

4-2019

Multiple Identities: Touchstones in Terrorism, Democratic Institutions, and the Rule of Law

Mary Frances Lebamoff

Follow this and additional works at: <https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr>

Part of the [Comparative Literature Commons](#), [History Commons](#), [International and Area Studies Commons](#), [Political Science Commons](#), and the [Sociology Commons](#)

Recommended Citation

Lebamoff, Mary Frances (2019) "Multiple Identities: Touchstones in Terrorism, Democratic Institutions, and the Rule of Law," *Comparative Civilizations Review*: Vol. 80 : No. 80 , Article 5.
Available at: <https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol80/iss80/5>

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the All Journals at BYU ScholarsArchive. It has been accepted for inclusion in Comparative Civilizations Review by an authorized editor of BYU ScholarsArchive. For more information, please contact scholarsarchive@byu.edu, ellen_amatangelo@byu.edu.

Multiple Identities: Touchstones in Terrorism, Democratic Institutions, and the Rule of Law

Mary Frances Lebamoff

Abstract. This paper explores the underlying, foundational politico-social theories and themes that relate closely to radicalization, terrorism, democracy and the rule of law. It examines factors (touchstones) critical to these areas (political violence, terrorism, rule of law and democracy, along with democratic institutions). Some of these touchstones include the ‘lenses’ of identities, tribalism, and contrasts between identities, including cultural, linguistic, socialization and civilizational aspects.

Keywords. Identity, multiple identities, amoral familism, ethnicity, ethnic identity, civic identity, political identity/identity politics, national identity, political tribes, religious and sectarian affiliations

Introduction

Identity is a potent force in today’s world, much as it has been in the past. One need only consider recent events in Spain and the identities that some claim — Catalan or Basque — that set individuals and groups who hold those identities as crucial against or apart from the state itself. Consider, too, countries in Eastern Europe like Bosnia, Macedonia and Kosovo. Identity, with its potentially many characteristics, is often shaped by social organizations. Examples of such identities and social organizations include age, religion, social class or caste, culture, dialect, disability, education, ethnicity, language, nationality, sex, gender identity, generation, occupation, profession, race, political party affiliation, sexual orientation, settlement, urban and rural environments, and veteran status. Yet not all members of a given group are involved in identity politics. Identity politics are frequently used by minority and civil rights organizations to form a coalition with or against members of the majority.

One person may hold several of these identities, and therefore have multiple identities. Awareness and understanding of multiple identities are crucial when objectively considering aspects of an individual, of groups, political activity, and propensity for or against violence or illicit activities such as smuggling or money-laundering, to name a few traits that may be reviewed or researched. Some are socially determined; others are determined communally or are civilizational. One may be, in a manner of speaking, “born into” specific identities related to ethnicity or religious beliefs, or those important to family and familial ties. Some personal identities are associated with cultural or linguistic characteristics. Indeed, throughout time, people have held (and sometimes juggled) multiple identities.

An example might be a person who is simultaneously female, a mother, an aunt or grandmother, a wife and later a widow, an educator, a business owner, a Native American, and a marketer. Which identities rise to the fore is based on civilization, socialization, environment, cultures, situations and circumstances, along with the need to reconcile potential and actual facets of the various identities a person holds.

Kwame Anthony Appiah wrote cogently of multiple identities, “Identities are complex and multiple and grow out of a history of changing responses to economic, political, and cultural forces, almost always in opposition to other identities.”¹

Identity politics and nationalism have become much-researched areas in recent decades; one only need think of the break-ups of the former Soviet Union and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to recall how identity issues, especially those associated with nationalism, came to the fore. Turkey, too, has strong and very serious nationalist movements at present, as do Poland and Hungary. All three of these latter countries are seeing significant erosion of checks and balances, democratic institutions (especially the judiciary), and a measurable move to the right politically.

Identity politics in political organizing is usually closely connected to the concepts of deprivation, repression and oppression of one or more minorities in a state—or, in response to those minorities, the organization of a countervailing identity political effort by the majority to maintain their political power.²

Determining political, legal and institutional frameworks for addressing a multicultural society, and accommodating its multiple, diverse characteristics are critical for the development and prosperity of a state and its members. These frameworks and accommodative elements can lead to tolerance, a secure and inclusive civil society, economic prosperity, and stable and equitable institutions, or they can lead to violent and other levels of conflict and tensions, economic displacement and upheaval, institutional fragility and inconsistencies, and quarrels over inclusion, system access, justice and additional aspects of civil societal insecurity between ethnicities.

These frameworks (constitutional and through other means) become particularly critical in a new state, particularly one in which there are known ethnic and even civilizational clefts, such as the Republic of Macedonia (which I will examine as a case), and even more so when ethno-religious fragmentation is pervasive.

¹ Kwame Anthony Appiah. *In My Father's House: Africa in the Philosophy of Culture*. Oxford University Press, London, 1993.

² “Identity Politics”, at <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-politics/>, Stanford University, California, 2016 (revised).

Huntington argues, in his “Clash of Civilizations” (1993), that major, ongoing conflicts will occur in various areas of the world because of clashing cultural and religious identities between groups, and that Islamic extremism would become the most threatening movement to world peace and order. Eastern Europe is one of the areas on a highly significant “cultural fault-line” or cleft between major civilizations (the uppermost level of culture). In the case of Eastern Europe, the two civilizations that come up against one another in that cleft are generally the Orthodox (Christian) and the Islamic ones.³ Huntington’s physical divisions of the various civilizations also indicate that Western civilization has a place in Eastern Europe.

In post-modern discussions, the importance of democracy in developing and determining structures, policies, and laws in states with multi-cultural, multiple-identity citizenry cannot be overstated. Democracy has become equivalent to specifying “majority rule” and was originally linked with “tolerance” by Pericles in 430 BCE. Democracy today no longer means “direct rule” by the people, but instead, usually representative democracy, where representatives are elected by the citizens to whom they are answerable at least at the next election. Power rests in the hands of the people who may elect official representatives to rule directly or indirectly. Today, too, tolerance and establishment of various rights are sometimes viewed as preconditions to democracy but “not as constitutive of democracy itself.”⁴ That all “democracies” are not created equal nor do they include the constitutive elements of democracy is evident, too: “democratic” in a country’s name does not indicate it is indeed a true democracy or anything even resembling a democracy — take the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea), or the People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria, as examples.

