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Editor's Note

From the Presidents
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Peer Reviewed Articles
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Essays
Five Epochs of Civilization
Meaning of the Twenty-First Century
Spengler’s Worldview: A Retrospective Analysis

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# Table of Contents

**Editor's Note**  
Joseph Drew ................................................................. 1

**From the Presidents**

Civilizational Analysis and Paths Not Taken, Part II: The Great Divergence  
Toby Huff ........................................................................ 5

The Transformation of The Information Wave Into Virtual Civilization and the Ethical Questions It Raises  
Andrew Targowski .......................................................... 28

**Peer-Reviewed Articles**

Chess Game of Civilizations  
Sallama Shaker and Colleen Bromberger ................................... 58

The European Centre for Higher Education (CEPES): A UNESCO Effort to Reduce Cold War Tensions and to Promote Cooperation in Higher Education in Europe  
Leland Conley Barrows ...................................................... 70

Leveraging Diasporic Power for Nation Building  
Uttam Gaulee .................................................................... 91

Beyond Eurasia: Technology in Africa, the Americas, and Oceania in Pre-Modern Times  
Norman Rothman ............................................................... 108

Workplace Bullying in the United States and Canada: Organizational Accountability Required in Higher Education  
Leah P. Hollis ................................................................. 117

**Essays**

Five Epochs of Civilization  
William McGaughey ........................................................... 126

Meaning of the Twenty-First Century: From Internationalism to Globalism  
Ronald Glossop ............................................................... 131

Spengler’s Worldview: A Retrospective Analysis  
Rudolph Zalter ............................................................... 137
Table of Contents (cont.)

Book Reviews


Table of Contents (cont.)

For the Authors

Comparative Civilizations Review Style Sheet .......................................................... 179

Conference Announcement

47th Annual Conference of the International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations
Marconi Conference Center
Marshall, California, USA............................................................................................ 181
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By “a comparative civilizational perspective” we mean (1) the use of evidence from more than one civilization (the various national traditions of the modern West being regarded, in this respect, as constituents of a single civilization) and (2) a method likely to throw new light either on the origins, processes, or structures of civilizations or on the problems of interpreting civilizations.

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Two hundred years ago, the French thinker and father of systematic social science, Comte de Saint-Simon, “the most encyclopedic mind of his age,” foresaw the potential emergence of authoritarianism, even totalitarianism, from democracy. He posited that social and political institutions are but ideas in action. Crises occur in government and society when major institutions are unable to respond adequately to general, typically inchoate ideas prevalent or rising among the public. All societies require educated leadership, an elite; it takes the emergence of a new elite, one “adequately educated according to the present state of knowledge” to restrain the unruly “ambition of peoples and kings” and bring an end to instability.

Saint-Simon theorized that this continuous inarticulation between changing public sentiment and governing institutions led to the alternation of (a) long “organic” periods during which social and political institutions are “in harmony with the state of civilization” and (b) “critical” or revolutionary periods marked by chaos, conflict, and often destructive criticism. Thus, his philosophy would say that an organic state preceded the critical period during which Greek philosophy flourished. And to him, the establishment of the Church in Europe constituted the commencement of a new organic period. Were he alive today, he might write that a long organic period is now ending in the United States, one which began with Franklin Roosevelt, brought the New Deal to the common man, built a large American middle class, and lasted for over eight decades.

Moreover, to Saint-Simon, should a cloud move in, and a nation suddenly lose the leadership of its elite, its productive scientists, artists, engineers, professionals, it will become a “lifeless corpse.” Society is endangered when, under those who rule, respect for scientific knowledge fades — or is rejected altogether; ignorance prevails when “in every sphere men of greater ability are subjected to the control of men who are incapable.”

So, following the unexpected triumph in the fall elections of anti-intellectualism and bigotry, and the concomitant failure of those who stood for climate science, environmental protection, healthcare for all, fair immigration policies, and the promotion of culture and education, amidst ugly political rallies that alternated between pummeling minority students — “throw them out!” — and threatening rote chants of “lock her up!” or “build the wall!”, the United States has now entered a Saint-Simonian critical period. Incompetence and ignorance ascend. Unqualified appointees rise on every front. Xenophobia is triumphant.

Did, to some extent, our educated elite fail us this time? Had it been drawn, as another Frenchman, Alexis de Tocqueville, warned was possible, into a world where privilege is divorced from duty, authority is destroyed, and comfort becomes the only prize? Did a “kind of virtuous materialism” emerge, to “not corrupt, but enervate, the soul and noiselessly unbend its springs of action?”
To de Tocqueville, of course, great danger to the American people could arise from the omnipotence or tyranny of the majority, as he wrote in his magisterial work, Democracy in America. But our democracy, he also wrote, is perpetually restless. Democratic societies have both a natural taste for freedom and an insatiable passion for equality.

It is now the task of educated men and women, in this restless democracy, to rise to the fundamental challenges newly presented to our nation, to champion science and progress, to oppose bigotry and exclusion, and through leadership built on reason and capability, on knowledge and tolerance, and on education accessible to all, to reverse course, to bring this society safely back to its moorings, established in 1776, back to freedom and equality.

Joseph Drew

As we consider what topics should be weighed in our annual meetings, one proposal would be to institute a continuing education program. Every other profession and field of study has one; why not this one? What specifically might be of most value to those who study and write in the field of comparative civilizations? Perhaps it is a course in methodology. Advances have been enormous over the past few decades, and yet most of the writing we do takes little or no guidance from the growth in research methodology. While comparative civilizationalists often are innovative in their methodology, rarely is whatever model utilized subjected to rigorous examination for its validity and ability to be replicated.

There is a community of men and women interested in the comparative study of civilizations, and many writers for this journal, participants in this community of practitioners, adopt what is today called “qualitative” research. This type of research explores a central phenomenon or issue and rests on the asking of broad questions, analyzing the information garnered for themes, and interpreting the resulting data. But “quantitative research,” which examines trends or variables in the literature and utilizes instruments to gather and analyze data collected, often with numbers, has much to offer. A third way is the utilization of what is called “mixed methods,” combining both qualitative and quantitative research; it also should be considered. In the field of educational research, these three broad categories offer rich possibilities for dissertations and for the process of undertaking meaningful research.

The field of research methodology is explosive in its growth over recent decades. New methods are emerging constantly, in many countries and in the fields of media and communication, education, medicine, social science, evaluation, social work, family research, nursing, policy research, and physical science research, and finding widespread acceptance. Hundreds of grants from the National Institutes of Health, for example, the National Science Foundation, the British Economic and Social Research Council, and other sources, now involve mixed methods. The new “Oxford Handbook of Multimethod and Mixed Methods Research Inquiry” has over 40 chapters written by authors from around the world.

1. Experimental Designs
2. Correlational Designs
3. Survey Designs
4. Grounded Theory Designs
5. Ethnographic Designs
6. Narrative Research Designs
7. Mixed Methods Designs
8. Action Research Designs

In addition, today’s researchers must consider the paradigm to be adopted in their study, the worldview, conscious or unconscious, taken by the researcher. Different methods relate to different worldviews, with varying philosophical approaches to ontology, epistemology, axiology, and rhetoric. The worldview affects the theoretical lens and, thus, the methodology chosen.

If we consider further what are called today Mixed Methods Designs – the courses I’m teaching this Spring, and several of the dissertations I am supervising, tend to involve the use of such designs – we see three “core” mixed methods emerging, both of a fixed design (i.e., where the use of quantitative and qualitative methods is predetermined) and of an emergent design (where the use of mixed methods arises due to issues that develop during the process of conducting the actual research). Three major types may be discerned: Convergent Design, Explanatory Sequential Design, and Exploratory Sequential Design.

These designs may themselves be built and utilized in a wide variety of ways. Most studies, however, are of a basic, simple nature: thus, a quantitative study, strand one (say, of a large sample drawn from many civilizations) plus a quantitative study, strand two (say, drawn from one civilization or manifestation) plus a qualitative study, strand three (say, drawn from interviews with scholars or experts on the one civilization studied in strand two as compared to the findings for the overall, large sample studied in strand one). Or, comparative civilizationalists might prefer to use the comparative case study approach.

Yet another possibility would be a complex mixed methods approach that is especially valuable when we are examining numerous phases, considering the work of multiple investigators, weighing many previous studies undertaken over the years, connecting a large set of multiple research questions to make an overarching point, or developing a research “map” for foundational purposes in the field. The great expert in this mapping exercise was the late Columbia University Professor Paul Lazarsfeld in his methodological work, “The Uses of Sociology.”
Such a mixed methods comparative civilizations research project might begin with a statement of existing theory and research on a phenomenon that has arisen frequently over time in multiple civilizations, then offer a theoretical concept or research map or model as a working hypothesis, then carry out basic research on one civilization using a design that is tentative, and thus formative, for the rest of the study. We would then, based on our findings, modify the originating research or foundational theory (if necessary). Next, we would develop our instrument that arises from our test of the original theory and validate the method we would use to examine the phenomenon in additional civilizations, or aspects of civilizations, that is of interest. Here we might insert a qualitative strand, such as interviewing other scholars and obtaining their observations on our theory and method being used in the study.

Then, we do our research, perhaps modify the theory or research design yet again as new data are uncovered, changing our instrument or design as needed based on our findings (i.e., utilizing grounded theory). We would then validate the revised theory, do final research, and develop a grand, inclusive, summative explanation for the phenomenon we have chosen to examine. This is combining grounded theory design (theory which arises from our study) with several quantitative or qualitative strands, a mixed methods design.

In the field of the comparative study of civilizations, we are addressing what are amongst the largest of human phenomena, developments that arise over very long periods of time. Our findings are therefore likely to be controversial, subject to constant caveats, exceptions, and potential attacks. So, we need to combine the ability to see the big picture, to grasp reality, with a research methodology capable of capturing and organizing data and then supporting an appropriate explanation of the data in a meaningful theory, one open to challenge by other researchers.

The best way to begin, in my opinion, is via a comprehensive, widely acceptable research map. If the field could agree on the key issues and on the boundaries of the domain of study, then solid methodology subscribed to by all experts in the subject could be employed to develop provable theories and premises that constitute foundational bases for research. It would invigorate the study of comparative civilizations.

In the meantime, I urge the International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations to consider the institution of a continuing education component to our wonderful annual meetings, this year to be held in sunny California.
Civilizational Analysis and Paths Not Taken,  
Part II: The Great Divergence

Toby Huff

In Part I of this essay, I sketched an overview of several contrasting approaches to civilizational analysis. I also pointed out that Europe from the twelfth century onward underwent a revolutionary transformation that set it apart from all other civilizations. The present discussion presents the analysis that follows from that background and the insights of Max Weber’s “Preface” to his Collected Essays in the Sociology of Religion (1920). It assumes the plural conception of civilizations pioneered by Durkheim, Mauss, and Benjamin Nelson. The intent of the discussion is to show how very different civilizational development turned out in three civilizations, even with the mediating intervention of direct encounters.

The first encounter was between Byzantium (Greek/Roman) civilization and Islamic civilization during the 8th and 9th centuries; the second encounter focuses on the 12th century interaction between Islam and the West; and the third, the 17th century encounter between European missionaries and Chinese scholars, when the Europeans attempted to introduce modern science to China. Because these issues are so large and complex, I can only offer a rough sketch here of the many issues.

Islamic Civilization: Encounters with Greek and Hellenic Culture

The first encounter, which has often been overlooked, concerns the transmission of cultural resources from Greek and Hellenic civilization to the newly emerging Islamic civilization of the ninth and tenth centuries. The focus here is not on military clashes and conquests but upon what I shall call the axial institutions (Benjamin Nelson’s phrase) of the two civilizations. The Islamic crusades or military conquests, fought over territory (although fateful for the peoples displaced), have little to do with the shaping of the fundamental religious and legal institutions that were to pervade Islamic civilization from that time to modern times.

When Islamic civilization was ascending, the main representative of what has come to be known as Western or European civilization was represented by Byzantium, inheritor of both the Roman Empire and Greek philosophy. It was an impressive cultural formation that often awed visitors (in places like Constantinople). For present purposes, I shall only

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highlight the fact that Byzantium’s three central components were the legacy of Greek philosophy, the unsurpassed Roman Civil Law, and the Christian faith.\(^3\).

While focusing on the transfer of philosophical and scientific knowledge to Islamic civilization, it should be borne in mind that the Emperor Justinian in the sixth century reformed the whole Roman legacy of law in creating what is known as the *Corpus Juris Civilis* or the *Roman Civil Law*. This was the most developed legal system in the history of the world (as extravagant as that claim may sound.)\(^4\) Justinian made this new legal code the law of the Byzantine empire in 534 A.D. However, because the Western portion of the Roman Empire collapsed in the middle of the 6\(^{th}\) century, the Roman legal texts (nearly 4,500 pages in English) were lost for centuries in Western Europe and were not rediscovered until the eleventh century; that rediscovery reinvigorated European legal thought as I discussed earlier.

For us, however, I need to emphasize that the Roman Civil Law was taught in the law schools across the Middle East in the *sixth and seventh* centuries, and above all, in the leading Roman law school in Beirut on the very eve of the rise of Islam. This is significant because Muslims never paid the slightest attention to Roman Civil Law when Islamic law was being shaped and refined. This was so because Muslims considered everything before Muhammad’s message the state of jahiliya, or ignorance and moral confusion. Consequently, Islamic law developed its own roots and its own path of jurisprudence. Only in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries did Islamic rulers and legal scholars realize that there were serious omissions in Islamic law from the point of view of economic development and political administration (among many others). Only very selectively and gradually did they replace Islamic law in government, economic transactions and some other areas. The end result was that Islamic law was restricted to the realm of the family and marriage. But that is to get ahead of our narrative. In the case of philosophy and natural science, however, the borrowing was massive.

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\(^4\) The difficulty here is that scholars who know Chinese or Islamic law have relatively limited exposure to the history of Western law, especially the work of Western legal historians of the last several decades. But what is clear is that neither Chinese law nor Islamic law had anything like the sophistication of Roman law, which continued to evolve, above all, with the thorough reform of Roman law under Emperor Justinian and its fusion with Canon law. Among others see Aldo Schiavone, *The Invention of Law in the West* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012); James Brundage, *The Medieval Origins of the Legal Professions. Canonists, Civilians, and Courts* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008); idem, "The Teaching and Study of Canon Law in the Law Schools," pp. 98-120 in the *History of Medieval Canon Law in the Classical Period, 1140-1234*, edited by Wilfried and Hartmann and Kenneth Pennington (Washington: Catholic University Press of America, 2008); and Judith Herren, “Roman Law”, in Herren, *Byzantium. The Surprising Life of a Medieval Empire* (Princeton University Press, 2007). Also more details in *The Rise of Early Modern Science*. 3\(^{rd}\) edition, forthcoming. This revised view of Western legal history was launched by Harold J. Berman in *Law and Revolution* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983).
What writers on the history of Arabic-Islamic science often forget or omit is the extraordinary legacy of Greek natural science and philosophy that was translated and without which it can be argued there would not have been a golden age of scientific inquiry in the Muslim world. As can be seen in Figure 1, the Greek Scientific and Philosophical Heritage translated into Arabic was comprehensive. The cultural elite of the emerging Islamic civilization, mainly Christians and Jews, translated an extraordinary collection of scientific and philosophical texts into Arabic.

- Pythagorus (c. 580-500 BCE) — Writings on mathematics
- Hippocrates (c. 460-333 BCE) — Medical writings
- Plato (428-347 BCE) — Only epitomes and incomplete translations of all the Dialogues, especially the Timaeus
- Aristotle (384-322 BCE) — “Organon” — works on Metaphysics, Physics, Meteorology, Plants and Animals, On the Heavens, Generation and Corruption, Logic (Analytics, etc), On the Soul, etc.
- Archimedes (c. 287-212 BCE) — Works on mathematics, mechanics and hydraulics
- Apollonius of Perga (c. 262-190 BCE) — Conics
- Aristarchus of Samos (fl. 270 BCE) — Sun-centered theory
- Euclid (fl 300 BCE) — Elements of Geometry & Optics
- Herophilus (335-280 BCE) — Medical works
- Erasistratus (fl. c. 250 BCE) — Medical works
- Galen of Pergamon (129 CE – c. 199) — Sixteen books on medicine and anatomy
- Ptolemy (2nd century CE) — Almagest (“the greatest” book), Tetrabiblos,

Figure 1. Outstanding Scientific Works Translated into Arabic

As time progressed, notable Islamic scholars became translators and masters of these new materials. This was especially true of scholars like al-Kindi (d. 850?) and his circle in Baghdad who did seminal philosophical and scientific work. In any case, it is fair to say that with this new intellectual cargo, the Islamic world had the most advanced science platform in the world, surpassing both Europe and China in foundational ideas that were only to reach their zenith when transferred back to Europe.

We can reduce this list down to four main areas: medicine, especially anatomy; mathematics; physical science; astronomy, and optics. However, the works of Aristotle’s natural philosophy are very broad and include what we think of as natural science, even

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5 This is foundational work on astrology used in the Middle East and Europe and still regarded by many as essential for horoscopes and astrological forecasting.

6 This list was compiled from several sources, especially F.E. Peters, Aristotle and the Arabs (New York: New York University Press 1968); Peters, Allah’s Commonwealth (New York: New York University Press, 1973), and Dimitri Gutas, Greek Thought, Arabic Culture (London: Routledge, 1998) and other sources.
proto-physics, but also the logical instruments of reasoned discourse. Built into Aristotle’s philosophy was the idea of natural causation: that natural forces operate autonomously. The task of natural science was to analyze these forces and explain how they operate. So it is not surprising that Aristotle's natural philosophy was not taught in the Islamic madrasas because it violated the fundamental Islamic principle that God is the author of every event.

Second, we should note that Plato’s little book, the Timaeus, was not translated. Yet this book contains the heart of Greek natural philosophy, with its proclamations that the cosmos is like a great machine, guided by natural forces, and that the whole system is rationally coherent and understandable by the human intellect.

Furthermore in Plato’s view, the pursuit of philosophy was the greatest boon that had ever come (or ever would come) to mankind, precisely because it enabled human beings to understand the natural universe. So here again, it is not surprising that this work was not fully translated into Arabic because it would run up against Islamic occasionalism, the worldview according to which God is always in control of everything and making predictions about how the world would work in the future is the domain of thought reserved to God.

Conversely, this rationalist account of the universe, and its notion that the human intellect is part of that rational cosmos, was taken up by medieval Christians and shaped all aspects of Western thought thereafter.7

Let us also note three additional elements in this translated material that would be necessary to get to the European scientific revolution and Newtonian synthesis. The first of these was the whole rationalist view constructed by both Plato and Aristotle. But in addition, there were Aristotle’s Physics (and related books), the geometry of Euclid, and Ptolemy’s great astronomical work called by the Arab translators, the Almagest or “the greatest book.” This was the unsurpassed model for astronomical thinking that prevailed for nearly 1,000 years. By the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, all of these elements would come together to give us the Copernican and Newtonian revolutions.

So now the question is, given this impressive cargo of Greek-inspired scientific and philosophical thought, how was it received and how was it integrated into Islamic education?

The Madrasas

The central educational institution in Islamic civilization was the madrasa, the place of study dedicated to the teaching of the religious sciences, the so-called “transmitted sciences” centered on Islamic law, its roots and methodologies as shown in Figure 2. This

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educational plan meant the study of Islamic law and its auxiliary disciplines: Quranic exegesis, hadith studies [comprised of the collected sayings of the prophet Muhammad], Arab genealogy and arithmetic for the division of inheritances. Later the study of logic and kalam (Islamic theology) were added but the central discipline was always Islamic law. The study of Greek natural philosophy or medicine were never brought into the madrasas, as the view was maintained that nothing inimical to Islamic piety should be permitted in the madrassas. In the eleventh and twelfth century the great religious philosopher al-Ghazali (d. 1111) spoke out powerfully and harshly about the likely impious influence of the Greek rational sciences, even suggesting that those who took them up could be accused of heresy.8

Designed to teach the “Transmitted sciences”:
Islamic Jurisprudence (fiqh) and the shari’a composed of
  Quranic studies
  Hadith studies
Arab genealogy
Arithmetic for dividing inheritances
Kalam (theology, added later) and some logic
No teaching of the natural science or medicine

Figure 2. Madrasas: Pious Endowments (waqf)9

Because these madrasas were pious endowments (waqf), they were simply a collection of self-appointed religious scholars, not a real faculty. There were no degrees, they could not grant a formal diploma, and there was no intellectual autonomy: most madrasas were devoted to a single school of law (of which there were four main schools). When the student had mastered the material of his teacher, shown by oral recitation, the teacher would then grant the student an ijaza, a “permission to transmit” that particular work, not a certification of general learning, or anything like a “license to teach.” Consequently, there was no attempt, even in those rare situations where all four schools of law were represented, to create a broadly unified set of legal opinions or standard procedural s for jurisprudence. At the same time, the natural sciences were left aside.

Given this background, the paradox has always been, how was it possible to make such advances as the Arabs and Muslims did make in science when the natural sciences were never brought into the madrasas? A small part of the answer to this question is the fact that the “foreign sciences” (as Greek natural philosophy was labelled) were taught privately by some scholars in their homes. This was a far cry from the institutionalization of scientific inquiry as was carried out by the European universities from the twelfth century onward. Yet, given the high levels of scientific inquiry that had been achieved by the Greek models

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imported through the translation movement, during the two hundred years of assimilation, Arabic and Islamic masters of these disciplines, commentary and improvement, did advance serious inquiry in some areas, for example, mathematics, optics, and the study of human anatomy.

**Legal Impediments**

For now I shall leave that question because we must look a little deeper into Islamic legal development. As I pointed out, Islamic law, the shari’a, was always and exclusively tied to its unique roots, that is, the Quran and the Hadith collections (the sayings of the prophet Muhammad). This inhibited innovation insofar as improving on or changing the nature of due process in shari’a laws.

Thus, to initiate a legal case, the believer would informally approach a qadi, a judge, perhaps walk with him outside the qadi’s office or in his garden, explaining his complaint. The qadi would then translate the complaint into legal language for a trial.10

But notice that there were no lawyers or advocates (for which there was no Arabic word11) to represent either plaintiff or defendant, nor were there clearly specified “rights” whose violations would be a basis for one’s case. Rather it was the various possible interpretations of holy writ that allowed a trial to begin.

At the same time, note that there were various legal helpers, clerks, professional witnesses and the agent known as the wakil; but he was simply any semi-literate person who could represent someone else in legal proceedings, not one who had legal training, and his limited knowledge of the facts of a case could be substituted for the defendant’s or the plaintiff’s first-hand account. In short, none of these actors had anything like the university training of clerks, notaries, and advocates in Europe.12 Consequently, the qadi presided over the trial, asking questions as he might, and with little power to control the plaintiff or witnesses. For example, the plaintiff could at any moment appeal his case to a religious scholar, asking for a written opinion that could then be presented to the judge, who, though not bound by such advice, would have to consider whether to accept the opinion or not.13

Second, we hear a lot about fatwas, legal opinions issued by legal scholars (muftis) representing any of the four schools of law, but these opinions were not binding on anyone. The only binding legal rulings were issued by the judge, the qadi, yet these were never

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12 These officials in Europe were sworn members of a legal profession, or the bar. See Brundage, *Medieval Origins*.

13 See Powers, ibid.
published, stored, or collected where they could be systematically studied. This absence of such public records available to scholars until the last quarter of the twentieth century led most scholars to conclude that there were no collections of such legal rulings. Only a very few such cases have been found because they were kept by the qadi in his private home, and they too disappeared with the judge’s retirement. The collections of legal opinions that we do have come almost entirely from the legal opinions of religious scholars (muftis) that are not binding juridical rulings issued by judges.14 Even when the voluminous records of religious scholars provide details of particular cases (because a religious scholar was consulted), the actual judicial decision was frequently omitted because it was not formally published as was the case in Europe.

Only in the mid-sixteenth century under the Ottomans were courthouses made available for such proceedings and for the recording of legal rulings, not solely the opinions of religious scholars.15 Consequently, this way of proceeding (quite intentionally) never resulted in the creation of a set of legal precedents that should be followed by other judges.

Third, because of this legal informality and the persistence of customary practice based on Quranic models, there were no innovative legal manuals that systematized and reformed actual legal procedure as happened in European law in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. For example, the great philosopher and legal scholar Ibn Rushd (Averröes, d. 1198) wrote a massive legal treatise, reviewing the legal opinions of the scholars associated with each of the four main schools of Islamic law (i.e. Shafi’i, Maliki, Hanbali, Hanafi). But he introduced no new legal procedures. His section on legal procedure (what we would call the domain of due process of law) is a mere two and half pages, the whole section on procedure only twenty pages. He only repeats what legal scholars said in the past that conform to understandings of what the prophet Muhammad did in his lifetime.16

The Problem of Scientific Development and the Middle East

While we can say that scholars in Islamic civilization made contributions to the advancement of medicine, optics, astronomy and mathematics, the fact is that after 200 years, when the Islamic Middle East was assimilating the Greek heritage, and after the madrasas became widely ensconced across the Muslim world, innovative scientific activity ceased.

Defenders of Arabic-Islamic science often claim that certain advances in astronomy, medicine, and mathematics laid the foundations for the rise of modern science. That, however, is a problematic claim, though not without some truth.¹⁷

Let us consider first the case of astronomy: no scientific revolution occurred in Muslim astronomy and no one has shown a direct connection between any Arab-Islamic astronomical innovations and the actual revolutionary departure of Copernicus, not to mention any connection with Galileo, Kepler or Newton. While it is true that Muslim mathematicians did invent algebra and did perfect trigonometry, these advances were not used by Copernicus (Galileo, Kepler or Newton) to make their revolutionary advances. Those advances were brought about by the use of geometry.¹⁸

The second area of important work is medicine: it was Ibn Sina, the eleventh century physician, who systematized a great deal of medical thought of the Greek physician, Galen, especially Galen’s anatomical writings. These were translated into Latin and taught in the European universities for several hundred years.¹⁹ But advances beyond that landmark were entirely the work of Europeans who began dissecting (first pigs) then human bodies in the twelfth century, whereas Muslims (and Jews) always rejected such practice as something forbidden.

In a word, the one avenue open to scientific advance of knowledge of the human body, post-mortem dissections, was forbidden in the Islamic world. The positive effect of the more permissive attitude toward anatomical inquiry in Europe after the twelfth century can be shown graphically with the following illustrations. The ancient view of the human body going back to Alexandrian physicians, postulated five systems of anatomy, and hence the “five figures.” These included the muscular, nervous, and skeletal structures, plus veins and arteries as shown in figures 3-7. Alexandrian depictions of these were later picked up by Arab and Muslim physicians.

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¹⁸ For more on this see Huff, *Intellectual Curiosity*, Chapter 10.

With minor modifications and Arabic labels added, these primitive sketches continued to be reproduced in the Muslim world all the way into the nineteenth century. The most famous rendering of these illustrations is known as the Mansurian manuscripts that were still being used in the Middle East in modern times. As we see, there was a great leap forward in anatomical understanding made by Andreas Vesalius when he published his illustrated landmark, *The Fabric of the Human Body* (1543). Only several centuries later did Middle Eastern physicians, especially Turkish scholars, adopt these classic renditions of human anatomy.

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But the most important area of research advances made by Middle Easterner scholars was in optics. This was made possible by the extraordinary ability of Ibn al-Haytham, another eleventh century scholar (d. 1042), who built on the Greek heritage as well as al-Kindi’s work in optics. He demonstrated the straight-line transmission of light and thereby solved a major optical problem accepted by all subsequent leaders in optical research and thus setting a positive course for future optical study. He laid important foundations for optical advance that greatly influenced eleventh century Europeans who were already poised to supersede Middle Easterners in optics.

For example, Theodoric of Freiberg around 1310 showed that the rainbow is formed by rays of light refracting and reflecting in drops of water. He came up with this explanation virtually simultaneously with two Middle Eastern scholars, Qutb al-din al-Shirazi (d. 1311), and Kamal al-Din al Farisi (d. ca.1320). Yet in a very short period of time, the Europeans surpassed the Arab-Muslim world in optical studies and technology.

Indeed, it was a European monk in Pisa who invented eyeglasses in 1286, just as Roger Bacon was demonstrating how a curved piece of glass could be used to magnify visual images and serve as corrective lenses. Soon thereafter thousands of pairs of eyeglasses were manufactured by Italians and shipped around the world, especially to the Middle East,
India, and to China. Fifteenth and sixteenth century European and Mughal art has many examples of clerics and scholars wearing the newly invented spectacles, as in Figure 7.

![Figure 7](image-url)

**Figure 7.** A German cleric wearing rivet spectacles in a painting by Konrad von Soest from the altar piece in the Stadskirche of Bad Wildungen, Germany, 1403. They had been invented by an Italian monk ca. 1296.

