the vaults, the walls, the frescoes, the sculptures, and the stained-glass windows. As for his theory of truth and knowledge, from such a perspective, it is the the keystone of the main, bearing arch of the colossal edifice of his integralistic paradigm for the scientific study of the structure and dynamics of society, culture, and personality.

**Conclusion**

Throughout his unique half-century scholarly career, Pitirim A. Sorokin developed a great sociological system consisting of numerous sociological, culturological, psycho-neurological, and psycho-physiological concepts and theories, which we conditionally call his system of sociology. Both integralism as a whole and the integralistic historiosophy of Sorokin rest on the sound scientific basis of his system of sociology.
Comparative Civilizations Review

The fundamental integralistic paradigm of the scientific study of the structure and dynamics of society, culture and personality, developed by Sorokin, represents a solid foundation for the rapidly developing at the present time field of global studies of the macro-level socio-cultural formations and long-term socio-cultural processes.

The immense array of principles, concepts, and theories which make up the system of sociology are inextricably linked with the integralistic historiosophy of Sorokin, and therefore both are essential parts of his integralistic paradigm for the scientific study of the structure and dynamics of society, culture and personality.
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The Element-Based Method of Civilization Study

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Abstract

The purpose: to define the element-based method of studying civilization with a meaningful contribution to contemporary life.
The methodology: the transdisciplinary, big-picture view of human development on Earth based on graphic modeling of civilizational elements, their relations, and dynamics.
The findings: about 200+ civilizational elements have been recognized within about 500 possible elements of society, culture, and infrastructure.
Practical implications: today, civilization infrastructure challenges society and culture, which can lead to the fall of the Homo sapiens race and the rise of a human-machine race. Moreover, one of the options will be the rise of designer babies and the dichotomy of our race into traditional people and super healthy people; another option may lead to the labor-free economy and killer robots.
Social implications: to practice sustainable civilization it is necessary to regulate technological progress which conquers our well-being.
Originality: this approach offers an element-based understanding of civilization which is essential for developing wise aims and strategies of wise civilization.

Introduction

The study of civilization is about 150+ years old, marked by the contributions of such pioneers as Nikolay Danilevsky (1822-1885), Fukuzawa Yukichi (1867-1916), Oswald Spengler (1880-1936), Arnold Toynbee (1889-1975), Feliks Koneczny (1862-1949), and Fernand Braudel (1902-1985), plus others. They built the foundation for the study of the concept and role of civilization in the development of the organized humans. After World War II, the study of civilization became more popular and somehow separated from the study of history. Civilization was conceived as a living organism (still showing active signals from the past millennia and centuries) in contrast to history, which is time passé.

However, a civilization was perceived by many early scholars as a large culture -- mostly or especially by Pitirim Sorokin (1889-1968), Alfred Kroeber (1876-1960), Clyde Kluckhohn (1905-1960), and Lee D. Snyder (1933-2012). On the other hand, there have been recent scholars like Rushton Coulborn (1901-1968) and Carroll Quigley (1910-1977) who looked at a big-picture of civilization’s origin and evolution.
Eventually, the study of culture became widely implemented as the academic program, but the study of civilization landed on the waiting list in academia. This resulted in an impressive growth of scholarly research about culture. Since the number of different cultures is large, and there are at least about 100 dominant cultures one can investigate, the new knowledge about them is vast, dispersed and very often limited in conclusions with value for the current societies.

On the other hand, there have been about 26 to 30 (depending on the author) major civilizations, but today there are only about eight or nine major civilizations, as the term will be characterized in this study. Furthermore, the impact of these civilizations on our current lives worldwide is much more aggressive and significant than the impact of some of those cultures.

The International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations, since it was formed in 1961, has been filling this gap in studies on culture and civilization. This effort led to the extensive discussion of what is civilization, led by Mathew Melko, David Wilkinson, Steven Blaha, William McGaughey, Laina Farhat-Holzman, Andrew Targowski, and others (Targowski 2009b).

At the beginning of the 21st century the idea of “civilization” becomes more popular as we are facing terrorism, which is de facto a war of civilizations. At the same time a concept of a “state” changes, when for the sake of globalization some states are ready to minimize their roles and look for to self-supporting citizens and growing business in a world without borders. Both of these factors emphasize the growing role of “civilization” in world affairs. To investigate the current state of affairs successfully a new approach is offered in academia: Big History, which is still time passé, but perhaps less polluted with peripheral events and leaders.

Today as we face the deadly clash of civilizations, as defined by Samuel Huntington (1927-2008), a former member of the ISCS, even the best definition of civilization (or Big History’s impact) is not enough to understand why we face that clash while modern warfare (terrorism-driven and cyberwar) is largely unnoticed by most members of society. The contemporary study of civilization reminds us of the state of physics before the Solar Model of the Atom was offered by Rutherford–Bohr in 1913. Their significant solution was in recognizing the dynamics of such particles as the proton and the electron. Today, after 100+ years this two-element model is called the Cloud Model, since it contains about 50 particles and sub-particles, discovered step by step within the past 100+ years. A similar process is taking place in medicine, when in the 19th century “plasma” was one solid-state big “brick” of the human organism.
Today we know that our bio-system is composed of about 19,000-20,000 protein-coding genes and 23 chromosome pairs in cell nuclei and each gene has a particular function determining our well-being.

The reverse process should take place in the study of civilization. Namely, one must decompose this enormous societal organism, perceived by the majority of researchers as a solid cloud into many elements and sub-elements, and then investigate their functions, dynamics, and consequences. This investigation will address the process of recognizing categories of civilization’s elements and their functions, leading to research on their dynamics and consequences, for example at the level of the civilization indexes (Targowski 2004 and 2009a:62-74). In this way, one can better understand what the set of critical problems of contemporary civilizations is and what can we expect and how to prevent bad solutions.

The Structure of Civilization

Civilization is an info-material structure developed by humans to cope with themselves, nature, and their creator effectively. It is a vibrant “interface” which differentiates humans from animals (Figure 1).

The concept of “civilization” is applied to a wide diversity of particulars: to the level of religious ideas, to the level of customs, to the level of technology, to the level of manners, to the level of knowledge, and so forth. It can refer to the type of a city, or a relationship between men and women in family, tribe, or society. A type of law and its application reflects civilization also.

The mission of a civilization is to improve human existence. As Toynbee (1995:87) writes: "The goal of Mankind's continuous and increasing endeavors is still out of sight; we know, nevertheless, what it is."

What changed our pre-human predecessors into human beings is the attainment of awareness and problem-solving faculties. The cost of human-independent thinking, learning, and a quest for freedom is mental and moral relativity. Hence, the goal of civilization, or in general, of the world civilization, is to minimize "hate" and maximize "love," two opposite forces driving the pulse of human relativity.

The fundamental role of civilization is shown in Figure 1, which reflects in a graphic model the system of the Universe.

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1 Protein-coding sequences account for only a very small fraction of the genome (approximately 1.5%), and the rest is associated with non-coding RNA molecules, regulatory DNA sequences, LINEs, SINEs, introns, and sequences for which as yet no function has been determined (International Human Genome Sequencing Consortium (Feb 2001). "Initial sequencing and analysis of the human genome" Nature. 409 (6822): 860–921).
• The universe system is composed of three subsystems: humans, nature (ecosystem), and civilization.
• The creator (God or Big Bang) is the steerer of the universe.
• Relationships among these four components are of two types.
• The first one contains embedded relationships such as A, B, and D, that are somewhat beyond civilizational control, with some exception for sects (e.g., New Age) that define their Gods (the southern direction of the A relation).
• The second type of relationships, such as F, E, and C are controlled by civilization.

Figure 1. The civilization within the universe system

To understand the control function of a civilization one must open the civilizational structure and analyze its purpose, components, and their relationships as it is presented in Figure 2. In civilizational studies, one can recognize so far two approaches to this task. The English, French, and American Mono Element Model (MEM) of the humans’ interface treats equally “civilization” and “culture.” The German Bi Element Model (BEM) subordinates “zivilisation” to “kultur.”
The English-French-American concept of "civilization" contains all aspects of human life: religious, political, social, economic, and cultural. The German concept of "zivilisation" is limited to useful things, but only to a value of the second rank. The value of the first rank is "kultur" which refers to religious, intellectual, and artistic achievements. The "kultur" controls "zivilization" and develops it as a continuous motion of material-driven human development. The German concept of "kultur" emphasizes differences among nations that may share the same "zivilisation."

There is no doubt that the German model is more elaborate than the English-French-American model. However, the German model is still limited, since it does not recognize human entities that determine the whole civilizing process. A new model is needed which could integrate the contributions of these two historic models. The Targowski model recognizes three significant civilization elements:

- **Human Entity** - organized humans in the pursuit of civilization; it is an existence-driven community,
- **Culture** - a value-driven continuous process of developing patterned human behaviors, feelings, and reactions, based on symbols, learning from it and being a product of it,
- **Infrastructure** - a technology-driven additive process of acquiring and applying material means.

In the new Tri-Element Model (TEM), the German concept of “zivilization” has been replaced by a concept of an “infrastructure,” and the German concept of “kultur” has been kept intact only in reference to the infrastructure, since the English-French-American concept of civilization prevails as the developed, holistic, structure of human existence. The third component— the entity—has been included in the concept of civilization.

This model is somehow similar to the Greek model called *Paideia* that unified civilization, culture, tradition, literature, and education, and has been characterized by Jaeger (1945). This approach reflects to a certain degree a civilization concept as a set of wealth, power, and meaning, defined by Arnason (2003).

The 49 empirical components of civilization are categorized and shown in Figure 3. This list is a static model and is, of course, a product of knowledge that we can apply now. In the past, this list would be much shorter. A list-hierarchy of entities requires some explanation. The world civilization began when human individuals organized themselves in a family, tribe, or ethnos.

These entities created prehistoric, primitive civilization, since every human group civilizes itself as it has a purpose, responds to challenges, and applies tools. Toynbee associates the beginning of a civilization with the emergence of a society. We could add that the emerged society triggers the outburst of autonomous civilization and, *sui generis*, the world civilization.

These civilizational components are self-explanatory. A dynamic model of relationships among these components is a subject of the farther study for those who are interested in this subject. Most of these components have been developed or added along the 6,000 years of civilization history. The most recent components are those which belong to the Integrational Infrastructure and those which are emerging as post-nation entities like the European Union. From the model or ideal type point of view, the presented model’s infrastructure dimension allows for a more profound evaluation of the role of technology in civilization.
Figure 3. The three fundamental components of civilization and their essential subcomponents.
Human Entities and their Dynamics

A human entity is a set of structured relationships among a group of humans that can be organized under several forms, ranging from less to more flexible ones.

A family – a set of parents and children or relations, living together (or not) as the members of a household, serving the needs of the family.

A band – a few dozen people who move continuously in the search for food to survive. They are engaged in a hunting and gathering form of subsistence economy. Bands have informal leaders who may provide guidance.

A tribe – a group of (especially primitive) families or communities, linked together by social, economic, religious, or blood ties, and usually having common customs, dialect, and a recognized, informal leader. A tribe can be considered a segmented society devoted to horticulture or pastoralism rather than hunting and gathering.

An ethnos – a homogeneous community at an early stage of sharing the same culture and awareness of togetherness. It strives for further civilizational development (ex., Incas).

A chiefdom – an autonomous, socio-political unit comprising some villages or communities under the permanent control of a paramount chief with aristocratic ethos, but without formal, legal apparatus of forceful repression, and without the capacity to prevent fission.

A society is an organized group of people on the same territory in order to support their existence through the exchange of specialized, civilizational services. The society shares a common interest and responds to challenges. As a result, society develops its civilizational means. Along with the development of power and economic infrastructures, society transforms into people.

A people is a politically and economically organized society, where one can distinguish a hierarchy of subordinated individuals.

At the beginning of 600 B.C., the Hindu Civilization’s people were divided into three classes: priest (Brahman), noble warriors (Kshatriya), and commonalty (vaisya), including both farmers and artisans, augmented by a fourth group, the workers (sudra) consisting of non-Aryans.

At the beginning of 400 B.C., the Roman Civilization had people organized into two classes: patricians, who could belong to the Senate and plebeians, or commoners.
The patricians were more prosperous farmers who secured privileges for themselves. Without the access to power, Plebeians became clients to the patricians, who protected them in return for attendance and service.

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Poland’s people were divided into three strata: aristocracy (1%), szlachta (10%), and plebs (89%).

France organized people in three estates: nobles, clergy, and commons.

Every state or empire had its social hierarchy, one in which people at the top have felt that they were in charge of a state’s affairs. The remaining people were oppressed and indifferent to the state’s well-being. The force of the civilizing process was coming from a minimal group of people, who were, however, very much interested in the creation of wealth and all means leading to it.

In the 19th century, just after the American Revolution (1775-1783) and French Revolution (1789-99), the concept of a nation began to emerge. A Frenchman and an American no longer served a king but the French or American “nation,” (*patrie*). The nation became an entity as a result of a pact between the sovereign people and the state. The nineteenth century is the history of rising nation-states, such as the U.S., Germany, Italy, France, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Romania. In the 20th century, many more nation-states were formed, such as Poland (after 123 years of partitioning), Czechoslovakia (after almost 400 years of Austro-Hungarian rule), Hungary, Yugoslavia, and so forth.

A *proto-nation* is an entity ruled mostly by an empire. It is an entity that may eventually evolve into a nation. Although this entity is at the stage before a nation, it is a result of the formation of the nation concept.

An example of a proto-nation is Hungary, which self-ruled within the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the 19th century. In the modern sense, Hungary became a nation in 1919, when its state had been established. Czechoslovakia passed through the same process in 1919 and Slovakia in 1995. The fall of Yugoslavia in 1995-97 has the same roots with Slovenia and Croatia creating nation-states.

The disintegration of the USSR in 1991 led to the creation of such nation-states as; Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia. Proto-nations were Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, DDR, and Mongolia under the rule of the Soviet Empire in 1945-89. However, their states did not develop the Polish nation, or the Hungarian nation, since they were promoting the empire's interest which conflicted with these nations' interests.
From the civilizational point of view, proto-nations are *arrested mini* civilizations. Almost 50 years of the Soviet’s domination over Central-Eastern Europe led to this process in the region.

**A nation** is an entity which has a common language, culture, memory of historical events, and “national consciousness.” It does not mean that the nation must share a common territory. This condition is applied toward a state rather than toward a nation.

In this model, a state is a category of power infrastructure; however, the state creates the nation. It means that emigrants from the nation-state may claim the origin of their nationality from the nation-state, which may be thousands of miles away. They may say that they belong to the Irish nation, living in the U.S. or even having its citizenship. This new affiliation, however, should mean that an emigrant transforms (voluntarily or involuntarily) him/herself into a member of a new nation since the emigrant is a "subject" of a new state.

The combination of nation-with-state is a strong force, one which drives the civilizing process. The World Wars in the 20th century were experimental ranges for the civilizing process, inspired by strong nationalism, even superiority of one nation-race over another, as was the case of Nazi Germany. The Cold War in 1945-89 was a case of the rivalry between the American nation and the Soviet “nation”-empire. Although the USSR was a federation of tens of proto-nations, it was enforcing continuously the development of the “Soviet” nation, even a “*homo sovieticus*.” Likewise, the German Democratic Republic was also developing the “GDR” nation.

**A state** is an autonomous political unit, encompassing many communities within its territory and having a centralized government with the power to draft men and women for war or work, levy and collect taxes, and decree and enforce laws.

**An empire** is a state of large size exercising political dominion over others, with or without latter’s consent.

**Power** is a state, which is militarily or economically strong. For example, in 2003, China was militarily strong, and Japan was economically strong.

**A superpower** is a state, which in its military arsenal has atomic bombs and is politically very influential. For example, during the Cold War superpowers were the U.S. and USSR.
A hegemonic power is a state, which dominates the world politically, militarily, economically, and scientifically. For example, at the beginning of the 21st century, the U.S. plays such a role in the world.

Political society is a multi-ethnic entity which evolves from a nation. An excellent example of it is the United States at the end of the 20th century. During WW II the U.S. fought as one nation-state, very proud of its heritage and values. Afterward, along with the development of American democracy, minorities (of all types, including ethnic but mostly race and gender-oriented) evolved into strong interest groups that influenced politics (elections) and led to the transformation of the American nation into the American political society.

This society emphasizes its immigrant roots and uses its services and resources for its segmented aims in disregard of the common interest. In this type of entity, the civilization process is guided by the priority of infrastructure over culture. This society has become very productive but without a sense of how to aim for a meaningful life. The best solution for the U.S. is to sustain its one nation model and prevent fragmentation along the lines of race and gender.

A transnational community is a regional entity, which organizes itself against the challenges of the global economy.

- Examples of this entity type are: the Association of the Eastern Alps, the Celtic Arc, the European Port Cities Network, Working Communities of the Pyrenees, the Rhine Hub including North Rhine - Westphalia, Rhineland-Pfalz, Bayern, Baden-Wurttemberg, Switzerland, Lombardy, and Eastern France (including Burgundy, the Rhone Valley, Cote d'Azur, and Languedoc).
- The Asian regions are emerging around: Tokyo and Osaka, Shanghai-Guangzhou-Hong Kong.
- Changes after the Cold War in Central and Eastern Europe created the following regional communities: Vienna-Budapest-Prague (neo-revival of the Hapsburg Empire), Northeastern Europe: Copenhagen-Hamburg-Szczecin-Gdansk-Klaipeda-Liepaja-Riga-St. Petersburg-Helsinki, and so forth.

The civilization process of this entity type is strong since it is based on voluntary cooperation and respect for either partner’s achievements or their potential. Priority is placed upon infrastructure development, however within a shared culture.
The regional community is a very strong force in leveling disproportions of
civilizational developments among partners.

**A supranational community** is a cross-whole-national entity, which removes
states’ borders in a formal sense and also in the sense of economic and political
barriers. An example of this entity type is the European Union (perhaps even
NATO) that gradually expands toward a multi-national superstate with the
common market, currency, economic policy, and military. This entity's
civilizational process leads to the development of a strong common infrastructure,
which may lead to the homogenization of cultures.

In a very long perspective, this development may lead to the formation of the
political society. At the beginning of 21st century, leaders of EU states have just
become aware of it and look for solutions which could prevent the homogenization
of national cultures. They would like to guide the EU development by the policy
of "unity in diversity." They are aware that the homogenization of cultures leads
to lower cultural standards and ultimate vulgarization of existence.

Since the introduction of one legal language in the EU is impossible, it is, therefore,
unfeasible to create one European nation. If this is true, the supra-national
community must protect different cultures as the prerequisite of a meaningful life.
However, this life's comfort depends upon commonly shared infrastructures, which
sooner or later will trigger the homogenization of cultures. It is the dilemma of the
current EU.

**A spheric community** is an entity of several nations from the same civilization.
Examples of this entity are three states, U.S., Canada, and Mexico that were united
by the NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) treaty. The civilizational
force of this entity type lies in the area of infrastructural development.

**The global society** or the society of post-nations is the entity which emerges from
the development of a global economy and global culture. It is an entity of stateless
and post-national individuals and groups as well as organizations that promote free
trade, free flow of ideas and people as a prerequisite of world peace and
"happiness." This entity is a strong civilizational force that leads towards the most
effective civilizational solutions, particularly in the area of the integrational
infrastructure (the Internet, airlines, CNN) as well as its leisure time indulgence
culture (Coca-Cola and Nike).
The global political society is an entity that may emerge from global society. An example of this entity is the G-7 or the G-20 group of the most developed nations that promote a common economic policy. G-7 used to be an inter-civilizational group of seven nations plus Russia (from three civilizations), which was included in this Group as an award for the silent accord for the inclusion of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary in NATO. This entity's civilizational power lies in the promotion of global standards of products and services as well as in the promotion of democracy and peace. This action leads toward the modernization of world civilization and the reaction against the Westernization of the world. Both challenges are positive.

Utopia is an entity of calm and stagnation or perhaps even the beginning of civilization death. It seems at first glance that utopia is the desired state of the world civilization; however, it may be just its end.

A civilization can be composed of one or a combination of these human entities, which in the case of the latter is a sort of a configuration of human entities, as Sorok in calls it, a set "made up of several wholes, halves, and quarters of language, state, religious, economic, territorial groups and unorganized populations" (Sorokin 1950).

A Structure of Significant Cultures which Shape Civilizational Development

Figure 4 empirically reflects 18 major civilizations and about 100 significant cultures which through 6000 years of civilizational development have been shaping the civilized attitude of humans toward nature, including animals, but also toward the higher order which can be Gods or God or Big Bang.

By culture, one can understand the values and symbol-driven patterned thinking, behavior, and feelings of people and society as well their knowledge/wisdom and skills of applying infrastructural tools to guide the purpose and quality of life to control resources supporting that life.

- The essential element of culture is a religion which controls humans’ concept of values and symbols. A person can be theist, agnostic, and atheist.

- Other elements of culture are; education, tradition, science (research, knowledge, and wisdom), art, architecture (as the reflection of the society’s image), music, law, politics, governing, food, clothing, relations, and so forth.

However, today it is not enough to investigate a civilization without analyzing its infrastructure.
Figure 4. The empirical classification of already developed civilized cultures of 18 major civilizations

The Structure of Civilizational Infrastructure

The Scientific Revolution of the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries replaced the motionless earth with a “mechanized” one. The universe has ever since been understood as giant machine functioning according to natural and universal laws that could be formulated with mathematical precision. This new worldview inspired the belief that nature could be mastered. There may be some truth to this claim as space travel, including landing on the Moon and Mars, has shown.
Gradually Newtonian science has become the science of Western Civilization as well as the whole world, and its mechanistic paradigm has led to the development of technology in the form of water pumps, engines, automobiles, railroads, and factory systems which characterized the developing Enlightenment (in terms of social mechanisms) and the Industrial Revolution (in terms of mechanical products and processes).