There are many variations of democracy: direct and representative democracy; presidential and parliamentary democracy; authoritarian and participatory democracy; Islamic and social democracy.⁵ One often hears about liberal and illiberal democracy, too. Most democracies, however, are basically majoritarian — that is, decisions are made in line with majority rule. Those who hold leadership positions have, in most cases under majoritarian democracy, been elected by the people they are to represent, although there are also indirect ways of attaining leadership (appointments to committees, affiliation with others who hold a similar mindset on particular issues, and the like).

³ Samuel P. Huntington. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* Simon & Schuster, New York, 1998.

⁴ Iain McLean and A. McMillan. *Oxford Concise Dictionary of Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, 140-141.

⁵ Vaishnavi Patil, “What are the different types of democracy?” at <http://sciabc.us/iPAD8>.

This can lead to what Amy Chua terms “political tribes” in certain cases and is closely tied to “identity politics”.⁶

Conflict and Ethnic Conflict

Conflict emphasizes struggle and collision. Donald L. Horowitz’s definition is typical: “Conflict is a struggle in which the aim is to gain objectives and simultaneously to neutralize, injure or eliminate rivals.”⁷ Add this to Stefan Wolff’s ethnic conflict specifications, and the complexities are apparent: “...that in which the goals of at least one conflict party are defined in [exclusively] ethnic terms, and in which the primary fault line of confrontation is one of ethnic distinctions.” While it does not occur in every society, in some, ethnic difference or cleavages can lead to frustration and violence when “ethnic groups are forced to integrate into the national culture of the state in which they find themselves.”

Ethnic conflicts may fall into one of three categories: group-state conflicts between the minority and the *institutions* of the host state; inter-group conflicts, pitting the minority against the *host-nation* or the majority; and *between different ethnic groups* (sometimes, but not always, minority versus minority). There may be elements of simultaneity in the types of conflicts. These categories tend to hold true no matter if the geographic location is the Balkans, African states, North or Latin America, Western Europe or Asia.

Harff and Gurr define ethnic groups as “psychological communities” whose members hold a persistent sense of common interest and identity based on shared historical experiences and valued cultural traits. These may include language, beliefs, lifestyles, institutions, and a common homeland or established physical living space.⁸ The authors assert that the “ethnic groups whose status is of greatest concern...are those that are the target of discrimination and that have organized to take political action to promote or defend their interests.”⁹ Since they have already opened themselves to being activists, it can be a relatively short step to considering violence, especially if more peaceful forms of activism do not appear successful or do not meet group demands/expectations.

⁶ Amy Chua. *Political Tribes: Group Instincts and the Fate of Nations*. New York: Penguin Press, 2018; *World on Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global Instability*. New York: Random House LLC, 2003 (revised 2004).

⁷ Donald L. Horowitz. *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. 2nd ed. (Los Angeles: University of California Press 1985), 95.

⁸ Benedict Anderson discusses “imagined communities”, a closely related concept to ethnicity and ethnic groups, in his seminal work, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* Rev. Ed. New York and London: Verso Books, 1991. It follows that if communities can be imagined, they can also be re-imagined, an important concept for this paper.

⁹ Barbara Harff and Ted Robert Gurr. *Ethnic Conflict in World Politics*. 2nd Ed. Boulder CO: Westview Press, 2004, 3.

One of the factors can be thought of as a “touchstone” for varieties of political activism helps explain why specific groups do become politically active: *relative deprivation*. This theory was developed in the 1960s to examine and analyze situations in which individuals or groups *subjectively* perceive themselves to be in an unfair (even unjust) status or condition compared to their “advantaged” reference groups who have similar attributes; therefore, they are deserving of similar rewards but are not receiving them.

Subjective experiences and interpretations of deprivation are more likely when the differences between two groups shrink so that comparisons can be made fairly easily. The discontent arising from relative deprivation has been used to explain radical politics (whether of the left or the right), some religions, the rise of social movements, industrial disputes, and crime. “The usual distinction made is that religious fervor or demands for political change are a collective response to relative deprivation whereas crime is an individualized response. But this is certainly not true of many crimes - for example, smuggling, poaching or terrorism — which have a collective nature and a communal base...”¹⁰

Relative deprivation theory may, in other words, assist in explaining some actions of specific “discontented” groups, but not all. This is especially true when there are valid and available pathways in a democratic system by which a “deprived” group or person may register discontents and hopefully receive relief. If a specific group feels that they have no practical, meaningful way to approach a state’s institutions or its representatives, the situation will undoubtedly become more difficult to resolve.

But the signs and language of relative deprivation can be useful, especially in a democracy with free speech and rule of law, in identifying and assessing groups or persons at risk of becoming involved in criminal activities, such as terrorism, human trafficking, organized crime, money-laundering, and interethnic conflict or violence, to name a few of the risk areas. Not all persons who have a sense of relative deprivation will be activists or, more significantly, will become radicalized as part of their claimed identities. Nor does this indicate whether a person will engage in political violence or its cousin, terrorism.¹¹ The point here is that when persons believe themselves to be disadvantaged for reasons of their identities, or because they may apparently lack an identity others value, such as citizenship beliefs and ties to the state, crisis points can more easily arise.

¹⁰ Jock Young, *The Exclusive Society*. Thousand Oaks CA: Sage Publishing, 1999, and at <http://www.malcolmread.com/JockYoung/relative.htm>.

¹¹ John Alan Cohan, “Necessity, Political Violence and Terrorism”, *Stetson Law Review* 35, 904-981 (2006).

