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In and Out of Place: Civilizational Interaction and the Making of Australia in Oceania and Asia

Jeremy C. A. Smith

Abstract

The making of Euro-Australia occurred against the backdrop of two dimensions of its historical constitution. First, it occurred on the back of Britain’s entry into the Oceanian world and its intercivilizational encounters with Pacific cultures. The second dimension was the appropriation of the land of a complex and internally diverse Aboriginal civilization and suppression of its social world view. This was vital to a lasting sense of ambivalence in Australian identity and in the relations of the Commonwealth of Australia with island states in the Pacific. After Federation (1901), Australia became more independent in the context of devolution of the Commonwealth. Engagement in the Pacific War heralded a turn from allegiance to Britain to alliance with the United States. A new orientation to the Asia-Pacific was not a chosen course, but one compelled by geo-political conditions and a growing dynamism in this multi-civilizational world region. From the 1970s to the end of the twentieth century, engagement in Asia accelerated with the onset of a policy regime of multiculturalism and a process of neo-liberal modernization.

This essay argues that Euro-Australia emerged out of complex intercivilizational interactions entailing colonialism, diverse migratory and cultural flows, and the creation of a homogenizing collective memory. I contend that Australian modernity, due in part to its suppression of its indigenous civilization and accompanying denial of that suppression, has borne considerable cultural and political ambivalence about its place in the region — an ambivalence which structures its economic and political relations with neighbouring countries. In this essay, I focus on Pacific relations. I compare developments and turns in Australian foreign policy with patterns of cultural engagement since the 1970s. Towards the end, I raise the Australian regime of refugee detention in relation to climate refugees. The essay concludes with notes on the merits of civilizational analysis in understanding the Oceanian constellation and its potential futures and points for further research on Australia in a multi-civilizational context.

Introduction

This essay addresses two lacunae in civilizational analysis. First, it makes a small attempt to repair the neglect of the Pacific in civilizational analysis. Second, it turns to the making of Euro-Australia as a general feature of the interaction of civilization and, more precisely, as a middle power in relation to the Pacific civilizational world.
My specific argument is that, due to the character of its colonial conquest of Aboriginal civilization, Australian modernity has borne considerable cultural and political ambivalence about its place in the region — an ambivalence which structures its economic and political relations with neighbouring countries. I prosecute this argument in three parts.

First, I briefly sketch my concept of intercivilizational engagement as a reconstruction of Benjamin Nelson’s and Johann Árnason’s theories of intercivilizational encounters. Second, I present the case for considering the Pacific as a civilization in its own right (Árnason 2003, Nelson and Huff 1981, Árnason, Eisenstadt, and Wittrock 2005, Árnason and Hann 2018, Árnason 1997). This sets up a discussion of the legacies of intercivilizational interaction that influenced the formation of Euro-Australia.

In a third part, I argue that Australian culture exhibits an ambivalence towards the Pacific region and issues from the conditions of its formation and the ongoing political and commercial vision of the Pacific as a ‘deficient’ region in need of neoliberal reconstruction. The theoretical re-orientation is crucial to understanding the basis for the ambivalent relationship with the Pacific that Australia has. I conclude with notes on the merits of civilizational analysis in pursuing further research on the Australian relationship with a multi-civilizational Asia-Pacific.

The theoretical component on intercivilizational interaction comes in an abbreviated form. Elsewhere, I elaborate the argument for the utility of the concept of intercivilizational engagement (Smith 2017). In this essay, I condense a great deal of material from the book into a short passage. My variation of the notion of intercivilizational encounters draws on a number of sources of critical inspiration: S. N. Eisenstadt, Nelson, Árnason, and Fernand Braudel (Braudel 1994, Eisenstadt 2003, Nelson and Huff 1981, Árnason 2003, Ben Rafael, Sternberg, and Eisenstadt 2005). Cornelius Castoriadis is not a known civilizationalist, but his ontology of the imaginary institution of society resonates clearly with the objectives of civilizational analysis, as Árnason so capably argues (Castoriadis 1987). Readers of Comparative Civilizations Review will be familiar with Nelson.