In the meantime, optical inquiries and similar scientific advances waned in the Muslim world. As I pointed out in *Intellectual Curiosity*, when the telescope arrived in the Muslim world, Muslims in the Middle East and Mughal India in the 1620s had little use for it and did not use it to make new advances in astronomy.

**A Second Encounter: Arabic Materials Translated into Latin**

We should remember that during the rise of Islamic civilization, Europe (especially Western Europe) was largely cut off from its earlier Greek inheritance. It was only when Europeans in the eleventh and twelfth centuries began to discover the cultural and intellectual resources of the Islamic Middle East that the recovery of such materials began. This era of new encounters has often been discussed in connection with the “Renaissance of the twelfth century” and the new “translation movement.”

Europeans rediscovered the major works of Aristotle, Plato, Euclid, Galen, and others, along with the pioneering work of outstanding Arab-Muslim scholars and their commentaries on Greek works in natural philosophy.

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This intercultural transmission project entailed a complex process whereby some Arab scholars found their way to Europe through Italy, bringing important materials with them, especially in medicine. Likewise, when European scholars visited Spanish libraries, they found many resources illustrating the apparent “rationalism” of “our Arab masters,” as Adelard of Bath put it. This translation project was in many ways similar to the earlier translation of Greek thought into Arabic, except this time the Europeans were eager to assimilate the full range of this new intellectual heritage, especially Aristotle’s “natural books.” They not only translated all this material into their respective languages, but put major Aristotelian works in the curriculum at the center of university education all across Europe. Conversely, Muslim scholars found Aristotle’s naturalistic agenda too subversive to religious orthodoxy and hence prohibited its incorporation in the madrasas.

When the Europeans incorporated the new Greek materials in the newly established universities, they created a whole new scientific agenda within institutions of higher education for the first since Plato’s academy. That agenda continued all the way to the present, for these new books included Aristotle’s works on Physics, On the Heavens, On Generation and Corruption, Meteorology, The Small Works on Natural Things as well as biological works such as The History of Animals, The Parts of Animals, The Generation of Animals, and so on. All of this served to inculcate the new rationalist ethos of science that became the intellectual foundation on which the modern scientific revolution was launched. Not to be forgotten is the fact that although the university faculties were composed of Christian scholars, these new institutions were legally autonomous entities, a status entirely absent in Islamic law and civilization.

The Third Encounter: China and the West

In order to understand our third encounter, that between the West and China in the seventeenth century, we must shift our metaphysical outlook. As we recall, when the Reformation broke out across Europe in the early sixteenth century, Catholic officials began to look outside Europe for more believers to convert. Subsequently, the story of the Jesuit missionaries is one the most striking tales of intercultural exchange in the annals of world history. For these intrepid believers sailed around the world, often at great cost to their own lives (taking six months or more to get to China), in order to spread their religious message. That message, of course, was deeply embedded in Western philosophical and legal thought, as well as Christianity, and that outlook was radically different from the Chinese worldview.

In the Chinese metaphysical world, there was no monotheism, no push-pull causality, and no laws of nature governing the natural world and the human world. Insofar as the human world was concerned, it was the edicts of the emperor and the onerous rules of the past that were meant to control human behavior through the threat of severe punishment.

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Moreover, neo-Confucian education of the time centered on texts that were seen as the original source of wisdom, propriety, and moral probity drawn from past great sages. These values were taken to be essential to inform personal identity as well as the maintenance of the Chinese state. In an effort to make the wisdom and spirit of these documents more accessible, the twelfth century Chinese moral philosopher Chu Hsi edited those texts into a new collection called *The Four Books*, which were *The Greater Learning, the Analects, the Book of Mencius, and the Doctrine of the Mean*, but none had any scientific content. These were books about moral history, poetry, and the lessons one should learn from visiting the ideas of the great sages of the past.

However, due to the influence of Chu Hsi and his followers, these neo-Confucian texts became the canonical sources for the Civil Service Examinations that were administered on a three-year cycle, all the way to the twentieth century. Also notable was that there were no law schools nor was jurisprudence any part of the examinations.

In the realm of natural philosophy, the neo-Confucian worldview was suffused with the notion of ineffable energy (*chi’i*), manifested in *yang* and *yin*, polar elemental forces or states of nature. This organic conception of the universe of constantly recurring cycles contained the *wu hsing*, the five elements, or five phases of nature, each followed by the other: wood, water, fire, earth, and metal. With no causal forces governing these realms, it was difficult to get to a worldview of lawful regularity that might be described with mathematical precision.

So when missionaries arrived in China in the last third of the sixteenth century, especially the leader of the Jesuits, Matteo Ricci, with his university education and high proficiency in mathematics, they soon realized that Chinese science was not as advanced as Greek natural philosophy. This was especially true of Chinese astronomy, a poor substitute for the Ptolemaic system that had withstood hundreds of years of critical probing by Arab and Muslim as well as more recent European scholars.

Furthermore, Ptolemaic astronomy was based on a notion of nested spheres in the heavens and the utilization of the tools of geometry to analyze it. But both of these mathematical tools were missing in China. Recognizing this deficit, Ricci and his most important Chinese convert to Christianity, Xu Guangqi (also known as Dr. Paul), agreed that the first order of business had to be the translation of Euclid’s *Elements of Geometry*, followed by the European textbook, *On the Sphere*, written by Sacrobosco (in the thirteenth century) for university students as an explanation of astronomy and the heavenly system. It had been many times revised. Furthermore, Ricci and Dr. Paul believed that the native Chinese interest in mathematics would find this new system of mathematical reasoning (and its

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unique methods for developing logic proofs) a fascinating addition to traditional Chinese mathematics.

China and Western Science

Second, the missionaries hoped Chinese scholars would see the new system as a product of a Christian civilization, thus further inducing them to convert to Christianity. (That part of the plan was only modestly successful.)

This led to the great enterprise of translating the best of Western science, philosophy, technology, and mechanics into Chinese. In the end, the Jesuits brought at least 7,000 books to China and, with the aid of many Chinese scholars (some of them converts), translated these works into Chinese by the middle of the seventeenth century.

But in addition to the European books, the missionary scientists wrote dozens of new works, designed specially to explain all aspects of European astronomy. Here are some examples of the translated materials in astronomy that were brought to China when Galileo was making his revolutionary observations using the telescope. These were published by Galileo in a little book called The Starry Messenger in 1610; by 1615, the missionaries had translated and printed important parts of Galileo’s discoveries in Chinese.

First, we have two pages of a pamphlet translated into Chinese by the Portuguese missionary Manuel Diaz. It mentions the telescope and tells us what new things can be seen with it; how close they appear because of magnification; the novelty of Jupiter’s newly discovered satellites, as well as Saturn’s odd appearance of having “handles.”

Figure 8. A Chinese brochure of 1615 advertising the Appendix written by Manuel Diaz describing Galileo’s discoveries with a diagram showing Saturn’s “handles.” Owned by the author.

The second extraordinary transmission of cutting edge astronomical knowledge was the small treatise on making a telescope authored by the Chinese convert Wang Cheng (known as Dr. Philip). According to him:

First place a lens that is made of glass which seems flat but in fact is not at the mouth of the tube. The lens is called mouth-piece, also called center-protruded lens [convex], or front lens; next place a lens that is a bit curved-in [concave], also named eye-piece, center-recessed lens, or rear lens, at the back of the tube; if the proportion of the distance between the two lenses corresponds, one can see things.

There are only two pieces of lens, but the number of tubes can be added as desired. One tube fits into the other, and the tubes can be shortened or lengthened. The tubes can be fastened with screws which allow free movement of the telescope up and down or left and right. Viewing is done using only one eye. An object of 60 li (miles) seems two hundred steps away. One can thus observe the moon, Venus, the sun, Jupiter, Saturn, and star constellations. When one observes the sun and Venus, one adds thereto a dark green lens. Alternately, place a piece of white paper under the telescope to observe the sun.27

In short, the missionary scientists wrote more than two dozen books on astronomy and the telescope, explaining all the major elements of the Western system, which both Chinese and European scholars knew was more accurate than Chinese astronomy. This was so because at least a half dozen empirical tests (using solar eclipses as markers) of the two systems were carried out by European scholars in China. All of them revealed the far greater accuracy of the new or Western system.

Furthermore, the missionaries who had strong scientific backgrounds brought a large part of Kepler’s new optical theory to China and used it to explain why objects on the horizon may appear to be displaced from their actual positions. Some scholars have argued that the Jesuits held back critical astronomical information and that this affected the reception of European science.28 However, the historical record shows something quite different: the

27 The passage quoted is from Fang Hao, *Studies in the History of the Relations between China and the West* (Peiping: Institutum Sancti Thomae, 1948), p. 293, who is quoting from Wang Cheng’s book. This important discussion of Wang Cheng’s work based on Father Fang Hao’s research, published a year after D’Elia’s original study, was added to D’Elia’s account by the translators on p. 38 of *Galileo in China*. However, the translators mistranslated the key terms “chung wa ching “glass with sunken center” (or concave lens) and chung gao ching “glass with a protruded center” (or convex lens). The result was the reversal of the proper lens arrangement in a Dutch or Galilean telescope, that must place the convex lens as the objective and the concave as the eye-piece (ocular). The same mistake was made by Keizo Hashimoto, *Hsü Kuang-ch’i’i and Astronomical Reform*, p. 183, n58, who was probably following the translation in D’Elia. I am indebted to Chai Choon Lee for providing me with this revised and corrected translation of the Chinese text.

28 This was originally argued by Nathan Sivin, especially in his essay, “Copernicus in China,” *Studia Copernicana* 6 (1973): 63-122. Joseph Needham himself gave more credit to the missionaries. More recently, and without providing any new or old evidence, Harriet Zurndorfer made the same claim of Jesuit
missionaries gave the Chinese scholars more than enough training and information to not only understand basic empirical and theoretical issues, but in fact to set about empirically testing major aspects of the assumptions of both Chinese and Ptolemaic astronomy. Xu Guangqi carried this out when he took over the Chinese Bureau of Mathematics and Astronomy in 1630. Xu chose a half dozen astronomical markers and compared the predictions of European and Chinese astronomers. All of the Chinese predictions were much less accurate than the European. That the Chinese scholars undertook this empirical testing of the two contrasting systems of astronomy was first pointed out in considerable detail by the Japanese scholar, Keizo Hashimoto, in 1988.\textsuperscript{29} Clearly the significance of this research and testing is the fact that the Europeans gave the Chinese scholars all the information and training they needed to carry out their own research program testing the three systems (Chinese, Ptolemaic, and Tychonic). A great deal of the credit for this empirical success belongs to Xu Guangqi who designed the research strategy.\textsuperscript{30}

At the same time, it evident that when European scholars, first Adam Schall von Bell and then Ferdinand Verbiest, took over the directorship of the Chinese Bureau of Mathematics and Astronomy (in the mid-1600s), both leaders trained dozens of Chinese scholars in the “new” or “Western” science of astronomy, so there were decades of European astronomical guidance when the new system could have been fully assimilated by Chinese scholars.

There are many fascinating details regarding the successes and failures, of rejection, arrest and imprisonment of the Jesuit scholars in China, but the point is that, despite all the efforts they made to give Chinese scholars all the intellectual tools needed, in the end, the project failed. Leading Chinese scholars clung to their old system of astronomy and astrology, and, perhaps most significant of all, when Ferdinand Verbiest wrote a memo to the Kangxi emperor (in the late 1670’s)\textsuperscript{31} urging the reform of the Chinese educational system to accommodate the new science, the Emperor refused permission to allow the printing of the memo. A prominent view among the Chinese scholars opposing the new system, was, “it is better to have no good astronomy than to have Westerners in China.”\textsuperscript{32} Furthermore, these nativist scholars thought, China had been a great civilization in the past when its astronomy was poor, so it is better to be a great civilization than to have good astronomy.

As a result, no reform of Chinese education was undertaken; in the succeeding centuries (from the seventeenth through the nineteenth), Chinese scholars made no significant

\textsuperscript{29} Keizo Hashimoto, \textit{Hsü Kuang-ch'i and Astronomical Reform. The Process of the Chinese Acceptance of Western Astronomy 1629-1635.} (Kansai, Japan: Kansai University Press,1988).

\textsuperscript{30} For more on this see Hashimoto, \textit{Astronomical Reform} and my \textit{Intellectual Curiosity}, pp. 91-97. Also: see the list of Jesuit publication on astronomy in Appendix 2 in the third edition of \textit{The Rise of Early Modern Science: Islam, China and the West} (Cambridge/ New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017).

\textsuperscript{31} See Elman, \textit{On Their Own Terms}, p. 145.

\textsuperscript{32} George Wong, citing Yang Guangxian, in “China’s Opposition to Western Science During Late Ming and Early China,” \textit{Isis}, 54 pt 1 (1963): 35.
contributions to the scientific revolution (or modern science) that had begun in Europe, the knowledge of which the missionaries attempted to bring to China.

**Chinese Legal System**

Finally, we must consider the Chinese legal system. Many scholars would argue that one legal system is functionally equivalent to another and should have no impact on scientific inquiry. The reality is, however, different.

Western legal scholars have pointed out that in virtually all European languages, the terms used to refer to the legal domain mean *law* as well as *rights* (*ius, diritto, droit, dercho, Recht)*. In the Chinese legal codes, there are no such references, for traditional Chinese law was entirely a penal code. The Chinese term that has been translated as “law,” *fa*, means punishment, or at best a model of behavior that must be forcefully imposed on recalcitrant subjects.

Thus the Great Ming Code of the late fourteenth century (carried over to the Qing dynasty in the seventeenth century) begins with punishments, first spelling out the “Five Punishments” (beating with a light stick, beating with a heavy stick, penal servitude, exile, and the death penalty); then come the “Ten Abominations” (such as rebellion, sedition, contumacy, depravity, irreverence and so on). This group is followed by the “Eight Deliberations” that constitute a set of mitigating considerations that issue from Confucian notions of status hierarchy and filial piety. These are not existential or accidental circumstances that might mitigate punishment but are Confucian markers of status and kinship that grant privileged exemptions and sentence reduction. Conversely, for example, under these same principles, if someone violates the demands of filial piety (disrespect for elders or seniors) he could be charged with the crime of being “unfilial.” Put differently, this Confucianization of law meant that many offences to propriety had not been formally stated (had not in fact been “justicized”) but yet could be the basis for criminal punishment, beating with bamboo and so on. In other words, the Confucian idea of building the principles of sacred custom into the law, but without formally stating them,

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35 The ancient five punishments were tattooing, cutting off the nose, cutting off the leg, castration, and capital punishment; T’ung-tsu Ch’ü, *Laws and Society* (Paris: Mouton, 1961), p. 364.
meant that a whole realm of possible offenses (“an ocean” of legal possibilities\textsuperscript{40}) were attached to the legal code. One could never be sure of what the law actually was.

As with the case of Islamic law, the idea of a formally trained and legitimate advocate (a defense attorney) was absent in Chinese law. In place of such a professional with a sworn oath to uphold the law, the Chinese system gave rise to the “litigation master,”\textsuperscript{41} an informal legal specialist who worked behind the scenes, could not appear in public, and was often known to manipulate the parties in the case as well as to exaggerate the offenses to gain attention. If he were caught, the punishment could be very severe, leading to bamboosing or transporting. Moreover, all of these quasi-legal actors were self-taught as there were no law schools.

Of course, it was the district magistrate (a legal novice) whose job it was to handle the vast majority of the cases starting at the village or town level. But there was no straightforward path for getting a formal hearing of a grievance, especially in cases where proper family conduct should have occurred but did not, and thus gave cause for litigation. After submission of a petition, the magistrate could (1) turn down the plaint without much reason; (2) turn it down because he thought the claims of the case were untrue; (3) recommend that the case be given back to the lineage elders for settlement; (4) give the case to a runner or middleman to settle; or (5) take the case himself. All these delaying strategies ended up generating still more petitions asking for legal intervention, thus clogging the courts.

These are just a few of the deficits in the Chinese legal system, standing in contrast to European theory and practice of the late medieval period. But here are several crucial points: first of all, there was no such thing as a legally autonomous entity in China: every domain was regulated by the Penal Code and the Emperor's edicts. No group of scholars could be considered legally autonomous, and no such scholars had the freedom to establish a new curriculum or course of study in an autonomous organization in the way that European universities were. Furthermore, if someone were trained in what the Chinese would call, “heterodox” beliefs, such a person would immediately fail the official examinations and be an outcast, if not seriously punished.

It was also true that possessing books on mathematics was illegal during certain periods of time, and stargazing outside the Emperor's closed circle was strictly forbidden. On the other hand, official stargazers were commanded to report to the Emperor what they saw every night in case heavenly omens suggested Royal misconduct or heavenly disfavor. Likewise, using a telescope was forbidden and one of the leaders of the Chinese Bureau of Astronomy and Mathematics (in 1631) was nearly imprisoned for using the telescope brought by the missionaries in 1619 before it was officially presented to the emperor.

\textsuperscript{40} This was the analogy used by the Japanese scholar, Shiga Shuzo, as cited in Huang, “Codified Law,” p. 142.

\textsuperscript{41} See Melissa Macauley, Social Power and Legal Culture. Litigation Masters in Late Imperial China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998).
Here is a final striking illustration of how Royal edict controlled and inhibited scientific inquiry. It was standard practice in cases of suspected murder or foul play, that the magistrate, accompanied by a semiliterate coroner (not a physician), would go to the scene and examine the body. Since neither the magistrate nor the undertaker was trained in medicine, the magistrate used a manual — called Washing Away of Wrongs — in which were sketched the various so-called places of mortal wounds so that the investigation could be done “by the book.” (See Figure 9).

This manual was first developed in the 12th century and it was used into the 19th century. It should be expected that people examining human bodies, in effect doing proto-autopsies after foul play, would discover various new anatomical structures. But the Royal edict declared that no changes to the manual could be made, and the scholars and officials involved declined to change the manual in any way, though they knew modification was needed.42

Civilizational Analysis and the Great Divergence

Civilizational analysis when based on the plural conception of civilizations is neither a complete nor comprehensive mode of analysis. It can always be supplemented by the tools and techniques of the various social sciences. But for a certain range of phenomena and for certain periods of time, it is indispensable. It attempts to focus on the largest coherent units of analysis, civilizational configurations composed of 2+ n societies or peoples that transcend local constraints of time and space because of their underlying institutions and symbolic commitments.

Whatever the dynamics of these larger entities may be, and whatever commonalities they may have, the foregoing analysis has uncovered profound differences of development with universal consequences which surely extend into the twentieth century and beyond. They dramatize the importance of this kind of

analysis. They suggest that these earlier historical developments of a civilization-wide nature make a difference in world historical outcomes. Only by adopting such a framework can one understand the uniqueness of Western development as well as the singularity of the emergence of modern science, due process of law, parliamentary democracy, and other unique legal and institutional devices that made long term economic development possible. In Max Weber’s terms, the European transformation had universal implications for the global order.

There are, for example, a number of crucial cultural and institutional differences between the three civilizations of Europe, China, and the Islamic world. I have suggested that from a civilizational point of view, indigenous legal systems serve as indispensable identifying characteristics of the three civilizations. This was so because legal systems are institutional arrangements that are meant to regulate all aspects of social and cultural behavior within the jurisdiction of the cultural system during the formative period of civilizational gestation. Once a legal system is put in place, it tends to remain as a crucial reference point for all future action. Depending upon how elaborately the legal scholars worked out the fine details of the legal universe, it has the potential to envelop the entire gamut of social and cultural behavior within a civilization, and to do so in perpetuity. This is because only highly developed legal systems have worked out processes and procedures for formalized legal change (i.e., legislation). Neither the Islamic nor the Chinese system evolved to the point of this legislative change option.43 Furthermore, even after upheavals and “revolutions,” the elites within particular civilizations often revert to the rudiments of the previous legal regime. One may also note that this same kind of analysis could be applied to India and Russia as civilizational entities.

In reality, legal systems are alternative moral and intellectual geometries: they codify and divide up the moral terrain in sharply contrasting ways. When looked at comparatively, a large number of differences stand out, in effect creating contrasting limits and possibilities of legal action, commerce, ownership, and much more. Additionally, not all legal systems are equal, not all of them worked out the same (if any) conceptions of human rights, due process, legal autonomy, and so on. Even when there are direct encounters between representatives of contrasting civilizations, their fundamental legal and religious structures often remain intact. Consequently, those codified differences have had profound consequences for scientific, political and economic development. Max Weber had intuited much of this during his early work in European legal history, but his death at the age 56 meant that his most seminal work, his essays in the Sociology of Law, along with his superb cross-civilizational studies, remained a set of tentative reflections.

What is certain is that the three civilizations discussed herein did develop in entirely different ways, creating what authors in other contexts have called “a great divergence”. But that divergence was not confined to nor did it originate in the eighteen or nineteenth

43 More details on this will be found in the third edition of The Rise of Early Modern Science: Islam, China and the West by Anthony Huff (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming April 2017).
centuries as the conception was originally formulated, but far earlier in a defining “axial age” of the European middle ages.

A brief summation of the great divergence seen through this lens, and despite the three intercivilizational encounters, can be put as follows.

At all times, it is indispensable to maintain a comparative framework. I began these inquiries with the question of scientific development, why modern science developed in the western world but not Islam or China. Only much later did I fully explore the singular importance of juridical ideas on social and cultural development. Nor did I at any time exclude the importance of religious and philosophical ideas or economic factors.

Some people have imagined that modern science could have arisen anywhere, but the fact is, it did not. As we saw in the three encounters between Europe, China, and Islam, the cultural elite took the contrasting civilizations in very different directions.

Between the ninth and tenth centuries, the first encounter between Greek and Roman-inspired Western civilization and the emerging Islamic civilization resulted in the transfer to Islamic civilization of a wealth of intellectual resources, especially Greek natural philosophy. During the early phase of this transmission, there were outstanding Arab scholars who took the assimilation of this new material seriously.

But the religious scholars (the ulama) undertook to create a new educational institution dedicated entirely to the religious sciences; therefore the study of the ancient or foreign sciences was given over to private scholars who could not discuss this material in the madrasas. The early Arab masters of Greek natural philosophy made some significant advances in medicine, optics, astronomy and mathematics, but these petered out in many fields by the end of the twelfth century. One could nevertheless suggest that at least the theoretical modelling aspect of Islamic astronomy continued to the end of the fourteenth century with the work of Ibn al-Shatir, (d. 1375), but no revolutionary breakthrough or advances in theoretical or observational astronomy occurred. When the telescope arrived in the Muslim world as early as the 1620s, no Muslim scholars or astronomers were interested in its use for astronomical or scientific purposes. In its most important scientific field, optics, Europeans had begun to supersede Arab scholars both practically and theoretically by the fourteenth century. Despite Ibn al-Haytham’s genius in the study of light, no one in the Muslim world invented the lens or eyeglasses. In astronomy, Muslims

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hung onto the ancient earth-centered worldview even through the eighteen and nineteenth centuries.

In the realm of law, the early Muslims had no use for the Roman Civil law which had been in use for centuries across the formerly Christian Middle East. Islamic legal scholars went in an entirely different direction based on the revealed word of the Quran. Consequently, they did not develop a clear sense of due process of law, and did not reform their legal system until forced to by trade with Europeans in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. They found no Quranic basis for articulating the idea of human rights, the beginnings of which were found among Christian legal scholars in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.45

In the case of China, as late as the end of the seventeenth century, the Chinese rejected the Western scientific worldview made available to them with great effort by the Christian missionaries. Consequently, fully qualified Chinese scholars were prevented from making any contributions to the rise of modern science.

In the domain of law, there was another dominating impediment to the development of constitutionalism, parliamentary democracy, and due process of law. The whole legal domain remained within the sphere of the Emperor’s wish, and no body of independent scholars, no law schools, were allowed to emerge.46 The progressive legal development so characteristic of European history was absent. These legal rigidities likewise ensured the continuation of the backward-looking education regime centered on the ancient Chinese classics, without any focus on natural science, all the way to the twentieth century.

Given these profound differences of civilizational architecture and progression, one would think that social scientists would acknowledge the likelihood that supposedly universal sociological and economic principles and processes have natural limits within civilizational boundaries. A great deal of social scientific thinking presupposes universal application (because results in the US, for example, were often replicated in European societies), but fails to admit such results were achievable because of the underlying civilizational foundations that had been put in place centuries earlier.

Economists in particular have often been purveyors of this perspective because of their assumption that “economic man” is always the chief actor. This has been conjoined with their assumption that economic man can simply tweak the underlying cultural resources to arrive at the legal equivalents to the Western conceptions that were a long time in


46 A remarkable contemporary parallel to the prohibition against the autonomy of social groups in contemporary China was recently pointed out by James Fallows, “Throughout the Communist era, the Chinese state has suppressed the growth of any form of organization other than the party itself.” “China’s Great Leap Backward,” *The Atlantic*, November 15, 2016.
gestation.\textsuperscript{47} Much more research in a civilizational mode of analysis on these questions, among many others, is needed.

In short, the study of civilizations and civilizational configurations of the past reveal quite different paths of development suggesting that “path dependence” also applies to comparative civilizational history. I hope to extend this analysis further in future essays.

\textsuperscript{47} There are scores of writings about this assumption in the literature, a good recent example of which, building upon such typical assumptions, is Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, \textit{Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty} (London: Profile Books, 2012). My review in \textit{Contemporary Sociology} 42 1(2013): 55-59.
The Transformation of The Information Wave Into Virtual Civilization and the Ethical Questions It Raises

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Abstract

The purpose of this investigation is to define the main contents and issues of the impact of informing systems on the rise and development of Virtual Civilization. The methodology is based on an interdisciplinary big-picture view of the elements of development of virtual civilization and their interdependency. Among the findings are the following: Virtual Civilization has infrastructural characteristics, a world-wide unlimited, socially constructed work and leisure space in cyberspace, and it can last centuries/millennia—as long as informing systems are operational. Practical implications: The mission of Virtual Civilization is to control the public policies of real civilizations in order to secure the common good in real societies. Social implications: The quest for the common good by virtual society may limit or even replace representative democracy by direct democracy which, while solving some problems in a positive way, may eventually trigger permanent political chaos in real civilizations. Originality: This investigation defines the question of ethics regarding the role of informing systems in the development of Virtual Civilization by providing an interdisciplinary and civilizational approach at the big-picture level.

Introduction

This article applies the civilizational approach to the understanding of the role of information and communication in the development of civilization at the levels of society, culture, and infrastructure. Such an approach treats a civilization as a live organism, one that is larger than a nation, region, city, or village.

This investigation is particularly aimed at the impact of information and communication on civilizations which are active in the 21st century. Its purpose is to evaluate the impact of informing systems on the development of contemporary civilization which began about 6,000 years ago in 4,000 BC. This development is leading to the rise of a Virtual Civilization in the 21st century. In addition, this inquiry emphasizes the role of informing science in the development of Virtual Civilization. By civilization, one can assume the following meaning (Targowski, 2009b):

A civilization is a complex of compatibly interactive entities of society, culture(s) and infrastructure in a large frame of territory and time, usually embracing several nations and centuries/millennia.
Currently, the development and operations of social systems are investigated at rather low levels, such as the family, the village, the city, and specific cultures, nations, and regions. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1991, we have been facing a clash of civilizations (Huntington, 1996) masquerading as the New World Order in the 21st century. It is no longer sufficient to claim that the clash is only between the United States and ISIS. Indeed, the clash, today, is between Western and Islamic Civilizations.

Analyzing social change at the level of civilization reflects social change over large areas and long timeframes. We note, for instance, that Western Civilization has been functioning in America, Europe, Australia, and New Zealand for about the last 1200 years. Similarly, Islamic Civilization has been functioning in the Middle East, Africa, and Indonesia for about the last 1385 years. In the 21st century, the major civilizations can be broken down into separate categories: Western, Eastern, Chinese, Japanese, Islamic, Buddhist, Hindu, and African. These civilizations are spreading throughout the whole globe through the actions of individuals who are migrating in order to study, work, and live. Yet today they are in real-time communication with their families and friends in different countries.

How is this type of communication possible? Paper-based civilization cannot secure such a good form of communication. In the 20th century, trans-civilizational communication was only slightly improved by oral telephone-based communication. The development of informing systems has transformed office-oriented information-communication technology into real-time control systems now found in front-office and inter-personal powerful info-communication of a type which has been embraced by almost every organization in the world and by several billion people. This process is so powerful and overwhelming that it transforms real civilization into a virtual civilization that impacts the social modus operandi of society tremendously.

The Development of Civilization

The comprehensive scientific investigation of civilization was undertaken by English historian Arnold Toynbee (1889-1975). His greatest published work is his twelve-volume *A Study of History* ([1934-1961] (1995)) in which he compared the histories of twenty six different civilizations and argues that each one has followed a similar pattern of evolution through a cyclical pattern of growth, maturity, and decay. He believed that societies thrive best in response to challenges and that the most important task of a society is to create a religion. He stressed the importance of religious and philosophical factors in the guiding of civilizations.