Another theory, that of the “good vs. bad neighborhood”, also offers some explanatory and guiding power regarding conflict: if a state is in a “good” neighborhood, one that is stable, friendly, and with citizens who are like those in other nearby states, conflict is less likely internally or with other states. If one instead has “bad neighbors” (is located in a bad neighborhood, in other words), not only is inter-state conflict likely, but other types of instability will also be present (economic, employment, sectarian, and so on). Intra-state conflict is also more probable. The state which may be rather good but finds itself in a bad neighborhood because of changes in the surrounding states or regimes is also more likely to engage in “bad” behavior both internally and in its interstate relations.¹²

Another danger has recently arisen, the decline in democracies: fully one-third of the world’s population lives in a “back-sliding democracy”, one in which authoritarian traits are on the rise and have already had an impact. Even the U.S. is in this group.¹³ This decline is a worrisome trend, especially as newer states attempt to consolidate democracy, democratic institutions, the rule of law, and to battle corruption.

Identities and the State

Determining political, legal and institutional frameworks for addressing a multicultural civil society, and accommodating its multiple, diverse characteristics are critical for the development and prosperity of a state and its members. These frameworks, especially democracy and the rule of law, with other accommodative elements, can lead to tolerance, a secure and inclusive civil society, general economic prosperity, and stable and equitable institutions — or they can lead to violent and other damaging levels of conflict, economic displacement and upheaval, institutional fragility and inconsistencies, and quarrels over inclusion, system access, corruption, justice and additional aspects of civil societal insecurity between groups (ethnicities in particular). The constitutional framework and other practices, policies or programs become particularly critical in a new state, especially in one in which there are identified, known ethnic cleavages, and even more so when specific ethno-religious fragmentation is pervasive.

¹² Myron S. Weiner, "Bad Neighbors, Bad Neighborhoods: An Inquiry into the Causes of Refugee Flows", *International Security* 21, 1 (Summer 1996), pp. 37-38; see also the important research of Michael Edward Brown in this area regarding proximate causes and underlying causes that may lead to conflict.

¹³ “Democracy for All? V-DEM Democracy Report 2018”, University of Gothenburg, at https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/3f/19/3f19efc9-e25f-4356-b159-b5c0ec894115/v-dem_democracy_report_2018.pdf.

Using Harff and Gurr's typology of politically active ethnic groups (ethnonationalists, indigenous peoples, ethnoclasses and communal contenders), one may classify, as they do, the ethnic tensions situation in Macedonia, for example, as ethnonationalist, driven by the minority ethnicity's aspiration to establish an independent state, or to be autonomous (in varying degrees) from the present ruling state. Some ethnicities may also wish closer ties with a national homeland outside of the one they currently live in. These traits are generally true of Albanians in Macedonia.¹⁴

Again, Amy Chua's "political tribalism" working theory may be of use: individuals of a particular group gather together, shunning those who are not considered "like them", to engage in political actions and activities aimed at achieving the group's goals.¹⁵ There are those applying this theory even to current events in the United States, which should come as no surprise. Political tribalism is closely related to amoral familism as Edward Banfield explained it in the mid-1950s after a close case study of a northern Italian community.¹⁶ It has been applied more to social and economic endeavors than to wholly political ones. There are those who argue that today's Kosovo resembles the Italian community that Banfield examined in his case study. What both amoral familism and political tribalism have most strongly in common is their foundational belief that if it is good for the family (tribe), then it is good. Full stop. No further moral, ethical, or other examination need occur.¹⁷ Some might also argue that this conclusion helps to explain mafias and some criminal organizations.

The Rule of Law

Law enforcement and intelligence agencies (and other relevant institutions and organizations), both national and international, know all of this, of course. It is when trust erodes in an institution or its practices that serious problems can arise in society and the institutions which are tasked with supporting that society.

The rule of law is based on four cornerstones:

1. **Accountability:** the government as well as private actors are accountable under the law;

¹⁴ Ibid. 19. "Macedonia" is used throughout this paper for purposes of simplicity and because of majority formal international recognition of the Republic under its constitutional name, including the United States' recognition.

¹⁵ Amy Chua. *Political Tribes: Group Instincts and the Fate of Nations*. New York: Penguin Press, 2018; *World on Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global Instability*. New York: Random House LLC, 2003 (revised 2004).

¹⁶ Edward C. Banfield. *Moral Bases of Backward Societies*. Chicago: Free Press (University of Chicago), 1955; revised and republished 1967.

¹⁷ Agron Demi. "The Society of Amoral Familism". 22 Feb 2017 accessed at <https://prishtinainsight.com/society-amoral-familism/> on 21 March 2018.

2. **Just Laws:** laws are clear, publicized, stable, and just; are applied evenly; and protect fundamental rights, including the security of persons and property and certain core human rights;
3. **Open Government:** processes by which the laws are enacted, administered, and enforced are accessible, fair, and efficient; and
4. **Accessible and Impartial Dispute Resolution:** Justice is delivered timely by competent, ethical, and independent representatives and by neutrals who are accessible, have adequate resources, and reflect the makeup of the communities they serve.¹⁸

There are other critical areas to the rule of law that arise from these four bases, and that also may be affected by multiple identities: the *World Justice Project* (WJP) utilizes these additional traits in its annual assessment and surveys. These nine additional traits are:

1. Constraints on Government Powers;
2. Absence of Corruption;
3. Open Government;
4. Fundamental Rights;
5. Order and Security;
6. Regulatory Enforcement;
7. Civil Justice;
8. Criminal Justice; and
9. Informal Justice.¹⁹

WJP's survey for 2017-2018 placed Macedonia at 0.53, or in a weaker status, on par with Bulgaria, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Serbia. All these states ranked better than Turkey, and just slightly behind Greece regionally. Macedonia, however, is trending downward as of the most recent data, along with Bulgaria, not a positive sign for the rule of law in these states. Deeper dives into the data on Rule of Law as part of the World Justice Project's surveys are available at <http://data.worldjusticeproject.org/>, with an interactive map of the world and the results. They are quite enlightening.

