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Jihad: Peaceful Applications for Society and the Individual

48th Annual Conference
Photos
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The *Comparative Civilizations Review* thanks our Digital Media Editor, Connie Lamb, and her colleagues at Brigham Young University for making this free public access and electronically searchable index possible. Thanks, too, to Prof. Norman Rothman, Executive Editor, for working with Scholars Archive to produce these issues.

Readers may also access all previous issues at https://ojs.lib.byu.edu/spc/index.php/CCR.

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Editor’s Note

Fall, 2018

This year’s 48th Annual Conference of the International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations was held from June 14 to June 17, 2018, at the venerable Soochow University of China and proved to be a resounding success. The ISCSC gathering in China constituted a first-time venture into that powerful and huge country for the international organization, although there has long been vigorous participation by Chinese scholars in the intellectual and academic work of the body. At the end of the conference, following a grand banquet featuring a live performance of Chinese opera in addition to speeches and great food, the organization was invited gracefully, and cordially, to return many times in the future to China.

Sponsored by the Center for Comparative Literature of the famed university’s School of Liberal Arts and co-sponsored by its School of Foreign Languages, the session’s meetings and lectures were held on the second floor of the attractive and spacious Chong-yuan Building, located near the center of the university’s huge, beautifully manicured green campus. These original campus grounds themselves, while set in the middle of the city of Suzhou, Jiangsu Province, China, and part of an economically burgeoning southeast region of China, somehow appear like a great American or European university, separated, conducive to contemplation, ivory tower, as if placed in the countryside somewhere.

Foreign speakers and conference attendees flew to Soochow mostly via nearby Shanghai and came from all over the world, as hosts Prof. Fang Hanwen, Prof. Zhu Xinfu, and Prof. Shi Yuanhui, organized the conference with extraordinary thoroughness and grace. They noted in materials distributed to all attendees that the Comparative Literature and Comparative Civilizations Research Center of Soochow University has carried out considerable work in the comparative study of civilizations, with nine academic monographs and more than 60 academic papers on the subject published since 2003. The faculty has trained students for master’s and doctoral degrees in the comparative study of civilizations for eight years. The university itself was established in 1900 by Dr. David L. Anderson, a Methodist from the United States, serving as the first president, and the American origins are reflected in the architecture and layout of the main campus.

The conferees stayed in a lovely hotel on one of Suzhou’s famed canals, located just blocks from the university. When Marco Polo passed through Suzhou in the 13th century, he labelled it “very great and noble” and commented favorably upon its canals, stone bridges, silk production and wonderful classic gardens, one of which, near to the university, has been designated a UNESCO World Heritage Site. He also wrote in awe of the “many great philosophers” who lived in Suzhou.
Today it is not only an academic setting but also a location for bustling international and Chinese hi-tech firms, and over ten million people (including suburbs) call it home, half of that number within the city limits. The city is known as the Venice of the East, and it surely is that.

As the conference got underway, ISCSC President Lynn Rhodes offered keynote remarks, explaining the history of the organization, since many in attendance were from China and might be not fully acquainted with it.

The conference coordinators for the ISCSC were President Lynn Rhodes and Vice President Michael Andregg, and Prof. Andregg was also the ISCSC Program Chair. Both did a spectacular job.

One result of the conference was the development of a proposal to jointly offer the doctorate in comparative civilizational studies. This proposal was presented orally at Suzhou on June 16, 2018 and approved overwhelmingly by the Board of the ISCSC and the Chinese hosts and attendees.

Potential faculty members have already indicated interest and ongoing discussions indicate that there is a likelihood that this sixty-credit, three-year minimum degree might be offered in the United States, authorized by Soochow University, soon. However, final arrangements have not been reached as of the time of this writing.

A total of 21 points were included in the draft proposal. Among the most important are the following:

1. The curriculum will track the curriculum of the current Soochow University PhD in Comparative Civilizations.
2. Faculty members will include members of the International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations who possess the PhD, are knowledgeable in the field, and wish to participate; faculty members will also include those employed by Soochow University in the existing program.
3. Students who enter the program will include students who have completed the master’s degree from an accredited university in the U.S. or abroad. Special encouragement will be given to those who are ABD, that is, who have earned transcript-recorded credits.
   The program will accept credits in the social sciences and allied fields from such students. This should make the program very attractive to many individuals in the U.S.
4. The program will require a minimum of three years until conferral of the doctorate, consist of 60 credits, including “maintaining status” credits earned during the period when the student is working on the doctoral dissertation.
5. The curriculum offered will be blended-learning, cohort based. It will be offered on a trimester basis (spring, summer, fall terms).

6. Summer face-to-face residencies (held for one week two times in the three-year program) will be combined with online courses. A capstone course (during the student’s second year) will round out the scholarly learning experience and prepare students for the period during which they write their doctoral dissertations.

Should any reader wish more details, the Board would be happy to send a full copy of the draft proposal. The goal is to develop the best possible doctorate in the field. Currently, programs offering the degree exist in Europe and Asia, but none appear to be ongoing in North America.

A second result of the conference was the adoption by attendees of a formal resolution recognizing the China Section of the International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations.

The following language was adopted by unanimous vote:

--RESOLUTION--

International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations
China Section

RESOLVED: It is hereby resolved that the International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations recognizes the China Section of the ISCSC in a formal, historic and long-lasting partnership.

RESOLVED: The China Section has a long history of the study of civilization, its comparisons, professional, and scholarly endeavors.

RESOLVED: The mission, vision, goal and strategy of the ISCSC and China Section are in harmony.

RESOLVED: The Mission is to provide means of cooperation among all persons interested in the advancement of the comparative study of civilizations.

The Vision is that Civilizations matter.

The Goal is to achieve scholar-recognition as a primary source of knowledge and wisdom on the comparative study of civilization.
The **Strategy** is organizing annual international conferences with scholar-leaders of the comparative study of civilizations and publishing the formal journal: *Comparative Civilization Review (CCR)*; conference proceedings; contribute to other professional journals and civilizational book series.

RESOLVED: The China Section of the ISCSC has shown great leadership in hosting and coordinating the 48th Annual Conference of the ISCSC in Suzhou, Jiangsu Province, People’s Republic of China at Soochow University. The Conference hosts, Professor Fang Hanwen (方汉文), PhD, President of the China Section of the ISCSC and Vice President of Coordination for China; Professor Zhu Xinfu (朱新福), PhD, Dean of School of Foreign Languages, Soochow University; and Professor Shi Yuanhui (史元辉), PhD, China Program Chair; university staff; and many officials showed great leadership to recognize the importance of the conference and support for the comparative study of civilizations.

A third development for the ISCSC occurred during the conference when the Pitirim A. Sorokin Foundation (named in honor of the first president of the ISCSC) sent greetings to ISCSC President Lynn Rhodes and Dr. Vlad Alalykin-Izvekov, ISCSC Representative and Programs Coordinator (Europe, Russia) on June 12 which stated that:

> On the behalf of Dr. Sergei P. Sorokin and the Pitirim A. Sorokin Foundation I am honored to convey greetings to the Institution, which was founded with active support and involvement of Pitirim A. Sorokin.

> One of the goals of founding the International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations was better understanding and communication in the increasingly inter-dependent world. Such direction today has become more important than ever.

> Your Society, as well as Pitirim A. Sorokin Foundation, share similar values in promoting and supporting social scientists and researchers who brings new knowledge by "standing on the shoulders of giants."

The letter of support came from Dr. Pavel P. Krotov, Executive Director of the Pitirim A. Sorokin Foundation.

Several of the papers from the conference are included in this issue. We are also creating for the first time a Proceedings section, containing, in particular, abstracts or summaries of foreign-language presentations from Soochow.

I would like to note that while working with students this past term, I have discovered that there are roughly 150 full text articles from CCR now indexed online via SocINDEX, a product of EBSCO.
Readers will observe that this issue carries presentations from two presenters who attended the Soochow University conference from Iran – a first for the society. Both scholars suggested that there was an interest in developing relations with international scholars in our field by their colleagues back home in Iran. The Board of the ISCSC will be considering possible future follow-up on these suggestions.

In Suzhou, it was announced that the next annual meeting of the ISCSC will be on the campus of California State University, Monterey Bay. More details will be forthcoming.

From June 16 to June 19, 2019, there will be a major conference at which this writer is scheduled to be speaking. The conference is entitled: From ‘Holocaust by Bullets’ to Auschwitz: Regional Dimensions of the Final Solution. It is going to be held at the Uzhgorod National University in the Transcarpathia region of Ukraine. The theme: to provide an integrated & multi-dimensional view of the evolution of the Final Solution, from “person-to-person” murder to industrial extermination, in the region of Central & Eastern Europe. While the main theme will focus on Ukraine, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Poland, and Moldavia, there will be opportunities to discuss the full scope of the Holocaust. The conference will also coincide with the 75th anniversary of the Hungarian Holocaust. For details contact the Organizing Committee: education_pro@hotmail.com.

Finally, an innovation in this issue is the reproduction of color photographs from Soochow University and the conference, as well as on a few other pages. The building shown with attendees sitting and standing on the lawn is meters away from the one in which the conference was held. Thanks to those who made this picture possible, including the very kind official photographer.

Joseph Drew, PhD
From the President

Environmental Crime and Civilization: Identification; Impacts; Threats and Rapid Response – June 2018

Lynn Rhodes

The definition of “environmental crime” is not universally agreed. It is most commonly understood as a collective term to describe illegal activities harming the environment and aimed at benefitting individuals or groups or companies from the exploitation of, damage to, trade or theft of natural resources, including serious crimes and transnational organized crime.¹

Over 1,000 protected-area-officers² have been killed worldwide and many more injured over the last 12 years.³ Over 740 of those from 2009-2017.⁴

Vast sums of money generated from environmental crimes not only harm the environment and threaten protected-area officers, but these funds also keep sophisticated international criminal gangs in business, fueling insecurity around the world. Armed and unarmed groups worldwide use environmental crimes as a low-risk high-profit source of revenue: depriving governments of revenues while threatening peace, development and security. The economic loss due to environmental crime is estimated at $91-258 billion annually. Weak laws and poorly funded security forces enable international criminal networks and armed rebels to profit from a trade that fuels conflicts, devastates ecosystems and is threatening species with extinction.⁵

Species are going extinct at a faster than historic rate. If ecosystems collapse, some human existence and civilizations as we know them may become impossible or extinct. A global system-collapse is possible and with it, the world’s economic and political systems face systematic risks because of their intricate and interconnected natures.

² Employees of a “clearly defined geographical space, recognized, dedicated and managed, through legal or other effective means, to achieve the long-term conservation of nature with associated ecosystem services and cultural values.” (IUCN Definition 2008 - https://www.iucn.org/theme/protected-areas/about)
Researchers agree that more work needs to be done to clarify what parts of the system(s) could collapse and destroy civilization. They define a civilization-collapse as a “drastic decrease in human population size and political/economic/social complexity, globally and for an extended time.”

The environment provides the foundation for sustainable development, our health, food security, and our economies. Ecosystems provide a clean water supply, clean air, and secure food and ultimately both physical and mental well-being. Natural resources also provide livelihoods, jobs and revenues to governments that can be used for education, health care, development and sustainable business models.

The increase of environmental crimes is extraordinary. The diversity of environmental crimes has grown and the impacts go beyond those thought of as traditional crimes. Environmental crimes impede our ability to have and retain a sustainable and healthy planet. They add to the cost and impact to the environment and the cost to future generations. Deforestation, chemical-dumping, and illegal fisheries cause loss of ecosystem services such as clean air and clean water, extreme weather mitigation, food security and yes, health and well-being. They also deprive governments of critical revenue and undermine legal businesses.

Referenced by a UNEP-INTERPOL Rapid Response Assessment Report 2016 (UNEP-INTERPOL RRAR 2016), enhanced law enforcement response can help address these trends. The responses can be either formal or informal and can help put responses into context for action. Enforcement cases show an increase in the scale and organization of environmental crimes. Those who have been prosecuted and found guilty of illegal logging and laundering of hundreds of millions of dollars (US), for example, dwarf the resources that would otherwise be available for enforcement, investigation and prosecution.

Financially, the large and growing scale of environmental crimes requires a new approach and coordinated responses. It requires international cooperation including international jurisdictions and collaboration across borders.

The ability to coordinate and help control environmental crimes is more important today as they often cause direct threats to peace, security and civilization. Worldwide, armed terrorist and non-state groups are benefiting financially from these crimes to fund their activities. Examples are the common smuggling of drugs and guns, oil, antiques, migrants and anything for profit. Environmental crimes provide a relatively low-risk, high-profit source of revenue compared to other forms of revenue.

Three examples of effective coordinated responses:
1. In Brazil, a sector-wide Plan for Protection & Combating Deforestation in the Amazon (PPCDAM), is reducing deforestation in the Amazon by 76% in five years. One office in Brazil was given the sole responsibility for coordination in close collaboration with 13 ministries, additional partners and others. 3.9 billion in fines were issued and over one million cubic meters of timber seized.

2. The Montreal protocol played a role in reducing illegal trade in ozone-depleting substances with a number of coordinated programs including “Informal Prior-Informed Consent” with UNEP. With this and related projects over 800 tons of ozone depleting substances were seized from 2006-2010. The scale of illegal trade in CFC’s has been reduced as a result of global agreement on phasing out these substances, also affecting criminal markets. These types of programs demonstrate how implementing environmental rule of law with global agreements such as the Stockholm, Rotterdam and Basel conventions can meet environmental goals and reduce global trade of these goods or commodities by not allowing safe-haven for the activity and helping to close criminal markets.

3. In 2017 the Environmental Crimes Committee of the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) developed an online application to assist field and safety professionals in their response to and investigation of environmental crimes. The application is called ChemSafety. It is readily available online and its effectiveness is supported with the following statistics: In one month (April-May 2018) data show over 71,000 sessions; 171,427 views and over 50,000 individual users. The application guides field and safety professionals through the S.A.F.E. acronym in response to environmental crimes:

   **S**: Safety and health for the law enforcement officer
   **A**: Acute & chronic chemical, biological and radiation exposures
   **F**: Forensic evidence protection & preservation
   **E**: Environment, human health and wildlife impacts

   This web application is intended to enhance the abilities of law enforcement officers and other safety professionals to safely respond to incidents of potential or suspected environmental crimes and hazardous materials incidents by providing information and best practices in the key areas for safe, effective response to and investigations of environmental crimes.6

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6 International Assoc. of Chiefs of Police, Environmental Crimes Committee
http://www.theiacp.org/chemsafety/
Figure 1. Courtesy IACP Environmental Crimes Committee Online Application 2018
Figures 2 & 3 illustrate the major environmental crimes, annual economic loss, their drivers and their resulting impacts. Beginning at the center, primary key drivers of environmental crime show the nexus and scale of these drivers: corruption; corporate crime; conflicts; domestic and international demand; lack of law enforcement at the national and international levels; lack of legislation; and both international and national mafias.

Environmental Crimes Illustrated.
Figure 2. Courtesy of UNEP-INTERPOL RRA 2016
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Environmental Crime</th>
<th>Annual Loss of Resources Pre 2014 Estimate (USD)</th>
<th>Annual Loss of Resources 2016 Estimate (USD)</th>
<th>Source or Reviews</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Illegal logging and trade</td>
<td>30–100 billion</td>
<td>50.7–152 billion</td>
<td>New Sources: UNEP, 2014 (10–30%), updated by FAOSTAT 2014:(^{73}) Roundwood including woodfuel: 3.7 billion m(^3) x average export unit price of 137 USD/m(^3) = global wood trade of USD 507 billion. With 10–30% possibly illegal this accounts for USD 50.7–152 billion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated fisheries</td>
<td>11–30 billion</td>
<td>11–23.5 billion</td>
<td>MRAG and UBC 2008(^{86}) (10–23 billion) UNODC 2011(^{72}) and Agnew 2009(^{75}) (10–23.5 billion) (12–32% of the global trade). No new updates available. However, this does not include illegal open sea discard of approximately one-third of the global catch. Hence discards may account for tens of billions of USD in addition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegal extraction and trade in minerals/mining</td>
<td>12–48 billion</td>
<td>12–48 billion</td>
<td>Estimated as only 1–4% of by industry of the global trade (GF1, 2011; GA 2012). New source GI 2016(^{77}) indicates –28–90% of mined gold was illegal in five South America countries, accounting alone for 7 billion USD on gold alone in five countries) suggesting that this is a gross underestimate. However it has been kept as this for now as more research is needed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegal trade and dumping of hazardous waste</td>
<td>10–12 billion</td>
<td>10–12 billion US$</td>
<td>US Department of Justice 2000(^{99}) (10–20 billion); GA 2012. New source UNEP 2015 (Unaccounted or illegally traded E-waste alone accounted for 12.2–19 Billion USD in 2015).(^{78}) The ratio between illegal and unregulated is not clear; hence previous estimate is kept.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegal trade and poaching of plants and other wildlife</td>
<td>7–23 billion</td>
<td>7–23 billion US$</td>
<td>Wyler and Sheik 2008(^{98}) (5–20 billion). Haken 2011(^{111}) (7.8–10 billion). US Government agencies 2000 cited OECD 2012(^{22}) (USD 6-10 billion excluding wood and fish). New estimates UNODC including mainly endangered species cf. CITES. This estimate is somewhat confounded with forestry data, hence original estimate is kept but needs revision. No new estimate currently available, but see separate section on growth in environmental crimes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sum environmental crime</td>
<td>70–213 billion</td>
<td>91–259 billion US$ (30–22% higher ie. 26% on average)</td>
<td>All converted to 2016 USD(^{73})</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Impacts from Environmental Crimes**

**Figure 3. Courtesy UNEP-INTERPOL RRA 2016**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Other non-environmental crimes</th>
<th>Annual loss of resources pre 2014 estimate (USD)</th>
<th>Annual loss of resources 2016 estimate (USD)</th>
<th>Source or reviews</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Drugs</td>
<td></td>
<td>344 billion USD</td>
<td>UNODC 2005 (cannabis herb and resin USD 142 billion)(^\text{T1}), UNODC 2011 (2009 cocaine 85 billion + opiates/heroin 68 billion)(^\text{T11}).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human trafficking (excl. recent migrant to Europe)</td>
<td></td>
<td>157.1 billion</td>
<td>International Labour Organisation 2014 (forced labour generates USD 150 billion in illegal profits per year. 2/3 is from sexual exploitation and the rest other economic exploitation)(^\text{T10}), EUROPOL-INTERPOL 2016 (Recent migration wave Europe USD 5.5 billion)(^\text{T11}).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterfeit crimes</td>
<td></td>
<td>288 billion USD</td>
<td>OECD 2007(^\text{T10}) and UNODC(^\text{T9}) (USD 250 billion) does not include domestically produced and consumed products, or non-tangible digital products.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small arms illegal trafficking</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.5–3 billion USD</td>
<td>10-20% of the licit small arms trade, which is USD 10.3 billion incl. parts and sights per year (Small Arms Survey 2012)(^\text{T19}), Ammunition USD 4.2 billion per year (Janes Intelligence Review 2013)(^\text{T3}).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These estimates are derived from published reports, UN statistics on legal trades and estimates from criminal intelligence through INTERPOL on the extent based on reporting from National Central Bureaus in member states. Given that criminals do not report statistics on their activities, considerable uncertainties exist not only regarding the accuracy of the estimates, but also the delineation amongst the different crime groups and the commodity prices applied in the different sectors. For example, some agencies include only CITES registered species, others include fisheries and forestry but not the much larger trade in timber and wood fuel. Hence wide ranges are provided.

**Impacts from Environmental Crimes**

Figure 3.(continued) Courtesy UNEP-INTERPOL RRA 2016

The UNEP-INTERPOL 2016 RRAR describes ecosystems as providing a range of services and providing the very foundations of our economy, human health, livelihoods and well-being. They can include clean air, water supply, extreme weather mitigation, storm protection, food security and pollination, to list a few. The report describes the environmental impacts of illegal trade in wildlife. However, there is no current assessment of environmental impacts for the wider range of environmental crimes and their full implications for sustainability and development goals and this consolidated information is needed.
A Legal Framework — Identifying the Crimes, Jurisdictions, Prosecution:

An environmental crime can only be prosecuted if the specific jurisdiction decides that the offense is to be pursued by way of law. Identifying the environmental crime as a criminal offense itself can be leveraged to help enforce environmental law. Jurisdictions worldwide have different approaches to carrying out enforcement. Approaches from varying jurisdictions come with varying penalties and sanctions. Even with strong environmental laws, if a jurisdiction does not have the full capacity to enforce the laws, they cannot be effective.

Capacity to monitor, enforce and prosecute environmental crimes varies. For example, while Mongolia has enacted strong environmental laws they are experiencing an explosion of mining projects, wildlife poaching, development and other resource threats. Their protected-area-officers cover vast areas of open space far removed from modern infrastructure and legal support systems. Even with good laws and good officers, their enforcement capacity needs improvement in order to show substantial results with environmental enforcement of existing laws.

It is important to identify criminal offenses so that they can be incorporated into legal responses, prosecution and restoration where possible. Simply identifying offenses as criminal acts has the ability at times to serve as a deterrent and allows for collective education of environmental laws. Globally however, the varying degrees to which crimes are identified, incorporated into law, listed, and subsequently prosecuted allows for criminal elements to hedge the differences amongst countries and states.

Legislation:

In 2014 the INTERPOL General Assembly passed a Resolution in response to emergency threats in Environmental Security. In that Resolution, instead of defining environmental crime, INTERPOL focused on “environmental security” by recognizing the impact that environmental crime can have on a nation’s political stability, environmental quality, its natural resources, biodiversity, economy and human life. INTERPOL also recognizes that criminal networks engaged in financial crime, fraud, corruption, illicit trade and human trafficking are also engaged in or facilitating environmental crime.7

Increasingly, illicit use of natural resources is driving conflicts. It is becoming a nexus of organized crime and the emphasis on security for the environment is needed more than ever.

Encouraged by the United Nations Security Council, member states are being asked to work together to collect, analyze and share intelligence to help prevent terrorism and transnational organized crime. To increase effectiveness, a broader definition of environmental crime is needed in addition to referring to environmental crime as a serious crime.

Figure 4. Broad Definition for Environmental Crimes Needed: Courtesy UNEP-INTERPOL RRAR 2016

The United Nations Environmental Program (UNEPA) Governing Council plays a key role in maintaining focus and awareness of the legislative efforts across vested interests in order to support the rule of environmental law.
The efforts are largely driven by the increase in organized criminal groups trafficking in hazardous waste, wildlife and illegal timber harvesting. It has been recognized that environmental crime undermines environmental goals and effective governance. UNEPA Governing Council’s decision 27/9, in part, emphasized the strengthening of environmental governance and expertise for prosecutors, judges and law enforcement.\(^8\)

In April 2016 IUCN World Environmental Law Congress met in Rio de Janeiro. A number of forward thinking actions resulted from the congress. These actions included core principles to strengthen the collective efforts including implementation and enforcement strategies; laws that can be enforced; implementation and accountability; coordination of roles and treating environmental crimes as serious crimes. Figure 5 below illustrates an informal network of international organizations that are needed for effective collaboration.

![Figure 5. International Organizations Influenced by Environmental Crime. Courtesy UNEP-INTERPOL RRAR 2016](image)

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\(^8\) United Nations Environmental Program UNEPA Multilateral Agreements 5/e: https://www.informea.org/en.decision.advancing-justice-governance-and-law-environmental-sustainability#decision-body-field
Statistics for environmental crimes are difficult to measure due to the sheer volume of underground activity. However, it is generally recognized that progress in combating individual cases has grown while realizing these crimes are a significant threat to peace, civilizations, society, health, security and development.

In addition to extremely varying wildlife poaching, illegal timber harvesting and the impacts of global waste and pollution is valued at 410 billion USD per year. The global waste sector takes several forms including legal industry, environmental protection, unregulated business, and trafficking in hazardous waste and chemicals by organized crime.  

![Global illegal waste traffic map](image)

Figure 6 & 7. Illegal Trafficking Routes of Hazardous Waste. Courtesy UNEPA-INTERPOL 2016 RRAR

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The links of environmental crimes to white collar, organized criminal networks have shown to be low risk with high profit margins. They harm our collective environment and security while exploiting natural resources to fund their illegal activities. At least 40 percent of global internal conflicts in the last 60 years have links to natural resources.\(^ {10}\)

Causes of Environmental Crime:

Poverty, demand and a permissive environment are root causes enabling environmental crime.

- Poverty is a driver of environmental crime because the poor are often vulnerable and easy to recruit at entry levels of activity.
- Demand for goods derived from natural resources such as wood, timber, wildlife, as well as the always growing and desperate need for waste disposal services, drives criminal activity due to readily available profits.
- Underfunding and lack of capacity to enforce laws and regulations leads to crime occurring almost by inertia or default.

Response & Restoration:

Coordinated, international operations highlighted in the UNEPA-INTERPOL 2016 RRAR outlined successful case studies to combat wildlife, fisheries and forestry crime, ozone layer depletion and pollution. Impacts on a global scale undermine peace for civilization and security of the world’s people in addition to both legal business and trade.

Lester R. Brown, in *PLAN B 3.0*, writes that we are in a race between tipping points in nature and our political systems and suggests help for countries to stabilize our populations and ecosystems before they become failing states. In order to understand our current environmental dilemma, it helps to look at earlier civilizations that also got into environmental trouble. The question is how we will respond.\(^ {11}\) Some early societies were able to modify how they lived with the environment in a way to avoid their collapse or decline.

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\(^ {10}\) Ibid. page 67

\(^ {11}\) Brown, Lester R. *PLAN B 3.0* Earth Policy Institute W.W.Norton & Company New York – London 2018
Current civilization, across borders, states, and oceans, is threatened. This is due in part to the violations and sheer scale of environmental crimes that must be curtailed. Our quality of life and civilization itself is at stake. Engaged response, sound laws, along with more and better monitoring, enforcement and restoration will help ensure our ability to maintain clean air and water, the basics of life as we know it, as we would like to leave them for the next generations.
Comparing Post-Expansion Integration Policies of the Early Roman Republic and the Early Chu State from a Geopolitical Perspective

Pengfei Su

Keywords: Geopolitical, Autonomy, Alliance, Annexation, Colonization

Abstract

The Early Chu state (705 BC – 476 BC) in Zhou Dynasty China was an excellent object for comparison with mid-Roman Republic (390 BC – 200 BC) regarding the policies adopted for integrating and consolidating the new territories they had each acquired. Such comparison was based upon similar geopolitical environments that early Chu and Roman states were each situated in, if we consider (i) early Rome’s position vis-à-vis Hellenistic civilization and (ii) early Chu state’s position vis-à-vis Zhou civilization.

A series of expansionary wars by early Roman and Chu states had similar backgrounds and produced similar effects, if assessed in civilizational maps. In order to integrate its new territories in Italy, Roman Republic adopted three key policies: (i) Annexation, (ii) Colonization and (iii) Alliance. In its new territories, early Chu state implemented three integration policies that were very similar to each of the abovementioned three Roman policies.

This paper provides narratives and analyses on Chu state’s integration policies that mirrored each of the three Roman policies, with historical examples provided in support of such thesis. In conjunction with policy comparisons, this paper also discusses the following aspects that were comparable between Rome and Chu states: (a) geographical regions that they were situated in, (b) elite persons who originated from subjugated territories and were then integrated into ruling circles of Roman and Chu states, and (c) how soldiers from new territories were positioned in the military formations of Rome and Chu states.

After assessing the civilizational implications of their expansions, this paper posits that the similarities between early Roman and Chu states can be regarded as a prologue to the similarities that would later emerge between Roman and Han Empires.
Introduction

Much academic research has been conducted regarding a wide range of similarities that existed between ancient Roman and Chinese civilizations.\(^1\) Close parallels have been drawn between the evolutions of the Roman states and Qin-Han (秦汉) Empires, and step-by-step comparisons have been made regarding each stage of the gradual developments of the Qin and Rome states into ecumenical world empires.\(^2\) Much attention has been paid to the growth of Qin state/empire as a parallel to the emergence of Roman hegemony. However, one very crucial early Sinic state has been ignored in nearly all such comparative studies, even though this ignored state is arguably a better polity for comparisons between early Sinic and the Roman states, i.e. the state of Chu (楚). The author of this article believes that in drawing civilizational parallels between the early Roman Republic and the Sinic world, the state of Chu during the Spring & Autumn period (rather than the state of Qin during the Warring States period, 475 to 221 BCE) was an excellent entity for comparison with the early Roman Republic.

On the surface, we can clearly see some distinctions between Rome and Qin states: the state of Qin during late Warring States adopted a wide range of domestic policies for centralization and bureaucratization on a level far higher than that of contemporary Roman Republic. Later on, the Qin state pursued an aggressive policy of total war and conquered the other six Sinic states in a series of blitzkriegs that had no parallels since Rome annexed the Mediterranean world on a more piecemeal basis. Furthermore, the short-lived Qin regime lasted only for a matter of fifteen years before being overthrown, while the rule of the Roman Republic in the Mediterranean world was never overthrown by any force (despite a series of civil wars).

On a more profound level, in Sinic classical civilizational growth, the state of Chu played a role that most closely resembled the role played by the Roman states in the expansion of Hellenistic classical civilization.

- While the intense particularism of Greek city states and the jealousy with which they guarded their citizenship made it extremely difficult for the Greek polities to integrate neighboring non-Greek peoples into sustainable states, the Romans excelled among the Mediterranean states in building a well-integrated classical empire.\(^3\) In this process, Rome consciously absorbed the cultural fruits of the Hellenistic civilizations and spread them to the western territories of the Roman state at large.

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\(^2\) Ibid, at p 15 – 17.

Similarly, the state of Chu successfully integrated the territories it acquired in southern and central China, without undergoing the disintegration (e.g. in the state of Jin 晉) or regime change (e.g. in the state of Qi 齊) that took place in major northern Sinic states that had only completed territorial expansion at a more modest level. More importantly, Chu played a crucial role in adopting the cultural fruits of the northern Sinic civilizations and spreading them to the vast territories of central and southern China at large.

As will be analyzed below, early Chu state bore a series of surprising structural similarities to the early Roman Republic in terms of the policies for integrating their newly-acquired territories into an organic body politic. While the policies and rules they employed carried drastically different nomenclature, the functional outcome produced by their integration policies was very similar.

The Chu state to be discussed in this article is that of the Spring & Autumn period, or more exactly, starting in the year in which Chu state irrevocably declared itself as a kingdom (705 B.C.) and ending in 476 B.C. The early Roman state to be discussed in this article is for the period between about 390 B.C. and 200 B.C. In at least the following four aspects, the Chu state of the above period bore resemblances to contemporary Roman Republic:

(1) geopolitical surroundings prior to the commencement of their territorial expansions;
(2) the impact of certain major wars as milestones in their territorial expansions;
(3) the key policies they each implemented for the purpose of consolidating and integrating their newly-acquired territories; and
(4) the roles played by various Chu regions in territorial consolidation vis-à-vis the roles of certain Italic regions in Roman territorial consolidation.

Some special emphasis needs to be made on the third similarity above. In its territorial expansion in the Italian peninsula during the abovementioned era, the Roman Republic developed multiple innovative methods aiming at consolidating newly acquired communities into the Roman polity. Depending upon the specific circumstances of each subject community, the most frequent methods used by the Romans were, respectively, Annexation, Colonization and Alliance. By means of these policies, the Romans managed to both achieve domestic peace and multiply Roman military strength. Half the globe away, in its territorial expansion in central China a few centuries earlier, early Chu state employed exactly the same three policies to consolidate various newly-acquired communities into the Chu polity. By means of such policies, Chu managed to achieve substantial territorial growth and consolidate dozens of subject communities into a well-integrated nation.
The structure of this article is as follows: Part I draws comparisons between the geopolitical situations of pre-expansion Roman and Chu polities, showing that they were surrounded by states and communities whose relationships were comparable in terms of civilizational growth. Part II provides very brief narratives of the expansion wars of the early Roman Republic, showing that they each had close parallels and comparable outcomes in Chu history with respect to territorial expansion. Regarding the various integration policies adopted by the early Roman Republic, Part III analyzes how the Roman policy of annexation was closely mirrored in Chu’s territorial expansion; Part IV analyzes how Chu state implemented population relocations that reflected the policies and motives of Roman colonization in the Italian peninsula, and Part V analyses show Chu’s alliance policy with vassal states was comparable to the Roman alliance policy in its expansion in the Italian peninsula. Such policies proved to work well for Rome during the Second Punic War, and this article discusses how similar Chu policies proved to be useful when Chu was under massive invasion from the neighboring state of Wu. Part VI provides broader insights into the implications of the above comparative studies and discusses why the thesis of this article can be well integrated with prior academic research that compared the Roman and Han Empires.

**Part I: Comparison of Pre-Expansion Geopolitical Environments**

The geopolitical environments from which these two states emerged seemed to be different on their faces: the Roman Republic was situated in the middle of a long peninsula dominated by the Mediterranean type of climate, with mountainous regions to its northeast, while Chu’s base area before its formal establishment was in the fertile subtropical plains in the valleys of mid-Yangtze River and Han River, facing mountainous areas to the west. On closer look, however, we can find these two early states actually grew in comparable environments, if we disregard superficial physical geographical factors and instead focus on their positions within abstract civilizational maps. We find that early Rome and Chu states were both situated on the exterior fringes of the then-acknowledged “civilized” worlds in western and eastern Eurasia respectively: early Republican Rome was adjacent to the northern fringe of the Greek-speaking Hellenistic cities in the Italian peninsula and was directly (through trade and cultural links with Magna Graecia) and indirectly (from the Etruscans to the north) influenced by Hellenism in culture. The nascent Chu state bordered upon the southern fringe of the vast constellation of Zhou vassal states dotted throughout the Central Plains (中原), and Chu attempted to play cultural catch-up for centuries with their northern neighbors. In folk legends, the founding father of the city of Rome could be traced to Greek heroes who fled from the city of Troy. By Chinese historical records, the founding fathers of the state of Chu could be traced to pre-Zhou tribal chieftains in the Central Plains who made contributions to the founding of the Zhou regime.  

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4 Sima Qian, *Records of Grand Historian, Chu Hereditary House* (史记·楚世家).
After its foundation in 509 BC, the early Roman Republic was surrounded by the following groups of peoples and communities:

(i) Neighboring Latin peoples, with whom Rome shared linguistic and cultural affinities,
(ii) Oscan-speaking mountainous tribes to the east and southeast, with the Samnites being most prominent among them,
(iii) Etruscan city states to the north, separated by River Tiber from the city of Rome,
(iv) Greek-speaking Hellenistic city states in southern Italy, which represented a generally higher level of cultural development, and
(v) multi-ethnic Campanians to Rome’s southeast, who had been heavily Hellenized in culture by the early Roman Republic era.

Similarly, when Chu was formally declared as a kingdom around 705 BC in what is now west-central Hubei province to the west of Han River, early Chu state was surrounded by the following groups of peoples and polities:

(i) Several small states whose rulers were descended from the same ancestors as Chu rulers were;
(ii) Mountainous tribal groups to the north and northwest of Chu’s home region;
(iii) Several Zhou vassal states situated to the east of Chu and separated by Han River from Chu’s home region;
(iv) Numerous Zhou vassal states situated to the north of Chu, representing a generally higher level of cultural development; and among such Zhou vassals were:

a) a series of small states situated in Nanyang (南阳) Basin, such as the states of Shin (申), Tang (唐) and Lv (吕).

If viewed in the perspectives of territorial expansions by Roman and Chu states, each neighbor of Rome played a very similar role to the corresponding neighbor of Chu that carries the similar serial number, i.e. there exist various functional similarities between Rome’s neighbor number (i) and Chu’s neighbor (i), between the Rome’s neighbor number (ii) and Chu’s neighbor (ii), and so on. Some of the ascribed functional similarities between these two groups of polities will be discussed below.

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5 As the names of the states of 申 and 沈 are both pronounced as “shen” in Mandarin pinyin, to distinguish them in English in this article, the translation by James Legge of the former state (i.e. Shin) is used for 申, while the name 沈 is translated as “Shen”.
A key factor in the growth of an ancient state was how it was geopolitically situated in a civilizational map. While a key challenge for the new-born Republic of Rome was how to survive and expand in the shadow of a vast Hellenistic civilization sphere that shed its light directly from the south and indirectly from the north (Etruria), the essential challenge for the newborn Chu kingdom was how to assert its power in the shadow of a giant Zhou civilization sphere which shed its light directly from the north and indirectly from the east. After accomplishing their initial steps of territorial expansion, both Rome and Chu were faced with similar secondary tasks, i.e., to integrate each of the newly acquired polities and to withstand invasions from mountainous tribes. In the end, Rome and Chu both accomplished all the above tasks brilliantly, each building and consolidating a thick web of interstate networks that retained its respective original political control and that integrated the newly-acquired territories.

**Part II: Comparison of Expansionary Wars**

As we can see below, the early Roman Republic and Chu state encountered comparable challenges from each of the above five groups of polities, and both states defeated their opponents through a series of wars which resulted in the expansion of their territories.

2.1 Chu equivalent of Rome’s Latin wars

The early Romans were in close ethnic affinity with various communities in the neighboring Latium region. Although the early Roman Republic was in alliance with its Latin neighbors, as the Roman power grew increasingly strong, the alliance relationship deteriorated. The Latin War (340 BC – 338 BC) broke out between the Latin cities and Rome, in which Rome defeated its Latin neighbors and annexed them into the territory of the Roman Republic.

Near the nascent Chu state, there existed several polities whose rulers had been descended from the same ancestor as Chu rulers; these kindred polities were among the earliest group of states that were incorporated into Chu territory. While Rome defeated and dissolved the league of Latin states through one major war with the Latin cities, Chu subjugated and annexed its kindred states through a series of wars with each of them:

A. The states of Luo (罗) and Yun (郧)

The rulers of the states of Luo, Yun and Chu shared the same prominent ancestor of Zu Rong (祝融)⁶ and their home territories were closely adjacent to each other.

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⁶Sima Qian, *Records of the Grand Historian*, *Chu Hereditary House* (史记·楚世家); see also He Guang Yue (何光岳), *chu mie guo kao*(楚灭国考), p 46 – 47, p 53.
Despite such affinities in ancestry and location, Luo and Yun adopted an aggressively anti-Chu policy and tried to build a wide range of alliances among the surrounding polities to contain Chu’s expansion. Such rivalry evolved into wars with the early Chu state, which defeated and annexed both states.

The general background to the war between Chu and Luo/Yun was comparable to that of the Latin War. It was the anxiety of the other Latin cities concerning the growth of Roman power in the mid-fourth century BCE that led to the war between Rome and its Latin neighbors, and it was the anxieties of Luo/Yun over the rapid growth in Chu power that led to their hostilities with Chu. In 701 BC, the king of Chu entered into alliances with some neighboring states, sweeping them into Chu’s sphere of influence. Alarmed by such expansion by Chu, Yun entered alliance with some other neighboring states of Chu to prepare for joint military operation against Chu. Chu then launched a preemptive attack against the Yun army and won a major victory. Yun territory was probably annexed into Chu soon afterwards.

In 700 BC, when Chu’s army was about to launch counterattacks against a neighboring state, they realized they were being stalked by Luo officers who closely spied upon Chu troop movements. Such covert acts of espionage gave Chu the excuse for starting a war against Luo. In a battle in 698 BC, the Luo army won a major victory over Chu troops, causing the latter’s commander to commit suicide. However, this victory was short-lived; it did not save Luo from its final demise and subjugation by Chu about 10 years later.

B. The state of Kui (夔)

The state of Kui was founded by Xiong Zhi (熊挚), who was a descendant of Chu ancestral ruler Xiong Yi (熊绎). Xiong Zhi abdicated from the Chu throne due to his poor health, moved to the southwest of Chu territory and established the state of Kui. Later, the Chu king granted to Kui’s ruler the title of viscount, virtually turning Kui into a vassal state of Chu. Kui remained in existence until the year 634 B.C. when it was annexed by Chu with military forces, on the grounds that Kui rulers had failed to worship the common ancestors of Chu and Kui.

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9 Zuozhuan, Duke of Huan 13th Year; James Legge, The Chinese Classics, vol. 5, p. 61. In contrast with such suicide of Chu commander, the Roman consul Publius Decius Mus voluntarily sacrificed his own life (fulfilling the Roman religious ritual of devotio) to ensure Roman victory over the Latin army in the Battle of Vesuvius in 340 BC.
C. The state of Jun (麇):

The rulers of Jun and Chu states shared the same ancestor of Jilian (季连). In early Spring & Autumn, Jun people lived to the northwest of Chu and were in alliance with Chu. However, Jun’s alliance with Chu was rather fragile and tended to easily break down,\(^{11}\) just as the relationship between early Roman Republic and the Latin states was fraught with tension and prone to break down into wars.

In 611 B.C, when the Chu people were suffering from a major famine, Jun combined forces with the various mountainous tribes of Pu (濮) and the nearby state of Yong (庸) to launch a major offensive against Chu, which successfully counterattacked and conquered Jun. After that, Chu ordered Jun people to relocate to the Han River Valley that was much closer to the Chu heartland.

2.2 Chu equivalent of Rome’s Samnite wars:

The Samnites were a confederation of militaristic tribal people who lived on the stretches of the Apennine Mountains to the southeast of Rome, and for many years they posed serious military threats to the Roman Republic and its other neighbors until the Romans subdued the Samnites through three long drawn-out wars.

Similarly, the state of Yong (庸) was situated in the mountainous regions to the northwest of Chu’s base region, and they built a loose alliance with the barbarians of Pu (濮) who resided in the neighboring mountainous regions to the south. Just like the militaristic Samnites who seriously threatened the Romans, Yong state put Chu security in great jeopardy. In 611 BC Yong took advantage of the great famine that had recently occurred in Chu and invaded into the depths of Chu territories. Many other barbarian tribes and the state of Jun revolted as well and also attempted to invade Chu. Feeling deeply threatened, Chu’s ruling elite considered evacuating from the capital.\(^{12}\) With Yong troops marching on other fronts in northern Chu territory, the Chu-dominated cities of Shin (申) and Xi (息) felt threatened and kept their city gates shut.\(^{13}\)

What happened next was a major military turnaround, in which Chu army joined with the forces of the neighboring states of Qin (秦) and Ba(巴), defeated the Yong army and extinguished the Yong state.\(^{14}\)


\(^{13}\) The geopolitical position of Shin and Xi to early Chu state was comparable to that of Campania to the early Roman Republic. A parallel incident to the Yong threat to Shin/Xi was that the First Samnite War was ignited by the Samnites’ invasion of Campania.

\(^{14}\) See supra note 12.
The level of Yong resistance met by Chu was not comparable to the hardship endured by the Roman army in the three lengthy Samnite wars; still, the end results were very much the same for both states.

While a feature of the Samnite wars was that various participants in the wars (e.g. the Sabines, Lucanians and Etruscans) frequently shifted their allegiances among the warring parties, similar shifting of sides was a major factor in Chu’s quick victory over Yong: soon after Chu’s military attack started, Pu (濮) and other barbarian tribes either exited from the war or even switched sides to ally with Chu.15

2.3 Chu equivalent of Roman war with Pyrrhus:

When the Hellenistic city of Tarentum in southern Italy had a dispute with Rome relating to the presence of Roman warships near Tarentine territory, Tarentum turned to the Greek king Pyrrhus for military support. After Pyrrhus’s army invaded Rome from Greece in 280 BC, a series of battles broke out. Pyrrhus won a number of victories with Rome but was dragged into a war of attrition in which the Roman strength in mobilizing Italian manpower began to assert itself. Eventually, Pyrrhus had to withdraw from the war due to the heavy casualties that his army suffered in the battles. Roman domination of southern Italy then became established.

Similarly, when the Central Plains state of Xu (许) to the north of Chu had an internal political dispute relating to whether to ally with the states of Chu or Jin, the ruler of Xu turned to the state of Jin for military support. Jin invaded Chu in 557 B.C. and won a number of victories inside Chu territory. The Jin army attacked the garrison of Xu and overran Chu territories outside the Chu Great Wall before finally returning to Jin territory.16 However, Jin’s victories against Chu were largely Pyrrhic and did not lead to any territorial transfer or diplomatic success in favor of Jin. In the subsequent interstate peace conference attended by 14 states in 546 BC, Jin and Chu mutually acknowledged the sphere of influence controlled by the other power.17 During the four decades that followed, Chu’s hegemony on the southern peripheral of the Central Plains was not challenged by other major states from north China.

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15 Ibid.
3 Chu equivalent of Second Punic War

The federation policy of the Roman Republic underwent its gravest test during Hannibal's invasion of Italy in the 2nd Punic War (218–201 BC), in which Hannibal pursued a strategy aiming at breaking up the Roman alliances and inducing them to rebel against Rome's hegemony. However, he only made very limited success towards this end:

(i) Most of Campanians (the major city of Capua in particular) defected to Carthage;
(ii) Not a single Latin city defected to Carthage;
(iii) Central Italians (such as Etruscans) remained loyal to Rome; and
(iv) A minority of the Hellenistic cities in southern Italy (including Tarentum) defected or tried to defect to Carthage.

After the Roman victory in the Second Punic War, the defector cities were subject to a series of punishments. For example:

(i) Tarentum lost its autonomous status and was put under direct rule by the Roman praetor Titus Quinctius Flamininus;\(^\text{18}\)
(ii) In the Campanian city of Capua, its communal organizations were abolished, its inhabitants lost their civic rights, and its territory was declared *ager publicus* (Roman state domain); its lands were sold, divided among the citizens of the newly-established colonies, or reserved by the Roman state for future division or award.\(^\text{19}\)

A similar pattern of events occurred to the state of Chu in 506 B.C., when two geopolitical attempts were made at attacking Chu:

In the spring, at the proposal of the state of Jin, 18 states convened at Shaoling (召陵) to discuss a joint military attack against Chu. It was notable that the convening states included a number of alliance states of Chu, such as Chen (陈), Cai (蔡), Dun (顿) and Hu (胡).\(^\text{20}\) Although this convention failed to produce any outcome due to internal strife, the Cai ruler soon launched an attack against Chu’s vassal state of Shen (沈) and annihilated the Shen regime.\(^\text{21}\)

When Chu counterattacked against Cai, Cai formed an alliance with Wu, which started a major invasion westward into Chu territory.

\(^{18}\) Plut. Flam.1’4-5.
\(^{19}\) Liv. 26.16.6-8.
Wu’s attack in 506 B.C. was efficient, well-planned and well-organized, and it posed to the very existence of the Chu state a threat that was as serious as the threat from Hannibal toward Carthage during the Second Punic War. After a series of battles, Wu decisively defeated the Chu army and marched triumphantly into Chu’s capital. Chu’s Zhao King (楚昭王) had to flee northward to Chu’s vassal state of Sui, where he would probably have been captured by Wu army if the Sui ruler had not provided loyal protection for him.22 Chu was able to restore its territories and defeated the invaders’ army only after the neighboring state of Qin generously launched military operations in support of Chu.23

After recovering from Wu’s attack, Chu started a series of retaliation acts against the previously-defecting polities:

(i) In 505 BC, Chu subjugated the state of Tang;24
(ii) In 496 B.C., Chu subjugated the state of Dun;25
(iii) In 495 B.C., Chu subjugated the state of Hu.26

Some parallels can be drawn here between Chu state and Roman Republic when they were both under very grave military invasions:

(i) The state of Sui remained staunchly loyal to the Chu king, which was comparable to the support by Etruscan cities for Rome during the Second Punic War;
(ii) Several years after the Wu invasion, Chu annihilated the renegade states of Dun and Hu in the Central Plains, comparable to postwar Rome extinguishing the autonomy of Tarentum in Magna Graecia; and
(iii) Chu promptly annihilated the renegade state of Tang, which was situated in Nanyang Basin and was geographically more proximate to Chu’s capital than the other defecting polities were. This was comparable to postwar Rome’s elimination of the autonomy of Capua, which was nearer the city of Rome than the other defecting cities were.