The term “Industrial Revolution” symbolized the shift from an agrarian, handicraft, labor-intensive economy to one dominated by machine-driven manufacturing, specialization of tasks (at the shop-floor and in the office where bureaucracy was born), a free flow of capital, and the concentration of people in the cities of the emerging Industrial Society.

The following legacies of the Industrial Revolution can be perceived from a 200+ year-long perspective (Targowski 2015:109):

1. Factory system and bureaucracy — technological progress in the cotton and iron industries created a factory system based on the engine, which provided centralized power to machines.
2. Railroads — transportation rapidly grew as workers from the countryside had to be taken to the factories in cities via a network of railroads.
3. Steamboats — transportation through seas and oceans was developing fast as the colonies needed products and services, and Europe could provide them but at the same time needed raw materials and free labor (slaves and immigrants).
4. Post Office and telegraph — communication of information was necessary to control the rapid flow of material, products, and services. Royal couriers were found in Ancient Egypt in 2400 BCE. The oldest post office in the world still functioning was opened in England in 1712, and the first telegraphic message was sent from Baltimore, Maryland, to Washington, D.C., in 1844. Very soon, in 1851, a cable was laid down under the English Channel connecting England with continental Europe, and in 1866 the transatlantic cable allowed electric communication between the United States and Europe.
5. Financial system — The West developed a form of stocks for investment in companies with some controlled liability, which allowed for a more effective concentration of capital for savings and investments.
6. Urbanization — concentration of industrial businesses in cities led to their rapid growth. Before industrialization, most workers could grow their food; however, in cramped towns, they had to rely on all sorts of services, which were developing the landscape of those towns. Most of the world’s population now lives in cities.
7. Bourgeoisie versus proletariat — a new social structure emerged in the West. According to Marxist theory, this could be characterized as composed of affluent people who are conventional, conservative, or materialistic in outlook.
and who own the means of producing wealth, and the exploited working class. The former has organized itself into political parties to defend its economic status, while the latter has organized itself frequently into political parties and international workers organizations to protect its work opportunities and income.

8. Per capita income — since 1820 industrializing world development has been much more dynamic, and more intensive, than in the millennium before. Per capita income rose faster than the growing population; by 1998, it was 8.5 times as high as in 1820 (Maddison 2000:27). This growth created discretionary income which fueled the further development of industrialization and population growth.

9. Population growth — once industry could provide large quantities of products, customers were needed. From 1820 to 1998 the population expanded 5.6 times faster than in the years from 1000 to 1819 (Maddison, 2000:27).

In the 21st century, civilization infrastructure evolved into “Western-Global-Virtual” civilization. As the father of civilization studies, Arnold Toynbee stated (1935) that civilizations respond to challenges of nature and society. He did not mention “infrastructure,” since he did not investigate current civilizations in the 21st century, and in those times there were only a few infrastructures, such as authority, military, and rural.

However, in the 21st century, Western civilization became “Technological civilization” dispossessed of culture with a governing soul. Today, “Western-Global-Virtual” civilization functions within many specialized civilizational infrastructures which require responses by its society. These civilization infrastructures are challenging the modus operandi in all other cultures including Chinese, Japanese, Hindu, Buddhist, African, Islam, and the newly developing Global culture.

In this investigation I will sketch the global information infrastructures as their model is shown in Figure 5.
Due to the fast development of such technologies as social networks (Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Quora and other), artificial intelligence, and genomics — contemporary civilization may be dramatically shifted into human-machine civilization with a new kind of people whose brain will be “e-wired.” Why?

- “Singularity is near” (Kurtzweil 2005:5,486) which means that we — Homo sapiens will be replaced by machine-driven thinking and decision-making species who will be developing human-machine civilization about 25% faster than we do today. It will be done because the humans calculate with a speed of “only” $10^{90}$ operations per second and our brains automatically interfacing with computers (embedded) will calculate with speed of trillions of operations per second, making of us a new species. Supposedly this range of speed can be available about 2025 according to R. Kurtzweil (2005:125). It will be the second Big Bang in human history, after the first one which took place a few millions of years ago when we had transformed from animals into humans.

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2 Genomics is an interdisciplinary field of science focusing on the structure, function, evolution, mapping, and editing of genomes. A genome is an organism's complete set of DNA, including all of its genes. In contrast to genetics, which refers to the study of individual genes and their roles in inheritance.
• Killer robots are on the horizon, those “who” will kill their masters but before that stage will be active, peaceful robots. They will be designed and planned to:
  o develop a labor-free economy, at least in Western civilization in the very near future, perhaps within ten to fifteen years
  o collect and analyze personal data from social networks and apply artificially made conclusions which will strongly impact our lives (Standage 2018:24)
  o define policies, sentencings, job recruitments and evaluations based on the past information via the extrapolation and repetition of some wrong rules (Standage 2018:24)
  o drive autonomous vehicles (cars, trucks, buses, and so forth) which cannot be reliable 100%
  o implement policing social order and even wars via drones and like machines.

• Connected online is half of the world’s population in 2018. They eventually can electronically elect presidents and parliamentary members at all levels of society. In this way, representative democracy perhaps will be replaced by direct democracy, possibly leading to societal chaos.

As the Internet makes people and organizations better informed it also makes them more aggressive under the rubric of hate, cybercrime, and even paid censorship which can spread fake news. For example, in Myanmar Facebook has been manipulated to exaggerate the hatred of the Rohingya minority. In the Philippines, it helped Rodrigo Duterte, the populist president, get elected. He now uses it to manage an insult crusade against opponents of his bloody war on drugs. In Europe and Northern America, it is used by the terrorists. Before we are ready to regulate world-wide e-communication in society, it will be most likely worse before it is better. Due to our slowness to regulate technology, perhaps it will be too late to “be better.”

• Designer babies — can be obtained already in 2018, by screening an embryo's genes responsible for specific diseases and behavior. It will lead to genetic editing by replacing unwanted genes with better ones. Those who have money will have a chance to provide their children with solutions supporting a long and healthy life. Eventually, it may lead to the societal dichotomy of society, composed of a higher and lower race. We have seen such an unfortunate approach in Nazi Germany, where Übermacht race-oriented politics was in charge of developing the master nation. It failed, luckily.

Nowadays our civilization — as it results from the short list of possible new technology-driven solutions — is impacted rather by the infrastructure than by culture.
Furthermore, it looks that this impact is so rapid, complex, and intense that probably our still “slow” and not the superior, brain is not able to solve the problems challenging us, including even such unlikely outcomes as the replacement of humans by human-machines.

**Observations from the Empirical Development of Civilization as Suggesting What to Study**

Observation 1: According to Toynbee (1995) the historical development of civilization is driven by physical, societal, cultural (ideological) challenges (paradigms) which are reflected in sets of factors specific for a given developmental stage. Today one must add the technological (infrastructural), global and universal challenges (paradigms) which define civilization.

This sequence of stages indicates only the significant factors in the stimulus-response processes. However, this sequence is inclusive, and the next civilization development’s paradigm includes attributes of the previous stages (“civilization additive memory”). This type of dynamic is shown in Figure 6.

Observation 2: Among driving forces of civilization development one can recognize the following:

- Each civilization stage’s experience drives the remaining stages. There are endless factors characterizing these stages. To make the study of civilization more focused, one can investigate the inter-stages experiences through the following processes and systems:
  - Nature (climate) and biological evolutions
  - Strategizing culture
  - Info-communication processes
  - World-systems

- The info-communication process is crucial in providing better information flows and communication among humans, first by developing speech, later symbols, papyrus, books, newspapers, telephone, mass-media, computer, and its networks, which lead to higher awareness, more knowledgeable, and perhaps wiser decision-making by civilized humans.
The world-systems are critical for historical evolution of civilization, for example, such as “capitalism,” “democratic revolutions,” “undemocratic revolutions,” “industrialization,” “scientific knowledge,” and “world wars.” Those world-systems one can classify include large-scale world-systems (UN, EU, GATT, Internet); mid-scale world-systems (IMF, World Bank, NATO, Google, English, CNN); and small-scale world-systems (WHO, WTO, ISO, Amazon, the Wall Street Journal).

The biological and nature-driven evolutions impact each civilization stage and vice versa.

Observation 3: In the last 6000 thousand years the development of vertical civilizations, such as Mesopotamian, Egyptian, Sinic, Japanese, Islamic, Western, and others took place. About the year 2000, the first horizontal civilization begins its existence, under a form of the Global Civilization.
It is an infrastructural civilization, based on mediated-info-communication and an extended transportation network, guided by a policy of the free flow of ideas, goods, and services, and a still limited flow of people, through the global marketplace. The market forces mainly drive this civilization and do not satisfy many socially-minded people. Hence, there is a strong criticism of globalism.

Observation 4: The idealistic view of the future promotes the necessity to work on the development of a Universal Civilization (horizontal civilization, driven by cultural behavior), taking the best from all civilizations and providing goodness and wisdom for all humans. Vaclav Havel (1996) defined this quest in the following manner:

“…Constantly talking about Europe, we have entirely ignored one of the pillars of the European spiritual tradition – universalism, the commandment to think of everyone, to act as everyone should act, and to look for a universally acceptable solution.”

Jan Szczepański (1991), a former president of the International Sociological Association stated that:

Today, universalism can be co-created as undoubtedly the most suitable answer to the challenges of the ideological vacuum. Already, universalism can be a barrier against individualism and egoism, the ideology of post-modernism, and all sorts of fundamentalisms and totalitarianism. Universalism will also be capable of examining and solving the problems of nationalism while retaining the most authentic values of national cultures.

Janusz Kuczyński (1986), founder and honorary president of International Society for Universalism, has stated that:

“Universalism has to advocate the solidarity of all peoples and nations, which is rooted in our common human fates and our joint struggle against the ever more numerous and greater threats, including the nuclear suicide of Mankind.”

Possible Further Research About Civilization

One can suggest the possible further research on civilization in selected areas, as follows:

- Research of relationships among society, culture, infrastructure (technology), globalization, and universality developments as the determining factor in civilization advancement or decline; such research can also explain current and future expected challenges.
- Research into human entities and their dynamics in transformations within a communities’ ladder, due to civilizational challenges.
- Research of different world-systems and their impact on civilization development or regress, particularly in the 21st century.
- Research of the world civilization and its impact on international relations.
- Other topics

The excellent research opportunities now available are in innovative exploration deepened by:

- Interdisciplinary research into history, political science, technology, anthropology, medicine, and others.
- Big-picture-oriented research of civilizational responses to the globalization processes taking place in the society, culture, and infrastructure in the 21st century. Furthermore, what does lead to a new kind of civilization, which can be a global one or even human-machine one?

Conclusions

1. Based on the presented models one can define civilization as an interface between organized humans and the Creator and nature, which applies value and symbol-driven cultural behaviors, feelings, reactions and infrastructural tools to guide the purpose and quality of life and to control life-supporting resources and infrastructure. By civilization we mean organized people who purposely and skillfully improve the population, and its organizations’ internal and external conditions; it concerns a population and its organizations’ relation to nature, the Creator (Nature or God), and his/her fellow people. It is a state of affairs which can be of a physical, social, mental, and spiritual character which indeed requires our wise and large-scale-oriented intervention at the local, regional, spherical or and worldwide levels.

2. After more than 150 years of developing the concept of civilization, it is perhaps time, as has been seen in other sciences, to recognize and agree upon the set of elements of civilization and research their individual and grouped relations, impacts and dynamics in different scopes and timelines. The purpose of the proposed undertaking is to regulate not only local communities, regions, and states but also to understand the nature of civilizations more clearly. This ruling should minimize conflicts, maximize the sustainability of Mankind and aim at a satisfactory quality of life, grounded in law and justice.

3. This investigation recognized 220 civilizational elements. However, the classification of the infrastructural elements has been just sketched. It will be easy to add another 80 to 200+ elements of this type.
One can possibly predict that civilization’s cloud has at least about 500 essential elements. It is necessary to recognize these elements, characterize, and know their dynamics and impact upon us. Why? Because as we see today, we need to begin to rule our civilization if we want to survive on the planet Earth.
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Spengler’s “Magian” Classification Applied to an Unrecognized Ecumene: 
The Near East, 1500 to 0 BCE

The Magian I World-View

David B. Richardson

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My aim in the following discussion was to determine from the historical evidence that small group of ideas, metaphysical assumptions, and attitudes which made up the core of the Magian I psychological world-outlook. The latter two-thirds of the essay is devoted to this problem, while the first third is concerned with the evidence for the very existence in the first millennium B.C. of a Near Eastern worldview of the same order as that of Greece, Europe, China, and India.

My goal, therefore, has not been to make a sketch, à la Condorcet, of a universal history of the Pre-Christian Levant, but in the light of a widely shared skepticism among historians, philosophers, and civilizationalists about the Spenglerian Magian “style” of the early Christian era, I have seen no alternative but to trace the historical evidence for the homogeneity of a metaphysical worldview among the Near Eastern peoples in the fifteen hundred years preceding the birth of Christ.

If the reality of Spengler’s Magian worldview is still generally doubted by experts today, the experts are more likely to doubt my contention that a similar worldview existed a thousand years earlier.

Archeological evidence is being unearthed at the present day—as through the whole past century —and in all probability, the more evidence archeologists, linguists, and philologists will uncover about ancient Near Eastern peoples, the more clearly will appear the presence of the Magian I world-style throughout the area.

My approach cannot help but be “Spenglerian” because my historical paradigm, like Herder’s, Danilevsky’s, Dilthey’s, and Spengler’s is: world-styles of historical civilizations. I shall not, therefore, be dealing purely and simply with the pre-Christian Levantine Ecumene as my object of analysis.
To attempt to define absolutely such a vast complex of cultures would be as helpless a task as for a botanist to attempt to define in detail some huge phylum of plant life.

Spengler evidently was unaware of the juxtaposition of the two types of investigation he was undertaking in *The Decline of the West*: one which is narrow, manageable, and susceptible of meaningful analysis, namely the study of world-styles, or “Destinies”; the second, less manageable and less susceptible of rational analysis, namely, the morphological descriptions of higher cultures, or ecumenical complexes composed of diverse civilizations and sub-cultures.

Thus, he investigated not only the Magian worldview of the Christian era, but he also treated as a meaningful object of detailed analysis the Magian culture—that is, the enormously complex Near Eastern and Mediterranean peoples to whom the worldview extended.

It would, however, be scientifically unsound for an investigator of civilizations from a comparative standpoint to think only of the small class which he is studying, because this would become unreal. His classification is abstract, but only historical peoples, their deeds, and their works, have really existed. I have not confined my attention only to the world-outlook; and to avoid such an abstract approach I have constantly used such terms as “Near East,” “Levant,” “Magian I Culture,” “Near Eastern Peoples,” and the like. Sometimes I have referred to these societies in such terms as the following: “insofar as they shared the Magian I metaphysical worldview,” or I have used similar terms.

Once I wrote in the following vein: “the emergent culture or ecumene, insofar as it was influenced by the new (Magian) psychological Weltanschauung.” The qualification in the foregoing phrase (“insofar as”) enables me to treat of a relatively small classification and still to keep in mind the historical world civilization.

**The Magian Civilizational Style in World History**

Spengler’s names for the civilizational worldview of the Near Eastern civilization of the early Christian era are “Magian” and “Arabian,” and these are approximate, although they should not be used in their basic meaning.

Originally, “Magian” refers to the Magi cult; i.e., the followers of the Magi priests were Magians. It was a world well known to the Greeks, e.g., in Aristotle’s book about the Magi, entitled *Magicus*.1
But I shall stipulate a technical definition for “Magian” which will denominate a civilizational worldview held in common by many diverse peoples in the ancient Levant, e.g., the Hebrews, the Zoroastrians, the Magians, the Syrians, Assyrians, Chaldeans, etc. And the ideologies of these people were in conflict.

For example, though the prophet Zoroaster (who lived as a Mede and subsequently as a Persian, c. 500 BCE) belonged originally to the tribe of the Magi, he developed Iranian religion in what might be called a “Hebrew” direction. The Persian Magians were not Zoroastrians, but Iranian polytheists; Zoroaster, however, taught that there was only one Supreme Good, Divine Being (Ahura Mazda), and he reduced the native Iranian divinities to the status of demons or angels.

Spengler’s term “Arabian,” as a synonym for “Magian,” had the same meaning, though the actual Arabians (i.e., the nomads of the Arabian steppe) shared only partly in the Near Eastern worldview in ancient times.

A vivid twofold way of envisioning all reality – a duality in two respects: the world vs. the transcendent, and evil vs. good – was a characteristic of the Near East at the beginning of the Christian era. This dual vision had already been in existence for well over a thousand years in that region. In the old ritual of the Babylonian New Year festival, for example, Baal, “without equal in his anger,” is prayed to in his transcendence: “Merciful king…with whose glance he dost give the law…”

Of the various ideologies and religions in the Near Orient, sharing in the Magian worldview, the following are of particular interest. Judaism, from the date of the return from Babylon to the time of the destruction of Jerusalem, was affected more by the spread of Zoroastrian Persism than by any other external religious impulse; and the duality between the material and the unseen worlds, the physical and the spiritual, was greatly intensified among the Jews by the Zoroastrian doctrines.

In India and China, religion, however, as produced by the creative members of society, has been much more philosophical than in the West; and the Oriental philosophical quality is dramatically opposite to Magian dualism. The dualism is a division between philosophy and religion.

**The Magian Predecessor to Spengler’s Magian II World-Style**

In interpreting the emergence of the “Arabian” (that is, Magian) Culture, Spengler distinguished between the civilization, which he held to have been “born” in the year 1, and its world-outlook —the latter having been developing many centuries earlier. There was a strong, unbroken continuous passage from the predecessor phase of the civilization to the Magian [II] epoch.
That is, there was no break from the long “gestation” period of the Magian II culture to its swift “birth” at the beginning of the Christian era.

Spengler could have, but did not, trace out all those Magian qualities which existed in the civilization five hundred years earlier in the time of Xerxes, or even nine hundred years earlier in the Magian I culture’s “springtime,” in the time of Solomon. But then, he would have left in ambiguity the distinct reality of the new Magian II Civilization of the year 1.

The Magian I and Magian II outlooks, however, had so much in common that it is fair also to say that they really constituted two phases of one worldview. They were ingredients in a Near Eastern ecumene which also contained Near Eastern religious, economic, and political configurations, as well as a civilizational Weltanschauung.

Apparently perplexed by the overlapping of various Near Eastern civilizations during the first millennium before Christ, Spengler could not discern the earlier Magian I world-outlook which still predominated in the Levant during the two hundred-year gestation period leading to the emergence of the new phases in the Christian era. He saw the first millennium BCE as the pre-cultural period of the “Arabian” culture, taking place in Syrian, Assyrian, Persian, and Jewish territories and in the area of the old Babylonian Empire.6

But more recently, Toynbee and Quigley have traced out cultural components of the earlier Near East. This ecumene encompassed Toynbee’s Syriac and Sumero-Akkadian and Quigley’s Canaanite and Mesopotamian civilizations, and also Christopher Dawson’s “Judeo-Aramean” culture7 – roughly speaking, the whole Fertile Crescent.

That the influence of the Magian I world-style was great in the centuries just preceding the Christian era is implicit in the influence of the Phoenicians on the Greeks by way of a Phoenician code of ethics (Stoicism) and system of cosmology. “The Phoenicians,” wrote Toynbee, “had a Weltanschauung that was akin to that of the prophets of Israel and Judah.”

Toynbee has not used Spengler’s paradigm for examining civilizations, but here he departs, for just a moment, from the religious and political models that he customarily uses. The new Magian II worldview (just before the Christian era) was taking form in the Eastern territory8 of the Graeco-Roman civilization, under the influence of the Magian I worldview.
Their Geographical and Environmental Paradigms Critically Examined

I shall describe as “Magian I” the metaphysical worldview which prevailed in the Near East approximately 1200-100 BCE, a name which cannot be entirely appropriate for that which it signifies.

Spengler used the name of the Persian priesthood and that of Arabia (with some license) to denote the worldview in early Christian times of the Mediterranean civilization: “Magian.” But, for that matter, consider the personage Faust. His name, as a symbol of the medieval-modern Western worldview, is appropriate – a name which Goethe, Spengler, and many others used to depict “Faustian” man.

The Magian I ecumene was roughly coterminous with that society which Christopher Dawson termed the “Aramaic-Babylonian” civilization; it is Toynbee’s post-1200 BCE “Babylonian” and “Syriac” civilizations taken together; and it is congruent with C. Quigley’s “Canaanite” and “Mesopotamian” civilizations.

It is, moreover, an earlier appearance of the Magian II culture of Christian times. This region, whose peoples were greatly disturbed in the preceding two thousand years by the conflicts of several societies, extended from the mouth of the Euphrates to the Nile. We must expect a variety of usages in depicting the civilizations of the Near East during the extremely turbulent years, 1200 to 100 BCE, in view of the variety of perspectives of historians; for there is no simple indisputable theory about the prevailing higher cultures of that time.

One can speak more particularly and accurately of Hittite, Assyrian, Chaldean, Phoenician, and Persian civilizations. Yet Quigley has picked out for special attention two higher cultures – the Mesopotamian and the Canaanite Civilizations – which rose and fell in the area outlined by the Fertile Crescent. He traces the former from its birth approximately 4500 BCE to its final demise in 332 BCE and the latter from its birth approximately 1400 BCE to its final demise in 146 BCE.

The paradigm according to which he and Toynbee have defined the two civilizations are not religious, and they have a political quality. Both civilizations, as historical facts, are traceable today in the historical vestiges of their econo-political regimes.