The Rule of Law is one of the facets of democracy and good governance that creates and permits "space" for political activities and activism. Under positive Rule of Law, that space is orderly and transparent; if Rule of Law breaks down, that space becomes more risk-filled, radicalized, and usually but not always more violent and less democratic.

¹⁸ <https://worldjusticeproject.org/about-us/overview/what-rule-law>

¹⁹ <https://worldjusticeproject.org/our-work/wjp-rule-law-index>

Democracy and Democratic Institutions

It is important to remember that, when examining Eastern European states, they are nascent democracies – none even 50 years old yet, and several are not yet three decades old (this includes Macedonia). One cannot expect these states to have mature democratic institutions, much less the established and balanced Rule of Law and consistency that more mature democracies often have (although sometimes not constantly; much depends on the type of democracy and regime, as previously noted). Add to youthfulness the fact that there is a history of corruption in most of these countries that continues even today, and it is easier to understand why these newer states face issues that at least some older states have largely overcome. Lack of trust exacerbates the challenges in Eastern Europe — between countries and within each of them. Political tribalism adds to the complexities, without a doubt, especially in states with distinctive (often historical) ethnic rivalries.

Tribalism has two faces: it is inclusive for those in the defined group (that definition usually developed and created by its members); it is also exclusive to those outside of the defined group. Some have ethnonationalist traits and bases (even in the United States). Some political tribalism is zero-sum (that is, anything lost from one group is gained in total by the other). What one group or “tribe” (ethnic or ethnoreligious group, in many cases) gains, the opposing group or other(s) lose.²⁰

The trust issue is a major one in infant democracies (and even in older ones), particularly if any incidents occur that affect minority groups, and even more specifically, if those impact a “majority-minority” (that is, a group holding a high percentage of the minority populace. The Albanian-Macedonians are such a group in Macedonia, for example, at roughly around 25-30% of the state’s total population).²¹

²⁰ See Thomas Schelling. *The Strategy of Conflict*. Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1990; also, Robert Axelrod. *The Evolution of Cooperation*. New York: Basic Books, 2006; and Ken Binmore. *Game Theory and the Social Contract: Playing Fair (Vol I)*. Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1994. These are all classics in the field of game theory. See also Chua, 2018.

²¹ Jens Reuter. 1993. “Policy and Economy in Macedonia,” in *The Macedonian Question*, ed. James Pettifer (NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), 28-38. The percentage is an estimate, as Albanian-Macedonians have not taken part in any national censuses to date. Explanations for their boycott vary. Ethnic Albanians boycotted the 1991 census as a protest against the government’s census: forms were not printed in Albanian. The results of the 1994 Census are also formally disputed by ethnic Albanians, particularly by ethnic Albanian political party leaders. See Reuter, and P.H. Liotta and Cindy R. Jebb, *Mapping Macedonia: Idea and Identity* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004), 66 and *passim*. Therefore, the 2002 census was similarly indeterminate for Albanian-Macedonians. The actual population percent of ethnic Albanians and ethnic Macedonians is a commonly raised issue by partisan political leaders from both ethnicities.

There have been many such incidents in Macedonia involving Albanian-Macedonians, unfortunately; one need only review issues of the *Balkan Investigative Reporting Network* (BIRN, at birn.eu.com, is a “network of local non-governmental organizations promoting freedom of speech, human rights and democratic values.”)²² They focus on recent past and current reports from the Balkans. As a further example, Bosnia-Herzegovina has no actual majority, although Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims) are believed to comprise about 48% of the country’s population prior to the wars there.²³

In Macedonia, Albanian-Macedonians are currently working with ethnic Macedonians and the government under the terms of the Ohrid Framework Agreement 2001. It was negotiated mostly by the international community (externally, in other words). This technically did not and does not augur well for it; historically, externally developed agreements, such as this one, do not hold up over time. Consider the very fragile Dayton Accords or the Good Friday/Belfast agreements as examples of difficult, externally designed agreements that are at risk.

If one accepts that it is unlikely these demographics are likely to change in any statistically significant fashion, this means that democratic institutions must be highly transparent and consistent in the manners in which they address their citizens’ issues, and free from corruption if they wish to gain their populace’s trust, no matter which ethnicity or other tribal group or affiliation any person claims.

Some even have sectarian aspects (again, see Huntington’s *Clash of Civilizations*). This is certainly the case in Serbia, Republika Srpska, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, Croatia, Poland, and other countries. Finding common ground and building consensus among the various political parties and other activists are often viewed as next to impossible; this makes liberal democracy and a stable, balanced and respected Rule of Law even more difficult to instill. When powerful nationalist, sectarian or populist sentiments are included in the variables that must be addressed in these endeavors, the chances of formulating and holding together a liberal democracy with a solid and transparent rule of law look somewhat bleak, to say the least. Recent rises in nationalism and populism, as mentioned, have placed several Eastern and Central European countries at significant risk.

Sectarianism is a well-determined touchstone for terrorism: this applies both to terrorism occurring within a state and those who act as “foreign fighters” (seen most recently in ISIS, the Islamic State in Syria).

²² www.birn.eu.com (Homepage note).

²³ “Ethnic composition of Bosnia & Herzegovina 1991,” at Pop-stat.mashke.org.

Because nationalist and/or sectarian sentiments do not necessarily stop at a state's border, there are transnational and diaspora aspects included in this. There are also important issues that arise when such foreign fighters return to their home state after involvement elsewhere. How can they be reintegrated into their home country and society — and some ask if they even should be.

Banking systems associated with certain religious groups may make money laundering more direct. *Hawala* or *hewala* is a much-used, informal funding transfer system based not on the movement of cash, or wire transfers between banks, but instead on the performance, confidentiality, and honor of a huge network of Islamic money handlers (brokers). It is often used worldwide by those sending remittances back to a “home country”, or to other individuals or organizations, including, it is suspected, terrorist groups. One of the pillars of Islam, *zakat*, also specifies that charitable giving, in some cases, may be appropriately used to fund fighters for Islamic goals and purposes.²⁴ So assets could be transferred to terrorists by the mosque. Add these factors to tightly knit ethnic groups and kin groups, and the challenge of shutting down terrorism and its resources, along with other forms of political activism, increases exponentially.