There is only one world civilization, and yet there are about twenty-six main autonomous civilizations that have developed over the last 6,000 years. Perhaps if one included satellite civilizations (cultures), this number might possibly reach about 100 or even more. However, for the sake of clarity in this synthesis we would like to limit the scope to the foremost twenty-six autonomous civilizations.
The world civilization is a continuum. It never dies. It only evolves from one stage to another. This evolution takes place through the life cycles of autonomous civilizations. At the very beginning of human civilization, there were several successful formations of living processes that could be considered autonomous civilizations. They existed in different parts of the world and consisted of about eight cases. The first autonomous civilization was the Mesopotamian Civilization (including Sumerian), which emerged in the valley of the Tigris-Euphrates Rivers in the Middle East, about 4000 B.C. In the Far East, the first autonomous civilizations rose inland: the Indus (Harrappan) about 2500 B.C. and the Sinic, about 1500 B.C. In Africa, the initial civilization was the Berberic-Carthaginian Civilization 600 B.C., and in South America, early autonomous civilizations included the Andean Civilization that emerged about 1500 B.C. In Central America the first autonomous civilization was the Meso-American Civilization which arose in 1000 B.C. The latter two civilizations fell to Spanish invaders around A.D. 1600.

Autonomous civilizations arose in response to the physical challenges of nature (ecosystems). Humans began to organize themselves into societies which provided exchangeable and specialized services, such as hunting and food gathering, production, house building, road construction, transportation, health care, entertainment, and so forth. These services and growing human communication led to the formation of cities. These types of autonomous civilizations we shall call societal civilizations.

In addition to environmental challenges, societal civilization as a whole has been threatened by its own internal structure involving power, wealth creation, enforcement of beliefs, family formation, leadership, and so forth. As societal civilizations evolved into more complex entities, they were managed through cultural manipulation. We shall refer to these types of autonomous civilizations as cultural civilizations. By culture, we understand a value-driven patterned behavior of a human entity.

Ever since religion was transformed from beliefs in magic to beliefs in poly-gods and then belief in a mono-god, cultural civilization has applied religion as the principal tool for cultural control. Religious and military forces were the foundations of the power apparatus that maintained societies as governed entities. These forces civilized societies and moved them to increasingly elevated levels of organization. One can recognize around sixteen examples of cultural civilizations. They include Egyptian Civilization (3100 B.C.), Minoan Civilization (2700 B.C.), Mycenaean Civilization (1500 B.C.), Sinic Civilization (1500 B.C.), Hellenic Civilization (750 B.C.), Canaanite Civilization (1100 B.C.), Hindu Civilization (600 B.C.), Roman Civilization (31 B.C.), Eastern Civilization (A.D. 350), Hellenistic Civilization (323 B.C.), Buddhist Civilization (A.D. 600), Ethiopian Civilization (A.D. 400), Sub-Saharan African Civilization (A.D. 800), Western Civilization (A.D. 800), Islamic Civilization (A.D. 1300), and Maghrebin Civilization (A.D. 1000). The evolution of cultural civilization is influenced by challenges generated by intra- and inter-civilizational issues of war and peace. These issues, arising from these challenges, have been managed by technological means of domination. We shall call the resulting civilizations infrastructural civilizations (Targowski, 2009).
The purpose of infrastructural civilization is to expand spheres of influence by means of technology. Technology drives the development of infrastructural civilizations. The prime beneficiary of technological applications has been the military which supports the fundamental values of given civilizations. The by-products of the military applications of technology affect the civilian sectors of infrastructural civilizations. For purposes of our discussion, we can recognize eight infrastructural civilizations: Sinic Civilization (1500 B.C.), Hindu Civilization (600 B.C.), Japanese Civilization (A.D. 650), Western Civilization A.D. 800), Eastern Civilization (A.D. 350), Buddhist Civilization (A. D. 600), Islamic Civilization (A.D. 1300), and African Civilization (A.D. 1885, following the Berlin Treaty).

By the end of the 2nd Millennium A.D. infrastructural civilizations had become the specific civilizations that are responsible for world hemisphere influence and domination. Hence, Western Civilization dominates the Western Hemisphere; Eastern and Hindu Civilizations rule the Eastern Hemisphere; Islamic Civilization rules the Near and Middle Eastern Hemisphere and certain parts of the Far Eastern Hemisphere; Japanese Civilization governs a part of the Far Eastern Hemisphere; Chinese Civilization influences the larger portions of the Far Eastern Hemisphere, and Buddhist civilization influences a smaller portion of the Far Eastern Hemisphere.

The evolution of civilizations at the end of the 20th century is depicted in Figure 1 according to the kinds of challenges that they have faced and their responses to these challenges.

Figure 1. The Evolution of Civilizations at the End of the 20th Century.
According to a composite definition of a civilization (Targowski 2009b), the evolution of a civilization is characterized by the following important attributes:

1) Large society
   a. Labor specialization
   b. Self-differentiating
   c. Sharing the same knowledge system

2) Space and Time
   a. Autonomous fuzzy reification
   b. Distinguished and extended area or period of time
   c. Reification not a part of a larger entity

3) Cultural system, values and symbol-driven
   a. Communication-driven (e.g.: literate plus electronic media)
   b. Religion, wealth and power-driven

4) Infrastructural system, technology-driven first by at least one of the following:
   a. Urban infrastructure
   b. Agricultural infrastructure
   c. Informing systems infrastructure
   d. Other infrastructures (industrial, information, etc.)

5) Cycle-driven, rising, growing, declining, and falling over time

6) Spaces; cognitive, real, and virtual

Based on these attributes, the composite definition of civilization is as follows: (Targowski 2009b). It complements the brief definition given earlier.

_Civilization is a large society living in an autonomous, fuzzy reification (invisible-visible) which is not a part of [a] larger one and exists over an extended period of time. It specializes in labor and differentiates[itsel] from other civilizations by developing its own advanced cultural system driven by communication, religion, wealth, power, and sharing the same knowledge/wisdom system within complex urban, agricultural infrastructures, and others such as industrial and information ones. It also progresses in a cycle or cycles of rising, growing, declining and falling in cognitive, real, and virtual spaces._

A graphic model of civilizations is illustrated in Figure 2. Civilizations are dynamic. They rise, expand, decline, disappear, or transform themselves into other civilizations. Usually the developmental phases of civilizations can be differentiated as feudal systems, state systems, and imperial systems (Melko, 1969). However, in the study of the history of political or technological developments, temporal categories are usually designated as “ages,” “eras,” and “waves.”

Generally speaking, an “age” designates a dominant technology or political system applied in practice at a certain time, although a given technology/political system will be sooner or later replaced by the succeeding “age” of progressive or regressive solutions. An “era” is
a synonym for “age” but implies a long “age.” An “era” can evolve into the next “era” as a progressive or regressive evolution.

A “wave” is associated with the production, processing, or trade of a kind of food, good, or information related to a new technology or new rules. A wave has a very strong impact on the modus operandi of a society. It is not replaceable, but is impacted by the next wave of technology.

**Ages, Eras, and Waves of Civilization with Special Consideration for the Role of Information Handling**

Humans have survived longer than animals with greater physical force than they because they have had an important advantage: brains driven by information-communication. With a brain, humankind has been able to learn, to communicate, and to develop a structure of consciousness. At first, the nose was the most important organ for archaic, nomadic hunters. Then, about 200,000 years ago, the human information system began to “upgrade” human consciousness through emotions and rituals, and the ear became the most important organ for hunters. Then ears developed an appreciation for music and dance and gave rise to the first advanced pattern of human cultural behavior. About 10,000 years ago, consciousness became mythical and 2-dimensional, with some appreciation for the natural tempo of events.
Humankind began to farm, to dream of an improved social order for its members, and to create myths through symbolic imagination and language-driven communication. By this time, then, the mouth had become the most important organ. Around 5000 BC, the Egyptian calendar, regulated by the Sun and the Moon and providing for a year of 360 days (12 months of 30 days each), became the first organized information system (IS) device that supported the survival and development of humankind. About 1000 years later, the Sumerians developed writing and organizational patterns for “civilized” cities. About 2,500 BC, the structure of consciousness became mental and 3-dimensional, with a sense of abstract time, cultural curiosity for science and art, dogma, rules, and laws. The first knowledge centers appeared in Egypt, where written literature speculated about the meaning of life. Speculations were recorded in writing on papyri and eventually collected in the Great Library of Alexandria. The manufacturing of objects and the production of food (bread, beer) took place. Thus, the eye became the most important organ for awakened man having volition and reflection about himself and the world (Simpson, 1992).

For extended periods of time, the evolution of the Earth was understood as being regulated by a relationship between the internal forces of nature: gravity, atomic dynamics, time, and space dynamics. Today, the problem of life on Earth has become a puzzle based upon relationships (info-communication) among people and their levels of cognition as communicated through information-knowledge systems.

The tool by which this role is achieved is knowledge that was at first disseminated by books and now by computers and their networks.

Mediated communication has a long history. The invention of the printing press by Johann Gutenberg in 1454 boosted the spread of knowledge. The printing press became the most significant invention for the separation of written print from the spoken word. Printing soon became a means for disseminating and intensifying intellectual endeavors. Before Gutenberg, each volume was handwritten, often by monks. In the fifteenth century, a book was as costly and as rare as jewels.

Before the invention of the printing press, scientists would go on long journeys merely to familiarize themselves with the contents of specific books. The enlightened ruler, Carl IV of Luxembourg, collected 114 volumes, while the French king, Charles V, amassed as many as 900. Then, printing houses began to print hundreds of books. By 1500, within fifty years of the invention of the German press, 30,000 reasonably priced books were in circulation (Figure 3). The satire of Erasmus of Rotterdam appeared during the lifetime of its author in 27 editions. Print was steering thoughts and ideas in millions of people, inspiring them to speed, simplify, and strengthen the work of the mind.

\[1\] It is necessary to mention that the technique of woodblock printing of written characters was known in China by A.D. 350. Ceramic movable type was in use in China by about A.D. 1040. The Koreans invented print in the 5th century; however, it was not applied widely and became unknown for others outside Korea.
Figure 3. The Gutenberg Press modernized civilization for the next 500+ years. 
(Photo: Library of Congress, www.loc.gov)

The printed alphabet in book form, which was the first “computer terminal,” became an absorber and transformer of civilization. New media such as letters and printed books altered the relationship, one to the others, of our senses and changed the mental (information processing) process. Print caused a split between the head and the heart, creating a situation which has become a trauma affecting Western Civilization up to the present day (McLuhan, 1962). It created government regulations, but it also inspired individualism, science, art, and opposition to ideology. Science and technology began to develop at an accelerated pace. Airplanes, automobiles, telegraph systems, telephones, typewriters, phonographs, movies, radios, television sets, weapons, computers, automation, and telecommunications modernized human life and its story. Human consciousness has become integral and 4-dimentional (free from space and time), allowing us to enjoy learning, loving, wholeness, and wisdom for the community and ourselves. The nervous system has now become the most crucial organ, developing a “meta-sense.” We are better at understanding than explaining the purpose and rules of our existence through education and research.

American physicist John Wheeler has formulated the Theory of the Participatory Universe. According to this theory, observers are central to the nature of physical reality, and matter is ultimately relegated to the mind. Wheeler views the Universe as a gigantic “information processing” system with a yet-undetermined output, and he has coined the phrase, “IT from BIT,” meaning every “thing”—a particle, a field of force, or even space-time itself—all are ultimately manifested to us through “bits” of information.

The strong role of mediated informing systems in the development of civilization began in the Control Revolution (19th century) which led to the invention of the telegraph, punched cards (the precursor technology which led to the development of computers in the 20th century), and so forth to support the dynamics of the Industrial Revolution in the 19th century. The following ages, waves, and eras have been strongly supported by the intensified development of informing systems. The latter were transformed from mechanical-electrical apparatus to electronic computers and networks. Certain “ages,” “eras” and “waves” (only major and non-exclusive ones) which influence the role of
information (and vice-versa) are characterized as follows:

1. *The Era of Modernity (1454-1814)*: transition from the Middle Ages to early modernity; development of printed books leading to the development of scientific knowledge and to the application of navigational instruments (information technology) by Portuguese sailors that led to the discovery of new navigational routes (around South Africa to India) and to the discovery of new lands.

2. *The Age of Science (1500-1800’s)*: rise of the theoretical sciences and modern technology (maritime) led to the invention of the mechanical arithmometer by Thomas de Colmar, a precursor of future information technology.

3. *The Age of Revolution (1685-1917)*: the English, American, French, and Bolshevik Revolutions. Claude Chappe invented a coded information system that communicated through light beams from one tower to another with operators who read and transmitted mediated information to the next tower. This system was installed to protect the French Revolution. Later Napoleon expanded this system to protect his regime.

4. *The Modern Era (1814-1914)*: the Industrial Revolution (the steam engine, electricity, and the factory system) led to complex processes which required complex calculations. A punched tape applied by Joseph Jacquard to the steering of a loom inspired Charles Babbage to invent the first mechanical “analytical engine,” in fact, the first ever programmable “computer.” Trade required long-distance communication which led to the inventions of the telegraph, with Morse code, and eventually punched cards (invented by Herman Hollerith), which laid the foundations for the rise of modern information technology and its applications in business and governments.

5. *The Control Revolution (since the 19th century)*: telegraph systems, punched cards, typewriters, the transatlantic cable, telephones, cash registers, adding machines, movies, wireless telegraph systems, and radios supporting expanding bureaucracy in a search for increased office efficiency (productivity), never mind that today bureaucracy is viewed as a synonym for inefficient office work.

6. *The Era of Modernity (1914-1990’s)*: technological innovations of the 19th century applied on a large scale in periods of peace and war. The invention of the automobile and the airplane led to technology-intensive wars supported by business and advances in information technology. Another application of information technology was the development of the Social Security System. It required the efficient configuration of punched cards and the machines to read them developed by IBM and UNIVAC in the United States. In Europe, the Bull Company produced such machines. Encryption technology led to the development of binary languages (Claude Shannon), computers (ENIAC), and advanced applications of informing systems.

7. *The Electronic Age (1940’s-)*: Computers and transistors were invented, which provided the foundation for the rise of advanced informing systems.

9. The Information Age (1980’s-): application systems such as management information systems and e-commerce. Micro-computers triggered the quiet revolution which led to personal computing by billions of people.

10. The Telecommunication Age (1960’s-): Satellites, breakup of AT&T. The huge number of island computers needed led to the online exchange of data among them. Telecommunication technology development was aimed at this task. Also the Cuban Missile Crisis led to the invention and development of the packet switching network (Paul Baran) which was expected to operate on the Day-After (an atomic blast). Informing systems became online real-time organizational tools in developed nations.

11. The Communication Age (1983-): the Internet, e-mail, mobile communication, and smartphones, all serving as informing systems. Once the ARPANET was divided into MILINET and INTERNET (1983) and the latter became the public common network, the computer became the main online real-time ubiquitous tool for people in developed nations.

12. The Next Globalization Wave (1990’s-): world-wide-web and a global economy. This trend was made possible by the ease of application of the Internet around the globe. This development led to the outsourcing of manufacturing to cheap labor countries and the steady decline of Western Civilization.

13. The Virtualization Age (2000’s-): virtual organizations and social networks. This trend was made possible when computer storage became inexpensive and almost unlimited in size, thus creating a cyberspace for the unlimited virtual application of informing systems to support organizational and personal activities.

14. The Internet of Things (2010’s-): info-communication among sensor-controlled devices. This trend is leading to machine-to-machine applications of informing systems with consequences that are unknown today. What can be perceived is that such an electronized environment will easily host cybercrime and cyberwars.

15. Post-Modernization Era (1990’s-): from economic growth towards sustainability and from materialism towards subjective well-being as the leading ideas that will nevertheless not be applied on a large scale in world societies. This trend questions the massive applications of informing systems which do not support but conquer human culture and civilization.

The curriculum of the Human Story driven by science, technology, and informing systems is illustrated in Figure 4. This model attempts to establish relationships among the Political, Labor, and Intellectual Perspectives in the modern history of civilization. This period began in the Renaissance with a rebirth of learning following the darkness of the medieval period. The modern era started in 1453 when Constantinople fell to the Ottoman Turks. Many scholars who fled from the Byzantine Empire moved westward for safety (some are still fleeing). Their learning spread rapidly with the development of printing in Europe (1454). This expansion of learning boosted the questioning of established ideas regarding religion (Reformation), art, and science. When scholarship began to develop independently of the church, the human rather than the divine in life and art was emphasized. The well-rounded, informed individual (for example, Leonardo da Vinci) become the ideal.
Figure 4. Civilization Ages, Eras, and Waves in the last 500+ Years (Targowski 2009).
Although civilization began about 4000 BCE, meaning it is 6000 years old, modern civilization is only about 500 years old, as characterized by fifteen ages, eras, and waves described above. To establish more synthesized periods of civilization development, one must view them in terms of waves.

Most of the writing on waves of civilization was that of Alvin Toffler (1980) who recognized three waves: First Wave (Agricultural Wave), Second Wave (Industrial Wave), and the Third Wave (Information Wave). However, one can note additional waves in the development of humankind. Nowadays these number a total of seven (Targowski, 2009):

0. **Settlers Wave (9,000 BCE - 7,000 BCE)** — from nomads to settlers.

I. **Agriculture Wave (7,000 BCE+)** — from settlers to farmers with specialized common sense knowledge and skills.

II. **Industrial Wave (1800+)** — from farmers to workers and engineers with theoretical knowledge and skills resulting from education and improved handling of information.

III. **Information Wave (1980+)** — from material handlers to information (informing systems) handlers who improve the control possibilities of previous waves and increase productivity of labor and organizations.

IV. **Globalization Wave (1990+)** — from local to global competition in the delivery of goods and services owing to global informing systems that cause the “death of distance.”

V. **Virtualization Waves (2000+)** — steady migration from a real to a virtual world, mostly by the young generation that is skilled in applying informing systems all the time, 24/7.

VI. **Communicating Things Wave (2010+)** — wide connectivity of machines and people to optimize all sorts of hybrid processes from advanced smart informing systems.

*The Zero Wave — the Settlers Wave:* This wave transformed hunters and farmers into settlers who organized the first villages in the Middle East and stabilized their lives around animal domestication and food production, which after 5,000 years of wealth accumulation led to the rise of the first civilization in 4000 BCE. It is interesting to notice that after 9000 years (7000 B.C. — A.D. 2000) mankind is moving again and has become a “global hunter” for profit and jobs, while the Fourth Wave, Globalization, took off in the 1990’s through the global infrastructures of info-communication and transportation networks.

*The First Wave — the Agriculture Wave:* This wave began in 7000 BCE and will remain active as long as food is needed, which means that it will be active as long as humankind continues to exist. The Second Wave—the rise of the Industrial Wave—is about 200 years old. It minimized the physical effort required by humans through mechanization and free time for education which led to the Scientific Revolution and the invention of aircraft and computers. The latter has led to the Third Wave, the Information Wave, and its magic tool, the Internet. The airplane and the Internet have increased human global mobility, which
has triggered the Fourth Wave, the Globalization Wave.

The waves of civilization are portrayed in Figure 5. Each wave has its own set of civilizational tools which primarily support control processes by elites over their clients. The main control solutions for each wave are portrayed in this figure. It is important to notice that none of these waves replace the wave that precedes it. For example, information cannot replace food, steel, or plastic. It can only improve their creation and utilization.

Figure 5. Civilization Waves and Emerging *Informing Systems* as the Transformers of Technology and Distance-based Waves

None of the civilization waves are disappearing (with the exception to a certain degree of the Settlers Wave, which is a de facto pre-civilization wave). Perhaps each new wave assumes the leadership role in civilizational development and selects the best talent to work for it. Moreover, each wave perpetuates other waves, as is shown in Figure 6. Current job trends, which focus on outsourcing computing to India, contradict earlier assessments that
the millennial American workforce would be heavily focused on computing. In the 21st century, it is even possible to outsource computer programming to India, thousands of miles away from Western headquarters, and similarly, the manufacturing of goods to China.

The Rise of the Information Wave at the End of the 20th Century

As the Industrial Wave declines and the Control Revolution rises, the Information Wave also rises. The theory of post-industrialism advanced by Daniel Bell (1986) provides much of the conceptual background for viewing the Information Wave as the Information Society. Bell’s concept of postindustrial society has five dimensions:

1. There is a shift from a goods-producing economy to a service-producing one.
2. There is an increase in size and influence of the classes of professional workers.
3. Post-industrial society is organized around theoretical knowledge.
4. A critical aim is the management of technological growth.
5. An emphasis is placed on the development of methods of intellectual technology.

Intelligent technology in the form of global computer networks dramatically expands the power of the brain so as to develop hyper-intelligence. With appropriate control programming, a network becomes a sensitive device, not only as a physical device, but also as an economic, social, and political one.

The spending on info-communication technology (informing systems) in the United States reached $3.6 trillion in 2012 (The New York Times, July 9th, 2012), a sum which is about 22 percent of GDP, 20 percent more than what was spent on health care that year.

The 19th century eliminated the wilderness by means of railroads. The 20th century developed science and technology that improved the well-being of many and pushed the planet to its limits in terms of resources. The 21st century will perhaps implement the Information Wave across all civilizations in order to improve knowledge-based, critical decision-making about social life in conditions of limited resources.

The mission of the Information Wave (Targowski, 2009) is the following: To exercise wisdom in controlling the development and operations of the Agricultural Wave, the Industrial Wave, the Global Wave, and the other waves as well.

The goals of the Information Wave are the following:

1. To optimize the development and the operations of the Agricultural Wave, the Industrial Wave, the Global Wave, and the other waves in order to minimize the use of resources and ecology and to increase the citizen’s choices and quality of life.
2. To sustain the development of human cognition in order to make conscious and wise decisions about the sense of human possibilities, life, education, health, politics, defense, business, entertainment and leisure time.

The strategy of the Information Wave is to develop and apply info-communication technology in control systems (as informing systems) in a rational and humane manner.

The role of the Information Wave in supporting other waves is portrayed in Figure 6.

Figure 6. The Role of the Information Wave in Supporting other Civilization Waves

These goals should be applied at all levels of civilization, including national and local governments, schools and colleges, businesses and other organizations, homes, and individuals. The Information Wave is composed of the following metaphoric elements derived through the application of informing systems (Figure 7):
• Info-factories, which generate information and seek new information. These include the following: online enterprises: online schools and colleges, online communities, online governments, e-Republics, etc.
• Info-malls which provide the following services: e-mail, e-learning, e-banking, e-trading, e-job recruitment, e-information services, e-research, e-publishing, e-entertainment, e-calling, etc.
• Infohighways, which transmit the content of information through info-communication services including Local Area Networks (LAN), Metropolitan Area Networks (MAN), Wide Area Networks (WAN), Global Area Networks (GAN), Value Area Networks (VAN), the Internet, television, radio broadcasting, etc.
• Cyberspace is a digital information-based dark space, that is, a dispersed, infinite constellation of digital files, databases, home pages, bulletin boards, directories,
menus, etc., where humans with a password navigate interactively in order to create, update, exchange, and retrieve information.

- Cybernauts (netcitizens), who are informed tele-computer users with passwords to access billions of information tidbits and do everything on-line from shopping and learning to working and resting. Cybernauts can be “electronic immigrants” who can telecommute to work over long distances.

The Information Wave is not simply a matter of technology and economics. It involves morality, culture, and ideas as well as institutions and political structures. In short, it entails a true transformation of human affairs (Toffler and Toffler, 1994). However, the unwise application of the Information Wave may be harmful for humans.

Let us pose the following questions to decision-makers of civilizations:

- Is it wise to design automation, robotization, and informatization in such a way that their operators only watch the screens of many instruments but have little to say in the development control of a product? Sooner or later society will be divided into two groups of people: “thinking” designers and “thoughtless” users of such systems. This divide may lead to more productive solutions, but it may also degrade people and create a bifurcated society.
- Should the world apply automation, robotization, and informatization to reduce employment when population growth and the demands of workers give rise to interests that are frequently in conflict with strategies of efficiency?
- Should business and public administration apply automation, robotization, and informatization to promote endless economic growth when the reserves of strategic resources are being depleted and sooner or later civilization as we know it will literally run out of fuel?

Currently, civilization faces many questions of this sort. Most of the time they are neglected, sometimes with catastrophic results. The potential of the Information Wave lies in the optimization of economic performance as well as, to an even greater extent, in the wise control of civilization.

The Rise of the Virtual Wave at the Beginning of the 21st Century

When the virtual mode was first introduced into information technology, it was applied to memory simulated by the computer, that is, memory not actually built into the processor. Over time, however, the virtual mode has been applied to entities that include organizations, processes, and people that really exist and are simulated by means of information technology. For example, virtual conversations are conversations that take place over computer networks, and virtual communities are genuine social groups that assemble around the use of e-mail, webpages, and other networked resources. The adjectives, “virtual” and “digital,” and the prefixes, “e-” and “cyber-,” are all used in various ways to denote information, things, activities, and organizations that are realized or carried out
chiefly in an electronic medium. “Virtual” tends to be used in reference to entities that mimic their “real” parallels. Thus a digital library would simply be a library that applies information technology, whether it be a brick-and-mortar library equipped with networked computers or a library that exists exclusively in electronic form; whereas a virtual library could only be the latter of these. The prefix “e-” is generally preferred when referring to the commercial applications of the Web, as in e-commerce, e-cash, and e-business, whereas “cyber-” tends to be used when speaking of a computer or of networks from a broader cultural point of view, as in cybersex, cyber-church, and cyberspace. But like everything else in this field, such usages are evolving rapidly, and it would be rash to try to predict how these expressions will be used in the future (The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition).

Virtual worlds have exploded out of online game culture and now capture the attention of millions of ordinary people: students, husbands, wives, fathers, mothers, workers, and retirees. Devoting dozens of hours each week to massive multiplayer virtual reality environments, such as Civilization, World of Warcraft, or Second Life, these millions represent the start of an exodus to the refuge of the virtual, where they experience life under a new social, political, and economic order built around fun (Castronova, 2007).

The development of the Global Economy in the 2010’s is well established. The integrated information infrastructure has led to a boom in the development of social networks. In the past several years, some networks have thrived, some have vanished, and hundreds of new ones have appeared. Social networks have become a huge area to follow. Nowadays, one estimate is that about 500 large social networking sites offer services for about 1.242 billion users. Table 1 illustrates the richness of this kind of info-communication-driven socialization.

These 1,635,000,000 users of global social networks today create the Global Virtual Society (GVS) which is composed mostly of young and middle-aged people (a new emerging global information elite). They exchange info-communication (via informing systems) about facts, events, feelings, situations, activities, pictures, videos, and opinions faster and more frequently than they could in the real environment [117 million users visited Facebook every month in March 2010 (Time, May 31, 2010, p.37)]

These facts are very encouraging given that the world in the 2010’s is not in good shape. Some civilizations such as Western, Eastern, and Islamic are involved in conflicts and wars. The global economy that is flattening the world economically is doing so at the expense of Western Civilization which is declining economically because it is outsourcing its industry to less developed civilizations with low labor costs. The world needs new ideas and a political will to improve its well-being. There is hope that the young generation, which populated and even created the GVS (complex of social networks), will come up with new ideas and the political will to improve the well-being of the world.
Table 1. The Ranking of the Largest Nations by its Citizenships/Memberships in 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ranking</th>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Global Virtual Society</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>1.360 M</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>1.234 M</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Facebook</td>
<td>1,100 M</td>
<td>1,100 M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>317 M</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>MySpace</td>
<td>35 M</td>
<td>35 M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>238 M</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>201 M</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>184 M</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>144 M</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>153 M</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>174 M</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>127 M</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Twitter</td>
<td>124 M</td>
<td>200 M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>118 M</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>89 M</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other Social Networks</td>
<td>Estimation</td>
<td>300 M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.635 B</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the spring of 2010, just after being elected Prime Minister of Great Britain, David Cameron wanted to receive a few tips from somebody who could tell him how it felt to be responsible for and accountable to many millions of people who expected things from him, even though, in most cases, he would never shake their hands. The Prime Minister did not turn to a fellow government leader but to Mark Zuckerberg, the founder and CEO of Facebook, the largest social network. The two men talked about ways for networks to help governments, for example, generate ideas on cutting public spending. They talked as masters of two great nations (The Economist, p. 59, 7-24, 2010).

In the 2010’s, Facebook is the fastest growing social network. Within a few years it should reach 1.5 billion users. It will be a social network with the potential to become the first example in civilization of the Global Virtual Nation (GVN). To become such a nation, Facebook must transform itself into a not-for-profit service and form a government, government agencies, and acquire citizens. This transformation could take place sometime in the near future. It would require some strong societal and organizational will as well as initial capital.