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22 Ibid at 757.
24 Ibid.
26 Ibid at p. 790.
Part III: Chu equivalent of Roman policy of Annexation

3.1. Annexation Policy in General

After the Roman victory in the Latin War, the Roman Republic dissolved the Latin League and incorporated most of the Latin communities into the territory of the Republic; at the same time the Republic granted substantial autonomy to the subject communities. After subsequent military victories in central Italian regions, similar policies were adopted towards the residents of Campania, southern Etruria and Sabine. Members of such communities were granted either full Roman citizenship or citizenship without voting rights (civitas sine suffragio). The latter case meant the residents of such autonomous cities (municipia) did not have rights to vote or be elected as Roman officials but were put under the protection of Roman law in terms of commerce (commercium), marriage (connubium), and property succession. The pre-existing political structures of the subject communities largely remained the same, and their traditional customs were kept intact. Meanwhile, in terms of foreign policy and military matters, they were supposed to obey Roman direction, and most importantly, these communities should send troops to fight together with Roman legions in wars.

One of the earliest records of such arrangements was contained in the Treaty of Cassius between Rome and the Latin cities. Although the treaty was nullified in the Latin War, many treaties that the Roman Republic entered into with defeated communities after Roman military victories contained similar arrangements. Altogether around 150 treaties were entered between Rome and various communities in the Italian peninsula, building a multi-layered thick web of security in defense of a body politic with Rome lying in the center. The external buffer zones of this security web were the Roman alliances (socii), which retained their sovereignties and constitutions and were further away from the city of Rome. The internal buffer zones of this web were the Roman autonomous cities (municipia) which lost their sovereignties and were situated closer to the city of Rome. Both groups of communities were obligated to follow Roman direction in foreign relations and defense matters, and to send troops to fight on the side of the Romans in wars. Through this political network reaching into the depths of numerous Italic communities, the Roman Republic effectively mobilized the manpower of much of the Italian peninsula for military defense.

In parallel to the expansion by the early Roman Republic, among all the Sinic states that expanded during this period, the state of Chu subjugated the biggest number of lesser polities and drastically expanded its territories in the middle reaches of Yangtze Valley and southern Central Plains.
After subjugation of the Nanyang Basin, the state of Chu built a long series of defense fortifications along its northern frontier line; these stretches of fortification walls were called the Chu Great Wall (方城). After further territories north of the Chu Great Wall were subsequently put under Chu dominion, Chu applied different policies with regards to its territories:

(i) Inside the Chu Great Wall, Chu’s policy was to annex the territories into Chu sovereignty and convert them into newly-created administrative units of prefectures (县). Substantial autonomy was granted to the Chu-appointed governors of the prefectures, which were comparable to the partially autonomous municipia established by Rome in central Italy.

(ii) Outside the Chu Great Wall, Chu granted a higher degree of autonomy to the vassal states, which retained their nominal existences as sovereign states. Their existing rulers continued to reign, except that they were to follow Chu’s direction on diplomatic and military affairs. These Chu vassal states were comparable to Roman allies (socii).

Chu state tried to maintain at least three layers of defense lines: “barbarian” polities as the outermost ring, then the exterior neighbors of Chu’s vassal states, then the territories of Chu proper. In typical cases, the state of Chu would convert annexed polities into prefectures, force the pre-existing rulers of such polities to relocate to other regions in Chu, and appoint governors who were from the same clan as the Chu king. At the same time, the pre-existing nobility of the annexed polities who chose to collaborate with the Chu regime tended to retain substantial political power, and such prefectures enjoyed substantial autonomy under the administration of Chu-appointed governors. As a result, it was possible that some ruling elites of Chu’s central government could utilize the prefectural autonomous organization to advance their own political agenda in some manner. Sometimes these were surprising.

For example, the state of Cai (蔡) was annexed by Chu’s Ling King into Chu in 531 BC and was converted into a Chu prefecture, with a governor appointed as its prefectural governor. Chaowu (朝吳), who had previously been a senior official in the state of Cai, was also appointed to a senior position in the Chu prefecture. Chaowu colluded with a Chu nobleman Guan Cong (观从) to set up a plot to topple the Chu king. They started a rebel force in Cai’s suburb and launched an attack into the prefecture city. After the Chu-appointed Cai governor fled, Guan Cong spread the rumor among Cai people that the governor had sided with the rebel forces.

28 Liu Jia He (刘家和), gu dai zhong guo yu shi jie (古代中国与世界), p 236.
An assembly of Cai people gathered and wanted to have Guan Cong arrested. They gave up this attempt only after Guan convinced them of the futility of such arrest. Chaowu delivered a public speech to the Cai people and urged them to support the Cai governor who switched to the side of the rebels.\(^{29}\) The crowds of Cai people roared in consensus and proceeded to gather around their governor. The rebel faction declared that the subjugated state of Cai would be restored, and they eventually succeeded in overthrowing the Chu Ling King.\(^{30}\) After that, the governor of Cai ascended to the Chu throne, and the new king ordered that Cai be restored as a state.

Judging from the process of the coup d’état, the former organization of Cai nobility had probably been maintained after Chu’s annexation of the Cai polity. Such maintenance of a political status-quo made it possible for Chaowu to retain his senior position and heavy influence in Cai public life after the annexation by Chu. Post-annexation Cai subjects remained able to promptly assemble for political purpose and to make collective decisions on vital issues, displaying a high degree of self-organization. They regarded the new governor of Cai as their “superior”, whose status was comparable to the previous Tsai monarch in their minds. Although the true engineer of this coup d’état behind the scene was actually the Chu-appointed Cai governor rather than local Cai people, it importantly did show that if tapped by Chu’s central elites, the potential power of a Chu prefecture for influencing central politics could be greater than that of a Roman muncipium or socii.

3.2 Integrating Local Elites in Government

After annexing various territories in Italy, the Roman Republic adopted a conscious policy of incorporating into the Roman ruling elite those capable nobles who came from the annexed communities. Rome recruited into its ruling elite many members of the aristocratic families of the annexed communities. For example:

- The family of the Plautii, which produced five Roman consuls, probably came from the Latin city of Praeneste.\(^{31}\)
- Being of Sabine origin, Manius Curius Dentatus served as consul four times and was a conqueror of the Sabines and Samnites.\(^{32}\)
- In 48 AD, in a speech addressing the Senate, Roman Emperor Claudius praised the virtue of the Roman integration policy, listed many earlier examples of Roman ruling elites who originated from outside the city of Rome, and stressed that such policy was a key reason for Rome’s rise over certain prominent Greek city states.\(^{33}\)

\(^{30}\) Ibid at 649.
\(^{31}\) Klaus Bringmann, A History of the Roman Republic, p. 53.
\(^{32}\) Ibid.
\(^{33}\) Tacitus, Annals, XI.24.
Similarly, Chu integrated into its government many members of the previous ruling elite of the territories that had been acquired by Chu state. As commented by an official of Chu’s rival state Jin, when the king of Chu appointed individuals to offices, interior regions appointments tended to be made from his own kinship, and exterior regions appointments tended to be made from pre-existing noble clans.\(^{34}\)

For example, the geopolitical situation of Nanyang Basin to Chu state was comparable to that of Campania to the early Roman Republic,\(^{35}\) and similar integration measures were adopted for both regions. In 340 BC, the Roman Senate granted full Roman citizenship to sixteen hundred Capuan aristocrats as reward for their help in the Latin war.\(^{36}\) In parallel, after the conquest of Nanyang Basin, the king of Chu took integrative measures towards the local nobility for similar purposes.

For example, in the war between the state of Chu and the state of Shin, Peng Zhongshuang (彭仲爽), a member of the Shin nobility, was captured by Chu as a prisoner of war. However, Chu’s Wen King (文) took note of Peng’s remarkable capabilities and appointed him to be the prime minister of Chu. Peng lived up to the expectations of the Chu king. Acting as the Chu prime minister, he subjugated the states of Shin (申) and Xi (息) and established Chu’s prefectural governments in the two regions; as a result of his efforts, the rulers of the states of Chen (陈) and Cai (蔡) had to come to the court of Chu to pay homage to the Chu king. Besides that, he expanded Chu territory to the region of Ru (汝) to the north.\(^{37}\)

Based upon excavations in the Nanyang region, we understand that after the state of Shin was subjugated by Chu, Peng Yu (彭宇), another member of the Peng clan from the same region, was appointed governor of the newly-established Shin Prefecture.\(^{38}\) Over one century later, Peng Zishou (彭子寿), another member of the clan, was appointed to Shin governorship.\(^{39}\)

\(^{35}\) At the beginning of the Spring & Autumn Period, the polities in the Nanyang Basin were surrounded by mountainous tribes to the west, Zhou vassal states to the north, east and immediate south, with Chu’s kindred states and Chu home land lying to its further south; during the early Roman Republican period, Campania was surrounded by warlike mountainous tribes to its east and straight north, Hellenistic polities to its southeast, Latin cities to its immediate northwest, with the city of Rome lying to its further northwest.
\(^{36}\) Livy, 8.11.16
In the administration of Shin territory, Chu apparently kept intact the local governance structure, recruiting members of the pre-existing Shin nobility to prominent positions not only in local governments but also in Chu’s central government.

The Peng clan can be compared with their Roman counterparts at least in the following aspects:

(i) Given the similarity in geopolitical positions between Nanyang Basin and Campania during this period, we can make comparison between the political attainments of the Peng clan with those of the Decii clan of Campanian origin: in 340 BC, one member of the clan, Publius Decius Mus, became the first Roman consul of Campanian origin. His son served as Roman consul four times in all, and in 295 BC won a decisive victory over the Celts and Etruscans at the battle of Sentinum by sacrificing himself.40

(ii) Given Peng Zhongshuang’s armed resistance against Chu invasion in his early career, we can compare the Peng clan to the Fulvii clan: either L. Fulvius Curvus or his father had led the city of Tusculum against Rome in the Latin War. However, after the Latin defeat he was admitted to Roman political circles and was elected to be Roman consul in 322 BC. Fulvius Curvus won a victory over the Samnites and was awarded a triumph by the Roman Senate; his son was elected consul in 305 BC, and the Fulvii long held prominent positions in Roman politics.41

The following Roman example of integration was mirrored in a non-Chu clan that was well integrated into Chu’s political life:

Tiberius Coruncanius was a consul of the Roman Republic in 280 BC. His clan originated in Latium and later moved to the annexed city, Tusculum. He led military expeditions to Etruria and was known for leading the battles against Pyrrhus of Epirus. Besides, he served as the chief high priest (Pontifex Maximus) of the Roman state religion.42

The military achievements of Tiberius Coruncanius were mirrored by the career of Guan Ting Fu (观丁父). Guan Ting Fu was a native of the state of Ruo (鄀) situated to the northwest of Chu.

40 Klaus Bringmann, A History of the Roman Republic, p. 53.
42 Klaus Bringmann, A History of the Roman Republic, p. 53.
He was captured by Chu in a war between Ruo and Chu, but Chu’s Wu king employed him as a marshal of the Chu army, and in that position, he conquered the states of Zhou (州) and Liao (蓼), subjugated the states of Sui (随) and Tang (唐), and expanded Chu territories into the Man (蛮) tribes.43

The religious achievements of Tiberius Coruncanius were mirrored by the careers of two other members of the Guan clan: Guan Cong (观从) played an important role in helping Chu’s Ping King ascend to the throne from Cai governorship. After the Ping King came into power, Guan Cong chose to serve as the Minister of Divination (卜尹), the chief state priest for Chu’s religious worship activities.44 This position was succeeded to by some of his descendants, such as Guan Shefu (观射父), who was reputed as a “national treasure” of Chu and was consulted by Chu king on crucial matters relating to religious worship.45

3.3 Providing Military Support

The Roman Republic granted internal autonomy to its municipia, which were obligated to pay military tax (called tributum) to Rome, and to send soldiers to serve in the Roman army. As a result of the integration in its annexed territories, the Roman Republic had a huge reservoir of military manpower against which none of the Hellenistic city states could compete: Pyrrhus was one of the first Greek/Hellenistic rulers who were defeated by the prowess of this system. For example, in 225 BC, based upon the figures provided by Polybius, we estimate that maximum military reserve in Italy was 900,000 men, of whom more than a third were Romans and Roman subjects (325,000) and the rest were allies, including 85,000 Latins.46

Similarly, after Chu state subjugated a polity, each annexed polity ceded its diplomatic and defense powers to Chu but retained substantial autonomy in local administration matters. The regular policy of Chu on annexed lands was not to grant them to Chu aristocrats as hereditary fiefdoms, but to hold them in the name of Chu kings and to levy military tributes to provide for war needs. Many such subjugated communities were converted into prefectures of Chu, and able-bodied male subjects of such a prefecture were recruited into a military unit called “prefectural army” (县师), which was put under direct command of Chu generals.

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45 *Discourses of the States*, Chapter 18, *Discourses of Chu* (国语卷十八楚语).
46 Klaus Bringmann, *A History of the Roman Republic*, p. 34.
For example, in 594 BC, after Chu nobleman Zizhong (子重) made a major contribution in Chu’s siege war against the state of Song, on the return march, he made a request to the Chu king that he receive certain lands in the prefectures of Shin (申) and Lv (呂) as reward. The king wanted to grant this request when Wu Chen (巫臣) (Chu’s governor of Shin) challenged it, stating, “it is these lands which maintain Shin and Lv as municipia (邑). From such lands, the two municipia derive the levy with which they resist invasions from the northern States. If the lands are taken away, there will be no Shin or Lv, and the States of Jin and Zheng will march down to the Han River”. Upon hearing this, the Chu king gave up his thought on the land grant.\footnote{Zuozhuan, Duke of Cheng 7th Year; James Legge, The Chinese Classics, vol. 5, p. 363.}

The status of Shin and Lv during this period was comparable to a Roman municipium. The two communities retained substantial autonomy in local governance but were completely subject to the directions of Chu’s central government on military and foreign affairs. The two communities were supposed to pay “levies”, which were associated with military costs and are analogous to the Roman notion of “tributum” levied upon its citizens. The land grant as requested by Zizhong would fundamentally disrupt the existing status of lands in Shin and Lv and could not fit into a Chu state that treated its military support system as a vital need of the polity.

Prefectural armies actively participated in Chu’s external military actions and substantially increased Chu’s military strength. For example, for a brief time during the reign of Chu’s Ling King (楚灵王), the former alliance states of Chen, Cai, East Bulang (不羹) and West Bulang were annexed into Chu as prefectures,\footnote{After Chu Ling King was dethroned, the annexed communities of Chen and Cai regained nominal independence and restored their statuses as Chu’s alliance states.} after which the king exclaimed that from each of these four prefectures 1,000 chariots can be levied. One of his ministers replied that the military strength of those four municipia alone were sufficient to inspire great awe in Chu’s neighboring states to the north.\footnote{Zuozhuan, Duke of Zhao 12th Year; James Legge, The Chinese Classics, vol. 5, p. 641.} As each chariot during this period was matched by about 25 soldiers, each prefecture as mentioned could have about 25,000 soldiers under the command of Chu. Given that during this period Chu subjugated in total approximately 48 polities,\footnote{Tan Li Ming (谭黎明), Chunqiu zhanguo shiqi chuguo guanzhi yanjiu (春秋战国时代楚国官制研究), p 122 – 123.} most of which were annexed into Chu territories, Chu gained a huge reservoir of military manpower against which none of the other Sinic states could compete.

\footnote{Zuozhuan, Duke of Cheng 7th Year; James Legge, The Chinese Classics, vol. 5, p. 363.\footnote{After Chu Ling King was dethroned, the annexed communities of Chen and Cai regained nominal independence and restored their statuses as Chu’s alliance states.\footnote{Zuozhuan, Duke of Zhao 12th Year; James Legge, The Chinese Classics, vol. 5, p. 641.\footnote{Tan Li Ming (谭黎明), Chunqiu zhanguo shiqi chuguo guanzhi yanjiu (春秋战国时代楚国官制研究), p 122 – 123.}}}}
Part IV: Chu Equivalent of Roman policy of Colonization

The territorial expansions of the Roman Republic and Chu state both involved constant movement of peoples who were resettled or relocated to other regions. The primary motives in relation to such resettlement or relocation could be one of the following three:

(i) to relocate politically-unreliable populations away from newly-acquired territories,
(ii) to relocate politically-reliable populations to newly-acquired territories, and
(iii) to relocate politically-reliable populations to geographically safer regions to avoid military threats from alien states.

After closer examination, we find that the Roman Republic widely conducted relocation types (i) and (ii), while Chu state conducted all three types of relocations.

4.1. Two Types of Population Relocations by Rome

Below are some examples of type (i) relocations that occurred in the course of Roman expansion:

- In 338 BC, as the city of Velitrae had joined the rebellion in the Latin War and then was defeated, the land of its Senators was confiscated by Rome and they were deported to the other side of the Tiber.\(^{51}\)
- In 329 BC, after the city of Privernum attacked the Roman colonies of Setia, Norba and Cora, the city was besieged and the walls destroyed by Rome. Its senators were deported to the other side of the Tiber.\(^ {52} \)
- In 210 BC, after Capua defected to the side of Hannibal and then was defeated by Rome, some Capua people were deported to southern Etruria.\(^{53}\)

For type (ii) relocations, after an Italic community was conquered by Rome, it was often forced to cede to Rome some land, on which Rome would establish colonies that were populated by either Roman citizens or members of the Latin cities. The former were referred to as “Roman colonies”, whose members enjoyed full rights of Roman citizenship, while the latter were called “Latin colonies”, whose members had an equal status with Roman citizens in civil law in terms of marriage and commercial exchange.

\(^{51}\) Liv. 8.14.5-7. – Should “Liv.” be Livy or?? Unclear.
\(^{52}\) Liv. 8.20.9.
\(^{53}\) Liv. 26.34.10.
Being founded as military settlements, these colonies had fortified municipal centers and could be regarded as bastions of Roman rule amidst newly-conquered populations. It was estimated that at least 31 Latin colonies and about 22 Roman colonies were established in the Italian peninsula between the fifth and second century B.C.⁵⁴

4.2. Three Types of Population Relocations by Chu

Chu’s territorial expansions involved population relocations that were at least as intense as those of Roman conquest in Italy.

4.2.1. Chu Population Relocation Type (i)

After Chu subjugated a polity, Chu often conducted type (i) relocations so that some of the subjugated population (typically its ruling elite) would be moved to the interior of Chu territory. Located in the hinterland of Chu territory, the post-relocation populations would pose much less threat to Chu’s national security and would instead make contributions to Chu’s development of sparsely-populated territories in deep south regions.

Below was the initial recorded incidence of Chu’s relocation of subjugated populations, which could be deemed as type (i):

During the first decade of the 7th century BC, Chu subjugated the polity of Quan (权) and had Dou Min (斗シンプ), a member of Chu’s royal clan, serve as the governor of the Quan community. However, Dou Min launched a rebellion against Chu on the basis of the local support he received as the governor of Quan. After Chu crushed the rebellion, the Quan population was moved by Chu to the town of Nachu (那处), which had been annexed into Chu territory in an earlier period.⁵⁵

Another example of type (i) relocation occurred to the state of Luo (罗): after this state was annihilated, Luo people were relocated from their homeland in the mid-Han River Valley down south to Zhijiang (枝江) near the north bank of the Yangtze River. Subsequently, they were moved further down south to the Miluo (汨罗) valley region in Hunan.⁵⁶

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⁵⁶ Li Daoyuan, *Shui Jing Zhu* (水经注), Volume 34.
4.2.2. Chu Population Relocation Type (ii)

Previously we made mention of two incidents of garrison-building in Chu; as the building of such military establishments would very likely be followed by civil populations (family dependents of stationed soldiers), they can be deemed as type (ii) relocations:

- In 506 BC, when the Wu army invaded Chu’s hinterland, the previously-subjugated Jun (麇) people collaborated with the Wu army by letting in that army into their city. The king of Chu took note of such act of infidelity by the Jun people and, immediately after the retreat of Wu army, had a garrison built adjacent to the Jun city.
- After subjugation of Kui (夔) in 632 BC, the king of Chu ordered that one of his generals build a garrison at the former site of Kui on the bank of Yangtze River. Chu’s building of such garrison was comparable to Rome setting up citizen colonies Antium and Terracina on the Tyrrhenian Sea after the Latin war.

4.2.3. Chu Population Relocation Type (iii)

Occasionally Chu state had to relocate relatively politically-reliable populations to more secure land to avoid threats from major states in the north. The following are some examples of motive (iii):

- In 511 BC, when the state of Xu (徐) was invaded by Wu army and Chu army failed to come to Xu’s rescue, Chu established a garrison at Yi (夷) which was colonized by the ruler of Xu.
- In 510 BC, when the states of Qian (潜) were invaded by Wu army, Chu troops relocated the population of Qian to Nangang (南冈).

4.2.4. Chu Population Relocation of Mixed Types: Case of Xu

It was possible that one polity under Chu domination underwent multiple relocations, each of which were motivated by different reasons. The relocations of the polity of Xu (许) best illustrates the logic of the different policies involved:

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The state of Xu was located in southern Central Plains, facing Chu to its south and the increasingly-aggressive state of Zheng (郑) to its north. The ruler of the state of Xu feared threats from Zheng, and in 576 BC he requested to the king of Chu for permission for relocation into Chu territories. The king of Chu agreed and arranged Xu’s move to the garrison of Sheh (叶) which was located just on the outside of the Chu Great Wall\(^{61}\). Such relocation was clearly a reflection of above motive (iii).

Judging from historical records, we found such relocation to Sheh had a profound effect on the attitude of Xu rulers to Chu hegemony. Before the relocation, Xu was often neutral or even resistant to Chu’s demands in interstate politics. After the relocation, the pattern of Xu elite to Chu lordship became much more suppliant, and they actively followed and participated in Chu’s actions in interstate politics. Using Roman terminology, we might say that the polity of Xu was “Latinized” to a certain degree after it was relocated to Sheh. When the kings of Chu subsequently requested Xu population to relocate to another region for various geopolitical reasons, Chu’s mentality was not totally different from the Senate of the Roman Republic in dispatching a group of Latin residents to establish a Latin colony in an acquired territory.

Below are some examples of relocation type (ii) arranged by Chu:

- In 538 BC, after Chu conquered the state of Lai (赖), the king of Chu wanted to relocate Xu people to the site of Lai and he requested two senior nobles to launch a project for building a garrison at Lai. He gave up this relocation plan only because there arose in the same winter a major flood in the region of Lai, making it impractical to build such garrison.\(^{62}\)

- The relocation idea seemed to linger with the king. In 533 BC, after Chu conquered the city of Chengfu (城父) from the state of Chen (located in Central Plains), the same Chu king ordered that Xu people should be relocated to Chengfu, and this order was subsequently implemented.\(^{63}\) In connection with the relocation, the king of Chu added to Xu’s territory the land of the newly-acquired state of Zhoulai (州来) north of Huai River and had certain land granted to the ruler of Xu.\(^{64}\) The king of Chu obviously considered the Xu population as more trustworthy than the newly-conquered Chen population in the heartland of the Central Plains, so his motive behind such resettlement by Xu was comparable to Roman founding of Latin colonies in Magna Graecia.


\(^{64}\) Ibid.
Part V: Chu’s equivalent of the Roman policy of Alliance

5.1 Overview of Chu’s alliance policy

After the Roman Republic conquered territories in the Italian peninsula further away from Latium or southern Etruria, by treaties Rome entered into alliance (socii) relationships with many polities. These polities would maintain their own laws and autonomy and pay no taxes to Rome. A typical alliance polity owed two vital obligations to the Roman Republic: it must follow Roman direction in foreign relations; and, in case of war, it must provide their own units of military troops to fight together with the Roman army under the direction of Roman generals.

The greatest challenge that the Roman alliance system underwent during this period took place during the Second Punic War, when Hannibal led the Carthaginian army into the Italian peninsula and tried to stir up resentment among Italians who had felt the loss of sovereignty under Roman rule. For example, after the Battle of Lake Trasimeno, Hannibal addressed the Italians,

\[ I \text{ have come not to fight against the Italians, but to fight against Rome on behalf of Italians; and therefore if the Italians were wise, you would attach yourselves to me: because I have come to restore freedom to the Italians, and to assist you to recover your cities and territory which you have lost to Rome. }^{65} \]

Hannibal tried hard to break apart the Roman alliance system and woo existing members of Roman confederacy. He succeeded in winning over many former Roman alliances states in southern Italy (as close as Capua in Campania), but achieved little diplomatic success in Latium and Etruria whose cities had long been integrated as Roman municipia or citizen communities.

Similarly, after Chu conquered northern territories that were further and further away from its home region, Chu granted a higher degree of autonomy to some of the newly-dominated vassal states, which would retain their nominal sovereignties and survive as alliance states of Chu. A typical alliance state owed two vital obligations to Chu: it must dispatch troops to fight on the side of Chu army, and it must follow Chu direction in foreign relations. Their military obligations will be discussed in below Section 5.2.

Examples of such alliance states include Chen (陈), Cai (蔡), Xu (许) and Sui (随). Even though Chu annihilated the regimes of Chen and Cai several times or reduced them into Chu prefectures, each time soon afterwards due to changes in geopolitical situations, Chu would restore their statuses as sovereign alliance states.

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\[^{65}\] Polybius, 3.77.
While most of such alliance states of Chu were located outside the Chu Great Wall, one notable exception was the state of Sui, which was located south of the Chu Great Wall. Sui entered into alliance with Chu first around the end of 8th century BC and retained its *de jure* independence for several centuries.

The greatest challenge that Chu’s alliance system underwent during this period took place in 506 BC, when the Wu army invaded Chu’s home region and tried to induce the defection of Chu’s vassal states or prefectures that had suffered living under Chu suzerainty. Wu state succeeded in winning over support from some Chu vassal states in the Central Plains (e.g., Cai, Dun and Hu) and in Nanyang Plains (e.g., Tang) but achieved little success in the Chu prefectures that had long been integrated into the Chu polity.

During Wu’s invasion, the state of Sui proved itself as a very loyal ally of Chu. In 506 BC, after Chu’s capital fell to the invading Wu army, the king of Chu fled to Sui and hid himself at a location in the north of Sui palaces. He was closely followed by the troops of Wu. A Wu general entered the southern quarters of Sui palaces and addressed Sui people in a tone that sounded similar to Hannibal’s message to Italians: after denouncing that Chu had subjugated all the Zhou-affiliated States (including Sui) in the Han Valley, he promised that if Sui could collaborate by giving away the Chu king in hiding, Wu would grant to Sui all the lands to the immediate north of Han River. After careful deliberations, however, the Sui ruler declined Wu’s request stressing, “for generations there have existed between Chu and Sui engagements of alliances, which Sui does not want to violate.”

In gratitude for the crucial rescue provided by Sui, the king of Chu pledged a blood oath of alliance with the ruler of Sui. It was probably based upon such renewed alliance that Sui’s existence as a vassal state continued for many decades afterwards inside deep Chu territories, while most of the other subjugated states had been completely deprived of their sovereignty and annexed into Chu territory.

5.2. Military obligations of Chu Alliance States

In a typical battle that the Roman legion participated in during the Republican days prior to the Social War, soldiers from Rome and Latin regions would appear in the center of the formation while soldiers from the alliance regions would appear as *alae* in the two wings of the central consular army. *Alae* soldiers were supposed to fight under the command of Roman officers.

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67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
Similarly, in a typical battle that the Chu army participated in the Spring & Autumn period, soldiers from Chu native lands would appear in the center of the formation, on its left wing were placed troops sent from Chu’s annexed territories (mostly prefectures), while on the right wing were troops dispatched from Chu’s vassal states. Both wings fought under the command of Chu generals. For example, at the battle between Chu and Jin armies in Chengpu (城濮) in 632 B.C., the native Chu army was placed in the center, on its left flank were troops from Shin and Xi, and on its right flank were troops from Chu’s alliances of Chen and Cai.69

There are many historical records that the king of Chu combined his troops with troops from Chu’s alliance states to fight interstate wars. For example,

- In 537 BC, the king of Chu led the rulers of Cai, Chen, Xu (徐), Dun, Hu and Shen and Huai barbarians to launch an attack against the state of Wu.70
- In 494 BC, the king of Chu led the rulers of Chen, Sui and Xu to lay a siege to the state of Cai.71

As previously discussed, with its wide use of troops recruited from its municipia and socii, the Roman Republic mobilized manpower in the Italian peninsula at an unprecedented level, and therefore gained access to a potential military force against which none of the other Mediterranean powers could compete.72 Meanwhile, such a broadened base of military mobilization to add quantity might occasionally compromise the quality of Roman troops, if the enemies spotted the weaker points that might exist at either wing of the Roman army in the battlefield.

For example, at the battle of Cannae in 216 BC during the Second Punic War, the cavalry from the Roman allies stationed on the left wing of the Roman formation, native Roman cavalry stationed on the right wing, with the consular army stationed in the middle. The Roman allies started by fighting Hannibal’s Numidian cavalry, but when the Carthage general Hasdrubal came charging in support of the Numidians, the Roman allied cavalry quickly broke and fled. Such early collapse of Roman allies made it possible for Hasdrubal’s men to turn around to launch a surprise attack on the back of the advancing central Roman legions, thus sealing the encirclement and defeat of the Roman army.73

Similarly, when the state of Chu combined troops from multiple alliances into its own army for military actions, the comparatively lower morale of the alliances could also undermine the overall fighting power of Chu army.

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72 Klaus Bringmann, A History of the Roman Republic, p. 34
For example, at the battle of Jifu (鸡父) in 519 BC, the king of Wu set up a strategy that was based on the lack of coordination between the armies of Chu and its alliance states Dun, Hu, Shen, Cai, Chen and Xu. First, the king of Wu sent 300 criminals in the front to attack the troops of Hu, Shen and Chen; behind these criminals Wu’s regular army followed in three divisions. The troops of Hu, Shen and Chen were thrown into great confusion by the chaotic fleeing of the Wu criminals on the battlefield and were caught by surprise when they were suddenly attacked by the advancing regular Wu army. Armies of these three alliances were defeated, with their commanders and many soldiers being captured by Wu. Then the Wu army suddenly released the captured Hu and Shen soldiers, and had them fleeing over to the fronts of Xu, Cai and Dun and exclaiming, “Our rulers are dead!” Wu soldiers followed the fleeing captives, charging along and shouting the same slogans. The troops of Xu, Cai and Dun also began to flee, and the Chu army was routed even before they had the chance to establish formations for the battle.74

During the Second Punic War, Hannibal treated the prisoners of war from Roman allies kindly and set them free without ransom.75 In doing so, Hannibal wished to alienate the Roman allies away from Rome, but the effect of such freeing of prisoners seemed to be limited. If he had known how the Wu army had applied the same tactics to successfully disrupt the enemies’ alliance at the battle of Jifu, Hannibal would probably have wanted to use it against the Romans in a more dramatic manner.

5.3 Benefits from Becoming Alliance States

The hegemony that Roman Republic built substantially ended the anarchical chaos that had plagued the Italian peninsula for centuries. Although the Italian allies had to surrender their military sovereignty over to Rome, they gained much from the nascent emergence of domestic peace and security, and they could call on Rome for help in dealing with external threats and domestic conflicts. For example, in 270 BC, the citizens of the Greek city of Rhegium were driven out by a Campanian force garrisoned in their town; when they appealed to Rome for help, Rome helped them return to their city and restore to their rights; in 263 BC, the aristocracy of the allied city Volsinii had yielded to a domestic revolt but were restored back to their position after Rome launched a military campaign in their support; when coastal towns of southern Italy appealed to Rome for help against Illyrian pirates, Rome intervened and put a violent end to such piracy.76

Similarly, Chu undertook a systematic policy of protecting its alliance states from external aggressions. For example,

75 Polybius, 3.77.
76 Klaus Bringmann, A History of the Roman Republic, p. 36.
• In 564 BC, a senior general of Chu launched an attack against the state of Zheng as retaliation against Zheng’s recent invasion of the state of Cai.\textsuperscript{77}

• In 490 BC, when the state of Wu invaded the state of Chen, the king of Chu said, “there has been an alliance between my predecessor king and the state of Chen, and I must by all means now go to its rescue”, and therefore he sent troops to Chen’s rescue.\textsuperscript{78}

\textbf{Part VI: Initial Conclusions on Comparisons Between Rome and the Han Empires.}

By persistently pursuing the various integration-oriented policies as discussed above, numerous Italic polities, cities and tribes conquered by Rome were consolidated into the Roman state not only politically but also psychologically, and the spread of Roman language, legal system, customs and architecture followed the expansion of Roman territory. The Roman Republic substantively changed the meaning of the terms “Roman” and “Latin”, which came to refer to legal status rather than actual ethnicity and the terms became infinitely extendable geographically.\textsuperscript{79}

Similarly, the rise and expansion of Chu state during Spring & Autumn and Warring States periods was more significant than those of other feudal states of Zhou’s making. By the mid-4\textsuperscript{th} century BC, Chu’s territory alone accounted for nearly half of the combined area of all Sinic states. A key reason for Chu’s vast territorial expansion was its abilities around integration and consolidation of the various polities, kingdom and tribes subjugated by Chu state. These integrated communities identified themselves with Chu state or culture not only while they were under Chu’s rule, but also after the Chu state had vanished as political unit. The concept of Chu had expanded enormously from its tiny homeland to the bulk of southern China. According to the historian Sima Qian, by the 2\textsuperscript{nd} century BC the region of Chu encompassed three disparate vast regions of Western Chu, Eastern Chu and Southern Chu,\textsuperscript{80} whose combined areas include what are now the provinces of Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi, Anhui, Jiangsu, and southern Henan. As the overwhelming majority of the populations living in such greater Chu region originally were not Chu people, the term of “Chu” had also undergone a profound change and had proved to be vastly extensible in the geographical sense.

In a deeper sense, the Chu state represented a new era of the evolutionary growth of Sinic civilization. Early Zhou dynasty kings officially recognized Chu’s reign on Zhou borderlands without dispatching Zhou subjects to Chu territory, which left a much greater degree of autonomy for Chu’s own development.

\textsuperscript{77} Zuozhuan, Duke of Xiang 8\textsuperscript{th} Year; James Legge, \textit{The Chinese Classics}, vol. 5, p. 435.

\textsuperscript{78} Zuozhuan, Duke of Ai 6\textsuperscript{th} Year; James Legge, \textit{The Chinese Classics}, vol. 5, p. 809.


\textsuperscript{80} Sima Qian, \textit{Records of the Grand Historian}, \textit{Huo Zhi Lie Zhuan }（史记・货殖列传）.
Compared with most of the contemporary states in the Chinese Central Plains, Chu performed better in inventing and developing a new model that integrated numerous local princedoms and tribes into an organic body politic without falling victim to internal strife. Just as Rome fared well where Athens and other Greek city states failed at the task of consolidating the Mediterranean cities, Chu fared better than contemporary bigger Sinic states in annexing and integrating smaller states. For centuries, it seemed that it was the state of Chu that was best qualified candidate for grabbing the Holy Grail of uniting the ancient Sinic states, just as the Roman Republic would become the mistress of the Mediterranean Basin before its demise.

Such an expectation might have omitted the element of chance in the unfolding of historical events. Historical fate had been kind to the Roman Republic in sparing it from the hurricane of military conquest marshaled by Alexander the Great. Historical fate had been too harsh on the Chu state in interjecting the more powerfully expansionist state of Qin. Qin exerted epic stratagems and efforts in launching unprecedented total wars hitherto unthinkable for other Sinic polities. If the life spans of the empires of Alexander and Qin were equally ephemeral, the staying powers of the states of Rome and Chu were equally enduring: just as the Roman Republic had the Roman Empire as its direct successor, the Han Empire was predominantly a successor of the Chu state. Although the Han Empire borrowed from Qin in its administrative system, most of the founding fathers of the empire were former Chu subjects, and the cultural ethos of the Han Empire was decisively Chu-originated.\(^{81}\)

If the myriad of historical similarities between Roman and Han Empires deserve in-depth research, the parallels between their predecessors of Roman Republic and Chu state warrant even closer examination with fresh eyes, because the surprising convergence between early Roman and Chu states was not a historical coincidence, but was a prologue to the abundant similarities between the two world-systems whose numerous resemblances would gradually and subtly emerge in the following centuries.

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\(^{81}\) Li Ze Hou (李泽厚), *mei de li cheng* (《美的历程》), p 72.
Policies Through Which Central Eurasian Nations Are Promoting Their Civilizational Experiences:
An Exercise in ‘Soft Power’ and Global Image Making

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This article is based on a paper presented at a SAIS/National University of Mongolia conference in June 2016 in Ulaanbaatar.

Introduction

The Eurasian world does not possess one civilization; rather it hosts many cultures and civilizations. A lack of a common vision in the past often led to cultural and political conflicts, but the Eurasian continent emphasized a common spirit in the first decades of the 21st Century, often expressed under the terminology of ‘Silk Road,’ in hopes of overcoming historical and religious rivalries. The soft power civilizational-related initiatives of China, Russia, Turkey, Mongolia, Iran, and India are raising their global images over the greater Eurasian region and the world. The governments of each of these nations today are implementing various well-designed culturally-based, multi-vector strategies to reassert their ideologies and civilizational ideals. Such policies have the potential to dramatically increase continental integration in the short and medium term.

Greater Eurasia is the landmass that holds about seventy percent of the world's population and covers almost one tenth of the Earth's surface. Originally it was a geographical term first coined in late 19th century to define the supercontinent comprising Europe and Asia, which until that period was treated as two separate continents. This article is downsizing the term to cover more precisely Central Eurasia or Central Asia or Inner Asia, which is the contiguous territory from the Caucasus and Iran eastward through Central Asia, Russia, Mongolia, and China to South Asia and the Pacific.

The history of this territory is intimately related to shared, oftentimes confrontational, relations among the peoples in the region over millennia. During the past three hundred years this inner continent attracted the attention of superpower antagonists. In the 19th century it was the focus of the Great Game rivalry amongst Czarist Russia, Manchu Qing China, and British India. The 20th century witnessed the emergence of the Soviet Union as the great, incorporating power and the retreat of both the Chinese and British. Japan during World War II tried to assert dominance over the entire Asia Pacific area and left a legacy of historical animus that still reverberates. With the Cold War, the United States sought to replace British influence in Southeast Asia and fought wars on Asia’s eastern rim in Korea and Vietnam to curb the power of its Soviet rival.
From the *Realpolitik* perspective, there is skepticism about the ability of this region to develop the cooperative integration required for stability and security.¹ In the 21st century we have entered a period called by some a “New Great Game,” dominated by competition for energy sources with increased capital flows and expansion of regional trade. Nonetheless, it is undeniable that the Central Eurasian region, traditionally a backwater of the global economic and political mainstream, is today rapidly changing through increased international and interregional efforts to disassemble its longstanding isolation. Chinese investments and trade are triggering large-scale infrastructure development, shipment of goods, and flow of people.² Concurrently, China’s thirst for energy security has propelled liquid energy exporters such as Russia and Iran, and energy mineral-rich nations, such as Kazakhstan, Mongolia, and even North Korea to explore new ideas for transit and economic integration.

Simultaneously, all the nations across the vast continent are facing questions of national identity and historical legacies which conflict with the premise of common values. As the experience of the European Union suggests, non-interference in internal affairs and equality among member states are easier to achieve when countries and populations share common values.³ Yet, the Central Eurasian continent does not possess one civilization, but has many intersecting and at times conflicting cultural traditions. Throughout history, this lack of a common vision often led to social and political misunderstandings. In recent years the Eurasian continent has emphasized a common spirit, often tied to the amorphous concept of the ‘Silk Road,’ in hopes of overcoming historical and religious rivalries. This article examines how the different cultures of China, Russia, Turkey, Mongolia, Iran, and India are being universalized over the continent through modern soft power civilizational-related mechanisms.

**China**

The disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1990 resulted in the independence of the Central Asian Republics and enabled China to become a major presence in the western regions of Eurasia. China initially promoted greater Asian continental integration in order to control the rise of Muslim extremism within its own western borders. Nowadays, the catalyst for Chinese reengagement increasingly has been to secure energy supplies to fuel China’s rapid economic development as Middle Eastern suppliers have become increasingly unreliable. Chinese outreach was pursued both through multilateral organizations in which China wields strong influence and through policies to promote Chinese civilization.

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³ Fredholm, *ibid.*, 16.
Ideological and cultural differences with the nationalities once under Soviet domination were deliberately minimized in favor of emphasizing commonalities stemming from vaguely conceived notions of connectivity with the continent’s Silk Road past. Thus, it can be said that Chinese diplomacy entered a new stage through promotion of multilateral, multi-directional interactions in Central Eurasia in order “to avoid frictions with its neighbors while preserving and pursuing its own national interests.” It has attempted to avoid being viewed as using Eurasian nations simply as resources pits: “Therefore, strengthening the combination of summit foreign policy and people-to-people policy is the major strategy of Chinese policy in Central Asia.” The result of this approach is that “in a short time China has managed to remove its negative ‘China threat’ image and [to gain] an air of respectability in the region.”

**Shanghai Cooperation Organization**

The first major example of Chinese soft power diplomacy in Eurasia was within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) which originated from a summit meeting in April 1996 among China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan—states that share common borders. The original foci of SCO were on border demarcation, confidence building, and security, but not a military alliance per se. With the September 11, 2001 World Trade Center attack, the SCO emphasized the countering of Islamic extremism and separatism. Over the years, the organization has morphed into economic and financial cooperation centered around energy so that today the SCO is often cited as a successful case of Asian multilateralism — an effective, efficient, and credible paradigm that now includes four powers having nuclear weapons (Russia, China, India, and Pakistan) representing almost half the world’s population, 20 percent of the world’s GDP, and three of the world’s leading emerging economies.

According to Professor Pan Guang, Director of the Center of SCO Studies and Vice Chairman of the Shanghai Center for International Studies at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, the intent of the cultural and humanistic cooperation goals of SCO “is to highlight the spirit of the Silk Road by enhancing mutual communication and understanding among the different civilizations and nations in the region, thus strengthening personal ties among the Chinese, Central Asians, and Russians, and paving the way for comprehensive cooperation within the SCO.” Beginning in 2005, SCO summits noted the need to promote people-to-people activities and cultural cooperation.

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7 In 2001 upon the entrance of Uzbekistan the title SCO was adopted.
8 Fredholm, *ibid.*, 3-4.
10 Pan Guang, *ibid.*, 25.
A year later, the Shanghai summit produced an educational cooperation agreement\textsuperscript{11}, and the SCO Forum was launched as an academic mechanism for research and discussion. Subsequently there have been annual SCO Cultural and Art Festivals.

The use by China of the SCO in its own soft power projection is now clearly evident in the annual SCO meetings of cultural ministers that first convened in Beijing in April 2002. At the 2018 meeting in Sanya, Hainan province, China, where the cultural ministers reached consensus on a \textit{2018-2020 Executive Plan}, Chinese Culture and Tourism Minister Luo Shugang in his keynote address introduced the “great significance of the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China and the Thought on Socialism with Chinese characteristics for a New Era.” Asserting that “China will work hand in hand with the rest of the world to create a community of shared future for mankind,” he suggested that promotion of cultural exchanges and cooperation among the SCO member countries would lay a solid foundation of public support for the "Shanghai Spirit.”\textsuperscript{12}

The “Shanghai Spirit” of "mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, mutual consultations, respect for cultural diversity, and pursuit of common development” is the guiding principle of the organization and is held up as a code of conduct to be internalized by SCO members. In a report on SCO development released in 2018 by the Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies at Renmin University of China, together with two other institutes, this “Shanghai Spirit” was identified as the bedrock or "the soul of the SCO" and the essential distinction of the organization from other international organizations.\textsuperscript{13} Chinese President Xi Jinping has lauded the mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, consultation, respect for diverse civilizations, and commitment to common development of the “Shanghai Spirit” as the underpinnings of the growth of the SCO. However, his comment that, “The SCO has the responsibility to prevent instability, forestall the spread of terrorist and religious extremist ideologies and stop forces with hidden agendas from undermining peace and stability in our region”\textsuperscript{14} reinforces the concerns of critics who have labelled the “Shanghai Spirit” as a formula for autocratic leaders to rationalize their power.

\textsuperscript{11} Joint Communique of the Meeting of the Council of Heads of Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Shanghai, June 15, 2006.
\textsuperscript{12} Zhang Xingjian, “SCO cultural ministers' meeting highlights exchanges, cooperation,” Chinaculture.org (May 18, 2018), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201805/18/WS5afe1a62a3103f6866ee91e7_2.html.
\textsuperscript{13} "Steady development and expansion of the SCO would not have been possible without the Shanghai Spirit as the "soul," said Yao Peisheng, former Chinese ambassador to countries including Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.” See “Shanghai Spirit - strong momentum behind steady SCO development,” Xinhua (May 23, 2018), http://www.ecns.cn/voices/2018-05-23/detail-ifyuqkkxh5543277.shtml.
and undermine democratization by “utilising multilateral organizations to defend themselves against regional and global democratic trends.”¹⁵

**Confucius Institutes**

Chinese Premier Hu Jintao in 2004-2005 initiated the promotion of soft power initiatives to increase the influence of China internationally through cultural and language programs on Chinese civilization by means of non-profit public institutions called Confucius Institutes (Chinese: 孔子学院; pinyin: Kǒngzǐ Xuéyuàn) affiliated with the PRC Ministry of Education and administered by the Hanban or Office of the Chinese Language Council International. The Hanban’s governing council consists of the heads of twelve Chinese government ministries, including the State Press and Publications Administration (state-run media and propaganda) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Hanban fully funds and dispatches teachers and textbooks from China and requires universities to obtain its approval for all course offerings and programs. The Confucius Institutes have been compared to such language and cultural promotion organizations as Britain’s British Council, France’s Alliance Française, and Germany’s Goethe-Institut, but unlike these organizations, many Confucius Institutes operate directly on university campuses. The Institutes are specifically named after the Chinese philosopher Confucius (551–479 BCE) to cast an image of peace and harmony,¹⁶ to develop “a brand that was instantly recognized as a symbol of Chinese culture, [one] radically different from the image of the Communist Party.”¹⁷ The Confucius Institute mechanism has been described as "an important channel to glorify Chinese culture, to help Chinese culture spread to the world" and as a "part of China's foreign propaganda strategy."¹⁸

In the beginning, Confucius Institutes were directed towards China’s Central Eurasian neighbors. The first Confucius Institute opened on November 21, 2004 in Seoul, South Korea, following the establishment of a pilot institute in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, in June 2004. Hundreds more have opened in dozens of countries around the world, but today the highest concentration of Institutes is in the United States (over 100 — 39 percent of the total), Japan, and South Korea.

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As of April 2017, there were 581 Confucius Institutes in dozens of countries on six continents with 100 million people learning Chinese overseas. The goal is to establish 1,000 by 2020. Additionally, there are 1,074 Confucius Classrooms located in primary and secondary schools. All of these are under the jurisdiction of the Hanban. The institutes operate in co-operation with local affiliate colleges and universities around the world, and financing is shared between the Hanban and the host institutions. The Confucius Classroom program partners with local secondary schools or school districts and provides teachers and instructional materials.