Understanding the causes, dynamics and progression of conflicts, particularly violent ones which border on actual terrorism, and the potential forms of resolution are key points in a move toward such resolution with a goal of attaining societal security. In a democracy, whether relatively new or more mature, one approach is to consider the various identities the parties hold who are involved in such tensions, and to attempt to sort through which tensions are associated with which identities. Which are most likely to have been or to become politicized? Where will support for the contending group come from? Potentially, it could arise from organized crime, mafia-type criminal “families”, money-laundering, the diaspora community, religiously affiliated organizations and entities, traditional and new smuggling operations, and so on.

Conflict is broad-ranging and far-reaching, in most cases. It need not take place on the parties' doorsteps. Indeed, much of terrorism takes place away from the fighters' homelands. That such action occurs makes the return and reintegration of those who have been involved in foreign conflicts even more crucial if peace, positive or negative, is to be maintained on the “home front”. If one's identity as a terrorist, together with the associated ideologies and belief sets, is ascendant, reintegration may not be possible or desirable. In that case, the justice system and its democratic institutions must step in to handle these cases.

²⁴ William A. Gawthrop. 2010. “Zakat: A Warfare Funding Mechanism”, at <http://micastore.com/Vanguard/PastIssues/2010April.pdf>.

Handling Conflicts: Management, Settlement, Resolution and Consolidation

Albert Einstein's definition of peace may be useful in this respect: "Peace is not merely the absence of war but the presence of justice, of law, of order — in short, of government."

Important to positive peace then are aspects of interethnic tolerance or harmony, and positive attitudes such as generosity, tolerance or inclusion of minorities by the majority group. Control of violence matters and is often achieved by dissociation (conflicting parties are separated, whether by their own efforts or through governmental or military efforts). In general, policies based on negative peace (the absence of war/conflict) rather than positive peace do not deal with the underlying causes of violence, only its manifestations. Negative peace efforts may actually lead to future escalation of violence rather than a lasting peace, since tensions from social conflict are merely repressed rather than fully resolved.²⁵

Conflict management and associated regulation are attempts to "contain, limit, or direct the effects of an ongoing ethnic conflict on the wider society in which it takes place." This can be a society/location, as indicated, far from one's home state. Conflict settlement's goal is to implement "an institutional framework in which the conflicting interests of different ethnic groups can be accommodated [so]...that incentives for cooperation and non-violent pursuit of conflicts...through compromise outweigh any benefits that might be expected from violent confrontation."²⁶

Conflict resolution demands identification of causal factors fundamental to the conflict and developing means to address them effectively. This infers, in turn, that attitudes and behavior that view violence as an acceptable means to address difference must be changed, that systems and structures may require alteration to be responsive and adaptive to ethnicities within a state, and furthermore, the recognition that conflict resolution is both a process and the process's terminal result.

The negotiation process determines outcome (management, settlement or resolution), whether the real causes are recognized and considered by the negotiators, or whether they are deflected or avoided because discussing them is too high-risk. Consolidation of the conflict management's terms may occur at the same time, or later.

²⁵ D.C. Woolman, "Education and Peace in the Thought of Johan Galtung," *Currents: Issues in Education and Human Development Education and Peace* 3, no. 2 (Spring 1985), 7-20. Quoted in Sandy and Perkins, Jr., 3-4. See also Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and War," *Foreign Affairs* 74, no. 3 (May/June 1995), reprinted in *Conflict after the Cold War: Arguments on Causes of War and Peace* 2nd ed., Richard K. Betts, ed. (NY: Pearson Longman, 2005), 318-30.

²⁶ Stefan Wolff, "Managing and Settling Ethnic Conflicts," in *Managing and Settling Ethnic Conflicts: Perspectives on Successes and Failures in Europe, Africa and Asia*, eds. Ulrich Schneckener and Stefan Wolff (NY: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), 12.

It also depends on attitudes toward violence among the conflicting groups. Continuing to use Macedonia as an exemplar, consider that crucial to inter-ethnic violence potential, the 2001 UNDP polls indicated 60% of Albanian-Macedonian male respondents (ages 18-24) found violence an acceptable political approach.

In comparison, about 16.4% of Macedonian males in the same age group accepted violence as a political practice.²⁷ When one considers these factors [willingness to use violence, high unemployment, pervasive mistrust of the Macedonian state (more specifically, the Macedonian national police and other security and military forces), civilizational cleavages, with limited education and economic prospects among younger Albanian men in Macedonia)], it is little wonder Albanian paramilitaries and other groups advocating political violence were perceived to be a credible option (perhaps even an attractive one in some respects).²⁸

From 1990 through 2001, conflict management efforts in Macedonia ranged from unsuccessful integration attempts to various proposals for partition. With its symbolic shift toward emphasis on ethnic Macedonians as the “titular nation” (a “hybrid mix of the nation-state and state-nation concepts”)²⁹, the 1991 Constitution intended to integrate Macedonian citizens at the individual, not the group, level. Albanian Macedonians found this “national minority” status unacceptable; as indicated, they demanded constituent nation status as a group. In 2001, several members of the Macedonian Academy of Sciences and Arts and the Prime Minister of Macedonia advocated partition of the state along Macedonian-Albanian ethnic lines; the proposal was abandoned due to open domestic and international disapproval of it. This issue remains an open one legally, although attempts were (and are presently being) made by various parties to resolve it. As a result, outbreaks of ethnic violence and preservation of delicate inter-ethnic relations in Macedonia were addressed through a combination of gradual concessions toward ethnic Albanians, the Ohrid Framework Agreement’s terms, application of coercive means, and corrupt exchanges between ethnic elites.³⁰

²⁷ United Nations Development Programme, “Early warning report no. 4”, Feb/Mar 2001, accessed at <http://earlywarning.undp.sk/Reports/index.cfm?page=TeamReports&TeamID=5>. Other early warning reports sound similar and sometimes more extensive alarms.