The emerging social networks are leading to the birth of collective “mindspheres” of intelligence, knowledge, and wisdom at global and national levels. Figure 8 illustrates the architecture of these new collective mindspheres. Along with practice, these mindspheres can multiply at all levels of the nation, for example, at the level of the village, town, township, county, city, and state. It will take time for such mindspheres to become...
organized. This development will certainly not take place everywhere, but it will take place where there is social will and organizational might.

Figure 8. The Architecture of Emerging Collective Mindspheres at the Global and National Levels in the 21st Century (Targowski 2015)
Mindspheres working in universal cyberspace should facilitate the collection and exchanges of ideas and solutions which by doing so may liberate us from social and political hierarchies that are blocking the advancement of humankind (Lévy, 1997). According to Pierre Lévy, “it is a utopia but [it] is an achievable utopia.” Furthermore, he thinks that “we cannot only exchange information but think together, share our memories and our plans to produce a cooperative brain.” This collective brain, or rather mind, can multiply our social and cognitive potential. With such a powerful tool, humankind’s consciousness can become broader, deeper, more sophisticated, and perhaps be able to solve what are currently unsolvable problems. Will we be ready with such a collective mind to stop the depletion of the strategic resources of our civilization which will be completely gone within 50-200 years if we do not find good solutions?

Of course, this “rosy” picture is full of unexpected motives and actions triggered by computer hackers, criminals, and anti-social agents. Since the new virtual world is beset by the same or even more intensified crimes as the physical world, it is, therefore, not yet a paradise or a utopia! Rather it is a hope for a wiser and better civilization which one would like to have last as long as possible.

The Rise of Virtual Civilization at the Beginning of the 21st Century

How good must one be and how much money must one possess to be elected president of the Global Virtual Nation? What would be the nature of a virtual election? Can candidacies be made more available for a greater number of candidates? Can elections be free from pressure groups? Can they be free of fraud? Today it is too soon to answer these questions. The coming operational practice of the GVN will certainly elaborate procedures for political processes and systems. The development of GVN will be fascinating since it will also be the birth of a new civilization which can be called Virtual Civilization. It will be the next layer upon the existing civilizations. For example, in the 2010’s Western Civilization is being transformed into Global Civilization and is also transforming itself into Virtual Civilization. An American or Portuguese citizen will function concurrently in these three civilizations! It will be a major challenge to be successful in such an environment.

It will also be interesting to see whether the Global Virtual Nation, created by Western Civilization, will be pro-Western, anti-Western, or universal—the most desirable position of all. Perhaps Virtual Civilization will be conducive to the development of Orwellianism; then again, it might just as well be opposed to the Big Brother polity. Today it is too soon to state which way the new civilization will evolve.

In contrast to participative-representative democracy as practiced in Western Civilization today, the GVN will apply populist-direct democracy where in order to pass a bill, every citizen will vote electronically. Supposedly, every virtual citizen will belong to the information elite whose members are well informed and aware of what is good or bad in a proposal being submitted to a vote. The GVN will be dangerous for nations with
authoritarian, dictatorial, and theocratic governments which neglect public opinion. Today, China, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and other countries block Facebook operations and censor the Internet. In the 1970’s, totalitarian Poland did not tolerate the INFOSTRADA Project which enabled the bypassing of governmental communication channels in the delivery of public information (Targowski, 2009, p. 193).

The impact of the GVN upon real global organizations (e.g., the UN, IMF, WTO, and other international organizations) and national governments can be large and decisive. If virtual citizens of the GVN agree on an issue and a strategy, they may enforce directions in the real world, since these virtual citizens are also real citizens in real countries where real governments rule. Today, most people feel that they have little to say about what governments do. An overwhelming majority says that governments are run by a few large, selfish interests. Therefore, the GVN provides an opportunity to organize unsatisfied people and to enable them to pursue their issues and solutions (but not their particular interests).

A question asked is whether or not the GVN will take over civilization and direct real national governments. Something similar occurred in totalitarian Poland when underpowered society beat the dictatorship in 1989 as happened when the underground press exceeded the volume and truthful content of the official press. It was the victory of a well-informed and motivated solidarity movement which overcame a powerful, militarized government. Later the whole Soviet Empire collapsed, mostly owing to the info-communication-oriented policy of glasnost and perestroika implemented by M. Gorbachev.

A generalized model of the dynamics of Virtual Civilization is provided in Figure 9.

One can expect that the GVN will create subunits in the form of virtual nations (VN). A virtual nation will organize a National Virtual Government (NVG) and National Virtual Citizens (NVC) around the important issues and solutions to be found within the boundaries of a real nation. Lawrence Grossman (1995) has perceived the emergence of an electronic republic in which electronic voting and opinion-registering technologies will go from the bottom to the top (lawmakers). But as practice demonstrates, lawmakers listen to lobbyists rather than to their constituencies. It is true that the views of citizens are known as reported in the media and in political circles, but citizens are rather passive and unable to implement their solutions through the official political parties, which are most concerned with maintaining their own “jobs.” It is a fact that real citizens are unorganized and dispersed. An example of a certain kind of self-organization of unsatisfied citizens in America is that of the Tea Party in the 2010’s.
Why is the Virtual Wave considered to have become Virtual Civilization in the 21st century? The main reason is that the latter satisfies all the criteria of a civilization as it is defined in Table 2 and has created its own independent, virtual society, parallel to the real one.
Table 2. The Classifying Criteria of the Virtual Civilization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CRITERIA</th>
<th>ATTRIBUTES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Space boundaries</td>
<td>World-wide unlimited, socially-constructed work and leisure space in cyberspace. It is an extraterritorial space with a post-national culture and in some circumstances even post-nations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time span</td>
<td>Centuries/millennia - as long as info-communication technology as informing systems is operational.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion (ideology)</td>
<td>Unlimited freedom, cyberspace, and progress supported by collective intelligence — to secure common good in an alternative virtual world, since the “real” one is going in the wrong direction in the 21st century.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Society</td>
<td>Virtual global, local and between communities, including the Virtual Global Society and Virtual Global Nation (possibly) living in spacial dispersion of social, political, and material processes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture</td>
<td>Virtual techno-culture (Robins &amp; Webster, 1999), is the culture that has emerged, or is emerging, from the use of computer networks for communication, entertainment and business (Horn, 1998). E-values: connected, expected feedback, rhythm, productivity, velocity, impatience, techno-centrism, cyber-ethics, informed, optimization, big-picture vs small-picture, global awareness, self-conciseness. E-behavior: net-centric, anytime, anywhere, “death” of distance, no-middleman, curiosity, discovery, digital &amp; virtual divide, information wealth, poverty of attention (Targowski, 2009:306). It is also the study of various social phenomena associated with the Internet and other new forms of network communication, such as online communities, online multi-player gaming, and text messaging (Jones, 1997). In the 1990’s information took a sharp turn away from the concrete and tangible to the abstract and intangible (Rheingold, 1993).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>Computer networks and storage (online cyberspace as a repository for collective cultural memory, whose narrative is created by its virtual society) used through informing systems.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Virtual Civilization (of the infrastructural character) is to a certain degree an entity which is parallel to real Global Civilization in space and time. However, the goal of the former is to control the latter in order to secure the common good. The main infrastructure of Virtual Civilization is collective intelligence (Lévy, 1997) which develops and shares a strong ability to solve problems among virtual members and is based on a world-wide retrieval of knowledge and wisdom kept in digital format.

Virtual Civilization penetrates horizontally all other autonomous civilizations including Global Civilization, as is depicted in Figure 10.
The Future of Informing Systems and the Ethical Questions that They Raise

The future of informing systems, regardless of their societal value, is almost unlimited since their advancement supposedly represents universal scientific progress. This statement might be correct if working people (labor) replaced by these systems could have other sources of income. Clearly they do not have them. Therefore the question is what is more important, the advancement of informing systems to their limits, or the well-being of working people? This urgent ethical question must be addressed by governments, legislative bodies, professional associations, schools, and colleges.

The first priority for informing systems-driven business ethics is the well-being of society which is under pressure from linked automation, robotization, and faceless service systems since they are leading in the direction of a labor-less economy and structural unemployment. This issue will be addressed with reference to relevant laws of robotics, automation, and service systems. Of course, these laws reflect only a few of the sorts of problems and are not limited to them in the context of a New Economy and the sustainable functionality of society in the early 21st century.
Comparative Civilizations Review

Laws of Robotics

The Three Laws of Robotics, also known as Asimov's Laws, are a set of rules devised by the science fiction author, Isaac Asimov. He introduced these rules in his 1942 short story “Runaround,” even though he had foreshadowed them in a few earlier stories. The three laws are the following:

1. A robot may not injure a human being or, through inaction, allow a human being to come to harm.
2. A robot must obey the orders given to it by human beings, except where such orders would conflict with the First Law.
3. A robot must protect its own existence as long as such protection does not conflict with the First or Second Law (Asimov 1950).

The development of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in advanced informing systems is good business, and businesses are extremely unconcerned with taking necessary precautions, particularly precautions related to ethics. Some examples include the tobacco industry and the nuclear industry. Not one of these businesses ever recognized at the start that important protections were necessary. Each one of them resisted externally enforced precautions. None of them has ever recognized or completely endorsed a commitment not to harm humans. Furthermore, Ray Kurzweil (2005) predicts that a technological singularity will be achieved around 2045 when computers will think faster than humans. The question is why would humans risk building computers of a kind which could harm or kill them? His comment is that the development of such computers is scientific progress and as such cannot be controlled by any policy. What about the cloning of humans? Is doing so medical progress even though the widely accepted policy states that human cloning is illegal and might harm the clones themselves.

Automation Laws

According to known facts, factory automation has uniformly caused a worldwide decline in manufacturing jobs during the 2000’s-2010’s, not only in developed countries but in developing countries as well. Hence, the laws of Automation Systems that are driven by informing systems should be merged into society’s undertakings because these systems are very sensitive in terms of the well-being of society.

Automation systems are among the most complex systems in civilization. They have triggered tremendous developmental trends in science and technology in the 20th century. They looked very promising at their early stages but later gave rise to many doubts about their positive role in society. Automation systems designed for better effectiveness, reliability, and quality are positive as long as they do not harm and endanger human beings and society.
With respect to these issues, Andrew Targowski & Vladimir Modrák (2011) offered the following Laws of Automation in Manufacturing:

- Law I. Do not implement high automation technology if you are not sure that the same goal can be achieved by another means.
- Law II. Do not implement automation technology with the aim to totally eliminate human presence in the manufacturing process.
- Law III. Do not develop automation which harms society or endangers the human race.

**Service Systems Laws**

The service economy which dominates Western civilization in the early 21st century is steadily moving towards an electronization of services which will eventually replace face-to-face communication by faceless expert systems, causing, among many results, the death of customer service. In order to protect quality services, the following laws of service systems should be applied (formulated by Targowski, 2009, p. 273):

- Law I - Do not develop service systems without a human presence.
- Law II - Do not develop service systems which harm society.
- Law III - Do not develop service systems which endanger the human race.

Law I protects people against passivity. Law II protects society against structural unemployment. Law III protects the human race against bifurcation into two kinds of species, one kind which is highly developed because it is engaged in the development of sophisticated service systems, and the second kind, which is composed of passive users whose skills are limited to knowing when to click the entry button.

In order to integrate all these laws into one coherent discipline, a new discipline should be developed. Perhaps it should be named *Informingsophy (Technosophy)*, which should investigate wise info-communication engineering for wise civilization. This kind of engineering should be developed today and aimed at the sustainability of our civilization in times of shrinking strategic resources. It is widely known that a large population will become too large to sustain our Western lifestyle, even for the short-term future. Hence, the future is now, and *Informingsophy (Technosophy)* is needed today as never before.

Having learned that the potential applications of the Internet are almost unlimited, people need to acquire some wisdom in order to avoid harming society (for example through addiction and isolation). We must now face the next challenge, that of the rising Internet of Things which has an even greater potential for improving and/or harming society if it is applied only on the basis of a technological impulse. Certainly this new info-communication channel provides progress for machine-to-machine communication but not solutions for societal problems. Although such positive technology used to support the
solution of societal problems back when technology or machines in general supported culture (Mumford, 1934), there is an increasing awareness nowadays of the reality that machines conquer culture. If this is true, it is bad for the well-being of society.

Conclusion

1. Virtual Civilization has transformed itself from the Virtual Wave to Virtual Civilization owing to advances in info-communication technology as informing systems in the 21st century, exemplified by the ability of the Internet to secure operations of virtual organizations and social networks. Therefore, one can characterize Virtual Civilization as having an infrastructural character.

2. The mission of Virtual Civilization is to control the public policy of other real civilizations so as to secure the common good in these real societies. This mission is being exemplified by the practice of certain virtual communities at the dawn of the 21st century.

3. Today it is too early to judge the impact of Virtual Civilization upon the real civilizations. However, despite the positive aspects, like the quest for the common good, one can observe negative aspects, particularly in the young generation, exemplified by a shortened span of attention and a craving for constant (electronic, in fact) fun: playing computer games for long hours and engaging in “empty talk” in virtual media. For example students, 18-24 years old, learn less, since on average they send and answer about 100 text messages every day (Smith, 2011). This figure is about five times higher than the number of messages that a college faculty member receives and answers in one day. Some eager students send twice as many messages per day (200).

4. The quest for the common good by virtual society may limit or even replace representative democracy by direct democracy which although it may eventually create a few positive policies may also trigger permanent political chaos in real civilizations.

5. The many e-communications among people from different parts of the world are causing a decline in local interrelations and intensifying connectivity among international or/and distant, parochial cultures, which eventually will separate, isolate, and alienate individuals in their real living places.

6. At this time it is very improbable that virtual society can be regulated by real society. Thus, on one hand, Virtual Civilization can be positive, but on the other hand, it can be harmful for humanity which is living in a declining civilization owing to overpopulation, super-consumerism, depletion of strategic resources, and environmental degradation.
References


Chess Game of Civilizations

Ambassador Sallama Shaker and Colleen Bromberger

In his article “The Clash of Civilizations” published in the June 1993 issue of Foreign Affairs, Samuel Huntington argues that,

The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault line between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future. [...] The civilizations to which people belong is the broadest level of identification with which people intensely identify. People can and do redefine their identities, and as a result, the composition and boundaries of civilizations change. Over centuries, differences among civilizations have generated the most prolonged and most violent conflicts.¹

Applying Huntington's theory to the conflicts that the Middle Eastern region is currently witnessing, as a region that is possessor of both ‘the cradle of civilizations’ as well as the three Abrahamic religions, it is evident that the Middle East has been the playground of prolonged wars for the past several centuries. From the 16th to the 19th centuries, the Ottoman Empire (with a largely Sunni population) and the Safavid Dynasty were archrivals during which the two empires fought for control over Eastern Anatolia, the Caucasus region and Mesopotamia (Iraq). Referring once again to Huntington's narrative about ‘the West versus the Rest,’² he emphasizes that,

In the emerging world, relations between states and groups from different civilizations will not be close and will often be antagonistic since the West will always maintain its military superiority in its international agenda, which will shape the future of the world.³

Contrary to Huntington’s narrative on civilizations as inherently clashing in the post-Cold War era, some scholarship indicates that the civilizations of the Middle East are not ‘inferior’ to the West, as Huntington suggests. These civilizations instead have experienced their own rise and fall in the context of changing world order. For example, in The Rise and Decline of Nations, Mancur Olson emphasizes that,

Many have been puzzled by the mysterious decline or collapse of great empires or civilizations and by the remarkable rise to wealth, power or cultural achievement of previously peripheral or obscure peoples. The Middle East provides several examples of such collapsed empires.⁴

³ Ibid., p. 185.
Therefore, this paper will approach the ‘clash’ not of civilizations, but instead the ‘clash’ of power rivalry in the Middle East. The reader will not be able to appreciate the authors’ argument simply because he or she finds it plausible or consistent with known facts. Hence, the authors will be arguing their case based on assumptions that are enhanced by historical and political facts as well as case studies. This is due to the multiple causal forces and proven theories that can substantiate the authors’ arguments.

The question that will be addressed in the context of Huntington's narrative and Joseph Nye's theory (see footnote 5) of the balance of power is: are the current regional conflicts in the Middle East validated by these theories we are portraying metaphorically as ‘chess games in the Middle East,’ where civilizations have risen and fallen, and thus leave behind them unfinished wars? Linking past with present, the Middle East, after the Arab Uprisings of 2011, has been in continuous chaos and ongoing ethnic conflicts under the guise of a cultural Sunni-Shiite rivalry wherein Islam is being used to justify the endless bloodshed in countries such as Iraq, Yemen, and Syria. The ramification of all these conflicts, as well as the humanitarian crises triggered by animosities and rivalries among the ‘old empires,’ is destabilizing the Middle East since the area is becoming a hot bed for regional and global power rivalries as envisioned in the proxy wars in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. Ultimately, it is important to consider the following question: is the historical chess game repeating itself with different players? Moreover, another question regarding this argument is how Joseph Nye’s theory of power relates to the ‘chess game’ of the region.

Exploring the history of the post-Ottoman Middle East through the lens of a chess game will reveal the reason why geopolitics, rather than differences between civilizations, seems to be the game changer. This metaphor illustrates two key points: first, that the Middle East has experienced several ‘matches’ between various global, as well as regional powers depending on historical context and secondly, that key global power ‘team leaders’ have formed respective teams for personal gain. While both the teams and team leaders differ based on the historical context, a common theme persists in the geopolitics of the Middle East in the 21st century: both global and regional players have consistently used the region as a ‘chessboard’ to tilt the balance of power for self-interest.

So what is the impact of the remapping of the Middle East on the current regional conflicts in Syria and Yemen since the 2011 uprisings? Can these conflicts be considered proxy wars, where regional and global players manipulate the growing tensions in the region to benefit their own self-interest as well as to achieve strategic geopolitical gains in the Middle East? In contrast to Richard N. Haass’ ideas (see footnote 7), the author argues that the Middle East is indeed not only a region of power, but at the same time will always be a region of instability due to the artificial borders drawn by the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916. In response, we find that the nearly century-old chess game of the Middle East is reaching a ‘zero-sum’ situation; despite the numerous teams, players, and matches, there is no end, nor one winner in sight. Clearly, this is a chess game where nations like Turkey and Iran are competing in order to resurrect their empires (Ottoman versus Persian) or divisions of beliefs, such as the Sunni Arabs (Saudi Arabia) versus the Shiites (Iran and...
A catastrophic escalation between regional and global powers could be triggered by the redrawing of maps and borders in the region. If there is no winner, then it is important to consider how the power vacuum in the Middle East will be filled when the ‘king’ and ‘queen’ on the ‘chessboard’ lose their soldiers (i.e. people's support).

So what is ‘power’ and why is the Middle East considered a region of power? As Nye argues, power is almost impossible to define. But for the sake of this paper, power will be understood through the definition that Nye uses: “the capacity to do things in social situations to affect others to get the outcomes we want.”

Nye illustrates the distribution of power as, “a complex three-dimensional chess game” with the first tier as military, the second tier as economic, and the third tier as transnational relations. Yet all three tiers must work together to create a constant ebb and flow of power dynamics in the international world order.

After the demise of the Ottoman Empire, the two main powers that dominated the region were the U.K. and France. Then the global powers shifted after World War II when U.S. and Russia showed interest in the Middle East, which dragged the whole region into the Cold War power rivalry between the two main superpowers. However, contrary to American-centric critics such as Richard. N. Haass who argues that the post-2003 region is not “home to any major power” or “great power competition,” the Middle East is one of the most crucial ‘chessboards’ in the 21st century for both global and regional powers alike. More specifically, the roles of both global powers (U.S. and Russia) as well as regional powers (Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey) are crucial to understanding the implications of the global/regional power rivalry, which, especially in the case of Syria, can eventually lead to a ‘remapping’ of the region. Contextualizing this understanding of power will help to re-examine the reasons for which the Middle East is not only a region of power, but also how this struggle for power is a chess game played between regional and global competing actors.

In contrast to Haass’s assertions that there is a lack of ‘great’ power in the region, as well as through the multifaceted framework of understanding power in both ‘hard’ and ‘soft' contexts, the region can be re-contextualized through the lens of a chess game. The chess game was selected as a metaphoric lens due to its inherently strategic nature: a player must not only play the game to win, but also must anticipate the other player’s moves. However, in this two-person, or team, game, there is not always a designated winner or loser; sometimes, both sides can end in a ‘stalemate,’ or a ‘zero-sum game.’ Ultimately, this game is beyond a mere winning or losing, but also must include predicting and assessing how to conquer the opponent through a series of well-calculated moves, sometimes including sacrifice on each player’s part. In view of these realities, the Middle East can be

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6 Ibid., p. xv.
understood ultimately as the chessboard in which the various major superpowers of the world, depending on the era, have partaken in this so-called ‘game.’ In fact, there have been three notable periods in which different ‘matches’ have occurred in the region.

Beginning with the post-Ottoman/European colonial ‘match,’ the Middle East was quickly divided up between the British and the French through the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916; however, this match informally began a few years prior when British and Russian forces invaded the declining Ottoman Empire.\(^8\) For example, in an attempt to corner the Turks, the British army prepared for an invasion of Iraq in the beginning of World War I (this, of course, was beneficial for the Allies; however it was not just for Britain and France to control the oil rich lands, but also helped contribute to ending the reign of the long-held opponent of Russia.) However, they were not prepared for the Turks to react by closing the supply route through the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus to stop Russia’s supply of weapons. Some scholars surmise that this struggle of power would ultimately contribute to the fall of the Ottoman Empire, or the final illness of the “Sick Man of Europe.”\(^9\)

Once the Empire fell, the two primary external forces of Britain and France conquered the region. Both the British and the French were eager to claim territory in the region for its geostrategic location, as well as its natural resources. While there was an attempt of some internal/regional participants to play the ‘game,’ such as the Hashemite family as evidenced in the Husayn-McMahon Correspondence,\(^10\) ultimately the region in the colonial-era game was played between the external powers of the British and the French. For these two superpowers of the time, the chessboard of the region was mapped from the creation of artificial borders (e.g. Gertrude Bell and the formation of Iraq),\(^11\) to the implementation of artificial government structures that remapped Iraq, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia.

The second ‘match’ of the Middle East chess game was the shift from the colonial era powers to the United States (U.S.) and the Soviet Union (USSR) during the Cold War. Suddenly, the chess game had different rules; no longer was the region the product of colonial creation, it was now the region in an era of maintenance in the context of containment and strategic intervention.\(^12\) Fragile nation-states from the colonial era were left to their own devices; governments which had been previously established and propped up by the colonial powers underwent transformations as some leaders advocated for a Pan-Arab or Arab nationalism. Minorities not included in the division of states continued to

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\(^10\) Baxter (2008), p. 11.


fight for autonomy, and ultimately, the intervention of U.S. and USSR worked strategically for self-interest.

It is during this period in which nation-states within the region that were not necessarily powers functioned as ‘pawns’ for global power ‘teams.’ While there were certainly ‘teams’ of this chess game before the period (for example, Baxter notes the critical mistake of the Ottoman Empire siding with the Central Powers during World War I, ultimately hammering one of the final nails in the Empire’s coffin), the Cold War context transformed the chess game from a two-member match led by colonial superpowers, to a two-team match in which the superpowers counted advantages based on who and where their respective teammates resided in geostrategic locations. In what some scholars call “the Broader Middle East,” nation-states, such as Afghanistan, became critical pawns in the game due to their geostrategic locations, and the intervention of states as well as the strategic partnerships between regional and global powers functioned as critical alignments, or ‘teams’ in the ‘chess game’ for regional dominance. Overall, both superpowers functioned on the premise that the Middle East in the Cold War context was a geostrategic region that required continual maintenance to avoid the opposing power from emerging victorious.

In the post-Cold War context, the rules of the game, as well as the players, changed once again. Gone was the dual power rivalry, as well as “zero-sum relationship” that the U.S. and the USSR projected for almost half century. Instead, a new game emerged in which one player remained (or as some authors argue remains) unchallenged: the United States. The nature of the game transformed as well — scholars allude to the lessening importance of strategic partnerships and instead to the growth of an unchallenged hegemony as the United States made decisions ultimately based on self-interest. Migdal alludes to one such example of the post-Cold War U.S. Presidents George H.W. Bush and William Clinton as they, “took some time […] to map out the new lay of the land.” Migdal is ultimately referring to the administrations of the aforementioned presidents, in which “ad hoc” decisions were made as the, “US. Foreign policy in the 1990s tended to be by the seat of the pants rather than driven by a coherent decision.” Migdal emphasizes that the post-Cold War policy decisions (or lack thereof) were based on the rise of neoconservative thinkers who during the 1990s focused efforts on strong foreign policy measures based on American values. While neoconservative outlooks were indeed forming during the post-Cold War and pre-9/11 years, this shift in foreign policy, marked with George W. Bush’s administration post-9/11, would be the best example of reflecting the changing attitudes (e.g. invasion of Iraq and the removal of Saddam Hussein) of neo-conservatism as an appropriate outlook, or as Migdal states “a new view of the world,” in U.S. foreign policy.

14 Ibid., p. 132.
18 Ibid., p. 214.
Re-contextualizing through the lens of the chess game, the post-Cold War, pre-9/11 era of the 1990s was an era of the Middle East ‘chess game’ in which the newly unrivalled and increasingly hegemonic U.S. sought new reasons to justify its invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 on the basis of human rights, or as Lila Abu-Lughod states “authorizing moral crusades,” and Iraq in 2003 to build democratic institutions. 19

In order for Russia to recover the losses in Afghanistan and its role in the Middle East and to counter the U.S.’s presence in the region, Vladimir Putin stated, “Russia must act to balance America’s dominance by taking a more proactive approach in the international arena and promoting a bi-polar global situation.”20 As a result, the emergence of either pro-American or anti-American rhetoric/policies became critical in the formation of new ‘teams’ in the region (e.g. Saudi Arabia for the former and Iran for the latter). 21 But it is important to note that this rhetoric was not based upon a difference in culture or civilizations, but instead upon the differences in power struggles as well as strategic partnerships in the chess game of the region.

Returning to the core metaphor, the rise of unlikely or unassuming players in the Middle East, especially those not on the superpowers’ teams, once again forced other players to renegotiate their positions. For example, with the ‘rise of Iran,’ now unchecked by Iraq (a consequence of the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq), other nations in the region must re-evaluate their partnerships, or their teammates, to ensure they are on the team that is most beneficial to them. An important question that must be re-evaluated is: does the team benefit the self-interest of the superpower/team leader? The answer of course depends on each player’s goals in the region as it varies with the maintenance of power, dominance, and world order.

While our discussion is primarily focused on the global vs. global teams, there are regional and non-state actors that are in the midst of playing their own ‘game.’ The most notable example is undoubtedly the Sunni-Shia conflict, in which the 2003 invasion of Iraq upset the centuries-long ‘winning’ team of the Sunnis to re-strategize their ‘game’ against the opposing Shias. In addition, non-state actors, such as the aforementioned political Islamists and stateless Kurdish population, also threaten the status quo of regional Sunni-Shia/U.S./nation-state order.22 However, in the case of the Sunni-Shia conflict, it is important to note that the primary underlying tension in the 21st century is not on the religions nor any cultural divide, but instead upon the power struggle between rising powers in the region. Thus, culture and civilization clashes are merely a façade for the ongoing power struggle.

20 Shay Har-Zvi, “The Return of the Russian Bear to the Middle East,” Bar Ilan University, Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Middle East Security Studies, no. 120.
In 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini became another ‘game changing player’ in the chessboard of the Middle East, which was already losing some of the strong battalions. The region witnessed a tidal wave of political Islam, and the Sunni-Shia conflict was politicized due to the war in Iraq. Iran thus transformed itself as a new regional player; in fact, Migdal traces the intricate moments in which the United States, after the end of the Cold War, attempted to determine who the new major player in the Middle East would be, that is to say, who the new opponent or the ideal strategic partnership for the U.S. would be. It was here that the U.S. guessed wrong, since they assumed that they would be playing the chess game of the Middle East against Iraq; they had not closely observed the new emerging player of Iran.23

This ‘rise of Iran’ upset the power balance not only for global, but regional powers as well. In regards to the latter, this upset of the power balance derives not only from the standpoint of a theological perspective (i.e. Sunni-Shia conflict), but also from a political perspective. Countries such as Russia, China and the U.S., to a certain extent (more recently with the Iran Nuclear deal), attempt to create and maintain strategic partnerships with Iran in the region.24 This is a marked shift from the once politically isolated Iran of the late 20th century; now that the balance of power has tipped in the favor of Iran, more players, such as Russia, Hezbollah, and China, are attempting to join a growing ‘team’ of pro-Iranian regional dominance.25

As a player as well as a ‘team leader’ for Shia populations in the Middle East, the ‘rise of Iran’ has led to both an increase in strategic partnerships as well as support for Shia groups in the region. For example, in Phillip Smyth’s “How Iran Is Building Its Syrian Hezbollah,” he notes how Shia opposition groups in Syria, “show loyalty to Tehran, over even the Assad regime, marking an important shift in the wartime dynamic.”26 Smyth describes the ‘hezbollahization,’ a process that began in 2012, of such Syrian Shia groups as marking a partnership between Iran and Russia. In fact, many of the groups in Syria refer to themselves as “Hezbollah in Syria.” These are not the first non-state actors that Iran has influenced; in fact, Smyth points to similarities involving Iran in other regional conflicts, such as Iraq, which are, “multifaceted and carry out ideological as well as other regional power-projection goals.”27 Ultimately, Smyth opines that with no end in sight to the conflict in Syria, the infiltration of Iran in the region is a testament to the regional power’s growing strength, clearly evident in the chess game of the Middle East.