The presence of the Institutes has raised concerns over the possible influence of their policies on academic freedom and even intelligence gathering. There has been a growing chorus of complaints about infringement of academic freedom and political influence. In a report by Dr. Ross Babbage, former head of strategic analysis in the Office of National Assessments and now a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) in Washington, D.C., the Chinese are practicing a type of warfare called “comprehensive coercion,” by which governments avoid dissent by discouraging “foreign narratives that are inimical to their interests, generate support for policies they favour, enhance their freedom of action by keeping rivals distracted, and mitigate push back against overt acts of revisionism.” Such criticism in the United States comes from all sides of the political spectrum. The U.S. National Association of Scholars (NAS, a conservative academic lobbying group in New York) has claimed that the Confucius Institutes manipulate “intellectual freedom, transparency, entanglement, and soft power.” Rachelle Peterson, the director of research projects at the NAS and the author of Outsourced to China: Confucius Institutes and Soft Power in American Higher Education, asserts that although “...the Confucius Institutes present themselves as a vehicle for cultural diplomacy, it would be more accurate to think of them as a way for China to subvert American higher education.”

20 According to Xinhua, “Confucius Institutes: promoting language, culture, and friendliness” (October 2, 2006).
21 The Confucius Institute is headquartered in Beijing and establishes the guidelines for the separate Confucius Institutes. A council with fifteen members, ten of whom are directors of overseas institutes, governs the organization, and each Institute is individually managed under the leadership of its own board of directors with local partners represented. See “Constitution and By-Laws of the Confucius Institutes,” http://english.hanban.org/node_10971.htm
22 Fabrice De Pierrebourg and Michel Juneau-Katsuya, Nest of Spies: the starting truth about foreign agents at work within Canada’s borders (Canada: HarperCollins, 2009), 160–162.
But Confucius Institutes also serve as a vehicle for Chinese propaganda, restricting what the teachers they supply from China can say, distorting what students learn, and pressuring American professors to censor themselves.

In Central Eurasia, criticism of Confucius Institutes is more muted. The Chinese are trying to influence the future generation of elites as well as to counter negative attitudes in cities where trade with China is significant. In 2017, there were five Confucius Institutes in Kazakhstan, four in Kyrgyzstan, and two in both Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, with growing student enrollments. Many Asians, who come from countries hosting Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects in them (see below), view the Institutes and Centers as providing language skills which can be translated into jobs in BRI projects. But there is resistance in several countries such as Vietnam and India. New Delhi believes that Confucius Institutes are “insidious institutions primarily meant to brainwash people of the host countries to wean them away from their entrenched beliefs, and make them think and act like the Chinese, in much the way as Thomas Babington Macaulay wanted to ‘Anglicize’ Indians in mid-19th Century to make them the backbone of British rule in India.”

Chinese authorities dispute any criticism that they act as direct promoters of the political viewpoints of the Chinese Communist Party but do not deny that one important goal of the Institutes is to influence the ways other countries view China. At a June 2018 conference in Sri Lanka Hanban authorities revealed that the CIs and the CCs now have three objectives: i) to teach the Chinese language and Chinese culture and prepare the host countries to accept China-funded infrastructure projects under the BRI; ii) to be responsive to specific local demands and needs; and iii) to overcome the suspicion that the CIs and CCs are not benign, but rather have a hidden political and strategic agenda impinging on the sovereignty of host countries. Despite all the concerns that they present a selective and politicized view of China, the Confucius Institutes to date have been a very successful means for advancing Chinese soft power in Eurasia and internationally.

26 In 2006 there were 400 students in Bishkek Humanitarian University, while in 2017, this number grew to 700. In Uzbekistan, the number of students in the Confucius Institute in Tashkent was estimated 350 (www. confucius.ucoz.com). See Anna Tiido, “Language as a Soft Power Tool in Central Asia” (February 23, 2018), http://intersectionproject.eu/article/russia-world/language-soft-power-tool-central-asia.
28 Ibid.
Perhaps the most Eurasia-specific initiative sponsored by China today is the One Belt One Road (OBOR) concept, now retitled Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), first announced by Chinese President Xi Jinping in September and October 2013. The initiative promotes the “orderly and free flow of economic factors, highly efficient allocation of resources, and deep integration of markets by enhancing the connectivity of the Asian, European, and African continents and their adjacent seas.” While most of the attention has been concentrated on the transit, infrastructure, and financial connectivity projects that this multilateral concept embraces, there is a strong Chinese ‘soft power’ cultural component which is linked to the Silk Road image. This component is evidenced in the opening description of the BRI vision issued in March 2015 by the National Development and Reform Commission of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Commerce of the PRC with State Council authorization:

More than two millennia ago the diligent and courageous people of Eurasia explored and opened up several routes of trade and cultural exchange that linked the major civilizations of Asia, Europe, and Africa, collectively called the Silk Road by later generations. For thousands of years, the Silk Road Spirit—‘peace and cooperation, openness and inclusiveness, mutual learning and mutual benefit’—has been passed from generation to generation, promoted the progress of human civilization, and contributed greatly to the prosperity and development of the countries along the Silk Road. Symbolizing communication and cooperation between the East and the West, the Silk Road Spirit is a historic and cultural heritage shared by all countries around the world.

Critics of the BRI call it an attempt by China to assume a larger role in global affairs with a China-centered trading network and point out that its strategy as announced by President Xi would be financially unsound and unsustainable. Financial experts at the State Council have estimated that it would cost as much as USD $8 trillion if fully implemented. The likely goal of the project is to export excess production and infrastructural equipment to developing countries in Central Asia, South Asia, East Africa, and the ASEAN countries so as to expand the political influence of China and to energize its economy to counter the slowing of growth in its exports and weak domestic demand: “Simply put, China is trying to buy friendship and political influence by investing massive amounts of money on infrastructure in countries along the “One Belt, One Road”.”

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The Chinese government responds by calling this initiative "a bid to enhance regional connectivity and embrace a brighter future." It believes that the building of the Belt and Road infrastructure can help promote economic prosperity and regional economic cooperation, but just as important is the cultural component that will strengthen people-to-people exchanges and mutual learning among different civilizations and promote world peace and development. The Chinese Foreign Ministry especially emphasizes the people-to-people bond within BRI: “We should carry forward the spirit of friendly cooperation of the Silk Road by promoting extensive cultural and academic exchanges, personnel exchanges and cooperation, media cooperation, youth and women exchanges, and volunteer services so as to win public support for deepening bilateral and multilateral cooperation.”

BRI promises to provide 10,000 government scholarships to the countries along the Belt and Road every year and to include student exchanges and jointly administered schools. It is a vehicle to raise China’s Eurasian profile through soft power by holding culture years, arts festivals, film festivals, TV weeks, and book fairs in the different BRI countries; to cooperate on the production and translation of films, radio, and TV programs; and to jointly protect World Cultural Heritage sites. It is obvious that China through the soft power aspects of BRI is investing in the formation of future Eurasian elites whose members will one day move into decision-making positions.

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32 "China unveils action plan," _ibid._
33 _Ibid._
Russia

For 200 years, the Russian language and Russian culture have spread throughout European and Central Asian regions during Czarist and Soviet times. Russian was the official language in much of Central Eurasia, and Russia had a huge cultural influence on the 160 different ethnic groups in the region. Soviet Marxist Leninist ideology overwhelmed native traditions during the 20th century as Russian culture, especially Soviet philosophy and education, was the predominant model and the first exposure to modern western civilization for many Eurasian peoples. With the fall of the Soviet Union in 1990, many of the Turkic-Mongol cultures reemerged as nation states across the continent but with profound changes as these nations have consciously attempted to remove Russian influences and re-assert nativist traditions. At the same time, Russia itself has been occupied with reattaching its historical western-based cultural and Orthodox Christian roots to its Asian continentalist experiences. Russia’s pivot to Asia in the last decade not only includes the important task of creating a Eurasian trading bloc but also of curtailing the loss of Russian influence in Central Asia and counterbalancing the rise of China as a major continental trading partner. As a great but reduced power in the region (with the world’s twelfth largest economy34), it has a traditional and continuing interest in defining and spreading its civilization to all peoples of the continent without the impediment of ideology.

Eurasianism

One approach, which has re-emerged since the Cold War, seeks to provide the philosophical justification for Russia to take the lead in Central Eurasia, as well as to integrate Russia within the larger continentalist trend. This political movement is Euro-Asianism which had its origins in the Russian émigré community of the 1920s and is focused on a geopolitical concept of Eurasia. The movement was based upon the premise that Russian civilization should not be categorized as "European" but as non-European Orthodox Christian.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990, a modified version arose called Neo-Euro-Asianism that considers Russia to be culturally closer to Asia than to Western Europe. The founder of the Neo-Euro-Asianist movement is considered to have been Lev Gumilev.

34 According to the International Monetary Fund, "World Economic Outlook Database" (April 17, 2018).
He maintained that the Central Asian Mongol tribal cultural occupation of Russia from 1240 to 1480 was a positive event that shielded the emergent Russian civilization or ethnose from Western European, Catholic aggressors.\textsuperscript{35} In Gumilev’s view, there was no Mongol/Tatar yoke, but rather the Mongols handed the imperial torch to the Russians. Thus the Czarist Russian Empire became a type of Orthodox-Mongol Empire. The major proponent of Neo-Euro-Asianness today is Alexander Dugin, who promotes this concept as a way for Russian policymakers to remain relevant in modern Eurasia\textsuperscript{36} and is considered by some political scientists to be the originator of a Russian version of the European New Right.\textsuperscript{37} Since the late 1990s, Euro-Asianness also has gained some following in Turkey in nationalist, and military circles.\textsuperscript{38}

**Russkiy Mir Foundation**
The Russkiy Mir Foundation [Russian World Foundation] is a soft power public diplomacy project that targets society more than elites or state structures beyond the boundaries of Russia with a focus on Russian immigrants and Russian speakers in the Eurasian continental region.\textsuperscript{39} In forming the Russkiy Mir Foundation as a global project, Russia was creating for itself a new identity, new possibilities for effective cooperation with the rest of the world, and new incentives for its own development.\textsuperscript{340} The concept of a Russian World was used for the first time officially in 2001 by Vladimir Putin in his speech to the first World Congress of Compatriots Living Abroad. He declared, “The notion of the Russian World extends far from Russia’s geographical borders and even far from the borders of the Russian ethnicity.”\textsuperscript{41} However, it took several years for actualization of the idea. In an April 2007 address to the Russian Federal Assembly, President Putin proposed the establishment of a “bureau for regional contact and cultural links on foreign affairs” to build the foundations for a “world of Russian language”.

\textsuperscript{35} Lev Gumilev (October 1, 1912-June 15, 1992) argued that it was the military prowess of the Mongols that had saved the Eastern Slavs from conquest by the West—a theory in contrast to the predominant Soviet position that Russia had saved Europe and Christianity from the Mongol hordes, \url{http://russiapedia.rt.com/prominent-russians/science-and-technology/lev-gumilev/}. He is one of the representatives of the civilizational approach to geopolitical processes. See Alexey Kharin, “The Civilizational and Ethnological Paradigm in Geopolitics,” *Katehon* (2017), \url{http://katehon.com/1277-the-civilizational-and-ethnological-paradigm-in-geopolitics.html}.


\textsuperscript{40} Viacheslav Nikonov, the head of the Politika Foundation, quoted in Laruelle, *ibid.*, 13.

\textsuperscript{41} Vladimir Putin in his speech before the first World Congress of Compatriots Living Abroad, quoted in Laruelle, *ibid.*, 6.
A few months later, the Russian World Foundation was established as a Russian government-sponsored organization under the joint umbrella of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and of Education and Science. Its vision of “promoting the Russian language, as Russia's national heritage and a significant aspect of Russian and world culture, and supporting Russian language teaching programs abroad.” is a global project with two branches in St. Petersburg and Vladivostok. Although its mandate is broader than just Central Eurasia, because its task is to popularize Russian language and culture overseas, there is a strong focus on reinstating Russian cultural influences in this core region. Nine Russian Centers have been opened in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, six in China, two in South Korea, and one each in Azerbaijan, Turkey, North Korea, and Mongolia.

Eurasian Economic Union
The Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) is one of the Russian-dominated vehicles that was developed in the post-Cold War period to maintain Russian relevance in Eurasia. Putin’s 2012 EEU initiative, based on a suggestion by Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev in March 1994, seeks to advance economic integration between Europe and Asia into a single comprehensive national alliance in the political, economic, cultural, and security spheres. It has evoked strong reactions: “Those who supported him called it “rain falling in a time of drought” as it would substantially boost Russia’s self-confidence and rebuild its image on the world stage as a superpower. Those who opposed it described it as representing the colonial ambitions of Russia and a plan to restore the Soviet Union.” Russia also utilized the EEU to begin cooperating more with countries in Europe and Asia in science and technology, education, and sports with the aim of raising the international image and status of Russia.

The EEU Single Economic Space established a single market across the territory of Belarus, Russia, and Kazakhstan, and in 2015 Armenia and Kyrgyzstan joined. These countries represent a market of 183 million people and a combined GDP of around $4 trillion. Although nowadays its emphasis is on economic development integration, it is important to recognize that the EEU has cultural as well as economic aspects.

44 Wang, ibid., 1.
45 The first integration stage primarily focused on increasing inter-member states trade and created a legal and institutional foundation. The second stage includes the free movements of goods, people, services, and capital.
46 The Treaty on Increased Integration in the Economic and Humanitarian Fields signed in 1996 laid down the first foundation for economic convergence. The treaty was the blueprint for the future common market for goods, services, capital, and labor.
In theory, the Russian Eurasian Union project can be considered a part of the Russian World concept — the part devoted to the neighborhood and centered on shared economic strategies. If Russkiy Mir represents Russian culture for those in the ‘Greater Russian World’ who already identify themselves with Russia linguistically and culturally, then it also could be the cultural aspect of the broader Eurasian Union project. But these complementarities actually do not exist in practice. Therefore these Russian Eurasian projects are more institutional, economic, and strategic realities that affect the development patterns of the member states. The Eurasian Economic Union is designed to leverage Russia’s geographically-based economic market as a bridge between the European Union and China’s BRI.

**Turkey**

The emergence of Turkic states in Central Eurasia represented a critical juncture or turning point in defining the presence of Turkey in a region where in recent years it had only marginal influence. As a result, the issue of Turkish identity, which was never resolved since the founding of the modern republic and its integration with the West since World War II, has returned to be a factor on the continent. Turkey now regards itself as a bridge or passage point between many of the Eurasian sub-regions. In the post-Cold War period there have been strains in Turkey’s European relations and the rise of Islamic activism which have drawn the nation back into Middle Eastern politics. The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the reemergence of Turkic republics in Central Asia and Azerbaijan have stimulated closer social and cultural ties with Central Eurasia and propelled Turkish interests even further to the East to the original homeland on the Mongolian plateau.

Turkey today emphasizes that Mongolians and Turks have the same ancestors and that the first Turkic State was founded on the territory of Mongolia. In the 1990s, the willingness of Turkey to reengage with Central Asia was encouraged by the West and welcomed by the leaders of the new Turkic states as a secular leadership model for nation building and economic development in predominantly Muslim societies. However, with the rise of terrorism, militant Islamic movements, and authoritarian governance in many of the republics, the Turkic development model has been questioned in favor of others, such as the Chinese model.

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47 Laruelle, *ibid.*, 18.
Turkey in recent years has pursued a policy of cultural pan-Turkism aimed at promoting Turkish culture and language in Central Asia through the Eurasia satellite television network, advocacy for the creation of a Turkish script in the Latin alphabet for Central Asian nations, and development of common educational programs throughout the region. Specialists in the field see this interest in Central Eurasia as reflective of growing Turkish nationalist sentiments which have “made ethnicity a key factor in shaping the foreign policy of Turkey.”

In the 21st century the Turkish Ministry of Culture has been involved in programs to promote Turkey throughout the Asian continent as well as around the world. Ankara pursues an activist soft power strategy in Eurasia aimed at increasing social, political, and economic interdependence because it believes it uniquely can connect Central Eurasian states to the Western European democracies and their integrated market.

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One aspect of cultural policy that Turkey particularly pursues is overseas archaeological and historical preservation. Since the 1990s, there has been a great increase in archaeological departments within Turkish universities, and with the renewed focus of the Turkish population on the past of the Turkic peoples, these institutions have become important agents for promoting cultural studies and carrying out foreign excavations across the continent.\textsuperscript{50}

A leading example is the Eurasia Institute of Istanbul University\textsuperscript{51} which has a goal of preparing a cultural inventory of Turkish heritage to spread Turkish culture in Eurasia. The Turkish government plays a dominant role in cultural preservation and archaeology. It is claimed that the way Turkey manipulates the scientific findings involves national identity, tourist promotion, and economic development issues that may not be clearly understood by the other nations involved.

\textit{Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA)}

When the Soviet Union fell and Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Kyrgyzstan became independent, Turkey saw an opportunity as well as an obligation to promote its common language and shared cultural memory and culture with these new countries. In 1992, the Turkish government established TIKA out of the belief that “Turkey and the countries in Central Asia consider themselves as one nation containing different countries, and our foreign politics displayed a multilateral and proactive understanding in the region. Our relations with the Turkish speaking countries has become a permanent focus for Turkey, and this focus gained in importance in the most recent 20 years of global politics.”\textsuperscript{52} It established offices in six Central Eurasian countries including Mongolia to execute a number of educational and cultural projects including the construction of schools, libraries, and laboratories.

During the 21\textsuperscript{st} century, TIKA began to expand its activities and offices into a worldwide program as the country’s leadership promoted the efforts of Turkey to become an important player in its region as well as globally. The increasingly civilizational nature of Turkey’s aims for its TIKA program was evident in the comment of Deputy Prime Minister Veysi Kaynak: “Our country, taking strength and inspiration from its civilizational values, has been advocating a stance that demands global justice for the problems of the contemporary world. In this respect, Turkey’s projects are meant to address real and immediate problems of people around the world….”\textsuperscript{53}


\textsuperscript{51} Founded in 1983 as the Eurasian Archaeology Institute, it has undergone several changes of name. In 2005 it received this name. http://avrasya.istanbul.edu.tr/en/?page_id=6334

\textsuperscript{52} http://www.tika.gov.tr/en/page/about_us-14650.

TIKA Programme Coordination Offices increased from twelve in 2002 (with a budget of $85 million) to sixty-one (with a budget of $3.9 billion) in 2015 across five continents with various development projects in 170 countries. According to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, in 2018, 80% of its projects target social infrastructure including education in Muslim and non-Muslim countries: “We placed humane diplomacy at the center of our foreign policy.” He stressed the soft power, selfless quality of Turkish aid by asserting, “Let others plot and scheme for their interests, for oil, for mines, for gold, for land, for cheap workforce.”

*Turkish Cultural Days*

Turkey’s cultural and tourism policies were reframed by the government in 2014 to make use of fashion festivals, social media, and TV programs to promote the country. Turkish diplomatic missions are in the forefront of such soft power activities in order to contribute to the overseas promotion of the rich historical and cultural heritage of the country. Every year a wide range of cultural activities is organized by Turkish missions under the labels of “Turkish Culture Days/Weeks,” “Turkish Movie Days,” “Turkish Festivals,” “Turkish Food Week,” along with exhibitions, dance performances, concerts, conferences, and seminars on culture and art, poetry festivals, and literature days. For example, Kadir Topbas, Mayor of Istanbul, attended the 2016 Turkish Cultural Days in Mongolia. In his remarks in a meeting with Ulaanbaatar Mayor E. Bat-Uul, Mayor Topbas emphasized: “We have to support each other in these times when our fate and future depends only upon ourselves. We have to share our achievements and accomplishments,” and noted the importance of sharing the culture inherited from our ancestors.

These international festivals and cultural events/functions that are usually coordinated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are not always simply bilateral in scope. The Culture and Tourism Ministry also organizes competitions about Turkey through social networks. They promote Turkish cinema at the Eurasia Film Festival, the biggest in Central Asia.

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These cultural promotions also occur in other areas of the world, particularly in Germany and the United States.58

Mongolia

In this same complex Central Eurasian cultural environment, Mongolia, as one of the older nations on the continent, whose influence penetrated not only throughout Inner Asia but also to Europe and Southeast Asia in the pre-modern period, is once again determined to play a significant role in shaping the geo-political order. Although it was a pawn in the Sino-Russian and Japanese “Great Game” in the 20th century, the end of the Cold War fundamentally altered its position from a buffer zone in Asian continental politics to one that could promote its own civilizational experience through soft power initiatives.

The Mongols, as former conquerors of the Turkic world, are reviving their sense of geopolitical responsibilities in the greater Asian region. This phenomenon had its origins under Mongolian President Tsakhia Elbegdorj (2009-2017), who led the nation during a time of meteoric development of its energy resources and its mineral sector. Elbegdorj recognized that the geographical position of Mongolia at the cross junction of Central Asia, Northeast Asia, the Far East, China, and Russia made it strategically the most significant country in Asia. He promoted the historical role of Mongolia as a transit nation on the “steppe road” under the term zam sudlal or “roadology”

Indian researcher Phunchok Stobdan has noted that Mongol diaspora communities across Inner Asia enable it to be a cultural stabilizer in Asia, and the Buddhist religious/cultural background of the Mongols has a neutralizing effect on the complex cultural and political contradictions across Asia, including assisting in stopping the spread of Islamic fundamentalism. He also maintains that Mongolia can continue to have a moderating political influence on Sino-Russian relations and bridge conflicts between China and the United States. Stobdan views the geographical position of Mongolia on the continent as crucial to its balancing role in South Asia and of strategic importance for industrialized countries of the region to gain access to resource-rich Siberian Russia.59

58 The Turkish Cultural Foundation (TCF) is a charitable foundation with offices located in Washington DC., Boston, Sonoma, and Istanbul; see http://www.turkishculturalfoundation.org. It promotes and preserves Turkish culture and heritage worldwide by coordinating a series of people-to-people cultural exchanges, educational programs, and websites promoting Turkish music, art, and cuisine. The Turkish Cultural Foundation contributes to the worldwide promotion of Turkish culture via its three main educational websites. The TCF portals received over 1.7 million visitors from 204 countries and territories in 2010. The Foundation’s Turkish Music Portal is the first public educational website dedicated to Turkish music and explores the history, reviews the instruments of Turkish classical folk music, and introduces the composers and performers of all types of Turkish music.

International Cooperation Fund

The promotion of the recent civilizational experience of Mongolia in adapting its communist economy and society to the free market and democracy is the basis of its new activism throughout Central Eurasia. Mongolian President Elbegdorj has explained that, “Mongolia does not have an intention to teach others about democracy or path to development. Yet we have lessons to share with others.” He has proclaimed that the desire of Mongolia is to be a responsible member of the international community and to “become more active in tackling broader Asian issues which have impacted Mongolia’s regional transportation and communication options.” That is why it is sharing its experiences in democracy building, human rights, and a market economy via its International Cooperation Fund (ICF).

This Fund is a key element of Mongolia’s on-going process of the ‘third neighbor’ redefinition. According to the Mongolian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the ICF is an important tool for advancing and implementing the foreign policy objectives of Mongolia to strengthen its role through the sharing of its experiences of transition to democracy and democratic processes, expanding bilateral cooperation with countries in the Central Eurasian continental region, and providing development and technical support for emerging democracies. Through this soft power mechanism, Mongolia explains its democratic transitional experiences and provides development and technical support for emerging ex-socialist/communist and authoritarian Asian nations such as Burma, Kyrgyzstan, Afghanistan, Nepal, Cambodia, and even North Korea.

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62 The statute of the ICF was adopted under a Government Resolution No. 115 passed on 30 March 2013. According to the Statute the operation of the fund shall be administered by a Council consisting of seven members.

63 The Third Neighbor Policy is a Mongolian foreign relations strategy developed in the early 1990s referring to the efforts of Mongolia to build relationships with countries other than its only border neighbors, Russia and China. This term was first used by U.S. Secretary of State James Baker on an August 1990 trip to the nation. There is much literature on this concept. For a Mongolian view see Munkh-Ochir Dorjjugder, “Mongolia’s “Third Neighbor” Doctrine and North Korea,” Brookings (January 28, 2011), https://www.brookings.edu/research/mongolias-third-neighbor-doctrine-and-north-korea/.
The activities of the Fund include organization of international conferences in Mongolia to promote democracy, human rights, and good governance; sharing experiences and lessons learnt with new and emerging democracies; organization of seminars and trainings for diplomats and public officers from developing countries, in cooperation with other international and regional organizations; and sending national experts in democracy, human rights, and good governance to relevant international events. According to Foreign Minister Pujee Purevsuren in 2015, the purpose of the Fund is aimed at sharing the country’s experience in democratic transition, such as cooperation with Burma on training public officers in the field of constitutional and election laws.

The Mongols have also shared lessons learned in building effective parliamentary democracy and in undertaking legal reforms with Kyrgyzstan. In Afghanistan, they are conducting training for diplomats and public servants; with Burma, the Mongolian government hosts media workers, journalists, and members of civil society; and with North Korea, they are engaging in economic and security dialogues. The new administration under President Khaltmaa Battulga has continued the ICF program but with less publicity.

Mongolian Cultural Centers and Genghis Khan Schools
Another more traditional approach to raising the profile of Mongolian civilization and traditional heritage throughout the world originated as an initiative of the Office of the President. The Mongolian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) has established a new Public Diplomacy and Communications Department with responsibility for the promotion of cultural heritage, modern art forms, and people-to-people exchanges. The establishment of the department was authorized under the Action Program of the Government of Mongolia for 2016-2020 and was charged with:

intensify[ing] the work on projecting Mongolia abroad by publicizing its history, cultural heritage, achievements and progress in economic and social development, its foreign policy, external relations and cooperation; [by] organizing exhibitions abroad, film shows, cultural and art events, Mongolia days, as well as meetings and discussions on Mongolia; [and] lay[ing] down the basis for expanding Mongolian studies and ensuring [their] sustainable development.

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In the framework of the MFA’s Overseas Promotion Program, there was a discussion with the theme "Mongolian Foreign Promotion-National Culture and Arts" on September 22, 2017 organized jointly by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Education, Culture, Science and Sports, and other cultural and art organizations. Well-known art and cultural figures and artists participated in the discussion to exchange ideas on how the government could take a unified approach to promoting Mongolia abroad through national culture and arts.57

Since 2014, the Ministry has worked together with the Ministry of Education, Culture, and Science to establish Mongolian Cultural Centers throughout the world.68 These were not initially set up on the Asian continent, but rather in Europe. It is likely that the centers will grow in number. Japanese professor Norihiko Ikeda proposed in April 2016 in Ulaanbaatar that the Mongols create Genghis Khan Schools throughout the continent of Eurasia. He suggested that Mongolia might follow the example of the Chinese Confucius Institutes and use government funds to set up NPO-type language schools under the name: “Genghis Khan Schools” in Eurasian capital cities. Such a civilizational promotion of a borderless, multicultural Mongolian identity would enhance the image of Mongolia globally and be useful in helping to establish an international base of support for Mongolia. Ikeda believes that this would be another dimension of the ‘third neighbor’ policy of Mongolia whereby shared memories will open the way to a new consciousness and new relationships. The emergence of such “borderless connections” will help create a new mindset and lead to the development of a new sense of community. He maintains that Mongolia could play a unique role on the world stage in the 21st century because as a country with “empirical” knowledge from its historical experience as a world empire it would benefit others in the world community to learn how Mongolia converted its many “hard” or environmental disadvantages to its advantage:

Looked at from this perspective, if the wisdom buried in Mongolia’s historical experience could be brought back into the light and converted to spiritual and intellectual resources, that could lead to the creation and dissemination of content capable of serving the needs of the world community. In other words it would feed the development of ‘soft power.’…

68 Such centers were initially organized in Europe beginning in 2014-2015 in Hungary at the Elte University of Budapest, in France with INALCO at the University of Paris, in the Czech Republic at Prague University, in Germany at Bonn University and at Berlin’s Humbolt University, and in Russia. In the U.S. Mongolian Studies have been given funds for new cultural programs at the University of California Berkeley and at Indiana University; however, actual Mongolian Centers have not been organized.
Because this will be a cultural rather than a political process, it will not become a cause of friction among currently existing states.\footnote{Norihiko Ikeda, in “Mongolians: New identity? Or revival? Expanding Mongolia’s options for the 21st century,” \textit{The Mongol Messenger}, April 22, 2016, 7.}

To date, the Mongolian government has not proceeded with this concept.

**Iran**

Since the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union, Iran has aspired to developing closer relations with the Eurasian Central region based upon its significant historical and cultural ties. Governments before and after the 1979 Islamic Revolution have had the common aim of spreading the culture, religion, and imperial legacy of Iran. It may not be seeking to reconstruct past Persian Empires, but “Many Iranians consider their former imperial boundaries to be a natural sphere of influence.”\footnote{Michael Rubin, “Strategies Underlying Iranian Soft Power,” \textit{AEI} (March 7, 2017), \url{http://www.aei.org/publication/strategies-underlying-iranian-soft-power/}.} The Islamic Republic’s perception of itself is more than that of a “revolutionary Islamic state,” but rather of a nation with a unique culture with long historical ties with Central Eurasia. Analysts maintain that the core element of the Iranian regime's ‘manifest destiny’ identity and governing frame of reference is Iranian civilizational nationalism:

> The Islamic regime does not differ from any of its predecessors in its cultivation of a nationalist pride of belonging to an ancient noble and imperial nation which controlled most of the Middle East, experienced civilization centuries before Islam, and (unlike most of the nations conquered by Islam [which] adopted Arabic) maintained its national language and culture even after the Islamic conquest.\footnote{Shmuel Bar, “Iranian Terrorist Policy and “Export of Revolution,” Herzliya Conference on the Balance of Israel’s National Security and Resilience (February 2-4, 2009), 14, \url{http://www.herzliyaconference.org/_Uploads/2903Iranian.pdf}}

Modern Iran draws upon its Shi’ite form of Islam, its historical Zoroastrianism for its religious identity, and its Persian language (in use from Kurdistan in Iraq to India) to unite diverse peoples under a common ethnicity. It exploits the fact that Persian remains the language of culture and poetry throughout much of West, South, and Central Asia.

The two abiding priorities informing Iranian foreign policy, as expressed in the Iranian constitution in the post-revolutionary era since 1979, have been the export of the Islamic revolution and pan-Islamism to its neighbors, the Muslim World, and developing nations. In the aftermath of the revolution, the Islamic Republic has been eager to expand its trade and political ties with Eurasia, especially its six majority-Muslim states of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.
The Islamic Revolution sought to export its brand of religion to other regional states and expanded its vision for the country from being a regional power into a model for the world. While certainly its foreign policy considerations have included spreading “Islamic fundamentalism” and replacing secular regimes, the expanding presence of the United States in the region also has influenced Iran’s geopolitical calculations as to how to define its policy towards Eurasia. Turkish-Iranian cooperation and competition and Chinese economic penetration are other factors that mold the Iranian regional political posture. All of these considerations go into Iran’s calculus as to how to use identity politics and shared cultural and religious values, where appropriate, to forge closer relations with Central Eurasian and Asian countries. There are indications that Islamic factors are treated as variables within a broader context of sociocultural conditions, and Iran may be even more interested in expanding continental trade and cultural ties.\textsuperscript{72} Across the continent, Iran has concentrated on its fellow Persian speaking nation of Tajikistan, but it has also sought deeper bilateral cultural links with Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.

\textsuperscript{72} Manochehr Dorraj and Nader Entessar, “Iran’s Northern Exposure: Foreign Policy Challenges in Eurasia,” Center for International and Regional Studies Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar (2013), 20.
Michael Rubin, resident scholar on Iran and the Middle East at the American Enterprise Institute who teaches on terrorism for the FBI, has analyzed the phenomenon of Iranian soft power. Noting that “Tehran holds soft power as an arrow in its quiver,” Rubin points out that, “Iranian soft power seeks both to exploit the commonalities Iran shares with the target[s] it seeks to influence and to use a variety of tools to achieve that influence.”

It supports Hezbollah and “resistance” groups that function like political parties by means of an active social service network of charities, media outlets, and schools that create a state within a state so as to delegitimize the official state structure until this can be co-opted or overthrown. Iran also manipulates mass media and the press as a form of strategic diplomacy to further the Iranian message and “fill its power deficit, increase its influence, and defend its interests.”

Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, and ECO

The government office most closely aligned with promoting Iranian culture in Central Eurasia is the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance. This Ministry, which has many responsibilities, has a mandate to expand cultural ties with various nations and Muslims and to prepare the ground for the spread of the culture of the Islamic Revolution and the Persian language in other countries. It sponsors Koranic competitions and supports the Islamic Propagation Organization which publishes political and religious tracts and prints posters and religious art. The Ministry of Culture together with the Ministry of Education operates Iranian “Cultural Centers” within Iranian embassies especially in the periphery of the Muslim world—South East Asia, the CIS countries, and Africa.

The leader of Iran’s Islamic revolution, the Ayatollah Khomeini, prioritized the transformation of schools and universities so as to move society away from Western philosophy through education policy under the guidance of a Cultural Revolution Committee. In recent years, the Iranian government has sought to reinvigorate its cultural revolution and export it abroad through the mechanism of expanding its network of Islam Azad Universities internationally.

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73 Rubin, *ibid*.
75 The Ministry of Culture and Islamic Propagation is responsible for domestic censorship, promotion of “ethical virtues based on belief and piety”; “informing the world community about the basis and aspirations of the Islamic Revolution”; and running the affairs of the Hajj including operation of facilities for domestic and international tourism. It controls the Culture and Islamic Communication Organization, the Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA), the Printing and Publication Organization, and the Pilgrimage Organization.
This network of several hundred community colleges has promoted regime ideology. Branches of the Islamic Azad operate in Afghanistan, Armenia, Dubai, and Lebanon.\textsuperscript{77}

Iran anticipates huge opportunities in the Central Asia region not only because of its natural resources, but also owing to its common cultural and security interests. Some observers believe that the desire of Iran to act as a bridge or gateway to Central Asia is also key to Iranian geopolitical thinking regarding competition with China and Russia:

When coupled with an increasingly assertive Russian policy towards states in its so-called ‘near abroad’, this means that Iran, as ever, remains mindful of Russia’s position in Central Asia. Furthermore, the re-emergence of the Silk Road as a viable trading route, led by a key Iranian ally in China, will be aided by Iran’s gradual reintegration into the global economy following the nuclear deal. This is a key feature of … Iranian strategic thinking, with Central Asia, and Iran’s position vis-à-vis these states forming a key part of its wider geopolitical imagination.\textsuperscript{78}

To counter its competitors, Iran has advocated drawing on the cultural and historical links it shares with its greater region through the Economic Cooperation Organization or ECO, a Eurasian political and economic intergovernmental organization which was founded in 1985 in Tehran by Iran, Pakistan and Turkey. It consists of predominantly Muslim-majority states and has the goal of forming a trade bloc for the Central Asian states intended to connect them to the Mediterranean through Turkey to the Persian Gulf via Iran and to the Arabian Sea via Pakistan. Although the ECO to date exists mainly at the bilateral economic level, Iran particularly stresses the cultural links between member states. The ECO’s Cultural Institute gives Iran further opportunities to promote its cultural diplomacy within the organization by focusing on shared literary figures and cultural traditions such as the celebration of the Persian New Year, Nowruz. However, it is competing against the financial and religious influences of Saudi Arabia and Wahhabism.

\textbf{India}

Central Asia historically was a zone of Indian civilizational influence. Prior to the Arab conquest of Central Asia in the seventh century, Buddhism had flourished across the vast Central Eurasian steppe, and monasteries along the Silk Route served as both cultural and commercial outposts. Perhaps the first modern promoter of Indian cultural soft power who endeavored to spread its global influence was Jawaharlal Nehru (Prime Minister from 1947 to 1964), who raised the image of his country as the co-founder of the Non-Aligned Movement during the Cold War era.

\textsuperscript{77} \textit{Rubin, ibid.}

In the 1990s, recognizing the historical affinity of India with the Central Eurasian continent, India developed a re-engaging strategy towards the Central Asian Republics which was known as the “Extended Neighborhood Policy.” It involved cooperation agreements and providing substantive development aid and technical support. This policy was formulated not only to reconnect with the region itself but also to respond to great power diplomacy in Central Asia. Beyond military training and transport connectivity initiatives, New Delhi developed programs to support capacity building and human resource development. However, results for India have been spotty, a situation which researchers have explained by the relative failure of India to compete in the energy game. In more recent times, expressions of Indian soft power — spiritualism, cinema, literature, cricket, Ayurveda, handicrafts, and tourism — have spread worldwide, but perhaps not in a coherent, coordinated manner. Since the rise to power of Prime Minister Narendra Modi in 2014, the government has spoken openly about exerting soft power, but it has been pointed out that in the 2017 Soft Power 30 Index, India does not make the top 30.

A well known Indian defense strategist, Professor Phunchok Stobdan, has written about the Indian soft power strategic framework within the context of India entering the Eurasian integration path. In 2010 he recommended that India redesign its Central Asian soft power outreach into a strategic framework and make it the linchpin of Indian policy goals because Central Asia was always a fertile ground in which Indian thought and culture might grow. He suggested the establishment of a university in Central Asia to re-harness and promote the traditional interests of India in the Central Eurasian continent: “The objective should be to facilitate the revival of civilizational and cultural linkages between India and Central Asia through intellectual and institutional resources available in both regions.” Such a university “should be oriented towards evolving India’s own understanding of Central Asia, … strengthening the Indian strategic position and robust presence in Central Asia, and eventually to make it a catalyst for peace and stability in the entire region.” The university would assist local governmental institutions and NGOs engaged in scientific and archaeological research such as programs established by UNESCO and the European Union.

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82 Central universities or union universities in India are established by an Act of Parliament and are under the purview of the Department of Higher Education in the Union Human Resource Development Ministry.
83 http://www.idsa.in/event/IndiasEngagementwithCentralAsia100712.
Connect Central Asia

In June 2012 the Minister of State for External Affairs of India, Shri E. Ahamed, gave a Keynote Address at the First India-Central Asia Dialogue, a Track-II initiative, at which he announced a new ‘Connect Central Asia’ governmental policy: i) India will build strong political relations through the exchange of high level visits; ii) India will cooperate particularly in the medical field by setting up Central Asian civil hospitals/clinics; iii) India will assist in establishing a Central Asian University in Bishkek specializing in Information Technology, management, philosophy, and languages; iv) India will work to improve air connectivity among Central Asian countries to facilitate Indian tourism; and v) India will increase its exchanges of scholars, academics, civil society and youth delegations to gain deeper insights into each other’s cultures.  

A month later at a New Delhi roundtable on “India's Engagement with Central Asia: Exploring Future Directions,” India called for greater engagement at the multilateral level, a high level dialogue for regional stability and peace, and more emphasis on Track 1.5 and Track 2 levels of engagement. The Indian Government chose “the word ‘connect’ because it refers to the core policy of establishing an e-network to provide [medical] and education[al] expertise to Central Asia with India as the hub, thereby increasing Indian engagement with its extended neighborhood and giving substance to the existing political relationship.” It was also recommended that India translate historical texts especially in the Persian language and send Indian archaeologists for joint expeditions and explorations in Central Asia.

Reaction to Indian new soft power activism from the Central Asians was very positive. Kyrgyzstan applauded New Delhi’s building of long-term partnerships within the Eurasian region, particularly with Kyrgyzstan, based upon the close historical and cultural links between the two countries. It urged India to play a bigger role in developing the mining, agricultural, hydro power, IT, and educational sectors of Kyrgyzstan, to set up an Indian Cultural Center in Bishkek, and to revive youth cultural and educational exchanges. Kazakhstan also welcomed the new soft power initiative of India and supported its greater economic role in the region.

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84 “Keynote address by MOS Shri E. Ahamed at First India-Central Asia Dialogue,” Government of India Media Center (June 12, 2012), http://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/19791/Keynote+address+by+MOS+Shri+E+Ahamed+at+First+IndiaCentral+Asia+Dialogue#.


86 Kyrgyz Ambassador Mrs. Irina A. Orolbaeva quoted in “India Reworking,” ibid.

87 Kazakh Ambassador Mr. Doulat Kuanyshiev quoted in “India Reworking,” ibid.
Ministry of Culture Additional Soft Power Activities
Various governmental actors today are working to leverage India’s soft power “by using it to support larger foreign policy initiatives such as the Look East Policy (now Act East), the Connect Central Asia policy, and developing strategic aid and trade partnerships.” This official diplomacy has been supported by cultural exchange efforts to increase public appreciation of India in foreign countries. Besides setting up a public diplomacy division within the Ministry of External Affairs in 2006 and expanding the Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR) worldwide, the Ministry of Tourism, which is behind the “Incredible India” campaign, and the Ministry for Overseas Indians “showcases its social, political, and cultural assets abroad.”

India’s Ministry of Culture has the mandate “to disseminate Indian Culture in its diverse forms and develop cultural relations between India and various countries of the world through Cultural Agreements and Cultural Exchange Programs.” The 2014 report of the Ministry of Culture emphasized that the government must play the role of a catalyst. It has done so through “The Scheme of International Cultural Relations” which assists artists financially for them to participate in international fairs and events through seminars, festivals, and exhibitions on cultural subjects in order to create awareness and encourage learning about Indian culture. Additional activities of the Ministry are promotion of Buddhist and Tibetan studies institutions and organizations and developing cultural agreements with foreign countries. In 2013, it revived Indian Festivals abroad to showcase the diverse cultures of India. Most of the festivals have been in the greater Asian region: Vietnam, Laos, Indonesia, Thailand, and Cambodia in 2014; Japan, Korea, Sri Lanka, Mongolia, Malaysia, and China in 2015; Burma, Hungary, Spain, Morocco, Italy, Australia, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Tanzania, Kyrgyzstan, and Oman in 2016; and Cambodia, Ghana, Netherlands, Senegal, Ukraine, Côte d’Ivoire, Fiji, and Uzbekistan in 2017.

Conclusion
Joseph Nye, the father of “soft power” analysis, noted that the conditions for projecting the soft power of a country rely mainly on three pillars: culture, political values and foreign policy. It is a form of power based on the cultural resources of a country.

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88 Rohan Mukherjee, a research scholar at the Department of Politics in Princeton University, speaking in an interview in Sudha Ramachandran, “India’s Soft Power Potential,” The Diplomat (May 29, 2015), https://thediplomat.com/2015/05/indias-soft-power-potential/.
It utilizes a different type of currency to engender cooperation — an attraction to shared values. Nye recognized that, “Soft power rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others. Simply put, in behavioral terms, soft power is attractive power. Soft power resources are the assets that produce such attraction.”\(^9\) Central Eurasia past and present has been identified with the idea of a geopolitical balance or alternative against the West. Turkey is one of the countries that is affected the most by this new geopolitical reality not only because it is geographically located at the center of the Eurasian supercontinent, but also owing to its decision, particularly in the last decade, to develop its strategic relations with the rising Central Eurasian powers.

Central Eurasia from the Mediterranean to the Pacific is a vast continental space that has been home to many great multicultural civilizations. India and Persia, through the introduction of Buddhism along the Central Asian steppe oases in the 7\(^{th}\) century, were the first to have extensive interactions with the Turkic nomadic peoples that had their own large empires in the Central Eurasian deserts and grasslands. In the Middle Ages, the great Mongolian empire of the 13-14\(^{th}\) centuries united all the many peoples of Eurasia from China and Korea to Egypt and Russia and expanded the Silk Road connecting Asia and Europe at its height. After the dissolution of the empire, Iran, Ottoman Turkey, Manchu China, Britain, and Czarist Russia competed for influence in Central Eurasia in a carefully choreographed manner, while in the 20\(^{th}\) century Soviet Russia and the People’s Republic of China were the major influential continental powers.

In the post-Cold War globalized world, China has assumed an even larger economic and political presence, while Russia has retreated to some extent. The United States is a new player that has entered this geopolitical space and has become increasingly significant via its programs to promote “liberal democracy” and free market economics in the Central Asian republics and Mongolia. Under these circumstances, U.S.-China-Russia strategic interaction in the region in the early 21\(^{st}\) century has become more complicated and multifaceted.

Specialists in international relations and politics have claimed that geopolitics, sometimes called the “New Great Game,” have returned to this Asian continental space as major external powers jockey to maximize their energy security and supply routes. Economists and financial specialists have focused on the connectivity among the Central Eurasian nations as they pursue economic integration and development.

Another integrative process that has emerged is that nations are developing cultural and educational policies to promote their civilizational experiences through multi-vector ‘soft power’ and global image making. China, Russia, Turkey, Mongolia, Iran, and India are now implementing various well-designed soft power initiatives to reassert their ideologies and civilizational ideals. Such policies, which represent civilizational geopolitical thinking, can either co-mingle cooperatively to dramatically increase continental integration in the short and medium term or eventually become sources of confrontation and dispute.
The Russian Euro-Asian Movement and Its Geopolitical Consequences

Piotr Eberhardt

Abstract

This article presents the history of the Euro-Asian movement. An original ideological stream of Russian political thought, it appeared at the beginning of the 1920s. Its founders expressed the necessity of establishing a great empire encompassing the major part of the Eurasian continent. Such proposals have been brought back and re-created in contemporary Russia. The leading representative of this ideological movement is Alexander Dugin whose views are discussed. The final section of the paper is devoted to the possible geopolitical consequences of such thinking.

Keywords:
Russia, Euro-Asian movement, geopolitics

Introduction

The central part of the Eurasian continent and its influence on the development of the civilizations and politics of the world have been the subject of studies by numerous geographers, ethnographers, and historians. These studies have been primarily undertaken by Russian scholars, but western scholars have also devoted attention to the particular significance of this school of thought in the history of humanity. Among them were the founders of geopolitics, a new, dynamic discipline, which took shape at the beginning of the 20th century. Its theoretical bases were laid down in the work of H. J. Mackinder on the geopolitical model of the world, the decisive role in which is played by the so-called “heartland”. According to Mackinder (1904) the country which dominates the “heartland” of the Eurasian continent also influences in a dominating manner the political fate of the world. The classical works of the leading specialists in geopolitics, such as F. Ratzel, R. Kjellén, and K. Haushofer, strongly emphasize the role of Russia as a powerful continental empire ruling over a principal part of Eurasia. The sole continental power which seized and held this strategic part of the world for a relatively long period was the Russian Empire followed by the Soviet Union.

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1 The notion of Eurasia was introduced by the Austrian geologist Edward Suess who demonstrated that there is no distinct geographical boundary between Europe and Asia. In the text, we shall evoke the notion of Eurasia for primarily geographical issues and that of Euro-Asia in reference to the ideology under consideration.
The Russian empire, which expanded in all geographical directions starting with Ivan the Terrible and continued through the rule of Joseph Stalin, offered evidence that the vision of J. H. Mackinder was becoming a political reality. It was only the unexpected events at the end of the 20th century and the disintegration of the USSR that brought a new look at this geopolitical concept. Despite the current domination by the maritime powers, with the United States in the lead, the heartland domination idea continues to have fervent supporters in the Russian Federation. Numerous reports devoted to this subject are being published. They are not simply of abstract scientific importance; they are influencing current Russian policies with respect to neighboring countries.