In this passage, I generalize Árnason’s elucidation of intercivilizational encounters. Taking Nelson and others fully into account, Arnason argues that ‘mutually formative relations between civilizational complexes’ constitute civilizations (Árnason 2003, p.287). Árnason follows Nelson, while also revising his earlier formulations. For Árnason, the crucial question is what makes specific civilizations more open to confrontation with other sociocultural constellations? Encounters that take place in multi-civilizational zones and have an impact are especially important. Arnason also brings in economic and political factors to supplement cultural ones.
Following Nelson and Árnason, but also going beyond them, I emphasize deeper connections between different constellations. Globalisation analysis might stress connections between nations and blocs in the post-war world of the twentieth century. However, globalization analysis rarely highlights the longer histories of interregional connectivity. For this reason alone, civilizational analysis is more appealing. The transactions between civilizations are, overall, deeper than many of the major accounts than globalization analysis has suggested.

With Árnason, I contend that civilizations become meaningful at points of intersection. Historical patterns of connection and obstruction produce a remarkable diversity of linkages. Seen from this point of view, it is possible to define my main concept. Intercivilizational engagement is the regularisation of contact and encounter.

To quote from my more extensive elaboration of the concept:

(Intercivilizational engagement) has a heavier gravity in the structures of daily existence. Regularised contacts and connections over long historical periods are of a different order to encounters. Where encounters are treated analytically as episodic and time-bound forms of interaction, inter-civilizational engagement can be applied as a problematic of the connectedness of world regions, societies and cultures over a longer duration. Of course, there are differing degrees of inter-civilizational engagement just as encounters differ widely in the significance that the literature attributes to them. Be that as it may, there are precious few societies and civilisations that have been isolated from inter-cultural contact altogether or that have completely closed and fixed symbolic borders for lasting periods of time. (Smith 2017, p.81)

My methodology takes the reader into examples and case studies of intercivilizational engagement across four dimensions of collective life: migration, deep engagement in economic relations, cultural exchange, and transformative borrowing of models of polity.

I distinguish this from encounters in the following way. Theorists of encounters rightly emphasize mutually formative engagement as ground-breaking. In their eyes, intercivilizational encounters have wider and lasting ramifications. The accent falls on the intensity of periods of what I call deep intercivilizational engagement. However, the regularised contacts and connections over long historical periods are of a different order to encounters, especially across the four dimensions. I operationalize the concept in case studies of Latin America, Japan, and the Pacific.

In considering the Pacific, some comments on the civilizational background of connectivity are called for. I begin by noting that the Pacific figures all too rarely in discussions of civilization and intercivilizational encounters.
The field can amend that situation. Archaeologists, anthropologists, and historians have developed a scholarship of engagement, which magnifies the civilizational character of the Pacific world (Matsuda 2012, Scarr 1990, Shilliam 2015).

Moreover, indigenous movements, artists, and political and community leaders have given voice to the longer and distinct precolonial history of engagement. They are leaders in the recovery and reconstruction of identity and a form of cultural and historical memory that demarcates islands of the Pacific as a distinct imaginary and civilizational constellation.

Intercivilizational engagement took the form of: (a) three great waves of migration, the first beginning as far back as 40000 years BP; (b) reciprocal inter-island exchange; (c) a rich and complex cosmology comprised on multiple traditions of legend, adding up to a common fund of myths of creation, movement and settlement; and, (d) transfer of models of rule and power within groups of islands. Over millennia, these added up to a paradigm of connection. Here is an old world that was already relational when Europeans first intruded on the seas of the Pacific.

In their landmark anthropologies of the Pacific, Marcel Mauss and Bronislaw Malinowski had small but sufficient and important insights into the moral ontology, social relations, and material life of Pacific Islander civilization. Their published ethnographies of the complexity of islander cultures and their ethnographic surveys did much to illuminate key aspects of this civilization, especially for non-Oceanian audiences.

By the time Mauss and Malinowski published their findings, British and French colonialism had violently disordered this civilization, although far from completely. Since the 1960s, there has been a reconstruction of historical and cultural memory in the Pacific, which has been possible due to the upsurge in indigenous activism and the revival in the arts and the human sciences.