The contemporary Middle East, especially considering the likely redrawing of borders that Haass indicates, is in a state of flux that will ultimately result in a rebalancing of power. This rebalancing, as noted in the previous section, is not self-contained in the redrawing of

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25 Shay Har-Zvi, “The Return of the Russian Bear to the Middle East.”
27 Ibid.
borders; the rebalancing is likely to affect the regional and ultimately global power balance of nation-states. While the author previously noted many critical historical matches in which Syria functioned as a pawn, the following section will turn to the current situation in Syria, which can be best defined as its decimation and ultimately self-interested calculated moves by regional and global powers alike. The author’s argument is indeed validated by focusing on the Syrian conflict that erupted in 2011. Exploring the past will help us figure out the various players’ roles in a chess game that seems to have no rules.

The region commonly known as Syria today was once a cradle of civilization and culture in the Middle East, marked by numerous cities of culture and religion. Before the post-Ottoman chess game, Syria was geographically situated where ‘East’ and ‘West’ met both culturally and metaphorically, since the region’s primary function was as a trading center in the ancient cities of Damascus and Aleppo. There the mixing of cultures such as Mesopotamian, Phoenician, Roman and the growing Islamic empires interacted as well as established political authority. The state of Syria did not exist until the end of World War I; instead, until the end of the Ottoman Empire, it was a land in which major cities such as Damascus were crucial points of Christian and Muslim intellectual thought, as well as freedom to co-mingle under the borderless and diverse Empire. However, as the authors mentioned previously, the consequences of the secret Sykes-Picot Agreement (officially the Asia Minor Agreement) and the imperialist artificial borders, have contributed to a plethora of tension for groups in the current Syrian border.

The transformation of Syria in the context of the chess game of the Middle East is stark: Syria has never been a team leader, or even team player, but instead a pawn on the 20th and 21st century chessboard. Migdal notes Syrian importance as well as its demise due to its ‘team’ of the USSR (one has only to examine the current political situation in Syria to see the long-term effect that choosing the USSR held for Syria). Migdal stresses that Syria, while possibly choosing the wrong team, has been a critical pawn in the ‘chess game’ of the Middle East. In fact, he notes that, “[Syria] had tipped the balance of power in one direction or another through the ages […]. When Syria was controlled by or allied with one of the two powers, that bloc tended to dominate.” In the context of the chess game, Syria was a pawn that, due to its strategic position, had the possibility of benefitting its teammates; however, it could also be easily disposed of as well as experience a polar opposite reaction to whichever team the country was playing for. While Midgal does not elaborate on Syria’s history as a critical region for power domination, his reference supports the idea that Syria is ultimately subject to the will of the powerful countries which control it.

An important discussion that can be linked to Migdal’s reference is that Syria has been the pawn for proxy wars, wars that are controlled by remote countries. The hegemonic players did not become directly involved, ultimately reflecting the movement of power in either

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direction. These proxy wars by no means ended with the end of the Cold War and the rise of American hegemonic power in the region; in fact, the conflict in Syria today is evidence that proxy wars are still very critical to the involvement of global powers in the region.

Using proxy war as a basis to discuss the current conflict in Syria is not favored by all scholars of the region; in fact, Lionel Beehner’s “How Proxy Wars Work” focuses on how the current situation regarding Syria in the Middle East should not be categorized as a proxy war, but instead a “multidimensional war.”30 Aside from the semantic issue of definition of proxy war in regards to the overall conflict, Beehner’s argument fails due to the fact that there is more evidence, especially through the lens of the ‘chess game,’ that substantiates the usage of ‘proxy war’ in defining this conflict. Beehner notes the implications of defining Syria as a proxy war as the following:

First, describing the Syrian quagmire as a proxy war implies that the conflict is mainly about larger fissures in the region, especially the rift between Sunni and Shiite, Saudi Arabia and Iran. Second, it suggests that the conflict will be resolved chiefly by outside actors hashing out their differences at the table. Third, the phrase indicates that the conflict is an incredibly high-stakes game involving existential issues over which compromise is impossible.”31

However, as has been previously stated, these three requirements of a proxy war are very much applicable in the case of Syria. In particular, the ‘rift’ between the divisions of Islam, as represented by Iran and Saudi Arabia, is a major contributor to the overall power balance within the region, and therefore, their subsequent involvement (e.g. the aforementioned Iranian funding of Shia groups in Syria to support al-Assad) has major implications on the war overall. Furthermore, it is most likely that the only solution to the proxy war in Syria is that “outside actors [will hash] out their differences;” this is evident in the historical cycle of superpowers selecting pawns for their game. Only when the game has ended between the two chess teams (U.S./pro-rebel/Saudi Arabia/Turkey and Russia/Iran/al-Assad/China) will there be peace in Syria.

The current situation in Syria is leading toward a ‘zero-sum’ game, where neither of the players (both regional and global) have committed to a clear cause. In a sense, the strategy in which the game in Syria is being played is all in the context of self-interest for each of the players. While this is hardly a new concept in realism-based foreign policy, the actual consequences of such motivations and strategies based on self-interest are that no two regional or global players desire the same outcome in Syria. In particular, the current clash of interests can be seen in the basic disagreement of the current standing regime: Bashar al-Assad, supported by Russia as well as Iran (i.e. teammates) versus the removal of al-Assad,

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31 Ibid., p. 2.
as urged by Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the U.S. Yet within even the issue of maintenance or removal of al-Assad, there are different motivations.

More specifically, Russia wants to prop up the al-Assad regime because of the history of Syria as a crucial ally of the Soviet Union since the Cold War. For example the Congressional Research Service states that Russian military involvement in Syria dates back to the 1950’s when the former Soviet Union embraced Syrian nationalist rulers as a counterbalance to U.S. regional partners. Soviet and Russian Federation naval forces have accessed a facility at the Syrian port of Tartus since the early 1970s, using it as a logistical hub to enable longer Mediterranean operations. Former Syrian president Hafiz al Asad (1971-2000) regularly hosted Soviet military and economic advisors but resisted attempts by Moscow to leverage its military assistance to gain greater access to shore facilities. Syria eventually became the largest Middle East recipient of Russian equipment and training, with Russia supplying the majority of Syria's tanks, artillery, fixed-wing aircraft, and helicopters.

While Russian personnel have since been based in Syria to maintain Russian military equipment and train Syrians, their numbers have fluctuated over time. The number of Soviet and Eastern European military technicians in Syria reached approximately 5,800 in 1983, according to CIA estimates, then gradually declined. By 2006, there were only 2,000 Russian military personnel, according to an academic study. Some reports suggest that Russian personnel numbers further declined to a few hundred, many of whom were withdrawn for security reasons prior to recent redeployments.32

Furthermore, Syria is not just a pawn on the Middle East chessboard for ideological purposes (though the humanitarian crisis has shed light onto many of the atrocities such as war-torn Aleppo), but also in the recurring theme of ‘teammates’: it is no coincidence that Iran and Russia support the same goal, and that Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the U.S. support another. These are teammates supporting their respective teams so as to not ultimately overhaul the strategic partnerships developed so carefully in the chessboard of the Middle East, all of which are guilty of servicing self-interest over reform. Douglas Lovelace notes that:

Regional and global powers, including Iran, Turkey, the Arab Gulf states, Russia, and the United States, responded to the uprising and emerging conflict in Syria in ways that prioritized their own interests and perspectives. Funding, weaponry, political support, and personnel offered by outside forces—both state and nonstate—have contributed directly to the intensification and continuation of fighting across Syria from 2012 to the present.33

Within the context of power and world order, the authors would like to highlight important and very relevant issues. Haass formulates his judgment from an advantage and self-interest point, but just because there is not anything there for the United States does not mean there is not power at all; in fact, there is almost too much power, and the attempt to balance has resulted in chaos. This chaos is not due to the intended disruption of order by clashes between civilizations, but instead by an attempt to create order that is not Eurocentric, as is evidenced by the struggle for power. Yet the ongoing ‘chess game’ is at the expense of this regional order. The interest of what would benefit the region politically is pushed aside for the global powers as well as regional powers attempting to use their region for personal gain. There is clearly no simple solution; however, dismissing the region as lacking power is not a helpful framework for development. If anything, it dismisses the very chess game that has allowed superpowers to fight for, as well as maintain, hegemony at the expense of others. As early as the 1950s, Lester Pearson warned in his book, *Democracy in World Politics*, that humans were moving into:

> An age when different civilizations will have to learn to live side by side in peaceful interchange, learning from each other, studying each other’s history and ideals and culture. The alternative in this overcrowded little world is misunderstanding, tension, clash and catastrophe.34

Clearly, the Middle East is in this critical era where the clashes of civilizations and power rivalry are catastrophically threatening peace and world order.

Ultimately, the chess game of the Middle East is manifested in a variety of different players. The ‘chess game’ of the Middle East is a result of centuries-long power struggles between the great empires and the void they left after endless wars. Perhaps it is best to re-contextualize the triad of regional chess games in the three-tiered model illustrated by Nye; however, rather than the levels containing different forms of power, each tier represents the simultaneous games played by various actors in the Middle East. With the global superpower match on the first tier, political Sunni-Shia conflict on the second, and finally non-state actors on the third, all three ‘games’ are evidence of the critical nature regarding why the Middle East is not only one of the most power-possessing regions of the century, but also one of the most volatile in that none of the three games have a clear ‘winner.’

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The European Centre for Higher Education: A UNESCO Effort to Reduce Cold War Tensions and to Promote Co-operation in Higher Education in Europe

Leland Conley Barrows

The UNESCO European Centre for Higher Education (CEPES) operated in Bucharest, Romania, from September 1972 through December 2011, as a decentralized unit of the Education Sector of the UNESCO Secretariat*. Its initial Cold War mandate called for it to promote international cooperation in higher education in the Europe Region of UNESCO, a region so defined as to include North America, Turkey, and Israel¹, and after the 1991 collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Russia itself and other successor states of the former USSR. This definition of Europe was intended to downplay as much as possible the ideological divide that had characterized Europe from the end of the Second World War until 1990. When the Cold War ended, CEPES expanded its activities by engaging in efforts to bring the higher education systems of Eastern and Western Europe closer together by the organization of common reform projects, many of them in collaboration with the European Commission and the Bologna Process.

Cooperation took many forms. From the start, CEPES was called upon to collect and disseminate information including educational statistics. It was also assigned a forum function that stressed the organization of thematic conferences and workshops and the diffusion and application of the results. The preferred method of diffusion was publication; hence, the launching in 1975 of what would become the trilingual quarterly review, Higher Education in Europe, which was published regularly until the end of 2009. In addition, CEPES launched five themed series of monographs on various subjects that were published periodically.

* This article is a revised and updated version of the paper which the author presented at a seminar titled “UNESCO and the Cold War” organized by the International Scientific Committee for the UNESCO History Project in Heidelberg, Germany, in March 2010. He published the first revision in French as “Le Centre Européen de l’UNESCO pour l’enseignement supérieur (CEPES) dans le cadre de la réaction de l’UNESCO face à la guerre froide” in GeoPolitica: Revistă de Geografie Politică, GeoPolitică și GeoStrategie 8 36-37 3 (2010): 210-223. The article is based on written sources and secondary materials, particularly successive versions (1997, 2012, and 2013) of a monograph written by the author on the history and operation of CEPES. A second version, titled European Centre for Higher Education (UNESCO-CEPES 1972-2011), appears as a volume in the International Encyclopaedia of Laws: Intergovernmental Organizations series, an imprint of Kluwer Law International. The article and the book reflect the author’s service from 1983 to 2004 as the Senior Editor at CEPES. Having kept in touch with former colleagues, he wishes to expresses his gratitude to these persons, even though they are not named, for the information that they were willing to share with him.

¹ The 19th Session of the General Conference of UNESCO included Canada, the United States of America, and Israel within the UNESCO Europe Region in 1976.
The presence of CEPES in Romania prior to 1990 conferred on UNESCO a European presence on both sides of the Iron Curtain that was unique for an international organization based in Western Europe during the years that Europe was split ideologically.

**Origins of CEPES**

In addition to the will of UNESCO to found a center like CEPES, there was the determination of the Romanian communist authorities to reach out to the world beyond the confines of the socialist bloc both to traditional friends, particularly France, that had been both a mentor and a sometime ally of Romania, and to the rest of the world, frequently via the organs of the United Nations. Another factor was a deliberate French policy to utilize UNESCO, its headquarters situated in Paris, to further French cultural, linguistic, and, to some extent, political objectives, including the reaffirmation of French influence in Central and Eastern Europe.  

Well before the founding of CEPES, France had been promoting the idea of a Third Force in Europe. During the 1950s, France supported the organization of meetings of the national UNESCO commissions of different European countries. In 1956, France took the initiative in organizing the first Conference of European National Commissions for UNESCO in Aix-en-Provence. Meetings between the French National Commission for UNESCO and the UNESCO National Commissions of certain Eastern European countries followed.

In 1962, Professor Jean Stoetzel, a delegate to the French National Commission for UNESCO, strongly supported the creation in Vienna, Austria, of the European Coordination Centre for Research and Documentation in the Social Sciences. Stoetzel, who had served between 1958 and 1975 as President of the Committee for the Social Sciences in the French National Commission for UNESCO took steps to obtain generous funding for this center from the French government. He served as a member of its Executive Committee from 1964 to 1975. In the words of a Belgian delegate to the Executive Board of UNESCO, this center served as a “meeting ground between East and West”—exactly what would be said, later on, of CEPES.

Higher education, which began to undergo an unprecedented expansion on both sides of the Iron Curtain after World War II, seemed to provide an excellent venue for East-West international dialogue and co-operation. Such problems as access, academic/cultural versus practical education, the links between higher education and employment, continuing education, financing, standard-setting, equivalence and mobility, massification—all were common to both sides. Also, higher education offered the advantage of being more ideologically neutral than other possible areas of cooperation. Moreover, the institutional

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3 The Center operated in Vienna from 1964 to 1989.
structures of European higher education, both East and West, were strongly statist, and the traditions of higher education in both parts of Europe harked back to the early modern period in European history and in some cases to the High Middle Ages.

Thus, higher education would be a “safe”, but presumably productive, vehicle for East-West European dialogue and co-operation. That was the view taken by UNESCO and its French Director-General, René Maheu, who in 1966 had published *La civilisation de l’universel* (Paris: Lafont-Gauthier), as preparations were being made to hold the first Conference of Ministers of Education of the European Member States of UNESCO (MINEDEUROPE I) that was held in Vienna, Austria, from November 20 to November 25, 1967. Although this meeting was indeed one bringing together ministers of education, it concentrated almost exclusively on higher education, specifically access to higher education.

Backtracking a bit, we note that Romania achieved United Nations membership in December 1955 and UNESCO membership in early 1956. Very soon Romania became active in the affairs of the United Nations system, as it had been in the affairs of the League of Nations prior to World War II. In 1965, Romania was one of eight medium-sized European countries, including Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Turkey, and Yugoslavia, that sponsored a United Nations Resolution on Europe intended ‘...to improve good neighborly relationships among countries belonging to different horizons, as the tripartite spirit of the Resolution envisioned: East, West, and neutral.’

Contributing to this effort was the mathematician, future member of the Romanian Academy, and diplomat, Professor Mircea Malitza, a founder of CEPES, who, at the time was the Vice Minister for United Nations Relations in the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. According to him, the sponsoring countries of this resolution translated it into a ‘real UNESCO plan for Europe’, a first outcome being the MINEDEUROPE I Conference.

Romanians played very active roles in this conference that took place at the same time that the General Assembly of the United Nations was meeting in New York under the chairmanship of Corneliu Mănescu, the Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs. The General Rapporteur of MINEDEUROPE I, elected by acclamation by its participants upon the proposal of Ştefan Bălan, the Romanian Minister of Education, was Jean Livescu, the Romanian Vice-Minister of Education, who, as Director-General Maheu recognized in his inaugural address, had chaired the *ad hoc* committee which had met earlier at UNESCO Headquarters to plan the Conference.

In the same address, Maheu suggested that ‘the fact that Europe, which [had] never before been assembled on such a scale and at such a level on any subject [negated] …a cliché…

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to the effect that Europe [was] only to a slight extent directly and properly concerned in the action of UNESCO’. 7

The General Recommendation formulated by this conference, quoted below, is considered to have been the inspiration for the founding of CEPES:

The Conference

1. **Recommends** that [the] European Member States of UNESCO and the Organization itself:
   
   (a) consider appropriate ways and means of promoting activities designed to foster European co-operation in the field of education, …particularly higher education, taking into account the work already carried out by various national, international and non-governmental organizations and expert meetings;

   (b) develop the use of existing information services to enable the various experiences in higher education to be exchanged on a wider basis;

   (c) stimulate educational research in connexion [sic] with problems concerning access to and the future planning of higher education;

2. **Recommends**, moreover [that] UNESCO:

   (a) …pursue, in close cooperation with European Member States and taking into account the work of international organizations, further methodological studies and formulate recommendations on the provision of internationally comparable data and the standardisation of educational statistics, terminology and definitions on topics relating to access to higher education;

   (b) …explore the possibility of making provision in the Organization’s program for a further Conference of Ministers of Education of European Member States. 8

As recommended, a second MINEDEUROPE Conference met in Bucharest between November 26 and December 3 of 1973, a year and two months after the opening of CEPES. The final report of this conference makes clear that ‘guided by the spirit of the recommendations of the Vienna conference, UNESCO made provision…, as early as the Sixteenth Session of the General Conference, for the establishment of a European Centre for Higher Education, which was opened in Bucharest….” 9

It was probably in 1969 that the Romanian government began to lobby systematically for the creation of a UNESCO higher education center in Bucharest. In the next few years, it would successively obtain the opening, in Bucharest, of a United Nations Information Center (UNIC) in 1970, a United Nations Development Program (UNDP) office in 1971, a


On one hand, the stance taken by Nicolae Ceauşescu, President of the State Council of Romania and Secretary General of the Romanian Communist Party, in opposition to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia increased the popularity of Romania in the West. On the other hand, the events occurring in France in May of 1968 and then elsewhere increased the awareness on the part of higher education decision-makers and administrators in Western Europe of their common problems.

For Romania, this period of opening towards the United Nations and its specialized agencies corresponded to a reawakening of Franco-Romanian collaboration. A joint venture linking Renault, the parastatal French automobile manufacturer, had given rise to the launching of the Dacia plant in Piteşti between 1966 and 1968. For many years, this plant assembled the “Renault 12” giving it the trade name, “Dacia 1300”. Collaboration between the Société Aérospatiale de France and Industria Aeronautică Română (IAR) of Braşov in the manufacturing of helicopters began several years later.

It was notable that even though the French social upheavals during May of 1968 began while French President Charles de Gaulle was on an official visit to Romania, he did not cut short his stay. One Frenchman who believed very strongly in this Franco-Romanian rapprochement throughout its duration was the Director-General of UNESCO, René Maheu.

The formal 1970 decision to set up CEPES in Bucharest was taken during the Sixteenth Session of the UNESCO General Conference (October 12 to November 14, 1970), but not without difficulty. The Report of the Program Commission that brought together delegates from forty-four countries reveals that several countries, Sweden, Finland, Norway, Denmark, and the United Kingdom initially opposed the idea, believing that all the functions of such a center would best be assumed by the Paris Headquarters of UNESCO. On the other hand, certain countries other than Romania, particularly Austria and the USSR, wanted to host the Centre.

10 UNESCO, 16th Session of the General Conference (12 October–14 November 1970), Rapport de la Commission du Programme, p. 43; Valentin Lipatti, Strada Povernei 23 (Bucharest: Editura Garamond, 1993), pp. 166-167). Nevertheless, several of the CEPES directors were recruited from these countries: Two of them were Swedish (Eric Ribbing, 1972-1974, and Carin Berg, 1988-1995); one was Norwegian (Audun Ofjørd, 1978-1980), and one was Scottish (Lesley Wilson, 1996-1999). One director, (Frans Eberhard, 1982-1986) came from Austria, a country that had made a bid to host CEPES. With the exception of Audun Ofjørd, a career UNESCO official, these directors were more or less political appointees. Another director (Thomas Keller, 1976-1978), also a career UNESCO official, came from the Federal Republic of Germany. Upon the retirement of the final CEPES director, Jan Sadlak (1999-2009), who held Polish and Canadian citizenship, an English program specialist, Peter Wells, on post at CEPES as of 2003, was named “Head of Office ad interim”, a position he held until CEPES closed at the end of 2011. His lack of enthusiasm for keeping CEPES open and running evokes the original British attitude towards the founding of CEPES. All the interim directors, including Wells, were career UNESCO functionaries. Two of them were French
Obtaining the Centre for Romania, reported Ambassador Valentin Lipatti, the Romanian Representative to UNESCO between 1965 and 1971, was not an easy task. It required him and other Romanian officials to lobby vigorously in several European and UNESCO venues, starting with a meeting of European university rectors sponsored jointly by UNESCO and the Standing Conference of Rectors and Vice-Chancellors of the European Universities, held in Bucharest in April 1970. The 48th Session of the UNESCO Executive Board (May 4 to June 19, 1970) issued a positive recommendation.

At its meeting of October 14 to 16, 1970, the Higher Education and Research Committee of the Cultural Co-operation Council of the Council of Europe endorsed this recommendation. It added that CEPES should be a European center ‘…for information on the mobility of researchers, teachers, and students’.

Summing up, Ambassador Lipatti could report that 1970, which, by coincidence, the United Nations organization had designated as the International Year of Education, had been very fruitful for Romania. We note Lipatti’s presence as an observer in the Meeting of Experts on the Feasibility of Establishing a European Center for Higher Education that met from September 27 to October 1, 1971, at UNESCO Headquarters in Paris and his satisfaction, when, at the farewell dinner offered in his honor by Director-General Maheu upon his transfer back to Romania the next month, the latter asked him to carry back with him the formal letter of confirmation, addressed to the Romanian government, of the intention of UNESCO to set up CEPES in Bucharest.

Over the next year, a series of meetings were held between representatives of UNESCO and of the Romanian government intended to iron out the details and to elaborate the formal Seat Agreement (accord de siège). Professor Mircea Malitza, now the Minister of Education of Romania, took a particular interest in the project the remote origins of which he traces back to a chance encounter with René Maheu at the Rio de Janeiro Airport in 1954. Among the responsibilities of his ministry was the refurbishing of the Kretzulescu Palace, in central Bucharest, including a two-story annex, the free use of which as the CEPES office the Romanian authorities had offered to UNESCO.


12 UNESCO, 16th Session, Rapport de la Commission, p. 43.
Anomalies in the Staffing of CEPES

Nothing was said, at this point, about the assignment of Romanian local staff members to CEPES. Rather, the documents speak of the possibility of other types of professionals, possibly university faculty members on temporary assignment from European universities.16

A few days before the inauguration of CEPES, however, an exchange of letters between Director-General Maheu and Minister of Education Malitza elicited a positive response by UNESCO to a Romanian offer of fourteen local employees—Romanian civil servants employed by the Ministry of Education and Instruction—to be assigned on a permanent basis to the center. Their positions were strictly categorized by professional function. Their salaries were to be paid by the Romanian government.

The Romanian local staff at CEPES prior to 1990 included five program assistants and multilingual documentalists, one librarian, three multilingual secretaries, a driver, a receptionist, a general technician, and two housekeepers. These employees had the appropriate academic or vocational qualifications obtained at the corresponding Romanian universities or professional schools. The driver was a former Romanian army mechanic. The housekeepers had only very basic levels of education. What all the Romanian personnel had in common was that they were vetted and approved by the security services (Securitatea) of the Romanian government and were required to report on the international staff to the Securitate agent(s) charged with the supervision of CEPES.

Almost all the members of the Romanian local staff, including the Romanian assistant directors who held international professional staff status, were members of the Romanian Communist Party and as such were required to participate each month, usually on a Friday afternoon, in the required political-ideological meetings held at the Ministry of Education located two blocks away from CEPES. As these persons never informed their non-Romanian international colleagues of upcoming meetings, the latter were periodically confronted with empty offices and unoccupied desks upon returning from their lunch breaks.

But there were always two members of the Romanian local staff who were never absent on such occasions. ‘They are the two who refused to join the Party’, declared a former Director of CEPES. After the Romanian Revolution of December 1989, she learned that Securitate personnel, who were responsible to the Ministry of the Interior and not to the Ministry of Education, held their meetings on Saturdays.

It also seems that just before the actual inauguration of the Center by Director-General Maheu and Secretary-General and State Council President Ceauşescu, Maheu and Malitza made a further agreement, a so-called “Gentleman’s Agreement” by which the second-ranking international post, that in all but title was that of an assistant director, would always be filled by a Romanian national — a senior academic — who nevertheless would not be permitted to officially hold the title of assistant or deputy director. The reasons for this rather humiliating denial of title to the ranking Romanian international staff member at CEPES (made even more humiliating because he was sometimes called the “assistant to the director”) are obscure; however, the impetus for this action seems to have come purely from UNESCO, where an anti-communist current wished to limit the prestige that the Socialist Republic of Romania might derive from CEPES.

Yet, the intellectual as well as the academic qualifications of the Romanian assistant directors of CEPES were considerably more distinguished than those of all the directors of CEPES except for the last director. The first assistant director of CEPES, Dr. Dragoş Vaida, was an Associate Professor of Mathematics at the Polytechnic Institute of Bucharest. Those who succeeded him were full professors. The last assistant director to serve before the 1989 Romanian Revolution, Professor Dumitru Chiţoran (1983-1989), a distinguished specialist in linguistics at the University of Bucharest, had served as Chairman of the Department of Philology and Pro-Rector for Exterior Affairs at the University of Bucharest. Only the last of the CEPES Directors, Dr. Jan Sadlak (1999-2009), could boast comparable intellectual and academic qualifications.

The question of the “correct” title for the Assistant Director of CEPES was summarily resolved with the nomination in 1991 of the Romanian sociologist, Professor Lazăr Vlăsceanu, to fill the position. He simply assumed the title of Assistant Director, and nobody complained. However, when Vlăsceanu retired in 2007, the demand made by the Romanian government that the post still be reserved for a senior Romanian academic, as per the “Gentlemen’s Agreement” of 1972, led to some friction. This Cold War era arrangement was no longer acceptable to the UNESCO Secretariat. All vacancies for international posts at CEPES were now to be truly opened to international recruitment. But because the Education Sector of UNESCO was already considering the possibility of closing CEPES, the Assistant Director’s post was not filled.

A question one might legitimately ask is to what extent the various Romanian citizens, officials, academics, and others who contributed to the setting up of CEPES or who later worked there, were convinced and/or influential communists. In vain does one peruse the 2006 Raport Final on the communist dictatorship in Romania that was compiled by a Romanian presidential commission chaired by Professor Vladimir Tismăneanu (currently a Professor of Political Science at the University of Maryland at College Park) in search of references to CEPES and its founders.17 There are none in the main text. However, an

appendix titled ‘Biografiile nomenclaturii’, lists Gheorghe Maurer, Prime Minister and President of the Council of Ministers of Romania between 1964 and 1974, and Ştefan Andrei, Minister of Foreign Affairs between 1978 and 1985, both of whom had contacts with CEPES and with the UNESCO Secretariat. Both were favorable to CEPES, Maurer having even formed a friendship with Director-General Maheu thanks to his many trips to Paris, his half-French ancestry, and his mastery of French. He was present at the inauguration of CEPES on September 22, 1972.

On the other hand, the tell-all account by Mihai Pacepa, Red Horizons (1987), indicates that when Ambassador Valentin Lipatti had completed his term of service at the UNESCO Secretariat, he returned to Romania to become Assistant Director of the Section on Disinformation in the Office of Information on Foreign Countries (DIE) of the Securitate. Here he was known as Colonel Leonte Lipatti and held the title, Director of Cultural Relations, in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Pacepa wrote that even though Lipatti was ‘bourgeois… [and the brother of the famous pianist, Dinu Lipatti], he had been recruited and retained by the DIE as a unique exception because of his devotion to Communism, his talent for diplomacy, his perfect mastery of French, and his exceptional understanding of the West’.