The desire to subordinate the essential part of the Eurasian continent to Russia and to expand towards three oceans was a constant foundation for the strategic objectives of the Russian state. It was also present in the work of Russian historians, philosophers, and geographers. An imperial perspective on the past, present, and future of Russia permanently pervades the texts of Russian thinkers. Such messianic and maximalist ideological and territorial concepts also find their reflection in Russian belles lettres. These concepts were most visible in the ideas promoted by the leading Russian thinkers belonging to the Slavophile stream and their great debate with the so-called “occidentalists” (“oriented-to-the-West”). The latter, critically assessing the Russian tradition, favored the western system of values based on rationality and individualism. They were cognizant of the backwardness of civilization in their country and opposed the cultural isolation of Russia from the West.

The best known representatives of the Slavophile ideology were Ivan Kireyevski, Alexi Khomiakov, Konstanty Axakov, and Yuriy Samarin. The central issue for them was not only a negative evaluation of Western European culture but also a particular attitude towards Russian statehood. According to the Slavophiles, the historical mission of Russia consisted in the creation of a distinct spiritual civilization and the expansion of the range of influence of Russian Orthodox culture. Expansionist tendencies were even stronger in the activities of the so-called Pan-Slavists. They promoted the ideology of imperial power, voicing the need to conquer the Balkans and the Dardanelles and to organize a greater Slavic federation, subordinated to Russia. This direction of thought was particularly represented in the writings of Mikhail Katkov, Mikhail Pogodin, Konstanty Pobedonostsev, and Konstanty Leontyev. For activists representing this orientation, the supreme goal was to build a greater empire uniting all Slavs for whom Eastern Orthodox Russian culture would offer the possibility of civilizational advancement.

2 This view conformed to the prophecy of Philotheus addressed to tsar Vassil III, father of Ivan the Terrible, which went as follows: “dva ubo Rima padosha a tretiy stoit’ a chetvertomu ne byti” (“two Romes [Rome and Byzance] fell, the third one [Moscow] stands, and there will be no fourth”).
3 It is worthwhile quoting a sentence from Fyodor Dostoyevski’s writings: “Our beautiful motherland is pointed at by a mysterious index finger as the country most appropriate for the realization of grand schemes” (The Possessed, Chapter VII).
The attitude of the Pan-Slavists towards Poland was inconsistent. On one hand they viewed Poland as a “traitor to the Slavic community,” subject to “Jesuit-and-Vatican” influences, while, on the other hand, they emphasized the Slavonic origins of the Polish people, which, in an alliance with Russia, could rid themselves of the fatal influence of Roman Catholicism. Pan-Slavic ideas were associated with the designs of a geopolitical character. The ultimate goal was to establish a greater empire stretching from the Mediterranean Sea to the Pacific Ocean.

The theoretical foundations of the Euro-Asian ideology took shape relatively late. They appeared among Russian emigrants following the October Revolution. Their founders were young refugees from Bolshevik Russia who found themselves in Sofia, Prague, Berlin, and Paris in the 1920s. They created an original school of thought which played a major role in the development of Russian geopolitical science.

The prerequisites for the emergence of the Euro-Asian movement were quite complex. They had their roots beyond doubt in the imperial past of the Russian state and in its geographical location on two continents. Russia was at the same time “Europe in Asia” and “Asia in Europe”. This conception engendered a definite psychological ambiguity for many Russians, for they were frequently viewed as “Asians” by many western Europeans, while they were perceived in Asia as one hundred percent “Europeans”. After the victory of the Bolsheviks, they saw that the empire, citizens of which they had been, and the power of which they were proud, had disintegrated. The reconstruction and re-integration of this country and the establishment of a new empire on new principles became a historical necessity for them. The new ideological-political movement was meant to serve as an alternative to the universalist appeal of communist ideology (Kara-Murza, 2002, p. 218).

The birth of the Euro-Asian movement is linked to the publication in Sofia in 1921 of the so-called Almanac, titled, in Russian, Iskhod k Vostoku, which can be freely translated as Drive towards the East, or, alternatively, Issue towards the East. This volume was composed of chapters written by four authors of whom the oldest was thirty-one years old. These young people included the linguist and ethnographer, Mikolay Trubetskoii, the geographer, Pyotr Savitskii, the philosopher, Georgiy Florovskii, and the art historian, Pyotr Suvchyn’skii. Later they were joined by the lawyer, Mikolay Alexeev, the historian, Georgiy Vernadskii, and the philosopher, Lev Karsavin.

The forerunners of the Euro-Asian concept were two Russian thinkers. The first of them was Mikolay Danilevski, who in 1870 published an ample treatise on the philosophy of history titled Russia and Europe. In this work he portrayed Russia as dominating Europe in a future in which Germanic-Roman Europe had gradually faded away. This idea was further developed by another visionary, Vladimir Laman’ski. His book, Three Worlds of the Asian-European Continent (1892), offered a concept of tripartite Euro-Asia. In this perspective, the small peninsula of Europe was to be subordinated to the Russian empire, which, in the West encompasses the major part of the Hapsburg monarchy, the Balkans with the Dardanelles, Silesia, East Prussia, and a part of Pomerania. At the same time, two-thirds of Asia would be subordinated to the influence of Eastern Orthodox Russia.
The scientific foundations for the new idea therefore had their sources in the disciplines of geography, philosophy, theology, history, and ethnography and were expected to contribute to a concrete political activity.

**Characterization of the Euro-Asian movement**

The above-presented introduction constitutes the starting point for an examination of Euro-Asian views, particularly those of one of the founders of the Euro-Asian movement, Pyotr Savitskii. As already mentioned, he was a geographer whose understanding of the concept of the movement stressed its territorial aspects. At the same time he was one of the most representative of the proponents of the concept.

It is possible to argue that “Euro-Asianism” was a distinct reaction to the pessimistic attitude which prevailed among white Russian émigrés after the victory of the Bolsheviks. According to the followers of the new movement, the revolution in Russia and the dethroning of the tsars was simply an episode on the way to the establishment of a greater continental empire.

The starting point for the theoretical considerations of P. Savitskii and other activists of this ideological orientation was to precisely define its three main concepts: Europe, Asia, and Euro-Asia. This key task had geographical and philosophical dimensions that determined their ideological attitude and the perceived relation to the political as well as topographic distinctions characterizing the Eurasian continent. The leading supporters of the Euro-Asian movement, including P. Savitskii, considered it nonsensical to use the term “Europe” to denote the territory stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to the Urals. In their opinion, the boundary set at the summit of the Urals had no historical, physiographic, ethnic, or political justification. Likewise, it was false to divide Russia into European and Asian sections. The basic prerequisite that Russia constitutes an indivisible whole led to serious consequences of both a geographical and a geopolitical nature. For this reason, the proponents of the Euro-Asian ideology were fervently opposed to the division of the Russian empire into national states. We can cite in this context a characteristic fragment from the work of P. Savitskii: “Russia is perceived by them [the ‘Euro-Asians’] as a unity. They will not agree to go along with those, who, for their egoistical purposes, desire to tear this unity to pieces. Moreover, they are fully convinced that such attempts must fail, and even if they succeed, it would only be for a short period and with the greatest harm to those, who might undertake them. Such attempts would be against the nature of things. The times we live in are the epoch of the establishment of giant economic organisms, ‘continent states’, encompassing vast territories and guaranteeing freedom and constancy of economic turnover. This tendency is also visible beyond the boundaries of Russia-Euro-Asia. The latter, in view of its geographic properties and its history, is a classic example of the ‘continent state.’ Geography, history, the needs of the present day – all oppose to an equal degree the fragmentation of this whole” (Savitskii, 1933, p. 109).
According to Savitskii, the great continental mass lying between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans is composed of three parts: the relatively small European peninsula, then Euro-Asia (Russia), composed of three plains: the Eastern-European, the Siberian, and Turkestan, and Asia proper encompassing the southeastern part of the Asian continent where the leading role is played by China. This basic geographical perspective is present in all the works published by the “Euro-Asians”. They particularly underline the separate character of Europe and Russia (Euro-Asia).

From the cognitive point of view, the sole significant task, given the above assumption, is to determine the boundary between Europe and Euro-Asia. Doing so is also important from the point of view of politics since this boundary is closely associated with the western border of Russia.

The issue is to determine which areas ought to be fully subordinated to Moscow. The Euro-Asian activists were not fully unanimous as to how this issue should be resolved. They linked it to the delimitation of the reach of influence of Russian power and culture. Writing in the 1920s, P. Savitskii, placed the eastern boundaries of Europe approximately along the boundaries of what was then Bolshevik Russia. According to this delimitation, the Scandinavian countries (including Finland), the Baltic countries, and Poland, within the boundaries set by the Treaties of Versailles and Riga, would belong to Europe, while the remaining part of the Eastern European Plain would constitute an integral part of Euro-Asia. For other adepts of Euro-Asianism, the eastern boundary of Europe was further to the West. And so, in particular, M. Trubetskoi (1925) maintained that eastern Galicia (‘Halychyna’) is a natural extension of Euro-Asia. The same author also assumed that the Eastern Orthodox Balkan countries would respond positively to Euro-Asian ideas thus offering the possibility of uniting southern Slavs with Greater Russia. Euro-Asians, therefore, were willing to include the Balkan countries in the Euro-Asian community, but they definitely viewed Poles, Czechs, and Slovaks as belonging to (Western) Europe. This distinction was based primarily upon cultural and religious factors, not linguistic kinship. The Euro-Asians understood that these nations have strong ties to the Latin cultural community.

In this case, the geographical-natural prerequisites were treated as secondary. The programming documents produced between 1926 and 1928 argued that the boundary between Europe and Euro-Asia followed the courses of the Niemen, Bug, and San Rivers and then reached the coast of the Black Sea in the vicinity of the mouth of the Danube, leaving Romania (except for Bessarabia) on the western side of this divide. Thus, one can conclude that there was no unanimous agreement in this regard. Yet, according to the founders of the Euro-Asian movement, the boundary between Europe and Euro-Asia ran, more-or-less, from the Baltic Sea to the Black or the Adriatic Seas. The political borders existing at that time were evidently not taken too seriously.

5 The founders of the Euro-Asian movement repeatedly indicated that the common designation, “Middle Country (Kingdom)” ought to be applied to the centrally situated Russia, and not to the peripherally located China.
The representatives of the Euro-Asian movement were proponents of extreme geographical determinism (even going beyond naturalistic factors). This perspective is particularly visible in their worldview and their adopted assumptions for spatial delimitation. The tripartite division of the Eurasian continent was justified for them by the physiographic conditions according to which the ethnographic (mainly denominational) divisions were adjusted. They constituted the objective basis for the development of political patterns. The Roman-and-Germanic countries were situated on the western side of the divide; and on the other side only Orthodox Russia should serve as the political sovereign. In the East all of Siberia including Mongolia, Manchuria, and Central Asia should also be subordinated to Russia. These presumptions justified the expansion of Russia to the West, to the South, and, above all, to the East.

These maximalist territorial postulates were motivated by the unique character of Russian culture. Special emphasis was placed on the difference between the values represented by the Russian Orthodox faith and those formed by the so-called latinstvo (Latinism). The western boundary of Euro-Asia would constitute a barrier to the destructive influence of western culture, especially of Roman Catholicism, on Russia. In the opinion of P. Savitskii, the divide separating Europe from Euro-Asia should even be given formal and symbolic expression. He therefore proposed moving the Greenwich “0” longitude to the East. Instead of the Greenwich Observatory, the new reference point would be the astronomical observatory in Pulkovo, near St. Petersburg. The core of Euro-Asia would thus be appropriately marked with geographical coordinates.

One can assume that such considerations that were permeated with “missionary zeal” were a pretext for the elaboration of imperial visions serving as justifications for the geopolitical programs being developed. The territorial reach of the future empire was, therefore, already distinctly determined. Realization of the goal thus outlined only required possession of appropriate political and military power.

Russians were not the only people living in the delimited geographical area of Euro-Asia. Various peoples of diverse ethnic origins inhabited this territory, not all of them associated with the Eastern Orthodox faith.

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6 When Euro-Asians wrote about Europe, they clearly emphasized its Roman-Germanic roots. They passed over in silence the Slavonic nations (Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Croats, and Slovenians), who, for more than 1000 years, belonged to the circle of Western civilization. This reality has an ideological explanation. According to the Euro-Asians, the Slavonic peoples should belong to the Euro-Asian community, their ties to the West being a kind of historical misunderstanding, resulting from the subordination of these nations to the dominating Roman-Germanic culture.
One of the best known founders of the Euro-Asian movement, N. Trubetskoi (1925)\(^7\), attempted to deal with this issue. He maintained that there is just one Euro-Asian nation but that it is composed of numerous smaller ethnic nationalities.

They are connected through their geographical, historical, and economic communities. The Euro-Asian nation encompasses not only Slavs but also the Karelian, Caucasian, and Mongolian peoples. Faced with the realities of multi-ethnic diversity, the Euro-Asians adopted views that were different from those of the Slavophiles. They abandoned the idea of uniting all Slavs in favor of integrating all the nations, regardless of ethnic origin, inhabiting the vast territories of Euro-Asia. The most important place among these nations was assigned to Russia in view of its significance and the size of its population. Russia indeed was tied with unbreakable bonds to all the nations of Euro-Asia. The binding element was Russian Orthodox culture.

Euro-Asians were very much against the independence movements in Ukraine. They recognized the existence of Ukrainian culture and folklore but within strictly defined limits. Universal Russian culture was viewed as the supreme culture. Russians constituted a decisive majority among the followers of the Euro-Asian ideology, but there were, also representatives of other nations of Euro-Asia. One such representative was J. Bromberg, a well-known writer active in the Euro-Asian movement who was an émigré of Jewish extraction. He lived in New York during the inter-war period (Bromberg, 2002).

A telling feature of Euro-Asian ideas was the specific and extreme anti-western attitudes that they vectored. Western civilization was treated with apprehension, even with enmity, since it propagated values that were alien to the Russian spirit. Elimination of its influence was the necessary condition for the construction of a separate Euro-Asian civilization based on economic idealism and social solidarity and permeated with Eastern Orthodox philosophy.

The founders of the idea of Euro-Asianism who lived as émigrés were painfully aware of their separation from the motherland. They were still strongly tied to the Eastern Orthodox religion and to Russian traditions. This situation is what led to the elaboration of idealistic scenarios that were underpinned by nostalgia for the past and that identified with what had been the powerful Russian Empire. They kept a respectful distance from the streams of Russian émigrés who favored a partial return to the state as it had existed before 1914. Euro-Asianists considered such a position to be unrealistic and even harmful for the future of Russia.

The attitude of Euro-Asians towards the political entity constituted by the Soviet Union was ambiguous. Despite their intense dislike of Bolshevism, they perceived some positive traits in the evolving processes in Russia following the Bolshevik Revolution.

\(^7\) His 1925 publication was included in the collective volume edited by A. Dugin (\textit{Evraziystvo…}, 2001, p. 11-15).
They distinguished the communist ideology put forward by the Bolsheviks from the revolutionary movement through which the aspirations of the masses for the establishment of a more just society were expressed. The views of the leading Russian Euro-Asianists were quite differentiated, especially as regarded an assessment of the Soviet state. They were opposed to communist principles associated with western Marxism but favored the establishment of an effective central authority in the Kremlin that opposed the centrifugal tendencies that were threatening the territorial cohesion of the country. They fully accepted the strong dictatorial power of the state which was imposing order and discipline and assessed positively the policy of isolation from the West. On the other hand, they criticized the attitude of the Soviet authorities towards the Orthodox Church and Orthodoxy in general, perceiving with apprehension that the struggle of the communist party to overcome the religious worldview and to promote communism and atheism had originated in the West. Their assessment of the economic undertakings of the Bolshevik party was more difficult. Euro-Asians were supporters of the private economy of individual producers and were thus not in favor of collectivization. In general terms, however, they supported the efforts to industrialize the Soviet Union so as to strengthen the economy and the military power of the Soviet state.

The overall attitude of the Euro-Asians towards the Soviet Union was different from that of the majority of Russian émigrés who longed for the collapse of the Bolshevik regime. Euro-Asians feared turmoil and the weakening of Soviet statehood given that it guaranteed stability on the Euro-Asian continent. The views presented were formulated in the 1920s and partly in the 1930s when there was as yet no direct threat of a European war. Their views that evolved during the later period paralleled changes in Soviet policies and then the territorial conquests of Stalin, which appeared to conform to their program. Although the Soviet state was far from their ideal, and the Marxist doctrine on which Bolshevik principles were based came from the hated West, they still believed that the rulers in the Kremlin would be forced to implement the concept of Euro-Asianism.

These assumptions proved to be correct. The Soviet empire gradually abandoned internationalism and to an increasing degree concentrated on strengthening Greater Russian power. Likewise, the rhetoric of the communist party changed and began to refer to the imperial tradition and to reflect the glory of the founders of Russian power (Ivan the Terrible, Peter the Great, Nakhimov, Suvorov, Kutuzov). For this reason, as time went by, the founders of the Euro-Asian movement came to view the Soviet program as a continuation of the former Russian imperial mission. Still, certain reservations remained concerning the issue of religion and the nationalization of small landed property.

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8 The supporters of Euro-Asian ideology were quite sceptical regarding the achievements of Peter the Great. On the one hand they praised his role in the strengthening of the military power of the Russian empire, but, on the other hand, they criticized him roundly for destroying ancient Russian traditions and introducing western models.
Yet, these issues were viewed as secondary in comparison to the principal objective of developing imperial power on the Euro-Asian continent.

At the end of the 1930s the Euro-Asian movement underwent ideological disintegration. Many of its members abandoned the movement and associated themselves with right wing, frequently even fascist, political factions. Others for various reasons collaborated with the Soviet regime. Agents of the NKVD, the Soviet political police, infiltrated and then destroyed the community of the Euro-Asian movement. Although the three leading activists, P. Savitskii, N. Trubetskoi, and G. Vernadskii were increasingly isolated, they remained faithful to their original views, even though their influence shrank significantly.

The subsequent stage in the development of the Euro-Asian movement took place in different political conditions. Following the victorious war with Hitler a new global superpower emerged, the Soviet Union, an empire dominating the vast territories of Euro-Asia. From the geographical point of view the designs and the dreams of the Euro-Asians were to some extent realized. Other issues once considered important (like, for instance, the place of the Eastern Orthodox Church) became increasingly marginalized in the new situation.

**The Euro-Asian Views of Lev Gumilov**

A new phase in the organizational aspect and the ideological concepts of Euro-Asianism took the name, Neo-Euro-Asian Movement. It was primarily associated with the views of Lev Gumilov, a scholar with a different profile from those of the founders of the original Euro-Asian movement. The founders had been primarily interested in ideological issues and political-territorial programs, while Lev Gumilov’s concerns were in geography, history, and ethnography.

When considering the scientific work and the views of Gumilov, one should take into account the conditions in which he lived and worked. He was a citizen of the USSR who worked at the Institute of Geography of Leningrad University where he contended with rigorous state- and self-imposed censorship.

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9 The disintegration of Euro-Asianism was primarily the result of the activity of L. Karsavin for whom the strengthening of the power of the USSR was evidence that under the rule of the communists the greater empire was being reconstructed. In the interwar period and then during World War II he resided in Lithuania. After the war he was arrested by the NKVD and sent to a gulag, where he died in 1952.

10 The authorities of the NKVD did not forget the “counterrevolutionary” activities of P. Savitskii who was living in Prague. After the Red Army marched in, he was arrested and deported to the USSR. He was held in Soviet gulags until 1953. As a Czech citizen he was allowed to return to Prague where he died in 1968.

11 He was the son of Mikolay Gumilov, an outstanding poet, founder of the stream of acmenism, who was shot by the Bolsheviks. His mother was the very well-known poetess, Anna Akhmatova.
Hence, he could not openly present views or even declare himself as a clear supporter of the Euro-Asian ideology with which he identified over his entire life. He avoided political subjects and devoted his scholarly work to history and to the ethnography of the Euro-Asian continent. Lev Gumilov associated geography closely with ethnology and the philosophy of history. He was interested in entire nations – “ethnoses” – these being the outcomes of relevant geographical-and-landscape conditions.

In his numerous books Gumilov discusses the history of the mainly nomadic peoples of Central Asia (in particular: *Hunns*, 1960; *History of Ancient Turks*, 1967; *Discovery of Khazaria*, 1970). He was the founder of a new research direction that was called ethnogenesis. Gumilov attempted to demonstrate that strict interrelations exist between natural conditions and ethnic processes on the Euro-Asian continent. He studied the cultural influences of Asian nations on the formation of the Russian mentality, and the role of Russians, brought up in the Tartar-Mongol spirit, in the establishment of the greater Euro-Asian continental empire, the Russian Empire.

According to Gumilov, echoing P. Savitskii and M. Trubetskoi, Euro-Asia links three oceans: the Pacific Ocean, the Indian Ocean, and the Atlantic Ocean. This enormous territory (excluding the small European peninsula and South Asia along with the adjacent islands) has a specific landscape. In the North the landscape is constituted by forests; in the South, by the steppes. Similar geographic conditions form the separate cultural-civilizational types of peoples living in these spaces. Gumilov argues that the landscape factor was decisive for the fate of the people and the nations of Euro-Asia. Consequently, a Euro-Asian “super-ethnos” developed, subdivided into “ethnoses” (Greater Russian, Belarusian, Ukrainian, Kazakh, Turkmen), and then into “sub-ethnoses” (for example, Don or Amur Cossacks). The decisive factor was constituted by the geographical environment, which influenced common history, culture and habits.\(^\text{12}\)

In his considerations regarding the theory of ethnogenesis, Gumilov pays special attention to the element of dynamics and phased development. As distinct from other Russian geographers and historians, Gumilov expresses a positive assessment of Mongol-Tartar slavery in Ruthenia. He emphasizes the civilizational achievements of the nomadic peoples and their influence in favour of the development of a centralized empire that evolved over several centuries. His fascination with the cultures of the Euro-Asian nations is closely linked to a sharp anti-western attitude. As with the followers of the Euro-Asian ideology, Gumilov is very critical of the West which he views as a destabilizing force in regard to the inhabitants of Euro-Asia. Although Gumilov always denied that he was a geographical determinist, all his books reflect the preponderant influence of geographical environments on the history and fate of particular nations and peoples.

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\(^\text{12}\) Gumilov cites the influence of Byzantine culture on the Russian soul but clearly downplays it. This position separates him from the émigré Euro-Asians, for whom the Eastern Orthodox religion was what caused the emergence of Russian culture.
Given these assumptions, one can conclude that Gumilov believed that the Russian conquest of the Euro-Asian continent conformed to the natural conditions as well as the aspirations and tendencies present in all the nations inhabiting this vast territory which cannot be classified as being situated strictly in Europe or in Asia. On this territory a separate “super-ethnos” took shape, composed of a mixture of Asian and European elements. As Gumilov had already written in the 1920s, “we are neither Slavs nor Turans, we are a synthesis of the Slavic and Turan elements” (Evraziystvo..., 1926, p. 357). Gumilov opposed the Euro-centrist vision of the history of Russia. He rejected the view, still alive in the Russian philosophy of history, of Tartar-Mongol slavery and of the archetypal hatred between farming and nomadic peoples. In his opinion, the superposition of the Slavonic, Turanic, and Finno-Ugric elements brought about the emergence of the greater Russian empire.

Gumilov’s hypotheses are similar to the views of F. Koneczny, who, in 1934, maintained that Russia belongs to a separate Turan civilization (Koneczny, 2002, p. 305). The historical development of Russia was conditioned by constant influences from the East (Khazars, Polovtsy, Mongols, Tartar slavery). The impact of the “Great Steppe” influenced the civilization and culture of the Russian nation.

During the decades of the post-World War II period, the Euro-Asian movement gradually faded away. The generation of inter-war supporters of the Euro-Asian movement abandoned the political stage. In the Soviet Union, the expression of views that did not conform to Marxist-Leninist ideology was forbidden. The Soviet domination of a large part of Europe, including a part of Germany, was not in agreement with the ideological doctrine of Euro-Asianism. Yet, the ultimate goal, conquest of Euro-Asia proper, was fully realized. Attempts to justify the territorial conquests were not significant scholarly or political endeavors.

The vast geopolitical changes brought about by the downfall of communism, the disintegration of the USSR, and the independence of the federal republics, linked, at the same time, with the acquisition of freedom of speech and publication, brought about the revival of Euro-Asian ideas which gained support in numerous communities of the Russian intelligentsia. For many nationalist groups, the Euro-Asian idea became an attractive intellectual alternative following the disgrace of communist ideology. Slogans associated with the rebirth of the superpower status of Russia became popular and catchy. Such a rebirth would require, first of all, the re-subordination to Russia of the former federal republics and the re-establishment of the empire according to new ideological principles.

13 Lev Gumilov remained faithful to his Euro-Asian views over his entire life. The evidence is provided by the sentence ending the last interview that he gave as evoked by S. Lavrov: “I only know and I will tell you in secret that if Russia is saved, it is only as a Euro-Asian country and only owing to Euro-Asianism” (Gumilov, 1993, p. 19).

14 Gumilov was nevertheless persecuted. He spent fourteen years in a gulag and was forbidden to publish for twenty-four years. His views were sharply criticized by orthodox Marxists (Yanov, 1992, p. 105).
The territorial program of the neo-Euro-Asian movement constituted a response to reborn expansionist dreams linked to the revival of the centralized state within the boundaries of the USSR or of the former Russian Empire. New hopes stimulated a consolidation of numerous political groups around Euro-Asian ideas. Many periodicals began to appear in which Euro-Asian concepts were promoted and popularized (e.g. *Molodaya Gvardiya, Sovetskaya Rossiya, Put’*).

### Alexander Dugin as a Continuer of the Euro-Asian Movement

The rebirth of the Euro-Asian movement is inseparably linked with the activity of Alexander Dugin. Relatively young (born in 1962), his domain is the geography of religion and geopolitics. He is also a historian and a philosopher – an intellectual with broad and multifaceted interests. Following the death of Julius Evola and René Guénon, he has been viewed as the most pronounced exponent of integral traditionalism.

Alexander Dugin is the author of numerous books of which the best known are *Goals and Tasks of our Revolution* (1999), *Templars of the Proletariat* (1997), *End of the World* (1997). He is also actively publishing in scholarly journals. He has grouped around him numerous supporters for whom he is an unquestioned scientific and political mentor. He published a monumental work titled *The Foundations for Geopolitics: Geopolitical Future of Russia* in which he deploys his views on the present and future of Russia. According to him, the powerful position of the Russian state underwent catastrophic decline as a consequence of political and economic undertakings programmed and implemented by the ideological enemies of Russia. But this decline is transitory. In the near future Russia will regain its position as a world superpower.

He expresses his views very distinctly: “The new world empire ought to be Euro-Asian, multi-continental, and in a further evolution, global. The war for Russian domination of the world has not ended” (Dugin, 1999, p. 213).

Alexander Dugin is a clear supporter of the Euro-Asian idea. He makes reference to the interwar classics dealing with the concepts and the work of Lev Gumilov. He does not identify himself with all the views expressed by the Euro-Asians; however, he updates them and introduces numerous modifications in the light of which his views have gradually evolved.

15 Julius Evola – outstanding Italian philosopher, who studied the influence of spirituality and culture on the development and transformation of civilizations, the ideological patron of the so-called European radical right; René Jean Guénon – a controversial French thinker and esoteric writer who studied religious, metaphysical, and mystic traditions and their influence on the development of societies.

16 Euro-Asian concepts and Dugin himself are the objects of sharp criticism by the Russian elite. Not only the liberal and democratic parties and associations are opposed to his imperialist and nationalistic ideas, but even Alexander Solzhenitsyn, who, after all, represents rightist views and is the supporter of the joint statehood of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan (1999, p. 31).
Regarding the Neo-Euro-Asian manifest, he identifies the positive aspects of Tartar slavery viewing it as having enabled the centralization of Russia and the transmission of the spirit of expansion. Nowadays, however, in the opinion of Dugin, Turan nations constitute a threat. They have the potential to break down the Euro-Asian realm into three regions: western (Russia, Europe), eastern (Siberia, the Far East) and southern (Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan). Russia cannot permit that to happen. For Dugin, Pan-Turkism is as great a threat as Pan-Slavism and Pan-Germanism, since it places the interests of one ethnic group over the collective goals of the entire Euro-Asian community.

On the other hand, Dugin identifies completely with the negative attitudes of the founders of Euro-Asianism towards western civilization. The philosophy that the West represents is, in his opinion, murderous for Russia. It is expansive and is attempting to impose its viewpoint on the entire world. It includes globalism, Cartesian and Enlightenment philosophy, individualist lifestyles, moral depravation, orientation towards consumption, materialism, and the dominance of economic aspects in the lives of persons and societies. Euro-Asian ideas therefore represent a negation of the West. In the East the spiritual element is recognized as being superior to the material element. Tradition is more important than democracy. The interests of the group and the community should prevail over the interests of the individual. These completely different perspectives on the world are bound to lead to an ideological and political or even a military confrontation.

The internationally recognized works on political geography, especially those referring to the division of forces in the modern world, embody ideas that are very close to those expressed by Russian scholars like Dugin. The latter in particular makes deliberate reference to the concepts of H. J. Mackinder and frequently cites the notion of the “heartland” of the Euro-Asian continent. He expects that in the future there will be a collision between the “land” (that is, Euro-Asia) and the “sea” (the Atlantic world). The antagonism leading up to it will be particularly evident in the interface areas (borderlands).

For this reason, the priority task for Russia is to form a new, vast continental realm (Euro-Asia). Dugin is uncompromising in this regard. He maintains that, irrespective of the moral assessment of the Soviet system, and even if one critically assesses the not always appropriate relation of the latter with Russian principles (for example, the Eastern Orthodox religion), the USSR achieved to a large extent the program of territorial integration of Euro-Asia. The renewed subordination of the lost territories to the rule of Moscow ought therefore to be the supreme objective to be unconditionally achieved. Dugin calls this program sobiraniye imperii (gathering of the empire). The issue is not simply one of the subordination of the countries of the so-called “near abroad” (that is of the post-Soviet republics), Russia should also regain control over Central Europe. In addition it should re-establish close relations with the French-German block in order to free Western Europe from Atlantic-American tutelage.
If the process of re-establishing the “Great Territory” is not started, a general catastrophe will ensue. China will expand towards the North and West in the direction of eastern Siberia and Kazakhstan. The countries of Central Europe will start to occupy Ukraine, Belarus, and western Russia, while the Islamic block will initiate the conquest of Central Asia, the Volga region, and a part of southern Russia. Only the emergence of a new “axis of history,” encompassing the principal portion of Euro-Asia, will offer a chance for stability and peace. Such a task is beyond the capacities of France, China, or even Germany. The only country which can fulfil this task is Russia, it being the “world island” or the “heartland” of Euro-Asia.

Dugin’s reasoning is logical and unambiguous. One should understand that it has an imperial-expansionist character and is, in principle, not territorially constrained. Even an assessment of the possibility of its realization is not relevant. The probability of fulfilment of this program is very low. Russia does not have the political, economic, and military capacities needed to realize it in the near or the distant future. Yet, one should not neglect such abstract designs, for they are creating an atmosphere of hostility and distrust.

This far-reaching geopolitical program can be broken down into a number of immediate tasks. These include the establishment of a “fourth geo-economic zone” to include certain countries with which Russia has friendly relations: Serbia, Greece, Iran, India, Iraq, Syria, Libya, in addition to Belarus, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Dugin’s list excludes Ukraine. It is hard to tell whether or not this omission is deliberate. It should be clearly understood, however, that the leading Euro-Asians do not envisage the future of Russia without the inclusion of Ukraine. They are as hostile to the idea of Ukrainian separatism as are Russian nationalist activists. An ample selection of such opinions can be found in (Ukrainskiy…, 1998), a book published several years ago in Moscow. A similar ideological image is presented by a collective volume edited by M. I. Turyanitsa (Ukraine, 2000). It presents numerous arguments intended to prove that the Ukrainian nation does not exist and that Ukraine is simply one of the provinces of Greater Russia.

In order to portray the extent of Russian territory in Euro-Asia, Dugin has developed three categories of geopolitical areas, each one the object of a map. The first one of these (Fig. 1) delimits the mono-ethnic areas inhabited by Russians. The second map (Fig. 2) portrays the Russian Federation within its current political boundaries. The third map (Fig. 3), the most interesting one of all, portrays Russia as the Euro-Asian empire. It encompasses the Russian Federation, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, northeastern Romania, all of the Black Sea, and three Caucasian countries. To the Northwest, Finland as well as northern Norway and Sweden are included. The Asian portion of the map includes all the post-Soviet countries of Central Asia. These are portrayed as internal subdivisions of Russia to which are added Afghanistan, Mongolia, Manchuria, and western China (Tien-Shan). Beyond the boundaries of the empire thus outlined, some countries including Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, the three Baltic states, Turkey, and Iran are portrayed as independent (see Figs. 1, 2, and 3), Dugin (1999).
These maps, except for the one portrayed by Fig. 2, are a creative improvisation that should not be taken too seriously. Yet one can suppose that for Dugin as well as for numerous Russians with nationalist opinions, the boundaries of Russia as portrayed are both justified and fair.\footnote{Many Serbian publications portray “Greater Serbia,” just as Croatian ones portray “Greater Croatia,” and Albanian publications, “Greater Albania.” These irredentist portrayals, however, are the concerns of territorially small countries, disposing of quite limited demographic and military resources. In the case of Russia, however, we are dealing with a country having imperial traditions and the capacity to engage in serious political undertakings. Therefore this type of rhetoric coming from Russians is dangerous.}

![Fig. 1. Russia as a Mono-Ethnic area. Source: A. Dugin (1999), p. 411](image)

Dugin advances interesting considerations regarding the so-called “geopolitical axes.” He lists the following axes: Moscow–Berlin, Moscow–Tokyo, and Moscow–Beijing. In conformity with the secular tradition in Russian politics, Dugin stresses the importance of the Russian-German understanding, especially with respect to Central-Eastern Europe. His position is that the countries in this area should be dominated by Germany but that Russian interests should also be recognized.

In view of the importance of this issue, it is necessary to quote Dugin’s words:
Germany today constitutes an economic giant and a political dwarf. Russia, on the contrary, is an economically handicapped country. The Moscow-Berlin axis will end the respective inabilities of the two partners and will facilitate the establishment of a powerful Greater Russia and a powerful Greater Germany. In a farther perspective this development will lead to the creation of a continuing strategic and economic elaboration of an emerging united Euro-Asian Empire – the European Empire in the West and the Russian Empire in the East of Euro-Asia…. Given this perspective, it would be wise to return the District of Kaliningrad (East Prussia) to Germany, thus giving up the last territorial symbol of the tragic fratricidal war. Then, in order that this gesture not be interpreted by Russians as a step towards geopolitical capitulation, Europe should propose to Russia other possibilities for territorial annexations or for extending its zone of influence, first of all at the expense of those countries that are stubbornly working for a ‘Black Sea-Baltic federation’ (Dugin, 1999, pp. 228-9).

Such reasoning demonstrates the lack of realism and sense of responsibility of the author. The proposed geopolitical concepts might have been appropriate during the Bismarckian era or as proposals for the Locarno or Rapallo conferences of the 1920’s. They might even have served a purpose in August 1939. Nowadays, however, such proposals are anachronous and do not constitute an adequate response to the processes unrolling in Europe. Dugin’s abstractions that ignore contemporary reality create scenarios for future events that would lead inevitably to the complete destabilization of Central-Eastern Europe.

Fig. 2. Russia as a State-Nation
Source: A. Dugin (1999), p. 413
Against the background of the general geopolitical concepts that Dugin is proposing, the problem being considered here is of secondary significance. Dugin’s primary objective is the formation in the future of a Greater Russian continental empire in Euro-Asia. His approach to the task, including his selection of arguments and relevant supporting evidence that are drawn from the tactics and strategy of the secular tradition of territorial expansion which is deeply rooted in the mentality of the political elite of Russia, are subordinated to the all-encompassing aim of making Russia coterminous with Euro-Asia.

Alexander Dugin has formulated his views regarding the contemporary world and the geopolitical role of Russia in ways that are logical and consistent. He has expressed them with simplicity, comprehensiveness, aggressiveness, and, at the same time, emotional engagement. The convention that he has adopted serves the purposes of propaganda.

When defending its national interests, Russia, according to Dugin, should stick to four main principles. First, Russia will remain responsible for the development of and control over the northeastern part of Euro-Asia (Central Asia, Siberia, Outer Mongolia) thus forming a counterweight to the increasing influence and power of China. Second, Russian politics at the global level will continue to have an anti-western character accounting for the fact that the United States will remain its main adversary.
The most probable location of conflict will be Europe. The supreme objective for Russia is to prevent the political and military unification of Europe (“Finlandization of the continent”), to force the USA to step back from this region, and to liquidate the strategic void in Europe (Belarus’, Ukraine) and in the Caucasus. Third, the efforts of Russia in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia (Turkestan) should aim in the direction of reconstructing the Greater Russian empire and its buffer zone of influence. Fourth, Russia is the sole vector of the civilization of the “Great Steppe.” The latter characteristic is decisive not only for the right of Russia to determine its own fate but also to determine the fate of the world.

Poland occupies a very distinct place in Dugin’s considerations. His views are similar to those expressed by the 19th century Russian Slavophiles. In his opinion Poland, through its language, folklore, and customs belongs to the eastern world, since it has Slavonic, therefore Euro-Asian, roots. On the other hand, its adoption of Christianity in its Latin form and of the Roman-Germanic legal system brought Poland into association with the West. By this very fact, Poland has found itself on the boundary between the two civilizations, but on its western side. The partitions of Poland undertaken by Prussia, Russia, and Austria were natural and morally justified deeds, since the existence of Poland as a separate civilization and cultural entity was a distinct geopolitical dissonance. Dugin writes very clearly about this situation: “Russia, in its geopolitical and sacral-geographical development is not interested in the existence of the sovereign Polish state in any shape…. Poland must choose either a Slavonic or a Catholic identity”.

Concluding Remarks

The Euro-Asian movement, the principal representative of which is Alexander Dugin, is becoming increasingly popular in Russia. Within the communities which identify themselves with this movement, views are quite diverse. Attention should be paid to the publications and literary writings of E. Limonov, who is appealing for the reconstruction of the Russian empire within the former Soviet boundaries (according to him, the disintegration of the USSR was an unconstitutional act). In many of his publications he sketches his vision of Russia – a powerful, centralized Euro-Asian nation. Unlike many other “Euro-Asians” he downplays denominational questions. For him, the integrating element for the new empire should be the Russian language and Russian culture.\(^{18}\)

Euro-Asian ideas have influenced the highest authorities of the Russian Federation. President Vladimir Putin does not hide his positive feelings regarding these ideas.

They have been echoed in such pronouncements as:

\(^{18}\) One of the leading activists of the contemporary Euro-Asian movement is Nikita Mikhalkov, the most well-known Russian movie director, son of Sergey Mikhalkov, author of the Soviet national anthem.
Russia has always defined itself as a Euro-Asian country. We never forgot that an essential part of the Russian territory is in Asia... The hopes that the Euro-Asian ideas bring are especially important nowadays, when relations based on equal rights are being developed between the countries belonging to the Commonwealth of Independent States. In this way we must preserve the best achievements of the centuries of history of the East and West (Evraziystvo..., 2001, pp. 3 and 5).

One should pay attention to the fact that the concepts of Russian Slavophilism (and then Pan-Slavism), Euro-Asianism, followed by Neo-Euro-Asianism have appeared at the turning points of Russian history (following the Crimean War, after World War I and the ensuing revolution and civil war, after World War II, and following the disintegration of the USSR). They have constituted attempts to “heal the aching Great Russian soul.” Given all the shortcomings of cures (moral and ideological ambiguity), such kinds of activity are in a sense rational – they contribute to the strengthening of responsibility for the institution of the state among citizens.

The transformations of the Euro-Asian movement have had a cyclical character. The movement appeared in a difficult period of Russian history, immediately after the downfall of the Russian Empire, but before the political and economic consolidation of the Soviet Union. After several years of lively creative and publishing activity this stream of thought disappeared for a couple of decades. After the downfall of communism and the disintegration of the Soviet state, it was revived and updated in the new geopolitical conditions. The considerations presented in this article imply that the Euro-Asian movement can become an attractive idea for Russian society.

In the unanimous opinion of many scholars interested in Russia, Euro-Asianism is among the most important achievements of Russian political thought in the 20th century. Its foundations are constituted by broad knowledge from the domains of geography, political science, philosophy, theology, history, and ethnography. At the same time, this stream of thought is provoking many questions of a moral, intellectual, and psychological nature. It calls for the verification and the re-evaluation of views about the history and achievements of Russia. This re-interpretation is also linked to a more universal approach to the question of Russian nationality. The ethnic criterion is losing significance in favor of political identification associated with a definite territory. The ideological message of this political movement is a call for the integration of ethnically different nations into an ideocratic super-civilization within a centralized neo-empire. The supporters of this kind of program often do not correctly perceive contemporary political reality.

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19 In this context, an interesting paper, in terms of the notions that it reflects and its cognitive aspects, was published by V. L. Skuratovskii (1998). This author assesses Euro-Asian ideas very negatively. For him, they appeared as a result of the catastrophic fall of the first (tsarist) empire and were brought back to life as a consequence of the breakdown of the second (Soviet) empire.

20 A similar universalist concept was promoted by the communist leaders, who aimed at the “creation” of the Soviet citizen (sometimes called, although in a different context, *homo sovieticus*), having no ethnic roots.
Implementation of these designs, hard to realize, would require liquidation of the sovereignty of some existing countries and the establishment of entirely new political divisions. Through the resulting destabilization, a new geopolitical order will supposedly emerge. This urge to save the world and its own citizens by such means is interwoven into centuries of Russian history. The ideological principles and the external conditions may change, but the causal mechanism remains the same. The future must differ significantly from the present. The road to the desired goal requires faith, sacrifice, and determination.

The plan to re-establish the Greater Russian empire on the Eurasian continent conforms to the aspirations, dreams, and attitudes of many citizens of the Russian Federation. The defeated idea of communism is being replaced by a new, universal idea the realization of which, it is hoped, will cement the currently disintegrated post-Soviet society.

The supreme goal of the partisans of Euro-Asianism is to establish a new world power through cooperation between the Eastern Orthodox religion and Islam and the integration of the eastern Slavonic nations with the peoples of Turan, Finno-Ugric, and Mongol origins. The result of a successful course of events would be the appearance of a new superpower, stretching from the Atlantic to the Pacific Oceans, and from the Arctic to the Himalayas.

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Jihad: Peaceful Applications for Society and the Individual

Norman C. Rothman

Abstract

This paper examines the historical and contemporary aspects of Jihad. It covers its various definitions and outside as well as inside perceptions of the concept. Emphasis is placed on the peaceful aspects of Jihad as well as its potential for use in peaceful dialogue.

Keywords – Sharia, Qur’an, Sufi, Hanafi, Wahhabi

Introduction

Jihad is a term often used as a catch phrase for a violent crusade against perceived enemies of Islam. Because it is now used by radical groups (some of which, such as Islamic Jihad) who seek a universal caliphate by various means including violence to justify actions, it has acquired a military connotation. In reality, the term is much more complex. Defined as “struggle” or “utmost effort,” it can have peaceful uses.

Background

Although Jihad has been most identified with military violence, it can have (as will be shown later in this paper) a number of different versions. The military campaigns during the expansion of Islam were intended to emphasize defending the faith and then expanding it by the use of military means, both internally against apostasy and externally against enemies. Historically, as it evolved in the 8th century, Jihad came to be considered a collective responsibility of the emerging political-legal Muslim community or umma so that jihad has been called the sixth commandment or pillar of Islam. It was an essential part of all major schools of Sunni judicial thought and interpretation of the Islamic law code or Sharia — Hanbali, Hanafi, Malaki, Shafi’i as well as the Shia version of Jafari. In his early writings, the Prophet advocated a peaceful rather than violent persuasion and counseled patience and pacific exchange while non-Muslims saw the light. This was the early attitude especially to people of the book (as the Prophet terms Christians and Jews who followed the Old and New Testaments of the Bible which he, Muhammad, recognized).

About 90 of the 114 verses in the Qur’an are explicitly non-military, especially in regard to “people of the Book,” such as “And dispute ye not with the People of the Book except with means better (than mere disputation) ... But say, We believe in the revelation which has come down to us and in that which came down to you. Our God and your God is One, and it is to Him we bow (in Islam)....”(Sura 29, passages 46-47).
However, the various struggles first against opponents within the Arabian Peninsula and then against external opponents such as the Sassanian Persians and Byzantine Greeks hardened the concept of Jihad so that its peaceful connotation receded as conciliation gave way to militancy. 

**Branches of Jihad**

Nonetheless, the theoretical aspects of jihad as a tool for people to come together continued as several major versions beside jihad of the sword remained even after the struggles in terms of expansion after the 8th century. Jihad of the heart, which advocated the advancement of Islam through the example of individual purity and in many aspects is analogous to the teachings of both Buddhism and Christianity (the main rivals to Islam in terms of global expansion during the post-8th century period), had many supporters. Jihad of the mouth, which supported the propagation of Islam by argumentation, rhetoric, and logic, was identified with the legal schools and could appeal to counselors of other faiths. A subset of this interpretation was propagation by poetry and literature. A branch of Islam, Sufism, became notable in this respect and in fact was instrumental in the mostly peaceful conversion of much of Central and Southeastern Asia. The Hanafi branch of Sharia, which relies on reason and logic, is most often identified with this approach. The final major jihad approach was jihad of the hand which has been interpreted as expanding Islam by exemplar, most notably by good deeds to inspire conversion. Together, these aspects of Jihad were very influential in expanding Islam especially in the Balkans and Caucasus well into the 18th century.

Throughout the history of Islam, the emphasis on internal struggle or striving against one’s self has also been important as is the related idea that striving to learn Islam is essential to both the here and now as well as the hereafter. The emphasis on striving in turn can be subdivided. It can refer to external and internal striving. Even in terms of opposition to others in defense of the faith in a militant way, external jihad can be carried out through economic, political, legal, and diplomatic means. If these fail, the military form of jihad is authorized (it should be noted in passing that the Arabic word for war is al-harb not al-jihad). The military aspect of jihad is comparatively rare. It must be sanctioned or declared by the proper authority and people deemed to be innocent such as women, children, and the chronically ill must not be harmed. Even if military action occurs, peaceful proposals from the enemy must be considered. In general, until the rise of radical groups, a jihad was not always declared against other religions even if military action took place. Only when there were calls for a just war as in the Crusades or in campaigns against the Sassanians or the Byzantines was “jihad of the sword” invoked. Many scholars stress the internal struggle for self-control and betterment as the predominant form of jihad. Within internal striving of jihad is the striving or struggle against one’s self. This striving is known as al-nafs and is subdivided into four kinds. For example, here is a complete verse or sura, Sura 29:69).
The striving begins with the Almighty. In general, fighting by the word with emphasis on the Almighty rather than the sword is epitomized by the following verse:

> And insult not those whom they worship besides Allah, lest they insult Allah wrongfully without knowledge. Thus, “We have made fair-seeming to each people its own doings; then to their Lord is their return and He shall then inform them of all that they used to do” (Sura 06: 108).

The first aspect of the struggle is to be accomplished by the study of holy texts. This is the primary aspects of al-nafs as happiness and success depend upon the acquisition of this knowledge. Without this attainment, an individual cannot find happiness in this world or the next. The second tenet is acting upon what is learned. Without putting to use holy knowledge, an individual is deprived of any benefit. The third tenet enjoins the learned to share knowledge learned with others. It is incumbent upon the learned not to conceal the wisdom acquired by the study of holy texts. Finally, those who wish to share knowledge to bring people to Allah must put up with any difficulties whether it be obduracy in learning or actual insults — the virtues of patience. If all four levels of this process are achieved by believers, — learning the truth, acting upon it, sharing knowledge and bringing non-believers to Islam despite difficulties, they will enter the kingdom of heaven.