Viewed from the point of view of this history of a connected Pacific world, Australia is a peculiar case. The British colonized the southern continent as part of the thrust into Asia and in a counter-move to growing French interest in the South Pacific. Scientific pursuits were a stimulus to the incursion also. Within comparative civilizational analysis, there are three reasons to treat Australia as a distinct case:

1. The British expropriation of the Aboriginal civilization had no identical counterpart in the world. Unlike other colonized lands, British authorities never settled any treaty on which a legal contest of sovereignty could take place. The Australian state has not settled a treaty either.
Since none exists, Australia is quite exceptional in terms of ‘fourth world’ societies. For much of Euro-Australian history, the state has utterly suppressed Aboriginal civilization in the national memory.

A multifaceted Australian war upon Aboriginal society was first challenged in the late 1930s, and then again in the 1960s and since. A significant shift has occurred in the discipline and practice of Australian history, with revisionist currents re-writing this past and to some degree altering the national education curriculum. There are ramifications for wider historiographical practice, and Australian perspectives on historiography have been part of the debate on post-colonial identity in other settler-colonizer countries of the Commonwealth.

2. Although the British had an accumulated history of colonization from their historical experiences in North America and the early gains of their trading empire in India and Asia, the British initially understood contexts outside of the Pacific far better. The new antipodean colonies were a laboratory for experiments in creating governmental institutions alongside of a nascent Victorian-era social order. Cities arose rapidly. In some instances, colonial leaders based newly founded settlements on Victorian urban design and built up public infrastructure in accordance with a Victorian vision of orderly civilized life. Victorian cities were the creative mark of the British colonies on the mainland southern continent.

3. After Federation, Australia assumed a neo-colonial role in the region. The largest state in the region continued in that vein in a formal military alliance signed in 1952 — the ANZUS alliance with the United States and New Zealand. As a middle-power in world terms, Australian governments enjoyed disproportionate influence in the Pacific, an influence not replicated in Asia, where Australia is a member of the ASEAN security treaty with comparable and confident partners.

That is a brief summary, which calls for more elaboration. Prior to British claims on the southern land, an immensely diverse Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander imagery had flourished. That civilization had rich relationships to the north of the continent through the islands up to Timor and beyond. The conquest and internal colonisation of Aboriginal civilization fostered the fiction and the myth of an ‘empty’ state of uninhabited lands.

Of course, the southern continent had been occupied and shaped by Aboriginal people for tens of thousands of years. British colonialism and the federated Commonwealth of Australia that succeeded it were in denial of the presence and civilization of Aboriginal First Nations.
Based on coastal observations of the southern continent by Banks and Matra, who were botanists on board Captain James Cook’s reconnaissance of the east coast of the continent in 1770, the British government invoked a paradox: the Aboriginal peoples sighted on the coast were rendered invisible on the assumption that the interior was entirely uninhabited. The British considered it their right — the land being apparently uninhabited — to claim full ownership, since no prior ownership could be established or claimed (Rundell 2004, p.202, p.206).

So began the myth of *terra nullius*, a legal fiction that the land was empty of culture and civilization and that therefore there was no prior sovereign people with which to negotiate a treaty. In the nineteenth century, the judiciary reaffirmed *terra nullius* in five separate judgements and legislative acts. This underpinned the wider resonance that the image of the empty land had in Australian culture.

Yet, the Aboriginal presence remained as a troubling reminder of the colonial past and colonizing present. In the first half of the twentieth century, many Australians reassured themselves of the moral worth of the civilizing mission by deeming that the Aboriginal race was ‘dying out’ and that the Christian duty was to ease the passing of Aboriginality through Christian education in the manners, language and customs of white Australia. Combined with frontier violence against Aboriginal people in the nineteenth and even early twentieth centuries, this amounted to a ‘war’ on Aboriginal civilization.

The legal fiction of *terra nullius* came to haunt the national mindset, with the growing sense of doubt about the foundational basis of white Australia. In the post-war period, and particularly from the 1960s onwards, critical challenges to the dominant historical understanding of the foundational story shed light on the undeclared war on the peoples, signs, semiotics and Dreamtime cosmology of Australian Aboriginal civilization.