Possibly one should class a large proportion of the Romanian officials who supported and even collaborated with CEPES during the Cold War as being among those who, according to the classification presented in Raport final, resisted communism through culture.

The opening of CEPES in Romania and the assignment there of a certain number of Romanian local staff members was linked to the possibility for Romania to obtain a major reduction in the annual membership dues that it owed to UNESCO. In offering the free use of the Kretzulescu Palace and the free services of fourteen (eventually fifteen) local staff members, the Romanian government succeeded in reducing the convertible hard currency portion of these dues to zero. Thus, the apparently generous offer that the Romanian government made to UNESCO masked its realization of certain financial advantages.

Romania also obtained hard currency by exploiting the Romanian Assistant Directors of CEPES whose salaries were paid by UNESCO in US dollars (two-thirds) and Romanian lei (one-third). In common with the practices of the other socialist bloc countries, Romanian citizens earning hard currency were required to “contribute” a portion of it to their governments. The portion required of Romanians became particularly large after 1980 as the economic situation of the country deteriorated. Thus, the Romanian Assistant Director who joined CEPES in 1983 was required to hand over his whole salary to the Romanian government, both the portion paid in US dollars and the portion paid in

18 Ibid., pp. 645-666.
Romanian lei. In return, the government paid him a salary in lei comparable to what he would have been earning as a senior professor and pro-rector at the University of Bucharest. The government changed the dollars into lei at a special rate that yielded more lei than the usual black market rate. It then used all the lei obtained to pay the salaries of the whole Romanian local staff and to cover the maintenance costs of the Kretzulescu Palace.

Functioning During the Cold War

After its inauguration on September 21, 1972, CEPES began to function in December of that year with a skeleton staff. The first Director, Eric Ribbing of Sweden, a former Head of the Department of Higher Education in the Swedish Ministry of Education, arrived to begin a two-year assignment during which he participated in the Second Conference of Ministers of the European Member States of UNESCO (MINEDEUROPE II). Indeed, the first meeting organized by CEPES, an Ad Hoc Panel of Experts on European University Co-operation, which met in Bucharest from June 5 to June 7 of 1973, provided input for this conference.

It had been established in advance that CEPES would not be divided into smaller sections (divisions, sections, sub-sections) as were the various sectors at UNESCO Headquarters in Paris, the CEPES staff being viewed as too small for such a grouping. A further clarification came in 1974 when the CEPES Advisory Committee report of that year stated that ‘…the Center cannot operate as a research center…’ Rather, it is expected ‘…to act as the host institution for the promotion of co-operation in the field of higher education in Europe and for the promotion of research….’ Thus, two characteristics for which CEPES would be roundly criticized many years later, its lack of clear internal organization and its brokering function, were clearly established immediately before and after the Centre opened its doors.

As structured, CEPES would broker many activities dealing with various aspects of higher education which would be undertaken by outside specialists on contract or via the synergy stimulated by the various forum activities that started almost from the moment CEPES began to function. Indeed, the debate as to whether CEPES should conduct research on its own or identify areas of research and farm out ideas for projects to co-operating organizations and individuals was really part of a much larger debate regarding the role and activity of UNESCO as a whole, one that began almost as soon as UNESCO itself came into existence.

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24 See James P. Sewell, UNESCO and World Politics: Engaging in International Relations (Princeton: University Press, 1975), Chapters 4 and 5, and William Preston Jr., Edward S. Herman, and Herbert I.
Just as MINEDEUROPE I had suggested tasks for a future CEPES, MINEDEUROPE II defined itself, to a great extent, as a forum for the further refinement of the CEPES program. It urged the Center to pursue the elaboration of a European diploma and equivalence convention, to develop modalities for the mobility of students and teachers in higher education, to propose activities that would further the aims of the Helsinki Process, to develop methods for the international exchange and diffusion of information on higher education policies, and to examine the possibilities of multimedia teaching and learning.  

Within these parameters, the work of CEPES consisted of the organization of thematic meetings and workshops in Bucharest and elsewhere in Europe and the preparation of publications, some of them reflecting the results of these meetings or reflecting other activities as they were periodically added to the CEPES agenda. In 1984, for instance, CEPES was appointed Secretariat of the Regional Committee Responsible for the Application of the 1979 UNESCO Convention on the Recognition of Studies, Diplomas, and Degrees Concerning Higher Education in the States belonging to the Europe Region. This one responsibility spawned a particularly large number of derived and related activities and projects including the participation of CEPES as of 2003 in the Bologna [Process] Follow-Up Group. Indeed, writing in 2008, an American researcher, Chris Darling, suggested that ‘…policy drafted by UNESCO-CEPES from 1973 to 1977 led to the elaboration of the Bologna Declaration’.  

Over its lifetime, CEPES sponsored or co-sponsored 174 international meetings (50 before 1990) held at CEPES or elsewhere, not counting the periodic meetings of the CEPES Advisory Committee (Advisory Board as of 1995) and the CEPES Liaison Officers. CEPES also edited and published 87 volumes distributed among five publication series, some of them printed in-house, others by Romanian or foreign commercial publishers, including several in collaboration with other units of UNESCO, the International Bureau of Education (IBE), for instance, and in one case, the International Labor Organization (ILO). In many cases, a meeting, a colloquium or seminar, a consultation led to one or more follow-up publications.


27 See Barrows, 2013, pp. 155-192, for the lists of all the CEPES meetings and publications of which the author could find a record.

28 In 1981 and 1987, CEPES compiled two successive editions of an *International Directory of Higher Education Research Institutions* for IBE. A symposium organized in collaboration with ILO titled Relations between Higher Education and Manpower Planning in June 1977 gave rise to seven national case studies that were published in the ILO World Employment Program Research Working Papers series. A comparative synthesis based on this work was published in 1982 in the ILO World Employment Program series as *Higher Education and Manpower Planning*. CEPES continued work in this domain by the...
Given the importance that the MINDEUROPE I and II Conferences and the founders of CEPES imparted to the collection and interpretation of statistics on higher education, the second meeting organized at CEPES in July 1974 was a Seminar on Planning of the Center’s Statistical Activities, organized in collaboration with the Office of Statistics of UNESCO. The outcome of this seminar gave rise to other activities on statistics that led to the preparation of three publications, the first one in 1978, *Statistical Study on Higher Education in Europe: 1970-1974*, a second and more important bilingual (French-English) one, *Higher Education and Economic Development in Europe, 1975-1980: A Statistical and Economic Study* (two volumes), by Petre Burloiu, and the third one, in 1989, a little more internationalized than the first two studies, *Statistics on Higher Education 1980-1985: A Study of Data on Higher Education and Research from the Countries of the Europe Region*, by Valentin Nicolae, René H. M. Smulders, and Mihai Korka.

Over several years, meetings of various kinds were organized on the general subject of higher education and research that gave rise to monographs or articles for the quarterly review, *Higher Education in Europe*, and another set of meetings on the planning of higher education. Thus, a symposium on planning in higher education held in Bucharest in December 1983 gave rise in 1986 to the volume, *Planning in Higher Education: Study on New Approaches in the Planning of Higher Education in Centrally Planned Economies and in Market Economy Systems*, by W. Wolter, a professor from the German Democratic Republic, and Ch. Oehler, a professor from the Federal Republic of Germany. The aim of promoting East-West collaboration was very evident.

The flagship CEPES publication was the quarterly review, *Higher Education in Europe*. It began modestly in 1975 as a reaction to a complaint voiced at the second CEPES Advisory Committee meeting that ‘the Centre’s activities had started so slowly, that the results were few, and little initiative had been shown’.  

In reality, this criticism was aimed at the first CEPES Director, Eric Ribbing, who had only recently resigned. It spurred a program specialist (and future CEPES Director), Jan Sadlak, who had joined the CEPES staff in September 1973, and the next Director, Thomas Keller (January 1976 to February 1978) of West Germany, to begin the production of a news bulletin. An experimental issue appeared in April 1975 and was followed in January 1976 by the regular publication of a typed and mimeographed bulletin titled *Higher Education in Europe* that initially appeared five times a year and then as of 1979 four times a year. Through a slow process of mission creep, the bulletin, as it was first designated, that began simply as a vehicle to reproduce and to diffuse, after translation when needed, news items and articles from other publications, East and West, evolved into a scholarly review.

creation of a publication series, Monographs on Higher Education [in the Europe Region of UNESCO] in 1978 that between 1978 and 2011 produced volumes having a standardized format on the higher education systems of 22 countries. Several country monographs were revised and republished in order to take account of post-Cold War changes.

Higher Education in Europe was published in three linguistic versions: English, the lead version, French, and Russian. As of 1979, the issues were themed. Between 1976 and 1982, the three linguistic versions of the review were produced in-house by electric typewriter and stencil duplicator. As of 1983, they were printed professionally by ILEXIM, a state-owned Romanian press. Beginning in 1997, the English version was printed and distributed by Carfax (now Taylor and Francis/Routledge) in the United Kingdom, and, as of 2000, the French and Russian versions were published on-line, the French version being translated and prepared in-house, the Russian version by Logos Ltd. of Moscow.

Between 1979, when Higher Education in Europe began to be themed, through 2009, it developed 115 themes or topics. Most of them were derived from CEPES activities, particularly the subjects and the outcomes of meetings and colloquia. The planning of higher education was chosen twice as the theme of a given issue, and research on higher education, four times.

Given both the international and the Cold War vocation of CEPES, the question of what was called geographical (including ideological) balance was always a matter taken very seriously both regarding the assignment of international staff members to CEPES and the selection of participants in conferences, authors for CEPES publications, and, after 1990, consultants for various higher education reform projects. The selection of such persons from the Western countries could generally be undertaken through contacts made by the Director, the other international staff members at CEPES, and the UNESCO Headquarters staff. Prior to 1990, collaborators and authors from the socialist countries usually had to be requested via the so-called Liaison Officers, designated officials serving as resource-person recruiters and information officers in each country, usually mid-level officials in the respective ministries of education or of higher education.

Before 1990, it proved particularly difficult to initiate contacts with the higher education institutions that were closest to CEPES, Romanian institutions. Foreigners were not permitted to enter Romanian institutions without prior arrangements, and these might be difficult or impossible to make. Typically, Romanian citizens were not permitted to have contacts with foreigners unless granted prior permission by the Securitate.

In theory, CEPES, particularly its library that was supervised by a Romanian librarian, a local staff member, was open to the public; however, few Romanians before 1990 actually frequented the library. Those who attempted to do so might be turned away by this librarian or possibly reported to the Securitate. Other Romanian visitors, students or colleagues of the Romanian professors who served successively as the assistant directors of CEPES, would avoid having any contacts with the CEPES international staff as they entered and left the building unless they were engaged in specific CEPES projects.

The Romanian and the international staff members nevertheless worked together quite harmoniously, but they rarely if ever fraternized outside of work. In addition to worries about the Securitate, the differences in status and, above all, salary, could be embarrassing.
Salary differences could be a major source of bitterness when local and international staff members undertook similar or identical tasks, secretarial duties for instance.

From the start, CEPES was mandated to work in three United Nations official languages: English, French, and Russian. Thus, the provision of high quality interpretation for conferences and translation for publications was always an important, difficult, and usually expensive part of the CEPES program. Producing the three linguistic versions of *Higher Education in Europe* was especially crucial and difficult.

In 1983, the CEPES Director, Frans Eberhard, and the newly hired Romanian Assistant Director, Dumitru Chiţoran, who was concurrently a Professor of English at the University of Bucharest, negotiated a contract with the University of Bucharest whereby translations would be undertaken by the staffs of the respective language departments. CEPES paid the university for this work according to generous standard UNESCO page rates. For the individual translators, however, the work they did was unremunerated, so-called “patriotic work”, undertaken in addition to their normal (and heavy) teaching and research loads. They might at best receive some token rewards from the CEPES international staff: bags of coffee—real coffee—or packs, sometimes whole cartons, of cigarettes of the Kent brand that circulated in Romania prior to 1991 as a sort of parallel currency. Of course, they might also earn good will or special privileges from the Romanian authorities. In 1984, an English-French translator of half-French origin “earned” permission to spend a summer vacation in France, her first visit there in twenty years.

The Romanian local staff members at CEPES continued to be paid by the Romanian government through 2000. It even increased their number, but salaries remained very low, much lower than what Romanian staff members earned in the other UN offices in Romania where they had a special local/international status and were paid in US dollars by their respective organizations.

As of January 2001, thanks to lobbying in Paris by CEPES Director Jan Sadlak, all the Romanian local staff members at CEPES were granted local/international status entailing salaries paid by UNESCO in US dollars. Unfortunately, this generosity on the part of the UNESCO Secretariat increased the total personnel costs of the center and served in 2009 as an argument for closing CEPES.

Despite the realities of the pre-1990 period, CEPES did indeed bring together scholars, professors, and academic administrators from all over a divided Europe. In April 1985, CEPES helped to initiate the process by which several Eastern European, particularly Soviet rectors whose universities had broken with the Standing Conference of Rectors and Vice-Chancellors of the European Universities (CRE) in 1975, renewed their memberships in this organization.30

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Through its multilingual publications, particularly *Higher Education in Europe*, CEPES helped to diffuse the writings of Western scholars among Eastern European academics (and vice versa). Clearly, the three-language version policy was an aid to diffusion. Subscriptions to the review remained free to subscribers from the socialist countries having non-convertible currencies even when paying subscriptions were introduced in 1985 for certain categories of Western hard currency subscribers. Over the same period, copies of the other CEPES publications were always provided free of charge to persons and institutions in Eastern Europe wishing to receive them, and a certain number of copies of the three linguistic versions of the review were always provided to the Liaison Officers from these countries.

Looking back at his collaboration with CEPES in the 1980’s, Adrian Năstase, the Romanian Prime Minister in 2002, referred to CEPES as a ‘personal window of opportunity’ in an otherwise isolated country.  

Although not a stated purpose of CEPES, it did offer a chance to a few Eastern Europeans, prior to 1990, to defect to the West. However, the three cases with which the author is familiar involved UNESCO international staff members. In two of these cases the defections were made to look like the normal transfer of UNESCO international staff members to Paris. The third case, however, the so-called Sorin Dumitrescu Affair, temporarily soured relations between UNESCO and the Romanian government but without unduly affecting CEPES.

Into the early 1980’s, CEPES continued to be strongly supported by UNESCO (even though as a decentralized unit of UNESCO Headquarters it did not appear prominently in the program documents the way the UNESCO institutes did) and by the European member states, East and West. During the lead-up to the temporary withdrawal of the United States from UNESCO (1985-2003), the American authorities made it clear that CEPES was one of the “good” UNESCO projects that would continue to receive American support.

As the western powers drew away from Romania in the late 1980’s — Mikhail Gorbachev with his policies of glasnost and perestroika superseding Ceauşescu, in Western eyes, as the perceived progressive communist leader — the UNESCO Secretariat began to cut back both the CEPES program and, via attrition, the international staff of CEPES. Certain

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32 This affair involved a ranking Romanian UNESCO official, who, in June 1976, while transiting to Bulgaria via Romania on official UNESCO business, was prevented from leaving Romania and forced by the Romanian authorities to submit a letter of resignation to the Director-General of UNESCO, Amadou Matar M’Bow. The latter not only refused to accept Dumitrescu’s resignation but demanded that he be permitted to return to his post in Paris. After a two-year standoff, President Ceauşescu permitted Dumitrescu to return to Paris.
Western member states of UNESCO began to suggest that CEPES be shifted from Romania to another Eastern European member state. The declining economy of Romania along with the extreme austerity measures imposed by the Romanian government as of 1983 made living and working conditions in Bucharest increasingly difficult. The urban renewal project, which Ceauşescu imposed as of 1981 and accelerated, particularly in Bucharest, in 1984, and the “rural systematization” project that he launched in 1974 and accelerated in 1988, both elicited the increasing disapproval of governments on either side of the European divide.\(^{33}\)

In 1984, when the Romanian government abruptly closed the United Nations/Romania Demographic Center, many observers believed that CEPES would be next. The favorable stance on birth control of CEDOR seemed to contradict the pro-natality policies of the Ceauşescu regime. Also, Elena Ceauşescu claimed that CEDOR harbored dissidents.

CEPES, however, was not affected by this closure, probably because higher education in the Europe Region of UNESCO, still very much a matter of the respective national or state governments, was something about which West and East — even Romania — could agree. Also, CEPES apparently continued to be a source of “economies” for the Romanian government. In 1988, when the Romanian authorities scrutinized the costs to Romania of hosting CEPES, the Romanian Assistant Director was able to prove, that, counting the salary he earned and turned over to these authorities, and the costs of the services and the goods that the Centre itself and the international staff purchased in Romania in hard currency, CEPES was profitable.

UNESCO initially seemed to be uninterested, at least at the official level, in Ceauşescu’s very harmful urban development and “rural systematization” projects. In 1985, when the Romanian architect, Ştefan Gane, attempted, through an international association he organized, to obtain the intervention of UNESCO to halt the damage being done to the architectural patrimony of Bucharest, he had no success.\(^{34}\) However, a new Director-General, Professor Federico Mayor, elected in November 1987, did become interested, probably because a new Director of CEPES, Carin Berg of Sweden (1988-1995), expressed harsh, if unofficial, opinions about both projects while on her visits to Paris.

Over the spring of 1989, out of solidarity with the Belgian-initiated *Opération Villages Roumains* that had recently gotten underway, Director-General Mayor charged a former Algerian Ambassador to Washington and Moscow, Layachi Yaker, with a special mission to enquire in Bucharest about the effects of “rural systematization”. He met at the residence of the CEPES Director with the ambassadors to Romania of several countries that were particularly supportive of *Opération Villages Roumains*: Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. Over the next two days, this group toured several systematization sites guided

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\(^{33}\) Both projects are described in some detail by Dennis Deletant in *Ceauşescu and the Securitate: Coercion and Dissent in Romania, 1965-1989* (New York: M. S. Sharpe, 1995), pp. 294-319.

by Romanian officials. One can assume that Ambassador Yaker’s mission report was negative; however, it seems to have disappeared from the UNESCO Archives.

By the end of 1989, the UNESCO Secretariat, out of solidarity with the now very strong international opposition to Ceaușescu’s policies, was seriously planning to remove CEPES from Romania. Indeed, it had permitted the international staff of CEPES to shrink to three: the Director, the Senior Editor, and the administrative officer. Two other Eastern European countries, Bulgaria and the USSR, were by now openly expressing a desire to inherit the CEPES.

After the Cold War

The sudden collapse of the Ceaușescu regime in December 1989 gave CEPES a new lease on life. The post-communist government of Romania renewed and reinforced the Romanian commitment to CEPES, including increased financial support and the assignment of additional local staff remunerated by it. Although there were some complaints at UNESCO Headquarters that ‘…CEPES [had] not play[ed] the part it should have… after the collapse of the communist system in Central and Eastern Europe’, and there were even some suggestions that CEPES should be closed because it was no longer relevant, the first UNESCO General Conference (October-November 1991) held after the collapse of communism in Europe called for the renewal of CEPES. A report on the future of CEPES prepared for Director-General Federico Mayor by two senior professors, members of the CEPES Advisory Committee, Justin Thorens of Switzerland and Gottfried Leibbrandt of the Netherlands, drew the same conclusion. They recommended that ‘CEPES… be maintained and developed even further’ and that it… remain in Bucharest.35

For the next eighteen years, CEPES prospered in post-communist Romania. Its activities expanded to include technical assistance to the post-communist higher education systems undertaken in cooperation with such partners as the World Bank, the Council of Europe, the European Commission, the Soros Foundation, particularly its Open Society Institute, the Japan Grant for the Reform of Romanian Higher Education, and the Japanese Trust Fund for the Preservation of the World Cultural Heritage. In 1998, CEPES assumed the task of assuring the European follow-up to the UNESCO World Conference on Higher Education held that year and as of 2003 was named a consultative member of the Bologna Follow-up Group.

But CEPES was unable to shed its image at UNESCO Headquarters as a Cold War relic. A detailed evaluation of the Centre commissioned by the UNESCO Internal Oversight Service (IOS) in 2005 and undertaken by three experts of the Norwegian Institute for Studies in Research and Education - Center for Innovation Studies (NIFU-STEP)

concluded that although CEPES was a productive unit of UNESCO, its activities were overly remote from the European higher education goals of the major Education for All initiative and the related Forum on Higher Education, Research, and Knowledge flagship activity.\textsuperscript{36} And as Romania moved toward membership of the European Union, there were those at the UNESCO Secretariat who argued that the political justification for the existence of CEPES was rapidly disappearing, despite the continued strong functional justification for its continued existence. It was, after all, undertaking a slate of activities of greater number, variety, and intensity than had ever been the case during the Cold War.

In January 2009, UNESCO Director-General, Koichiro Matsuura, by then nine months away from retirement, announced that he would close CEPES at the end of September 2009. He justified his decision in terms both of cost: ‘Out of a biennial budget of $2.3 million, less than ten percent [was] devoted to program activities,’ and of politics: ‘CEPES played an essential role in the strengthening of co-operation in higher education in Europe…. But given the new political realities in Europe, CEPES ha[d] fulfilled its role in Europe with success; therefore, its status as a center funded by the regular budget of UNESCO [was] no longer tenable’.\textsuperscript{37}

Unfortunately, the Director-General and his advisors failed to consider that CEPES was obtaining extra-budgetary resources despite impediments to doing so that were being created by the UNESCO Secretariat. They also failed to consider that CEPES was rendering direct and indirect services to its stakeholders that could not be given a specific monetary value but were nevertheless valued very highly by these same stakeholders.\textsuperscript{38} And they ignored the opinion expressed by the authors of the NIFU STEP report that ‘UNESCO gets “value for its dollars” in the sense that CEPES manages to produce a lot… for UNESCO [in terms of] relevant outcomes for the relatively small amount invested [by it] in CEPES’.\textsuperscript{39}

Fortunately, official Romanian attitudes about the role and the value of CEPES had changed. Rather than viewing the center as a source of hard currency, as had been the case before 1989, the Romanian government agreed, via a Memorandum of Understanding signed between Director-General Matsuura and Prime Minister Emil Boc on September 25, 2009, to cover the full costs of operation of CEPES for at least two years if the plan to close CEPES were deferred.

\textsuperscript{36} Peter Maassen et al., 2005, pp. 7-8. Although this Forum was inaugurated with great fanfare in 2001 as a follow-up to the 1998 UNESCO World Conference on Higher Education, it was not funded by the regular program budget of UNESCO, but by the Swedish International Development Co-operation Agency that chose to end it in 2009. Given the focus of the Forum on developing countries and its lack of permanence, Director Jan Sadlak was wise not to have involved CEPES in it.

\textsuperscript{37} Director-General of UNESCO to the Prime Minister of Romania (4 February 2009).

\textsuperscript{38} Peter Maassen \textit{et al.}, 2005, p. 6. (See footnote 23, above.)

\textsuperscript{39} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 51.
The top management of UNESCO, particularly the leadership of the Education Sector, accepted the Romanian offer; however, this leadership began immediately to weaken CEPE by transferring many of its activities to the Division of Higher Education in Paris and by offering generous separation packages to certain members of the local staff who were then not replaced. The Draft Program and Budget for the UNESCO 2010-2011 Biennium then in the making stated that “…a feasibility study [was] to be prepared [by Romanian experts] for the possible creation of a category I UNESCO institute in Bucharest, fully funded by Romania, to replace the existing UNESCO-CEPES. During this two-year transitional period, the Center [would] focus on the higher education needs of the Central, Eastern, and South-Eastern European sub-region.”

Conclusion

What stands out in the train of events leading to the first announcement that CEPE would close as of September 30, 2009, and then, after protests, to the second announcement that closure would be delayed December 31, 2009; and finally to the decision to keep CEPE alive through December 2011 — but weakened — is the speed and lack of transparency of the decisions taken and the bad faith of some of the actors in the UNESCO Secretariat. There were no prior consultations with stakeholders and little if any prior warning to the Romanian government. It seems that Director-General Matsuura and, particularly, Assistant Director-General for Education, Nicholas Burnett, an English and a former World Bank official, deliberately rejected any prior consultations with stakeholders on the grounds that because CEPE was not a Category I UNESCO Institute, like its counterpart in Venezuela, the UNESCO International Institute for Higher Education in Latin America and the Caribbean (IESALC), for instance, but a decentralized unit of the UNESCO Secretariat, its closure, representing nothing more than an internal administrative restructuring, did not require prior consultations with stakeholders or approval by the Executive Board or the General Conference of UNESCO. By comparison, the decision to found CEPE had evolved over a five-year period (1967-1972) with the greatest of transparency and took shape following discussions in several fora.

The real motives for the abusive way that the UNESCO Secretariat announced the anticipated closure of CEPE and then followed through with it are not particularly clear. Personal conflicts and jealousies played a role. CEPE appeared to be overly successful

41 Mircea Malitza to Director-General of UNESCO, 11 February 2009.
42 Burnett served as the UNESCO Assistant Director-General for Education from September 2007 to October 2009.
43 Originally a decentralized unit of the UNESCO Secretariat patterned on CEPE, IESALC had opened in 1978 as the UNESCO Regional Center for Higher Education in Latin America and the Caribbean (CRESALC). In 1997 it acquired Category I UNESCO Institute status and a changed name. Between 1995 and 2008, the CEPE Advisory Board made several recommendations that CEPE be granted the same status, but to no avail.
and more independent of the Education Sector than was acceptable in the eyes of certain of its senior managers. There was, in particular, the negative position taken by Assistant Director-General Burnett. And one must not overlook a comment appearing in the 2005 NIFU-STEP evaluation that ‘if UNESCO Headquarters is convinced that no argument exists for including the needs of European higher education in its educational strategies, the transfer of CEPES to Africa might be proposed.’

While the casual reader might have taken this remark as a joke, others, unfortunately, took it seriously. The intended allocation for CEPES from the UNESCO regular program budget for 2010-2011 was instead transferred to the UNESCO Regional Office for Education in Dakar (BREDA) and to the International Institute for Capacity Building in Africa (IICBA) opened in Addis Ababa in 1999.

The future of CEPES thus became very doubtful. When consulted on April 2, 2010, the CEPES webpage only listed four major projects that it would be undertaking during the 2010-2011 biennium: (i) work in favor of the Bologna Process; (ii) a project dealing with the future of higher education in Romania, (iii) a project to develop a method for monitoring graduates of higher education in order to anticipate future curricular reforms, and (iv) the organization of seminars on the qualifications of higher education leaders in Romania—altogether a very weak program. Nothing was said about the preparation of the feasibility study on the creation of a UNESCO Category I Institute specializing in higher education in Eastern and South Eastern Europe to supersede CEPES. Except for a first draft prepared by the Romanian Ministry of Education in March 2009 that the Education Sector of UNESCO summarily rejected, the study in question was never produced.

Upon the July 2009 retirement of Jan Sadlak, the last CEPES Director, Peter Wells, the remaining international staff member assigned to CEPES, took over as Head of Office ad interim. He was expected to remain in charge until a new director had been recruited; however, the UNESCO Secretariat seemed incapable of finding the “right” person to fill the position.

Additionally, the Romanian government that took power in October 2009, confronted as it was with economic problems, showed little enthusiasm for the agreement made by the outgoing government by which Romania would fund CEPES over the 2010-2011 biennium. At first non-committal about the post-2011 period, it finally informed the UNESCO Secretariat that it would not fund the whole CEPES budget beyond 2011. Possibly the Romanian authorities expected that the incoming Director-General of UNESCO, Irina Bokova, a Bulgarian national elected in October 2009, would be motivated by a sense of Eastern European solidarity to restore the CEPES regular program budget, but she did not do so.

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44 Peter Maassen et al., 2005, p. 33.
46 Qian Tang to Remus Pricopie, 31 March 2009 (D/ED/EO/09/13).
As Head of Office *ad interim*, Wells was a disappointment. He made no effort to save CEPES, failing to rally the many stakeholders that CEPES had at the time. Not being properly informed, many of these did not realize how precarious the situation of CEPES was. Nor did he make any effort to persuade the Romanian authorities that CEPES was worth financing and thus saving. Instead he concurred in the discontinuance of CEPES projects, particularly publication of *Higher Education in Europe*, even though it was not only the longest running of the CEPES projects but had evolved into a world-class scholarly journal and was actually earning some money for CEPES.

To make matters worse, neither Wells nor the Director of the Higher Education Division in Paris, Professor Georges Haddad, responded positively to an offer made by the publisher of the review, Taylor and Francis/Routledge, to assume more of the costs of publishing the English language version, increased responsibility for the identification of contributors and the editing of issues, and even to continue the publication of the review at its expense as a UNESCO-CEPES journal, should CEPES close.