The following excerpts from various suras exemplify this aspect of inner or greater jihad: in the Quran (58:11), God raises in rank “… those who have been given knowledge.” Muhammad also emphasized knowledge in a hadith, or saying of the Prophet, in which he said that “Seeking knowledge is a must for every Muslim, male or female, from cradle to grave in any part of the world.” Muhammad also stated in another hadith that “the ink of the scholar is more sacred than the blood of the martyr.” Therefore, good Muslims should act, whether it is in the Qur’an or within the meaning of “jihad” in terms of their obligation to seek out knowledge and apply that knowledge in good faith for the betterment of humanity.

The stress on peace is also given when applied to jihad with obvious applications to relations on an individual, national, and international level. The Prophet makes direct reference to this end in the following citations with the word being called “most beautiful names” of God (Qur’an, 59:23-24). Peace in the world reflects higher realities. In the Qur’an, peace is affirmed as the greeting, language, and condition of Paradise (Qur’an, 10:10, 14:23, 19:61-63, 36:58). God calls believers unto the abode of peace (dar al salam) (Qur’an, 10:25).

A related set of precepts defines jihad against the Devil or Tempter called the Shaytaan. The first division of this injunction is to resist any doubts caused by this tempter. Secondly, a learned and devout individual must ward any corrupt impulses caused by this entity. Overall, the al-nafs precepts lead to a certainty of faith while Shaytaan precepts lead to patience. In general patience can combat desire while certainty insulates a believer from doubt.
The second set of jihad classifications combines internal and external aspects. They include jihads against kaafirs (non-believers) and hypocrites (apostates or those who mix Muslim and non-Muslim customs and consequently commit impure acts or shirk). These sub-categories include such tools as the heart, the tongue, individual wealth, and one’s own self. The kaafir jihad can include physical fighting if not actual war while the second can be conducted through words and ideas.13

A related set of jihads can be waged against leaders of oppression and innovation — who threaten the practice of Islam both externally and internally. These jihads can take three forms. They can be of hand (which can include fighting or formal jihad) if one is able. If this is not possible, one can use one’s tongue through speech. If this, in turn, is not possible, one should use one’s heart through the hating of evil and feeling that is not right.14 In general, the Prophet counseled patience for evil doers in Sura 20:129,130 (also 38:15-17) (be patient with evil things said by evil people): “Had it not been for a word that went forth before from thy Lord, (their punishment) must necessarily have come, but there is a term appointed (for respite). Therefore, be patient with what they say....” Also, Sura 19:83, 84 (which basically says don’t fight evildoers as God allows them to destroy themselves). “Seest thou not that we have set the evil ones on against the unbelievers to incite them with fury? So make no haste against them, for we but count out to them a (limited) number (of days).”15

Overall, the invocation of jihad is for ordinary events and is an individual choice. External military jihad supported by the community is only invoked when a Muslim land is attacked, when there is no other option, and when a religious/secular leader has called for it. Only about the last fifth of jihad citations became militant after the flight of Muhammad to Medina.)16

Military Jihad

The predominance of military jihad against infidels and people considered backsliders is a relatively recent phenomenon. The new emphasis on jihad injunction by militants now came from the writings of the more militant legal codes such as the Shafi’i which supported the concept that there was always innate tension between the Dar-al-Islam (abode of Islam) and the non-Islamic world, the dar-al-harb (literally the abode of war) which it will suffer as the home of non-Muslims. Therefore, there would always be some conflict at any time although the actions of a few members relieve the obligations of the umma or Islamic community. As indicated in the preceding paragraph, the military action could be either defensive against hostility from non-Muslims or offensive in support of a Muslim ruler who sought action against non-Muslims. It should be noted in regard of the latter that the directive for jihad came from God and the Caliph was carrying out that command as the earthly representative.17
An elaborate set of rules was established for military action in the Middle Ages. First, it was only called by a caliph or religious ruler. Once battle lines are drawn, every able-bodied adult male must participate, especially if non-Muslims surround a Muslim land. However, individuals cannot conduct military jihad on their own unless commanded by their leader. Non-Muslim allies are not accepted unless Muslims are outnumbered and the allies show goodwill. Non-Muslims, defined in the middle ages as Jews, Christians, and Zoroastrians, could be protected from attack; others were not given this courtesy.\(^{18}\)

Other rules pertained to the conduct of the jihad. Certain groups of people such as women, children, old people and monks are not to be harmed unless they are in actual combat against Muslims. The exemption toward women and children does not apply to capture during jihad in terms of slavery as they automatically become property of the captor. Property disposal is also covered among jihad rules. An enemy’s trees and buildings can be destroyed. All adult males are entitled to the spoils of a defeated enemy. In addition to personal booty, they are entitled to one-fifth of overall spoils. The personal booty could include the horse of the defeated enemy, clothes, weapons, money, or anything else taken from the defeated or slain foe. The fate of a captured enemy depends upon the decision of the caliph.\(^{19}\)

Before the Middle Ages Islamist organizations were termed fundamentalist when they placed the stress on the Islamic society instituted by Muhammad as it existed at the beginning. Organizations such as the various Salafist organizations which are named after the Salafi or companions of Muhammad and offshoots (most notably the Wahhabists of Saudi Arabia) stressed a return to the pure Islam of early idealized Muslim times as epitomized by the adherence to the Qur’an, Islamic law (Sharia), and the Haditha or sayings of the Prophet.\(^{20}\) Later accretions are considered impure or “shirk” and therefore violations subject to severe punishment. Although the ultimate goal is a universal Caliphate, the means to achieve this result do not include “jihad of the Sword” as the major component.\(^{21}\)

However, with organizations that came to prominence in the latter part of the 20\(^{th}\) century and became known as “radical” groups the goals changed. The precursor of this change lay in the writings of Hassan al-Banna who founded the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928 in Egypt, and in his follower, the author Sayyid Qutb. His best-known work, *Milestones*, advanced theories not heretofore as dominant in Islamist philosophy. He maintained that Muslims must fight non-Muslims in every possible way. He went beyond the position that military jihad should only be used to defend Islam. It was incumbent to use jihad against very society that preached or put any hindrance in the way of Islam. Islam had the obligation to oppose all nations, whether they were hostile or not, who did not accept a universal Islamic dominion. The West was a special target since he felt that it retained a “crusading spirit” toward Islam.\(^{22}\)
Radical Groups

Since then jihad has become a prominent tool in the arsenal of weapons in radical organizations such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS which aspire to a global order. Generally, the jihad has three targets in its drive toward the universal caliphate. The first two are divided in what is called lesser unbelief and greater unbelief. The latter includes areas that were formerly under Muslim control but are not any longer under Islamic rule. This category has two sub categories—the near enemy would include Israel under the Middle East, Andalusia (formerly Al-Andalus in Muslim Spain), and Muslims areas in the Caucasus such as Dagestan and Chechnya that are now under Russian control. The far enemy would emphasize countries like the United States which are purported to support anti-Islamic activities such as the struggle against the Taliban in Afghanistan.23

The second major target, lesser unbelief, is directed by orthodox Sunni Muslims (who compose approximately 85% of the global Muslim population) toward sections of the community viewed as heretical or schismatic such as the Shia, Alawite, Ismaili, or Ahmadiyya who are considered to have departed from pristine Islam. They are considered as a threat to the unity of the umma. Therefore, they are thought to be diluting the Islamic message.24

The third target is those who are considered to have lapsed, intermingled Muslim customs with other customs, or hold other heterodox beliefs. In this manner, the Sufi custom of worshipping saints or visiting tombs is condemned. Apostates or individuals who have fallen away from Islam (or considered as such) are treated with special scorn.25

Radical Islamic groups (as well as other groups) point to three forms of accommodation. The first is simple conversion. In theory, conversion is submission to God’s will, which is a definition of Islam. Those who seek Islam find peace through adhesion to Islam and thus belong in the abode of peace, the dar-al-Islam. Otherwise, people will abide in the abode of war or dar-al-harb. The second route is through the payment of the non-believer or jizya tax defined as, usually, three percent of income. The third option is death. When Islamic groups pursue the third option to the exclusion of the first two and their pursuit involves violence and includes the killing of civilians and related forms of individual and mass terror, these groups are widely termed as terrorists.26

Peaceful Conflict Resolution

Nonetheless, there are essential ways that jihad can be used for peaceful resolution of disputes. There are three ways: Sufism, the legal tradition, and the varieties of jihad. In theory, the purpose of jihad is to end structural violence. Jihad stems from Allah. Muslim traditions based on the writings of Mohammad require personal re-examination in terms of one’s potential for achieving peace and moral responsibility.
The concept is divided in respect to the direction (inner and outer) and method (violent and non-violent). There is greater Jihad defined as the individual’s inner struggle against personal weaknesses and inner evil. On the other hand lesser Jihad is fought against external enemies. Its purpose is to eliminate evil within the umma or community. The greater Jihad directs the lesser Jihad in both its objectives and conduct. As such, Jihad places war and violence in the moral realm, indicating that fighting has its limits.  

The radical application of the concept Jihad has reversed the traditional priority of Jihad so that the basic purpose has been subordinated. An examination of Sufism, the legal heritage, and the classification of Jihad definitions demonstrate that in fact that Jihad can be used for peaceful conflict resolution. It will be shown that the popular identification of Jihad with militant force is misplaced.

Sufism

Sufism which is considered as the spiritual aspect of Islam has stressed personal connections with the almighty via mystical devotion. It has existed for a millennium, long before the rise of fundamentalist and radical organizations. It has a set of latitudinarian beliefs which includes the acceptance of non-Islamic beliefs and has often practiced syncretism with local customs. It has a global reach through its networks of religious brotherhoods as well as religious foundations. They connect to both members of the umma and outsiders via its schools and hospitals. It professes that all religions carry out the word of God. Throughout its existence, it has proclaimed that all religions are the same and that God can be found in various menus and through assorted Muslim vehicles including non-vehicles. Because of its emphasis on the universality of all beliefs, even non-Muslims have identified with Sufism. It has never advocated jihad of the sword which advocates the spread of Islam through the formal military means. It has always identified the use of Jihad of the Heart and Jihad of the Hand which support the advancement of Islam and via personal purity and good deeds. Disputes related to religion can be resolved in a peaceful manner through the above methods. More directly, the Sufis have gained world-wide recognition through their noteworthy production of poetry and philosophy. These works directly relate to the advancement of Islam through jihad of the mouth via logic and argument. Through its work in poetic literature, it contributes to peaceful dialogue via Jihad of the Pen. Overall, its writings in both philosophy and poetry have been a vital part of Jihad of the Pen and Jihad of the Mouth approach to the resolution of differences between Muslims and the non-Muslim world.
Legal Approaches: The Hanafi School

The scholars of the various legal schools have also played a role in the peaceful resolution of disputes. Among the five major schools of law, Hanafi Islam has been considered the most liberal (also the oldest). All schools of law emphasize the use of reason and opinion which correspond to Jihad of the Mouth and Jihad of the Pen. Hanafi followers have been particularly tolerant of both differences within the Muslim legal/political community and its relationship between the Almighty and man. The main purpose of the state or indeed of any human institution, should basically be with human rights, as it relates to both human rights per se and human relationships. Even blasphemy, a major cause of the declaration of jihad against unbelievers and apostates or “hypocrites,” a term for nominal Muslims who mix Muslim and non-Muslim practices, is not listed as a crime or sin by the Hanafis as this is matter beyond the scope of the state as a human institution. In general, the goal is for the better in this world. Even reason may be left as a product of individual judgment. As this is a global school with strong support in parts of the Middle East as well as parts of central, south, and southeast Asia, its belief system carries tremendous weight within the Muslim world.

Internal Definitions

Military Jihad is considered the lesser jihad by Muslim scholars since the time of Muhammad. It is first and foremost a community obligation not an individual one. If enough people within the community undertake it, the rest of the community members are relieved of responsibility. All members of the community should support it but can do so with advice, money, and weapons as needed. An individual will only be required to be active in four enumerated situations. First, when a Muslim finds himself in a jihad situation. Second, when the enemy attacks a Muslim area and therefore all individuals are obligated to fight in its defense. Third, when a ruler calls upon his people, everyone must respond. Finally, when a person is needed and there is no one else available to do the task.

There are other obligations that may involve participation in a military sense. If there is a jihad in one country, neighboring countries should assist with the closest being the most involved. If the closest countries assist, more distant countries are freed from participation since it is not necessary. In general, an individual is only obligated to engage in a military way apart from communal obligations, if he is actually present in a situation in which fighting is occurring. Even in this instance, he can be excused if he is departing to bring reinforcements. He is also allowed to depart a battlefield if he is needed elsewhere to strengthen another group. Even this exemption is subject to the condition that there may not be any danger to the group where it is currently located. If there is, he is forbidden to leave.
Two other situations may require the rare circumstance of individual participation in a military capacity. When a Muslim city is besieged (usually the home city), he must defend the city as there is no alternative. It is imperative since people are prevented from entering or leaving the city. More importantly, provisions are being prevented from reaching the city so there is the possibility of starvation. The third situation is when he is called upon by the leader to mobilize. As the highest authority in the state, even if not the leader of all Muslims, his dictates must be obeyed.

**Nuance and interpretation**

Outsiders often define organizations in relation to the positions of some members in regard to a number of issues especially jihad. This interpretation is often the case in reaction to fundamentalist organizations. For example, the Wahhabis are identified with a strict adherence to the Qur’an and Sharia. There is not much emphasis on Jihad of the Sword. Strictly speaking, a Wahhabi is someone who does not follow any particular imam of any of the four Sunni schools of thought. Rather, he is a person who learns his religious precepts with no individual teacher. But non-Muslims often learn about organizations through the prism of alleged jihadism.

**Practical applications to peaceful reconciliation**

The popular version of jihad does not correspond to reality. The people who espouse jihad are those who belong to radical organizations. Historically and in contemporary times, though, jihad has been used rarely and more often than not for non-military purposes. Rather, it can be used as a method of peaceful persuasion in a number of cases. Originally, Islam’s rationale was to bring people to the abode of peace (Dar-al-Salaam) (Qur’an, Sura 10.25). As individuals attain their surrender to the Divine (Taksim), they attain peace or inner harmony. Consequently, the striving for this goal is inner or greater jihad. It is the obligation of every Muslim to undergo this process of inner struggle to achieve a sense of self. The goal is attained through non-violence. Therefore, forgiveness is the preferred method of conflict resolution. Jihad in this sense can be used to avoid increasing conflict.

In practice, conflict resolution can be either on an individual or group basis. Islamic societies have traditionally tried to work out disagreements on a communal basis. Negotiation, mediation, and conciliation are the preferred methods to work out the latter. Formal arbitration that results in a settlement or sukh is often negotiated by a judge or qadi. However, mediation and conciliation in an informal way is stressed as conflict resolution efforts are directed toward the maintenance of communal or intercommunal harmony. The process of conflict resolution mechanisms is validated and often guaranteed by communal leaders and elders who facilitate a process of reconciliation.
The object is to apply the resolution process to the community and encourage all who strive toward order and harmony via inner/greater jihad to participate in a resolution process. This approach has obvious relevance in the international area for disputes.38

The Sufis have used the greater jihad as they emphasize the struggle to gain harmony through mystical devotion. It emphasizes the internal struggle to resist evil ideas within the self. The jihad is by the word rather than the sword. Although the Hanafi school (as well as the other schools of law) allow for military jihad, the emphasis is on spiritual warfare against the lower self (nafs). Whereas Sufis mention the jihad of the heart and pen, the Hanafi jurists stress jihad of the pen and mouth.39

Attitudes of Muslims around the globe reinforce the stress on harmony and spiritual matters. A recent survey of Muslims around the world indicated that the great majority condemned violent means and violent organizations that use jihad as a justification for violence and terrorism. In the United States, the figure was 86%.40

Even jihad as a military exercise can be interpreted so as not to constitute war against non-believers or the West. In Aceh in central and northern Sumatra, for example, which is the home of the most orthodox version of Islam in Indonesia, rebels and secessionists considered Javanese Islam (Java is the dominant part of Indonesia) as contaminated by Buddhist and Hindu influences and therefore not truly Islamic. They then felt justified in declaring a jihad against the central authorities. In this effort, they rejected Arab Muslim help as being ineffective since they had not upheld Palestinian rights. They felt justified in seeking the assistance of the United Nations, United States, and other Western nations in their external jihad and claimed that this alliance with non-Muslims was permitted if it saved the lives of Acehnese Muslims.41

**Theoretical foundations**

We can conclude that an external definition of Jihad as an exclusively military enterprise against non-believers and apostates is not totally accurate. It does not do justice to a complex concept. Implicit within this concept is the latitude it gives to peaceful reconciliation. It encompasses both negative and positive aspects of peace. The former can mean the absence of war while the latter means the search for justice through jihad or “struggle.”42

The terms in this sense arise from the teachings of the Prophet or Haditha as well as the Qur’an. Peace within oneself identified earlier in the paper as the greater Jihad leads to peace with other human beings since the struggle within oneself is for the prevalence of reason over desires which can lead to violence. This end product is considered spiritual jihad. Therefore one who undertakes peace is called a Mujahid or one who whom undertakes the mission of peace or peacemaker. One who undertakes peace within one self is likely to seek external peace.43
In addition to spiritual jihad, other uses of jihad for peaceful conflict resolution include the advice jihad which involves preaching against evil and injustice without violence. Non-forceful jihad can mean non-violent collective action directed toward internal aspects of social discord and involves types of jihad listed earlier. In the end, non-peaceful conflict resolution can only occur if it is for a just cause, it is conducted under a legitimate authority, and all other means have been exhausted. Even in this case, force is minimized so that the lives of non-combatants are not risked. Military use is to be invoked only if all aspects of deterrence have failed.  

**Conclusion**

Greater Jihad requires patience and understanding. Self-improvement and oneness with God is the major goal of Greater Jihad. If individuals achieve inner peace within themselves through struggle, they are better able to peacefully reconcile with others. Finding peace within oneself enables an individual to seek social justice within a society so as to reduce discord, as well as in the reconciliation of various external disputes. If one strives to achieve this end, this goal can be achieved so that a full comprehension of the meaning of the term becomes clear.

**Endnotes**

3 Denison, 2011, p. 81.
5 Ibid. Consult, for example, Roberta Metcalf and Ingvar Svanberg, “Turkic Central Asia,” in David Westerland and Ingvar Svanberg, eds., Islam Outside of the Arab World (London: Curzon, 1999), pp. 149-165.
7 Armstrong, pp.93-95.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
14 https: //quaraicquotes.com… see note # 9
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
21 see note #15.
22 Dennison, pp. 115-122.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 http://www.answering-islam.org/Authors/Arlandson/jihad.htm Retrieved on November 3, 2016
34 Ibid.
35 Hamid, pp.85-89.
36 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 Egger, p. 234.
40 Egger, p. 234.
43 Ibid., pp. 318-319, 322, and 359.
44 Ibid.
Introductory Comments

Thank you for the warm welcome and to all our very special hosts here in Suzhou for the 48th Annual ISCSC Conference. I’d like to share a little history of the ISCSC as we begin this conference.

In October 1961 an extraordinary group of scholars gathered in Salzburg, Austria to create the International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations (ISCSC). There were 26 founding members from Austria, Germany, France, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Spain, Italy, England, Russia, the United States, China, and Japan. Among them were brilliant scholars like Pitirim Sorokin and Arnold Toynbee. For six days, they debated topics such as the definition of “civilization”; problems in the analysis of complex cultures; civilizational encounters in the past; the Orient versus the Occident; problems of universal history; theories of historiography; and the role of the “human sciences” in “globalization.” The first meeting was funded by the Austrian government, in partnership with UNESCO (The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization is a specialized agency of the United Nations based in Paris). Sorokin was elected the Society’s first president. After several meetings in Europe, advancing age of its founding members and the declining health of then president, Othmar F. Anderle, the decision was made to transfer the Society to the United States.

In 1971, the first annual meeting of the ISCSC (U.S.) was held in Philadelphia. Important participants in that meeting and in the ISCSC’s activities during the next years included Benjamin Nelson (the ISCSC’s first American president), Roger Wescott, Vytautas Kavolis, Matthew Melko, and David Wilkinson. In 1974, the Salzburg branch of ISCSC was dissolved, and from then to the present we have the current ISCSC we know today.

The presidents of the ISCSC are, in order: In Europe, Pitirim Sorokin and Othmar Anderle; in the United States, Benjamin Nelson, Vytautas Kavolis, Matthew Melko, Michael Palencia-Roth, Roger Wescott, in Japan, Shuntaro Ito, Wayne Bledsoe, Lee Daniel Snyder, Andrew Targowski, David Rosner, Toby Huff, and myself. To date, we have held 47 meetings throughout the world; a number in the United States but also in Salzburg, Austria; Santo Domingo, The Dominican Republic; Dublin, Ireland; Chiba, Japan; Frenchman’s Cove, Jamaica; St. Petersburg, Russia; Paris, France; New Brunswick, Canada; and Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, and now the People’s Republic of China!
More than 30 countries are represented in the membership. Its intellectual excellence and professionalism have been maintained and enhanced through its annual meetings. The ISCSC is committed to the idea that complex civilizational problems can best be approached through analyses and debate by scholars from many fields. *The Comparative Civilizations Review* has been published continually since its first inaugural issue in 1979 and welcomes submissions from the Society’s members as well as other scholars. Professor Joseph Drew, our Editor in Chief, is here today.

Thank you all for coming. We look forward to hearing from everyone during this 48th Annual ISCSC Conference at Soochow University.
How to Escape Thucydides’s Trap: A Dialogue Among Sages

Michael Andregg

Abstract

This paper will review Sun Tzu and Thucydides first, but then Confucius, Lao Tzu and several other sages carefully, seeking ancient insight to help solve contemporary global security issues. Sun Tzu wrote his incomparable Art of War during what many civilizationalists and world historians call the "axial age." 1 It was a “Warring States” period in China, and a time of deep thinking and conceptual evolution around the world. Sun Tzu was roughly contemporary with Thucydides of Greece, who recorded a catastrophic war between Sparta and Athens in 404 BCE, leading to the decline of Greek civilization entire as Rome rose. A dialogue between Sun Tzu and Thucydides about eternal security issues could be enhanced by consulting Confucius, Lao Tzu, Von Clausewitz, and some less famous others like Graham Allison. 2,3 Even Jesus might be relevant, although he came four centuries later and did not make his mark being an officer of armies.

1 “Axial age” refers to the period from ~ 800-300 BCE, when new ways of thinking appeared in Persia, India, China and the Greco-Roman world in religion and philosophy. The term is ascribed to German philosopher Karl Jaspers. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Axial_Age for more details.
2 Allison, Graham, Destined for War: Can American and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? Houghton Mifflin, 2017. Prof. Allison is credited with creating or at least popularizing the term “Thucydides’s Trap” in a September 24, 2015 Atlantic article followed by the 2017 book cited above. He concludes that the odds of avoiding catastrophic war are only about 1 in 4, based on 16 historic cases, but that avoiding the catastrophic war remains the only rational option at this time. Then Allison urges President Trump to play “nuclear chicken” with China (below).
3 Allison, Graham, “Playing Chicken with China,” in the Wall Street Journal, August 21, 2017, p. A15. Here Graham urges playing (nuclear) chicken with China to force China to restrain North Korea, based on his observation that others used a Cold War strategy called “nuclear chicken” to get things done in our past, but that no one has blown up the world … yet. So, he urges President Trump to roll dice on the future of all humankind when faced with current frictions with China. When theory, or just love of abstract geopolitics, overcomes prudence, practice and experiences of real consequences of actual wars, everything under Heaven is at risk, in this author’s opinion.
Jesus certainly had strong opinions about the utilities of war and peace, and some of his most profound advice can also be found in the writings of Confucius and Lao Tzu.  

Some world history theorists conclude that rising powers must conflict with declining powers, and in extremis that wars are thus inevitable during such times. One label for this concept is the "Thucydides’s Trap." China is obviously rising, and the USA is obviously declining. So, if the trap theory is true, it suggests a grim prediction, since full-scale war between these military giants could wipe out civilization in the Northern Hemisphere. Even our species could be at risk if the most extreme biological or nuclear WMD scenarios came true. 

Therefore, sages of war and peace say ‘consult with us’ about such huge decisions on life or death for billions of people and possibly for civilization itself. They cry out, ‘We have seen a lot of slaughter, so we can speak from our graves about wisdom and war if you will just consult us.’ China wants to rise softly enough to not trigger war with the US. Still (naturally) China seeks to rise, while the US (naturally) is very reluctant to cede the lead role among nations. Therefore, serious people in both Washington and Beijing ponder this dilemma every day. Then there are related issues like our cousin Kim Jong-un, pressures on Japan, South Korea and Taiwan to obtain WMD, existential challenges presented by nuclear powers in the Middle East, and millions of angry young men in many countries who would love to have some WMD … to use. We are searching for wisdom in a world gone mad, but that is better than despair or indifference.

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4 The “Golden Rule” can be found in nearly identical forms in many ancient writings, among them “The Analects” of Confucius, in Book 12, section 2 and Book 15, section 24, “Do not impose on others what you yourself do not desire.” In the West, this is often attributed to Jesus (in the Bible, Matthew 7:12 and Luke 6:31) but Jesus referred to earlier writings of the Hebrews in Leviticus 19:18 which was probably written even earlier than The Analects. Some Biblical scholars reserve the term “Golden” to only Judeo-Christian versions, but I consider this imprudent. Which came first is trivial (to me) compared to the fact that wise people around the world carried these thoughts on.

5 Emphasis on the word “if.” Fortunately, social science theories seldom turn out to be very accurate, because they must simplify incredibly complex phenomena. The ‘inevitability’ of a civilization ending Armageddon has been predicted for millennia, and proven wrong thousands of times in human history. So far. You might also consider …


7 Geneticists have proven in several ways that all human beings are related to each other. The Lakota Sioux discovered this in some entirely different way, as illustrated by a phrase Mitakwe Asin, or “We are all Relatives.”

8 WMD stands for Weapons of Mass Destruction. We will use both forms in this essay on civilizational survival.

9 The most obvious of which is Israel, whose fear of Iran, of Islam in general, and of Palestinians in particular may eventually result in nuclear proliferation throughout the Middle East. Or a nuclear war triggered by “terrorism.”
The Challenges of Translation and Interpretation

At some point in any analysis like this, the manifold complications of interpreting ancient text in languages foreign to American, English language-speaking authors must be noted. We do that immediately, using the “Tao te Ching” of Lao Tzu for our example. First, we are completely dependent on translations by others. Second, even great scholars of literature differ on many important points, none of which we can adjudicate. For example, was Lao Tzu an individual, historic man, or a label applied to a collection of ancient sayings assembled by many authors? Was Lao Tzu, if an actual man, contemporary with Confucius as tradition claims, or did he arrive centuries later? How does one in a far-away land interpret ambiguous passages, which abound in the “Tao te Ching?” How can we evaluate contradictions? There are many. Dates, context, and linguistic nuance can greatly affect such judgments. So far as we can tell, even Chinese experts do not know for sure when this classic work was actually written, or by whom. Are passages in the original order, or scrambled by various fates? Most scholars agree that much ancient literature has been ‘corrupted’ by additions, subtractions, and other changes caused by editors or copiers over time. Which words came from the Master, and which were added by students later? Were words subtracted by powerful critics, or ignorant editors? This often happens if rulers do not like the words of sages, and many editors cannot resist opportunities to “improve” on others’ writing. Since we are quite unqualified to answer such questions, but face profound dangers that beg for wisdom from sages, we have chosen to press on as best we can using English-language sources for each book listed in the notes. We have also chosen to interpret from time to time, as best we can from our tiny base of experience and learning, just because we must. We encourage any reader to improve on this, and to correct any errors of fact you find.

10 For example, the translation of the Tao te Ching by D.C. Lau in 1963 is significantly different than the translation by his student Roger T. Ames (and David L. Hall) in 2003, titled A Philosophical Translation of the Dao de Jing: Making this Life Significant, partly because of archaeological finds in 1973 (Mawangdui) and especially Guodian in 1993 that produced the oldest extant bamboo strips of “Daodejing” including 14 new ones they call “The Great One Gives Birth to the Waters.” Despite their close proximity as student and teacher separated by merely 40 years, these authors use different spellings, different words, and significantly different philosophical lenses and literary styles. To these I would add here another “philosophical translation” by Ashok Kumar Malhotra of SUNY Oneonta, titled Wisdom of the Tao Te Ching: The Code of a Spiritual Warrior, Oneonta, NY: Oneonta Philosophy Studies, 2006. Where Ames is very abstract, pedantic and occasionally opaque, with long, flowery commentaries on every chapter, Malhotra is the opposite, as brief as possible, using the simplest English language possible, because his objective was making the great text accessible to ordinary students instead of just graduate philosophers.
Introduction

In Book I, line 23 of the classic “History of the Peloponnesian War,” Greek historian Thucydides concluded that: “What made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear this caused in Sparta.” He is certainly entitled to that opinion, and deserves honors since he wrote the only extant, detailed description of that very important historic war. But this remains an opinion that can be disputed. And parsing out obvious, proximate causes or triggering events from ephemeral, ultimate, psychological or system level ‘causes’ can be very tedious and open to many, well informed but different opinions.

Still, according to Thucydides, fear of rising neighbors was the most important, if least publicly discussed, ‘cause’ of that epochal war. What might Sun Tzu say? He addresses how to fight wars, mainly, with exceptional clarity. But Sun Tzu also offers some sage advice for leaders. In his incomparable “Art of War,” written sometime in the fifth century B.C.E., Sun Tzu wrote:

Generally, in war the best policy is to take a state intact; to ruin it is inferior to this. To capture the enemy’s army is better than to destroy it; to take intact a battalion, a company, or a five-man squad is better than to destroy them. For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill. Book 3: 1-3.

Sun Tzu’s words have been republished for over 2500 years, long after the emperors he worked for were forgotten, because unlike most of his peers, Sun Tzu was wise as well as skilled. You can see that he would encourage keeping the army strong and the state secure by preserving peace, more than by prevailing in constant wars. If Greek politicians had followed Sun Tzu’s advice, they might have been spared the degradation of their peoples and of the ancient virtues they had used to build their civilization. Instead of moderation, they refined slaughter and barbarism. If they had not destroyed themselves, they probably would have been strong enough to defeat Alexander the Great of Macedonia who conquered them shortly after.

Instead, Sparta, Athens and their many allies destroyed each other, and degraded civic virtues that had sustained their civilization for generations. Thucydides describes that degradation thus.  

Words had to change their ordinary meaning and to take that which was now given them. Reckless audacity came to be considered the courage of a loyal supporter; prudent hesitation, specious cowardice; moderation was held to be a cloak for unmanliness; ability to see all sides of a question incapacity to act on any. Frantic violence became the attribute of manliness; cautious plotting a justifiable means of self-defense. The advocate of extreme measures was always trustworthy; his opponent a man to be suspected. To succeed in a plot was to have a shrewd head, to divine a plot still shrewder; but to try to provide against having to do either was to break up your party and to be afraid of your adversaries. In short, to forestall an intending criminal, or to suggest the idea of a crime where it was lacking was equally commended, until even blood became a weaker tie than party, from the superior readiness of those united by the latter to dare everything without reserve; for such associations sought not the blessings derivable from established institutions but were formed by ambition to overthrow them; and the confidence of their members in each other rested less on any religious sanction than upon complicity in crime.

Later in the same section, Thucydides adds: “Love of power, operating through greed and through personal ambition, was the cause of all these evils. To this must be added the fanaticism which came into play once the struggle had broken out.” Fanaticism is important, because this is among the most dangerous transformations that war can induce. It caused the Greeks to kill each other until they were weak enough to be conquered by neighbors. Fu Sheng (符生) might be an example from Chinese history, but he was apparently so brutal and incompetent that he lasted only two years. There are others in the history of all great nations.

Sun Tzu replies:  

If not in the interests of the state, do not act. If you cannot succeed, do not use troops. If you are not in danger, do not fight. A sovereign cannot raise an army because he is enraged, nor can a general fight because he is resentful. For while an angered man may again be happy, and a resentful man again be pleased, a state that has perished cannot be restored, nor can the dead be brought back to life. Therefore, the enlightened ruler is prudent and the good general is warned against rash action. Thus the state is kept secure and the army preserved. Book 12: 17-19.

14 Thucydides, ibid, Book 3: 82, pp. 242-243.
Apparently, both of these sages urged prudence among citizens and caution among high leaders, even when their power is very great. They knew that power can disappear very quickly if leaders are unwise, and that resulting chaos can be incredibly destructive. What do other sages say?

**Lao Tzu**

Scholars write that Lao Tzu was much less influential than Confucius in the evolution of Chinese philosophy, if he even was an historic man. They also say that Lao Tzu and the “Tao te Ching” remain significant today, which one cannot say about most writings over 2300 years old. Two of his most interesting comments about war and peace, to me, are his first words, and nearly his last. At the very beginning, Lao Tzu writes: “The Way that can be spoken of, is not the constant Way.” This can address the fanaticism that Thucydides saw as his peoples destroyed each other. It can also speak to the bitter religious wars of today, if those who truly think that a “god” loves them more than any other will hear. There may very well be a “God,” but so far as I can tell it loves everyone, equally, period. This is a very unpopular idea to demagogues and fanatics.

In section 193, almost at the very end of his work, Lao Tzu writes: “Reduce the size and population of the state,” and “Ensure that even though the people have tools of war for a troop or battalion, they will not use them …” The first phrase has profound implications for the modern context. No nation has lived the goal of reducing population growth so that prosperity and peace could follow more than modern China. China has thrived therefore, but with growing strength, it begins to bully neighbors. Down that path lies destruction, as I read Lao Tzu.

The second phrase calls for arming the common people for self-defense, but for defense only, and arranging affairs so that they have little desire and no need to attack neighbors, near or far. Both of these are key principles for surviving the developing global crisis that everyone under Heaven feels today.

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17 Lao Tzu, *Tao te Ching*, ibid 1:1, p 57. It bears emphasis that “most interesting, to me” is a reservation that should be applied to every opinion here on writings of far-away sages from thousands of years ago. Picking and choosing which parts seem wise in modern context is a method fraught with analytic perils. Despite such perils, I interpret anyway, especially lines that I have remembered for 40 years because they spoke to me as noted. See below also.
18 This is of course, just this author’s opinion. But some opinions are necessary when interpreting deep philosophy.
19 British philosopher Bertrand Russell was allegedly quoted in a book called *A Word a Day*: “The whole problem with the world is that fools and fanatics are always so certain of themselves, and wiser people so full of doubts.” In any event, fanatics have corrupted many great thinkers by exaggerating their wisdom into certainties of hubris.
20 “The Developing Global Crisis” is a term we have used in many intelligence and military conferences. One example is: *The Developing Global Crisis and the Current Wave of*
Lao Tzu elaborates on this in sections 72 a & b:  

(a) “It is because arms are instruments of ill omen, and because there are Things that detest them that one who has the Way does not abide by their use. (b) The gentleman gives precedence to the left when at home but to the right when he goes to war. Arms are instruments of ill omen, not the instruments of the gentleman. When one is compelled to use them, it is best to do so without relish. There is no glory in victory, and to glorify it despite this is to exalt in the killing of men. One who exalts in the killing of men will never have his way in the empire.

Lao Tzu is rather like Sun Tzu in this respect. Prudence was his first word for rulers, like benevolence was for Confucius. It appears that Lao Tzu prized nature and peace over glory, war and transient wealth. It also appears that he (or they) never sought personal power, which is the way of true sages in the West, like Jesus. Perhaps that is why Lao Tzu is less popular today than others. Peacemakers are often marginalized, rejected, and sometimes they are killed. Witness Jesus, Martin Luther King Jr., Mahatma Gandhi and others I should not name lest we embarrass their living murderers. Tyrants always fear criticism and talent. This is why they repress dissent so fiercely. Free thinkers are fertilizers and catalysts for civilization, but tyrants fear questions and suggestions for improvement. Wise leaders cultivate constructive criticism, and encourage rethinking ancient assumptions. Thus has science advanced throughout the ages. If a civilization is flourishing, it may be able to afford killing some of its best and brightest citizens.

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Migrant/Refugees Heading for Europe" delivered to the 21st "Intelligence in the Knowledge Society" conference of the National Intelligence Academy of Romania "Mihai Viteazul", on October 16, 2016. Its major elements are population pressure, rising authoritarian law and militant religion, ever-growing income inequality, and climate change or gradual destruction of earth’s living system. This paper can be accessed at:  https://www.ceeol.com/content-files/document-570738.pdf

21 Lao Tzu, *Tao te Ching*, *ibid*, Book 1: 72a, 72b, p. 89.
But if a civilization faces stagnation or near death, as they eventually do, the arts of peace and the values of diversity may suddenly acquire merits hitherto unseen by leaders infected by hubris.

Confucius

In the West, the legend of Confucian influence on modern Chinese thinking is profound. So we read him over 40 years ago, but did not understand much. Today, chances for war between our nations makes learning more imperative. So we read again, and learn that Confucius was never a general or an emperor, but rather a scholar and philosopher, whose wisest quotes read more like Jesus than Sun Tzu. Indeed the “Golden Rule” appears twice in the Analects as translated by D.C. Lau, in chapter 12: 2, and chapter 15: 24. We also observe in chapter 7: 21, a student writes, “The topics the Master did not speak of were prodigies, force, disorder and gods.”

So I will comment on a few of Kongzi’s pearls of wisdom after reflecting on Dr. Lau’s summary of Confucian thought. Lau wrote, “The ultimate purpose of government is the welfare of the common people. This is the most basic principle in Confucianism and has remained unchanged throughout the ages.”

Dr. Lau also lists for Western students some cardinal virtues of Confucianism, to wit:

22 See The Evolution of Civilizations: An Introduction to Historical Analysis, by Carroll Quigley, first edition by Macmillan in New York, 1961, especially his chapter on the “Decay Phase” of civilizations. A relevant quote from that suggests chilling parallels to current conditions in the USA: “The Stage of Decay is a period of acute economic depression, declining standards of living, civil wars between the various vested interests and growing illiteracy. The society grows weaker and weaker. Vain efforts are made to stop the wastage by legislation. But the decline continues. The religious, intellectual, social and political levels of the society begin to lose the allegiance of the masses of the people on a large scale. New religious movements begin to sweep over the society. There is a growing reluctance to fight for the society or even to support it by paying taxes.”

“Hubris” is one of the truly great words the Greeks passed down to us, meaning in English roughly “overweening pride,” especially the kind that is corrosive of wisdom and hostile to correction until ignorance gets its reward.


Another translation of The Analects, by Roger Ames and Henry Rosemont Jr. in 1998, rendered this: “The Master had nothing to say about strange happenings, the use of force, disorder, or the spirits.” By any translation, the Master (Confucius) did not like to talk about the use of force, which suggests to me that he disapproved of it.

“Kongzi” is Chinese for “Confucius” in English.

Confucius, The Analects, ibid, p. 32.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Virtue</th>
<th>Chinese Character</th>
<th>English Meaning</th>
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<tr>
<td>Benevolence (ren)</td>
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<td>Wisdom (zhihui)</td>
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<td>Courage (yongqi)</td>
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<td>Trustworthiness (chengxin)</td>
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<td>Reverence (zunjing)</td>
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<td>Recognition of Duty (yiwu)</td>
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Well, these are certainly virtues of value for any human on this earth. At least five would be recognized instantly by warriors of the ancient kind, like Sun Tzu, and by the best philosophical martial artists of the modern era, like Morihei Ueshiba, the Japanese founder of Aikido.  

Elsewhere in “The Analects” available to me, I note especially the following annotated quotes.

“The Master said, ‘It is not easy to find a man who can study for three years without thinking about earning a salary.’” 31 I have found two, but there is no doubt that they are rare. They are rare even today, when ordinary men live longer, eat better, travel farther, and are arguably richer than emperors and kings from just a century ago, much less thousands of years ago.

“The Master said, ‘Make it your guiding principle to do your best for others and to be trustworthy in what you say.’” 32

We have already noted the Confucian version of “Golden Rule,” “Do not impose on others what you yourself do not desire” 33 but we also note later in that same chapter: “The Master said, ‘The gentleman helps others to realize what is good in them; he does not help them to realize what is bad in them. The small man does the opposite.’” This appears to me extremely wise advice for the highest leaders under Heaven, which is also a concept that Sun Tzu and other mystic Warriors recognize worldwide. We must come to understand much better what “t’ien ming” or 天命 means to modern Chinese people.

The thirteenth chapter of The Analects has two related quotes that bear on use of violence by governments. First, “The Master said, ‘How true is the saying that after a state has been ruled for 100 years by good men it is possible to get the better of cruelty and to do away with killing.’” 34 Then, in close proximity, “The Master said, ‘To send

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31 Confucius, *The Analects*, *ibid*, chapter 8: 12, p. 94.
34 Confucius, *The Analects*, *ibid*, chapter 13: 11, p. 120.
the common people to war untrained is to throw them away.’” 35 And finally, near the very end of The Analects, “The Master said, ‘To impose the death penalty without first trying to reform it is to be cruel;’” 36 Kongzi does not appear to be the harsh authoritarian he is often presented as in the West, notwithstanding his many other comments about filial duty and respect for authority in general.

There is no doubt that “respect for authority” is good for communities. Within reason, if they do not become tyrannical police-states. Aristotle (another ancient, but very wise Greek) claimed that even the best virtues, carried to extremes, can become dangerous and destructive vices. 37

**Carl von Clausewitz**

A Prussian general Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) is known today mostly for a book written after the Napoleonic wars, and published in 1832 titled “Vom Kriege” or “On War.” 38 While Sun Tzu is often described in the West as a master of the indirect approach, Clausewitz is considered a master of frontal and massive attacks. His reputation was diminished by experience from World War I, where about one-tenth of European males died when mass, frontal attacks faced modern weapons like machine guns, rapid-fire artillery, and chemical weapons (the latter now banned from civilized armies). The 9-months, serial slaughter at Gallipoli, Turkey, in 1915 stands as a symbol for ‘modern’ generals taking Clausewitz’s advice too literally for too long.

Here is a bad example. In Book 1, Chapter 1, Section 3, paragraph 1, Clausewitz writes: “Kind-hearted people might of course think there was some ingenious way to disarm or defeat the enemy without too much bloodshed, and might imagine this is the true goal of the art of war. 39 Pleasant as it sounds, this is a fallacy that must be exposed. War is such a dangerous business that mistakes which come from kindness are the very worst.” Sun Tzu agreed that excessive compassion could be a weakness for a general, 40 but I doubt he would ever have agreed that the slaughters of the “total wars” World War I and World War II were a good use of armies. Neither would Confucius, as I read his Analects, where the welfare of common people is very important.

37 *Nicomachean Ethics, Book II* by Aristotle the Greek, written around 340 BCE, again during the axial age. The point made here is generally called the “Doctrine of the Mean.” Virtues lie between vices of extremes.
39 This quote is from Book 1, Ch. 1, section 3, pg. 102. It appears to reference a difference of opinion with Sun Tzu.
40 Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, *ibid*, Book 8, 22-23.
In paragraph three of this same chapter, Clausewitz repeats, “To introduce into the philosophy of War a principle of moderation would be an absurdity.” Then, in section 24, he writes: “We see, therefore, that war is not merely an act of policy, but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse carried on with other means.” 41

Despite these harsh conclusions, one can find some small sense of moral dimensions in war in Book 3, where Clausewitz writes: “The moral elements are among the most important in war.” 42 This compares with Sun Tzu’s comments in Book 1 of his Art of War. From that chapter on Estimates, Sun Tzu writes (I paraphrase close sections) 3: “The first of these factors is moral influence, …” Then in section 4: “By moral influence I mean that which causes the people to be in harmony with their leaders, so that they will accompany them in life and unto death without fear of mortal peril.” Then, in section 7: “By command I mean the general’s qualities of wisdom, sincerity, humanity, courage and strictness.” Clausewitz writes elsewhere that his concept of morality includes a “genius” for war that can ignore all rules, because his art is somehow above rules. 43 That path leads, in my opinion, to ruin, for both armies, generals (genius or otherwise) and nations. It is a trail of hubris I have witnessed, and even marched on many times. 44

Strengths and Weaknesses of China versus the USA today, as they relate to Current Crises

Having consulted these sages of war, and occasionally of peace as well, I must now speculate on what this means for the clash of rising Chinese civilization and declining American civilization in the modern era. This is risky business, because it is my duty to be very honest with you all. My apologies in advance for discussing sometimes taboo topics for the good of everyone’s children, and for the Human Civilization, which transcends all lesser versions of “civilization.”

First let me admit that my nation, which I love, has committed every crime conceivable during its brief 241 years of existence, including genocide of native peoples, torture, rape and slaughter of millions, some guilty of war crimes as in World War II, others innocent as the dawn.

41 Clausewitz, On War, ibid, Book 1, Chapter 1, section 24, pg. 119. This is the most quoted sentence in On War.
42 Clausewitz, On War, ibid, Book 3, Chapter 3, section 1, pg. 251.
43 Clausewitz, On War, ibid, Book 3, Chapter 3 entire. This chapter, titled “Moral Forces,” contains a strange mixture of deep admiration for “moral forces” in war with a sublime hubris that only geniuses of war can understand those moral forces, and why they absolve one of all “so-called rules.” He claims such genius is “above all rules.”
44 Having considered these sages carefully, Sun Tzu appears the wisest, so I encourage rereading his quotes on p. 2-3.
One reason is the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) that go far beyond nuclear weapons, and another is deep corruptions that allowed our national command to invade countries on false pretenses, like Iraq in March, 2003. Just listing the 73 countries my nation has intervened in since the Korean War of 1950-53 would take more space than time allows here, and that is before discussing our covert methods and the evidence required to prove their tactical utilities.

My point is not self-punishment. China also has a list of crimes accumulated over 4000 to 5000 years of history. Neither of us is innocent, collectively. Both cultures also suffer from severe “exceptionalism” or beliefs that we are superior. To avoid premature deaths of billions rather than mere millions of innocents, I must now deal with the extreme hubris that “great powers” often display. “Exceptionalism” is very dangerous, yet common as dirt. Americans feel very exceptional, as do Chinese mandarins, Japanese samurai and even Korean patriots, who observe they have survived in between China and Japan for millennia also. My America never admits to imperialist behaviors, yet it has intervened militarily in more countries than any other in recent history, and has been in a state of near-perpetual war most of my adult life. At least six million people elsewhere have died young therefore, probably many more depending on how one counts casualties (if at all). China claims that it has never been “expansionist,” which is laughably inaccurate according to Tibetans and the Uighur, and the peoples of Vietnam, Korea and other neighbors who remember border disputes, the ancient tribute system, and its modern analogues.

Weapons of Mass Destruction have changed all that. If leaders truly comprehend what WMD mean, the days of nine kowtows are over, never to return. So are the days of “Manifest Destiny” and American imperialism. The “Century of Humiliation” is also over, never to return. So we must find a better balance, for the good of our nations and for survival of civilization. One of the conceptual inventors of nuclear power, our most famous physicist Albert Einstein, memorably said: “The unleashed power of the atom has changed everything, except our ways of thinking.” 45 All that was before the new genetic technologies could be applied to biological weapons, which could, in theory, kill everyone quite reliably. I am a geneticist; believe me, this is true.