This was one critical side of the process of making white civilization in Australia. Civilization-making coincided with Australian modernity. In other words, Euro-Australia was ‘born modern’.

Being a modern society from the outset, and yet one at war with the ancient Aboriginal civilization it had supplanted, created a strange cultural condition of uncertain and ambivalent belonging (Beilharz and Smith 1997). Deep ambivalence epitomises cultural perceptions in Australia, partly because of the occlusion of the colonial conquest. Australian modernity has rested on the problem of how to combine a denied Aboriginal old world with a new world that has no antiquity, no Middle Ages and no revolutionary foundation — in other words, none of the foundations of other states with which it might be compared.
Thus, there was no political foundation like that possessed by many European and Asian societies, the United States, France, and the Soviet Union in particular. Contrasting the deep temporality of the Aboriginal Dreamtime — with its stories of Creation from land and sea in a distant undated past — is a Euro-Australian historical memory of two short centuries. No other contrast of antique and modern civilizations is as sharp as this one.

Of course, Australia did have two British myths as a backdrop to its constitution (Rundell 2004).

The first was that Australia was terra nullius, as discussed above. It was the official doctrine of British colonial rule and then of the government in federated Australia. More importantly, terra nullius penetrated deeply into Australian cultural life. When combined with the second foundational myth (that the southern continent would host a ‘new’ white society based on an imported British constitutional tradition), the basis for racism was set.

As Aboriginal social movements asserted the living presence of indigenous civilization and as the Australian population diversified, the two myths have steadily been destabilized. With the adoption of multiculturalism in the 1970s, the lasting culture of Australian racism started to erode. Although multiculturalism is a complex and multidimensional problematic beyond this essay (but see Castles, Haas, and Miller 2014, pp.166-8), one short comment is necessary. Official multiculturalism, as formulated and practiced by Federal and State Governments, is a cultural dimension of a wider process of neo-liberal modernization. It was a crucial component of neo-liberalism — a process that came earlier to Australia than many other countries in the OECD.

Notwithstanding the undertow of revision of Australian identity, Euro-Australia still struggles with its past, a struggle that reverberates in debates about the cultural, collective and historical memory. Irresolution of the historical issues inhibits efforts to tackle social problems of the present. Aboriginal communities suffer acutely from high levels of unemployment, unconscionable disparities in health and education, and confrontations with the criminal justice system.

Questions of sovereignty in Aboriginal affairs hang over all this. There is more success in multiculturalism, but as with other polities with multiculturalist regimes of management of ethnic diversity, a populist backlash based on white identity has occurred since the late 1990s. Even so, right-wing populism has not entered the mainstream in the manner it did in the United States in 2016. There is no Australian Trump.
These are the cultural, historical and political settings for engagement with the Pacific since the 1970s. Australia inherited a political economy in the region based on the extraction of resources and has sustained the asymmetrical relationship. Like other powers, Australia engaged in the infamous practice of ‘blackbirding’ in the nineteenth century by seizing Pacific Islanders and transferring them to Australia to work as coerced labourers. For affected Pacific Islands, the result was a wave of depopulation.

While there has been no repeat of such dehumanizing practices, the terms of trade between Australia and Pacific producers remain profoundly unequal. An export trade in copra, guano, phosphate, sugar and coffee were at the heart of the plantation economy run by Australian and New Zealand companies. Towards the end of the twentieth century, mining, fishing and logging reached unsustainable levels on many islands, especially Fiji, Bougainville and the Solomon Islands, wrecking terrestrial and marine environments.

To avoid a one-sided analysis at this stage, I wish to also point to the multidimensional complexity of economic transactions, the patterns of land ownership, and some ontological aspects of economic relations between Australia and the Pacific. In this respect, it is important to keep the breadth of the process of intercivilizational engagement in the picture. The extractive logic of Australian capital is inseparable from the historical inter-connexion of Pacific and Eurasian worlds.