But I propose (in addition to the non-psychological and non-metaphysical structures) that a civilizational worldview came into being and prevailed during the war-filled centuries from 1400 to 146 BCE, a worldview which straddled the economic and political line of demarcation between the two civilizations; and this Weltanschauung articulated itself universally throughout the various societies of the entire Near Eastern region: the Chaldean, Phoenician, Assyrian, Aramaic, Jewish, Persian, etc.
A similar style of temple architecture prevailed throughout the civilization in the time of Solomon— in Babylonia, Assyria, and Palestine, in particular. The great temple of Marduk, tutelary god of Babylon, resembled Solomon’s temple in Jerusalem, as described in the Bible.\(^{12}\)

Some disagreement, however, follows from the following question: Were the Canaanite (Toynbee’s Syriac) and Mesopotamian civilizations each an integral whole and in possession of the requisite degree of self-identity genuinely enough to be, unto itself, a self-contained civilization? Did they each have an econo-political unity?

Both “civilizations” underwent conquest by other civilizations (sometimes both at once, as in the suzerainty of the Assyrians), and both were composed of numerous cities and states, whose inter-political ties were often so weak that the basic unity of the higher society is difficult to see.

I propose these problems in order to suggest that, if the unity of these econo-political societies can be seen despite the extreme turbulence of history which occurred in that region of the world at such a time, then is it unreasonable to look for a single civilizational world-outlook emerging in the midst of these civilizations?

The difficulty is that such a psychological world-style is characteristically the world-outlook of the people of a single international society, instead of two societies which are independent of each other. Yet the latter may sometimes seem to have been the case.

But I am encouraged to see that the difficulty of multiple sovereignties is ignored in Toynbee’s description of the “Medieval Cosmos of City-States,” a European “higher civilization” based on city-states which grew and declined.

The civilization of medieval city-states shared most of the cultural values of the encompassing Western Civilization. The citizens of the medieval city of Danzig, for example, were at the same time citizens of the European community of nations. And (in Spenglerian language) both “civilizations” shared the same Faustian civilizational world-outlook.

If Toynbee’s theory of a city-oriented medieval civilization is correct, then this instance verifies the generalization that two civilizations, contemporary to one another, each differentiated in virtue of the econo-political continuity of its central region, can also share in common a psychological world-outlook. The total society, moreover, will be an ecumene, an approximation to a civilization, part of whose meaning is a shared world-style; and this ecumene is a whole which is more than the mere sum of its parts.
The Magian I Metaphysical Worldview: Its Complex Origins – Environmental, Cultural, and Geographical

Environmental Influences
The physical and cultural conditions which evoked the Magian I Weltanschauung in the era from 1500 to 1100 BCE were considerably complicated by the interrelationships of the civilizations in the area during this interval, themselves having varying degrees of complexity in their modes of civilized life. In the following I shall sketch out these civilizational encounters in the context of several environmental and geographical factors.

From 3000 to 1000 BCE periods of drought and diminution of food supply, together with an over-population in the Arabian peninsula, caused several tribes to migrate from the Arabian Steppe to regions in or near the Fertile Crescent. These included:

- the Assyrians (2900 BCE),
- the Canaanites (2500 BCE),
- the Akkadians (2500 BCE),
- the Amorite “Babylonians” (2500 BCE)
- the Chaldeans and the Amorites (2000 BCE),
- Phoenicians (Arameans) and Syrians (1500 BCE), and
- the Habirus (Hebrews) (1200 BCE).

The possibility of development of a single metaphysical Weltanschauung throughout the region of these Near Eastern migrations was enhanced by the fact that the nomads who lived on the Arabian Steppe remained virtually the same throughout all their known history. As a consequence of the inroads of these dynamic peoples, the Fertile Crescent became unalterably the scene of Semitic civilizations.

More specifically, in the nomadic tribes entering the civilized Levant out of the harsh desert, there were certain personal characteristics which, in varying degrees, continued to develop in the diverse areas of the Near East after 2000 BCE. These included:

- a capacity for deep religiousness (though unfulfilled in the pre-civilized nomadic Arabs),
- vivid imagination,
- pronounced individuality, and
- marked ferocity.

The powerful presence of Egypt was gentle in comparison.
Certain pastoral peoples from the north, of Indo-European origin, were also immensely important in the history of the Magian II Civilization. The Hittites entered the Anatolian area sometime prior to 1500 BCE and, during the disintegration of the Sumerian culture of Mesopotamia, established the Hittite Civilization. The members of this civilization challenged Egypt’s claim of suzerainty over the Middle East during a series of wars from 1352 BCE until the establishment of peace in 1278.23

But at that time new migrations of Aryan invaders from the north (the Lydians and the Phrygians) were overwhelming the Hittite culture.24 In addition, Egypt had been invaded by the Hyksos around 1600 BCE.

Cultural and Social Ties of the Levant at the Time of Birth of the Magian I Culture

Just as the national groupings of modern Europe are closely tied by countless cross-currents of business, art, diplomacy, politics, and military relations—so much so, that the continent has a civilizational unit—so, too, the ancient Near East was comparable in this respect.25 The emphasis of morality on law was thoroughly accepted by the Near Eastern peoples, from Palestine to the Sumero-Akkadian Empire of Babylon, at least as early as 2400 BCE. The Code of Hammurabi (c. 1700), in fact, was only the continuation of Sumero-Akkadian law codes with the same formulation and point of view.26

The Semites from the desert, with their stern justice, had been infiltrating into the irrigation culture of Mesopotamia before 3000 BCE.27 During the period 2000 to 1000 BCE, there were many law codes throughout the Levant, and they all show the same basic structure as the Biblical Book of the Covenant.

However, Moses used considerable originality in choosing and organizing earlier Northwest-Semitic ideas and prescriptions. The description of the Covenant between Yahweh and Israel, in Joshua 24, was similar in many definite ways to Syro-Anatolian diplomatic treaties (that is covenants) of the fourteenth and thirteen centuries BCE.

The idea of legal treaties became widespread through the Near East28 and it figured in numerous references to the Divine Covenant in the Hebrew Bible.

Art, and particularly poetry, had been unifying the imaginations of the Near Eastern peoples since before 1500 BCE. During the suzerainty of Egypt in Palestine and Syria from c. 1550 to 1225,29 the Egyptians were corresponding (in clay tablets) with Babylonians, Assyrians, Mitannians, Hittites, and other Anatolians, and using the lingua franca, Akkadian.
J. H. Breasted saw in this age the “First Internationalization” in human history, and indeed the surviving international correspondence reveals the great extent of mutual influences exerted by Egypt, Mesopotamia, and Syria in these centuries.

“Many literary works were translated from Akkadian into Hurrian and Hittite, as well as from Hurrian into Hittite”; Egyptian poems were translated into Akkadian; a Canaanite myth was put into Egyptian; there is extant a Hittite version of an Akkadian (i.e., Babylonian) epic. The Song of Miriam in Exodus 15 and the Oracles of Balaam in Numbers 23 – 24 almost certainly derive from Palestinian poetry of the thirteenth/twelfth centuries BCE, to mention but a bit of the poetry of the Bible of pre-Biblical derivation.30

Egyptian and Babylonian scholars were highly valued in other Near Eastern states in c. 1300. The cultural internationalism had a tremendous impact on the religion of Western Asia, to be seen in the wholesale adaptations of the names of gods and goddesses all over the region of the Fertile Crescent, from Sumero-Akkadia to Egypt. Indeed, as early as Hammurabi (c. 1700) this process was going on, so great was the homogeneity of worldview in Mesopotamia, Syria, and the eastern Levant.31 Thus, in all probability a civilizational world-style pre-dated the Magian I outlook.

The universalistic tendencies of the “First International Age” were consummated in the thirteenth century BCE, when the gods of Egypt were severally identified with the leading deities of the western Levant, and the patron god of the Pharaoh was also the main god of the Canaanites, Hittites, and Mesopotamians.32

This is but a slight sketch of the rich amalgamation of culture which was going on in the epoch of the thirteenth-twelfth centuries. There had been a Dark Age between the time of Hammurabi and 1500 BCE in the Near Eastern Civilization, when non-Semitic barbarians had entered into the Fertile Crescent both from the Armenian sector and from the grasslands of Central Asia. (In the eighteenth-century BCE, for example, a variety of non-Semitic peoples flooded Palestine.) As a consequence, these lands were thoroughly internationalized before the Egyptian conquest of Palestine and Syria began about 1560 BCE, and both art and international trade had an excellent development.33

Geographical Diversity of the Pre-Magian Societies

Finally, in 1194 BCE, at the approximate time of the birth of the Magian I Civilization, Egypt and its Near Eastern allies and client states were invaded by the Aryan Peoples of the Sea (the Achaeans). And, four years later, in 1190, seafaring Philistines settled on the southern Palestinian coastal area.
In this same century, during the 1200s, the Arameans had erupted with great vehemence and violence out of the desert and moved into Palestine (but particularly into Damascus). In the same century, too, the Chaldeans had emerged out of the desert with similar ferocity and invaded the Tigris-Euphrates Valley. Also during this same century of the Egyptian New Empire’s decline, the Hebrews came from the desert, whence Moses led them, and invaded the Canaanite farm and town society in Palestine.

Here I have sketched out the events over many centuries, while the Magian I metaphysical worldview was taking form in the minds of creative members of Near Eastern societies. This preceded the emergence (c. 1300 to 1100 BCE) of the civilization, the members of which (notably, the artists and leaders) -- ranging from the militaristic Assyrians to the God-intoxicated Israelites and the relatively gentle Persians (albeit they were descendants of marauding Aryan barbarians) -- were to give material realization to a single metaphysical world-outlook.

Five civilizations, through lifestyles, politics, or worldviews, had influence over the Near East during these centuries (1500 – 1100 BCE):

- The Sumerian culture, which had been preserved under the rule of the Babylonians, was destined to heavily influence the conquerors, the Chaldeans.
- The Egyptian kingship, which brought the Levant under direct Egyptian rule, was in constant contact with the Levantine societies before and after the decline of Egyptian suzerainty in the thirteenth century BCE.
- The “Aegean” Civilization (comprising the Minoan, Helladic, and Mycenean civilizations), which had been disintegrating since 1400 BCE, had exposed the sea-going Phoenicians to a highly developed cultural influence.
- The Hittites, moreover, had assimilated the civilizing influences of the Sumero-Akkadians (it was largely through the mediation of another non-Semitic people, the Hurrians, that the Sumero-Akkadian culture reached the Hittites and other Anatolian peoples).
- In its turn, at the time of its dissolution, the Hittite society, in 1190 BCE, provided a civilizational influence on Semitic peoples, particularly the Assyrians.

The territory encompassed by the Magian I worldview revealed itself in works and deeds approximately the thirteenth century BCE, 600 years before Zoroaster was born (c. 565 BCE). It was destined to share large parts of its area with other civilizations, with pastoral tribal peoples, with the Hebrew Confederacy of the People of the Covenant, and with the sea-going Phoenicians.
The emergent ecumene, insofar as it was influenced by the new civilizational Weltanschauung, comes to light in historical retrospect, similarly as an image appears among many images on a palimpsest painting. The most meaningful “layers” of the Magian I “palimpsest” were the Canaanite Civilization and the Mesopotamian (both highly organized societies).

I shall not attempt to trace out the very limited extent to which the Magian I “Civilization” achieved actual political reality or approximation to social unity, except to observe that it was an ecumene participated in by several civilizations and cultures.

Yet I could conclude, in passing, that any higher culture, to the extent that it may be designated or denominated by the name of its worldview, then, by the same token it approximates – at least in some sporadic or partial degree – to a social-economic or political unity. By definition, to be political pertains to the very nature of a culture or a civilization.

The extremely dynamic and diversified history of the ancient Near East from 1200 to 100 BCE was one of an area never unified in that time except by military conquest in the form of empires. Although the unity of the Magian I peoples was far from a consummated unification of a higher society, nevertheless, I find that it was an ecumene which tended to approximate to a single higher civilization.

Quigley’s description of the Canaanite Civilization existing in the Levant (and, in less degree, his sketch of the continuous existence of the Mesopotamian Civilization until its termination in the lifetime of Alexander) has suggested to me that a Magian worldview must have existed in those regions in the first millennium before Christ; and, in fact, many centuries prior to the civilization I call “Magian I.”

I shall date the Magian civilizational worldview as taking shape in the minds of creative individuals at least as early as the eighteenth-century BCE Amorite lawmaker and patron of astronomy, Hammurabi (c. 1728-1686).
Footnotes

1. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, Prologue, 1, 2, 8.
10. Ibid., p. 143.
11. Ibid., p. 152, 156.
13. If we turn to East Asian societies, how simple, in comparison, were the physical and psychological provocative factors which elicited from the Chinese and the Indians their respective psychological Weltanschauungen.
22. Ibid., p. 10.
23. A. J. Toynbee, A Study of History, Somervell’s Abridgement (Oxford Univ., 1946), Vol. 1, Append, Table V.
26. Ibid., p. 198.
27. Ibid., p. 149.
28. Ibid., pp. 15-16.
29. Ibid., p. 206.
31. Ibid., pp. 209-213.
32. Ibid., p. 224.
33. Ibid., pp. 204-206.
35. Breasted, op. cit., p. 239.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid., p. 559.
39. Ibid., p. 560n.
41. Toynbee, op. cit., p. 435.
A Physics for Civilization

Arthur S. Iberall

Editor’s Note: The following paper, retrieved from the archives at Dickinson College, was presented at a session on the economic origins of civilizations and on the death of civilizations, at the 1980 Annual Conference of the International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations, held at Syracuse University, in May 1980.

A highly accomplished polymath, Arthur Iberall (1918-2002) served as an executive board member of the ISCSC as well as a long-time member and a distinguished participant in the ISCSC annual meetings. He was an expert on complex systems thinking.

Many discussions over the years were punctuated by his vigorous debating style and brilliant, insightful assertions. Few claims were spared in these intellectual thrusts. For example, I recall his arguing very persuasively, with data – and against others – about the direction in which the South Pacific and South America actually were settled by humans.

According to biographical material online, he held three patents, gave four U.S. Congressional briefings, and was awarded an honorary Doctor of Science degree by Ohio State University in recognition of his interdisciplinary scientific research. He published eight books, 95 peer-reviewed articles, and 49 scientific conference extended abstracts.

Wikipedia sums up his intellectual contributions by reporting that he “was an American physicist/hydrodynamicist and engineer who pioneered homeokinetics, the physics of complex, self-organizing systems. He was the originator of the concept of lines of non-extension on the human body which was used to create workable space suits.”

Thus, it is no surprise that an obituary online reports that “Dr. Iberall was honored at the 1998 Homeokinetics Conference at the University of Connecticut in Storrs, Connecticut where hundreds of his colleagues joined together to show how the application of homeokinetic principles explains the functioning of complex systems, in contrast to chaotic theory that has no physical basis.”

Arthur Iberall
CC BY-SA 4.0,
During his career, Dr. Iberall was a consultant to NASA, the Department of Transportation, the Army Research Office, as well as the Navy and the Air Force. His applied research was carried out at the National Bureau of Standards (1941-53), Rand, and other scientific organizations and major academic institutions. He is credited with having contributed significantly to the development of the first space suit, the high-speed dental drill, breathing regulators, fiberglass cutters, and major home appliances such as stove surface burners, the electric knife, and fancy-stitch sewing machines.

A fundraising drive to create a Distinguished Annual Lecture series in his honor at the Center for the Ecological Study of Perception and Action at the University of Connecticut stated:

Arthur Iberall had a vision in which he incorporated the questions that all of us asked – How do complex systems really work? Can physics be applied to real world problems? Is there a logic to running our society? How do human systems actually work? Where are all the thermodynamic engines and oscillators in the body and how do they interact? What physical and chemical data really need to be collected to do tasks such as design drugs that incorporate a homeokinetic perspective? What are the catalytic messaging units in the neuronal language?

On the topic of comparative civilizations, he used physics to explain the emergence of settled civilizations. He described a pattern based on stability transition, a process similar to that of matter condensation. First came a “condensation” to fixed settlements, and this was followed by a transition to urban civilization, he argued.

Among the eight books he published was one co-authored with David Wilkinson and Don White entitled *Foundations for Social and Biological Evolution*. The book examines how mankind populated the Earth (including its laws of growth), how settlement in place and urbanization occurred, the commonality of cultural and civilization evolution over the entire Earth for the past 15,000 years, and the processes which have undergirded it all.

Clearly, the paper he gave at Syracuse for the ISCSC meeting broke new ground and expanded considerably the research map upon which scholars of comparative civilizations may pursue further understanding of the discipline and its parameters.
A Physics for Civilization

I. The General Construct (1,2)

1. We are concerned with fluid-like systems, in which the atomistic participants are involved in movement relative to each other. (There is a very comparable physics which can be developed for solid state-like systems, but it will not be our present concern.)

2. In a system of such atomistic participants, the physics of motion and change for the ensemble of participants is tracked by means of those quantities which are conserved upon interactions between the participants (3).

3. In a simple system, there are three quantities which are conserved upon interaction – mass (the quantity of matter), energy, and momentum (the product of mass and velocity).

4. In a complex system, processes emerge which are long time delayed compared to the interactional time (e.g., time between collisions). They emerge because long time delayed complex processes are involved in the atomistic interiors. These long-time delayed processes modify the basic conservations in the following way:

   a. Chemical change may emerge, as atomisms are transformed. This appearance of new forms requires a statement of conservations for each individual mass species that may emerge atomistically.

   b. In the case of living systems, in which a complex chemical reproductive process involving birth, growth, life, death, and dissolution may take place, one distinguishes between the conservations of mass species and the conservation of population number. The new interactional conservation is contained in the statement that generation begets generation. That lengthens the total effective interactional time to the generation time.

   c. The physical conservation of momentum transfer between participants is modified. Instead of the relevant time scale for transfer being the interaction time (known technically in physical science as the collision or relaxation time), it is the time scale over which all internal processes within the interiors of the atomistic participants complete a cycle and reach an equilibrium. We denote this time scale as the factory day of the atomism. It is not only characteristic of living systems, but of all complex atomistic systems which conduct a great deal of action internally.

Such interior actions are not immune from physical law. It is just that a great deal of time-delayed fluid and chemical processes take place among another hierarchical nesting of smaller atomistic participants (e.g., cells in the living organism, or molecular clusters in the living cell).
However, over the factory day, instead of movement and change solely by external momentum, what emerges is a matrix of action modes, those characteristic actions which the atomistic participants perform:

- For living systems, they are psychological actions, partially internalized, partially externalized, as well as physiological actions.
- For mammals, they number perhaps nine; for humans perhaps 20.
- For long-lived species, most of the action modes are discharged over the geophysical day (for the individual, not the species).

Thus, there is a social physics possible for a social group of such individuals from the daily scale on up. Since the human is tied to a complex ecological web, action is more nearly complete in a societal physics for the geophysical scale of the year.

But if the conservation of population is to be invoked as a constraining conservation for the species (when the species is the ensemble, rather than a group), the social physics at the generation time is the first minimum scale for physical equilibrium for the species. Note at this scale, the individual’s actions are hardly to be detected anymore. Instead, the historical process, stripped of individuals, emerges.

5. The science of ensemble physics relates to -- and only to -- the quantities that are conserved upon interactions. Thus, individual-to-individual interactions are described by kinetics relating to these conservations. Motion and change in an atomistic ensemble are described by summing up these kinetic interactions, within a statistical mechanics, to produce a continuum-like thermodynamic description of the ensemble’s motion.

That continuum-like description has three facets, all relating to the conservations.

First, as a result of continuing interactions throughout the ensemble of atomistic participants, the conserved quantities are partitioned (shared) among all the participants to produce what is known as the statistical distribution functions of the ensemble. These are statements about how matter (density), momentum (or action) and energy (e.g., kinetic energy) are each distributed throughout the space (or in any local region).

Second, the statistical measures of these three conservations are related. These related measures form the equation of state of the ensemble. That equation expresses how ensemble average measures (macroscopic variables) of the essential conservations are related.
Such an equation holds both if the entire ensemble, in all of its regional extent, are contiguously in equilibrium, or only near equilibrium. (At equilibrium, for example, they will share the same kinetic energy measure and momentum measure.)

Third, if the ensemble is only near equilibrium, then there will be equations of change which will express fluxes (flows) and transports or diffusions of the conserved variables between regions of the field.

6. These equation sets, equation of state, equations of change, the existence of underlying atomistic participants, and boundary conditions that are constraints put on the field, complete the construct of physics for field ensembles. The boundary conditions generally are potentials (storage bins) from which sources for the various conservations may be drawn.

7. These two sets of equations are applied to a field, e.g., a social field, in the following sense:
   - First, having identified the basic atomisms (e.g., molecules, or in this case people), there is a minimum space and time scale at which such near continuum descriptions hold. For example, one certainly aggregates atomistic performance over the earth’s day rather than being concerned with momentary postures of the individual (the action mode matrix is largely completed in a day). And one aggregates over the local community in which daily activities are performed.
   - Second, there is a maximum space and time scale for which the field results are intended. For example, if civilizations and Man’s evolutionary history of civilizations are of concern, then the time scale likely has to be as extensive as Man’s 40,000-year history, and the entire continental surface of the earth becomes the spatial field.
   - Thus, the range: a day to 40,000 years, a few acres to the earth’s land surface, defines the bounds of concern. Within those bounds, there will be an extensive spectrum of effects. Given external large-scale causality for such spectral domains, the equation sets can be conceptually or actually applied to those domains.

The following temporal domains furnish natural divisions in the social process:

- The social process of the day (dominated by earth’s day-night rotational variation, it is marked within the chemical encoding of most biological organisms).
The social process of the year (dominated by the seasonal variation, the ecological web by which all higher species depend for material and energy supply is entrained in that periodic process).

The social process of the generation (each species has a generation time scale, associated with its chemical genetic code).

The social process of the life span (the life span, differing from the generation time or the life expectancy, e.g., 90 years for humans, marks a period over which the likelihood of any survivors on the social scene is essentially negligible. All social continuity then has to depend upon some form of information and memory transmission). These scales are clearly physically – chemically – biologically determined, ones over which the atomistic species has no control. They are exogenous to the social field process. The same is true for the following scales, but the theory and database are more controversial or speculative.