It should be clear to all by now that either China or the USA (among others) could blow up the entire world fighting over who is biggest, baddest and dumbest. Or, wiser leaders could chose “The Way” which has been written of and spoken about for millennia, in many languages.

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We bring very different strengths to this dilemma. The collective wisdom of China, and the long term, patient worldviews this promotes, is essential to create an international ethos able to survive another century, much less millennia. The individual genius of America, and the ‘can do’ attitude that believes all problems are solvable if ‘free people’ can approach them in diverse ways is also essential, with its correlates of “human rights” and “rule of laws” accumulated over millennia of thought about how to coexist with others in non-hierarchical ways.

Today, China can build a “bullet train” in months, while California dreams of building one in 15 years, maybe. China leads the world in deployment of solar technology, in particular low cost photovoltaics, and makes more steel and concrete than anyone else on earth. But California far outperforms China in consideration of environmental costs, and creative entrepreneurship, so it has far more pristine environment, far fewer deaths due to pollution, and the phenomenon called Silicon Valley. Both of our countries are deeply complicit in destruction of the earth’s living system which sustains us all, peasant and prince alike. In fact, our living system is being killed right now, as witness acidification of the oceans and the sixth “great extinction.” Which wizard of the East or West thought that this was a good formula for “Everything under Heaven?”

Today, we must consider things like ‘who will put a net on Kim Jong-un before he incites a US President to incinerate his nation, spreading death to all near neighbors and perhaps the northern hemisphere?’ And, ‘who will put a net on Mr. Trump before he seeks more applause by starting a discretionary war for entertainment or other egotistic reasons?’ There are many consequences of inaction. South Korea watches and reacts, and as you well know, Japan has tons of weapons-ready plutonium and the skills required to weaponize that in months (perhaps hours if worst-case scenarios are true). Taiwan has similar incentives, yet we are told that its freedom will never be safe, because China desires dominance so passionately. Who will guarantee freedom of trade throughout the South China Sea, so essential to so many Asian and other economies? Will it be the USA, or must it be China, or can the two gorillas set aside their military and cultural desires to be undisputed ‘king of the hill’ and share that burden somehow? Do not assume that either country would see its navy destroyed without unleashing their most powerful weapons, probably destroying Everything under Heaven including most of our peoples.

46 The Wall Street Journal editorial board observed on Aug. 30, 2017, p. A-14, that: “Japan has enough plutonium from its civilian nuclear reactors for more than 1,000 nuclear warheads, and it has the know-how to build them in months. This prospect should alarm China, which could suddenly face a nuclear-armed regional rival.”
Then there are the deep corruptions that cripple both of our nations and the world of high politics in general. Believe us, common people know this is a poison to us all. Yet authorities pretend corruption is unsolvable, or at best somebody else’s problem. Good luck with this; it is a real, stinky, dead-fish problem. But it cripples solutions to other great problems, so we must Press On!

The children of Tiananmen Square beg you to reconsider this kind of death thinking, the desire to dominate at any cost, as do our children from Kent State who were slaughtered by our soldiers in 1970, and many others much less famous who died during civil rights movements in America. A better balance between the state and its citizens is necessary everywhere if we are to endure as a species. WMD make retribution available to ever smaller actors. Crushing individuals because they ask forbidden questions is going the way of nine kowtows and Manifest Destinies. A better balance between humankind and the living system of the earth is also necessary. These can only be achieved by wise, prudent leadership, which is sensitive to ancient ways, but open to the profound changes necessary to turn from fat, old caterpillars into beautiful new butterflies.

The Lakota Sioux offer some words of wisdom for this dilemma, specifically *Mitakwe Asin*, or “We are all Relatives.” This was a concise appeal for harmony among disparate clans of the Sioux, but could it possibly be true? Geneticists have proven this twice, by the arithmetic of population genetics and by the physical evidence of genomic sequencing. If we are indeed “all relatives,” this makes the casual slaughter of wars even more immoral and unwise. How could the Lakota Sioux discover this, without “genetic science” or even writing? One might infer that the Universe (or The Way which guides it) has means of teaching that we do not yet understand. How did the ‘Golden Rule’ find its way into spiritual teachings all around the world?

“Competition brings out the Best, but Cooperation brings out the Most,” claimed a wise dentist named Dr. Ellis. What a concise perspective on main strengths of the West and the East, which should be fused to face that developing global crisis which threatens Everything under Heaven.

Finally, both nations should pay more attention to the concepts of global governance and reform of its institutions. Today, each nation flouts international laws despite “solemn pledges” to honor them and their institutions, like the World Court, the International Criminal Court, the UN, and Treaties to empower them like the “Law of the Sea Treaty” which the US wrote but never signed or ratified.

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47 An “International Consortium of Investigative Journalists” published many stories in November, 2017, based on hacked documents from tax dodgers called the “Paradise Papers.” This was an even greater scandal than preceding “Panama Papers” derived from a single law firm that specialized in creating tax havens for ultra-rich persons and corporations. A review of “Paradise Papers” can be found at: [https://www.icij.org/investigations/paradise-papers/](https://www.icij.org/investigations/paradise-papers/)
The guiding principle should be “what is best for international civilization and the seventh-generation of our descendants?” not just transient national interests.

Therefore, I urge the national command authorities of both China and the USA to consider these words and perspectives of ancient sages as they deal with “clashing” civilizations. Civilizational encounters can be very fertile times, if blended and harmonized by wise leadership. Or they can be the end of “Everything under Heaven.” The Hebrews alleged that their God put before us life and death, but urged us always to choose life. And Jesus said “Blessed are the Peacemakers,” not the warmongers. As always, what you do is up to you.

So I close by restating the wisest words I have found after studying ancient philosophers and practitioners regarding what to do when civilizations clash. They are, as noted above in this essay, from Sun Tzu:

> If not in the interests of the state, do not act. If you cannot succeed, do not use troops. If you are not in danger, do not fight. A sovereign cannot raise an army because he is enraged, nor can a general fight because he is resentful. For while an angered man may again be happy, and a resentful man again be pleased, a state that has perished cannot be restored, nor can the dead be brought back to life. Therefore, the enlightened ruler is prudent and the good general is warned against rash action. Thus the state is kept secure and the army preserved.

Book 12: 17-19. Followed by:

> Generally, in war the best policy is to take a state intact; to ruin it is inferior to this. To capture the enemy’s army is better than to destroy it; to take intact a battalion, a company, or a five-man squad is better than to destroy them. For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.


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48 A principle derived from the Iroquois Confederacy, a Native American group that produced their own democracy.
49 Bible, Deuteronomy 30: 19.
50 Bible, Matthew 5: 9.
In Chinese, as best I can determine, this is:

ming zhǔ lù zhī, liáng jiāng xiū zhī
明主虑之，良将修之

fēi bù dòng, fēi de bù yòng, fēi wēi bù zhàn
非利不动，非得不用，非危不战

zhù bù kě yī nù ér xīng shī, jiāng bù kě yī yún ér zhī zhàn
主不可以怒而兴师，将不可以愠而致战

nù kě yī fù xī, yùn kě yī fù yuè.
怒可以复喜，愠可以复悦

wáng guó bù kě yī fù cún, sǐ zhè bù kě yī fù shēng
亡国不可以复存，死者不可以复生

gù míng jūn shèn zhī, liáng jīng jīng zhī, cǐ ān guó quán jūn zhī dào yě
故明君慎之，良将警之，此安国全军之道也

Followed by:

fū yòng bīng zhī fā, quán guó wéi shàng, pò guó cì zhī
“夫用兵之法，全国为上，破国次之；

quán jūn wéi shàng, pò jūn cì zhī；quán lú wéi shàng, pò lú cì zhī
全军为上，破军次之；全旅为上，破旅次之

quán zú wéi shàng, pò zú cì zhī；quán wǔ wéi shàng, pò wǔ cì zhī
全卒为上，破卒次之；全伍为上，破伍次之”

shì gù bǎi zhàn bǎi shèng, fēi shān zhī shān yě；
是故百战百胜，非善之善也；

bù zhàn ér qū rén zhī bīng, shān zhī shān zhě
不战而屈人之兵，善之善者也
Civilizational Solutions for Relations Between the Middle East and the West — Religious Commonalities Rather Than Sharia Differences

Mohammad Reza Bahmani

Start with a Civilizational Word

I think that “Salaam” (سلام in Persian) is a Civilizational Word. Because there are two conceptual points:

1. Salaam is a starter word for relations between humans.
2. Salaam insists on Growing and Peaceful relations.

Therefore, I am starting with “سلام”.

Content of this presentation

This presentation composed of 4 parts.

- A model for description of a “civilizational approach”;
- Key factors Issue of relations between the Middle East and the West (from a civilization view);
- Importance of distinction between Religion and Sharia;
- A solution based on Religious commonalities and Sharia diversity;

A model for description of “Civilizational Approach”

For civilization analysis of each issue, it is necessary to indicate a conceptual model. In this presentation I explain a model that contains a “thematic analysis” of a definition about civilizations.

![Figure 1: A Model for Description of a “Civilization Approach”](https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol79/iss79/17)
Based on this model, to analyze social issues from a civilizational view, we should study them from following four perspectives:

- The Process of Development;
- The Role of Human groups;
- The situation of social coexistence;
- The Level of social structures.

The basic and theoretical concepts of this model are:

1. “process of development” is the base of our study;
2. “Human groups” play the main role in this process;
3. “Social coexistence” is the central indicator in the role of human groups;
4. Social coexistence can be achieved through “social structures”.

To apply this model we need to evaluate each of above conceptual themes by their respective criteria.

**What is the main question?**

To study the relations between the Middle East and the West based on this model, we have a main question. In the other words, the main question to start with in the process of applying the model, is:

What are **the most important measuring factors** to study the relations between the Middle East and the West?

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**Figure 2- Relations between the Middle East and the West**

**Six Criteria to study relations between the Middle East and the West**

Accordingly, now I am going to introduce six measuring factors that influence relations between the Middle East and the West:
- Governance structures
- Popular institutions
- Cultural diversity and coexistence
- Religious Beliefs and Behaviors
- Energy resources
- Development status

Figure 3- Criteria for study of Relations between the Middle East and the West

We have to notice that these six factors are related together and influential on each other.

We have just focused here on those measuring factor that are related to “religion” and “Human Behaviors”. I call them “soft factors”.

Soft factors for the study of relations between the Middle East and the West

Of those six conceptual factors, I selected three soft factors that are keys to study the relations between the West and the Middle East.

1. Cultural diversity and coexistence;
2. Religious Beliefs and Behaviors;
3. The Governance system that is formed by other two components (popular institutions and state structures).
These three factors can be illustrated with the next image.

**Three soft factors relevant to relations between the Middle East and the West (from civilization’s view)**

I believe these 3 key soft factors for civilization analysis of relations between the Middle East and the West can be depicted like this.
As you see these three factors have overlapping spaces.

Beliefs and behaviors of followers of religions are influenced by two other factors (their cultural contexts and governance systems). Therefore, to focus on religious behaviors and beliefs, it is necessary to consider the impact of the other two factors on this component (religious behaviors). (Figure 5)

From the perspective of this presentation, actors in relations between the West and the Middle East can be divided into two main groups: First, followers of the three main Abrahamic religions (Islam, Christianity and Judaism), and secondly, government systems on both sides.

Two levels of Religious Beliefs and Behaviors

Accordingly, as shown in Figure 5, it can be said that the beliefs and behaviors of followers of religions are influenced by two factors (their cultural contexts and governance systems).

The interaction between these three factors leads us to an important result: the possibility of studying religious beliefs and behaviors in two levels of Sharia and religious basics.

![Figure 6- Two Levels of Religious Beliefs and Behaviors](image)

I have used the theory of Allamah Tabataba'i (contemporary Iranian philosopher and commentator of the Quran) to define the difference between these two layers.

According to his theory:
1. Religious basics: these Abrahamic religions are common and similar in their central foundations. These commonalities could be found in two areas that are monotheism and morality.

2. Sharia: Tabatabaí believes that sharia is the way or path of life and coexistence for Followers of each religion. Tabatabai's terminology, which is rooted in Quranic verses, is different from Western terminology. In the Orientalist literature Sharia is seen and limited to the religious rituals of Islam and Islamic law, while for him Sharia is more or less similar to the lifestyle of religious followers.

It means, according to him, Sharia is the changeable layer of religion. Therefore sharia can abrogate or complete in accordance with time and place conditions and new requirements. But it is not true about a common religious basis. In other words Sharia, in contrary to religion, can be updated and adapted as requirements change.

**Parameters Effective in Sharia Changes**

Many parameters affect sharia changes. Here I consider several topics:

1. Methods of religion's understanding;
2. Culture and lifestyle of religion's followers;
3. New increasing needs for better life.
The Current Image of the Role of Religion in Relations between the Middle East and the West has two Properties

1. For non-Muslims, Islam per se is the only reason for the Middle East crises. They neglect many other factors (such as culture and politics) in making many complicated crises.
2. Exaggeration about sharia differences. This causes conflicts and frictions between each respective religion’s followers.

What is the Civilizational solution?

A Civilizational approach leads us and answers that all actors in relations between the Middle East and the West should have two strategies:

1. Recognition of diversity in sharia disputes;
2. Insisting on commonalities of religions.

![Figure 9 - Two strategies for applying a civilizational view in the relationship between the West and the Middle East](image)

Conclusions: Three points for applying Civilizational solution

1. Sharia differences and behavioral diversities of the followers of religion need to be respected by everyone (as culture diversity is now accepted in the West).
2. The method and rules for religious understanding can be considered as a serious topic for dialogue in academic centers. (As the differences and variety of methods in Western and Eastern academic centers do not conflict.) To bring these diversities to the mass media could be very dangerous and a problem for social solidarity in religious communities.
3. Acceptance of Culture and religious diversity in the Middle East could be a civilizational opportunity for the west. As John Elof Boodin said: Nor does it seem wise to conventionalize our country by a bigoted eradication of the culture heritage that some of the nations are bringing us.
Islam and Christianity
Their Respective Roles in Civilizational Clashes

Habib A. Babaei

Introductory Points

- Historically there are many conflicting points between Eastern and Western civilization. These conflicting points lasted after Islam between the Western and Islamic Civilizations (Crusade Wars and Colonialism and so forth). At first glance, it seems this historical conflict constituted and made essential conflict between Islam and the West so that there are no way to release from civilizational clashes. On the face of it, it seems impossible to go beyond determined history and to escape from an historically inevitable fate, the destiny of war and slaughter.

- On the other hand, there are a few connecting and maybe constructive points between the West and Muslim communities. Considering these points might open new perspectives in the relationship between Islam and the West (for instance, Age of Translation 750 to about 900 AC).

The Question

- What is the main origin of Islam-West clashes over history?
- And what about contemporary possible clashes between Iran-US (as a sample of Islam and the West)? Is it a religious cause, a cultural cause, or a political cause?

Historical Origins of Clashes

- Fundamental difference in the history of Western Civilization and Islamic civilization, and also some significant difference between the history of Islam and history of Christianity. Different place of religion in each civilization (centrality of Islam in Islamic civilization and marginality of Christianity in the Western Civilization.) This is a theological hole between Islam and the West.

- The identity of every civilization arises from the central component of civilization. In order to see what separates Islamic civilization from the Western one, it is a very key point to take the central factors of civilizations into account. This is very decisive matter in tracing the causes of clashes between the Islamic civilization and Western civilizations over history.

- Historical differences such as these could push each civilization to essential conflict and clash.

- In addition, there are some hate-points between Muslims and Western politicians that put psychological and emotional distance between two respective civilizations and between Iran and the US.
• Nevertheless, I think the centrality of Islam and marginality of Christianity in civilization arises from theology and culture simultaneously. Secular culture pushes Christianity (and Islam in the West) into the margin, and the mystical and spiritual culture in the East keeps Islam (and Christianity in Muslim world) in the Center. The clash is between secular and spiritual cultures.

• Another very important point is that Islam is not recognized by Christians as a divine religion, while Islam (and the Quran) recognizes Christianity as a divine religion and Jesus as a divine and fully respected prophet.

• From the Islamic view, there is no essential and fundamental gap between Islam and Christianity. So by considering this religious and Abrahamic foundations it is possible to decrease tensions and frictions.

• Therefore, I think the clash is not between religion (Islam) and religion (Christianity), but between spiritual religion (Islam) and secular culture.

Contemporary Clashes (Iran and the US)

• There are some suggestions in the Quran to make theological and social connection with Ahlul-Kitab (including Jewish and Christian people)

• At the same time there are some verses in the Quran and also some principles in contemporary Iranian constitution that insist on resistance against foreign non-Muslim domination of Muslim communities.

• The Islamic logic behind this constitution is rejection of domination (Nafye Sabil) when the Quran says: ” And never will Allah grant to the unbelievers a way (to triumph) over the believers.” 4: 141

• The same point is insisted by Imam Khomeiny and also supreme leader Imam Khamanei when they consider the Iran-US relationship as a wolf and sheep relationship that continued over many years.

• There were some politicians and some scholars who criticized this political view asserting that Iran is no longer a sheep, and some others insisted that US is no longer wolf as well (in Barak Obama presidency) and we could place our trust in US.

• President Rohani and some of his advocators and adherents supported this view. They believed that the US government is trustable now. So his political team began the JCPOA diplomacy.

• In the time of the Rohani presidency, I think the optimistic ground was ready to change from the wolf-sheep relationship to a peaceful relationship. But this optimistic situation did not last a long time and it shifted suddenly to very deep pessimism after Trump became president. This made new gaps between Iran and the US, and pushed us to very dangerous conflicts and clashes.

• What Donald Trump did is not based on Christianity. Both Christianity and Islam consider breaking a covenant (Nagdh al’Ahd) as immoral and prohibited according to the Bible and the Quran.
And now many politicians and scholars in Iran confirmed that the supreme leader’s prediction came true when he asserted that trusting in the US government is irrational policy.

Now, this clash and conflict is not a clash between two religions, but between religion and culture or religion and politics.

It should be noticed that Iranian experience over the Islamic revolution (40 years) indicates that weakness conduces to war and invasion (Iraq attack on Iran). In order to avoid war and violence it is necessary to be stronger and more powerful.

**Suggested Theological Way**

- Mankind! We created you from a single (pair) of a male and a female, and made you into nations and tribes, that ye may know each other (not that ye may despise (each other). Verily the most honoured of you in the sight of Allah is (he who is) the most righteous of you. ( 49:13.

- The first theological point is to comprehend (التعارف in Quranic terminology) and appreciate one another. (Clashes, Dialogue, and Taarof).

- Based on the Quran, “to know one another “ is the way for good-dealing with others on a social and civilizational scale (اعشروهن بالمعروف).

- Today, Shia Islam is not fully understood by US departments and universities. Shia Islam differs widely from the Salafi one in its political views, in its philosophy and rationality, and also in its morality and spirituality. These play a different role in making social order in Shia world today in Lebanon, Iran, and Iraq.

- To make this kind of relationship between the West and Islam, the best way is to start from Islam and Christianity, and to activate every respective common tie between Islam and Christianity.

- By activation of all inter-religious capacities, it would be possible to transform a secular violent culture into a humanitarian peace culture on both sides.

- According to Richard Niebuhr (in Christ and Culture), I think instead of transforming of cultures it is essential to let flourish humanitarian aspects of every culture. By flourishing of humanitarian features of each culture (alEsareh in Arabic) non humanitarian facets will be decreased and civilizational conflicts and clashes will be controlled.

- By doing this humanitarian flourishing of culture (humanitarian multiculturalism), it will be possible to recognize a sort of universal variety. In other words, by considering this, multiculturalism is necessary for non-US citizens as well on the universal scale.

- Based on this view, recognizing and respecting others’ religion and civilization would be beneficial for oneself and one’s own religion and civilization as well.
In the Islamic theological base, there are ontological relationships between self and others. The more you respect other humans as human beings, the more you will regard and provide humanitarian development on your side.

- Now, a very problematic matter is psychological and historical hatred (on both sides) that generates much hostility between the West and the Islamic world and between Iran and the US.
- Passions in doing international and civilizational dialogue could be very dangerous. I think Albert Hirschman’s theory (the Passions and the Interests) may work when he propose the interests (rational passions) instead of violent and irrational passions.
- So by practicing rationality and kind of piety (Piety as proposed by Marshall Hodgson) it would be possible to go beyond civilizational clashes.
Civilization, Violence, and Criminal Law

Xia Yong and Chen Dan

Abstract

I. Civilization and Violence

From the orientation of human civilization development, civilization and violence should drift apart from each other. From the history of human civilization development, civilization and violence are, on the whole, indeed the case.

Civilization signifies construction and accumulation, and violence signifies destruction and damage. They are running counter to each other.

II. Criminal law and Civilization

Criminal law is not only an important part of human civilization, but also a basic means for human civilization maintenance.

Criminal law suppresses violence and promotes civilization.

III. Violence and Criminal law

Any violence is negative energy. The essence of the criminal law is “violence against violence” which means “using violence for preventing violence”. Its purpose of “preventing violence” manifests rationality; however, its method of “using violence" distributes negative energy. In this sense, criminal law has relative justice.

On the one hand, for all violent behaviors against civilization, criminal law needs to play its full role in preventing violence. In particular, it must keep a tight legal network to curb all forms of terrorist activities, media dissemination activities of all kinds of violence, and all kinds of violent sadistic activities in daily life. For violent behaviors against violence, criminal law should support.

On the other hand, criminal law itself must restrain and move toward the path of penalty mitigation. In particular, for non-violent behaviors, it can take the lead in reducing the intensity of penalties and apply more non-penalty measures.
文明•暴力•刑法

夏勇 陈丹

一、文明与暴力

从人类文明的发展来看，文明与暴力之间应当是渐行渐远。从人类文明的发展历史来看，文明与暴力在总体上是渐行渐远。

文明的取向是建设和积累，暴力的取向是破坏和损毁。二者背道而驰。

二、刑法与文明

刑法既是人类文明的重要组成部分，又是人类文明得以维系的基本手段。

刑法抑制暴力，促进文明。

三、暴力与刑法

任何暴力都是负能量。刑法的实质是以暴制暴，其“制暴”的目的彰显合理性，但“以暴”的方式施放负能量。在此意义上，刑法具有相对的正义性。

一方面，对于反文明的一切暴力行为，刑法需要更加充分地发挥其制暴作用，尤其要严密法网，遏制各种形式的恐怖活动、各种暴力内容的媒体传播活动、以及日常生活中的各种暴力施虐活动。对于以暴力反抗暴力的行为予以支持。

另一方面，刑法本身要克制，走向刑罚轻缓化之路，尤其对于非暴力行为，可以率先降低刑罚的烈度，更多适用非刑罚措施。
The Concept and Path of Criminal Protection in Ancient China's Ecological Civilization

Dong-bangjun

Abstract

Ancient China’s ecological civilization originated from worship of totems. In the ten-day myth recorded in The Classic of Mountains and Rivers, Huang Di used the cloud as the totem to designate the army, and the ancient emperors sacrificed the sun, the moon and the mountains. During the Spring and Autumn period and the Warring States period, the Confucian school and the Taoist school put forward the ecological protection view of “unity of heaven and man and nature” and opposed the human being’s plunder of nature blindly.

In class society, the rulers of the dynasties strengthened the thought of environmental protection. In the imperial edicts of the Qin and Han Dynasties, in the imperial edicts of the emperors since the Qin and Han Dynasties, there were orders to protect the environmental resources, prohibiting the killing of young animals and the eggs of birds, protecting wild animals and plants, and paying attention to afforestation.

At the same time, in ancient China, there was strict legislation on environmental protection. It includes the following aspects: first, the crime of environmental pollution has been set up. second, the crime of destroying trees was set up. The third, the crime of illegal mining was set up. The fourth was to set up a crime, destruction of cultural relics and historic sites. Five, strict penalties were imposed on different types of crimes above.

Keywords: Ancient China; ecological civilization; concept; criminal protection
Sixty Years of the Performances of Shakespeare’s Plays on the Stage in China

Li Weimin

Compared to other foreign plays the performances of Shakespeare’s plays on the stage in China is obviously endowed by nature with uniqueness to attract the Chinese audience. The performances and research of Shakespeare’s plays remains prosperous for many years in China. Because whether in the early years since the founding of the People's Republic of China or in the era of Reform and Opening-up of China, the performances of Shakespeare’s plays on the stage in China were not only a symbol of culture exchange, but also a dialogue with literary canons and international theatrical art which showed the positive attitude of China towards the treasures of international literature art and at the same time it’s a kind of embodiment of national cultural soft power. Especially in the era when we are far away from “salvation” and “revolution“ the need for the acceptance of Shakespeare’s plays and the pursuit of human nature have been far more than the need and pursuit for other foreign dramatists such as Ibsen whose“Social Problem Drama” can directly interfere in civil life. According to various published disciplines statistics reports, citation reports and the data obtained in the statistics of this study Shakespeare is the most commonly-studied writer in China.1234

Meanwhile, Shakespeare’s plays are the most frequently performed foreign plays on the stage in China. Especially in the voice of“Re-reading the Classics”, the reinterpretation of the traditional classical writers’ works which including performances and studies of Shakespeare’s plays is always attractive to the theatrical workers and foreign literature researchers. For this reason there raises a question: How did the performances and studies of Shakespeare’s plays in the 20th century develop in China? This is a task which many people who are ready to perform Shakespeare’s plays on stage and Shakespeare researchers have to face. Therefore it is necessary to review the theories of the performances of Shakespeare’s plays on the stage in China within the sixty years since the founding of the People’s Republic of China.

1 Li Tieying: The Advanced report On Humanities And Social Sciences In China (1999), Social Sciences Academic Press, 2000
2 Li Tieying: The Advanced report On Humanities And Social Sciences In China (2001), Social Sciences Academic Press, 2002
3 Research Group of the Institute of Foreign Literature, Chinese Academy of Social Humanities and Social Sciences (Foreign Literature) scan of Frontier in: Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Review,01-07-2002 In recent years, Shakespeare have been listed as the most commonly-studied writer in China in many works which use biblio-meterology as the study method
4 Social Science Research and Ideological Work Department of the Ministry of Education China Academic Humanities and social sciences research author1996-2000),Renmin University of China press, 2004
In the voice of “Re-reading the Classics,” Shakespeare is definitely one of the classic writers who are supposed to be re-read. And to perform Shakespeare’s plays on the stage is definitely one way to reinterpret the classic works. Shakespeare’s plays were performed constantly on the stage in the history of introducing Shakespeare to China, and many Shakespeare’s plays which were adapted into Chinese dramas or operas with popularity left a memorable impression on people in the over one-hundred-year history of the exchange of Chinese and Western Dramas. Needless to say, with the further prosperity of the cultural exchange between China and foreign countries and the introduction of international performances of Shakespeare’s plays, Chinese performances of Shakespeare’s plays have been constantly tempered to maturity by the Oriental and Western theatrical theories. Some new methods of performance which were brought to China by Western theories of art and drama lent the Chinese performances of Shakespeare’s plays on the stage its own style and methods of performance; that is, the modern drama form of performances of Shakespeare’s plays and the traditional Chinese opera form of performances of Shakespeare’s plays. And with the continuous expanding of the view of art Chinese Shakespeare plays became attractive to both Western audiences and Chinese audiences.

There are many ways to re-read the classic literary works like Shakespeare’s works itself, but performing the Shakespeare plays in the form of Chinese dramas or operas is the best way to integrate Shakespeare’s works with Chinese culture so that classic works like Shakespeare’s plays can go into the midst of the common Chinese people. Shakespeare’s plays are supposed to be performed on the theater stage. That is one of the fundamental characteristics of Shakespeare’s plays which is different from other foreign writers’ works. Therefore we must pay attention to the performances of Shakespeare’s dramas on stage, especially to the successes and shortcomings of Chinese opera versions of Shakespeare’s plays. Chinese versions of Shakespeare’s plays become plays with rich cultural connotations and their own unique aesthetic characteristics which belong to both Shakespeare and China. Obviously this is a glorious mission carried out by Chinese performers and researchers of Shakespeare’s plays.

1. The Performances of Shakespeare’s Plays: The Significance of The Classic Works

According to academic research in recent years the voice of re-reading classical works has not ever stopped. Re-reading classics should not be limited to a range of literary texts, for such a dramatist the “Re-reading” Shakespeare is apparently not limited to texts, instead it should include the continuous performances of Shakespearean’s plays on the stage of theatre. Shakespeare’s plays definitely belong to these classics which we should re-read and reinterpret. That’s because from the point of view of world literature, Shakespeare’s classic status in the literary world shows long-term stability.
Shakespeare’s plays not only take the first place of the studies of classic literary texts in the whole world, but also keep performing on stage continuously. And the ultimate significance of interpreting classics is just to explore the inner spiritual values and aesthetic value that lies in classics, enlarging and reinterpreting humanistic values of classics as well. As Harold Bloom said: “The original sign that the literary works are able to win the classics status is some strangeness, this characteristic is either not be completely assimilated by us, or has the potential to become a well-established habit which makes us blind... ... Shakespeare is the excellent example of the second possibility as mentioned above”\textsuperscript{[1]}\textsuperscript{3}. Shakespeare’s classic status fully shows such strangeness. Shakespeare’s plays have a unique charm of connecting popular literature and classical literature. Shakespeare’s plays can motivate people to produce new knowledge about themselves, and about literature, art, humanity as well continuously. Shakespeare’s plays have been constructed and deconstructed constantly in their communication with the world, and this process of construction and deconstruction of Shakespeare’s plays is the important reason why Shakespeare can win classic status. At the same time, the fusion of modern dramas, Chinese operas, and Shakespeare’s plays produced a batch of Chinese versions of Shakespeare’s plays which have the features of classic exploration both in ideological content and in aesthetic creation.

2. Activation and Amplification: The Shining Modern Drama Versions of Shakespeare’s plays

Without a doubt, Shakespeare’s plays have been performed on stage in many types of dramas and operas during the past sixty years since the People’s Republic of China was founded, including seventeen kinds of dramas or operas such as modern drama, Peking opera, Kun Opera, Sichuan opera, Shaoxing opera, Huangmei opera, Cantonese opera, Shanghai opera, Wu opera (a kind of local opera in Zhejiang), Henan opera, Luzhou opera, Hunan opera, Si’xian opera, Lantern Opera, Dongjiang opera, Teochew opera, Hanchu opera and so on. This situation can be said to be distinctive from the other foreign dramas which were adapted into Chinese versions. Cao Yu once said, ‘we performed Shakespeare's plays in all kinds of different forms, and all of these performances and creations which were shining on the stage have built a beautiful bridge between Shakespeare and the Chinese people.’ If we observe Shakespeare’s plays on the stage of China within the sixty years since the People’s Republic of China was founded, we will find out that the performances of Shakespeare’s plays on the stage of China is mainly divided into three stages or have exhibited three different patterns if we take 1986 as a dividing line.
The first stage, from the early period of PRC to 1986, the performances of Shakespeare’s plays on the Chinese stage mainly took the form of the modern drama that used Stanislavsky’s realistic creation methods to perform, which means in the creation of characters of Shakespeare’s plays actresses and actors were required to accomplish a supreme task besides the completion of respective unit tasks, and this supreme task can be described in one sentence as “a basic, fundamental and all-embracing target that can attract all the tasks and activate the intention of creation which involves all the elements of performers-characters such as psychological motivation and self-perception.” The supreme task is restricted by the playwright’s creative motivation, emotions and thoughts, and is also expressed by the the subjects in the scripts. Although the Chinese theories of performance are also integrated into Shakespeare’s plays this stage mainly stayed in the period of learning; however, compared with the performances of Shakespeare’s plays on the stage in China before 1949, Chinese performances of Shakespeare’s plays have taken a qualitative leap. The second stage, although after 1986 Shakespeare’s plays which were performed in the way of realism were still in a dominant position in this stage, Shakespeare’s plays which performed in the form of Chinese operas appeared massively.

This kind of Shakespeare’s plays which were performed in the way of Chinese operas with both form and spirit not only integrated the art of Chinese operas and Shakespeare’s plays, but also created a batch of Shakespeare’s plays with romantic features under the guide and influence of both the theories of Chinese operas and Brecht’s theatre theories. The third stage: in recent years Shakespeare's plays got into the range of the commercial performances, such as adapted versions of Shakespeare’s plays based on the stories or themes from the original works, or the Shakespeare’s plays performed in the form of parody. There are formal performances of Shakespeare’s plays, and there also are the plays performed on campus, including the Chinese University Shakespeare’s Plays Festival which were held many times, but this kind of performance does not belong to formal performances. Shakespeare’s plays performed on campus are amateur performances, supported by the enthusiasm and interests of young students or the need to practice English, so their value as art is limited.

Talking about Shakespeare’s plays on the stage in China within the sixty years since the founding of the PRC, the modern drama form of Shakespeare’s plays achieved good results at first. We all know that the western plays are “a set of skills and systems of acting, stage art and theatres built by realistic dramas”. Although this kind of modern drama form of Shakespeare’s plays has each emphasis particularly on different subjects, all of them attempt to dig out the profound humanistic spirit which is implicated in Shakespeare’s plays from a realistic perspective, and they all have made high achievements in the specific implementation of making the words in the scripts become active and making the literary images become visible.
The modern drama form of Shakespeare’s plays is regarded as orthodox performances of Shakespeare’s plays in China, which has established the foundation of the classic status of Shakespeare’s plays on the stage in China. And there were a batch of Shakespeare’s plays performed in the form of modern drama which can be called the works with classical factors. Most starring roles in this sort of Shakespeare’s plays performed in the form of modern drama are the top performing artists of China whose performances have already been the training samples for the students of drama schools. For example, the King Lear produced by Central Academy of Drama and the King Lear produced by Liaoning People’s Art Theatre were both starring the famous performing artists of China. Let’s take the King Lear starring Li Moran as an example; this version of King Lear integrated profound thoughts with realistic characterization, and highlighted King Lear’s personalities such as perversity, self-confidence, arrogance, ignorance, but once when the royal robe of King Lear was taken off, Li Moran emphasized the collapse of King Lear’s subjective perception about life. The performance of this version of King Lear used reality to represent absurdity, making the audience feel the power of symbols which showed the fate of not only one single person, but of the entire human race. And the King Lear directed by Yang Shipeng and starring Hu Qingshu who was a famous drama artist has incisively and vividly demonstrated King Lear’s helplessness, greatly discerning and apprehending the ownership and loss of his power as well. In November 1980, Macbeth directed by Xu Xiaozhong and Li Zibo from the Central Academy of Drama highlighted the cruelty of that times which have penetrated into our feelings and imaginations. The symbolic meaning of "blood" in this play metaphorized the tragic connotation of the play itself, and the two directors of this play made the play show that fear is more than mercy in this play. The whole play showed the pain and suffering of a regicide and tyrant, and portrayed the whole process of self-mutilation of Macbeth’s soul.

The Othello directed by Chen Xinyi created three levels of mental space, which are the level of ideal, the level of secularity, and the level of dark revenge. Taking “psychological crisis” on the three levels of mental space can create the condition for the externalization of characters’ mental world, and represent clearly and accurately that the tragedy of Othello is just the loss of his faith in beauty; he became a sinner who destroyed beauty from a hero who pursued and defended beauty. The Othello directed by Lei Guohua is not only a tragedy of personality, but an allegory stressing the universal significance which reveals some fundamental weaknesses of human beings. The relationship between Othello and Iago is no longer the simple pattern of hero and villain in this play. In 1956, the Romeo and Juliet acted by the Performing Cadres Training Class of the Central Academy of Drama embodied the heroic struggle of Romeo and Juliet against the old feudal world with the aim of striving for happiness and love, and also embodied the reconciliation of the feud and the final coming of peace which were obtained by their death.
In 1961, the Romeo and Juliet performed by the 58th session of acting class of Central Academy of Drama as their graduation performance, drew lessons from Chinese traditional operas by taking the methods of acting such as the performance of throwing a ball made of strips of silk and the flowing white scarf to represent the keepsake of connecting the pure love of the young man and woman. The whole play was “both subtle and deep, and was not only beautiful but pure, it can bring people's feelings into a noble realm.” And this play also portrayed the innocent and enthusiastic youth images. The Romeo and Juliet performed by the Tibetan class of Shanghai Theater Academy in 1980 laid the particular emphasis on the fate of the characters and the development track of characters’ personalities.

Although the emphases of all these Shakespeare’s plays performed in the way of modern drama express the themes in the plays, the means of artistic expressions are different; none of these plays is performed by methods of realistic creation strictly, but the plays all attempt to dig out the humanist spirit of Shakespeare’s plays, and interpret the intrinsic progressive factors of Shakespeare’s plays.

3. Content and Form: The Embodiment of Modernity in Shakespeare’s Plays

For the stage of Chinese operas with an age-old tradition and various kinds of operas, Shakespeare’s plays performed in the way of realism made people feel unsatisfied; therefore the Chinese opera adaptations of Shakespeare’s plays became a way of some opera troupes to test their own kind of operas and the level of their directors. As soon as the Chinese opera adaptations of Shakespeare’s plays were performed on the stage, they were appreciated by the experts of Shakespeare studies and the majority of fans of Chinese traditional operas. The combination of Chinese Operas and Shakespeare’s plays took place in mid-1980s when the Chinese opera adaptations of Shakespeare’s plays rose sharply at China's Shakespeare Festival.

Around mid-1980s, although some people realized the possibility of the combination of Chinese operas and Shakespeare’s plays, it was still very awkward in the eyes of some experts of Shakespeare studies. The doubt on the combination was first from whether the Peking operas can be combined with Shakespeare’s plays. Could Shakespearean plays be adapted into Peking operas? Are they Peking operas or are they still Shakespearean plays? While practice had given the answer as early as the 1920s, it wasn’t deeply discussed in theory. Some people realized the isomorphism of aesthetics between Peking Opera and Shakespeare’s plays first. Peking opera has various ways to express life freely, and Peking opera is skilled in telling stories and depicting characters’ mentality, while Shakespeare’s plays were well-structured with beginnings and endings, and always have a happy ending, and the virtual scene could enlighten the imagination.
From the level of aesthetics, the western tragedy is essentially an imitative art, so it forms a special style and features of aesthetics. “The forms of expression of tragedy are the forms of reproducing life ... The mentality of characters is far more important than the external actions and gestures.” [5]586 To Chinese tragedy, the excitement of emotions is based on the stimulation of the external forms (the artistry of beauty), the form of aesthetics is beyond the understanding of content.” [5]591 So, if we could combine the reproduction of life and strong mental conflict of Shakespeare’s plays with the highly aesthetic performances of Peking opera, turning the mental activities into movements, we could, in the spectators’ views, express the deep psychology meanings and perform mental activities of Shakespeare’s plays on the psychology and aesthetics level, deepen the connotation of characters in Peking opera, and build the symbolism, image, concreteness, aesthetics, profundity and typical category of characters. It also meets modern people’s aesthetic requirements for plays.

The researchers who study Shakespeare first noticed the similarities of the stage scenery and the viewing habits between Peking Opera and Shakespeare’s plays. In the 1950’s, Zhang Zhenxian proposed his own views and possibilities of performing Shakespeare’s plays in the style of Peking opera from the aspects of theatres, performances on stage and audience. He thought that there were many similarities between Peking opera and Shakespeare’s plays indeed.[6] Audiences who are very familiar with Peking Opera would pay more attention to the form, even though it’s the same story and the same theater company, because the plot and the narration are not that important. That is to say, the audience of Peking Opera can ignore the stories of Shakespeare’s plays to a certain extent, but focus on the charm of the form of Peking opera; however, there also were some scholars who study Shakespeare who challenged this. Sun Jiaxiu thought it's not easy to adapt Shakespeare’s plays, and it's not just to bring it back and make it over or fill something in it. Sun Jiaxiu proposed an important standard of measuring whether the adaptation is successful or not, that is whether the adaptation meets the realistic spirits of art. It is incompatible and ridiculous for Hamlet, Macbeth and Shylock to wear Peking Opera costumes and to sing Peking Opera. Wang Yuanhua thought that to perform Shakespeare’s plays in China “should preserve the original style strictly in the way like the Buddhist scholar Dao’an abolished the research method of case discussion or like the translation method which were proposed by Luxun, instead of using the method of analogy of domestic books and foreign books (case discussion) or cut some parts out (domestication).

If the audience who have never watched Shakespeare’s plays watch the adaption of Shakespeare’s plays in Peking Opera style and think that Shakespeare’s plays is the same as Peking Opera, this is not a successful introduction of Shakespeare but a total failure.[7]437 If we really want to take Shakespeare’s plays adapted for Peking opera, are there any risks or possibilities of the violation against realism?[8]
In the context that literature should follow the principles of realism, people suspected that using the form of Peking opera can not exhibit the humanistic spirits of Shakespeare's plays which were implicated in the original works; and if we perform Shakespeare’s plays in the form of Peking Opera, we may worry that it is difficult for the audience to accept this form of performance.

In 1986, at the first China Shakespeare Festival, 25 Shakespeare’s plays all appeared on Chinese stage. There were not only Shakespeare’s plays performed under the guidance of realistic thoughts, but also some Shakespeare’s plays performed under the guidance of romantic ideas, and there were not only the Shakespeare’s plays performed in the form of modern drama, but also some Shakespeare’s plays performed in the form of Chinese operas. Especially in recent years the Shakespeare’s plays performed in the form of Chinese operas have attained great acclaim, and have achieved outstanding results in the re-interpretations of classics and the performances of the spirit of Shakespeare, or in the combination of the art of Chinese operas and Shakespeare’s plays as well. Shakespeare’s plays performed in the form of Chinese operas both interpreted the humanism spirit of Shakespeare’s plays and showed the inclusiveness of Chinese operas in the fusion of Chinese operas and Shakespeare’s plays. Through continuous practice, people realized that there are many similarities in inner spirits between Shakespeare’s plays and traditional Chinese operas not only in practice, but also in theory. For such a Chinese version of Shakespeare’s plays performed in the way of Kunqu Opera named “Bloody Hands,” people do not hope “it’s a version which was adapted according to the original works strictly”. At this stage, there are successful versions of Shakespeare’s plays which were adapted in the way of Kunqu opera, Peking Opera, Shaoxing opera, Huangmei opera, Sichuan opera, or Sixian opera.

The Kunqu opera “Bloody Hands” and the Huangmei opera “Much Ado About Nothing” both combined the inner experience of characters and the external performance together, which was not only faithful to the original spirit of Shakespeare’s plays, but also has a strong artistic expression and aesthetic value of art. The Kunqu opera “Bloody Hands” and the Huangmei opera “Much Ado About Nothing” both pursued virtual performances, the virtual installation of space, the feeling of sculpture and stylization which can be also described in one phrase as “The freehand style with allowable deformation.” The feeling of aesthetics was completed in the “imagination”. The Shaoxing opera “Hamlet” combined the lines of Shakespeare’s plays and the lyrical characteristics of Shaoxing opera together, which not only blended the beautiful and deep singing and melody of Yin Faction of Shaoxing opera with the sonorous and exciting characteristics of Shaoxing opera together, but also highlighted the complexity of the prince Hamlet’s character, and showed the positive side of human nature of the young prince in ancient China.
When it comes to adapting Shakespeare’s plays in the way of Chinese operas, the first thing come into mind is whether Shakespeare’s plays, especially “Hamlet” and the other tragedies, can be adapted in the way of Peking opera today. Adapting “Hamlet” in the artistic form of the Peking opera is a vivid presentation of the consciousness of modern aesthetics.

The modern consciousness of the Peking opera version of “Hamlet” can be shown in the form of mobilizing the various artistic means of Peking opera to perform the human nature of “Hamlet”, which requires the directors and actors to take the form of strange exotic culture (the Peking opera) to tell about the process of the struggling of modern people’s souls and personalities by using the original stories. We think that this kind of adaptation is a specific expression of having the modern consciousness of Shakespeare’s plays. For the adapter interpreting the birth of evilness implicated in “Hamlet” which the human being confronts all the time by using the form of Peking opera, the human being is rebuilding the humanistic spirit of our living home as well; this version pursued the beauty and harmony and the embodiment of the value which is completed in this kind of breaking and establishment. The Peking Opera adaptations of Shakespeare’s plays have the significance of demonstration and experience to the other kinds of Chinese operas. And the performance of either the Peking opera version of “King Lear” or the Shaoshing opera version of the prince’vengeance or Sichuan opera version of “King Lear” is a vivid presentation of the consciousness of modern stage, which means the Chinese operas have their own aesthetic principles and habits on the aspect of how to treat the relationship between the aesthetic subject and the aesthetic object (The “Mind” and the “Substance”). Even when the audience confronts the tragedies and the tragic scenes, they will cheer for the performers’ touching singing voice and beautiful appearance, posture and extraordinary martial arts.

It can be said that westerners are quite familiar with the stories of “King Lear.” How to express the glory of human nature which are contained in the plays by using the form of Peking opera is a task before the performing staff. For Chinese tragedies, the purpose is not to inspire audience’s fear and pity, but to make the audience feel moved (corrective influence) by ethical virtues. The Chinese tragedies are not the noble aesthetic of purifying souls by inspiring audience’s fear and pity, but they address the moral influence which comes from reasonable stories (which means the operas meet the logical and ethical standards), the aesthetic of what is good, and the high-profile of education as well.[5]596

If we combine Shakespeare’s reproductions of life and the fierce inner conflict with the performing style of Chinese operas, we could show the profound philosophical connotation and mental activities which are contained in his plays on the level of watching and enjoying, and also could explore and portray the images of Peking opera on the level of philosophy and aesthetics.
Shakespeare’s plays performed in the way of Chinese operas have embodied the complexity, concreteness, esthetics, accuracy and generality of the personality characteristics of many characters perfectly.

The Chinese opera versions of Shakespeare’s plays cannot exist without music and dance. The modern consciousness can be shown by mobilizing the various artistic means of Peking opera to perform the human nature of Shakespeare’s plays, for the European audience who are quite familiar with Shakespeare’s plays, getting the storylines is secondary, and getting the aesthetic feeling has become to be the major aspect. This situation requires the directors and actors to take the external form of strange exotic culture to perform the process of the struggling of the souls of modern people with the music and dance of Chinese operas. Therefore, the Kunqu opera, the Peking opera, the Shaoxing opera, the Huangmei opera and the Sichuan opera combine the form of “performing a story with songs and dances” with Shakespeare’s plays together, which show double classical artistic value in either content or form.

4. Deconstruction and Construction: the Contemporary Value and Commercial Impact of the Vanguard Shakespearean Plays

The performance of Shakespearean plays has been brisked up and has not been confined to the two forms of drama mentioned above since the new century arrived. Post modern elements such as intertextuality, parody, and deconstruction have appeared in Shakespearean plays recently.

Performing Shakespeare in the new deconstruction way has improved performing arts, which extraordinarily appeals to the young generation, and it meets the audience's demand for sensory stimulation, entertainment, and cultural diversity.

How did Lin Zhaohua twirl the kaleidoscope of “Hamlet”? The answer was role transition. “In the first act, the new king Claudius and the queen were ready to leave hand in hand after consoling Hamlet, while crestfallen Hamlet was suddenly in high spirit and turned into an agloat king. Then Hamlet went off the stage arm in arm with the queen. The cocky King Claudius depressingly hung his head and changed into a new Hamlet, and then told about his agony deep inside.”[11]

By changing the external images, the internal feelings and experiences of those two characters were changing simultaneously. Between Hamlet and Claudius's spirits and souls there was a sharp contrast which revealed the complexity of human nature.