As Marshall Sahlins eloquently argues, islanders bring their own experiences of exchange to economic relations with larger powers (Sahlins 1989). In Hawaii and throughout Polynesia, island societies negotiated the goods, networks and hierarchies of Western intruders. The intercultural character of economic engagement continued to involve exchanges in values and obligations, as well as exchange of goods and services. Those instances of reciprocal exchange may well fall under the constellation of worldwide capitalist trade patterns and their long chains of connection.

Still, there are limits to the integration of the economic culture of reciprocity. Limitations to the takeover of the ways of islander life by developmental patterns are evident in the ongoing advice of economists at the end of the twentieth century that Pacific Islanders need to embrace the capitalist spirit more (Dirlik 1998, 1997, pp.129-33). To the extent that Pacific patterns of economic culture persist, then the “social centrality of the ancient practice of reciprocity — the core of all oceanic cultures” remains in a complex and incomplete relationship to the economic orders of capitalism, as a Tongan artist, anthropologist, and advocate notes (Hau’ofa 2008, p.36).
The economic cultural complex of Pacific civilization has limited direct influence on Australian capital and the Australian state. Australia in the 1960s retreated from trusteeships in the Cook Islands and Nauru and, a little later, Papua New Guinea. In the wake of the decolonisation of Vanuatu, Tonga, Fiji, Western Samoa and the Solomon Islands, Australian policy cast the Pacific as a zone of few economic prospects, heightened political instability and pending environmental decline.

In the political discourse on the Pacific in Australia, there is no equivalent of the American imagination of the Pacific as a multipolar ‘rim’ of states surrounding the ‘empty’ ocean that has no centre (Dirlik 1998). Australian foreign policy casts the Pacific instead as a *region*. In the Australian imagination, the whole zone is still ‘deficient’, but with definite places and contents, for which Australia is responsible. While the Australian polity has restructured itself around a coalescing model of neoliberal modernization, political leaders, policy advisors, some journalists, business spokespeople, and even some NGOs have projected the standards of neoliberal governance to nascent states as the only viable developmental model. As Jolly states, they have arrived at the categorical view that Pacific states “need to open their economies; effect structural change and good governance; abolish customary land tenure and inappropriate, undemocratic traditions; and connect with the dynamism of Asia” (Jolly 2007, p.527).

With that outlook, fear of the absolute marginalisation of the Pacific from globalising processes has guided Australian governments in their development, aid and foreign policies. The worst fear in this respect lies in the nightmare of “failed states.” Consequently, Australian governments calibrate diplomatic and foreign policy settings on the belief that Pacific states are flawed. Irrespective of political persuasion, all Federal Governments since the mid-1970s have acted within a paradigm of neoliberal economic development for the region.

Though responsive to claims of neo-colonialism, Australia acts paternalistically as aid donor, security expert in geo-strategic affairs, major investor and source of tourism, and neighbouring military power. Its entire vision of the Pacific centers on Australia leading Pacific states to a viable developmental path. As Jolly maintains, the relevant policy settings have Australia “both as model and saviour of the Pacific, its future and its prophet” (Jolly 2007, p.527).

As discussed above, in an early passage of this essay, Árnason’s approach to intercivilizational encounters emphasizes the interchange, transactions, and even encounters between different cultures, even in situations of great asymmetry. Noting this, I point out that there is another and less often acknowledged side to the regional political economy. Epeli Hau'ofa highlights it in his 1990s project of ‘New Oceania’.
During that period, he asserted economic self-reliance, mutual ownership of land, movement and connectivity as elements of a millennia-old identity, precisely those elements of Pacific civilization that Australian governments have regarded as obstructions in the modernization and globalization process.

In displacing the deficit image of the Pacific, Hau’ofa inserts a vision of a densely connected network of island societies with histories that can serve islanders’ pursuit of greater sovereign control (Hau’ofa et al. 1993). He casts this as the alternative to the historical narratives told by Western states (Hau’ofa 2008, pp.60-79). In other words, the political and cultural resources that the Tongan intellectual is alluding to are, as a whole, nothing less than “the historicity of the indigenous peoples themselves and, therefore, their contemporaneity” (Dirlik 1997, p.140).