The social process associated with a cultural life span. We would argue that this is of the order of 500 years. It is the scale at which a small isolate culture can maintain coherence, i.e., the scale of which it can retain a founder figure myth and transmit its cultural epigenetic (ed.- relating to or arising from nongenetic influences on gene expression) heritage generation to generation without an extensive recorded abstract language.

We made an a priori estimate of the number of generations (about twenty) for which reliable information transmission might be expected. Then we found confirmation of that estimate in Murdock’s Ethnographic Atlas, which suggests that cultural independence exists for a small group if it has been separated either a few hundred miles or a thousand years from neighboring groups.

The fact that comparative civilizationalists (e.g., Mencius’s estimate, and more modern estimates, such as Blegen’s dissection of the levels of Troy, or Melko’s estimates) typically identify a scale of about 300 – 500 years for civilization even in complex social systems, is added evidence for the intrinsic nature of the information transmission process time scale.

What the numerical result implies is that there is a great deal of linear independence in the cultural process, in which it remains coherent and only diffuses slowly with such long-time constants even in the presence of other groups in a coupled interacting ecumene.

Ethnicity, for example, simply does not disappear in a few generations.
Even more speculative is a time scale of the order of a few millennia. Over this scale, as the process time for a number of “independent” cultural waves to cross a large land mass (diffusional time scales are of the order of one mile per year; thus, in a few thousand years, the chance of a number of diffusions and refractions to have taken place increases), one may expect reformations of social strategies, changes in the character of the epigenetic value potential, to have taken place.

Such a process scale would not exist among stimulus-bound animals, nor even the higher primates. One would have to associate it with the extra interneuronal capacity that developed with Pleistocene cortical evolution, and likely with the increased unstabilizing lateralization in the human brain (4).

The appearance of the extensive epigenetic value potential in the human brain makes that brain more unstable, not so tightly bound in its decision making. This is associated with the characteristics usually identified as “free will.”

Nevertheless, a successful system’s life, in a physical sense, must have a program for persistence of action, for survival. If it is not preprogrammed, that program has to consist of a strategy. In time the strategy (human strategy) may become stereotyped (Aristotle illustrates a first effort to count the types of political systems), but it has not yet become so.

Thus, one may seek a scale, an intellectual scale, at which strategies are reformed. Obviously, the individual and the individual culture are engaged constantly in defining such a process. But is there a supra-cultural time scale?

We suggest that such change occurs at the few millennia time scale. Why? It is a property of nonlinear decision making.

McCulloch, for example, illustrated why the briefest reaction moment of the individual organism is made up of about three response units, e.g., 0.1 second to determine position, 0.1 second to determine velocity, and 0.1 second to determine acceleration.

Or another example – it has been shown that business activity has a fluctuation time scale of the order of three years. (See, for example, Dewey Cycles.) One can conjecture that investment and business activity decisions require a minimum observation of the yearly balance, but that – as before – 3 to 4 units of independent binary decision units (e.g., yes-no) have to pass before a decision can be entrained by the nonlinear discrete brain process.
When it comes to social change, through cultures, an ecumene cannot change its outlook until a number of cultural changes have been observed. In any case, we realize that these longer scales may very well be speculative.

However, the equation sets would apply to each spectral domain, starting from the shortest scale unit and integrating (or aggregating) up to the next unit scale.

Summarizing, as applied to living systems, the following conservations are involved in making up relevant equation sets:

- **energy flow** (e.g., the daily caloric expenditure, roughly 2,000 kcal/day for Man)
- **matter** (loosely speaking, the conservation in the adult of the carbohydrate, fat, protein, minerals, ions, water content of the organism)
- **action modes** (the *factory day* budget of actions – energy-time product – that are characteristic of the species; e.g., among mammals, such behavior modes are noted (as) ingestive, eliminative, sexual, care-giving, care-soliciting, conflict, imitative, shelter-seeking, investigatory behavior; in humans, perhaps twenty modes are noted)
- **population** (for systems that grow, live, and die, conservation of the species requires that invariably generation begets generation)

The following potentials (*storage bins*) are involved, as boundary conditions:

- **temperature** (the solar flux, interacting with earth’s atmosphere, produces a temperature range that supports life and its ecological web)
- **chemical potential** (the earth, as substrate and depot, provides both materials, e.g., foodstuffs for building materials, and energy, e.g., foodstuffs that produce energy by chemical reaction)
- **genetic potential** (an internal chemical potential, carefully carried from generation to generation by germ cells in the form of a specific hereditary molecule DNA)
- **geographic potential** (the lithosphere, hydrosphere, atmosphere -- are available as substrate and surround to support life processes)
- **epigenetic potential** (another internal potential, emergent from the command-control system of living organisms, which furnish various competences for action, such as memory; in higher mammals, value systems)

The general character of physical law is largely contained in the statement that potential gradients drive fluxes. This is almost tautological because the potentials are *storage bins* for the flux quantities. The physics becomes interesting in how potentials come into being.
II. The Construct Specialized for Man

Very little has to be added to this construct to extend it to Man, except for some modifications and additions to the conservations and potentials. First, for example, retreating to Man’s Plio-Pleistocene hominid ancestors, one finds an enlargement of their epigenetic potential. They obviously begin to extend their mammalian and primate memory system to where it can be transmitted as an epigenetic heritage from generation to generation.

We surmise that that “freedom” included a growth in value systems as part of the epigenetic heritage. It is fair to say that a new internalized potential emerged within that hominid brain, a technological rate potential. (Tools are found before modern Man’s cultures.)

This potential is represented by the capability of each generation to add additional tool making complexity to the epigenetic heritage. The technological capability is likely best measured by the amplification in power-handling capability of the individual.

As far as we can tell, for the period of such tool evolution, e.g., perhaps two or more million years, that technological rate of increase has been linear for Man’s hominid ancestors. Each generation (e.g., measured in hundred to thousand generation units) could make an equal increment change in tool complexity.

We base that assertion on crudely estimating the gain in power-handling capability of the various evolutionary tool assemblages that have been identified with the past few million years (e.g., eoliths, hand axes, flakes, microtools).

We assert that the technological rate potential is new and independent of the epigenetic potential because it represents a new form of abstraction, beyond memory transmission, and because an epigenetic heritage can be imagined independent of a changing technology.

However, the social life that emerges for those higher primate hominids hardly differs in general character from that of other higher species, e.g., mammals, primates. One surmises that one major difference, as these pre-prehensile, facile upright species gradually transformed from predominantly frugivore gatherers to omnivore hunter-gatherers, is a band organization of camps with a considerable division of labor, rather than the more common pecking order organization of these other species.

Yet among primate organization, the gross social organization of hominids does not appear to be unusually different (5).
So now we turn to modern Man of the past 40,000 to 50,000 years. Whether the species Homo sapiens (who appeared then) and homo sapiens neanderthalensis (who disappeared at about that time) were members of the same breeding pool, or the same species, is not really known. Some significant anatomical features make them different, and there is a sharp difference in what has been identified with the characteristics of culture.

We take the position that on the criteria of handedness (4), change in speech capability (6), the distinctive change in tool-making that marks middle Paleolithic assemblages, and the appearance of abstract artifacts and symbolic art forms, as well as evidence for magico-religious social practices, such evidence points to association of these characteristics with a new species or breed, the current human species. This new species seems capable of all of performance of current Man, speech at neural rates, abstraction, a much more rapid rate of technological development, in short —human culture.

Thus, we start our boundary conditions from that new species, modern Man, emergent about 40,000 years ago with new tool assemblages and a richer technological potential (a higher rate of change). The species begins as a highly competent hunter-gatherer. Evidence exists that within the subsequent 10,000 - 20,000 years, the species is spread lightly through all continents (7) except possibly the Americas, to which the species cross likely in more than one wave, with few reliable datings earlier than 10,000 to 15,000 years before the present. Its highest latitudes are up into the northern tundra.

The question is why does a discontinuous change in social characteristics of that species take place, wherein it is subsequently found highly precipitated into place and organized into what is called civilization? The only potentials and fluxes available are the ones we have named.

We can ask two questions. One, are there any analogous changes or forms known in the biological kingdom? And two, what sort of physical process does the change suggest?

As to the former question, it is possible to analogize with regard to the plant kingdom wherein there are mobile phases of existence and finally a fixed existence, but much of that is related to the different way the woody plant is tied to its chemical potentials and the different time scale for its metabolism. Thus, many more have been attracted by the social insects who seem well organized into physical forms in place.

There is little doubt that this metaphor has inspired the creator (8) and many of the proponents of sociobiology. However, the metaphor is still far-fetched because of the fact that most of the behavior of those species are stimulus-bound and limited in central nervous system capacity.
The characteristics we seek are much more to be associated with the physical freeing of the central nervous systems of higher animals (9), which because of its increased inter-neuronal richness becomes increasingly less bound in its behavior, with increasing computational and storage capability, and in the case of the Pleistocene hominids explosive in its growth in cortical capacity.

The contrary problem is thus created. On what sort of behavioral program should such freedom, particularly an abstract high-speed linguistic capability, light upon? From a biological and a physical point of view, that strikes us as the central question.

The very clear physical answer that this question foreshadows is that the problem of human social evolution is a matter of dynamic stability, one in which a transition takes place from one type of field process operation to another.

Ever since pioneering work in elastic stability by Euler (e.g., the buckling of a column), in hydrodynamics by Reynolds (transition from laminar to turbulent flow), in mechanical orbits by Poincaré and Lyapounov, the subject of mechanistic stability has flourished, and it has been realized that the problem is associated with nonlinear dissipative processes. Recent conferences (10, 11) have assembled a large amount of material on the generality of the problem. We have offered a prior conjecture on its application to the social transition problem (12).

The problem we confront here is to try to explain the process in terms that social scientists may be willing to accept.

III. The Transition Process Toward Civilization

It is clear from what we have said that the beginning epoch of modern Man, 40,000 to 30,000 years ago, say, was represented by a style of life not much different from earlier hominid species or, except for the particular band characteristics (2), much different from many other modern primate species. This is true even though specific human cultural artifacts can be found.

What was that style of life, particularly as described in a physical sense?

Even before knowledge was available as to a possible progression of species, it had become feasible to distinguish a difference between Paleolithic, Mesolithic, and Neolithic tool assemblages, and in the Paleolithic, upper, middle, and lower periods.

We, of course, are concerned with human transitions, and so we can speak – in an ergodic sense – with some authority for human processes of thought (we are human).
But to the modest extent that we wish to invoke a particular thought process, we can surmise it to hold for Man’s tool-using ancestors.

In particular, we surmise that evolution of tools is simply not a process that follows automatically upon the thought process, but that in general, there are perceived needs and the hominid brain – dealing in abstraction – creates tools as abstractions and their modifications to deal with those needs.

Note -- Animals can distinguish self and other than self. That is, they possess such world images. Recent work, on recognizing self in mirrors and as objects of manipulation, have begun to clarify the existence of graded differences among higher apes. Thus, evidence is building up for the graded difference in abstraction abilities among primates.

Nevertheless, it is still one further step of abstraction when a hominid primate began to incorporate an epigenetic heritage of tool-using into his regular existence. A tool is neither self nor outer world, but an object which can be precisely manipulated between self and outer world to affect motor and sensory competences. That triangular relationship is an abstraction.

But the continued evolution of such tools has to follow additionally perceived needs. Nevertheless, while an epigenetic heritage can exist, it may exist within a “traditional” culture without change in tool-making. Thus, clearly there was social pressure to evolve tools. At the present we can only infer the character of the pressure from the direction that the tool types took, and a possible relation to the changing climatic-geographic potentials.

We can quickly jump to the lower Paleolithic hand axe which emerged in the mid-Pleistocene. This tool type is basically associated with Homo erectus, and it was the leading tool over an immense period of time for much of the territory in which that species has been found.

Perhaps this was 500,000 to 100,000 years before the present, not as far north as modern Man but up to the northern-most latitudes of the Black and Caspian Seas in Eurasia – but not east of India – and Africa (13) (14). Tool evolution existed over that immense period, but it was not exceptionally rapid.

This brings us to the Middle Paleolithic traditions which emerged in the late Pleistocene. This epoch is basically associated with Neanderthal Man, or Homo sapiens neanderthalensis. (By being so designated, it is increasingly considered to be an early subspecies, likely largely extinct, which preceded the current subspecies Homo sapiens sapiens.)
That subspecies of hominid, e.g., associated with Mousterian and Levalloisian tool traditions, was dominant over the period 100,000 to 50,000 years before the present, and it has been found even further north in Eurasia (15). A change in tool evolution is usually found, marked by a predominance of flint tools based on the production of flakes. Instead of producing one tool from a large core, a diversity of implements could be produced by continued flaking of small pieces from such a core. That tool technique was widely diffused throughout the hand axe province. Although the time scale of change is much more rapid, the changing industries are not precipitous. However, the database available and the scatter in type of tool is still not extensive enough that detailing at the level of a few millennia at a time can be done.

The important characteristic of that type of tool change (advance in the tool-making rate potential) was that it accompanied (and perhaps made possible) a significant extension of the range of human settlement to colder climes, and it accompanied an extension of the hunting-gathering capability of the hominid species.

Can we not jump immediately, then, to modern Man, a new subspecies who somehow may have lived contemporaneous with Neanderthal for some overlapping period, but then proceeded by some unknown legerdemain to have knocked out Neanderthal’s sharing or competing for the same niche, by virtue, perhaps, of superior hunting and killing tools? That is a common impression left in popular archeological literature.

However, some recent stories, relevant to civilizational startup, is bringing more perplexing detail to the transition; in other words, a sharper picture of the transition to civilization requires greater detailing in all occupied earth regions for a lower Paleolithic 250,000 to 100,000 years before the present, and a middle Paleolithic 100,000 to 30,000 years before the present period, including detailing of ecological conditions.

A case in point is the Nile valley history (16). History and evolution there were dominated by climate, just as in the northern Eurasian development. For example, we may start by noting that the area had a drought from about 500,000 to about 120,000 years before the present.

Eolithic (ed. - relating to or denoting a period at the beginning of the Stone Age, preceding the Paleolithic and characterized by the earliest crude stone tools) tools are found in the Nile valley.

They have a lower Pleistocene date of about 700,000 years before the present, associated with a rainy period. Dating to about 500,000 years before the present, hand axe traditions are found. One can conceive (as pure speculation) that the hominid path of diffusion, of population, of tool making, might have spread through the Nile valley from southern and eastern Africa to the Near East in an earlier period.
It appears that with the end of the drought and the beginning of a new pluvial age, the Abbassian (lasting from 120,000 to 90,000 years before the present), the late Acheulean (hand axe) hominids spread from the limited oases more broadly into the former desert wastes in search of large grazing animals.

We will here make the point that each time such weather changes have taken place, e.g., with the later withdrawal of the glaciers in Europe about 10,000 to 12,000 years before the present, both plants and grazing animals disperse as more broadly wetter regions appear, and tool-using hominids are forced by necessity to adapt their food searching style.

What is interesting about this instance, earlier than the one we previously discussed, is that it indicates the pressure on an earlier tool-using hominid to find related solutions and make some sort of lifestyle transition.

The hominids that were involved were those making a transition between Homo erectus and Homo sapiens neanderthalensis. One begins to find some of the earliest evidence of house-like structures. The suggestion is that these Acheuleans ventured seasonally into the open grasslands and retreated to permanent watering holes during the dry season.

The Abbassian pluvial was followed by drying desert conditions in the entire Sahara. The Neanderthals took refuge in the great oases of the Nile valley. At about this time, that species of Homo began to exhibit the Levalloisian tool-flaking tradition in Africa as well as Europe. One type of tool that may have been of revolutionary importance in hunting efficiency was the stone projectile point. This could be hafted to wooden shafts to make a hunting spear far superior to the fire-hardened wooden spear used earlier. Just as in northern climates, these flakes could be used as scrapers to prepare furs for clothing.

One senses that each such technological advance, made out of necessity for a particular climatic era, then had a capability of flowering in a subsequent age if the climatic changes were suited.

Thus, the Mousterian pluvial, a period from 50,000 to 30,000 years before the present, was ushered into the Sahara, much lusher than the earlier pluvial. The Neanderthals colonized every available niche in North Africa (just as they were spread across Eurasia). Rooted in this culture one finds the Aterian Industry, viewed as being contemporaneous with middle Paleolithic cultures in Europe, dating back to over 40,000 years before the present, with a demise just under 30,000 years before the present.
This interpretation is new. It demonstrates a slow but fairly continuous development of middle Paleolithic to upper Paleolithic culture. While the Aterians (who are likely Homo sapiens sapiens) had a somewhat superior tool assemblage to the Mousterians, it seems that they coexisted in a cultural mosaic during much of the Mousterian pluvial.

“The side-by-side persistence of strikingly different technological and possibly cultural (?) traditions is not unique to this period in Egypt but, as we shall see, characterizes the late Paleolithic sequence in the Kom Ombo Plain in southern Upper Egypt and probably continued through predynastic times to be echoed in Dynastic traditions of the cultural duality of Upper and Lower Egypt.” (16)

This seems to be an example of the kind of prehistory revisionism in progress. An earlier example in the mid-60s was the work of the Binfords on Mousterian settlement traditions. A great deal of overlapping cultural diversity existed on the savannas and oases of Middle Paleolithic northeastern Africa.

We cannot attempt to develop (or master or wait for) the discovery of all the detail that refers to this and other areas. A few references that enrich these stories is contained in References 17 through 33. But the basic need thus is to begin to trace the story of change and transition between, say, 30,000 years before the present – 2,000 years at a time, down to 4,000 years before the present, when the historical period is safely in hand.

The boundary conditions are likely the historical period of evolution of modern man 40,000 to 30,000 years before the present related to the climate of that period (e.g., glaciated in northern Eurasia, pluvial in Northern Africa), the diffusion of that species and the tool assemblages, and the ecology available for support of a human cultural life. Then the question is to what extent can regional predictions be made.

It would be one of our key theses that the basic relaxation process, by two millennia segments, would be a changing perception of how to conduct a lifestyle.

That may be. The problem we face here is to offer some sort of physical theory for the transition that took place in that time slot, say 30,000 to 4,000 years before the present, and related to the operational boundary conditions 40,000 to 30,000 years before the present, given the conservations, their fluxes, and the potentials we have named.

It is clear that the transitions we are concerned with are phase transitions, transitions like the condensation of matter from gas to liquid to solid phases. First, how would we describe Man the earlier hunter-gatherer? Similar to most other mammalian species, Man operated in a hunting range, appropriate to his size and metabolism (there being moderate differences in such ranges for carnivores and frugivores). At slow rates, he diffused over a wide habitat.
Climatic conditions, and thereby ecological conditions, in the main, governed that diffusive habitat. All this constitutes essentially straight-forward biological-ecological results.

Physically that motion, with its near isolation, e.g., typical band separations on large land masses was of the order of 70 – 100 miles, can be considered to be nearly gas-like motion, a two-dimensional gas. Its mean free path was of the order of one roaming range, e.g., 25 miles; its relaxation time was of the order of one generation, e.g., 25 years. That is, its propagation speed was of the order of one mile per year (34). “Information” (cultural information) could hardly be propagated at higher speed.

But note that low potentials of temperature and water and food would always cause condensation. A note on this is desirable.

One might think that diversity of form and complexity is associated with high energy. This is not the case. At high energy, e.g., high kinetic energy, systems move toward a gaseous phase. All low energy bonds are broken. Remaining degrees of freedom of motion are each equally endowed (equipartitioning) with energy. It is only at low temperature (low kinetic energy), as Einstein showed for the specific heat of matter at low temperature, that the same energy has to make do for many ordered configurations. There is a cooperative phenomenon which takes place; order is imposed, authority is established. Thus, matter condensation, e.g., liquid and solid states, always exhibit more diversity and complexity of order than does the gaseous state.

All species will respond to a poverty of potentials by some sort of condensation, in extreme cases in very great changes in sociochemical form. In each case, it is the internal potentials, e.g., genetic, that will select the condensation path. Hominids, with an additional epigenetic and tool-making potential, have always adapted by means of all three potentials.

The very nature of extreme climatic changes puts the major action in the Northern temperate zone in Eurasia, from northern tundra limits (dominated by the Scandinavian ice sheet), and Northern Africa, just as at a later date – when Man enters the Americas – another play takes place in that continental mass.

In the African case, it is the alternation of wet and dry which drives Man toward oases and toward dispersals. Likely as a universal theme, the more promising condensations are driven toward river valleys, and certainly invariably to search for reliable water supplies. Of all the chemical potentials, oxygen and then water are the most pressing (followed by temperature).

But the nature of the condensation depends on the state of the technological potential.
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What the new Egyptian story indicates is that the potential for significant condensation already exists in the Neanderthal-modern Man transitional period. The adaption, by necessity, of the wide variety of mid-Paleolithic tool industries is indicative of such capability.

What can come out of these two driving potentials – change in water potential, change in technological potential? Either cleverer adaption of tools and modes of living (and there is ample evidence around the earth for those processes), or condensation in place. This is via domestication:

- domestication of plant and animal, and
- later water resource, and still later
- all required resources—the status we are seeking now.

Thus, we would submit, that with these two changing potentials, it is only a matter of time and place for condensation to fixed agriculture to occur, as a liquid-like condensation.

We believe critical detailed study could establish much more precisely criteria for such transition, and when or where it might have occurred (35). In Europe, it relates to the end of the glacial age 10,000 years before the present. In Northern Africa, to the 8,000 (rather, 8,000 – 7,000) to 4,500 pluvial age. In both cases, the new condensation related to changed water supplies and the existing technology.

But the empirical data seem to foreshadow the theoretical result. The process of transition is (a) neither so difficult to occur, nor (b) so guaranteed to be lasting.