²⁸ Hislope, Robert, “Between a bad peace and a good war: insights and lessons from the almost war in Macedonia,” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 26, no. 1 (2004), 129-51.

²⁹ Marko, 5.

³⁰ Hislope, Robert. 1998. “Ethnic Conflict and the “Generosity Moment,” *Journal of Democracy* 9, no. 1 (1998), 140-153, at 145-46. See also Hislope, “Bad Peace, Good War,” 138-40.

Corrupt exchange is, unfortunately, a signature trait of Macedonia's ethnic conflict management, since "between consent and force stands corruption/fraud (characteristic of certain situations when it is hard to exercise the hegemonic function, and when the use of force is too risky)."³¹ Corrupt exchange provides "incentives to ethnic party elites to maintain coalition government despite the pressures that typically emanate from intra-ethnic party competition and the general absence of political or value consensus among coalition partners".³²

Short-term, government partners from all ethnic groups have an interest in maintaining the coalition and staying in power since substantial material rewards are at stake.

While these are expected (and rational) outcomes of political participation in the highest levels of government, corrupt elites in multi-ethnic coalitions further act to "avoid interethnic confrontations; de-mobilizing elites thereby tone down their nationalist rhetoric and adopt a more pragmatic approach upon taking office."³³

Macedonia's government has not seen much in the way of interethnic conflict avoidance and the like, given frequent (and ongoing) spates of verbal and physical violence (in Parliament among elected officials, and elsewhere), at least some of which is rooted in ethnicity, and nearly all of which has weakened inter-group trust, democracy, rule of law and democratic institutionalization/institutions, while strengthening corruption.³⁴

In his research of corruption and its influence on inter-ethnic relations, Hislope dissects the connection between corrupt exchange among ethnic elites and the stability of the multi-ethnic coalitions governing Macedonia from 1992 until 2001.³⁵ While corrupt exchange helped hold together multi-ethnic coalitions until 2001, its consequences were disastrous for institutions, democratic development, and for the rule of law. It is no coincidence that the first clashes in 2001 between ethnic Albanian fighters and the Macedonian national security forces occurred in villages left for years without the presence of police or border patrols, thereby allowing safe haven for a variety of smugglers and other lawbreakers who undermined societal security, civic affiliations and identities. Accusations of internal security negligence and irregularities were numerous.

³¹ Antonio Gramsci, in Robert Hislope, "When Being Bad is Good: Corrupt Exchange in Divided Societies", Conference Paper presented at Syracuse University, 2005 (unpublished), accessed on February 14, 2017, at www.maxwell.syr.edu/moynihan/programs/ces/peconfpdfs/Hislope.pdf, 1..

³² Hislope, "When Being Bad", 3.

³³ Hislope, "When Being Bad", 3.

³⁴ See reports on these incidents over the years at www.birn.eu.com. Refer also to various works in Bibliography of this paper for further information.

³⁵ See Hislope, "Calm Before the Storm? ...", and "When Being Bad".

A former Minister of Interior of Macedonia, Pavle Trajanov, blames subsequent Macedonian governments from the time of the “double embargo” in 1992 (by Greece to its south and Serbia to its north) until at least the early to mid-2000s for organizing or tolerating the smuggling of cigarettes, oil and a variety of arms from or through Macedonia to Kosovo, Albania, and Serbia.³⁶

Although the legal instruments of the August 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement should prevail and be fully implemented, the long practice of tolerating corruption continues to take its toll on the institutions and peoples of Macedonia. A focused cross-ethnic battle against corruption must be waged, if Macedonia wishes to function under the rule of law and democracy, with democratic institutions, to improve its economy and meet the standards expected by its citizens and the international organizations such as North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) that the country wishes to join.³⁷

Developments after the 2001 armed conflict support the contention that this ethnic conflict falls short of resolution, since the fundamental causes of the conflict have not been obviated. This is not unexpected, since dealing with the underlying causes is the most difficult aspect. Such a process requires strong domestic political will, the consistent support of the international community, and a significant amount of time. The cleavages from prior to and after 2001’s conflict must be attended to before proceeding to the underlying causal factors, in order to achieve real conflict resolution (rather than simply settlement) in Macedonia.

It is both probable and likely, as was discussed by other presenters at the NATO Advanced Research Workshop in Skopje, Macedonia (April 11-14, 2018) that arms, oil and other conflict-related materiel (especially small arms) are going to terrorist groups in various global locations, and more particularly to the conflict-ridden Fertile Crescent region which includes Syria, Jordan, Israel, a part of Egypt, southern Iraq, and Saudi Arabia (it is sometimes called the Cradle of Civilization.)³⁸ Some may also be destined for Yemen and other Middle Eastern states and ethnic groups (such as the Kurds), and the hands of ISIS and similar terrorist groups.

³⁶ Center for the Study of Democracy, CSD Reports: “Cigarette Smuggling”, <http://www.csd.bg/publications/book10/2.2.pdf>; “Macedonia’s Public Secret: How Corruption Drags the Country Down” (International Crisis Group Balkan Report no.133, 14 August 2002), 22-23, accessed at http://www.intl-crisis-group.org/projects/balkans/macedonia/reports/A400739_14082002.pdf; and Hislope, “When Being Bad is Good”, 34. Trajanov was Minister of Interior, 1998-99.

³⁷ Interview with V. Georgiev, Office of Prevention of Corruption, June 14, 2006, Skopje, Macedonia.

³⁸ Mark, Joshua J. “Fertile Crescent”, 28 March 2018, in *Ancient History Encyclopedia*, at https://www.ancient.eu/Fertile_Crescent/.