And CEPES did close on the last day of December, 2011. One is reminded of the words of Ambassador Valentin Lipatti: “…diplomacy is one of those professions that gives rise to the least durable of satisfactions. If one can speak of creation in this domain, [it] will no doubt be subject to rapid depreciation.”

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48 The managers at Taylor and Francis/Routledge continued the legacy of *Higher Education in Europe* by founding a new journal titled *European Journal of Higher Education*, but it has no link to UNESCO. Its first issue appeared in March 2011.
Leveraging Diasporic Power for Nation Building

Uttam Gaulee

A king is respected in his own kingdom whereas a scholar is respected everywhere. 
- The Chanakya Neeti

In September 2016 when Prem Baniya, a journalist and literary figure who had gained celebrity for his televised Nepali language talk show titled “Glory Be To Dignity” left the country to live in the United States, the Nepalese public erupted in an intense debate. Some argued that he was just another hypocritical intellectual who sank into the quagmire of personal opportunity abroad. Others defended him by saying that the political situation in Nepal had inspired despair even among the likes of Baniya, who was beloved for his many speeches challenging the political brass for their lack of patriotism (a reference made in the name of his television show).

Yet others rationalized that while a developing nation cannot stop its skilled manpower from being attracted by a globalized world, society at home might in the long run benefit from Baniya’s gain in knowledge and perspectives. They argued that his work could bolster a positive image of Nepal abroad, while the country could potentially benefit from his contributions to journalism elsewhere and a wider appreciation for the arts of Nepal. This argument, which evokes the popular Sanskrit verse cited above, notes that an intellectual who leaves home can bolster respect for the society from which he or she has come wherever he or she goes in the world.

The hotly debated and unusually publicized departure of this one public intellectual exposed the tip of a longstanding discourse about brain drain versus brain gain, a debate that arose in response to the increased global mobility of people in economically less developed parts of the world. The debate has taken different forms depending on time and context, but the underlying issue is linked to the social role and the responsibilities of the intellectual. The terms of the debate were defined strictly in nation-based terms during the period of developing nationalisms over the past two centuries.

When an intellectual crosses political or national borders, his or her role and responsibilities suddenly become undefined (both literally and in terms of the mathematical metaphor of being divided by zero). In nation-based socio-political and intellectual/professional paradigms, the identity, ethos, and respect for the “foreign scholar” are often as romanticized as that of the scholar in the Chanakya Neeti of ancient India, but there is always as well an underbelly of rejection, ambivalence, and confusion surrounding the intellectual’s place and value to the new society. Thus, the mobile intellectual’s unmooring from a national location can result in a double-edged sword, a reality on which public
discourse has not yet focused (perhaps typically because the focus is on how the receiving land can benefit from the gain, not on the experience and perspective of the in-coming outsider).

The debate on the “sending” or the “losing” side of brain drain often mirrors covert or overt resentment of highly-skilled migrants in the usually more developed destination countries. However, neither side of the issue has been addressed in a substantive manner in the scholarship of higher education. While the underlying power dynamics have been addressed theoretically within literary studies and political science by scholars of post-colonialism, literary critics have focused on the inability of creative writers to understand or to authentically represent their homelands, the people, and the cultures that they have left behind (Rao, 2004). Traditional and social media abound in conversations about the mobile intellectual, but the public ambivalence, volatility, and multi-dimensional nature of perception in the media is yet to be substantively discussed in higher education scholarship. For this reason, it is important that we begin to ask questions. We need to understand the challenges that these intellectuals face and the obstacles that institutions, societies, and individual advocates can help them in countering. The need is especially significant when migrating intellectuals cross civilizational boundaries.

How can institutions and societies from which intellectuals leave overcome public resentment so as to tap into the potential benefits for higher education at home resulting from the departing intellectuals? In other words, how can willing intellectuals at home pass over the roadblocks created by public discourse and resistance among scholars and others at home in order to explore pathways of collaboration and contribution? Similarly, what implications can scholarship draw for discussions about policies and practices in transnational higher education from the local/foreign power dynamics erupting among intellectuals who leave when these intellectuals start to work in receiving countries?

While the benefits of transnational collaboration made possible through collaboration with these transnational scholars are increasingly recognized in the abstract in receiving societies, the tensions, uncertainties, and changing attitudes that these scholars face in their new institutions are a different matter. Put together, how may higher education institutions tap into the unused resources of these mobile intellectuals, connecting them with institutions back home and inviting them to contribute on transnational terms to institutions in their destination countries?

The author argues that members of the educated diaspora not only serve as intellectual ambassadors in destination countries but also create bilateral and multilateral traffic in “soft power” that benefits all sides. Thus, he will critique the dominant view that losing or gaining scholars physically or intellectually is a zero-sum game, a view that fundamentally misses the very definition of the intellectual—and instead posits that both sides must reconceptualize the “scattering” of the diaspora intellectual as a process whereby the potential impact on the world of higher learning, both at home and abroad, is increased.
Finally, he notes the existence of certain roadblocks that, in practice, hinder this potential. He illustrates the resistance and tensions, ambivalence, and changing perceptions of the “defecting scholar” by evoking the case of Nepal while also drawing some broad lessons from the conscious efforts by China and India to curb contemporary brain drain.

**Brain Drain versus Brain Gain**

“Diaspora” literally means "to scatter about." Used historically to describe the Jewish people in exile, the word in modern times refers to people from any ethnic or national background who live outside the territory to which they historically belong (Carter, 2005). As opportunities and attractions for transnational mobility increase, the tendency of such dispersal from homelands to places across the globe, to civilizations near and far, has become increasingly manifest. Simultaneously, the opportunities of diasporic individuals and social/professional communities to “give back” to their homelands has also increased dramatically, given heightened numbers of practicing intellectuals, emerging means of communication, and the development of affordable transportation.

The increasing predominance of knowledge-sharing as a critical ingredient of socioeconomic development for knowledge-based national/global economies—enhanced and accelerated by rapid advancements in the information technologies—has not yet been adequately theorized in scholarship, not to mention appreciated by the general public, especially the publics of nations that lose intellectuals to the world beyond. Scholars of higher education seem to hesitate to engage the rather discomforting topic of resentment at home and rejection abroad that diaspora scholars may face.

The binary concepts of brain drain (or losing the national asset of intellect and skills) versus brain gain (or the gaining of knowledge and skills when people return or contribute to the homeland) are simplistic. They must be viewed in light of the complex realities of today’s globalized world. Diaspora intellectuals today have become a critical global asset to be tapped into by both local and global professional and social institutions and communities. This reality is particularly significant in higher education because transnational scholars not only study issues in particular nations but also issues that cross borders. Thus, their research is relevant both locally and across the various civilizational, national, and cultural borders. As such, higher education scholarship is tasked with finding ways by which to turn the “drain” into “gain,” thus disrupting the dichotomy, and conserving, recycling, and putting into productive use the intellectual resources of those who study and make an impact on institutions and issues across geopolitical territories.

While the dominant pattern of intellectual diaspora is one of people leaving underdeveloped countries for more developed ones, the major narrative of the brain drain in less-developed countries like Nepal frequently paints a bleak picture of the country. At the same time, however, arguments in the international development literature suggest that some countries have found a way to regain lost brainpower.
Toward the end of 2015, when the unofficial blockade imposed by India was suffocating Nepal, the Nepali diaspora worldwide was mobilized by its intellectuals who prompted Nepali expatriates in all the professions to take to the streets to demonstrate solidarity for the security and sovereignty of their home country. The spirit of love for the homeland that was reflected in the power of the diaspora indicates that when channeled effectively, it can be instrumental in addressing the challenges at home and raising intellectual and economic resources during a crisis. The expertise gained by the diaspora along with the social, even diplomatic, relationships built up over time can provide a critical nation building asset for a developing country such as Nepal.

Even in times of peace and strong economic growth, governments have invoked the power of their diasporas in support of national development. Both China and India have made conscious efforts to leverage their respective brainpower on the outside. Thus, in a recent plea to the Indian diaspora, Indian external affairs minister Susma Swaraj solicited donations for national development. In a message disseminated via recorded video, Swaraj said: “The money will not be just a donation. It is a way to get connected with the roots. It is a way to pay back to your motherland. It will be a reflection of emotional attachment to the country.” (Times of India, 2016).

By 2000, more than half of the highly skilled workers in Silicon Valley, the center of American innovation, were foreign-born. Most of them happen to have migrated from either India or China, accounting for over one-quarter of the scientists and engineers in the region. These individuals not only innovate in the United States, but they also combine their research insights with professional and business linkages to create critical nation-building mechanisms for their homelands.

Anna Lee Saxenian, a University of California professor and dean, terms such a process as “brain circulation” rather than “brain drain.” Her scholarship focuses on regional economies and the conditions under which people, ideas, and geographies combine and connect into hubs of economic activity. In her 2005 seminal article, Saxenian argues that these engineers and entrepreneurs, aided by the lowered transaction costs associated with digitization, are transferring technical and institutional know-how between distant regional economies faster and more flexibly than most large corporations can manage.

Saxenian further explains how brain drain becomes brain gain:

[T]he same individuals who left their home countries for better lifestyles abroad are now reversing the brain drain, transforming it into “brain circulation” as they return home to establish business relationships or to start new companies while maintaining their social and professional ties to the United States (Saxenian, 2005: 36).

Saxenian has studied how Chinese- and Indian-born engineers have been accelerating the development of information technology industries in their home countries—initially by
tapping the low-cost skills available there, and over time, by contributing to highly localized processes of entrepreneurial experimentation and upgrading while also maintaining close ties to the technology and markets in Silicon Valley.

A case in point: after a long period of wailing over lost brain power, India awoke to the possibility that there might be tangible benefits arising from brain gain. They can be spectacular. Recently India surprised the world with a successful operational mission to Mars. India's space program succeeded on its first attempt. The mission was budgeted at 4.5 billion rupees (74 million USD), which, by Western standards, is staggeringly cheap (BBC, 2014). This example is a manifestation of the power of diaspora that benefits nation building in specific ways. Since a large part of the scientific community in the United States consists of Indian-Americans, the sharing of technical insights coming out of thousands of expensive experiments happens informally.

During the 1986-1987 biennium and even more intensely during the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown, China pursued a policy of not recognizing its citizens who went to the United States to study. Thanks to Deng Xiaoping’s initiative, China began to reach out to its diaspora. It developed more favorable policies, offering higher-ranking positions, more attractive salaries, and better benefits to those willing to return. In 1992, the Chairman of the State Education Commission publicized the slogan “support overseas study, encourage people to return, and give people freedom to come and go” (Li Tieying, 1992: 190). China’s entry into the World Trade Organization led to an increased demand for returnees.

In this effort, China is following in the path of South Korea and Taiwan, where thriving economies supported by liberalized policies have turned brain drain into brain gain. China’s return flow has picked up despite an authoritarian regime and low per capita income (Zweig, 2006: 66).
Beine, Docquier, and Rapoport (2001, 2008) found that most developing countries are losers in the game of brain drain or brain gain. However, there are many developing countries (about 20 percent according to the sample derived from Beine et al.) that have been able to enjoy benefits coming from remittances and from diasporic externalities. While very few other studies focus on the tradeoff, it appears that scholars who are resilient enough to pursue any modest opportunities for transnational projects regularly confirm that they can bring significant self-realization and social contribution to their home countries. A Nepali expatriate who teaches at the State University of New York, Shyam Sharma, wrote recently about the satisfaction of “visit[ing] a Nepali town every month, without having to pay airfare, or even brave the snow” (2016) through video conferencing to train fellow professors in a small town in western Nepal. “No amount of money,” he goes on to quote his trainees in Nepal as saying, “would motivate [us] as powerfully as the desire to help the next generation catch up.” These trainees know that educators in Nepal and the world must come to grips with the “knowledge economy” and leverage all possible resources to benefit their nation and the world.

The author worked with other scholars in 2014 to investigate this idea. Using secondary data available from the Institute for Employment Research, they investigated the following question: Is there a relationship between the increasing rate of brain drain in a given country and its economic growth as demonstrated by such indicators as the positive enrollment in tertiary education for increased human development?

The number of male and female educated migrants to OECD countries from Nepal, in the years 1980-2010, supplemented with statistics available from the Central Bureau of Statistics of Nepal and the World Bank, were analyzed in five-year intervals to draw conclusions about the relationship between the out-migration of the educated population and the economic growth of the country.

The preliminary results of these analyses have indicated that no clear patterns have emerged (Gaulée, Ullman, and Bista, 2014). Faini (2003) finds little empirical support for this so-called “revisionist” approach but goes on to employ a different equation, one relating educational achievement to a set of explanatory variables that include migration. These contradictory theories complicate the research conducted and the theory developed by Gary Becker (1964) that clearly established a connection between the education and training of a population and the economic and social benefits that extend specifically to the individuals concerned but are enjoyed by the people and the respective governments as well.

The Case of Nepal

Nepal has a great need for its highly educated manpower; therefore, the resentment cited above is understandable. But what the author is arguing here is that resentment is extremely counterproductive for higher education institutions and higher education in general. Indeed, one can also cite implications of the power dynamics and the social psychology
involved that are more generally relevant to transnational higher education discourse and practice.

What does the case of Nepal hold for higher education scholarship in terms of building partnerships among participants who have different kinds of relationships, including those who share the same interests or view each other with suspicion and those on unequal power footings based on national identity or prestige of other types?

The special case of “family members” of a given nation who dislike their “brothers and sisters” when they leave home is an interesting, intriguing, even somewhat disturbing case; however, this case also serves to highlight other kinds of uncomfortable realities about how intellectuals treat one another across borders. Questions must be asked and answered in the context of both the losing and the gaining societies, especially regarding the very terms, “losing” and “gaining.” The intellectual, like knowledge or intellect, is never lost or gained; rather, he or she is shared. The dispersal of intellectuals is a process of growth, not demise. Their scattering from certain places into others is ultimately a gain for the world at large.

A recent report (2014) by the Ministry of Youth and Sports of Nepal found that young people aged 16 to 40 comprise fully 40.33 percent of the total population of Nepal. These young men and women deserve attention because they offer the greatest leverage for change in the overall educational level of the national workforce. They also provide the greatest returns on educational investments because of the long work lives they have ahead of them. Instead, what has been happening to this major population sector is that a large majority of it has been systematically dispirited, disillusioned, and declared to be failures. Nepal’s education system has been failing a large majority of its students every year, pushing them to despair.

At the same time, those who pass or somehow successfully navigate the system, usually those from well-off families, go abroad citing the need for further study as justification. Leaving Nepal for the United States, the United Kingdom, or Australia is a mark of great success among Nepali youth. Not surprisingly, the exodus of young men and women to overseas destinations over the past several decades has led to an expanded Nepali diaspora around the world. The unseen yet most important result, however, is the emergence of a cadre of successful professionals. This diaspora has grown to be an incredibly powerful force, willing to contribute to the development of Nepal.

On the one hand, concerns about the damaging consequences of brain drain must be taken seriously. Indeed, the outrage of the Nepali population regarding the abuse of transnational professional and economic opportunities available to public servants should also be taken seriously. On the other hand, however, it seems unhelpful not to tap into the tremendous amount of potential offered by the diaspora of highly-skilled Nepalis who live around the world. One of the largest groups that may not be making a direct economic contribution to the progress of Nepal is that of professionals in the field of education. From university and college professors to professional scientists and engineers, from nurses and doctors to
researchers in many different fields and many countries around world, the highly-educated Nepali diaspora has far more potential than is being utilized today.

As the number of Nepali intellectuals in the USA is increasing rapidly—and their potential will similarly increase in the future—the Nepali government, Nepali institutions, and Nepali scholars must begin to formulate appropriate policies and practices in regard to these people. Nepali-Americans are forging their unique identity in the United States as a hard-working, happy people. Even as a young group, the involvement and influence of Nepalis in the American democracy is constantly growing, but it was only in 1952 that the first Nepali immigrated to the United States (Dhungel, 1999).

As this table from Dhungel’s study indicates, Nepali immigration to the United States is not only a recent phenomenon, but it also began on a relatively small scale.

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Total number: 2433

Currently, the Nepali population in the United States is comprised largely either of students or of Diversity Visa winners.

Nath (2009) undertook an exploratory study of the Nepali diaspora in the United States. He found that Nepalis are still grappling with the issues of settlement, assimilation, adjustment to their new homeland and identity: “They are trying to create … and [are] also in the process [trying to] define their image as members of the South Asian diaspora” (p. 118). What is changing very rapidly is that the Nepali identity is now manifested in multiple ethnic and cultural organizations based in educational institutions, cities, and states.
representing Nepali culture. While Nepali identity brings all Nepalis together, larger cities tend to have various organizations representing differentiated identities, subgroups from the diverse social fabric of Nepal. Nepalis, who are promoting specific cultures, (e.g. Newars, Tamangs, Mahesis, etc.), have their own organizations.

According to a recent report released at the fifth General Assembly of the Non-Resident Nepali Association (NRN USA), there are more than 251,000 Nepalese in the United States including about 110,000 with permanent residency or citizenship status. The 2010 United States Census listed 59,490 Nepali immigrants. Owing to the undocumented status of many Nepalis in the United States, it is difficult to obtain an accurate number. It is even more difficult to obtain accurate statistics on how Nepalis are involved in various projects in Nepal. Describing such an involvement, even in the highly technical health sector, Devkota, Devkota, and Ghimire (2013) argue that “there is no proper mapping and a clear process of their involvement in Nepal's health sector.”

Figure 2. Distribution of the Nepali diaspora in the United States of America

Source: Kafle (2017).

Addressing the Resentment

While successful diaspora members abroad are frequently viewed by the public as models, they are sometimes and ironically viewed as rivals by their Nepali counterparts. While migrants leaving home primarily because of economic hardship are not viewed at home with disdain, they are often discriminated against in the destination countries.
A significant issue that needs to be explored in the context of increasing border-crossing and cross-border collaboration among higher education experts is the reverse dynamic, the resentment in the receiving countries of diaspora intellectuals. To what extent has this phenomenon been influenced by the worldwide rise in ultranationalist movements?

What is being witnessed worldwide is a growing bitterness of division. The surprising Brexit vote in the United Kingdom, the hardline party crackdown in China, the low intensity Russian-Ukrainian war, the failed coup in Turkey, a serious presidential crisis in Brazil, and the ongoing fragmentation of Syria as a result of its brutal civil war—all tell similar stories (Luke, 2016).

While patriotic feeling is cherished by all, it can become dangerous when people intensify it and begin to spy on one another in a competition to determine who is the most nationalistic. The tendency to label sets of people, especially those living outside the country, as “not-so-nationalistic” is becoming a new norm for Nepalis. A recent decision of the Minister of Public Administration, Mr. Lalbabu Pundit, to ban dual citizens from serving in the Nepali bureaucracy has gained popular support. While such decisions may have had practical purposes, policy makers should not forget the positive power of their national diaspora which can be channeled in support of national prosperity and security.

Negative perceptions are often complicated by power dynamics (e.g. within professions, departments, etc.). Whether to treat western or foreign educated intellectuals as a cut above the locals creates confusion and backfires owing to perceived competition. When the government tries to bring back diaspora expertise and thus applies the same prejudicial treatment to local counterparts, the system backfires again. Misconceptions abound. How do professionals succeed abroad? Are diaspora members aware of the pernicious effects of politics in education? Who, on either side, assumes that mistrust is all about money? How should the government and society tap into the potentials of both sides and, thus, create the right environment and incentives for all?

One welcome step has been taken by the Nepal Government in officially recognizing the Nepali diaspora. A new “Non-Resident Nepali Act” signifies that Nepal is reaching out to Nepali diaspora members by providing for the legal protection of Non-resident Nepalis. The Preamble to the Act reads that “…it is expedient to provide for the legal provision to motivate nonresident Nepalis to take part in [the] all around development of Nepal by enhancing their attachment to Nepal” (Nepal Law Commission, 2008).

What follows is one particular approach to analyzing the resentment and rejection of diaspora scholars by home communities. Because many people in developing nations are jumping straight from a subsistence agrarian economy into the heart of the knowledge economy (particularly individuals such as teachers and researchers), they often have difficulty appreciating the very basis and mode of production in what for them is a new economy. They fail to value knowledge as the product of their work.
Sharma (2016) illustrates this issue in an article that he wrote for *Republica* by citing the example of a high school teacher: “Leaving his parents' agricultural economy behind, [Gokul] had jumped straight into the heart of the new knowledge economy as a public-school teacher. But he didn't even realize that his teaching was his cash crop, that his continued learning was irrigation for it” (n.p.). Sharma goes on to discuss the issue more broadly: “Gokul's story can be used to explain why quality in education in the public sector has stagnated and lagged behind the demands of our times” (Sharma, 2016.)

The dramatic changes in the ways large numbers of people in traditional societies now make a living and transact knowledge seem even more confusing because higher learning is also blurring traditional boundaries of nation states, ethnic divisions, social class statuses, and the prestige of professions or disciplines. Higher education and knowledge are simultaneously global, national, and local (Marginson and Rhoades, 2002). Owing to the emergence of knowledge along with the advancement of information technology, the cross-border or global dimensions of activity are growing every day. Despite the general trend in favor of an increased international engagement for higher education, the actual levels of engagement with the knowledge economy are far from being uniform among nations and regions. With its large concentration of world class research institutions, the United States of America is still a magnet for world-wide talent, enrolling 100,000 international doctoral students each year. At the same time, many Asian countries are rapidly developing their strengths in science. Owing to these major changes in world higher education and research, multiple channels of knowledge exchange have opened across the world (Marginson, 2010).

**Challenges Facing the Foreign Scholar**

As is evident in the case of Nepal, intellectuals who have gone abroad must deal with many issues including being resented at home. As noted above, these intellectuals may also have difficulty in being able to truly contribute their best while they are being rejected in their new homes. The possibility of being sandwiched between resentment at home and rejection abroad is quite real. Persons caught in this vise need to situate themselves in favorable contexts, explore particular power dynamics, and identify pathways around roadblocks once they are understood.

What are the major dynamics and roadblocks that impede the global scholar?

The first roadblock is of course outright rejection, for instance, the exclusion of non-nationals from certain types of employment opportunities (e.g. jobs related to national security following the 9/11 tragedy in the United States). In addition to legal restrictions, there may be outright discrimination by the host society that discourages foreign scholars from even seeking opportunities in the host country. Then there is the implicit rejection of the knowledge or experience of foreign intellectuals. They therefore are forced to reinvent themselves in local terms. A Russian scholar reflecting the theoretical perspectives of socialist fellow scholars back home might need to elaborate a substitute perspective more
in conformity with American values, even if his or her socialist perspective might provide a better grounding for his or her scholarship. Possibly the Russian socialist perspective might introduce something new that could help American colleagues rethink the issue at hand in productive ways.

So, the failure to translate, transform, and transact ideas on transnational terms, compromising them, watering them down, or even discarding them in order to “fit better” into the new environment could undermine both quality and opportunity in scholarship. Even more significantly (and often painfully), discarding one’s foreign identity and expertise while bringing back bits and pieces of it can cause a scholar to become very unproductive and even to appear to be phony as well as confused. The ambivalence and possible resentment arising from being rejected can be sufficiently frustrating to cause a person to abandon any attempt at contributing. Such sentiments could undermine a person’s honesty, originality, and nuance as applied to his or her work.

The second roadblock is linked to the larger political changes occurring and the adverse economic or professional environment created by them. Given the lack of political stability and mature leadership in Nepal, scholars at home may see themselves as rivals of their counterparts in the diaspora. Such a perception prevents them from initiating calls to their counterparts to contribute at home. Decreased opportunities for scholars at home can undermine their self-confidence. They may feel threatened by the expatriates. Might the institution that employs them as well as society, students, and other stakeholders be viewing the counterparts in the diaspora as being better qualified? To make matters worse, the expatriates may make mistakes inadvertently by not being aware of relevant power dynamics and critical perceptions thus turning professional opportunities into social landmines.

The lack of concrete models is another obstacle. One cannot claim that there are no success stories in Nepal. What is lacking is a proper mechanism by which to document and publicize even small success stories. For example, the activities of the Summer Advantage Program implemented at the Midwestern University need to be documented and made available to other institutions that might emulate them. Without such a mechanism, the old discouraging narrative of the “kasari game” will prevail. Frequently many bona fide social project initiatives fail. The situation is like that of offering a new kind of food to a person without first preparing him or her for what is coming.

Fourth, the lack of appropriate government and/or institutional support can discourage potential initiatives. Even though everything does not have to be done by the government, government support is necessary at least at the policy level so as to provide necessary resources, approval, and legal infrastructure. In fact, governments and education institutions may also explicitly or implicitly discourage scholars from engaging in transnational engagements. For example, few universities and colleges prioritize or even recognize the work that their faculties do with academics in other countries. Other than for
the exceptionally dedicated, the lack of institutional recognition for professional service through transnational collaboration can become discouraging very rapidly.

There are practical challenges as well. For example, it is difficult for scholars to find time, resources, and confidence to join and contribute. In transition as they are, they need to learn new ways of life, a new language and culture, and the norms of the host society. These necessities may even cause the mobile scholar to have to unlearn much previous learning. Hence, while they are learning how to fit into the new culture, they may not be able to maintain contacts with their respective professional communities back home. When they are settled and want to reconnect, they may not know where to start or with whom to start working. In such a situation, the risk of taking the flak of rejection or resentment may outweigh the willpower to be helpful to the home country.

Pathways and Solutions

It is now time for Nepali scholars and researchers in the western world to initiate conversations on how to accommodate and spread the news of small success stories thus recognizing their stakeholders and developing the soft power of networking and the creation of momentum by reaching out to fellow Nepali across the borders.

Diaspora scholars cannot afford to simply focus on roadblocks. Scholars of higher education working across borders must explore potentials and possibilities for collaboration and exchanges. The number of globally mobile scholars has been increasing at unprecedented rates. There are both opportunities and challenges in international higher education that this group of scholars can and should help to address as well as unique opportunities that they can create.

The case of Nepal can serve to illustrate how intellectuals who are sandwiched between spaces they may have left and spaces in which they may not be easily accepted can turn themselves into productive assets by undertaking research and scholarship in higher education in an interconnected world. If scholars can invest the right ingredients into their work as transnational scholars, taking the right approach by using the “sandwich” situation positively, the fact of being sandwiched may become less a liability and more an advantage.

An example of how a few expert scholars from Nepal and the United States of America reached out to each other and collaborated productively across borders is described below.

Using information technology, the Midwestern University, a relatively new, small, but fully publicly funded institution in western Nepal developed its “Summer Advantage Program,” the object of which is to host returning expatriates during their summer visits to Nepal. Colleagues of the returnees from other countries are also invited as visitors to take part in the academic events. Accordingly, Midwestern University invited five professors from the United States, including three Nepali expatriates and two American scholars (one of Japanese origin) to Surkhet, where Midwestern University is located, for a weeklong series
of academic activities. This education summit, called “Transformations,” involved five tracks. The goal was to implement the semester system in Nepal and the task was to train faculty, engage students, and involve senior administrators (including the Vice Chancellor, who actively participated in the conference).

A part of the twenty-year educational transformation plan of Midwestern University, this event was the culmination of monthly web-based training sessions led by Shyam Sharma in which ten faculty members at Midwestern University participated. The author was involved in facilitating the training and situating it in the broader framework of the mission of the university. This collaboration among scholars in the United States and Nepal also gave rise to a variety of other conversations and initiatives for implementing and enhancing the semester system, promoting research and scholarship, integrating writing with research and innovative teaching/learning approaches, and internationalizing higher education in Nepal. A webinar series called WACAP (Writing Across the Curriculum and in the Professions) offered training to ten teachers on how to integrate writing and communication skills in teaching across academic departments. Based on this “training of trainers” program, the ten teachers have also started training other teachers.

Given its broader context of implementing new teaching/learning methods across the university, the project broadened its goals to include updating and improving teaching/learning, incorporating educational exchange, developing academic support facilities (such as a writing center), and integrating emerging technologies for enhancing teaching/learning.

The conference in question was organized within this broader framework. At its heart were five parallel programs led by the five visiting scholars and coordinated by their counterparts on the ground. Working groups produced tangible materials, including outlines for syllabi and assignments, handouts and guidelines for teaching and academic service, and recommendations for program development and policy updates.

When scholars across nations can combine their knowledge, energy, and resources, even small initiatives can make significant impacts. If the institution and its leadership provide support or simply boost the morale of those who are involved, the initiatives can quickly grow into impactful missions. As seen in the case of the interest of Midwestern University in tapping into diaspora expertise, institutions can reach out to their national diasporas around the world, creating a network of free but powerful intellectual resources.