Note that all that is required is Man to adapt his action modes of behavior to the species he wishes to domesticate, and to put some selection pressure on the species to adapt toward his action modes. Such symbioses are very common in the biological world, so it was hardly a novel invention. An epigenetic memory of time and place and sequential ordering is quite useful. But these are the attributes that Man had, so that the adaption process did not have to take the more usual million-year genetic scale of species. Rather, it could be a facilitated diffusion speeded up a thousand-fold to thousand-year scaling. That is the difference between the genetic and the epigenetic process.

So, near self-sufficient agriculture could emerge in the Nile valley, in the Tigris-Euphrates valley, in the Americas, elsewhere in Africa, in the Asian steppes (and be given up), in the Indus valley, in China. Were these all independent, or diffusively propagated? That requires expert detailed study. Some were independent, others derivative. For example, the diffusive spread of agriculture over Europe at the millennial scale has been carefully documented (36).
The emergence of a settled life and a dependence on cultivation is as extensive as the period of perhaps 20,000 to 10,000 years before the present. Without a great deal of local specificity, there is no reason to expect any lesser period of transition, and one would expect only very spotty beginnings.

Therefore, it is no surprise that a significant threshold for the startup of agriculture is given by about 10,000 years before the present (35) and associated with major changes in water potential:

- In the Eurasian region, one would associate it with the withdrawal of the glaciers (end of the last ice age), dated loosely 12,000 to 10,000 years before the present, and the dispersion of melting front, grasses, grazers, predators, toward new “permanent” water supplies – river valleys, well-watered mountain flanks, lakes, and springs.
- In Africa, one would associate it with concomitant wet-dry periods with condensation and radiation forces toward more permanent water supplies.
- In the Americas, with a time delay to master the land, we can see multiple starts at a later date.

Thus, the self-sufficient agricultural village, located strategically with regard to water supplies, became a new feature of the earth’s social landscape for Man, interspersed in some regions mosaic-like with hunter-gatherers.

In general, what one appears to see prior to civilization is a deterioration of environmental conditions, pressure for technological innovation, regionalization of social groups, a mosaic of cultural types (sympatric societies – various cultures occupying roughly the same niche, by basically using different tool traditions, and with modest separation, i.e., latent condensations).

Now, in a physical context, one would say that:

(1) two or more atomistic type fluid-like assemblages coexist in the field – solvent or solute (?)
(2) in which one kind of precipitated-out group (already condensed, or nearly condensed) will
(3) take over the superior social role and
(4) force the other groups either into opposition,
(5) or, dispersal (unlikely),
(6) or, absorb them into the condensation.

Therefore,
This occurred, hypothetically, as the Mousterian – Cro-Magnon transition (that is, 50,000 to 40,000 years before the present);

In the hunter-gatherer – agriculturist transition (that is, 20,000 to 10,000 years before the present);

It may have happened in various agriculturist – nomad transitions either way;

It may have occurred in the Acheulean – Mousterian transition (likely a Homo – Homo transition); or

Even in the eolithic – Acheulean transition (still an X-Homo transition, as far as the certain record of hominid types is concerned); and

It occurred in the agriculturalist – civilizational transition (e.g., 8,000 to 5,000 years before the present).

IV. Civilization, a Second Transition – Appearance of a New Conservation

Given these two possible social forms – hunter-gatherer, agricultural village settlement (and also, forest efficiencies and pastoralist nomads), why is there any need for any further transitions? There is obviously pressure for continuing evolution of agricultural-based technology, as well as dwellings, clothing, further domestication. But why any further transitions? Are there needs that dominate?

Such condensations, although they are liquid-like, that is no longer with 70 to 100 miles separations, are not all located in a perfect strategic manner. The greater permanence of food supply, with agriculture, instead of mobile hunter-gatherer, permits an appreciable growth or accretion in population and population density. Their separation is reduced to less than roaming range size, i.e., less than 25-mile separation. But now, again, mutual needs – for materials, for breeding population, for alliances against human predation, for security from climatic vicissitudes – all make some form of trading intercourse necessary. Since the settlement is fixed, and the materials of trade have to be carried, a fluid-like flow process known as convection is involved.

It is a remarkable consequence of physical interaction that, in an interacting field, there are only three types of field processes – diffusive, wave propagative, and convective. The first two are linear, the third is non-linear. It is marked by the product of the field carrier’s variable, e.g., velocity, and that which is carried, e.g., energy, momentum, matter, population, action.

In mathematical physical theory, there is an interesting consequence of having the combination of nonlinear and dissipative processes: The diffusions involve energy dissipation. What that means is not disappearance of energy, which is a conservation, but its dispersion, thermodynamically, among various participants. New singular states of motion may arise, as stability transitions (10, 11).
Notice that this does not involve a new matter condensation – after all the settlements have already provided condensation – but a new social format for movement and change throughout the field. The question is how shall the human social process respond to such new social pressure?

One must dwell on the requirement for social cohesion in any population center. People must recognize each other and have a basis for social bonding. This is represented within the agricultural village and it probably limits the size to less than 500, a rough count of the number of faces that can be recognized (37).

Primate social ordering— see Eisenberg (5)— or the more specialized hominid band formation (2) suggest the “traditional” kinds of village leadership that may emerge, and the variety of possible dependences on kinship and hereditary and appointed occupations arising or developing from a division of labor (for further, see Murdock (38)).

But now with convective fluid forces, there is pressure to permit the foreigner in for trade. Diffusion coefficients still prevail to govern conductances (a tautological statement), but they are now facilitated diffusions. For those familiar with hydrodynamic and engineering fluid mechanical concepts, these diffusions are no longer molecular diffusions (that is, person-to-person Brownian motion, per Einstein) but eddy diffusions. They are carried by the field fluxes, not by the individual atomisms.

We will now make the required connection to the central theme.

What is the essential nature of civilization? As we heard the themes in the 1979 ISCSC session on origins of civilization, it is a source of argument whether religion, or agriculture, or urban settlement, or trade, or literacy, or recorded tradition, etc., is the essential causal ingredient for civilization.

Let us go to the dictionary for what is the common ingredient involved in civilization. It appears to be the notion of *civitas* – the existence of a formal set of objective rules that clearly set forth to the onlooker, whether insider or outsider, what the relations are that govern hierarchical, heterarchical, or stratified class members that are permitted physical access to the society; e.g., ruler-citizen, master-slave, citizen-citizen, or citizen-outsider. It is rules of civil organization.

Believe it or not, that set of formal constraints, as “political” – flow of authority, for example, see Lasswell (39) – constraints, determines the impedances or conductances (diffusions) to flow. Diffusions are no longer solely physically determined, but they are facilitated or impeded by Man-made law.
It is quite interesting that, with written language going back to perhaps 5,000 to 5,500 years before the present, very largely recording person-to-person transactions (or extolling the deeds of ruler elites), that by about 4,200 to 3,700 years before the present, we find the first recorded codes governing largely class relations in the urban city-state. These clearly emerge as an equipollent (equal in power or significance -- ed.) or heterarchical (system of organization in which the elements are unranked or may be ranked in various ways -- ed.) element in the rise of empires (ensembles) of city-states.

It would be very impressive to push such city-state codes back another millennium, or even more impressive – in sharpness of transition – if such codes were found “recorded” (instead of simply implied) for the period of about 8,000 years before the present (or, at the outside, 10,000 years before the present), but we have to allow the possibility of a number of two millennia relaxations for Man to make such drastic transitions.

At the present, we cannot offer any greater precision in social scaling. An agricultural (effective) startup of 10,000 years before the present could not be accompanied by further hydrodynamic stability transitions in fewer than a few such relaxations.

How is such rationalization effected? (Rationalization: the creation of bureaucratic institutionalized forms by which human actions are regulated, e.g., laws.) It obviously involves abstractions, a functional performance which can be spewed out of the human mind with great ease. But how to endow it so that it has…value!!

Clearly, Man, as Man, with cultural symbols from his beginning (even with indications of their beginnings in Neanderthalers), could accept, in fact had to accept, value systems. Why “had to”? Because of the new freedom of abstraction in the brain, which would permit him both to time delay and form arbitrary “linguistic” associations.

Magico-religion became one such value system – e.g., shaman and totem and taboo, and ritual. But clearly agricultural systems and later urban systems required much more complex totems. It is hardly accidental that ziggurats in the Tigris – Euphrates mark some of the earliest structures in that urban explosion, or the probable evidence of religious formalism in Catal Huyuk.

So, certainly a particular explicit form (structurally institutionalized religion) emerges quite early in civilizational interaction. Clearly now civilizational interaction begins when there is extensive convection of trade among population concentration (urban) centers. They would be marked by populations greater than 500; e.g., composite groups in which appreciably more than a threshold of perhaps 2,500 persons were involved. The latter number was estimated from a cut off of complex cultures of about this size in Murdock (38).
But that convective interaction involves stranger and insider. It can no longer be
governed by established tradition (an oral heritage accepted by all internal parties, as in
the family, or in the local isolated village). Thus, an objective symbolism must be
invented. Using what? Using the intensive store of epigenetic value, but now
externalized into value-in-trade, a symbolic form invented out of mind and endowed
with value for all transactions. All other real conservations can be traded for using this
idealistic conservation.

The basic rule is that in each transaction, “equal” value is traded (by whatever defines
equality of value at the moment). Thus, the economic conservation is invented, comes
into being out of mind. With it arises a pricing system. And with it arises also the utter
terror of inflation, a runaway value system. As Pareto explained (40), it is all right for
society to pull the rug under its value-in-trade system as long as the next generation of
players is not discouraged from play.

This hopefully introduces, by physical reasoning, the economic variable into a social
physics as one additional and final conservation.

V: A Note on the Death of Civilization

But an optimistic note that each adolescent generation brings anew to the social
experience, that this is the life, that the now of this lifetime is the only one that counts,
is doomed to failure. Why? Because the system is unstable, thermodynamically. The
“why” of that instability is a basic piece of physical reasoning.

The young diffuse into society, diffuse and bind into its nested hierarchical institutions
– family, neighborhood, local political community (now largely either urban or rural),
national political community, plus acquire an epigenetic heritage, and gradually take
the roles of the adults they displace and replace.

That turnover guarantees no new successes. The problems of the past are propagated,
new ones are added. The conservations that have to be satisfied remain the same, what
each generation does not learn is the total operational wisdom that the past generation
may have acquired. That seems to take a lifetime of perhaps 20 to 40 to 60 years to
learn something about.

In traditional societies, in which movement is slow (movement from outside), the old
can act as ambulatory memories on how things are best done. The integration of notions
of how to deal with complex social systems in which the convective currents (e.g., daily,
weekly, monthly, yearly, per generation) are large and constantly changing with
vicissitudes is not quickly learned. It is a limitation of the human mind.
Most elite leaders are thrown into their basically abstract reasoning role in society with less than twenty years of experience past their adolescent growth. Their reactions are based on the biological motor-sensory responses of the moment. A political horizon of six months to one year is and has been the most common characteristic of Man since civilization began.

That turnover period is fine and fits the agricultural village or the hunger-gatherer society to a T. In such societies, the only conservations that have to be satisfied are materials, energy, and action modes. Some vague attention has to be paid by ambulatory memories as to the reproductive balance; the biological action mode of sexing itself is no issue. Each generation of young comes superbly prepared to quickly learn the mode, if necessary by trial and error. So, the social action, if any, is to regulate and control the issue of childbirth. Clearly, under these circumstances, the need for longer range planning or information, of an abstract nature, can be left to a few – leaders, elders, shamans, priests.

But face the issue in civilizations, with the continued influx of strangers and trade, and the requirement for symbolic balance in trade, requires responsiveness to ever-changing external conditions. Now one requires each youthful generation to develop a fantastic amount of action capability to deal with a complex series of interactions. As usual, it is not the populace who are concerned with the mastery of such operations but an “elite” structure, if you will, a new “priesthood.” As usual, from the nature of command and control systems, such operation is confined to an elite of a few percent of the population.

But they are not biological queen bees, endowed by some royal jelly with special powers. They are ordinary human beings, the same youth as the more plebian followers. As young priests of the market place—whether in feudal societies, or commercial, or capitalistic, or communistic, or socialistic, or dictatorships, or anarchies – they cannot and do not learn how to operate a complex society. That literally requires understanding and controlling conservational balances for periods of the order of one to three generations, the social equilibrium period.

In civilizations, that also involves high expectation of major wars per generation in the ecumene. Civilizations, from their beginnings, involve alternations of trade and war.

The issue, further, is that not only must the elite leader understand how to strike all the necessary balances for such periods, but he must convince the people, his followers, to carry out the requirements so posed. Over one year he can do it; for three years (e.g., the political process), he can do it. But to impose the kind of rational regulation and control required for longer periods, he cannot succeed. The political leader, and other elites, can supply a schema for rationalization (the hallmark of civilization), but he cannot succeed in supplying a schema for rationality.
And so periodically, the overall mismanagement of the social system catches up with itself and the system tumbles.

We have no real belief that we can make more than a handwaving estimate of that time scale at this time, but it also seems to come out – by any reasonable theory – to be of the order of 500 years. It takes perhaps twenty odd generations of elites before the mismatch produces incoherence.

But the societal members and local institutions—e.g., family, local agricultural community, are still designed for the year operation. So even when civilizations tumble, or come apart, or reform, the local units largely survive intact and begin the task of putting together a new form. And so, on it goes and has to go on for this biological species.

References

Readers: An Invitation to a Continuing Debate
Joseph Drew

For many years, the International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations has debated a central conundrum: Can we even define “civilization?”

Background

The organization was created in 1961, with a conference held at Salzburg, Austria. Scholars gathered there under the auspices of UNESCO for six days in October. Among those present were Pitirim Sorokin and Arnold Toynbee. The topics included the definition of the word “civilization,” problems in the analysis of complex cultures, civilizational encounters in the past, the Orient vs. the Occident, problems of universal history, theories of historiography, and the role of the social sciences and the humanities in globalization.

But civilization was not a new word in 1961 nor was it a new topic.

Arnold Toynbee begins his magisterial work, A Study of History with a first chapter, at least in the Somervell abridgement, entitled “The Unit of Historical Study.” He says that British national history never has been, and almost certainly never will be, an “intelligible field of historical study” in isolation; and “if that is true of Great Britain it surely must be true of any other national state a fortiori.” He then goes on to argue that one cannot study the city states of ancient Greece from 725 to 325 B.C. but rather the whole of Hellenic Society as the field in order to understand the significance of the various local histories. It is the same, he says, with the various small republics and cities of Northern Italy during the Middle Ages and with the differentiation between the national states of Europe in the Middle Ages and today.

So, he concludes: we must focus our attention upon the whole, because this whole is the field of study that is intelligible by itself. Then, he asks: what are these “wholes” in history? He finds most of Europe to be Western Christendom. And of the same species today he finds the Orthodox Christian society of Southeastern Europe and Russia; an Islamic Society, a Hindu Society, and a Far-Eastern Society. He then lists two sets of fossilized relics of similar societies, ones which are now extinct. One of these is that of the early Christians, Jews and Parsees; the second is Mahayana Buddhists of various countries and the Jains of India. His conclusion, he writes, is that the intelligible unit of historical study in neither a nation state nor mankind as a whole, but “a certain grouping of humanity which we have called a society.”
His next chapter is entitled “The Comparative Study of Civilizations.” He identifies 21 societies that he writes are in process of civilization. He cites G. Elliot Smith’s book *The Ancient Egyptians and the Origins of Civilization* and W. H. Perry’s work *The Children of the Sun: A Study in the Early History of Civilization*. To Toynbee, the comparable units of history are civilizations.

Probably the most popular work of the modern period on the subject of civilizations is Samuel Huntington’s *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. His book is divided into five sections:

1. A World of Civilizations
2. The Shifting Balance of Civilizations
3. The Emerging Order of Civilizations
4. Clashes of Civilizations
5. The Future of Civilizations

One interesting aspect to me is that in his theory development section he alludes to Thomas Kuhn’s great work *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. Kuhn shows that science has advanced with the displacement of one explanatory paradigm by another paradigm. The old one is not capable of explaining new facts, but the new paradigm can account for those facts in a more satisfactory fashion.

Huntington sets forth how various paradigms—incompatible with each other and full of deficiencies and limitations—have explained the modern world, the Cold War paradigm in particular. With the end of the Cold War came many competing maps or paradigms of world politics: the end of history thesis of Francis Fukuyama; Two Worlds: Us and Them; 184 States, More or Less; and Sheer Chaos.

But, says Huntington, viewing the world in terms of seven or eight civilizations avoids many of the difficulties each poses and is more compatible with the other competing theories than they are with each other. It sets forth a relatively simple map for understanding what was going on in the world as the 20th century ended.

You will notice that many, perhaps most of the individuals Huntington has listed who were alive from 1961 onward have participated actively in the International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations, an organization that persists to this day.

In Chapter Two, Huntington states that the idea of civilization was developed by 18th century French thinkers as the opposite of the concept of “barbarism.” Civilized society, he writes, differed from primitive society because it was settled, urban, and literate. “To be civilized was good, to be uncivilized was bad.”

He discusses civilization versus culture, a topic that has been very popular among our readers, noting that for Braudel, it is “a space, a ‘cultural area.’” In the chapter he makes five arguments about civilization and then proceeds to list as major contemporary civilizations ones he labels as the Sinic, Japanese, Hindu, Islamic, Orthodox, Western Latin American, and African—this latter he defines as “possibly.”

In the Spring 2006 issue, Number 54, of the Comparative Civilizations Review, we carried a fifty-page section called “Bibliographical History and Indices of the Comparative Civilizations Review.” The section was authored by Michael Palencia-Roth, a former president. After a brief history, the index lists articles indexed by author; book reviews, indexed by book’s author or editors; and book reviews, indexed by book titles. Many of the names cited by Huntington are present in this index, either as subjects of study themselves or as authors.

I often refer to a great collection, Theories of Society: Foundations of Modern Sociological Theory. It was put together by Parsons, Shils, Naegele and Pitts. Selections written by many of those mentioned by Huntington are in this book, as well.

A number of popular works have long addressed the meaning of “civilizations.” Here are six such books:

- One is “The Outline of History: The Whole Story of Man”, by H.G. Wells. I count in the index 30 citations of civilizations; the third book in the outline is entitled “The First Civilizations.”

- Another is “The Story of Civilization” by Will Durant. Durant opens with six chapters called “The Establishment of Civilization.” The titles are: The Conditions of Civilization; The Economic Elements of Civilization; The Political Elements of Civilization; The Moral Elements of Civilization; The Mental Elements of Civilization; and The Prehistoric Beginnings of Civilization. To Durant, civilization is a social order promoting cultural creation.
• A popular scholarly set of books is “A History of Civilization” by Brinton, Christopher, and Wolff. It slides over the definition, arguing only that man moved from prehistory to history, and from a culture to a civilization, saying only that the point at which a culture becomes a civilization is to some degree a matter of individual opinion.

• In his widely read book, “History of the World” J. M. Roberts wrote that “Civilization is the name we give to the interaction of human beings in a very creative way, when, as it were, a critical mass of cultural potential and a certain surplus of resources have been built up. In civilization this releases human capacities for development at quite a new level and in large measure the development which follows is self-sustaining.” But, he says, this is somewhat abstract and so he turns to examples.

He makes several arguments about what causes civilization and then states that it is easier to say something generally true about the marks of early civilization than about the way it happened. He concludes that thought: “Again, no absolute and universal statements are plausible.”

• Freud, in his monumental work “Civilization and Its Discontents” wrote that civilization describes “the whole sum of the achievements and the regulations which distinguish our lives from those of our animal ancestors and which serve two purposes – namely to protect men against nature and to adjust their mutual relations.” This is only problematic because the editor of the English version simply writes in a footnote: ‘Kultur.’ Then he states, “For the translation of this word see the Editor’s Note to The Future of an Illusion.”

• Finally, we have “The Boundaries of Civilizations in Space and Time” by Matt Melko and Leighton R. Scott. This work collects the results of discussions in many sessions over the years of the topic at hand. A total of 56 individuals are listed as participants. Matt identifies Oswald Spengler, Toynbee, and A. L. Kroeber as initiators during the period following World War I but observes that much criticism of the idea that civilizations followed certain courses rendered the topic less central to academic discussion.

In Chapter Two of the book, Leighton R. Scott says that the “complication of the subject” “guarantees no more than a measure of certainty and may indeed inhibit realization or understanding of ultimate desiderata or objectives.” Nevertheless, he writes, members of the ISCSC have been driven to evoke whole definitions, theories replete with lists of “criteria” and disclosure of “qualities.” The book then goes on for hundreds of pages discussing the subject.
As a result of this interesting topic, and of the formation in 1961 of the International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations, there have been over the years at the annual meetings many sessions dealing with definitions of civilization and the formulation of lists of them. Hot debates have marked many of them, but no definitive conclusion has been reached. What we can say for certain is that the study of civilizations has waxed and waned. Today, it is once more a major topic of public discourse.

The Challenge

So, readers, the question before us is: Is it possible to define the word “civilization” in English and in a way that the majority of scholars will accept it?

Please submit your answer and we will publish it in the Spring 2020 issue. Thank you.

Joseph Drew
Editor-in-Chief
FROM OUR AUTHORS

We are introducing here a special section dedicated to our member-authors and their published works.

The editors of *Comparative Civilizations Review* extend an invitation to all who write about the comparative study of civilizations and who would like a selection from their work to be published in the journal to submit their copy to Peter Hecht, Managing Editor, at peter.hecht@iscsc.org. The selection will be reviewed by the Editorial Board and, upon acceptance, scheduled for publication as space becomes available.

**The Sage, The Swordsman, and the Scholars**
by Pierre Dimaculangan

This issue of *Comparative Civilizations Review* features an excerpt from a work by Pierre Dimaculangan. Pierre is the author of several books. He has been a member of the International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations for many years and was named the 2014 International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations “Outstanding Young Scholar” award winner at our annual meeting in Monmouth University.