“Lin Zhaohua transformed the Renaissance humanistic tragedy into a cothurnus about contemporary people and life. (The director) filled the Shakespearean plays with ridiculous illusionary atmospheres.
Behind all his camouflage there concealed his philosophy of life.” (Quoted from the instruction book of Hamlet 1990, which was performed in 2009.) Lin successfully converted the Renaissance humanism into the discomfiture we are facing today. By exploring the complexity of humanity and perceiving the metaphor of the original tragedy Hamlet, he deconstructed the intrinsic humanism and constructed the inspiration that indicated "everybody is Hamlet".

No matter if Shakespearean plays are performed in modern drama or traditional Chinese opera, they do become an important way for Chinese drama artists to communicate with the world.

Looking back to the past 60 years, there have emerged a batch of classic Chinese Shakespearean plays[12] which are as excellent as Shakespearean plays performed by other countries.

Chinese directors and performers interpret the thinking and humanism spirit of Shakespeare in a unique way and even enrich the plays with Chinese drama aesthetics theories and perform the plays in different kinds of traditional operas: these are all our unique features and the reasons why performances of Shakespearean plays are constantly energetic and attractive on the stage of China.
References:
The Ghost Image in Traditional China and in Western Countries

Li Tianlu

Abstract

The image of the ghost in Chinese and western culture is a problem that needs to be further studied. These ghost images repose the expectations of human behavior, and even reflect different cultural conceptions and the psychological demands of persons. This paper takes the western culture of vampire and the Strange stories from a Chinese Studio as examples, discussing the different historical, religious and philosophical points of view which show how the images of ghosts reflect in China and western countries.

Keywords: image of ghost; vampire; Strange stories from a Chinese Studio, cultural concept

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Ross’s “American Pastoral” and “Human Stain”: Reflections on the Mental Problems of Modern Society

Shi Yuanhui

论文主要以美国当代作家菲利普·罗斯后期所创作的两部代表性作品《美国牧歌》和《人性污点》为例，对罗斯在作品中的现代性社会问题书写进行研究。本论文具体论述了罗斯在这两部小说中对于现代性社会的深刻反思，指出了诸多现代性社会问题如经典的消解、知识分子的世俗化和职业化沦落、主体性意识的零散化、青年的反抗和社会的分裂与对立在小说中的文学书写。
The Concept of Environmental Crime

Zhou Ling and Liu Xiaomeng

以新人类中心主义为基础构建环境犯罪法益概念

摘要

我国从1997年《刑法》增设破坏环境资源保护类犯罪以来，关于环境犯罪相关的立法正日趋完善。但目前环境犯罪领域仍存在诸多问题难以解决。如环境犯罪到底是实害犯还是危险犯，环境刑法的犯罪圈如何划定？捕杀非珍惜野生动物是否应当入罪？这主要在于我们对环境刑法所要保护的法益未有明确认知。当前我国环境法益研究中环境法益抽象化与生态法益独立化的观点违背了当前环境伦理观的发展。

出于当前环境伦理观的发展和风险社会下防控环境风险的考量，笔者认为，我国环境刑法的法益应当是一种基于新人类中心主义环境观的多维度的可持续发展利益。本文提出一种多层次结构的环境法益概念：第一层次是基于现实危害性的直接法益，指个人或社会集合体遭受环境污染类犯罪直接威胁的，可预见且可计算的经济利益和安全利益，这是环境刑法法益最直接的表现形式。侵犯这类法益的行为在犯罪客观要件形态上以实害犯与具体危险犯为主。第二层次是由可持续发展理念推导出的间接法益，是以风险社会概念为基础，可能因破坏物种多样性与生态系统的行为而遭受难以直接估算具体损失的社会经济可持续发展利益。这是环境刑法法益的主要间接表现形式。侵犯这类法益的行为在犯罪客观要件形态上以抽象危险犯为主。第三层次是基于法益精神化理念产生的环境法益，主要是以严重无视公序良俗的方式实施的包括虐畜、污损等行为可能侵犯到的人类共同环境道德与价值。这类法益本身缺乏实体性利益基础，在不同的刑法观视野下，会带来诸如犯罪圈设定以及刑法谦抑性等问题的争议。
Expansion and Innovation of Chinese Translation Studies in Cross-Cultural Contexts

Jiang Zhihui

Abstract

From the cross-cultural perspective, this paper retrospects how Chinese translation studies developed from the traditional phase to the modern stage. During this process, Chinese translation studies expanded and innovated by the linguistic-turn and cultural-turn of Western translation theories. However, there are still problems and shortcomings in present Chinese translation studies. Based on this, the paper tries to propose a new translation theory — Commune-Translation, which integrates the theories of Communication and Translation and lays emphasis on pre-translation and post-translation. Commune-Translation will provide some guiding principles for the Going Global of Chinese culture and hints for retaining the entity of Chinese translation theories.

Keywords: Cross-cultural Context; Commune-Translation; Pre-translation; Post-translation

翻译学：在跨文化语境中的拓展与更新

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摘要：本文立足于跨文化语境，从历时的角度梳理了中国翻译学从传统走向现代的过程，即西方翻译研究的语言学研究范式和文化研究范式给中国翻译研究带来的拓展与更新，并针对中国翻译研究在此过程中存在的问题与不足，提出一种翻译学和传播学相结合的跨学科理论尝试——译传论。译传论在译介学基础上，更加注重译前传播与译后传播，它不仅对于目前中国文化“走出去”具有理论指导作用，也为目前翻译学跨学科探索中如何保持中国翻译学的主体性具有启示意义。

关键词：跨文化语境；译传论；译前传播；译后传播
The Patrons of Lin Shu’s Translations and Their Influence

He Aijun and He Haiqin

Abstract

The success of Lin Shu as a translator and the creation of his translated novels should not be attributed to his own efforts, but to the collaboration of many patrons including powerful individuals, his coworkers, social groups and publishers. During his 27-year translation career, these patrons played an indispensable role in his translation practice from the choice of targeted translated texts to the spread of the translations. And because of their different patronages in economy, ideology and poetics, Lin Shu also took on different looks in terms of his translation attitudes, economic ability and social position.

Keywords: Lin Shu’s translations; economic patron; ideological patron; translator’s identity
Interpretation of Wallace Stevens’ Poetry from Heidegger’s Philosophy of Death

Jiang Zhihui

Abstract

Life and death is one of the themes of Wallace Stevens’ poetry. Sunday Morning and The Emperor of Ice Cream show his understanding of nihility in the emotion of anxiety and his acceptance of death, which present the coherence of his attitude towards life /death and Heidegger’s philosophy of “being-towards-death”.

Keywords: Wallace Stevens; Heidegger; Philosophy of death; “Being-towards-death”
基金项目：本论文系2016年江苏省教育厅高校优秀中青年教师和校长境外研修资助项目及苏州市职业大学博士科研启动基金阶段性成果。

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20世纪的西方是一片精神的“荒原”，上帝已死，信仰解体，对生命的意义和对死亡的思考再次进入人们的视野。史蒂文斯一生创作了无数的诗歌，表达了他对生命的意义与认知，其中很多的主题与死亡有关。他的第一本诗集《风琴》里如果有内在一致的主题，那就是用生命接受死亡。海德格尔是史蒂文斯一直关注的一位哲学家。海德格尔关于荷尔德林作品的一系列思考，在一定程度上与史蒂文斯在诗歌美学中表达的理念具有一致性或者说是相似性。史蒂文斯在诗歌中和海德格尔在哲学中对生命和死亡进行了不同程度的探讨。到目前为止，对两者死亡主题进行解读的文章寥寥无几，本文试图研究史蒂文斯的诗歌中对生命与死亡的理解如何与海德格尔的死亡观相契合。

一、存在与焦虑

海德格尔把人的存在方式区分为非本真的存在与本真的存在。非本真的存在就是日常生活中的存在。基本样式是“沉沦”（Verfallen）。“诱惑、安逸与异化”标识着沉沦的存在方式。”[1]320 人们在现实生活中忙忙碌碌地，为生活奔波，在繁琐的事务中忘记了自己生活的真正目的、价值和意义。在迷茫中沉沦于芸芸众生中，本真的存在则是个人真正地作为自身而存在，即此在。海德格尔认为死亡作为此在的终结，就是向死亡的存在，”死亡只在一种生存状态上的向死亡存在之中才存在”。[1]320 这两种存在方式对待死亡的态度也截然不
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同，即“非本真的同死而死”与“本真的同死而死”，“非本真的同死而死”特征是“惧怕”（Furcht），主要体现在恐惧死亡，总是思量着死的可能性，以及何时变为现实和对死后世界的想象。这种惧怕使人们更执着于日常生活中的死，从而更加沉沦于世俗的人事之中而失去自我，死亡在这个过程当中具有意义被弱化了，人们只是被动的等待死亡，面对死亡的另一种情绪是焦虑，与惧怕不同，焦虑一般毫无由来，没有明确的对象。当焦虑的情绪袭来时，人们感到茫然失措，对于生活无法把握，人们处于失控状态，平时认为的生存环境都消隐不见了，随之而来的焦虑的基本情绪，我们就体会到此在的遭遇了，在此的遭遇中，无我被揭示出来，而且无我必须在遭遇中才能得而追问。” [2] 与惧怕相反，焦虑所领会的正是死亡的本质即无我，既然死亡是不可避免的，何不在焦虑中坦然面对无我，从而大彻大悟，个人的本真存在不再执着于日常生活中的在，而是转移到自身上来，督促此在实现自身生存的无限可能性，从而超越生命的有限性以达到自由的存在，所以同死而死的本质上就是焦虑。

与海德格尔一样，海德格尔的焦虑同样趋于沉沦之中，丧失了真正的自己，他追求“本真的存在”，用他的语言给迷失的人们重塑的一点，从而使其在那种丧失了自我的沉沦状态中苏醒过来，在信仰丧失的混乱世界中重建秩序，追求自我的价值，《星期天早晨》这首诗歌中的海德格尔描绘了一个普通的星期天早晨，在温馨的早餐时刻，女主人公没有去教堂做礼拜，而是思考被毁灭的耶稣和圣经描绘的天堂，她开始勇敢面对自己渺小的信仰，不再沉沦于日常生活，引发了一系列关于生命的追问，诗中生动地展示了海德格尔所说的“此在”在思考死亡本质时产生的焦虑，面对信仰解体后的无我世界，追问人们该如何何从的状态，诗的开头用色彩鲜明的事物营造了一种悠闲、祥和的气氛：“女式睡衣的安逸，迟来的咖啡/和橙子，在一张洒满阳光的椅上，跟一块/地毯上一只美冠鹦鹉的/绿色随意混合着，驱散/古代祭献的神圣静寂。” [4] 但是诗人在接下来笔锋一转，主人公因为没有做礼拜而漫意识里拥有的犯罪感使得周遭明快的节奏变得沉重，死亡的阴影逐渐靠近：“她稍遥做梦，她感觉到那场/古老灾难黑暗的侵犯，/如一只静谧在水光里变暗。/酸涩的橙子及明亮、翠绿的翅膀/似乎是某死者列队的事物，/婉蜒穿过宽大的水域，没有声音，/白昼就像宽大的水域，没有声音，/静止不动好让她做梦的双足/越过海洋，去到宁静的巴勒斯坦，/血与坟
塞的领土。”[4]闭塞安逸的气氛突然被一种幻灭感和焦虑感自然而然逼近：主人公残存的信仰让她感到不安，耶稣为人类赎罪而做出了巨大的牺牲，而她却做不到，不愿意跟随耶稣，自我救赎将无法实现，永生将难以实现，于是眼前的事物都蒙上了死亡的阴影。


在焦虑中经过一系列的质疑和思考，主人公对耶稣之死有了新的认识，“她在寂静的水面上听见/一声叫唤：‘巴勒斯坦的坟茔/可是徘徊的幽灵的门廊’/那是基督安息的坟茔。”[4]“她”认为耶稣之墓也仅仅是他死后的安息之所，并不是我们寻求精神慰籍和寄托的地方，诗的第六节指出“死亡是美丽之母，是神秘之母，在她炎热的怀抱中，我们让自己尘世的母亲无眠的等待”。[4]在这里诗人提出了与基督教相背驰的思想：有限即永恒。传统基督教的思想认为人们信仰基督教，接受耶稣为是救赎我们赎罪而死，那么死后就可以进入天堂而得以永生，这是存在的价值和意义，而诗人却不欣赏永恒的天堂，不再对永生有期盼，开始拥抱死亡，因为有终结才有变化的风景。现世的人们由于过多的沉迷于对未来世界的想象，忘却了“尘世的母亲”，即大自然和现实世界。在反思中，诗人对死亡有了新的认识，既然死亡是存在终结时的必经阶段，人们就不应该在沉沦于现实世界中，成为众生的一员，而应该自由地去追寻他自身的真正存在，即向死而生。
二、向死而生

在海德格尔看来，死亡是一种有独特启示意义的积极力量。关键在于，“死是此在的本质的、无所关联的、不可逾越而又确知的可能性”。(25)他指出真正的向死而生的基本特征是：“先行在向在是在自己存在中的情况，并把此在带到主要不依靠操劳操持而是去作为此在自己存在带到可能性之前，而这个自己却就是热情的、解除了常人的幻想的、实际的、确知它自己而又缓慢的向死的自由之中”。(26)正因为死亡使个人的存在变得很有限，才促使个人要来认真思考他的存在究竟包含一些怎样的可能性，一个人在沉沦中被日常生活消磨得毫无个性，一旦当他在瞬间领会到自己的死以及死后的虚无，这时他就会发现，沉沦在世界和人们之中毫无意义，他应成为唯一他所能是的那样一个独一无二的人。这时的他会强烈地意识到自身不可重复的价值，从而渴望在有生之年实现自身所特有的那些可能性，所以，“真正的向死而生”就是“先行到死中去”，通过在先行中所领会的你的死与世界、与他人无关涉的状态，把你的真正的存在个别化到你身上来。所以，对自身的死的确实领会以“揭示出实际上已丧失在普通人日常生活中的情况”，把个人从沉沦的异化状态拯救出来，从而积极地自我设计，开展出“最本己的能是”，成为唯一这个人所能是的真实的个人。

埃塞文斯也有类似的论述，在论文《类比的效果》中，他写道：“举个例子，一个人以现实为满足，当他走到生命的尽头，他回到现实，就好像一个人从虚无梦幻中回到家乡的村子，那里一切可见可感，他珍视这一切，并尽力返回这一切。他没有想象地看待这一切，他不是更清楚地看到了自己清晰的现实，他不是在类似中栖居吗”。(27)从这点上来看，史蒂文斯和海德格尔对死亡的理解都是存在的终结，在走向终结的过程中，此在应该实现作为个体存在的种种可能性，即“向死而生”。

《冰淇淋皇帝》这首诗充分展示了史蒂文斯对海德格尔的“向死而生”的死亡观的认同。他通过最朴素的运动与静止的描述来表示他对于死亡的独特看法。诗歌通过生命和死亡的两部分对比和展示，让人们意识到逝者已逝，生命还要继续前行。虽然描写葬礼的场面，与诗歌开始的场景喧嚣而热闹，毫无肃穆可言，“喊那个卷着雪茄的人过来，/肌肉发达的那个，叫他打些/淫欲的奶冻在厨房杯子里。”“让她们冲去，身上的衣服/就是她们习惯穿的那种，让男孩子们/把包在上月报纸里的花拿过来。”(28)粗壮的大汉在厨房里制作清凉可口的冰淇淋，人们的衣着随便，态度随意，就是带来的花束也随手用旧报纸包扎，一群前来守灵的男孩女孩在厨房里闲谈，尽情享受着冰淇淋的清凉和甘美。人们忘记了对逝者的哀悼和告别，沉浸在冰淇淋的盛宴里，凝重和忧伤，宁静和寂寞不再是葬礼的主旋律，快乐和享受才是对
待生活的态度。在诗中对于守灵者而言，死亡是司空见惯的事情，死亡只是生命的终结，并非通往天堂的阶梯，无所谓浪漫和神圣。没有了天堂和地狱的存在，死亡就不再令人敬畏，对他们来说现实的生活才是应该追求的，活着的人就是要享受冰淇淋的甜美，享受现实的生活，享受生命中的乐趣。诗的下半节描述了冰凉而孤独的死亡场景：“从那松木的梳妆柜里，它少了三个玻璃把手，取出那条床单/她曾经在上面睡过，绣过扇尾鸽/把它铺开来遮住她的脸。/她那长了粗硬老茧的双脚伸在外面，不过在表明她全身冰冷，哑然无声。”[1]

扇尾鸽是一个宗教意象，是圣灵的化身，因此“绣了扇尾鸽的床单”表现了老妇人对天堂虔诚的向往。然而这样有宗教寓意的床单却遮不住老妇人的双脚，冰冷的双脚揭示着死亡的存在，无论如何去装饰它，美化它，也无法使死亡看上去更圣洁，冰冷、阴沉、僵硬的氛围构成死亡的情境，令人不寒而栗，同时无可奈何。

这首诗歌的基调并没有描述想象中的哀伤和肃穆，相反，冰淇淋却成了葬礼中的“皇帝”，主宰着人们的欲望和行为，对人们来说，任何的悲伤和肃穆都是无用的虚饰，死亡就是死亡本身，正如绣上扇尾鸽的床单终究遮不住粗硬老茧的脚，这些不过是虚无的想象，只有生的欢乐和死的冰冷才是现实。冰淇淋皇帝让一切的虚无想象都弱化了，葬礼的气氛不需要虚假的肃穆和伤感；死亡的寒冷使人们更愿意抓住现实生活的快乐和生命的价值，未来世界是虚无飘渺的，正如诗人所言，“让是成为似的终曲罢了，唯一的皇帝是冰淇淋皇帝”。[1]史蒂文斯正是要通过该诗告诉我们，死亡是一件正常的事情，是每个人的最终归宿。然而面对冰冷的死亡，和幻灭的天堂，活着的人更应该珍惜生命，抓住今天，活在当下及早享受现实的生活。

三、结语

在《星期天早晨》和《冰淇淋皇帝》两首诗歌中，史蒂文斯通过耶稣的死和老妇人的死，让读者跟随他“先行到死中”去体会死，去感受到存在的有限性，及其虚无的本质，从而认识到死是不可超越的可能性。在此不可超越的可能性之前，却延伸着种种可以实现的可能性。正如海德格尔认为，正是先行到死中去的体验使人从凡人琐事中解脱了出来，从而获得自由，开始对向着自己的死延伸过去的那些可能性进行选择，从而实现此在的“真正的向死而在”。至此，我们看到了史蒂文斯与海德格尔在死亡观上的一致性。
参考文献：


Tea Book: Publishing Process and International Promotion of “Best Book Design from All Over the World”

Wang Xiaoyan

Abstract

The book “Tea Book” was recognized in the domestic and foreign publishing industry and design world as it was originated from the development and creativity of the related ancient book resources about “tea culture” in the Complete Library of Four Branches of Literature by the Commercial Press. In addition to the text typesetting, the book is produced with the interspersed celebrities’ “tea pictures”, the traditional vertical line-bound book format, full-color printing, an elegant and fresh appearance, and a well-integrated content and form. Tea Book participated in the competition of “Best Book Design from All Over the World” and won the award in 2018. It can be described as a vivid practice of the international communication of China’s “tea culture”.

Keywords: Tea Book; ancient books; binding design; cross culture
Differences Between Chinese and Western Viewpoints on Life and Death as Reflected by the Hungry Ghost Festival and Halloween

Tian Wanqing

Abstract

Festivals not only serve as an important carrier of culture, but also as an important witness to cultural heritage. What is hidden behind festivals is a nation’s cultural concepts and its cultural spirit. The Chinese Ghost Festival, which is closely related to death, is deeply influenced by some religious thoughts of Taoism, whereas the Halloween represented by the West originally originated from the “All Hallows Day” of the European Catholic Church hundreds of years ago. Both of them are regarded as the most direct forms to commemorate death in different civilizations, which exerts great difference in festival cultures. This paper aims to research the difference between Chinese and Western viewpoints on Life and Death and beliefs in the soul through the comparison between Chinese and Western festivals and people’s attitudes toward festivals.

Keywords: Hungry Ghost Festival; Halloween; viewpoints on Life and Death

中元节与万圣节所折射出的中西方生死观念的差异

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摘要：节日不仅被视为文化的重要载体，也是文化传承的重要见证者，节日背后潜藏着一个民族的文化观念和文化精神。中国与死亡密切相关的中元节，深受道教学说思想的影响，而西方的万圣节最初则来源于两千多年前欧洲天主教会的“天下圣徒之日”，两者作为不同文明对死亡最直接的祭奠形式，节日文化差距巨大，本文从中西方的节日形式、人们对待节日的态度方式的对比中来思考由此表现出来的中西方生死观念和灵魂信仰上不同之处。

关键词：中元节；万圣节；生死观念

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The New Construction of Marxist Confucianism in the Context of Globalization

Guo Yingjie

全球化背景下马克思主义儒学的新建构

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摘要：马克思主义儒学概念的提出得益于中国儒学的马克思主义阐释，其新型话语建构受到国际和国内多重因素的深刻影响。在全球化背景下，马克思主义儒学不仅是中国学术领域的一种创造性阐释，更是一种基于世界多元文化思想模态和中国政治、经济、文化等现实语境所做出的比较中庸的学术论断，是新见解和新主张。一方面，它立足于中国国情，是中国马克思主义儒学派的新话语，另一方面，它着眼于世界文明，是与国际学术思想对话和争鸣的结果。历史地来看，马克思主义儒学得以阐释只是一个“宏大叙事”的开始，更多富有创新性的工作还需要继续。

关键词：马克思主义儒学；全球化；新建构

一、引言

马克思主义源自西方，是西方诸哲学流派中非常有影响力的理念之一，于20世纪20年代传入中国，成为中国无产阶级救亡图存、打破旧世界建设新世界理论武器。发展到今天，它已是“中国社会的指导思想、意识形态，又是中国人的终极关怀和信仰基础”。儒学是中国几千年未衰的传统文化精髓，是东方文明体系中最具代表性的文化现象之一，它也是“世界古代文明中唯一的主流文人文学说”；是中国文化之根，民族精神之魂，是中国人为中国人“思想核心”之一。表面上看，马克思主义和中国儒学一东一西，属于两种文化体系，似乎没有任何关系，但是随着中国近百年历史的运动轨迹，会看到马克思主义和中国儒学不仅有内在联系，而且联系非常密切，它们之间存在诸多共性特征。归根结底，这是由特殊的中国国情和国内外时代背景共同作用的结果。关于马克思主义与儒学的关系研究，国内学界曾经提出“对立说”、“并存说”以及“融合说”等。在新世纪，有学者提出马克思主义的中国化与儒学的现代化，使马克思主义与中国儒学的融合性研究成为热点问题之一。尤其是近来年，陈众议先生（2014）提出“立足本土”观念以及方汉文先生（2016）提出“中国马克思主义儒学派”使“马克思主义儒学”（简称“马儒”）成为新话语，成为研究
经典解释的新学科，也由此推动并形成了马克思主义阐释学在中国的新型话语构建

二、马克思主义阐释学新型话语建构的迫切性

从国际背景来看，马克思主义和中国儒学都产生于特殊的历史阶段，既是人类特有的精神产品和文化现象，又是历史不断沉淀的结果。马克思主义理论的奠基人之一恩格斯（1820-1895），早在《致梅林》中就已经阐释说：“历史思想家（历史在这里应当是政治、法律、哲学、神学——总之，一切属于社会而不是单纯属于自然界的领域的简单集合）在每一个科学领域中都有一定的材料，这些材料是从前的各代人的思维中独立形成的”，旨在说明：诸如“政治、法律、哲学、神学”等历史“材料”之间存在相互借鉴和融通，其关系的确立客观实在，完全不以人的意志为转移。

从某种意义上讲，马克思主义与中国儒学进行结合也是不以人的意志为转移的，因为它是在特殊的历史语境下的产物，顺应了历史发展的趋势，在近现代国际多极化氛围中产生的奇花异朵。历史地来看，该奇花异朵虽然曾经倍受质疑和批判，遭受来自西方各种意识形态和文化力量的冲击，但是，建立在“仁、义、礼、智、信”基础之上的中国儒学以及与其有紧密关系的马克思主义哲学信念，有的放矢地指导中国人民进行社会主义政治、经济和文化建设，取得了令全世界人民瞩目骄傲的成就，也让包括美国、俄罗斯、英国、法国等资本主义国家不得不刮目相看。“实际上历史已经证明：儒学完全可以适应现代化。20 世纪 70 年代，‘亚洲四小龙’的经济起飞，已经被西方学者认为是儒家学说的成功，因为‘亚洲四小龙’基本上是以中国儒学为传统的。21 世纪中国复兴，中国经济成为世界第二大经济体的事实，再一次证明了儒家学为传统的中国文化完全可以现代化，并且更为马克思主义阐释提供了有力的实践与理论依据”。

现如今，当包括美国在内的西方资本主义国家以迫切的心态急于从中国的儒家思想体系中汲取营养，从马克思主义儒学价值观念中寻求赞誉的历史背景下，作为中华民族的成员，我们更应该放眼世界、着眼未来，把中国气派、中国风格和中国精神发扬光大，使之在世界舞台熠熠生辉。这是一种历史担当，也是历史赋予新一代中华儿女的责任，更是从全球化背景下探讨马克思主义儒学新型话语建构的动力和源泉。

从国内背景来看，由于我们坚持马克思主义理想、信念不动摇，在国家建设方面始终立足于中国的基本国情，注意与中国特色社会主义紧密结合，已取得丰硕的成果，积累了许多成功的经验，这些都亟需我们继续保持冷静的头脑，做出更富有成效的阶段性总结，以充分理顺马克思主义哲学理论与儒学为代表的中国传统思想文化之间的关系。在学术研究层面，这些年来，有不少中国学者将马克思主义和中国儒学放在同一个视阈内进行综合考察，无论是张三萍（2006）提出的“现代新儒学的马克思主义观”、徐庆文（2010）论及的“20 世纪中国马克思主义儒
学观的变迁”、邵龙宝（2011）提出的“马克思主义的中国化和儒学的现代化”、丁成栋（2012）讨论的“儒学与马克思主义关系研究的三个面向”、杜维明和王杰（2013）进行的“马克思主义与儒学的交流与对话”、何萍（2015）“从马克思主义哲学中国化的视角看马克思主义与儒学的关系”等，都秉持非常理性的态度对马克思主义和中国儒学进行客观分析，但时代之所需，学者之所想，具有重要参考价值。当然，也需要明确的一点是，由于学者们考虑问题的视角和思想深度不一，所做出的文本阐释和最后结论不同，在一些具体问题的分析层面还存在差异，需要我们实事求是地做出更加系统的梳理和再阐释。在该方面，方汉文先生的话给我们以启示：“马克思主义是我们的指导思想，而儒家学说是中国传统文化的思想核心。在新时期的语境中，马克思主义对儒学的诠释与建构必然成为中国理论话语的中心”，尤其是中国儒学到了现代儒学这个发展阶段，“作为中国传统文明的思想理论，必然要通过马克思主义的阐释才能得到新生，这是儒学阐释的前提”②。

三、马克思主义儒学新型话语建构的认识论

在全球化背景下，首先要认识到：马克思主义儒学强调以人为本，凸显人的潜在价值和信念。中国儒学在经历了汉代之前的“原始儒学”、体系化的“汉儒”、倡导明德和知性的“宋明儒学”之后，迎来了中国儒学的新时代，即中国现代儒学阶段。中国现代儒学仍然继承和发扬几千年的优秀文化传统，希望在人的主体性建构、价值观念维度以及人文主义精神、民族精神、时代精神等方面做出新贡献③。马克思主义儒学观基于中国传统儒学的精神，在于人的基本问题上与现代儒学一脉相承。《论语·述而篇》云：“志于道，据于德，依于仁，游于艺”④，认为人要注重内心修养、德行和作为，不仅在价值观方面要弘道于心、立志于道，还要修德于性，践德于行，同时通过游艺于情向上升华人生境界，实现“人之为人”的目标。倘若“德之不修，学之不讲，闻义不能徙”，那么作为人不仅不仁义，而且失去了做人的根本，所谓“个人的价值观念和理想追求也不过是市井鄙琐，所以《论语·里仁篇》也讲：‘不患无位，患所以立’，‘不患人之不己知，患不知人也’。儒学中的人是现实中的人，在‘天地人’三才当中，人的价值和地位最重，因为人是联系天与地的中介和纽带。儒家认为人的理想品格的发展，其最高境界是‘内圣外王’，内在修为和精神修养是重要途径，当然人必须置身于社会，把自己的修为和修养变成现实的成果，才算真正意义上的功成名就。所以，《孟子·公孙丑章句上》云：“无侧隐之心，非人也；无羞恶之心，非人也；无辞让之心，非人也；无是非之心，非人也。恻隐之心，仁之端也；羞恶之心，义之端也；辞让之心，礼之端也；是非之心，智之端也。人之有是四端也，犹其有四体也”。马克思主义理论也把人当作客观现实的重要组成部分，认为人和社会的存在和发展都为了人类自己，至于过程如何也最终取决于人。“整个历史也

② 相关论述及周天锋参见张三军：《现代儒学马克思主义中国化的研究》，《学术论坛》2006 年第 9 期，第 27-29 页；徐复文：《革命与建设——20 世纪中国马克思主义中国化的变迁》，《文史哲》2010 年第 6 期，第 158-165 页；郭松立：《马克思主义的中国化和儒学的现代化》，《思想理论》2008 年第 6 期，第 57-62 页；丁成栋：《历史与未来：儒家与马克思主义关系研究的三个面向》，《马克思主义与现代》，2012 年第 4 期，第 195-200 页；杜维明、王杰：《面向未来：马克思主义与儒学的交流与对话》，《学术月刊》2013 年第 8 期，第 35-41 页，何萍：《从马克思主义哲学中国化的视角看马克思主义与儒家的关系》，《思想理论教育》2015 年第 1 期，第 4-12 页。

③ 方汉文：《中国儒学的马克思主义阐释》，《上海文化》2016 年第 8 期，第 29-32 页。
④ 同前，又见周天锋等：《东西文化与哲学》，北京：商务印书馆 1999 年版。
⑤ 本文中所有关于《论语》《孟子》《大学》《中庸》的原文，均出自《四书》，长沙：湖南出版社 1996 年版。
无非是人类本性的不断改变而已”，“人的本质不是单个人所固有的抽象物，在其现实性上，它是一切社会关系的总和”，而且人参与生产活动，实现发展目标，其动力正是在于“通过人并且为了人而对人的本质的真正占有”，或者说，“正是在改造对象世界中，人才真正证明自己是类存在物”。可见，什么是人的发展，人怎么发展以及人如何实现自身价值等问题，仍然是马克思主义理论深刻思考的问题，而“促进和实现人的自由而全面的发展”“全面发展”是社会发展的基本原理和最终目标。按照马克思和恩格斯自己的解释就是：“只有在集体中，个人才能获得全面发展其才能的手段，也就是说，只有在集体中才有可能实现个人自由”。所以，可以这样做出小结，无论是中国儒学还是马克思主义，在关于人的基本问题的理解上有其共通之处，这为马克思主义学说的含义和建构准备了条件。

其次，马克思主义儒学强调孔子大同思想与新世纪共产主义理想的有效结合。“大同”是华夏民族2000多年来孜孜以求的理想社会，最早记载“大同社会”的儒家经典是《礼记·礼运》。在《礼记·礼运》中，“孔子称颂帝尧、舜、禹秉持‘大道之行’，倡导‘天下为公’，给世人树立了典范：‘大道之行也，天下为公，选贤与能，讲信修睦。故人不独亲其亲，不独子其子，使老有所终，壮有所用，幼有所长，矜寡孤独废疾者皆有所养’”。意思是说，在上古制度的社会准则有效执行的时候，天下为世人所共享，人们主动把德才兼备的人选出来给大家办事，所有成员懂得诚信、和而相处，精神境界很高，因此人们不只赡养自己的父母，也不只抚养自己的子女，而是彼此关爱、兼顾其他，使老年人能够活到其年，中年人能够为社会效力，使幼童能够健康地成长，使老而无妻的人、老而无夫的人、幼年丧父的孩子、老而无子的人以及残疾人都能够得到供养。整个社会其乐融融。《孟子·梁惠王章句上》亦云：“老吾老，以及人之老；幼吾幼，以及人之幼。天下可运于掌。”在这样的社会氛围中，因为人们心中充满大爱，胸襟坦荡、德行高尚，“货恶其弃于地也，不必藏于己；力恶其不出于身也，不必为己。是故谋闭而不兴，盗窃乱贼而不作，故外户而闭，是谓大同。”即“对于社会，人们憎恨把它扔在地上的行为，却不一定要自己私藏；人们都愿意为公众之事竭尽全力，却不一定为自己谋私利。这样一来，就不会有人搞阴谋，就不会有人盗窃财物和兴兵作乱，所以可以夜不闭户，路不拾遗，这可视为理想社会。”

孔子所说的大同世界与马克思和恩格斯所描绘的共产主义社会有很多相似之处。在马克思和恩格斯看来，共产主义社会是人类社会发展的“高级社会形态”，分低级阶段和高级阶段，也就是我们通常所说的社会主义和共产主义。关于共产主义社会，马克思在《哥达纲领批判》中批判拉尔锡错误观点的基础上，指出“在共产主义社会高级阶段，在迫使个人奴隶般地服从分工的情形已经消失，从而脑力劳动和体力劳动的对立也随着消失以后；在劳动已经不仅仅是谋生的手段，而且本身成了生活的第一需要之后；在随着个人的全面发展，他们的生产力也增长起来，而集体财富的一切源泉都充分涌流之后，——只有在那个时候，才能完全超出资产阶级社会的狭隘眼界，社会才能在自己的旗帜上写上：各尽所能，按需分配！”

[德]马克思、恩格斯：《马克思恩格斯选集（第1卷）》，北京：人民出版社1995年版，第55-57页。
[德]马克思、恩格斯：《马克思恩格斯选集（第3卷）》，北京：人民出版社1995年版，第384-385页。
[德]马克思、恩格斯：《马克思恩格斯选集（第3卷）》，北京：人民出版社1995年版，第99-112页。
所倡导的共产主义社会有以下基本特征：（一）社会生产力高度发展，物质财富极大丰富，可以充分满足整个社会及其成员的物质需要；（二）社会成员共同占有全部生产资料，生产资料和劳动产品归全社会公共所有，劳动者本身既是劳动者又是生产资料的共同占有者；（三）实行各尽所能、按需分配的原则，社会成员将尽自己的能力，最大限度地参与社会劳动和工作，社会将根据每个成员的实际情况需要，分配个人消费品；（四）彻底消灭了阶级差别和重大社会差别，城乡之间、工农之间、脑力劳动与体力劳动之间的差别也将消失；（五）社会成员具有高度的共产主义觉悟和道德品质，劳动已经不再是谋生的手段，而是人们生活的第一需要；（六）作为阶级统治工具的国家将完全消亡，那时，管理公共事务的机构虽然存在，但它的社会职能已经失去其阶级性质。如果说孔子所描绘的大同世界具有原始的共产主义性质，马克思、恩格斯提出的共产主义社会具有预言性的一面，那么马克思主义使学视图下的共产主义则是孔夫子大同思想与新世纪共产主义理想的有效结合，而且马克思主义使学践行实事求是的主张，立足于中国现实主义语境和民族大同文化，倡导物质富裕、精神充实、友善团结的爱心社会。

再者，马克思主义使学强调在经济全球化时代建立和谐新秩序。经济全球化引发了一系列社会性变革，这一系列变化也促使中国儒学与马克思主义重新进行对话，并且不断调整彼此的关系。“着眼于中国文化与世界文化的相互关系，儒学的未来走向是培育良好的民族文化意识，回归传统，建立民族文化的认同，重建儒学传统与社会、民众生活的联系，形成具有文化主体性和当代意义的儒学形态。”

这是基于全球化时代的社会属性所做出的应对措施。在传统儒学发展史上，和谐秩序涉及君臣之间、父子之间、夫妻之间、氏族人之间的交流关系。《大学》云：“为君者，止于仁；为人臣者，止于敬；为爱人，止于孝；为友，止于慈；与人夫交，止于信。”即“仁”、“敬”、“孝”、“慈”、“信”都曾经是维系人与人关系的重要原则。在这种情况下，也是经过实践经验之后人对普适经验的总结和概括。《礼记·礼运》亦云：“故圣人以天下为一家，以中国为一人者，非意也，必知其情，辟于其义，明于其利，达于其患，然后能为之。何谓人情？喜、怒、哀、惧、爱、恶、欲七者，弗学而能。何谓人义？父子、君臣、夫妇、长幼、上下、亲疏，而人道备，非学不能。”

长惠，幼顺，君仁，臣忠，父者，谓之义。讲信修睦，谓之人利。争夺相杀，谓之人害。故圣人所以治人七情，修十义，讲信修睦，尚辞让，去争夺，舍礼何以治之？”无论是“人情”还是“人义”，都是以“天下为一家”的和谐观念为落脚点的。“圣人”为我们树立了榜样，治理七情，修十义，讲信修睦，尚辞让，去争夺，故能以“礼”得仁义。这些虽然是中国传统社会处理人与人之间关系的准则，但是对今天的我们还是有很多启发和借鉴意义。马克思和恩格斯指出：“一切划时代体系的真正内容都是由于产生这些体系的那个时期的需要形成的。所有这些体系都是以本国过去的整个发展为基础的，是由阶级关系的历史形成及其政治的、道德的、哲学的以及其它的后果为基础的。”回溯中国发展史，
尤其是近现代以来，无论是孙中山（1866-1925）提出的“天下为公”，毛泽东（1893-1976）提出的“建设一个没有阶级压迫和剥削的无产阶级国家”，邓小平（1904-1997）提出的“让一部分人先富起来，然后实现共同富裕”，江泽民（1926-）提出的“三个代表”和“构建社会主义和谐社会”，胡锦涛（1942-）提出的“社会主义科学发展观”以及习近平（1953-）提出的“富强、民主、文明、和谐、自由、平等、公正、法制、爱国、敬业、诚信、友善”之“社会主义和谐价值观”，都是在为实现共产主义“大同世界”努力奋斗，并且均做出了卓越的贡献。客观地说，上述国家领导人以“天下为己任”，“先天下之忧而忧，后天下之乐而乐”，“为天地立心，为生民立命，为往圣继绝学，为万世开太平”，创立了一个又一个辉煌。而这些辉煌成绩的取得，不只是政治层面的、经济层面的、社会学层面的，还有哲学层面的和精神层面的，说到底，是把科学的马克思主义理论与中国传统儒学精神和儒家文化融会贯通形成的结晶，是马克思主义儒学阶段性胜利和马克思主义儒学现实意义上的成功的。总之，马克思主义儒学不应该是一种虚无主义的“摆设”，而是必须与中国的社会主义现代化建设、新世纪共产主义理想紧密结合，构建一种具有现实主义品格的社会主义和谐价值体系，并在经济全球化时代建立和谐新秩序。

三、马克思主义儒学新型话语建构的开放性

知道了马克思主义儒学新型话语建构的认识论，这在现实层面还远远不够，还需要我们再解放思想，洞察马克思主义儒学新型话语建构的开放性。这里概述为以下三个方面：

第一，马克思主义儒学新型话语建构不是僵化和固步自封的，这意味着马克思主义儒学是一个不断发展变化的、鲜活的生态体系。马克思主义与中国儒学之间是对话和交流的，尤其是马克思主义与中国儒学的“融合说”，除了指马克思主义基本原理与中国无产阶级革命实践和社会主义现代化建设相结合这个基本事实，还指马克思主义与中传统的文化精神、延续几千年的中国传统文化有效结合这个现实状况。一方面，马克思主义儒学建立在传统上，把辉煌的历史和厚重的过去作为基石，这成为马克思主义儒学得以充满生命力的源泉所在，另一方面，必须认识到：马克思主义儒学面临诸多已知和未知的挑战，这使得我们要有忧患意识，因为马克思主义儒学是一个动态的、变化的体系，如果要使马克思主义儒学生态体系充满鲜活的状态，摒弃僵化的头脑、抛开固步自封的心态是一个关键。

第二，马克思主义儒学新型话语建构不是封闭和保守的，相反，它是一个兼容并包的开放体系。马克思主义儒学不是把其话语以封闭和保守的状态局限于马克思主义哲学、马克思主义政治经济学和科学社会主义的疆域内，也不只是仅仅局限于中国儒学的高阁之中，而是倡导兼收并蓄、会通中西，既洋为中用、古为今用，又保持个性，走中国特色的自强、自立、自觉之路，“推天之道以明人事”，努力做到自律、自省和自重，用《周易·文言》里的话说就是“与天地合其德，与日月合其明，与四时合其序”。当马克思主义儒学具备了天时、地利、人和，怎么能够不让世界刮目相看？

第三，马克思主义儒学新型话语建构呼唤富有创新精神的、高瞻远瞩的研究，也需要勇敢无畏、不怕千辛万苦的社会实践，马克思主义儒学要想保持旺盛的生命力，要想在世界舞台站稳脚跟，富有创新精神的、高瞻远瞩的研究必不可少。这正是我们上下求索、勤奋耕耘的动力和原因。但是应该看到，书斋式的讨论和
学术式的研究还不足以解决现实问题，就连我们的精神导师马克思自己也不提倡那种只在书斋里冥思苦想，而不把自己的思想转化成现实的人。换言之，马克思教诲我们要勇于实践，做“全人类解放的实践家”。马克思曾经在《黑格尔法哲学批判导言》中赋予“实践”以“武器”的职能：“哲学把无产阶级当作自己的物质武器，同时，无产阶级也把哲学作为自己的精神武器”。“哲学不消灭无产阶级，就不能成为现实；无产阶级不把哲学变成现实，就不可能消灭自己”。马克思于是给我们以启示：理论的提出只是一个开始，实践理论并把理论的精髓转化成现实的成果才是真谛。马克思主义儒学新型话语建构，一方面呼唤富有创新精神的研究推进与之相关的理论工作，另一方面倡导有价值、有作为的社会实践，检验已知理论的合理性。正所谓：实践是检验真理的唯一标准。

四、结语

马克思主义儒学概念的提出在中国学术史上具有重要的意义和价值。它不仅是中国学术领域的一种创造性阐释和革故鼎新的见解和主张，更是一种基于世界多元思想模式和中国政治、经济、文化等现实语境所做出的比较中庸的学术论断。一方面，它立足于中国国情，是中国马克思主义阐释学的新话语，另一方面，它着眼于世界文明，是与国际学术思想对话和争鸣的结果。马克思主义儒学既得益于马克思主义理论对中国儒学的借鉴和发挥，又得益于中国传统儒学经过马克思主义阐释之后实现的现代主义转型。当然，应该看到，马克思主义儒学得以阐释只是一个“宏大叙事”的开始，它与马克思主义理论本身一样，“必须和我国的具体特点相结合并通过一定的民族形式才能实现”。

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol79/iss79/17
Letter of Support from the Sorokin Foundation

Pëtr A. Sorokin Foundation
8 Cliff Street • Winchester MA 01890 • www.sorokinfoundation.org

To: Dr. Lynn Rhodes
President, International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations (ISCSC)

CC: Dr. Vlad Alalykin-Izvekov
SCSC Representative and Programs Coordinator (Europe, Russia)

June 12th, 2018

Dear Colleagues,

On the behalf of Dr. Sergei P. Sorokin and Pitirim A. Sorokin Foundation I am honored to convey greetings to the Institution, which was founded with active support and involvement of Pitirim A. Sorokin.

One of the goals of founding the International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations was better understanding and communication in the increasingly inter-dependent world. Such direction today has become more important than ever.

Your Society, as well as Pitirim A. Sorokin Foundation, share similar values in promoting and supporting social scientists and researchers who brings new knowledge by "standing on the shoulders of giants."

With the very best wishes,

Dr. Pavel P. Krutov
Executive Director,
Pëtr A. Sorokin Foundation
phone: +1 857.756.0970
Book Reviews


Reviewed by Michael Andregg

Allison’s book is divided into four parts. The first is on “The Rise of China.” The second is “Lessons from History.” The third, “A Gathering Storm,” includes a whole chapter on “Clash of Civilizations,” a perennial ISCSC theme. The final section, “Why War is not Inevitable,” attempts to balance the pessimistic tone of the rest by searching for policy solutions to the dilemmas described in the first three parts.

There is one area where Allison, Thucydides and I are in complete agreement. His introduction notes that, “Proximate causes for war are undoubtedly important. But the father of history (Thucydides) believed that the most obvious causes for bloodshed mask even more significant ones.” (p. iv.)

The “Rise of China” is obvious to everyone and is quite impressive. Therefore, I will limit further comments on this book to the remaining three parts. Among the many “Lessons from History” that Allison identifies, the most cogent to me pertain to a “Century of Humiliation” for China that I had not known about. For example, on page 112 he notes that, “From 1854 to 1941, US gunboats cruised China’s inland rivers to protect American interests.” That certainly would wound any nation’s pride! Imagine Chinese gunboats cruising our Mississippi River during the same period, when Chinese immigration was limited by a US Congress fearful of “Yellow Perils.” On page 122, he describes a campaign in contemporary China to “never forget our national humiliation” or “wawang guochi.”

In the “Clash of Civilizations,” Allison spends a lot of ink on recalling former ISCSC member and Harvard colleague Samuel Huntington’s work on that theme, with special reference to differences between Chinese or Confucian cultures and American or Western cultures. This recalls Ada Bozeman’s work on the importance of culture itself, as opposed to the ephemeral quirks of particular leaders and events.
On page 141, Allison provides a very useful table of the “Clash of Cultures” between America and China today.

He ends that chapter with the sensitive topic of how contemporary China views the seas around China, especially the South China Sea. The last chapter of this section is titled “From Here to War,” where Allison charts the trends of most immediate concern for ‘war forecasters’ like me.

Having rung his warning bell as loudly as he could, Allison then offers “Twelve Clues for Peace” in his conclusion that “War is Not Inevitable” even though the first 200 pages of his book contend that war between America and China is extremely likely. I will not itemize those 12 ideas here; that is what whole books are for. Allison accomplishes his main purpose of sounding an alarm, aided by the considerable resources of his publisher and Harvard University devoted to marketing this book. It has undoubtedly attracted more attention than the two that follow. However, sometimes the loudest voices are less wise than some of the quieter ones.

The Beautiful Country and the Middle Kingdom by John Pomfret

John Pomfret’s “Beautiful Country and the Middle Kingdom” is a magnum opus on US-China relations over the last 240 years, written by an accomplished journalist who clearly loves both countries. It is exquisitely detailed and full of vivid stories about the men and women who participated in perhaps the most fruitful intellectual exchange of the last two centuries. Pomfret does this with an ideal journalist’s reverence for objective truth, so he does not avoid sensitive topics and writes candidly about the defects and hidden agendas of many key personalities as lucidly as he describes their idealism and good works.

For example, as early as page 6 he describes the heroism of Nobel Prize winner Liu Xiaobo, who regrettably died in prison. And on page 15, Pomfret claims that many of America’s founders saw China as a source of inspiration, despite flaws and tensions on both sides. He ably describes the most important hubris, the deeply felt belief on both sides that Chinese and Americans are “exceptional” and that much of the rest of the world are “barbarians” (野蛮人, or Yěmán rén).

This journalistic style of looking at dark sides as objectively as the lighter, easier sides is very different from diplomatic style, which seeks never to offend. It is also central to this book’s utility. Like a doctor, Pomfret describes his subjects “warts and all” because he knows that real healing and healthy growth requires a little pain, and a lot of objective truth.
On page 157 in Chapter 10, on “American Dreams,” Pomfret observes that “In 1902 China rediscovered America,” and that “By the 1920’s the US hosted more Chinese students than all the nations of Europe combined.” One third of those students were women, by the way, a rarity with long-term consequences.