Memory is especially important in this context, not because the past is readily accessible and recoverable in a naïve positivist sense, but because islander values are being pressed into the service of contemporary projects of sustainable development and cultural renewal (Dirlik 1997, p.141). Pacific Islanders are reconstructing memories, whether cultural and public memory or communicative and popular memory. Both are involved in the potential reconfiguration of power according to Hau’ofa.

The regional context that Hau’ofa is working in is a world of motion, with people, ideas, values and goods all on the move (Scarr 1990, Matsuda 2012).

The values, practices, and relationality of Oceania find a place in Australia via four areas of contemporary engagement: diasporic migration to Australasia and California, greater travel and communication, acquisition of property and jobs in Australia, and popularization of the visual arts, film, literature and music.

As a category of migration, Oceania had the greatest percentage of international immigrants of any world region (Castles, Haas, and Miller 2014, p.166). The lion’s share of islander movement involves islanders travelling to New Zealand and Australia, whether in travel or to re-settle. The critical impact of climate change will undoubtedly accelerate those movements. It may already be doing so.

Economically, Polynesian regional networks exercise an informal regional economy comprising a circulation of goods and monies between island homes and emigrants living in New Zealand and on the eastern seaboard of Australia. Not only is money remitted — a sure sign of dependency, when that is all that is transacted — but a vast array of objects, technology materials and symbolic foodstuffs flow back and forth in consignments. The informal trade circuit is reminiscent of ‘old’ Pacific more than new developmental strategies.
The general pattern re-creates elements of the reciprocity of economic and cultural engagement of Oceanian civilization. I want to highlight the fact that migration continues in patterns reminiscent of great traditions of travel. Migration and travel of this kind is consonant with Pacific Islander efforts to construct cultural memory.

Civilizational analysis can capture the multivalence of this regional context well. To be sure, Australia as a middle power dominates regional affairs and sets a political model for the Pacific. Yet, within the regional field of power, islander agency, meaning and reconstructed memory have impact and alter the terms of power.

On the other side, civilizational analysis can bring out the contradictions of antipodean modernity. Australia is far from reconciled to a Pacific identity with which the nation could engage culturally and on political and economic terms that are reciprocal. The cruel current day practice of shipping asylum seekers to offshore detention centers in Nauru and in PNG betray the inconsistencies in Australian foreign policy.

On one hand, Australian political discourse focuses on regional leadership and partnerships with island states. On the other hand, the acid-test issue of refugees is resolved through treatment of immediate neighbours as extra-territorial holding pens for excluded asylum seekers. More than in any other area of policy, Australian governments project ambivalence here about their entire relationship with the Pacific. In doing so, they reflect a more general ambivalence of place.

Conclusion

Terra Australis would be British, but other than Britain; Oceanian, but a huge continent, not an island; connected through its north (in a deep Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander history as well as through contemporary globalization) but populated in a different and much older migration than the voyaging patterns that created Polynesia.

The short history of Euro-Australia contrasts with a long Aboriginal civilizational history and sense of place so strong that it has survived colonialism. Pacific Islander societies also have a longer history and current day projects of cultural renewal and reconstruction of memory. Both Australia and the individual states of the Pacific are part of greater civilizational constellations constituted in engagement. Consequently, they engage with each other in and through contrasts.

Can Australian modernity adapt to place through intercivilizational encounters? The question is one for further research. Two preliminary points can foreshadow future work in this area. Australia sits in flows of engagement across the four dimensions of migration, economic connectedness, adaption of political models, and cultural traffic.
However, engagement with Aboriginal and Oceanian civilizations has not involved learning encounters conducive to a strong sense of antipodean place that incorporates a sensitivity to the ecology of the southern land, or the constitutive and living traditions of the region.

Still lacking place-specific learning processes, Australian modernity looks ill-equipped to meet the decisive challenge of our times: climate change and creating a new civilizational base for sustainability (see Camilleri 1976). A full reconciliation with the peoples of the region in the present is a prerequisite to a sustainable orientation for the future. Finding a new direction is urgently necessary.

Acknowledgments


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