*The Sage, The Swordsman and the Scholars: Trials of the Middle Kingdom*, Second Edition, by Pierre Dimaculangan is the first in a series of four books. Pierre’s expansive knowledge of Chinese history, along with his considerable writing talent, enables him to bring historical fiction to life for the reader. Pierre is also an accomplished digital artist and has personally done all of the cover and marketing art for his works. In addition to this book, Pierre has published the second novel in the series, *Clash of Alliances*, as well as the children’s book *Flight of Garu*. 
Pierre Dimaculangan

The Sage, the Swordsman and the Scholars
Trials of the Middle Kingdom
Second Edition

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol81/iss81/14
A FATEFUL ACQUAINTANCE

He hiked pensively through the marshy and sparsely wooded landscape of the province of Guangxi. His head hung low, and though his body moved in a purposeful direction, his mind spun and wandered more than usual. He had just returned from the desert regions of the western edges of the Ming Empire after having hunted down a troublesome warlord who had long caused havoc and unrest in the region. However, the success of his mission no longer left him with the same feeling of satisfaction. A gaping hole in his heart nagged at his soul, and the possible meaninglessness of his deeds was becoming more and more apparent. Sun Xin was entering the tenth year of his wanderings in the empire yet, for all his accomplishments, he felt emptier than when he had first begun. Much had changed within him since he took the first step on his lonesome journeys throughout the Middle Kingdom.
PIERRE DIMACULANGAN

Over the years he had made friends and enemies, and forged fragile alliances with rivals if he had not already eliminated them. His greatest frustration however, stemmed from the questions that plagued his mind. Does anything I do even matter? Are the pain and anguish worth the effort? Though his personal crusade had entered its first decade, a sense of futility was beginning to grow with his every action. In fact, it appeared that the more he tried, the worse it became. It was not enough, yet his only chosen recourse was more and more killing. His heart grew as frosty as his blade.

So many years had been invested into his sword, but how much longer would he have to continue these quests? He was but three years from the age of thirty, and already the incessant fighting and endless roaming on every quest would, in time, leave little room for additional scars on his body. Reality was weighing more heavily on his mind than anywhere else. However, the utter hatred he carried for those he considered unworthy to be kept alive inspired him to continue the fight. Sun Xin was without a horse so he undertook his long and uneventful journey on foot. The lack of speed added to his frustration.

His thoughts and feelings continued to conflict as he cut his way through the marsh. He ignored the fact that he had just entered the misty dominion of the Crimson Moon Sect— one of the many bothersome rebel groups experiencing resurgence across the land. They were naught but deluded cutthroats who have deemed themselves worthy of a “righteous crusade”?

Away from the noise of his troubled soul, it was the rustling of leaves, the melody of a stream, and the whispers of the wind that produced the sounds of the forest in the morning. Even the locks of his long black hair danced to the left and right of his face. A
melancholy song slowly entered in harmony with the music of the forest. Sun Xin played his flute to the rhythm of that flowing stream to calm his spirit and clear a clouded mind. Into the heart of the forest he strode under the rays of sunlight beaming between the trees.

The peace and the music were abruptly disturbed by the sudden, though expected appearance of the Crimson Moon Sect. Out from the undergrowth they leaped and stood before him motionless, hooded, and clad in black. The whole forest fell silent, leaving only the menacing sounds of their rasping breaths and the faint rattling of their chained sickles. The silence of the air was broken by the sudden whistle of a rushing arrow rapidly approaching from his rear. In one swift motion and a spin of the heel, Sun Xin drew his sword and slashed the arrow mid-flight. Together, the occultists attacked when his back had turned, but they were quickly dispatched by the masterful strokes of his blade; a deep thrust into the chest of the first followed by a diagonal slash across the belly of the second were enough to neutralize the threats. More arrows darted toward him, but he dove away from their trajectory. The bowman was obscured amongst heavy bamboo foliage so Xin made a mad dash to his position and cut the bamboo to reveal the shooter who then vanished in a plume of white smoke.

What was left of the bodies he had slain had seemingly vaporized into thin air. Empty. It was typical of the trickery practiced by the dark ones. He scoffed at their pathetic attempt to ambush him, but such was the nature of his journeys across the countryside.

“They never learn,” he muttered to himself.

He drew a sharp sigh, sheathed his sword, and tightened the chin strap of his broad-brimmed hat. He continued down a hidden trail
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deep into the thickness of the forest. The foliage canopy eventually led into an opening revealing a small river valley. In the distance, embracing a mountainside engulfed by mist and mountain fog, stood a small homestead surrounded by colorful vegetable gardens. Gray smoke ascended from the rooftop eaves that gently curved up to the sky. A sign above the door post of the cabin read *Heaven watches over this home*. He had passed by the remote homestead before. It looked inviting and perhaps its resident would allow a weary traveler food and brief respite. It was in the moment when he approached the front steps of the cabin that Sun Xin suddenly staggered and struggled to keep his footing.

His vision narrowed and a terrible burn scorched the back of his neck. When he had felt for it, a crimson stain streaked across his palm. An arrow had, indeed, managed to leave its mark on him. He fell at the doorstep of the cabin and faded into unconsciousness…

He awakened with a start, though dazed, in a sweat, and inflicted with head pain. Half a dozen fine needles were embedded into the vital points and nerves of his neck and shoulder. He was greeted by a silvery-haired man noticeably older than he and wore on his face a peaceful and kind countenance. It was the hermit of the home.

“It was by no accident you have arrived to my humble home, Master Swordsman,” he said while handing Xin a pitcher of water. “I hope those horrid bandits did not give you too much trouble. They have tried to enter my home before only to discover that this sign speaks the truth.” He chuckled while pointing toward the sign outside.

“You mean to say that Heaven intervened?” Xin asked as soon as he guzzled a tankard of water.
THE SAGE, THE SWORDSMAN AND THE SCHOLARS

“Indeed, it was by the Will of Heaven that you have made it here,” he replied with a satisfied grin. “You were in a slumber for three days since the poison needed to run its course. You, my friend, are quite fortunate. The poison you received was but a fraction of the intended dose.”

“Did you really say ‘Heaven’?” Xin muttered trying to shake off the disorientation. “You sound like my old master.”

The hermit simply smiled.

Sun Xin was not sure how to react to the stranger who seemed to have saved his life, but his instincts dictated that he was at least trustworthy, and harmless most of all. His wounded neck was patched in herbs, but the burn remained. He should be grateful. He was not so sure of how to express it, not to mention that this was the first time anyone had saved his life in such a way.

The hermit was of average stature, though, rather taller than others of his ripe age and had a light beard encircling his mouth. He was neatly dressed and groomed for someone who lived in seclusion upon a mountain far away from any village or township.

“That is a very fine sword you carry, Wanderer,” he commented as he cast his gaze upon Sun Xin’s straight sword. “I have yet to see any other such as yours, so ornate and fine. It bears the elegance and skill of a master craftsman. I certainly hope that it has not been misused in any way. A gentleman’s weapon should not be used for selfish gain,” he said smiling as he plucked the needles from Xin’s body.

It had been a very long time since Xin had met a man who conducted himself with such peace. He turned his gaze to where the sword leaned against the corner.

“It is both a gift and a burden and my answer to those who seek
other times than peace. In this sword lies my purpose,” Sun Xin answered. It is curious that a hermit would show interest in a sword, he thought.

“Ah yes, I see, I see,” the hermit nodded.

Sun Xin stayed well after dark with the mysterious man whose name he did not even ask.

They talked over tea and hot stew until the moon peaked its arc across the night sky. Their conversation went to and fro discussing such things the ancient philosophers once pondered and taught.

“So tell me your story,” said the hermit. “Tell from whence you came that you would stumble upon my home, barely alive whilst brandishing a crossbow and a fancy sword that, um, I assume has tasted much blood.”

Sun Xin lowered his gaze and leaned against the bed frame. “The all me a ‘Youxia’— a knight-errant. But I am naught but a lone swordsman. For years I had been drifting through the lands serving as an independent agent employed with the League—er...” he stopped mid-sentence, being careful about what he would reveal. “I am under contract with an underground guild of learned men who have sworn themselves to protect the Middle Kingdom from the shadows. They only desire to help keep the peace, but are independent from the tiresome politics of the imperial bureaucracy. They’re not bound by the burdensome complications of law and war. Before landing here I was on my way to Guangzhou to meet with them.”

“Ah, so they are what you would call ‘glorified vigilantes’,” the hermit commented.

“More like unofficial secret police,” Xin corrected him. “Yes, their order is largely secretive, they operate in plain sight. I should
emphasize that I am no mere bounty hunter or sellsword, nor am I puppet hit man who couldn’t care less about the corruption of government officials high and low. I fight for a cause of the highest calling, and what I do is not for myself, but for the good of others.”

Sun Xin was quite surprised with himself. He had never been so quick to talk nor had he divulged such information so easily, especially with a stranger.

“And yet you seem largely dissatisfied. I can see it in your eyes. A conflict burns within your soul,” the hermit said.

“You would know of such things, hermit?” Xin asked redirecting his steely gaze to the face of his host.

“I have experienced much and received plenty. But I know nothing on my own other than that which has been revealed to me,” he answered plainly. “The cause of goodness is always like swimming upstream against the raging currents of a mighty river. Those who swim in it are becoming fewer. Evil, however, enjoys an easy route, and is practiced with little effort by countless followers. Pursuing the path of evil is like riding the downstream current of that river and it pulls you faster and farther with every passing moment,” the hermit changed his tone to a whisper. “... until you’ve drifted so fast and so far you can no longer turn back.”

“You’re telling me this because...?” Sun Xin questioned with a raised eyebrow.

“Because I see your pursuit of right, or at least the enforcement of it, is genuine. But you tread a thin line as fine as the spider’s silk. One wrong step and you’ll be riding the river downstream and headed for a waterfall too!” chuckled the hermit. He nearly coughed from it.

“So you’ve got me all figured out, is that it? You don’t have to
worry about me, ‘Uncle,’” muttered Xin with a hint of sarcasm. “I’d rather die than be anything like the criminal or rebel scum I have learned to hate.”

“That is exactly what I mean,” the hermit answered.

“Like what?” Xin said, this time his tone more terse.

“The hate. It will make you paddle downstream.”

Sun Xin did not answer. He grimaced at the reminder. It was a lesson his master had long instilled in him. But the very precepts of the sword art he wielded were left buried and forgotten in a deserted crevice of his hardened heart. It was a heart that now burned with a fiery rage that fueled his curse, a bloodlust and callousness to the sight of death. He considered himself to be a righteous man even though he had long discarded the sacred principles his master had bestowed upon him since childhood. He refused to accept it, but deep inside, Sun Xin knew the moral path he had chosen was one in which there would be no return.

The cost of his own humanity was the price he was ultimately willing to pay for the realization of his vision.

Mercy? Forgiveness? These were weaknesses that yielded no results for the swift eradication of evil! he kept telling himself. He believed his master was mistaken, even naive for adhering to such doctrine, and apparently so was this hermit.

The hermit reached for the tea pot. “Let’s shift to a more light-hearted topic, shall we? You were asking about the sign posted outside my door.”

The hermit spoke continuously of Heaven whom he called Shang Di, the “Lord of Heaven” whom the ancients once worshiped, honored, and obeyed.

“The Way is Heaven’s gift—a revelation and the transcendent
THE SAGE, THE SWORDSMAN AND THE SCHOLARS

path of righteousness that humanity has been ordained to walk,” he proclaimed. “Through the Way all things were created. It is only through the perfect Way that the imperfect world can be saved.”

He made further mention of outlandish antiquated beliefs concerning the invisible things like the so-called spirits inhabiting the world. He also spoke of the machinations of darkness and the personification of it that worked furiously to lead men far from the knowledge of the Way, presenting in its stead a false path. “All such things,” he claimed, “would only become more evident in the days to come.”

The hermit sage shared his convictions of such ancient things with a doctrine that Sun Xin found unusually old-fashioned, overly superstitious, and riddled with dogma. He would usually ignore the crazed ramblings of such old men, but there was something about the hermit that Xin found intriguing. He was wise and collected as if he was completely sure about the truths of which he spoke.

“Such teachings have been forgotten or regarded as outdated belief neither practiced nor studied in its orthodoxy for more than two and a half thousand years,” said the hermit.

Still, it was intriguing and unusually frustrating for Xin to have to absorb. The hermit preached of Heaven’s will and the indispensability of impartial love for all people. Love, he said, was the cure for all the evil and injustice of man. It is, as he said, the supreme ethic that embodied the nature of the “Way”...

Whatever it was he meant by it, thought Xin.

On the other hand, Xin stubbornly stood firm in his convictions in the enforcement of law and in the administering of justice by force.

The hermit intrigued him. He was such a curious character
because he shared a wisdom that had been largely forgotten and strangely difficult to refute. In many ways, he reminded Xin of his old master for they were similar in their convictions and philosophies.

“You speak like a man from the age of sages, but I do not see any disciples?” Sun Xin inquired.

The hermit redirected his gaze to the floor. “I traveled from province to province telling others of my revelation, but there was no room in the hearts of the people. Those who would listen fear ridicule or even estrangement from their homes.”

“And what is your message?” Xin asked with a raised eyebrow.

Before the hermit could answer, the cabin rattled and shook. An obnoxious hammering and crashing suddenly plagued the house. Savage whoops and shrieks pierced through the nooks and crannies of the home and could be heard echoing across the valley beyond. It was intimidation in one of its more aggressive forms. The Crimson Moon Sect had returned. They seemed to have followed Xin into the hermit’s home and wanted his blood in revenge for their fallen comrades or for perhaps the priceless bounty that had been placed on his head. He quickly reached for his sword, but was stopped by the hermit.

“Stay your blade, Swordsman! They cannot enter here,” he snapped.

Xin started to protest. “They will break down your door and—”

“No, they most certainly will not.” The hermit said, this time in a low voice, almost a whisper.

Xin was most uncomfortable with the situation. He scrambled to his sword and gripped it tightly. His vision focused and his heartbeat quickened. The incessant banging on the walls and the door grew more aggressive, and he almost drew his blade before the hermit
stood firmly in front of him with both his hands resting on his cane, and he declared:

“I rebuke you, foul agents of the enemy! Be gone; you have no place here! This home belongs to Heaven! You have been warned!”

A mighty gust likened to a monsoon wind rushed through the interior of the cabin, causing the candle lights to dim to a near simmer. The air grew cold and the night fell eerily silent. As quickly as it began, the terrors of the night had ceased and the echoes faded into the valley. The cultists had fled deep into the black forest from whence they came. Sun Xin stood motionless and stunned, unable to comprehend what he had just witnessed. What sort of trickery was this? He sought an explanation, but was not sure what to ask first.

“What happened? What did you just do?” He questioned as he stood clutching his sheathed sword. The hermit sighed, but with a smile said:

“Well, you did ask me what my message was, and what you have just witnessed is but a small testament to that,” said the hermit. “Knowing Heaven is the great endeavor. Walking in the Way negates the necessity of sheer force. A sword may have its uses in the hands of the righteous, but it is not a staff which one should lean upon.”

Sun Xin was not fond of preachy philosophy. He merely smirked at the hermit’s answer. But nonetheless, he slept that night pondering the mysterious words of the hermit and nursing the toxic wound inflicted by the poisonous arrow.

The events of that night continued to bewilder him. Xin did not consider himself to be a superstitious man and he considered such spiritual teaching, for the most part, a hindrance to the progress of society. It most often served as an avenue for violent fanaticism. However, he felt something strangely different with the hermit even
though he could not fully understand the meaning of his words. Was he some sort of sorcerer? He could not be, Xin thought. The hermit was nothing like the fabled wizards or mages in ancient times. How was it that he was able to stop the attack so quickly and effortlessly? His thoughts kept him awake for another two hours before he finally found sleep.

When morning had arrived, the sun cast rays of gold into the valley and its light beamed brightly through the open window. His sword leaned against the hearth, and the lion’s face engraved upon its golden hilt glistened against the morning light. He slung the sword across the back of his hip while flexing away the stiffness in his joints. He had grown eager to return to Guangzhou and already had spent too much time lying around in the hermit’s home. The old man was outside sitting silently by the stream possibly praying or meditating.

Xin joined him outside for breakfast. After a bath in the stream, he was presented with his robes—newly washed and neatly folded next to his dusted boots. After donning his mail vest and dark blue robes, he secured his hard leather bracers into his forearms and secured the tightening straps around them. The crossbow he slung behind his back. The sword he refastened to his hip. Finally, his trusty rattan hat now rested upon his crown strapped firmly around his jaw and chin.

“I must take my leave. My allies in Guangzhou are expecting my arrival very soon. Thank you most of all for nursing me back to health. I will also not forget your kindness, your words, or what I have witnessed last night. My name is Sun Xin,” he said with a slight bow and fist wrapped in hand—a salute and gesture of gratitude.

“I am Famin Jie. It was a pleasure to have accommodated your
stay. Safe journeys my friend. May your path lead you to the pursuit of righteousness,” he said with a bow as he exchanged the salute. The hermit set him on his way packed with provisions. Famin Jie was the hermit’s name and he would be sure to remember it.

He left the small valley with the words of Famin Jie still impressed into his mind and with the events of the previous night replaying through his memory. He found his way back to the old trails and roads, passing by farms and isolated communities. A small country temple not far from the beaten path was abandoned long ago, but provided shelter from a storm. There, Xin sat patiently on the floor, eyes closed with arms and legs crossed amidst the ghastly statues of a pantheon of deities for all whom the temple stood. They seemed to hauntingly stare at him as the rains poured and the wind howled. To Xin, such idolatry was vanity and mere illusion. Quite ironic that he found shelter in such a place. He scoffed at the idols adorning the walls of the derelict temple while he waited for the storm to subside and the thunder to fade into the mountains. It was curious, even to him, that he did not the harbor the same feelings for the teachings of Famin Jie. They were food for philosophical thought rather than objects of ridicule. He did not understand it, really. It did at least give him something to think about until the rains passed.

He continued his journey further south, walking at an accelerated pace through rice fields and lakes ornamented with lotus and water lilies. A procession of Ming imperial troops making its way toward the provincial garrison marched down a main road. It was headed by mounted commanders in imposing armor and winged helmets topped with bright red tassels. They were accompanied by haughty high-ranking government officials wearing brocade uniforms of bright colors. Their approach was heralded by the uniform rhythm
of their pounding boots and the clatter of their weapons and armor. He walked to the side of the road and the soldiers passed him with a glare of suspicion that screamed “We’re watching you, vagrant. Tread carefully.” He had a healthy respect for most the imperial army and had no desire to engage them at any time. They had often proved to be as strong and skilled as they were intimidating. Sun Xin smirked as he recalled some of his past experiences.

Other travelers became more frequent as he neared Guangzhou. Many of them simply gave Xin a nervous grin and leaned to the opposite side of the road as they passed him by. Villages and towns became more frequent as well. The people would always take a brief moment from their daily activities to observe the strangers making their way through their town. Sun Xin had grown accustomed to their staring. People have become overly cautious of travelers carrying weapons. It was always in the smaller and more remote settlements where blending with crowds was impossible for the lack thereof. At least the chickens roaming about the streets paid him no attention.

It was not long until the silhouette of the walled city appeared in the horizon. It overlooked the sea which faintly sparkled in the hazy distance. Many great ships from various seas of the known world were docked at the harbor of Guangzhou, a city nestled beside the sea. A dozen other vessels anchored not far from shore. Columns of smoke rose from the shapely colorful rooftops of countless establishments. Across the districts, the streets sprawled with thousands of citizens like ants of a vast colony, and thousands more came and went through the monumental city gates. A large pagoda overlooked the districts majestically, casting a shadow that shaded many street blocks. Guangzhou—The Ming Empire’s gateway in the
South has stood for nearly one thousand five hundred years and has become a crossroads for the maritime world.

It was late into the afternoon by the time Sun Xin approached the vast city gates. They were guarded by light detachments of spearmen from the local Ming imperial garrison. They were posted on both sides of the gate keeping watch for suspicious and wanted persons filtering through the bustling crowds. High up on the walls archers and crossbow units were stationed. Past the gates, the city truly opened up before Xin. The streets were lined with vendors selling food and condiments of all sorts. Shops providing exotic fabrics, textiles and various garments, spices and herbs from all over the known world lined the stores on another street, and beyond were restaurants, herbal medicinal shops, offices, and large pavilions. Thick and thin crowds hurried about their business, buying and selling, meeting and eating. Craftsmen from the province had set up shop in the streets to peddle their wares. Olive-skinned foreigners wearing long surcoats of ornate embroidery walked past Sun Xin, but the light company of soldiers patrolling the streets paid them no attention.

“Even visitors from the desertous West have become common,” he thought.

Most buildings went up two and three stories and they riddled the street canopies with lanterns, flags, and various banners. Along the main avenue, a trio of musicians played their flutes and stringed instruments together in harmony with costumed dancers. Across from them stood a congregation of acrobats, jugglers, and street performers hoping to win the crowds for some coin. Further down the dusty street, Xin paused to observe the local outdoor performance of an opera. Many children ran about and the smell of street food filled the air.
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The city can truly be an overwhelming place; it was a sharp contrast to the province. It was festive, lively, and colorful, yet, suffocating, and exhausting. The districts divided the residential from the commercial, although they were, for the most part, thoroughly diffused. The heavy crowds were straining the sense of urgency he had developed since he left the hermit’s homestead. He dashed towards a nearby wall and used a combination of momentum and friction to scale it to the rooftop with ease. With a quick and steady pace he cut through the streets by gracefully leaping from rooftop to rooftop while being careful to avoid slipping from loose tiles. He launched himself from a ledge and watched the ground as it rushed toward his feet, his long scarf trailing behind him like the tail of a kite. He dropped into a dim alley and hit the ground with a roll swiftly and silently far from the awareness of the people nearby. He brushed the dust off his shoulders and secured the satchel strapped to his back. He casually continued to his destination on level ground. At the top of a broad and shallow hill, a large multi-storied structure stood mightily inside a walled courtyard complex.