Remaining Issues for Conflict Settlement

In order to treat the unresolved underlying causes of ethnic conflict in Macedonia, action is required to resolve structural and economic problems, as well as addressing the factors of fear. Structural factors necessitating immediate attention are a broad and effective battle against corruption and organized-crime, and deep, cross-cutting reforms in the judiciary and public administration. A solution must be acceptable to both sides in order to be sustainable and contribute to the stability and security of the entire region. It is best if the proposed solutions are developed by the main parties to them (the ethnic groups and their political representation).³⁹

The importance of deep and significant reforms in the judiciary and public administration sectors in Macedonia cannot be overstated and has been the subject of much political posturing and publicity. Ensuring an efficient and professional administration and judiciary, free from political machinations, is crucial for the rule of law, non-discrimination and fight against corruption. It is also a necessary precondition for improving the business climate and attracting foreign investment in Macedonia. Only by taking such measures can Macedonia begin addressing the two major problems for all citizens of the country regardless of their ethnicity: unemployment and poverty.⁴⁰

The aid and assistance the international community has given Macedonia to undertake reforms in these fields has been valuable over the past decade, but without strong domestic political will and dedication to reforms that are often painful, not to mention embarrassing, no significant or sustainable progress can be achieved.

Education is a crucial long-term investment in reconciliation and ethnic conflict resolution. Macedonia's educational system must reinforce the positive values of diversity, tolerance, and the cultural benefits of living in such a multi-cultural society. The education system must provide students with the possibility for elective classes in minority languages and, at the same time, should improve the quality of training in the Macedonian language for students from other ethnic communities educated in a primary language other than Macedonian.

It is important, not only for Macedonia but also for the entire Western Balkans region, that the EU keeps commitments made as part of the 2003 Thessaloniki EU Council regarding the future inclusion of the Western Balkan states as members.

³⁹ Martha Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism", *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 13, No. 4 (July 1981), pp. 379-399; at stable URL <https://www.jstor.org/stable/421717>.

⁴⁰ In the IRI Macedonia Survey, March 2006, <http://macedonia.usaid.gov/>, 52% of the citizens responded that unemployment is the most serious problem facing Macedonia.

If the EU elects to postpone the Euro-integrative processes for an extended period or offers alternatives other than the prospect of EU membership, its conflict resolution efforts in Macedonia and elsewhere in the Western Balkans will be undermined, since its conditionality will not hold the same positive force as it has had. In such a situation, radical forces likely would question whether “incentives for cooperation and the non-violent pursuit of conflicts of interest through compromise outweigh any benefits that might be expected from violent confrontation.”⁴¹

The focus on Macedonia’s Euro-Atlantic integration process and prospects supported the country’s willingness to cooperate in the conflict resolution mechanisms proposed by these international organizations and entities. In Macedonia, the struggle for political stability and security, economic progress and democratic reform continues. These issues are undoubtedly connected with successful ethnic conflict resolution and once again point to the third side of Macedonia’s conflict resolution puzzle: Macedonia cannot ignore the international community, especially EU and NATO. Only a serious commitment from EU and NATO that includes the prospect of full membership in these organizations at some realistic and specific future date will insulate Macedonia from forthcoming risks and create a solid basis for the continuation of reforms needed to fulfill the Copenhagen criteria, and to resolve, not simply settle or mask, the country’s internal ethnic conflicts.

There is significant power in the Macedonian and Albanian diasporas. The stronger the ties to an identity and a “homeland” among those diasporas, the more active their membership tends to be. This can offer opportunities and/or barriers to cracking the touchstones of terrorism and political violence

Furthermore, international actors have tended to underestimate the depth and complexity of cleavages themselves within Macedonia. What may appear rational, unambiguous, uncontroversial and logical to those outside Macedonia may face hurdles not immediately evident to those not intimately involved in the socio-cultural, socio-political and socio-economic fabric of daily life in Macedonia. Integration is not pervasive, nor is there necessarily a commitment to it across the board. *Identity* as an exclusionary factor still defines much of life; that nearly all political parties are ethnically based is a cogent example of this, as are continuing claims that there are ethnic restrictions on where one may safely or comfortably live, be employed, travel without harm, where security may be enforced, and the like. Progress has been made, but more is needed, including stronger emphasis on civic identity and citizenship of a state (inclusivity) versus ethnicity or other identity (exclusivity and cleavages).

⁴¹ Ted Robert Gurr, “Peoples against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing World System,” *International Studies Quarterly* 38 (1994), 347-77; see also Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg, “Armed Conflict and Regional Conflict Complexes, 1989-97,” *Journal of Peace Research* 35:5 (1998), 621-34.

Selected Bibliography

[Note: Internet resources are fully set forth in the footnotes, so are mostly omitted here.]

- Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (Rev. ed.) NY and London: Verso Books, 1991.
- Banfield, Edward. *Moral Basis of a Backward Society*. Glencoe, IL: The Free Press (University of Chicago), 1955.
- Brown, Keith. *The Past in Question: Modern Macedonia and the Uncertainties of Nation*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003.
- Brown, Michael E., Owen R. Coté, Jr., S.M. Lynn-Jones, S.E. Miller, eds. *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict: An International Security Reader* Rev. ed. Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2001.
- Brunnbauer, Ulf, "Fertility, Families and Ethnic Conflict: Macedonians and Albanians in the Republic of Macedonia 1944-2002," *Nationalities Papers* 32, no. 3 (2004), 565-98.
- Cooley, Charles Horton. *On Self and Social Organization*. University of Chicago Press. 1st edition, 1998.
- Crenshaw, Martha. "The Causes of Terrorism," *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 13, No. 4 (July, 1981), pp. 379-399; at stable URL <https://www.jstor.org/stable/421717>.
- Danforth, Loring M. *The Macedonian Conflict: Ethnic Nationalism in a Transnational World*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997.
- Daskaloski, Zhidas. *Walking on the Edge: Consolidating Multiethnic Macedonia 1989-2004*. Chapel Hill NC: Globic Press, 2006.
- De Varennes, Fernando, "Recurrent Challenges to the Implementation of Intra-State Peace Agreement: Resistance of State Authorities," *New Balkan Politics* 7/8, 2003, at <http://www.newbalkanpolitics.org.mk/napis.asp?id=21&lang=English>.
- Friedman, Victor, "Observing the Observers: Language, Ethnicity and Power in the 1994 Macedonian Census and Beyond," *New Balkan Politics* 3/4 (undated) at http://www.newbalkanpolitics.org.mk/OldSite/Issue_3/friedman.eng.asp, first printed in *Toward Comprehensive Peace in Southeastern Europe: Conflict Prevention in the South Balkans*, ed. by Barnett Rubin. New York: Council on Foreign Relations/Twentieth Century Fund, 1996, 105-26.
- Gawthrop, William A. 2010. "Zakat: A Warfare Funding Mechanism", at <http://micastore.com/Vanguard/PastIssues/2010April.pdf>.
- Gellner, Ernest. *Nations and Nationalism*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983.
- Henrard, Kristin, "Relating Human Rights, Minority Rights and Self-Determination in Minority Protection," in *Managing and Settling Ethnic Conflicts: Perspectives on Successes and Failures in Europe, Africa and Asia*, ed. Ulrich Schneckener and Stefan Wolff. NY: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004.