The author then slogs through the Pre-World War II history of China and Japan in particular, because the resulting alliance between China and America would be so important for the future of the entire earth. When describing the tragic invasion of what Japan would call “Manchukuo” (NE China) in 1934, Pomfret also observed that “Japan’s population had doubled in 50 years.”

On page 243 Pomfret emphasizes the enduring importance of America’s alliance with China against Japanese aggression. On page 246, he begins a great story of an American adventurer and pilot, Claire Chennault, who among many other martial acts created an American volunteer fighter group called the “Flying Tigers” that distinguished itself long before the regular US army was near.

A danger of this book for reviewers is that it is so rich in detailed stories about vivid personalities and events that time is gone long before we get to the end. However, before leaping to Pomfret’s conclusions, I must highlight the seminal importance of a Chinese scholar, P.C. Chang, who had great impact on the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Pomfret claims that Chang has mostly been forgotten in mainland China. He writes, “Marrying Western belief in the primacy of the individual with Chinese concern for the greater good, Chang personified the dream of the ‘Great Harmony’ between China and the United States.” (p. 368)

Pomfret’s Chapter 28, called “Hate America,” relates the enduring consequences of the Korean War, where we were on opposite sides of a very lethal conflict, which by any estimate killed many more Chinese than Americans before resulting in the dangerous stalemate that we observe today. Chapter 29 is titled “Hate China” and describes the reciprocal propaganda in the US that emphasized all that could be criticized about the Middle Kingdom. Pomfret always regrets the negative consequences of such campaigns on any side.

In “The Cold War,” Pomfret reveals that our President Eisenhower “threatened Mao Zedong’s regime with nuclear annihilation eight times.” (p. 405). I did not know that, but it is obvious that this would leave a lasting impression on anyone.

In the last few chapters, Pomfret dwells on the tensions now afflicting US-China relations. The Chinese philosopher-diplomat P.C. Chang reappears here, and a detailed story about why Liu Xiaobo died in jail despite winning a Nobel Prize for peace in 2010.
He supported the students at Tiananmen Square in 1989, better known as Liosi here in China. Pomfret was expelled from China then because of his reporting for the AP on those tragic events.

This is a magnum opus, and well worth reading. On to my favorite among these three books, Howard French’s *Everything Under the Heavens*.

*Everything Under the Heavens* by Howard W. French

French’s first chapter is titled “National Humiliation” and added much texture to what I had learned about this only recently. An equally noteworthy concept was “barbarian management,” which illustrates the exceptional worldview that China has always been the only “real” civilization, surrounded by uncivilized “lessers” who come in two varieties, “raw” and “cooked.” You would enjoy learning what French means by that, and who he cites for his cogent quotes.

Considerable space was devoted to why many Chinese hate Japan today, which is understandable when one knows the terrible history of World War II. I did not know about deeper historical roots extending over the past 13 centuries, but I can understand now. Mr. French is not trying to resurrect historic roots of hatred, rather to promote a more nuanced understanding of cultural attitudes and their origins. If every country hated every other country that ever attacked them, the world would be one writhing mass of historic resentments, which we must overcome if we are to create a healthy, global civilization able to face the challenges of a new millennium.

French ends this section with three quotes. On page 21, he notes that, “More than two hundred anti-Japanese films were produced in 2012 alone, with one scholar estimating that 70 percent of Chinese TV dramas involve Japanese-related war plots.” On page 30, he cites a senior editor of a major Japanese paper, the *Asahi Shunbun*, who claimed that “Hundreds of smaller societies have been absorbed by China over the last 200 years.” Thus, animus can run both ways. (American examples of that are legion.) “Exceptionalism” is a curse both of our great countries share. One parallel was the concept of “Manifest Destiny,” which rationalized a century of conquest here.

I was especially pleased to read a long treatment (pp. 95-107) of legendary Admiral Zheng who sailed as far as Africa “in 1405 with an armada that included some of the biggest wooden ships ever built.” Stories of this fleet have always been impressive, and the mystery of why it was eventually destroyed has always been curious (change of Emperors). French adds much more detail to these events, which very ably captures both the yin and yang of China’s relationships with neighbors.
On page 112, French introduced me to the concept of “hua ren” (or Wénmíng de rén, 文明的人) which I aspire to be. One challenge is always who defines what constitutes a civilized person.

The fourth chapter, “A Pacified South,” is a historic review of what we call Southeast Asia and its relations with China, rich with detail and insight. By page 181, French is describing dramatic changes catalyzed by Deng Xiaoping that had much to do with the extraordinary rise of Chinese economic and diplomatic power ever since. There are too many to list in this brief review, but they reveal a leader of remarkable vision and ability to incorporate the best of other civilizations without sacrificing the best of his own. Here too, I see glimpses of the “Great Harmony,” which is the best hope of global civilization to come.

French closes this chapter with some major economic and demographic observations. One is the profoundly complex effects of the “One Child Policy” that Deng began. This enabled the greatest expansion of economic prosperity in human history (along with many other factors of course). But one side effect is an aging population. French claims that “Current trends…suggest that by 2040 the Chinese population will be more skewed in favor of old people than Japan, the ‘grayest’ major country in the world today.” China is undoubtedly becoming rich and powerful. The key question for our world is whether China will become wise enough to handle such responsibilities without any catastrophic failures. America has gone through a similar transition, but whether US “wisdom” has grown as fast as our GDP or military clout is, at the least, extremely questionable.

Like the other authors, French’s closing chapters focus on contemporary frictions like the South China Sea, and the rise of Xi Jinping, while America descends into whatever Trump represents. I will spare you all the details of these chapters, and simply note that, like Pomfret, French is able to call a spade a spade without calling it a shovel. All thoughtful and well-informed people today wonder if the rise of China and the probable decline of America can be handled with maximum diplomacy and minimal strife, following the wisdom of Sun Tzu. I have quoted Sun Tzu for more than 40 years because he simply stands above all others in his advice to generals and emperors, written 2,500 years ago. That alone says much about Chinese civilization.

So, each of these books has substantial merits and none is perfect. Allison issues a strident warning to the West, and his book is filled with high-end political science theory along with a boatload of facts to support his views on that. Pomfret is the most in love with China, and he provides the most vivid and personalized history of US-China relations over the last 240 years. French is the easiest to read and may be the most insightful. But who am I to judge? I am not by any measure a scholar of China. Therefore, I came as a pilgrim to learn more about the ancient sages who inform Chinese culture.
Rather, I am a serious student of war and peace with some reputation. Therefore, I urge everyone under heaven to attend to the tasks of peace on earth before Weapons of Mass Destruction spread far enough to find the spark that could set them off.
Eric H. Cline, *1177 B.C. - The Year Civilization Collapsed*

Reviewed by Mariana Tepfenhart

Eric Cline is a professor of Classics and Anthropology at Georgetown University, a Fulbright scholar, co-director of many archeological excavations and winner of many national and local awards for his teaching and research.

The book examines the dramatic events that led to the collapse of the civilizations around the Mediterranean Sea in the late Bronze Age, about 3000 years ago. It was a world with a globalized economy and an intense diplomatic system. Based on the latest archeological discoveries, the author, Eric Cline, challenges the previous theory that it was “the sea people” who brought down the Mediterranean civilizations during that time. He analyzed all the factors that led to their decline and argues that the “sea people” could have been both victims of natural catastrophic events and aggressors as well. What I found very interesting about this book is the analogy the author made between the events that occurred during the Bronze Age and the present time, characterized by global economy, culture, political tensions and mass migration.

In the Prologue, Cline examines the so called “sea people.” Previous historians made these people “scapegoats” for the destruction of the Bronze Age civilization, but they relied only on inscriptions left by the Egyptians, long before archeological excavations brought forth new evidence. What is known is the fact that they were not a homogeneous group but five different groups with different cultures, coming from Sardinia, Sicily and other places. Recent excavations showed destruction, but it is from different time periods and it is not clear who was responsible for it. Cline suggests that the fall of the civilizations around the Mediterranean Sea cannot be entirely attributed to the “sea people.”

The author has divided the book into four acts to provide the historical context of the major players of this drama.

Act 1 introduces the most important civilizations of the fifteenth century B.C. on the Mediterranean Sea. It starts with the Hyksos and their invasion of Egypt during the Middle Kingdom period (2134-1720 B.C.). Due to advanced weapons, the Hyksos ruled Egypt, but they were expelled around 1550 B.C. by the pharaoh Kamose as it was recorded. It was the beginning of the New Kingdom when the country was rebuilt and established trade and diplomatic connections with various cultures. As evidence for this period of growth, the author mentions the marriages of the Egyptian pharaohs to foreigners, as well as the art that decorated the palaces that had a great Minoan influence.
Next there is a focus on the relations between Mesopotamia and Crete, which were well documented by the discoveries of 2,000 clay tablets in 1930. There were inscriptions about administration, business contracts, and lists of gifts between the rulers of different kingdoms and cities. Quoting different sources, such as inscriptions on the tombs and papyri, the author presents more connections between the Minoans and Egypt, and between Egypt and the kingdom of Punt, identified as possible Yemen.

There were other civilizations, less known, such as the Mitianian kingdom that came into existence in the fifteenth century B.C. and was in the northern part of Syria. The kingdom of the Hittites, previously known only from the Hebrew Bible, was discovered in Turkey. In 1906, German archeologists unearthed numerous clay tablets, which provided extensive information about the state, everyday life, their code of law, their interaction with other people and kingdoms, as well as poems and stories. All this information showed the beginning of globalization in the Mediterranean and Aegean world in the fifteenth century BC. The kingdoms were getting interconnected sometimes through trade and diplomacy, or through war.

Act II focuses on the type of items that were traded. The discovery of the list with names of items on the base of a statue of Amenhotep III, known as the Aegean List, shows the connection of Egypt with different places such as Greece, Crete, cities in Canaan, Babylon, etc. As the author stated, “it looks suspiciously like an itinerary of a round trip voyage from Egypt to the Aegean Sea and back again” (p. 47). More impressive than the Aegean List is the discovery in 1887 A.D. of the Amarna Archives that prove sustained international relations between Egypt and kingdoms of Eastern Mediterranean. It is a rich correspondence of Amenhotep and his son Akhenaten with different rulers, and it contains lists of gifts, diplomatic relations, and requests for help. Among the items traded were gold from Egypt, copper from Crete, ebony from Nubia, raw glass from Mesopotamia, spices and figs from Canaan, and swords and daggers from Italy and Greece. Trade was not limited to various items but also ideas, innovations, skilled workers, physicians, masons, and artists. This would explain the similarities in architecture between Egypt, Anatolia, Canaan, Syria and Israel.

This chapter also includes an unsolved mystery from the Bronze Age. It is known as the Zannanza Affair and was recorded in the Deeds of Suppiluliuma, king of the Hittites. Supposedly a letter was sent from the queen of Egypt with a strange request. She wanted to marry one of the king’s sons and make him pharaoh of Egypt. Suppiluliuma was persuaded and sent one of his sons, Zannanza, but unfortunately, he was assassinated on the way to Egypt. A war broke out between the two countries. However, the Egyptian prisoners taken by the Hittites were infected by a terrible disease that claimed the life of the king. It remains a mystery who sent the letter and who killed the Hittite prince.
The thirteenth century BC is the focus of Act III. The author selects two legendary events that, although they were not proved historically, are important to understand this century. These are the Trojan War and the Hebrew Exodus.

Troy was discovered in what is today Hisarlik in Turkey. It was a rich city situated between the Hittite Empire and the Mycenean world, two super powers of the Bronze Age period. The excavations showed nine cities, one on top of the other. The debate is around cities number six and seven, which contain elements of destruction. However, scholars could not determine if it was the result of an attack of the Mycenaeans, an earthquake, or an invasion of the “sea people.” Cline makes a very interesting and persuasive argument regarding the Trojan War. He argues that the war was actually a rebellion of a group of states known as Assuwa that rose up against the Hittites in 1430 B.C. The presence of Mycenean warriors from mainland Greece in Anatolia is attested in the records of the Hittites. They were fighting as mercenaries for the Assuwa coalition.

The biblical story of the Exodus is famous, but ancient texts and archeological excavations did not substantiate it. According to the Bible, the Exodus took place in the fifteenth or fourteenth century B.C. but there was no evidence that Israelites were in Canaan. A more accurate estimate would be the thirteenth century B.C., when many sites in Canaan were destroyed, but it is difficult to prove who was responsible. The author concluded that Israelites established themselves in Canaan, and that together with the Philistines and the Phoenicians built a new civilization on the ashes of an old one.

Act IV explains the title of the book. The year 1177 B.C. marked the destruction of the Mediterranean and Aegean world. Cline lists many sites that were destroyed and different interpretations of their demise. Although the “sea people were blamed for this, historical data cannot prove that they were the only perpetrators.”

Other factors such as climate change, drought, famine, rebellions, invaders, collapse of international trade, decentralization or the elusive “sea people” are introduced as individual events, none powerful enough to bring down any of these civilizations on their own. However, together they created “the perfect storm.” Nations of the late Bronze Age were globalized and interdependent, therefore one failure could affect and destabilize them all.

It was a long process lasting approximately between 1125 B.C. and 1175 B.C. The year 1177 is significant because it was in this year that Ramses III was fighting against the “sea people” for the survival of his own country. It was a year when some major civilizations were already in decline or had ceased completely. City-states replaced great empires. There was not only a loss of people and buildings, but also a loss of knowledge and ideas. Cuneiform writing disappeared and was replaced by an alphabet.
Monotheistic religion started. New powerful states later appeared, such as Assyria, the Phoenicians and Israel. It is an inexorable process that repeats itself over and over.

The author reminds us that we are vulnerable to this process also. We are experiencing climate change, globalization, dependency on products and services, and we could experience something similar. Cline concluded with a quote from Robert Zoellik, president of the World Bank, who stated “the global financial system may have reached a tipping point” which is “the moment when a crisis cascades into a full-blown meltdown and becomes extremely difficult for governments to contain.” (p. 176)

It is a brilliantly researched study. Eric Cline makes a compelling argument regarding the collapse of civilizations during the late Bronze Age. He explored all the events that took place during that period to create “a perfect storm,” which led to the demise of the Mediterranean civilizations. He draws on his own research, but also presents other studies and interpretations. Using many details, photos, different tables and original documents, he portrays a vivid picture of the cosmopolitan world of the late Bronze Age. He concludes with a warning for the present time, that global interdependence makes us vulnerable to a “perfect storm.” His style is lively and gripping, and one can forget that this volume is a history book not a novel. Everyone interested in ancient history or ancient mysteries should read this work.
Eric Ashley Hairston, *The Ebony Column: Classics, Civilization, and The African American Reclamation of the West*  

Reviewed by John Berteaux

In today’s world, one is expected to defend any university course that does not instantly lead to a specific career or occupation. In a recent *New York Review of Books* article, author Marilynne Robinson states, “There is a great deal of questioning now of the value of the humanities, those aptly named disciplines that make us consider what human beings have been, and are, and will be.” (Robinson, p. 28) Robinson’s article makes plain why I often find myself defending my chosen discipline—Philosophy. After all, a university education is expensive and, moreover, once the student leaves the university, food, clothing, and a place to live don’t come cheap; one must make a living. Hence, students, administrators, and parents ask: “ Philosophy? What can you do with that?” If questions about the usefulness of the humanities are apropos, then Professor of English, Law, and Humanities Eric Ashley Hairston asks a far more compelling question in his book, *The Ebony Column*. Given that we live in a society in which race matters socially, politically and economically, Hairston asks us to consider the value or usefulness of a classical education for today’s black American student.

In defending my chosen discipline, generally, I turn to philosopher Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) for support. The essence of Hairston’s argument, however, intimates that I could just as easily have turned to African American sociologist, historian and civil rights leader W. E. B. Du Bois (1868-1963). In *The Value of Philosophy*, Bertrand Russell, a contemporary of Du Bois, considers what it is that makes philosophical questions unique and worth taking the time and effort to think about. Russell writes, “The ‘practical’ man…is one who recognizes only material needs, who realizes that men must have food for the body, but is oblivious of the necessity of providing food for the mind.” (Russell, p. 154) He insists what makes philosophy special is that it aims at a kind of knowledge that “gives unity and system to the body of the sciences, and the kind which results from a critical examination of the grounds of our convictions, prejudices, and beliefs.” (Russell, p. 154)

In fact, Eric Hairston (p. 159) insists that W. E. B. Du Bois’s “analysis of the opportunities, dangers, and challenges African Americans face clearly pits the pursuit of the good life and its meaning, wisdom, and culture—the virtuous life—against the barbaric pursuit of wealth, power, and possessions.” For example, he reports that Du Bois draws on the classical myth of Hippomenes to demonstrate that virtue and liberty can be destroyed by materialism. One version of this story is that Hippomenes fell in love with Atalanta. Atalanta did not want to marry. As a result, she set up a test. She was known to be a very fast runner.
She conceded to marry anyone who could beat her in a foot race with the caveat being that anyone who tried to beat her and lost would be punished by death. Atalanta raced all her suitors save one: Hippomenes. In the end, she agreed to race Hippomenes. He defeated her by placing three golden apples in her path. When Atalanta stopped to pick up the apples, Hippomenes passed her and won the race and her hand. Hippomenes’s desire to possess Atalanta unfortunately led to their doom.

While Bertrand Russell claims the utility of philosophy is found in its indirect effects on the lives of those who study it, similarly, W. E. B. Du Bois saw the classics as an antidote to vulgar materialism. In sum, then, both Russell and Du Bois were concerned that we integrate or balance our practical and intellectual pursuits. They were critical of applying a wholly practical or economic meaning to the term “useful.” (Hairston, p. 160; Russell, p. 153)

Hairston observes that “an actual examination of Du Bois’s education reveals remarkable depth and a significant investment in classical texts and subjects.” (Hairston, p. 167) Yet, he complains, treatments of Du Bois’s work rarely mention his classicism or pays only superficial attention to his classical education. (Hairston, p. 159, p. 160) According to Hairston (p. 160):

Despite Du Bois’s overt use of classics in *The Souls of Black Folk*, especially in his core educational philosophy, few scholars have pondered the implications of the preeminent African American scholar of the twentieth century having envisioned African American education as a classical education. None have adequately addressed what lessons, virtues, strategies or tools Du Bois intended for an education grounded in the classics to provide African Americans. The absence of the classics from scholarly discussions of Du Bois is hardly to be believed, given the sheer volume of commentary on Du Bois.

In addition to W. E. B. Du Bois, Eric Hairston draws on the compositions of classicist and ex-slave Phillis Wheatley (c. 1753-1784); classicist, ex-slave and abolitionist Fredrick Douglas (c. 1818-1895); and classicist, educator, sociologist and black activist Anna Julia Cooper (1858-1964). Hairston posits that these scholars came to redefine the classics, using the field to give unity to a body of work that resulted in a critical examination of nineteenth century racism. One implication of the recognition of their commitment to the classics is that it raises the question: What if “old white men ideas” really are ideas that were developed by women and people of color?

The upshot of all this is that, on the one hand, Eric Hairston suggests the classics contain a wealth of “moral and intellectual lessons…relatively objective and practically race-neutral.” (Hairston, p. 157)
Yet, at the same time, his treatment of these scholars reclaims the Western Civilization story for African Americans as part of their heritage (Hairston xv). They remind us that “many Africans had been part of the classical world and part of the Roman Empire…classical sources like Herodotus and Tacitus [suggest] African Americans had proof of both black historical presence and historical context.” (Hairston, p. 16) In a world in which Western Civilization courses have all but disappeared, Hairston himself writes, “I endeavor to provide a partial correction of the multigenerational and multiracial failure to chronicle the journey of African Americans in the West and within the experience of Western Civilization.” (Hairston, p. xv)

Hairston’s point is that the classical education received by Wheatley, Douglas, Cooper and Du Bois demonstrates that the classics have always been central to the African American intellectual tradition. By allowing these scholars to reject the stereotypical characterization of intellectual deficiency foisted on blacks, the classics: 1) offered a unique reading of race and gender; 2) posed a transforming set of ideals that shaped African American culture, and freed blacks from the narrow confines of a Christian morality, replacing it with a humanistic theology, a theology that is evident in the work of Douglas, Cooper and Du Bois; and 3) allowed for a critical examination of the ideologies upon which American society was based. Ultimately, Hairston’s goal is to demonstrate that it is not what the ancients said but what African American classicists did with what they said that matters.

Hairston’s argument is both compelling and clear. The case he makes is important in a world in which “those disciplines that make us consider what human beings have been, and are, and will be” are facing extinction. (Robinson, p. 28) While these black scholars exploded the Thomas Jefferson myth of blacks as subhuman, inferior and intellectually deficient, Hairston essentially claims that they did much more. Their use of the classics was liberating in that it indicated black Americans could do more than mimic and put on a show. They could sublimate cultural interpretations of “useful” and integrate intellectual and cultural pursuits. Given that they illustrated that the classics could serve as a basis for a critical examination of society, one would think the field might offer tools for challenging contemporary racism.

Endnotes


Reviewed by Andrew Targowski

This book scrutinizes why humans have big brains, what big brains enable us to do, and how specialized brains are related to eusociality in animals. The humans have the most advanced eusociality among animals, which is defined by the following characteristics: supportive family care (including care of offspring from other individuals), overlapping generations within a colony of adults, and a division of labor into reproductive and non-reproductive groups. The division of labor creates specialized behavioral groups within an animal society that are sometimes called castes. Eusociality is distinguished from all other social systems because individuals of at least one caste usually lose the ability to perform at least one behavior characteristic of individuals in another caste.

In the first part of the book, the author discovers why brains expanded so slowly, and then why they stopped growing. This book hones down the number of theories on brain size evolution to a few, and these few lend themselves to testable hypotheses that lead to logical and practical explanations for the phenomenon. At the essence of this book is data resulting from original, previously unpublished research on brain size in several social mammals. These data support the idea that evolution of the brain in humans is the result of social interaction.

This book also traces the products of the social brain: ideology, religion, urban life, housing, and learning and adapting to dense, complex social interactions. It uniquely compares brain evolution in social animals across the animal kingdom and examines the nature of the human brain and its development within the social and historical context of complex human social structures. Caldararo proves that the reductions in human brain size follow the achievement of humans’ enhanced eusociality, mainly triggered by domestication and complex social factors.

The second part of “Big Brains” scrutinizes the evolution of human consciousness as well as the idea of human cognition and the mind in the context of the physical means of function—that is, electrons, bonding, complex molecules and synapses. These physical means networks have formed a feature of life that Caldararo calls “humankind,” with a uniform response to the environment. By this, he means “uniform” regarding “seeing” by mediating part of the spectrum of light. Also, learning by responding to physical states like greater or lesser amounts of heat provides a biological framework. And, the “mind” provides each being with a map of cognitive and behavioral responses to these stimuli. He calls this map “culture.”
Then, he discusses whether the mind can exist without “culture” or “language.” Can one be human without language? Or is the mind a creation of environmental stimuli about the organism, retained and reused as brief encounters, which evolve into a collective and continuous experience of consciousness? Since this implies learning at the cellular level, and interaction of neurons in neural nets is ancient in the history of multicellularity (as Arendt noticed it), one would imagine so would be the “mind” or “consciousness.”

The author begins his investigation when stable life was invented, along with the domestication of plants and animals, from the earlier collecting platform of behavior that evolved from the Primate heritage beginning with Sahelanthropus over seven million years ago. That means it took a long time before the civilization started. Eventually, he addresses the problem of the mind and how human attempts to understand the mind are tied to ideas of cosmology, with humans as the center of creation, gods’ meanings, and the “reason” for the perceptions we have, such as the universe of stars. What can we learn about reality from this brain that can relate the life we find on Earth to that on the stars, and in fact, is what we call life so interrelated that we cannot separate ourselves from it?

Caldararo argues that central to our understanding of what the brain does for us is the effort to examine learning and its context, as well as the costs of learning and technology. In the past, the adults taught the children. He assesses that this has been true for almost 99 percent of human history. Today, we are increasingly learning from technology—television, computers, smartphones (which, of course, are computers)—and this learning takes place in different contexts: alone, in groups (class, workshops, etc.), and in virtual assemblies. Some scientists and health care professionals think that the way we are living is creating learning disabilities like ADD/ADHD, dyslexia, and autism spectrum disorders.

Descriptions of the educational setting in ancient Rome seem like those in the nineteenth century of rapidly industrializing England. What is not surprising for Caldararo is that the education of the children of rich and poor are still remarkably different in the twenty-first century, as they were in the nineteenth century, or the feudal past, due to economic inequality.

The author argues that the process of self-domestication has set us on the road to the kind of animal society, characterized by increased complexity and specialization, which some insects also have. But he reminds us that humans are the only animals that have self-domesticated, become food producers, and eliminated all their predators. Though cooperative defense against predators was not found to correlate with larger brains, the evolution of sociality may still arise as a defense against predation, and we see that parental care is associated with an attack on the young in both the prey and the predator.
He noted that insect eusociality was a successful adaptation to many challenges but failed to eradicate the species’ predators, while humans appear to have achieved this at the end of the Mesolithic and the dawn of the Neolithic periods.

The author passes to the civilizing of humans, reminding us that now and then an alligator or tiger kills a human, usually a child or person unaware, but we are not threatened in general by such animals. Our teaching has changed from an individual context to a mass setting, parallel to the mass media that have gone from scrolls and parchment, clay tablets, or newsprint to machines like computers. Thus, he considers that humans evolved to a kind of “superorganism.”

He noticed that as our sheer numbers in communications have increased, the density of our living arrangements and arguments become greater. Therefore, the needs for providing solutions for these masses must change the way humans communicate. Shorter and faster signals are delivered with more general references and are sent out on microwaves like texting, which can influence millions—and perhaps billions—in ways human society has never achieved before, inflicting surrender or submission. He reminds us that organizing others to build, fight or surrender requires useful forms of communication. Surrender and conversion are complex behaviors that we have learned so far.

The brain as the advanced thinking personal device is the pretext for the author to analyze our brain-based worldview—i.e., whether the universe is anthropocentric or indifferent? He reminds us that we often argue that humans have produced the only complex societies, domestication of plants and animals, structures, language and art. This claim is an erroneous argument as numerous animals have achieved these features of social life, including art. Are humans then the pawns of the accident, and is the human mind a blank slate floating in a sea of a coincidence that it must learn to see as rationality or fated reactions of accidental molecules? Caldararo asks why it took so long to develop human culture and complex human society. And he replies that human physiology, especially the biology of the brain, might have been crucial in this long process of becoming who we are today. It is possible that the evolution of the human mind, under social selection, is already closing, partly because of self-domestication and advanced learning.

The author uses the brain factor in analyzing racism as a human disease, the housing crisis, and homelessness (he lives in California where 25% of all homeless people in the U.S. live) and so forth—all urgent issues of our contemporary civilization. He is right since the brain and its mind are responsible for the morale of our superorganism. It looks like a “software” driven mind today is not yet fully ready to successfully cope with these issues.
Caldararo’s comprehensive analysis of the human brain in the central perspectives like biological and social is similar to Darwin’s theory of evolution with compelling evidence in his 1859 book *On the Origin of Species*. Since then, it took 158 years to have a theory of the brain evolution, which indeed controlled human development.

Unfortunately, in the twenty-first century, due to the very rapid development of information technology and artificial intelligence, there is a claim that computers will be thinking faster than humans by about 2025, and we will face the rise of the singularity of a new human race. Ray Kurzweil is the author of this prediction; he also asserts that in the future, everyone will live forever. In a 2013 interview, he said that in 15 years, medical technology could add more than a year to one's remaining life expectancy for each year that passes, and we could then "outrun our deaths."

This review’s author thinks that the human brain reached some well-functioning framework, but the mind has been transforming from a limited one into a bio-digital and bio-virtual hybrid. In its virtual side, it operates on data, information, concepts, knowledge, and wisdom provided by 2.5-plus billion users of the social networks, like Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, and Quora.

Hence, Caldararo’s quest for the understanding of the evolution of the brain is not yet finished. He has to answer the question: is it possible that due to the virtual side of the mind, the meat-constructed brain will shrink as not used in full? What will change in our civilization due to our shrinking brain? The following table reflects this challenge.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Animals</th>
<th>Nervous System - Neurons in Billion</th>
<th>Cerebral Cortex – Neurons in Billion</th>
<th>Number of Neurons in Virtual Mind</th>
<th>Cerebral Cortex in Hybrid Brain –Neurons</th>
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<td>100</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Unlimited</td>
<td>Bigger or lower than in a meat-developed brain</td>
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<td>possibility</td>
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<td>1.7</td>
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In the meantime, this book is the must read to learn about the human brain, for all those who claim that technology will replace the human brain very soon.
François Guizot, *The History of Civilization in Europe*  

Reviewed by Mariana Tepfenhart

In this book, the author examines the development of European civilization from the fall of Rome to the nineteenth century.

François Guizot was a brilliant historian of the nineteenth century. He was born in France, in 1787 in a Protestant family. He was a witness of the French Revolution, which claimed his father as a victim of the Great Terror in 1794. His mother decided to move to Geneva where she could get support from other Protestants. There he received a very good education in history and philosophy. Learning Greek and Latin, as well as other European languages, enabled him to be in contact with many new ideas of the time.

He returned to Paris and encountered the intelligentsia of the post-revolutionary France. He frequented the salon of Maine de Biran, the center of one of the best-known philosophical circles. The most important appointments in his career were to the position of Chair of Modern History at the prestigious University of Sorbonne and later, to the position of Secretary General of the Ministry of Justice, which gave him the opportunity to understand how the French Government worked.

The book is divided in 14 lectures, each one with a subheading that allows the reader to follow the main ideas easily. Lecture 1 covers the definition of civilization. For Guizot, civilization does not include only social relations, the power of the state, production, and labor relations but also the development of man, of his faculties. He argues that there is a strong correlation between society and the internal development of the man. There is a mutual influence as he clearly states: “... all of the great developments of the internal man have turned to the profit of society; all the great developments of the social states to the profit of individual man.” (p.22)

In the Lecture 2, Guizot compared the homogenous societies of the ancient world with the diversity of modern civilizations. He argued that in each of the ancient civilizations there is one dominant principle that permeates all aspects of life.

Guizot identified the three major components of European civilization: Roman, Christian, and Germanic. From the Romans, the Europeans inherited the idea of state with uniform legislation and the institution of municipality with local government. From Christianity, the Europeans added the idea that there is a moral law above the human legislation and the idea of separation of spiritual and secular power. The Germans introduced the bond between warriors, loyalty towards their leader, and love of independence, of personal liberty as a citizen.
Lecture 3 covers the period between the fifth and the ninth century. It is a period where three systems, monarchical, aristocratic, and popular, attempted to establish dominance. These existed in a state of constant combat and compromise. The church also, by its divine mission, tried to establish a theocratic system. These systems proclaimed the principle of political legitimacy, but they did not admit that force was at the base of any power. Once the political power was established, they disavowed force and turned to legitimacy of justice and right.

This “barbaric epoch” (p. 58), as Guizot named it, is characterized by universal turmoil, and the infancy of all systems. Society was changing. People transitioned from migratory to sedentary life. The instability of the period impacted the individuals who were predominantly concerned about their own interests and passions. A special bond, as well as a certain hierarchy of rights and services, was established relating to individuals, the land they settled on, and their lords. The invasion of the Muslims in the south and the continuous wars of the Frankish kings in the north kept Europe in disorder. Although he admired the human individuality of the Germans, Guizot said that in a time of “barbarism and ignorance, this sentiment becomes selfishness.” (p. 63)

However, it was the power of the church and the desire of the Frankish king, Charlemagne, that introduced order and the spirit of civilization and unity among the people. Between the fifth and the ninth century, the Germanic element prevailed.

The author goes on in Lecture 4 to analyze the elements of feudalism. There was no central or independent government, therefore “no individual was in a condition to impose his will on others.” (p. 83) He presented the importance of the fief, which came with duties and rights. It came also with the hereditary spirit that resulted from the nature of property. The possessor of the fief had all the rights on his estates. The only thing that guaranteed these rights was force. The author argued that feudalism contributed to the fine development of the character of the individual on one hand and the right of individual resistance on the other. Although it involves force, it should never be abolished because, as Guizot said, “it means acceptance to servitude.” (p. 87) Guizot equates the feudal system with a federation. He stated: “It aimed at leaving in the hands of each lord all that portion of government and sovereignty which could remain there and to carry to the suzerain, or to the general assembly of the barons, only the least possible portion of power.” (p. 86)

Lecture 5 examines the relation of the church with the people and with the princes, the representatives of the temporal power. In the fifth century, the church was an independent society that connected the people with their sovereigns. It was recruiting people from all levels of society. It was accessible and open to all who wanted to join. However, the author criticized the church for not respecting the liberties of the individuals, by imposing certain creeds, and thus, forcing the human spirit to revolt.
Initially, the church proclaimed the separation of spiritual from temporal power and by this, it prepared the way for independence of thought. Later, the church attempted to establish dominance over the temporal power, resulting in conflict.

Lecture 6 continues the investigation of the role of the church in European civilization. Guizot recognized the good influence of the church upon the social and moral order, but he points out an unfortunate influence on the political order. He mentioned that the church always attached itself to and defended the temporal power. After the death of Charlemagne, the institution of the church went into a decline. Pope Gregory VII tried to reform the monasteries and take over the governments of the world. By the end of the eleventh century, and the beginning of the twelfth century, a group of free thinkers challenged the authority of the church.

In Lecture 7 Guizot analyzes the third element of civilization, the boroughs. He considers the third estate of 1789 to be the direct descendent of the corporations of the twelfth century. He describes the conflict between lords and burghers over rights and liberties. The town people revolted despite the inequalities of the conditions between them and the lords. Charters were set up by both parties and violated. However, by the end of the twelfth century, the enfranchisement of the burghers was accomplished. It was the birth of the bourgeois. The author points out the importance of the rising boroughs founded “upon altogether other principles of feudalism and the church, the diversity of social classes, their struggles, the first and profound characteristic of modern burgher manners, timidity of spirit, side by side with energy of soul, the demagogue spirit, side by side with the legal spirit.” (p. 153)

He goes on in Lecture 8 to present the impact of the crusades on society. Guizot stated that they produced a “greater degree of individual liberty” (p. 167) on the one hand and led to political unity and centralization, on the other hand. Maritime commerce developed, travelers encountered different civilizations and they “were struck with the riches and elegance of manners of the Muslims.” (p. 161)

Another factor that contributed to the history of Europe was royalty. In Lecture 9, Guizot examines different types of royalties. He traced the role of the royalties from the time of Imperial Rome to the Germanic invasion and to the nineteenth century. Imperial royalty during the reign of Augustus and Tiberius exercised the power of the people. In the fifth century, the Germanic kings were elected. Christianity changed the character of imperial royalty. Beginning with the reign of Constantine, the power came from above, from God. This was the religious royalty when the kings are interpreters of the divine will. Theoretically, the king has power, but practically, the feudal lords were entirely independent of royalty. By the twelfth century a new concept was introduced: the hereditary principle of succession. In the face of violence, desolation and economic hardship, people turned to the king for help.
He became the protector of public order, the moral authority. Royalty strengthened and developed itself, and the whole society was reduced to two elements: the government and the country.

François Guizot continued in Lecture 10 by focusing on the fourteenth and the beginning of the fifteenth century and explained why there was no unity, and why the attempts to create government and nations failed. He argued that it was the lack of general interests and opinions, that society was not ready for unity because it was still fragmented and local.

In Lecture 11, Guizot presented the moral and political facts that contributed to the strengthening of the state and the formation of the modern society. Thus, he claimed that the war between France and England led to unity, order and the beginning of nation building. Diplomacy started in the fifteenth century to create a system of equilibrium between countries. It was in the fifteenth century that a new school of free thinkers started—the Renaissance. The fall of Constantinople brought Greek fugitives to Italy, with their manuscripts, and knowledge of ancient civilizations. It was a period of discoveries, innovations, enterprises and the extension of European commerce.

The Reformation was the topic of the Lecture 12. Guizot defines it “as a great movement of the liberty of the human mind, a new necessity for freely thinking and judging its own account, and with its own power, of facts and ideas which hitherto Europe had received, or was held bound to receive from the hands of authority.” (p. 225) Reformation eliminated religion from politics and restored the independence of the governments, which led to centralization of power. However, there were two contradictory principles that led to conflict. The author illustrated this conflict using as an example the 1688 revolution in England. He presents the state of the country in the seventeenth century, the prosperity, the existence of free institutions like the House of Commons and the Parliament. The two national demands for political and religious freedom united against the king who held both powers.

Lecture 13 described all the phases of the English revolution in detail. It ended up with William, prince of Orange, becoming the ruler in England. He became the champion of the religious liberties and opposed the universal monarchy. The same struggle against absolute monarchy was taking place in Europe as well.

The last lecture, 14, draws a comparison between England and France and it explains why France, not England, had the greatest influence in Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth century. In England, the different elements of civilization—such as royalty, aristocracy, religious orders, local and central institutions—developed continuously. There was no element dominant at one time, and there was no element that disappeared completely. They existed simultaneously and contributed to the establishment of a strong and free government.
On the continent, in France, the same elements of civilization developed in succession but “its development was wrought upon a larger scale, and with more grandeur and brilliancy.” (254) France dominated the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries, through the absolute monarchy of Louis XIV. The king became weak at the end of the reign and so was the absolute power. The government that followed Louis XIV, apathetic and inert, “labored only to hide itself in the background.” (p. 267) This was the moment when the people took control. With a great desire to reform everything, the human mind changed in the process and now considered itself a “creator.” The struggle between free inquiry and absolute monarchy in England was taking place in France. Guizot stated that the government of Louis XIV perished because it was an absolute monarchy, and the power that succeeded him had the same fate for the same reason. Although the author expressed his admiration for the progress of the eighteenth century, he also was disappointed with this epoch when the human mind “possessed absolute power, became corrupted…holding established facts and former ideas in an illegitimate disdain and aversion.” (p. 270)

François Guizot was a prominent figure in nineteenth century France. In an eloquent, witty style, Guizot examines the development of European civilization from the fall of Rome to the nineteenth century. He reveals the components of the European civilization, the competition of these principles, which allowed unlimited potential for development in Europe. The author presents the changing structure of European society that shifted from aristocracy to democracy. He insists on pluralism and diversity of the European society, clearly a discussion that resonates today. While there are many historical studies of European civilization, this one stands out through its sociological character, which is original. Students and experts alike would benefit from this impressive study.
Justinian’s Flea by William Rosen depicts the key events that led to the first great plague of the Roman Empire and the other different forces that helped create the medieval world of Europe.

William Rosen’s book is an erudite depiction of the key events that led to the first great plague of the Roman Empire. The plague, together with other different forces, created the culture that is now considered medieval Europe. These forces include geography, climate change, invasion of the nomadic people, and the impact of having Christianity adopted as the official religion by Emperor Constantine. In the introduction of the book, the author stated his intentions to provide the reader with a broad context in which the bubonic plague occurred.

The book is divided into four parts: Emperor, Glory, Bacterium and Pandemic. In the first part, the author describes the humble beginnings of Justinian, including his journey from Skopje, in Serbia Macedonia, a province where many Roman soldiers were settled, to Constantinople. The city made a profound impression on Petrus Sabbatius, the real name of Justinian. It was a cosmopolitan city with over seventy spoken languages and a population of about half a million “packed into a space roughly two-thirds the size of Manhattan.” (p. 19) Although the city had numerous architectural marvels like churches and palaces, the most impressive structure was the wall surrounding it. It was Constantine, the first Christian emperor, who moved the capital from Rome to Constantinople, renewed the first wall of the city, and started to build a New Rome.

Emperor Constantine, according to the author, was not particularly interested in theological debates. However, when Arius, a priest from Alexandria, declared that that Jesus was not divine and not equal to God, the emperor felt that the unity of the empire was threatened and weakened. The Council of Nicaea proclaimed that God and Jesus are of the same essence. This would have a great influence on Justinian, who also believed in a single law, a single religion in the empire.

Rosen continues with the presentation of the events that led to the fall of the western Roman Empire. The most important of these were the invasions of the Goths and the Huns. One major battle between the Goths and the Romans took place at Adrianople in 378 A.D. The Romans’ defeat marked the isolation of the western side of the empire from the eastern side. It also showed the weakness of the Roman emperors who were forced to hire non-Romans in the army, who then turned around and used their new acquired military strategy to attack Rome itself. Odoacer, leader of the Ostragoth barbarians, created his own kingdom in what is now Italy during the fifth century A.D.
The new non-Roman rulers adopted, and adapted to, Roman traditions, a strategic approach that increased the stability of their rule. The new kingdoms were a mixture of Gothic, Arianism, and Italian culture, which continued to exert a powerful attraction.

The eastern empire still had the vitality that had disappeared in the west. The social elite in Constantinople followed Roman traditions and identity. They still had massive scale entertainment, such as chariot races, religious festivities, and theatres. The eastern emperors tried to prevent their subjects from adopting foreign ways, even forcing them to look Roman.

Part 2, Glory, takes us to the time of Justinian’s reign. The author presents some of the most remarkable moments of the emperor’s life. Chariot races were very popular in Constantinople, and the residents divided themselves into competitive factions called Blues and Greens. It was at one of these competitions that the Nika Revolt started as a protest first against corruption in the government, but then changed into a revolt against Justinian himself. It lasted for several days, and Justinian was ready to flee the country but was stopped by his wife, the formidable Theodora. With the help of a very capable general, the revolt was defeated in a massacre. Justinian eliminated any opposition to his government.

Hagia Sophia, the church commissioned by Justinian, stands out as one of the greatest architectural achievements in history. Justinian did not spare any expense in its construction. It was built in almost six years by two famous Greek mathematicians, Isodore of Miletus and Anthemius of Tralles. They combined mathematical and engineering skills to create a new design. Its interior walls glow from the light reflecting from the gold mosaic. Imported marble of different colors added to the sparkling effect.

To strengthen his authority and bring uniformity to his empire, Justinian codified the laws. His team of experts combined and condensed regulations intended to expedite legal cases and provide textbooks for the law students. The Civil Law of Justinian is central to the European legal system.

Justinian’s most ambitious goal was to reconquer former western territories. His generals defeated the Vandals and the Ostrogoths after a series of lengthy and costly campaigns. His armies restored most of the old empire’s territories. With such victories in territorial gains, he was confident that the empire would stand for centuries. However, his dreams were shattered when, in 540 A.D. a horrific epidemic swept through Constantinople killing half of the population.

Part 3, Bacterium, gives a detailed account of the origins of the bacteria, the type of hosts they need, how they multiply and in what conditions they mutate. Y. Pestis, or the “Demon,” became a terrifying killer. There are different theories about the origins of the disease, but William Rosen argued that it started in Egypt. Alexandria was a very
big port to the Mediterranean Sea; it was filled with cargo ships from Asia, the Middle
East and Africa. Egypt provided grain for the empire. The favorite meal of the rats, a
primary bacterial host, was grain. Documents suggest that in 540 A.D. the population
of rats in the Nile delta increased considerably. Also, the author describes the limited
knowledge of the physicians regarding the disease, its causes and how it spread.

The last part of the book is Pandemic. War, trade, climate change and geographical
position determined the direction taken by the plague. It started spreading north and
east from Egypt. The Persians stopped encroaching on Roman territories because of
the plague. The Arabs conquered the Persians in a relatively short time because the
plague weakened the empire. Those provinces that traded with the Persians, like
Anatolia, were hit by the disease, some of them multiple times. In Italy, hundreds of
thousands were killed by war, plague or famine. Gaul, Spain and Britain were also
affected. The northern lands were less troubled because the climate did not permit the
cultivation of grain, which translated in a reduced population of rats to carry the disease.
Other lands were protected by desert, sluggish trade or low-density population. The
Roman army suffered from a shortage of recruits, requiring the emperor to hire
mercenaries, which left many farms vacant and led to reduced tax revenues. The
population decreased during the plague but increased after the epidemic. Labor
shortages meant more land and higher salaries which in turn translated into prosperity.

The conclusion of the book is that the plague made the transition from late
Mediterranean antiquity to medieval Europe possible. The Germanic states would not
have survived their infancy if Justinian was able to hold onto his conquests in western
Europe.

The book contains an abundance of information in different fields such as history,
theology, epidemiology, architecture and evolutionary history. It is a superbly
documented study describing the plague symptoms, progression, transmission and its
unpredictable trajectory. I highly recommend this book for students and professors
alike.
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Begin the document with title, author’s name and email address, author’s position (e.g. professor, lecturer, graduate student, independent scholar), author’s academic department and affiliation, if any, and the article’s abstract (maximum 200 words). Do not include page numbers, headers, or footers. These will be added by the editors. Do not utilize automatic formatting for indents, space following subheads and paragraphs, etc.

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In October 1961, in Salzburg, Austria, an extraordinary group of scholars gathered to create the International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations. Among the 26 founding members from Austria, Germany, France, Switzerland, The Netherlands, Spain, Italy, England, Russia, the United States, China and Japan were such luminaries as Pitirim Sorokin and Arnold Toynbee.

For six days, the participants debated such topics as the definition of “civilization,” problems in the analysis of complex cultures, civilizational encounters in the past, the Orient versus the Occident, problems of universal history, theories of historiography, and the role of the “human sciences” in “globalization.” The meeting was funded by the Austrian government, in cooperation with UNESCO, and received considerable press coverage. Sorokin was elected the Society’s first president.

After several meetings in Europe, the advancing age of its founding members and the declining health of then president, Othmar F. Anderle, were important factors in the decision to transfer the Society to the United States.

Between 1968 and 1970 Roger Williams Wescott of Drew University facilitated that transition. In 1971, the first annual meeting of the ISCSC (US) was held in Philadelphia. Important participants in that meeting and in the Society’s activities during the next years included Benjamin Nelson (the Society’s first American president), Roger Wescott, Vytautas Kavolis, Matthew Melko, David Wilkinson, Rushton Coulborn and C.P. Wolf. In 1974, the Salzburg branch was formally dissolved, and from that year to the present there has been only one International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations (ISCSC).

The presidents of the ISCSC are, in order: In Europe, Pitirim Sorokin and Othmar Anderle; in the United States, Benjamin Nelson, Vytautas Kavolis, Matthew Melko, Michael Palencia-Roth, Roger Wescott, Shuntaro Ito (from Japan), Wayne Bledsoe, Lee Daniel Snyder, Andrew Targowski, David Rosner, Toby Huff, and Lynn Rhodes. To date, the Society has held 48 meetings, most of them in the United States but also in Salzburg, Austria; Santo Domingo, The Dominican Republic; Dublin, Ireland; Chiba, Japan; Frenchman’s Cove, Jamaica; St. Petersburg, Russia; Paris, France; New Brunswick, Canada; Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; and Suzhou, China.

More than 30 countries are represented in the Society’s membership. Its intellectual dynamism and vibrancy over the years have been maintained and enhanced through its annual meetings, its publications, and the participation of such scholars as Talcott Parsons, Hayden White, Immanuel Wallerstein, Gordon Hewes, André Gunder Frank, Marshall Sahlins, Lynn White Jr., and Jeremy Sabloff.

The Society is committed to the idea that complex civilizational problems can best be approached through multidisciplinary analyses and debate by scholars from a variety of fields. The Comparative Civilizations Review, which welcomes submissions from the Society’s members as well as other scholars, has been published continually since its inaugural issue in 1979.

Prof. Michael Palencia-Roth
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