A stately academy for music, literature, statecraft, history, philosophy, and martial arts served as the face of the League of Martial Scholars’ official headquarters and it stood loftily upon a hill at the edge of one of Guangzhou’s greener districts. A wide stone staircase led to the large red doors that stood in between the stone statues of mythical beasts. A prestigious sign hung attractively at the top of the door post: School of the Way of Culture. Many students from various walks of life attended the school seeking to gain skills and knowledge far beyond business and agriculture and it served as an attractive alternative for those who desired something different, even nobler besides passing the maddening civil service examinations.
in which many aspiring scholars dedicate their lives. The Academy also offered its students a means to a life of higher purpose other than civil service. The school was known for graduates who have proceeded into success in various disciplines. Throughout the empire, it was the only school of its kind. However, it was only a means to an end—a façade to continue the never-ending vigilantism of the political cabal that was the League of Martial Scholars.

The academy which the Scholars headed was alive with culture. There were many students at work, writing and studying, playing or composing music, and in another courtyard at the center of the academy grounds, one hundred students practiced combative art forms in unison training in the armed and unarmed fighting systems. After completion of their studies many of them move on to civil service examinations and become virtuous government officials. Others become writers, artists, architects, doctors, and musicians to name a few.

From among the students who attended the school, candidates of exceptional skills and unique backgrounds were carefully and secretly chosen to be initiated into the League’s mysterious brotherhood of warriors. Many have been given a chance to enter League’s inner circle as official Martial Academicians and were obligated to swear an oath of allegiance that indoctrinated them with a creed to uphold justice and defend peace through blade and brush. Wherever they may be or whatever path they choose in life, their oath would always stand.

Behind the main hall of assorted musical instruments, book shelves, and calligraphy brushes were several halls for study, dormitories, and quarters for martial and musical practice. The walls displayed a wide array of traditional weapons. Spears, sabers, various
PIERRE DIMACULANGAN

swords, and halberds decorated the rooms.

Sun Xin entered the school through the main gate which opened up into a spacious courtyard. At the center of the courtyard stood a heroic stone memorial of one of the Middle Kingdom’s greatest warriors, Yue Fei, who had valiantly led the armies of the Song Dynasty against the marauding armies of the Liao and Nuzhen nations in the north some three hundred fifty years earlier. The image of Yue Fei served as a powerful symbol and daily reminder of the meaning of loyalty, patriotism, and superior martial skill. For the likes of Sun Xin and the Scholars who fought for the people’s cause largely in secret, the story of Yue Fei served to remind them of the necessity of abstaining from the burdensome yokes of politics and the complications of government affairs. For Yue Fei, his timeless devotion and impeccable military record did not suffice to save him from being betrayed, imprisoned, and executed by the corrupt officials in the very government he swore to protect. The League of Scholars and those who associate with it therefore avoid corrupted politics and legalism in exchange for swift judgment founded upon a sacred written oath formulated in shadow many years ago.

Xin proceeded through the courtyard and entered the main office. There upon the second story of the pavilion he was immediately greeted by the Head Scholar of the League, Lu Guanying who also happened to be the school’s headmaster. He was a most superior combatant and was especially well-versed in nearly all studies offered in the school. He was also very knowledgeable of the teachings of the great Master Kong whose philosophical teachings allowed the Middle Kingdom to achieve unprecedented developments in society and government or the last two thousand years.
THE SAGE, THE SWORDSMAIN AND THE SCHOLARS

There was also Tian Qiu the polymath, somewhat short and clean-shaven, but was a man of rare skills ranging from the philosophy of science to the application of mathematics. Where wisdom should have been however, there was but an abyss, an insatiable desire for knowledge — knowledge in which he took great lengths to achieve. He took great care to not make it so evident to his colleagues, though he could always be seen carrying with him a scroll or a set of books.

At the other end of the room was Shang Jian, a brilliant tactician and strategist unlike the Middle Kingdom had seen since the legendary Zhuge Liang of the Three Kingdoms era. He was a handsome man with effeminate features yet was exceptionally skilled in unarmed hand to hand combat as well as an erudite of the ancient Seven Military Classics. He had declined a coveted prestigious position in the capital in exchange for applying his abilities for a more profound, albeit secretive calling within the League.

With him stood Zhen Shu, the wealthy descendant of a long line of legendary master craftsmen and armorers. His family’s forge was renowned all throughout the Middle Kingdom for superb craftsmanship in weapons and armor. He was olive-skinned and muscular from the many years of forging iron and steel. Only the finest warriors of the Ming Imperial Army were able to obtain his fine work and a chosen few were gifted his special weapons and armor. Some of his pieces were bestowed to Sun Xin for his valiant efforts in enforcing the creed of the League. The sword hanging from his hip, the mail covering his torso beneath his clothes, and the hardened leather vambraces wrapped around his forearms were his very handiwork. Such were a few of the key members of the League, diverse, but joined for a single noble purpose whilst taking into
account the cultivation of the mind of the scholar.

“Ah, Sun Xin you have finally arrived,” he said delightedly. Lu Guanying was a kind man with his years full of experience. He was strong-willed and in good health. A maroon cap covered the top-knot of his long silver-streaked hair. The rest of the members of the League stood to greet Xin’s arrival. Sun Xin greeted them with a salute, his left hand covering his right fist. They returned the gesture. He unfastened his cap and loosened his scarf as he looked around to survey the old familiar place. His connection with them gave him a sense of belonging, not that he felt he needed such a thing, of course.

“How was your campaign in the deserts of the Far West? What of your training in solitude?” Lu Guanying asked Xin since he had spent weeks abroad.

“I have not found peace in the field; there are only common thieves and bandit gangs that the army refused to bother itself with. I have, however, succeeded in destroying a bandit safe-haven in the northwest and had the pleasure of hunting down a notorious serial killer during my return journey.”

“Quite eventful, it seemed,” Tian Qiu commented. “May I ask whom it was you slew?”

“The Crossbones Killer. Have you heard of his rampage in the northwestern provinces? Prints of his face are on every notice board of every city and town there,” Xin answered. His arms were crossed and his posture was erect.

“Indeed,” said Tian Qu. “He was permitted to commit his atrocities for far too long. The Subprefectural and District Magistrates in that region would rather fatten themselves on pastries and politics rather than offer a bounty an experienced tracker would accept.”
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“Or have enough sense to coordinate with the bureaus at the capital to prompt an imperial response,” Shang Jian added.

“And it’s for such things that our organization exists,” continued Lu Guanying.

“Nevertheless, the Crossbones Killer is no more,” Sun Xin remarked.

“How did you do it?” they asked.

Sun Xin redirected his gaze downward. “I had been tracking him for several days. He didn’t make it difficult. He could not help himself from killing. Persons missing for weeks were turning up dead at every turn with each killing as gruesome as the last. The things he’d make them do to each other and themselves were nothing short of atrocious. He knew I was on his trail and thus led me to an abandoned outpost in the middle of nowhere.”

“Knowing it was a trap you had naught left to do but spring it,” said Zhen Shu.

“Naught left to do but spring that trap,” Xin echoed. “That abandoned outpost was a den or a mass grave where many corpses were hanged in display. He thought such a sight would have caught me off guard; he then proceeded to harass me with hit and run tactics. After I had become familiar with his attack pattern I cut him down. Before I landed the killing blow he smiled at me and said ‘b’fore long, your entire world will turn upside-down.’ I thought nothing more of it drove tip of my sword through his throat.”

“Surely the ramblings of a deranged psychopath,” Lu Guanying remarked. “I am truly impressed with this feat. Tis a great burden that has been lifted from society, but a crying shame for the victims we cannot resurrect.”

Xin switched topics. “On a more geographically political front,
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now our troubles with Lin Xuan the Warmonger are over. I tracked him down at an inn near the desert and deceived him into thinking I was one of his henchmen. He and his trusted commanders will no longer be our concern. Word of his death spread rapidly across the region. The Menggu tribe of that region has disbanded their alliance with his men and the people are celebrating his elimination. The nearest army garrison mopped up the remnants of the forces there. The army now occupies his territory and is still clueless as to the cause of his death. Not even the governor of the province was aware of my presence there,” he said as he leaned back against the wall with his arms crossed. He paused for a moment.

“Upon completing my objective I found a map outlining the other nests where many of his followers reside in wait. Your Academicians can raid them to eradicate their presence from that province once and for all.” Sun Xin said plainly as he pointed at the map.

“Well done, Xin,” Guanying said nodding with satisfaction. The rest of the members of League murmured with excitement and approval of the mission’s success. They have been tracking Lin Xuan for many years and it was Xin who had finally removed him once and for all relieving the Ming Empire from a painful thorn in the flesh.

The government, however, will never truly figure out who killed him and that is perhaps for the better.

“That was quite a feat, but we must keep one eye open. The worst may be in the loss of the balance of power upon the death of the desert warlord. The region under his influence has surely been agitated. Get your fill to eat and rest a while,” Lu Guanying said as he tossed Xin a fat sack heavy with coin.

Though Xin was not a member of the League, he had long
THE SAGE, THE SWORDSMAN AND THE SCHOLARS

earned his place among them. He was even requested to officially lead the Academicians, but better judgment or perhaps even pride prevented him from assimilating into their brotherhood. Still, Lu Guanying felt quite fortunate to have had such a skilled fighter and assassin to carry out the combative causes of the Martial Scholars. They have once said that if the enemy does not sway with words and civilized diplomacy, the sword was but the last tool implemented to enforce justice. Such was the creed of the League of Martial Scholars. Sun Xin’s first encounter with them went back some years ago, when the Academicians led by Shang Jian had been hunting the same target he had been tracking for many weeks. When Xin struck first blood on the target, the Scholars’ attention refocused on him. A professional relationship with the League and their brotherhood of Academicians had begun from that point forward.

Xin paused for a moment to recall his trek through the woods. “I was making my way through the outer edge of the dominion of the Crimson Moon Sect. During my scuffle with three of their scouts I was wounded by a poisonous arrow. Living alone in the mountain, there was a hermit like the sages of times past, who had nursed me back to health. When the evening had come, the occultists attacked the house and attempted to harass us with their usual terror tactics. The sage, however, claimed that he was under the protection of Heaven and so with one statement alone, the occultists fled into the night as if they had felt a power against which they knew they could not contend. I have never seen such power or authority projected from man before.” Xin and the Scholars stood in silence unsure of what to make of the story.

Headmaster Guanying broke the silence. “There are stories of a more fantastical nature circulating throughout the Middle Kingdom
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since time immemorial. Many have merely neglected such news as myth or superstition but not even I can deny that dark activities have grown frequent of late. I do not find your encounter with the occult nor the resurgence of crime or even rumors of wars too surprising. We must stay vigilant and dutiful to the people within the borders of the empire. But tread carefully, Xin. These days charlatans abound and run to and fro,” he advised to Xin. “Even so, this hermit or sage has made himself a friend of the League.”

“I sense that something dark is on the horizon for the Ming Empire,” Tian Qiu expressed rather unexpectedly. “All of us, even among the Academicians could sense its approach though they remained largely silent about it.”

“Explain yourself;” said Xin in a rather commanding tone.

“Our information network spread throughout the districts and prefectures across the empire has fed the League with vital information that I find is of great concern. Middle Kingdom’s state of affairs grows dire. Our informants indicate increased hostile activity from many criminal groups and underground rebel organizations. Such news was troubling though no one could produce an explanation as to why. You’ve already personally experienced this truth with the Crimson Moon Sect.”

Shang Jian the strategist stepped in. “The rebel groups and secret societies have grown bold of late. Even the imperial government has grown anxious. We’ve heard that the bureaucrats of the palace in the capital are scrambling for solutions. However, we ourselves are unsure of what their spy agencies in the Eastern and Western Depots already know. Their lackeys in the Imperial Secret Police are largely untrustworthy and corrupt, most being mere pawns of the powerful eunuchs heading the Depots.”
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“The war ministers and officials can do little to initiate military action,” added Zhen Shu. “Most are occupied in defending the northern and western borders from hostile nomad horse tribes, enemies of the Middle Kingdom since ancient times. Furthermore, the rest of the troops have been allocated along the southeastern coasts to defend from marauding pirates from the island nation of Riben across the Yellow Sea. The cities’ prefects were ill-equipped to combat the rebel and bandit raids on the outlying provinces and cities. Military responses were less than satisfactory.”

Headmaster Guanying rubbed his chin in contemplation. “The League does not officially meddle in the military affairs of the empire and leaves such matters to the emperor and his court. Still, there might be a time when our involvement in war would become inevitable. There are, however, troubling reports from the neighboring provinces regarding the arrival of foreigners never before encountered in any of the seas. They’ve congregated in Guangzhou and are treating with high ranking officials who’ve bothered to come all the way from Beijing. The eyes of the League have been set upon them for some time now. I believe we are right to do so…”

Though their day to day routines have provided them with a feeling of security, recent unfolding events have changed that feeling to anticipation and anxiety.

Sun Xin did not consider himself to be a part of the cabal, but took pride as a lone agent with an alliance with those who shared his philosophical views of justice, punishment, and national security. The Academy had been a sort of home for a number of years now and was currently the only place where he could find respite and training for his body and mind.
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How he ended up with the League was a long story and he would never forget how Lu Guanying had bailed him out of a great demise while offering him a place amongst their ranks not so long ago. Sun Xin owed the headmaster much and he did his best to repay that debt by fulfilling his missions in the name of their cause and creed. Across the large courtyard, Xin entered a study and rested. To his wonder, the wound on his neck had almost completely healed. Now he felt as he had another new debt to the sage living on that small mountain. Famin Jie’s words and actions on the night he had spent in his home was one he would never forget. Sun Xin remained bewildered and awed at what he had experienced there. He had seen and heard many things, but he never thought he would meet a man whose words held so much power that even the darkest minions fled upon hearing them. In the back of his mind, Xin hoped that one day he would meet the hermit sage again.
Wisdom versus knowledge

In the modern era, information seems to be abundant. The internet is readily accessible for so many. It is a nearly endless source of up-to-the-minute information and qualified, or more often not-so-qualified, opinion. But is humanity any smarter than it was in the days before the internet? How about before the days of the printing press? Or an alphabet?

An important phrase in modern education is critical thinking. Although the definition of this phrase is debated by scholars, it is generally agreed that the spirit of the concept is the combination of learned knowledge with careful consideration. This is one way to understand wisdom; the combination of accumulated knowledge with the benefit of hindsight. Myths, legends, stories and fables are ways that human societies have passed wisdom along over time. Ashok Kumar Malhotra, with Grandpa Chopra’s Stories for Life’s Nourishment, has continued the tradition of collecting and redistributing wisdom. All can benefit in some way from his work.

Prof. Malhotra has re-introduced readers to the kind of information that has accompanied humanity for far longer than the written word. His collection of stories is a gathering of the kind of wisdom that is casually, but critically, passed along from generation to generation in the form of stories, told by those who are older, to those who are younger. These stories contain far more than just a lesson. They contain the accumulated wisdom of thousands of generations. And more importantly, they create, and then represent in memory, the loving relationships between the generations, and even more, between all previous generations.

Dr. Malhotra explains that this is a retelling of stories, the first twenty as he remembers them from his Grandfather, the next eighteen from his own personal experiences. Each story has a moral, as in the widely loved Aesop’s Fables. He recalls that his grandfather had collected hundreds of stories from various cultures and although he was only formally educated through high school, he could speak more than six languages.
On the cover of the book is a photograph of Prof. Malhotra walking down a path while holding the hands of his granddaughters. We see them as walking away from us, but what they are actually doing is progressing along the never-ending journey of humanity. And one day, we know, those two little girls will take the same journey with their grandchildren, maybe down the same path, maybe a different path, but the stories will be the same. The message will be identical: That you are loved, that you are a part of a larger journey by something far larger and greater than yourself, and that you are invited, and needed, to contribute to the continuing story of humanity.

Importantly Ashok Malhotra notes that all proceeds from the sale of this book will be donated to the Ninash Foundation (www.ninash.org). The foundation is building schools in India for the poor, and for girls.

Volume 1 and 2 are available now on Amazon.

Grandpa Chopra’s Stories
For Life’s Nourishment

Grandpa Chopra’s Wisdom Stories, Vol. 2

Grandpa Chopra’s Wisdom Stories, Vol. 3
The editor and co-author, who is a practicing clinical psychologist, analyzes the state of civilization in the 21st century from the point of view of human behavior, which is a central element of nature and civilization (a relatively recent development of nature).

Nineteen co-authors were invited to help accomplish this task, all of whom had similar professional profiles as the editor and co-author.

Celiński bases his approach to the state of civilization in the 21st century on his published theory of Challenge-Resilience-Resourcefulness. Because an effective person is guided by reason, he or she will integrate sense-making and values and will increase his or her effectiveness in solving problems. This process allows humans to go beyond mere response to stimulation because reason allows humans to understand challenges that require creative responses. What civilization could persist with lifeforms lacking developed brains and minds?

Hence, humans can recover from crisis, and it is likely that a civilization controlled by humans can recover as well. The author’s position is optimistic. He applies Targowski’s theory of minds (steering, essential, reasoning, global, universal, digital, virtual, hybrid, and cosmic) and adds a new mind—the totalitarian mind—which is the source of many crises. He expands on a model of human engagement, emphasizing the role of instinct, intuition, reason and faith in the process of being co-creative with nature in order to successfully develop toward freedom.

The book is composed of three parts:

I. Human nature and its potential for crisis and renewal
II. Renewal of civilization
III. Summary of the nature of crisis and renewal.

In the first part, Celiński examines models of alternative responses to threats and crises, which depend not only on a state of mind but also on available resources. What is more, some of those models analyze how progress can combat determinism. Celiński also emphasizes the importance of the role of parallel processes of cognitive development and moral sensitivity in the palette of tools available to humankind. In part II, the book reviews how to apply renewal approaches to civilization via social engineering methods.
David A. Eisenberg reminds us that **perfect societal order cannot be realized**. However, utopian ideas have some value for future generations who will face new crises, for they can apply some utopian ideas from the past to overcome problems.

Akop Pogosovich Nazaretyan tells us that **we face a non-linear future according to his view of mega-history**. Even worse, the crisis in the 21st century is triggered by knowledge-enabled destruction (e.g., nano-bombs, nanotechnology, robotics). He quotes disturbing data, such as the fact that, according to the World Health Organizations, the number of murders (repressions and wars) in the year 2000 was about half a million. In addition, there were about 815,000 suicides committed in that year.

He perceives our contemporary crisis as the confrontation of fundamentalism with globalization. Furthermore, besides this crisis, he expects there to be fundamental reconsiderations of death and immortality; humans and machines; solidarity, mind and intelligence; and soul, spirit, and spirituality.

David J. Rosner analyzes **challenges faced by humans in the 21st century, such as environmental degradation, overpopulation, and constant conflict**. These are taking place due to moral inertia and the wrong prioritization of means and ends. He expects that spiritual renewal is the primary process that can save civilization.

Michael Andregg argues that **civilization today is driven by a hidden evil under the form of psychopathic personalities and secret power systems among groups**. Both are especially prone to evil acts. He perceives the solution to lie in effective transparency in governing, in love and criminal justice, in improving mental health, in healing the living systems, and in spirituality beyond churches.

Stephen T. Satkiewicz scrutinizes **revolutions as a violent encounter with eternity**. He perceives revolutions as a peculiar form of civilizational crisis since revolutions usually aim to establish utopia through apocalyptic fervor and the destruction of the old order. Even more, they lay the foundations for their undoing, which is reflected in the saying that “the revolution eats its own children.” This is similar to what happened after the Arab Spring recently.

Adan Stevens-Diaz takes on **the future of civilization using science fiction to objectivize crisis and renewal**. The chapter presents scenarios of globalization, ecology, automatization and religious revival as “trajectories” shaping the future of civilization. Specific examples are provided for these themes through the analysis of popular series, including *Dune, Terminator*, and *Star Trek*, among others. The chapter concludes with an assessment of contemporary science fiction’s potential to be an instrument of popular understanding of crisis and renewal in civilization.
Marek Celiński analyzes the trauma of time and development of cognition and morality, assuming that civilizations have been developing as a result of traumatic experiences that separate present events from the past in our ancestors’ minds. Such disruption of the self forced the mind to regain its continuity and cohesiveness through individual and collective efforts while also making it sensitive to potential disruptions.

A sense of personal responsibility combined with a respect for tradition and acknowledgment of the dialectic tension between the temporary and the eternal gradually led to the development of religion, science and art, all of which unite us with eternity and timelessness. The further development of civilization is dependent on a creative combination of both temporary and eternal aspects of existence.

Frank J. Lucatelli and Rhonda C. Messinger offer a solution regarding how using axioms can unblock civilization’s progress. They argue that the data deluge is caused by insufficient methods for validating constructs (creative ideas and intuition). A-Prior Modal Analysis (APMA) is offered as a holistic, axiomatic method of logic for establishing construct validity and for overcoming the obstacles of our data-driven society. Governance and health care are used to demonstrate how systems can evolve in intricacy, how control can be dispersed more widely, and how civilization can progress without burning out.

APMA reveals how axioms and postulates can guide and limit data collection to only the critical information needed, and how statistical data can be meaningfully sorted and validated even with the increasing complexity of meaning.

Ernest Lawrence Rossi and Kathryn Lane Rossi explain how the rise and fall of civilization and evolution of scientific spirituality is impacted by the psychosocial dynamics of mind, genes, war and peace. Subsequently, the rise and fall of civilizations and their discontents originate in the crisis of cognition, consciousness and culture, which has been recorded throughout human history. The authors define a 4-stage creative cycle: 1) Mind (crisis & opportunities); 2) Mirror neurons—eRNAs (intuition); 3) Epi-genomics—HARs (adapt & heal); 4) Brain & Body—DRD (insight & applications). This cycle supposedly facilitates an understanding of why humans are in states of war and peace. They argue that this approach offers a new hope for understanding and optimizing the human condition and its dynamics since the Renaissance and Enlightenment.