- Hirschman, Albert O. *Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Declines in Firms, Organizations and States*. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1970 (new ed. 2007).
- Hislope, Robert, "Between a bad peace and a good war: insights and lessons from the almost war in Macedonia," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 26, no. 1 (2004), 129-51.
- _____. "Organized Crime in a Disorganized State: How Corruption Contributed to Macedonia's Mini-War," *Problems of Post-Communism* 49, no. 3 (2002), 33-41.
- _____. "The Calm before the Storm? The Influence of Cross-Border Networks, Corruption and Contraband on Macedonian Stability and Regional Security." Unpublished paper presented at the September 2001 Conference of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, California, USA.
- _____. "Ethnic Conflict and the 'Generosity Moment'," *Journal of Democracy* no. 1 (1998), 140-53.
- Holmes, Jennifer S. *Terrorism and Democratic Stability*. New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2006.
- Horowitz, Donald L. *The Deadly Ethnic Riot*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001.
- _____. *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2000.
- Hristova, Lidija, "Democratic Consolidation of Divided Societies – The Macedonian Case", *New Balkan Politics* 9 (2005).
- Huntington, Samuel P. *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968.
- Laitin, David. *Nations, States and Violence*. NY: Oxford University Press, 2007.
- Lederach, John P. *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*. Washington D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1997.
- Lijphart, Arendt. *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999.
- Liotta, P.H, and Cindy Jebb. *Mapping Macedonia: Idea and Identity*. Westport CT: Praeger, 2004.
- Maleska, Mirjana, "What kind of a political system did Macedonia get after the Ohrid Peace Agreement?" *New Balkan Politics* 9 (2005).
- Maleski, Denko, "The Causes of a War: Ethnic Conflict in Macedonia in 2001," *New Balkan Politics* 7/8 (2003).
- Mansfield, Edward D., and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and War," *Foreign Affairs* 74, no. 3, 1995.
- Marko, Joseph, "The Referendum for Decentralization in Macedonia in 2004: A Litmus Test for Macedonia's Interethnic Relations," in *European Yearbooks of Minority Issues* Vol 4, 2004/2005.
- McGarry, John and Brendan O'Leary, Eds. *The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation*. NY: Routledge, 1993.

- Messas, Kostas G., "Failure in the Former Yugoslavia: Hard Lessons for the European Union," in *Crisis in the Balkans: Views from the Participants*, ed. Constantine Danopoulos and Kostas G. Messas. Boulder: Westview Press, 1997, 311-29.
- Miall, Hugh. *The Peacemakers: Peaceful Settlements of Disputes since 1945*. NY: St. Martin Press, 1992.
- Milcin, Vladimir, Gordana Duvnjak, Nikola Gevelski, Eds. *Inventory "Macedonia in the Aftermath of the Framework Agreement"*. Skopje, MK: Foundation Open Society Institute, 2006.
- Mincheva, Lyubov G., "Dissolving Boundaries between Domestic and Regional/International Conflict," *New Balkan Politics* 9 (2005).
- Poulton, Hugh. *Who are the Macedonians?* 2nd ed. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000.
- Ramet, Sabrina P. *The Three Yugoslavias: State-Building and Legitimation, 1918-2005*. Bloomington IN: Indiana University Press, 2006, and Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2006.
- Reuter, Jens, "Policy and Economy in Macedonia," in *The Macedonian Question*, ed. James Pettifer. NY: St. Martin's Press, 1999.
- Roeder, Philip G. *Where Nation-States Come From: Institutional Change in the Age of Nationalism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007.
- Romanucci-Ross, Lola and George Davis, eds. *Ethnic Identity: Creation, Conflict and Accommodation* 3rd ed. Walnut Creek CA: Sage Publications, 1995.
- Schneckener, Ulrich, "Managing and Settling Ethnic Conflicts", in *Managing and Settling Ethnic Conflicts: Perspectives on Successes and Failures in Europe, Africa and Asia*, ed. Ulrich Schneckener and Stefan Wolff. NY: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004.
- _____, "Developing and Applying EU Crisis Management: Test Case Macedonia," ECMI Working Paper #14, European Center for Minority Issues (ECMI), January 2002.
- Schöpflin, George, "The rise and fall of Yugoslavia", in *The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation*, ed. John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary. NY: Routledge, 1993.
- Sisk, Timothy. *Power Sharing*. In *Beyond Intractability*. Eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess, Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder, September 2003.
- _____. *Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts*. Washington D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1996.
- Soeters, Joseph L. *Ethnic Conflict and Terrorism: The Origins and Dynamics of Civil Wars*. London: Routledge, 2005.

Spangler, Brad, "Settlement, Resolution, Management and Transformation: An Explanation of Terms," *Beyond Intractability*. Ed. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess. Boulder CO: Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado, September 2004.

Weiner, Myron S, "Bad Neighbors, Bad Neighborhoods: An Inquiry into the Causes of Refugee Flows," *International Security* 21, 1 (Summer 1996), pp. 37-38

Wolff, Stefan. *Ethnic Conflict: A Global Perspective*. NY: Oxford University Press, 2006.