Alex J. Zautra, Anna M. Palucka, and Marek Celiński argue that social connectedness and creativity are mutually influencing processes that promote human evolution. These predispositions lie at the foundation of socially intelligent behavior and mutually satisfying relationships.
They argue for the importance of the link between social attitudes and socially intelligent interactions on the one hand, and cognitive abilities on the other, as well as the importance of the consequences when the humanity of others is ignored or denied.

Based on this link, they define five principles (P) that may serve to guide the development of interventions to avoid a crisis. P1 is to recognize humanity of others. P2 is that our brains are wired to connect with others. P3 is that neurological processing is mostly unconscious since the human brain makes decisions 6-10 seconds before we are aware of them. P4 is that each person is unique. Finally, P5 is that socially intelligent behavior is guided by our choices and the consequences of each choice.

Their last appeal is to avoid a self-centered attitude and to broadly connect one’s self with others so that our creative humanistic potential can be fully realized.

Darlene A. Osowiec takes on a new world view of humanity’s challenges. The origins and sources of the current crisis are analyzed. Special attention is given to the lack of balance in power between the genders from pre-history to present times. The author suggests moving from a “Me vs. You” competitive approach to a “Us-Together” cooperative approach.

John A. Grayzel argues that the Marshal Plan (1948) after the colossal crisis of World War II was the trigger for the development of global civilization in the 21st century. Furthermore, this Plan, by triggering international cooperation, became a global norm for an emerging New World Order (NWO) after the fall of the Soviet Union and the Cold War in 1991. However, this is not entirely true since the NWO today is characterized by the clash of civilizations and since globalization is reduced to expensive labor outsourcing from western civilization to countries with low-cost labor.

Michael Hogan, Helen Johnston, Benjamin Broome, and Chris Noone analyze how to design national wellbeing and how to provide policies and measures. They analyze the approaches of some countries regarding how they plan the wellbeing of their citizens. Unfortunately, there is no standard policy and applicable structure yet.

However, they provide an extended example of planned wellbeing in Ireland. They also discuss the applied system science methodology with respect to the design of a national wellbeing index in Ireland. Despite that methodology, they argue for adopting a broader social science toolkit to address the challenge of facilitating social progress.

Marek Celiński, in summary, synthesizes the nature of crisis and renewal. He is optimistic and argues that crisis should be perceived as an inspiration for improving the state of wellbeing of individuals and society. He reminds us that human resilience and resourcefulness are critical for renewal.
Among significant resources, the editor argues for the crucial role of religion and democracy in minimizing crisis and energizing renewal.

The book is an excellent set of ideas, approaches, data and principles regarding civilizational crisis and renewal from the point of view of the human being. This is an innovative approach in the study of civilization, which usually is considered at the aggregated level of many elements and their relations.

Such edited books are usually composed of independent chapters, which is also the case with this work. Perhaps Marek Celiński will write his next book with coherent chapters, and their knowledge and wisdom will be supported by the crises and renewals which took place in the history of civilization.

I will remember Celiński, Zautra, and Palucka’s statement that “social connectedness and creativity are mutually influencing processes that promote human evolution.” Indeed, it is true, but besides reproduction and consumption, the next crucial process is developing security via confidence\(^1\) through group-living based on connectedness and creativity. I hope that clinical psychologists agree with this statement.

This book shows that there is a need for anti-crisis thinking from different perspectives. This book has sketched the psychological approach to crisis. Thus, one can expect a future book with a comprehensive approach to impending crises triggered by overpopulation, climate change, the depletion of strategic resource, cyberwars, cybercrime, a labor-free economy, and civilization clashes.

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\(^1\) This idea was provided by Henryk Krawczyk, co-author of publications with Andrew Targowski.
Piotr Dutkiewicz and Richard Sakwa. *22 Ideas to Fix the World.*
SSRC 7 NYU Press, New York/London, 2013

Reviewed by John Grayzel

While procrastinating from writing this review I picked up the August 5 (2019) edition of Bloomberg Businessweek magazine to find multiple page of the same ad — differing only by the different personality featured: Janet Yellen, Bill Gates, Ajay Banga—each saying they wanted me to email them my ideas on how to fix the world, which they will carry to Michael Bloomberg's New Economic Forum scheduled for November 2019 in Beijing.

The first question, of course, is why, if they need my ideas, are they, and not me, going to Beijing? The second, more germane to this book review, is the question of why don't they just read *22 Ideas to Fix the World?*

The answer to the latter is simply: *22 Ideas to Fix the World* really does not contain what its title purports. Rather it, itself, is demonstrable evidence of just how serious and intractable the challenges to current global civilization are.

In fact, those interviewed for the book (the interviews being its actual substance) are highly credible and accomplished individuals. They include Nobel laureates Muhammad Yunus, founder of the Grameen Bank and economist Joseph Stigler, as well as world-systems theorist Immanuel Wallerstein and former UN Undersecretary General José Ocampo. To their credit, most of them, despite the optimistic title of the book, do not hide their deep concerns that the challenges faced are not seriously addressable by specific "fixes," but reflect deep and maladaptive systemic conditions.

Thus, Yunus quickly fingers how "money has become a habit, an obsession, an addiction (and how) ... every human being is interpreted as a money maker". He notes that while the Grameen Bank microloan approach, by combining microcredit with technical and social support, did raise many out of abject poverty, over time its success has become the basis for a new microcredit industry whose objective is profit-making for the engaged institutions rather than poverty alleviation for their clients. Somewhat similarly, Paul Watson sees the problems in terms of people "being sold into paying for things we don't need" (e.g., water in plastic bottles), and that today "the whole nature of governments is such that they cause problems. They don't solve problems".

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1 Dutkiewicz et al p.8
2 Ibid. p.13
3 Ibid. p. 100
4 Ibid. p.105
And Manuel Montes sees adequate progress requiring "states being able to be less beholden to money politics." (What's the chance of that happening soon?)

Even more sobering, is how the contributors themselves seem incapable of venturing beyond the walls of the current reigning paradigm of man and society as primarily an economically driven phenomenon. For example, Shimshon Bichler, at the same time as he identifies the prevailing understandings and practices of capitalism as counterproductive to achieving either national or global equity or sustainability, proposes as his solution a yet unknown new definition and understanding of "capital". Thus, at the same time as he identifies the culprit, he is incapable of freeing his mind from its embrace. It is as though he (along with economics in general) is suffering from an ideological "Stockholm syndrome" wherein hostages develop a psychological alliance with their captors.

In another interview, Ha-Joon Chang admits that "if any (other) theory had failed in practice...as free market economics, it would have been discredited and banned". Yet he thinks "basically we need to take a gradualist view of change" because neither he nor any of the other contributors can offer any "safe" suggestions as to alternative dramatically transformational solutions.

It is as if even the most thoughtful and sincere of our current thinkers are, like the ancient mariner, caught on a ship in the doldrums of the conceptual sea upon which our civilization currently sails, while the albatross of "money" hangs from their necks. For students of civilization, the book's resulting portrait of our times seems to correspond to Arnold Toynbee's statement that: "In the growth phase, (a) civilization successfully responds to a series of ever new challenges, while in the disintegration stage, it fails to give such a response to a given challenge. It tries to answer it again and again, but recurrently fails."

Given the book's title, it would seem that my description of its actual presentations dramatically differs from what its editors intended. Why they were unable or unwilling to accept the reality of the presentations themselves, and build better upon them, is unclear. However, to the credit of most of the interviewees, in their answers, truth manages to emerge from the fog of classical "economics."

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5 Ibid. p.325
6 Ibid. p.338
7 Ibid. p.57
8 Ibid. p.69
Whether the economic captains of global civilization that are scheduled to meet in Beijing for the 2019 Blumberg New Economic Forum will see any of the truths of this book through their spy glasses is questionable.


Reviewed by John Grayzel

Both Mark Pearcey's book *The Exclusions of Civilizations,* and Nick McDonell's book *The Civilization of Perpetual Movement,* focus on the phenomenon of the marginalization of a specific category of people in the actual operations of nation-states and in the conceptualization of membership in the civilizations with which those states are identified. For Pearcy the category is "indigenous," while for McDonell it is "nomadic." However, both see political globalization and an evolving global civilization as possibly offering a new set of emerging justifications, opportunities and assertions for their recognition, inclusion and participation as integral members of both their respective nations and their respective impinging civilizations.

In *The Exclusions of Civilization,* Pearcey has two resounding points. The first is that the concepts of “civilization" and "indigenous" peoples are the direct products of Western colonialism and represent normative judgements rather than objective classifications. The second is that the label of "indigenous" is not a simple normative description but actually a brutal political label that has allowed specific populations to be forcefully subjected to the full powers of the nation-state holding sway over them while being denied the normal prerogatives accorded those generally recognized as citizens of that state.

Pearcey notes how the word "civilization" itself first appeared in the mid-1700s, beginning with a general understanding of the term as connoting refinement of manners and moral sensibilities and, thereafter, became a distinguished, particularly between those of European origin and newly discovered "savage" people. As such it conveniently served as a justifier for claiming the lands on which "indigenous" and "non-civilized" people live as being Terra Nullius ("nobody’s land") and therefore claimable by European discoverers. The term "indigenous" became increasingly important as "civilization" becomes increasingly associated with the nation-state and national cultures.
When later arriving reigning groups were faced with the reality of earlier populations having an enduring presence within their nations, the term "indigenous", by creating a separate status for the original inhabitants, became a convenient way of excluding them from full recognition and participation, both within and outside their commanding nations — somewhat akin to their being recognized and managed like native flora and fauna rather than citizens or sovereigns.

Thus, Americans didn't see any contradiction between a policy of trying to force Indian populations to adapt American/Christian culture and expelling them — as happened when the Cherokee Indians were thrown off their lands in Georgia even after they had settled down to a commercial agricultural life and had won Supreme Court recognition of their legal status within the United States (Worcester v. Georgia, 1832).

Similarly, after WWI, the Covenant of the League of Nations "used the concept of civilization to extend the sovereign reach of some of its members to the former territories of Imperial Germany and the Ottoman Empire."¹

Like Pearcey, McDonell also has two major resounding points that might be seen as similar but in fact are quite different. For him, the classic problem between "nomadic" groups and nation-states is not that of the nation-state or dominating civilization trying to "exclude them through inclusion" but rather the desire to capture and control them administratively for purposes of taxes, trade and security. Thus, McDonell's first focus is on what he sees as the inherent tension between nomadic people, who endeavor to avoid the political and administrative grip of the surrounding sedentary civilization, and the exasperation of the authorities and institutions of that civilization at their own inabilities to impose their dictates and norms upon groups that strive to be forever transient. (e.g.: Think how America denies all sorts of benefits to people without a permanent address).

His second concern is how political and civilizational studies have largely ignored nomadic people per se. Despite the important role they have often played in trade, transport and livestock production, and the fact one such group, the Mongols, ruled the largest empire in the world, they are predominantly portrayed as outsiders who become relevant when they become temporary intruders and lose this recognition after they are either repulsed, sedentarized and/or assimilated.

Both Pearcey and McDonell share a third point. It is that since the end of the colonial age, three new phenomena have created new realities and opportunities around which to refashion new relationships between nomadic and indigenous peoples, and between the nation-states in which they reside and the larger international world order.

¹ Pearcey p. 85
The relevant factors are the expanded ability of nation-states to dominate entire populations, the quest for self-determination by various groups across the globe, and the emergence of self-aware transnational communities and identities in the age of globalization.

In addition to these factors, both authors see the present role that a minority of the members of these groups play in activities that threaten national and global security, such as drug smuggling and terrorism, as creating new incentives for nation-states to improve the political treatment of the innocent majority. However, as Pearcey characterizes it, "exclusion through inclusion" into the nation-state continues to play an important role in keeping them from both equitable national inclusion and appropriate internationalization.

Regrettably, as important as the authors' points are, neither book is either adequately comprehensive or sufficiently exacting in its coverage to provide a solid foundation on which to build a comprehensive understanding of the actual circumstances of indigenous and nomadic peoples, let alone to develop and to recommend realistic alternative policies and practices in response to current needs and opportunities.

In the case of Pearcey, his rather short book spends an inordinate amount of space paying homage to the political science lineage of his concerns. This comes at the cost of his even mentioning such factually and philosophically critical cases as the Australian aborigines and Amazon populations, let alone groups such as the Tibetans and Uighurs, whom China seems to be treating as neo-quasi indigenous peoples.

McDonell, in his relatively short book, focuses mainly on the Saharan Tuareg and Mongolia, to the exclusion of arguably even more important groups. Such groups include neighboring Mauritania (one of the only two nations in the world whose majority population was, at independence, still primarily nomadic), as well as the associated Western Saharan Polisario and the Fulani to the south, who, like the Mongols, historically moved between nomadism and empire building. McDonell especially devotes a relatively large sector of his book on a case study of conflict between nomadic herders and sedentary mining interests in Mongolia (the other, until recently, predominantly nomadic nation). In the case of Mongolia, the country has so recently flipped to a sedentary majority that almost anyone over forty still fully understands the qualities of nomadic life. Today, the reigning conflicts in Mongolia are over power and money, not political, social or environmental ideology. What's more, till the collapse of the U.S.S.R. in 1991, Mongolia was an example of an authoritarian (communist) state which strongly supported the nomadic way of life and a nomadic economy. (Moreover, Mongolian nomads have lived within various state-like confederation, Khaganates and dynasties since circa 300 BCE).
The Mongolian situation reflects four methodological deficiencies, found in both the works:

1) their almost exclusive reliance on English language sources when probably the best information, at least for Africa, is in French — particularly from the French school of human geography;

2) their minimizing the importance of the factor that has always been a major determinant of the treatment of nomads by others — namely resource competition, predominantly land but also mineral wealth and trade route control;

3) their inattention to critical realities. For example, many nomadic groups are not, as McDonell defines them, embodiments of “perpetual mobility.” Rather, most are transhumant — meaning certain individuals and families move their livestock from one grazing ground to another in a seasonal cycle, while the old, the young, and the infirm reside in semi-established settlements. In fact, the Roma and the Irish travelers are probably more truly nomadic than the Tuareg of Fulani.

4) lastly, both authors see the critical phenomena as primarily political. This may be true from the perspective of the nation-state and its representatives, but it is not the case for many indigenous and nomadic people.

For the Fulani (among whom I lived for 16 months), the driving value is the maintaining of "personal freedom" expressed in many forms — from geographic mobility to creative thinking to economic independence to sexual love, all in ways corresponding to their code of behavior called pulaaku. In Mongolia (where I worked intermittently for fifteen years from 1993 to 2008), the ger (their round cloth nomadic hut), their encampment (ail), and the rules of hospitality that are indispensable to nomadic survival, serve, with specific related manners and rituals, as mental psycho-social vehicles for organizing much of their personal and social behaviors and feelings.

Likewise, in Mauritania, where I lived and worked for five years, the combined power of an unusual desert aesthetic and an all-pervasive spiritual/religious presence have played a vital role in enthraling and mooring its people to life under its harsh desert conditions. Unfortunately, such non-tangible, non-materialistic factors are imperiled more than ever by the onslaught of global neo-liberal capitalism, resource-related political conflict and, now, rapidly emerging climate change. Yet they are not (and possibly cannot be) adequately addressed by even enlightened academic theories, national policies or international agreements, such as are suggested in these works.

In the end, both these works provide a valuable service in highlighting how the two respective groups—indigenous and nomadic—have been, and still are, purposely ignored, misrepresented and mistreated by the preponderance of scholarly analysis in civilization and political science studies and the realpolitik of nation-state and international behavior.
In this regard they are effective raisers of reader conscience and consciousness and should be recognized and commended for so doing. However, readers stimulated by either of the works will need to search further than these books for more meaningful understandings of the predicaments, prospects and realities of the lives of those subsumed under the categories of "indigenous" and "nomadic" peoples.

Reviewed by E. Wesley Reynolds, III

David Ringrose reveals just how much early modern world history needs revision. For decades the post-colonialist historiography has given undue emphasis to the rise of Western imperialism, but as Ringrose argues, from 1450-1750, Western “empires” hardly existed. Instead, it was the empires of the east, namely the Ottoman, Chinese and Mughal empires that controlled trade and permitted European merchant families to live and work within their trade networks. The world over, European “expansion” in the age of exploration was limited to small enclaves, home to diasporas of multi-ethnic and even multi-religious families who relied on native allies more than gunpowder to survive.

This work accomplishes several feats. First, it gives a more convincing reason for European migrations to other places of the world. Europeans wanted to cash in on preexisting trade routes. They relied on diplomacy rather than force in naval affairs and avoided large-scale conflicts with their Ottoman and Mughal neighbors. The Armenian, Sephardic Jewish and Multani Indian diasporas allowed Europeans to contact and to expand the overland trade routes of spices, silks and porcelains from Cairo to Northern India and Southwestern Asia. Spain conquered preexisting empires in Mesoamerica by promoting native administrators. The Portuguese depended upon the Songhai West African empire and the Kingdom of Kongo for its slave trade. Ringrose proposes that western imperialism belongs to the nation-states of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and not to the early modern world.

Second, Ringrose’s work demonstrates that Europeans were not fundamentally racist in their initial contacts and assimilated into native life when and where they could. Rather than seeing Catholicism as an imperial force, Ringrose argues that Catholics believed in the common decent of all men and assimilated into other civilizations. Many Europeans took native wives, raised their children of mixed ethnicity inside local communities, and even adopted native religions. Extended families were the primary social networks for trade relationships and patriarchal or matriarchal associations fostered cross-family apprenticeships. European communities abroad grew more diverse, whether it be the French and Italian merchants in the Indian and Persian pepper trade, the English and Dutch in the South China Sea, or the Portuguese in Africa. Even in America, English settlers sought out native alliances until the mid-eighteenth century, after which time, New England in particular embraced a racial social order. European migrations were diasporas rather than centers of control.
Third, Ringrose’s work reveals the importance of silver in effectively subsidizing the Far Eastern trade for two centuries. When the Ming dynasty in China switched to silver currency, the value of silver steadily rose until the Spanish discovered silver in Mexico and Peru. Europeans, particularly the English, used silver from America and Manila on the European market as a linch-pin to open up Chinese trade. So important was the trade that by the 1630s, most English East India Company ships headed for ports in India carried only silver. Here again, Europe was at the mercy of an eastern market.

Some would perhaps desire a more direct engagement with the orientalist “othering” narrative — an issue mainly confined to the footnotes. And some of Ringrose’s claims appear, on the face of it, too benign, like arguing for periods of amicable relationships between natives of North America and Dutch and English settlers. Ringrose does not address the more crusading rhetoric of Richard Hakluyt and the visionaries behind many European joint-stock companies. The Navigation Acts and the imperial reorientation of the British Atlantic world are left out. Ringrose also does not discuss missionary efforts, which were by their very nature not assimilationist with regards to salvation. Still, Ringrose does much to recover a more dynamic world than one of mere exploitation and victimization.
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Comparative Civilizations Review

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In October 1961, in Salzburg, Austria, an extraordinary group of scholars gathered to create the International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations. Among the 26 founding members from Austria, Germany, France, Switzerland, The Netherlands, Spain, Italy, England, Russia, the United States, China and Japan were such luminaries as Pitirim Sorokin and Arnold Toynbee.

For six days, the participants debated such topics as the definition of “civilization,” problems in the analysis of complex cultures, civilizational encounters in the past, the Orient versus the Occident, problems of universal history, theories of historiography, and the role of the “human sciences” in “globalization.” The meeting was funded by the Austrian government, in cooperation with UNESCO, and received considerable press coverage. Sorokin was elected the Society’s first president.

After several meetings in Europe, the advancing age of its founding members and the declining health of then president, Othmar F. Anderle, were important factors in the decision to transfer the Society to the United States.

Between 1968 and 1970 Roger Williams Wescott of Drew University facilitated that transition. In 1971, the first annual meeting of the ISSCC (US) was held in Philadelphia. Important participants in that meeting and in the Society’s activities during the next years included Benjamin Nelson (the Society’s first American president), Roger Wescott, Vytautas Kavolis, Matthew Melko, David Wilkinson, Rushton Coulborn and C.P. Wolf. In 1974, the Salzburg branch was formally dissolved, and from that year to the present there has been only one International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations (ISCSC).

The presidents of the ISSCC are, in order: In Europe, Pitirim Sorokin and Othmar Anderle; in the United States, Benjamin Nelson, Vytautas Kavolis, Matthew Melko, Michael Palencia-Roth, Roger Wescott, Shuntaro Ito (from Japan), Wayne Bledsoe, Lee Daniel Snyder, Andrew Targowski, David Rosner, Toby Huff, and current president Lynn Rhodes. To date, the Society has held 47 meetings, most of them in the United States but also in Salzburg, Austria; Santo Domingo, The Dominican Republic; Dublin, Ireland; Chiba, Japan; Frenchman’s Cove, Jamaica; St. Petersburg, Russia; Paris, France; New Brunswick, Canada; Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; and Suzhou, China.

More than 30 countries are represented in the Society’s membership. Its intellectual dynamism and vibrancy over the years have been maintained and enhanced through its annual meetings, its publications, and the participation of such scholars as Talcott Parsons, Hayden White, Immanuel Wallerstein, Gordon Hewes, André Gunder Frank, Marshall Sahlins, Lynn White Jr., and Jeremy Sabloff.

The Society is committed to the idea that complex civilizational problems can best be approached through multidisciplinary analyses and debate by scholars from a variety of fields. *The Comparative Civilizations Review*, which welcomes submissions from the Society’s members as well as other scholars, has been published continually since its inaugural issue in 1979.

Prof. Michael Palencia-Roth
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