An important nation-building step for developing nations should be the recognition of their own diasporas as stakeholders in the nation-building process. While it is impossible to contain or to force human resources to remain in one place owing to the forces of globalization, these same forces, if complemented by information technology, make it possible for developing countries to enjoy many benefits from their diasporas, particularly in the field of education. The constitution of Nepal now includes a provision for non-
resident Nepalese citizenship. It needs to be implemented in such a way that facilitates the free flow of capital and ideas in a seamless manner.

**Conclusions**

The case of Nepal may be used to illustrate some of the implications for transnational educational engagements that tap into the energy and resources of mobile scholars. Clichéd as it may sound, Nepal is at a crossroads: the political conflicts of the past twenty years have ended. The country has a new constitution, and the population is starting to be invested in democratic institutions and new economic opportunities. The forces created by globalization are prompting transnational higher education exchanges and collaboration. But uncertainty and pessimism are also rampant. The constitution exists on paper, but will it be respected in practice? Will the political chaos created by the conflict which followed the end of the monarchy ever end? Will increasing numbers of educated minds in Nepal continue to leave for better opportunities abroad?

Individual scholars are perhaps the most important agents in transnational educational collaboration and exchange. Emerging technologies make communication across the world easier to use—including videoconferencing, collaborative documents worked on simultaneously around the world, internet-based telephones, wi-fi based connections, and mobile devices. Collaboration is free or cost effective, intimate, and rewarding. In this age of social media, individual scholars can spread the word, inspire others, rally support, and put pressure on institutions and society to do more to provide educational development and innovation.

Higher education institutions are the greatest beneficiaries of transnational educational collaboration and exchange. If institutional leaders or even individual faculty or staff members are passionate about educational progress through partnerships with nationals living abroad, they can easily locate scholars and experts and contact them personally. Asking for insights and resources to enhance and enrich curricula, for example, can be accomplished through consultation with diaspora scholars who are usually willing and eager to contribute. Clearly the emerging professional diasporas originally resident in developing countries can provide unique opportunities for the economic and social development of their homelands.

The public in both the receiving and the gaining countries and in the sending or the losing countries tend to view the mobile scholar in stereotypical terms, as if he or she were a question of loss versus gain. Given the rise of nationalistic fervor around the world, it is difficult for people to imagine intellectual resources as inherently capable of crossing borders. Much depends on individual initiative and resilience, goodwill, and the desire to give back to both host and home countries. It may be that for the time being, the vagaries of migration and politics may prevent a prominent figure such as Prem Baniya from serving his homeland from abroad, but the sheer rise in the number of diaspora scholars across the world could obviously benefit higher education in such countries as Nepal which face an
unprecedented brain drain. Such collaboration should be increasingly valued because it is in the interest of both host and home countries.

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Other Literature

Beyond Eurasia: Technology in Africa, the Americas, and Oceania in pre-Modern Times

Norman Rothman

Introduction

The central landmass of Eurasia including the adjoining landmass of Northeast Africa, mainly Egypt and the related Nile valley, has received the bulk of attention in terms of pre-modern technology. This is due to three basic causes. First, it has witnessed a series of civilizations in ancient times such as Mesopotamia and the related Fertile Crescent which along with Egypt/Nile River Valley formed the nucleus of the Middle East, the Indus River Valley in what is now the northwestern part of the Indian subcontinent, and the first of the continuous Chinese civilizations along the northern Hwang-Ho or Yellow River. Second, the classical civilizations of Greece and Rome which laid the basis of western culture in regard to law, government, language, and, in conjunction with the Hebrews, the basis of religion. In terms of technology, all of these civilizations were linked from antiquity by cultural transmission routes such as the inland Great Silk Road and the Indian Ocean.

As a result, technological developments in areas outside of Eurasia before 1400 have not received as much attention as the world island. These areas—sub-Saharan Africa, the Americas before Columbus, and Oceania before the arrival of European explorers—will be examined in terms of technological development before the advent of modern times. Two points should be made. Although in some cases, as in Africa, innovations in technology came from outside, most of the technological accommodations were indigenous. In addition, the adjustments that these societies made were in direct response to the particular environment in which they live.

Sub-Saharan Africa

Africa was known as the “Dark Continent” but its darkness lay in the point of view of its commentators who tended to look on areas outside the world island of Eurasia as marginal. In fact, Africa had always participated in the development of civilization including scientific and technological applications from Neolithic times. There had been areas of cultural transmission north and south as well as east and west. The first was the Nile River Valley which flow in its various tributaries from Ethiopia and the Lake states of Africa to the Mediterranean via Egypt by 4000 B.C.E.

The second was the Sudanic grassland belt between the Sahara on the north and the rain-forest areas in west and equatorial Africa and extending from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea. Metallurgy knowledge of first bronze and iron technology had spread along these areas well before the Middle Ages. The Sudanic (also called the Sahel) states including Mali, Ghana, Songhai, Kanem-Bornu, Hausaland, and various Nubian states beginning with
Kush in 1500 B.C. and ending with Alwa and Dongola where the Nile interfaces with the Sudanic belt had long had mining traditions by the Middle Ages. Ethiopia on the Horn of Africa had also gone through the bronze and iron phases as these other areas had. The Swahili city-states that extended from central Somalia to central Mozambique on the Indian Ocean had also developed advance mining techniques related to metallurgy by the Middle Ages. The interior of central Africa including the Lake states, the Luba-Lunda states centered in what is Katanga and northern Angola also had advanced mining procedures as did the empire of Zimbabwe centered on what in now northwestern Mozambique and northeastern present-day Zimbabwe.  

Various African states had also produced assorted textiles by 1500. Perhaps the most famous had been the state of Benin which dominated south central Nigeria and the ancestral state of the Yoruba peoples, Oyo-Ife, who became famous for both their textiles and ironwork. Even today, Benin Bronze figurines and textile masks and brass products are famous and shown in museums as are portions of their decorated doors. The quality of Benin fabric as well as other Nigerian groups (Oyo-Ife and the Hausaland cities) was recognized as very high. However when the British took over Benin and later Hausaland these crafts were replaced by machine goods as earlier the Bengal crafts in India had been.

The Middle Ages also witnessed the apogee of the Swahili manufactured goods. The period between 1000-1500 was a high point for the cities—iron working, pottery production, copper tools and utensils were produced as well as ornaments made from ivory and gold based on items obtained by Swahili from trade in the interior (ivory from the Lake States, copper from Katanga, gold from Zimbabwe) in return for products from Indian Ocean countries (India, Persia, Arabia, China) as well as Egypt. Iron goods were especially valued by Arabs and Indians because of their superior malleability. A number of cities such as Kilwa in southern Tanzania and Mogadishu in central Somali had large spindle whorls indicated large-scale textile production and copper mints for currency had been established at Kilwa and Mogadishu.

The great age of Swahili civilization came to an end with Portuguese conquest in the early 1500’s. The future cultural patterns of Africa south of the Sahara exclusive of the Sudanic belt were determined by iron-age technology. The origin of the Bantu or Niger Congo is identified with the Nok site in north central Nigeria where iron working and terra cotta working had taken place as early as 500 B.C.

The Bantu whose origins are in central Nigeria and nearby Cameroon were the first group to make use of iron product and thereby secured their later expansion due to superior technology throughout Central, eastern, and southern Africa. There is a debate as to whether it was through military means as exemplified by iron spears or iron hoes which gave them farming surpluses and led to a population explosion. It may have been a combination of both.
However, their expansion took place before and concurrently with the Middle Ages. The Bantu-speakers followed the waterways around the rainforests and reached what is now southern Congo or Katanga by the end of the first millennium BCE. From Katanga, which had both metal products and fertile farmlands, they occupied much of central, eastern, and southern Africa before and during the Middle Ages. Their offshoots gave way to various kingdoms such as the Luba-Lunda and Kongo kingdoms, the Lake Kingdoms, Zimbabwe, and the Bantu component of the Swahili states and so the continuous history of much of the continent begins. (When Bantu-speakers reached East Africa, they came into contact with Austronesian food crops which increased the population as well as watercraft via both the Austronesian-settled Madagascar and the Swahili coast).

When making iron, Africans used various methods. They were somewhat handicapped as they did not always have large supplies of water outside of the major riverways to operate smelting of iron. Therefore, they invented one method—the natural-draft furnace, which is designed to reach the temperatures necessary to form and drain slag by using a chimney effect—hot air leaving the top of the furnace draws in more air through openings at the base. These natural-draft furnaces were particularly characteristic of African woodlands (the Africa belt between the grassland and rainforest), and were used in two geographical areas—across the Sahelian woodlands from Senegal in the west to Sudan in the east, and in woodlands from southern Tanzania south to northern Zimbabwe (known as the savanna belt in south central Africa). The oldest natural-draft furnace yet found is in Burkina Faso and dates to the seventh/eight centuries CE in small forges. Large-scale iron production also used this method. The large masses of slag (10,000 to 60,000 tons) noted in some locations in Togo, Burkina Faso and Mali indicate that there was a great expansion of iron production in western Africa probably after 1000 CE that is associated with the spread of natural-draft furnace technology. These methods in the first two areas are connected with the arrival of the Bantu.

The Americas

Although there is so far no evidence of iron-making before the 9th century, Native Americans did make progress in metallurgy before this period. They were smelting metals such as gold, silver, and copper long before and continuing into the Middle Ages. Other processes connected with metallurgy were in existence before and during the Medieval period. They included using winds from the mountains to raise temperatures for smelting, welding, annealing, hammering meteoric iron and copper, and working platinum well before the Europeans did it in the nineteenth century, and how to solder, foil, and make and use rivets in order to fasten metals together.

In response to the natural soil, Native American cultures developed corn, potatoes, tomatoes, raspberries, and strawberries, and cocoa beans; altogether perhaps 60% of food that contemporary people eat. They developed tobacco and a form of cotton in addition to medications long before the rest of the world such as digitalis, aspirin, and quinine. Other health applications included anesthetics, medication for diabetes, and brain surgery.
Overall, Native Americans developed a wide variety of products and innovations. These included petroleum jelly and rubber and an abacus machine called the Yupana based on units of 20 long before the Chinese. Various Native American groups developed astronomical devices that confirmed the earth floated in space, a black hole, and the movements of the stars, sun, moon, and planet long before others, and some engaged in embalming before the Egyptians. Apparently, they knew the concept of zero well before the South Asian Indian. 9

Their most spectacular applications of science and technology lay in engineering. Their road system pre-dated the Romans in the Andean civilizations; they developed the grid pattern in urban planning long before others, some groups of Indians built houses with central chimneys and cedar wrapped in bark to produce all-yearlong central heating. The Mexica/Aztecs had running water long before the 19th century in their capital. Above all, they used applied architectural principles to build pyramids in today’s Mexico and Peru, the latter before the Egyptians.10 In all, they used the natural environment and applied it to their individual needs in both daily life and for societal needs.

The three Native American civilizations in existence during the Middle Ages were in regions where cultures had long existed even if there was no bronze/iron technology before the 9th century and no developed industries in textiles/weaving. They were the Maya in Central America, the Aztecs in central and southern Mexico (technically both in Mesoamerica), and the Inca (the latest in a series of Andean civilizations). The Mayas had a civilization that began perhaps dated as far back as 1800 BCE; it reached its height during the early phases of the Middle Ages (ca. 300-900 C.E.) termed their classical period and continued in some form until as late as 1600 C.E. Although never a formal empire, the area influenced by Mayas extended to southern Mexico (Chiapas), the Yucatan Peninsula, Guatemala, and Honduras, but was centered in the Yucatan Peninsula and the highlands of Guatemala.11

Technologically, they reached the highest stage of cultural development in the Americas. They were accomplished mathematicians and astronomers. As mathematicians, they developed a counting system based on units of 20. They used zero and 1-5 which enabled both addition and subtraction.12 They were the only people in the Americas to have a writing system that was in hieroglyphics and reached the phonetic rather than pictographic and ideographic stage so that their syllables corresponded to sound.13 In astronomy, Mayas created a solar calendar more accurate than anywhere else in the world and very accurately measured the years and the months in calculations similar to those used today. With their mathematical and astronomical calculations, they were able to measure the paths of such planets as Venus, Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn and accurately predict eclipses of both the sun and moon. They applied their learning in a technological fashion in the temples and pyramids that they built. At Chichen Itza, perhaps their leading city during the classical period, the principal pyramid had 91 steps on each of its four sides plus the platform which correspond to the 365 days of the solar calendar.14
There were other technical applications. In the agricultural field Mayas developed innovative techniques, using the fertile soils of the swamps and irrigation systems. In the tropical lowlands of Guatemala, the Mayas built an agrarian civilization that supported the highest population densities in the pre-industrial Americas, at least 20 times what it is in today’s Guatemala, even though, their biggest cities were away from the water. Moreover, in Maya and other Meso-American cultures maize was grown in an intricate system of planting multiple crops together so that they would be nutritionally and environmentally complementary. In Meso-America and North America the so-called three sisters’ method combined physical and bio-chemical properties of maize, beans and squash in polyculture agriculture and thus foreshadowed a technique now called companion planting, a technique widely considered part of the modern organic gardening movement.

Mayas are often downgraded because they did not enter a “bronze” or “iron” age. The fact is that they made full use of surrounding nature for applications in their engineering. Their technological achievements include the fabrication of tools that are harder than iron, the use of rubber from latex plants, and innovations used in their buildings: the invention of high strength durable materials of construction including the fabrication of hydraulic cement for producing cast-in-place concrete; and the development of the Maya arch as a structural mechanism to create multi-story and clear span structures. Also they developed elevated concrete paved roads; long-span bridges, and advanced water management methodologies that permitted the Maya urban civilization to survive in a seasonal desert environment. Most importantly, they used jade for their tools and implements which is even more impressive as they are harder than bronze or iron.

The other two civilizations lasted less than a century but they were built upon previous civilizations. The Aztecs had full control of their empire which covered all of central Mexico and part of Guatemala. They built upon previous civilizations beginning with the Olmecs around 2000 B.C.E. and ending with the Toltecs and other groups, their immediate predecessors that the Aztecs defeated to create their empire early in the fifteenth century. They emulated the Mayas in the use of a solar calendar. The Aztecs were advanced scientific thinkers as they followed the Mayas in both mathematics and astronomy. Their pyramids and temples reflected information on their calendars. They were similar to the Romans in their construction of roads, canals, and aqueducts. Their supreme achievement in this respect was the construction of their capital city at Tenochtitlan which was built upon drained land and connected to lands by man-made causeways. They were watered by artificial lakes. They had running water and botanical gardens in their capital. (They also emulated other cultures including the Mayas with ointments, drinks, and salves in their medicine as well as performing cataract surgery and arthrodesis surgery on knees.)

As was the case of the Mayas, they compensated for lack of iron and bronze by using other metals and minerals found in nature. Aztec tools were made with obsidian and chert. Just before the Spanish conquistadors, advances in Aztec technology had led to the experimentation of making tools with copper. Other advances included axe blades made
with stone or copper. Specialization was so advanced that they even made drills which were of reed or bone. In addition, Aztecs proved ingenious with weapons. One weapon, the atlatl, made it easier to throw a spear. In addition, this weapon was used to aid in fishing. The Aztecs also used a macahuitl, which was a wooden club containing sharp pieces of volcanic glass, or obsidian. This weapon was used to disable an enemy or opponent without killing him. In addition, the Aztecs utilized bows and arrows.\textsuperscript{18}

The Incas also established an empire in the fifteenth century based on earlier cultures that went back as far as 3500 years ago. They continued the tradition of elaborate pottery, textile weaving, and metallurgy (albeit with bronze rather than iron) and an elaborate pyramid building scheme that predates the Egyptians by 500 years. At their height, their empire extended from Ecuador to Chile – an area of 1500 miles with a population estimated at 16 million. They developed various ritual products based on gold and silver. Their reputation rests on their engineering feats although in fields such as medicine where they perfected anesthetics and in foods where they developed thousands of varieties of potatoes, they were eminent. However, it was their massive engineering that has lasted. Their road system of basically crushed stone was over 2,000 miles.

With only bronze and without mortar to bind materials together, the Inca were able to establish temples and fortresses of astonishing size. The crown jewel in this area is the city of Machu Picchu near their capital of Cuzco. An architectural marvel, the city was constructed on two high peaks 9000 feet above sea level. In a city of three square miles, through the use of just heavy stone hammers, the Inca built two-story stone buildings and elaborate terraces (they also practiced terraced farming with mountain run-off in other areas) which surrounded large ceremonial plazas—a prime example of advanced urban planning. As advanced as the Inca (and Aztec) were, they had never developed the technology that goes with gunpowder (of which they were ignorant) so that they fell rather easily to European conquest.\textsuperscript{19}

\textbf{Austronesia/ Oceania/Polynesia}

The Austronesians, originally from South China before the Han Chinese, migrated from Taiwan after 2000 B.C.E. Eventually, they colonized what is today island southeast Asia including the Philippines, Indonesia, the isthmus of Malaya across from Indonesia, the coast of New Guinea, and ultimately after 1650 B.C, the majority of the Pacific islands. The Lapita culture, which is identified with origins of the Polynesians, and which emphasized navigation and sailing, was established at this time, and was evident for two millennia. Eventually, by the Middle Ages, Austronesians extended from Madagascar of the coast of Africa all the way to Easter Island and Marquesas off the coast of South America. Of this group, the eastern-most segment, the Polynesians were the most active during the period of 500-1200. By this period an examination of sweet potatoes originally found in South America present in Polynesia and chickens from Southeast Asia found in Chile as well as Polynesian cocoanuts and bottle gourds found in Ecuador indicates cross-Pacific exchanges. By the conclusion of their explorations around 1200 C.E., they had
settled perhaps one/fifth of the earth’s surface, three times the size of the continental United States and larger than Russia during its Soviet phase. Its area of settlement ranged from Hawaii at its apex to New Zealand on the Southwest to Easter Island on the Southeast—a huge triangle.  

Faced with a limited land environment with relatively few resources and an ever increasing population in a limited land area, the Polynesians used applied technology in both navigation and shipbuilding. Polynesian navigators employed a whole range of techniques including use of the stars, the movement of ocean currents and wave patterns, the air and sea interference patterns caused by islands and, the flight of birds, the winds and the weather. Birds were used in exploration. A typical Pacific island can be sighted on a clear day from about 10 miles (16 km) away. Birds can significantly extend this detection zone. The zones can range to 30 miles (50 km) from land, two types of species, masked boobies and frigate birds, have an even longer can range much farther, up to 100 miles (160 km) from land. Clouds were another sign of land that Polynesians used. Clouds accumulate over islands, and an isolated pile of clouds on the horizon often signaled the presence of land. Reflected light on clouds can be another clue. When sunlight (or moonlight) shines on white sand and shallow bays, the light could reflect upward, thereby illuminating the base of low clouds with a silver or greenish glow. Other innovations were used that implied adaptations to the environment via techniques. Polynesians made use of waves. Wave patterns, too, can be altered by the presence of land. Islands block, reflect, and refract ocean swells, creating distinct wave patterns that can help steer a seasoned navigator to land—especially helpful at night or when visibility is low. Bits of land vegetation such as seed pods or driftwood floating on the waves were another sign of land nearby.  

Astronomy was also used. Navigators near the equator view have a view which is simplified since the whole celestial sphere was exposed. Any star that passes (overhead) is on the equator which is the basis of the equatorial coordinate system. The stars are known by their position and when they rise or set they can determine a bearing or navigation. For example, in the Caroline Islands of Micronesia, natural navigation was studied with a star compass which traced star directions. Another Micronesian island group, the Marshall Islands (Micronesia was settled by Polynesians after 500 BCE and is mostly Polynesian with an admixture of Melanesian) made stick charts that were used by the Marshallese to navigate the Pacific Ocean by canoe. The charts represented major ocean patterns and the ways the islands disrupted those patterns, typically determined by sensing disruptions in ocean swells by islands during sea navigation. Therefore, these developments signaled land ahead. The boats, constructed from materials found on the most islands such as logs from wood which were tied together with bark from trees, grew to huge size to accommodate a large number of people.
Conclusion

During the pre-modern period, the global cultural regions covered built upon previous achievements and synthesized occasional influences outside of the region with internal developments. These two trends are evident in the areas that we have covered. Sub-Saharan Africa built upon the arrival of iron and the subsequent expansion of the Bantu while having access to external influences via the Sudanic grassland belt south of the Sahara and the Nile River of Northeast. In addition, its Indian Ocean coast off the Horn of Africa and East Africa brought it into contact with Asia and the Middle East.

Areas of the globe thought to have been static and isolated such as the Americas and Oceania turned out not to be as totally singular as thought. Meso-America built upon the achievements of the Olmecs and the subsequent civilizations such as the Maya and the Aztec built upon previous patterns. In the Andean region, there were a series of civilizations that went back 3500 years and exhibited certain similarities such as pyramid and temple construction. Based on similarity of crops and livestock, there is some empirical evidence that there were contacts at least between one branch of the Austronesian-Oceanic group, the Polynesians, and South America during this period. The other side of this probable trans-Pacific contact, the Polynesians, built upon the nautical expertise of their Austronesian forbears and the Lapita culture to develop technologically-based nautical and shipbuilding culture. Their voyages and that of their fellow Austronesian seafarers covered a huge expanse of the earth and brought them into contact with various cultures during this period. In summation, the pre-modern period can be viewed as the true dawn of a global age.

Endnotes

5 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
13  Ibid.
14  Ibid.
15  Ibid.  See also following note.
19  http://www.crystalinks.com/inca_civilization retrieved on May 9, 2016
22  Ibid.
23  Ibid.
Workplace Bullying in the United States and Canada: 
Organizational Accountability Required in Higher Education

Leah P. Hollis

Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to compare the probable existence of two North American civilizations, Canada and the United States, and then consider how each civilization has addressed workplace bullying. Canada started to prohibit workplace bullying in 2004. However, the United States only began to address the problem ten years later, in 2014, with a few states passing statutes. Examining the differences in culture and the research on how higher education in both Canada and the United States has dealt with workplace bullying may give insights to how both Canada and the United States can better protect employees faced with workplace bullying.

Brief Definition of Civilization

Many varying and competing definitions of the controversial concept of ‘civilization’ exist in the literature. However, Permumpanani (2013), writing with the Comparative Civilization Review, defined civilization as a “dynamic system that supports endogenous cultural development through economic activity aggregated across elements of data” (p. 9). He further noted that scholars have long debated the definitions for ‘civilization’ and ‘culture,’ failing to reach consensus. Huntington (2003) offered a list of eight major civilizations, while the British historian Clark (1982) admitted “he still did not know what civilization was, but thought he could recognize it when he saw it” (p. 18). In some discussions, ‘culture’ and ‘civilization’ are interchangeable terms, reflecting both historical and evolutionary dynamics. Nonetheless, Permumpanani (2013) considered at the basic level that civilizations started as an undefined or inchoate group, and then became defined by geographic, linguistic, or religious parameters. Once these parameters were established, the civilization evolved over time within the interaction of people living in the group (Permumpanani, 2013).

Within Permumpanani’s frame (2013) regarding civilization, Canada and the United States emerged as different civilizations. While they both grew from roots by leaving imperialistic governance in Europe, the United States secured independence close to one hundred years before Canada. Further, the US culture has an indelible foundation in racism, slavery, and the exploitation of different people for capitalistic gain. Until recently, the United States was intensely committed to the English language to the exclusion of other languages, even in the primary educational curriculum.

In contrast, Canada’s evolution involved more recent and still retained ties to the British crown. For example, in the early 1900s, Canadians resisted the World War I notion that
British engagement in the war assumed Canadian engagement in World War I. Further, Canadian society was based on civic equity. Such values have been part of Quebec’s struggle to maintain its French influence and language. Their official languages include both English and French. While racism is a problem affecting most civilizations, Canada did not codify racial differences by forbidding interracial marriage or institutional segregation that occurred in the United States.

Further, the US and Canada maintain differences regarding economic competition. A focus on capitalist growth yielded for Canada, a Canadian Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of only $1550.54 billion in 2013, compared to a mammoth $18036.65 billion in the United States (Trading economics, 2017). Thus, in comparative terms, Canada represents 2.5% of the world economy while the US contributes 29.09% of the world economy (Trading economics, 2017).

These two different civilizations then have two different sets of values, with the US being more competitive and more focused on capitalism than Canada. This difference in economic dynamism and its implications for competition would inform a difference in workplace values. In turn, the differences in values about work and competition could inform the difference in commitment to anti-bullying legislation between Canada and the United States.

**Differences in Approaches to Workplace Bullying**

With the aforementioned differences in mind, it becomes clearer perhaps, why Canada started passing anti-workplace bullying legislation in 2004, ten years before the United States did. Workplace bullying is a destructive behavior based on a power differential. The target is left in an inferior position, often with psychological and emotional scars from the trauma (Einarsen, 2003).

Quebec was the first to address this issue by introducing a law prohibiting workplace bullying in 2004, followed by several other Canadian provinces, including British Columbia, Ontario, and Manitoba (New Harassment Prevention, 2011; Labor Standards, 2004; Preventing workplace, 2011; Guidelines, 2013; Workplace bullying, 2012). In many ways, Canada recognized workplace bullying as a health and wellness issue. For example, the Ontario lawmakers prohibited workplace “psychological harassment” or bullying through the Occupational Health and Safety Act, which stated that employers must maintain a program to prevent workplace bullying and review this program annually. Quebec’s Labour Standards, Sec. 81.18, which became effective on June 2004, prohibited hostile behavior in the workplace. The law specifically declared that the employer has the “responsibility to take reasonable steps to prevent psychological harassment and to put a stop to such behaviour when it is brought to his knowledge” (para. 11). According to WorkSafe BC, “If workplace bullying and harassment is not addressed, it can lead to lost productivity, anxiety, and sometimes even suicidal thoughts or actions” (Guidelines, 2013, para. 1).
Researchers and practitioners have paid attention to workplace bullying in North America and Europe since the early 1990s. Namie and Namie (2009) reported that 37% of all American workers faced workplace bullying. As Björkqvist, Österman, and Hjelt-Bäck (1994), Einarsen, Hoel, Zapf, and Cooper (2003), Nielsen, Tangen, Idsoe, Matthiesen, and Magerøy (2015) and Salin and Hoel (2013) initiated empirical research in this field, the Scandinavians seem to be leading the research endeavor on bullying.

Various researchers have analyzed the effect of workplace bullying; for example, Hollis (2016b) examined the impact of workplace bullying on gender and organizational costs. Bennadi and Konekeri (2015) looked at bullying in different fields. Sanmina, Salamon, and Singh, (2014) researched how bullying affects employees’ trust of an organization and Hollis (2016a) examined the effect of bullying online.

More specifically, Hollis (2015) conducted a study of workplace bullying in American higher education, using a sample of 175 college and universities. The author reported that 62% of university administrators who took part in the survey faced workplace bullying. Hollis replicated the study to examine a sample of 142 community colleges, where 64% of employees reported workplace bullying (Hollis, 2016b). These results indicated that women, people of color, and the LGBT community members face workplace bullying with increased frequency than the general population.

McKay, Arnold, Frats, and Thomas (2008) conducted a similar study in 2007, examining workplace bullying in Canadian higher education institutions. At the time of the McKay (2008) study, Quebec was the only jurisdiction in Canada to directly prohibit workplace bullying. However, Canadian courts were awarding complainants damages and other forms of relief for enduring workplace bullying. In Quebec, 825 complaints were registered, resulting in 38% of the complainants receiving settlements; further 32% chose to settle outside of court. For example, in Sulz v. Canada Attorney General (2006), Sulz claimed that her immediate supervisors intentionally, or negligently, harassed her to the extent that she became so clinically depressed that she had no choice but to accept a medical discharge. The Supreme Court of British Columbia awarded Sulz 950,000 CAD as a compensation for back wages and future lost wages (McKay, 2008). This case was decided in 2006, seven years before Workplace BC implementation in 2013. In another example, the Supreme Court of Ontario ruled in favor of Keays in Honda Canada v. Keays on a bad faith discharge and upheld that the award was related to harassment and discrimination.

Presumably, while XYZ University (the pseudonym used in the McKay et al. (2008) study) was located in a province that did not prohibit bullying until after 2010, the Canadian national trend was moving to protect targets of workplace bullying.

**Higher Education Workplace Bullying in Canada and United States**

Similar to American researchers (Hollis, 2015) and Scandinavian researchers Björkqvist, Österman, and Hjelt-Bäck (1994), Einarsen, et al. (2003), McKay et al. (2008) reported that
staff facing bullying at XYZ University tended to be newly hired or the untenured, and consequently had the least amount of power. These workers also felt unsupported in reporting the abuse to administration. The Hollis (2015) study on American higher education and the McKay et al. (2008) study both utilized emailed surveys for the data collection process and posed similar questions about the duration of bullying and how bullying may affect career trajectory. In both the US (Hollis, 2015) and the Canadian (McKay, 2008) study on higher education, the sample emerged from an area that did not prohibit workplace bullying. However, at the time of these respective studies, Canada was experiencing a trend of workplace bullying lawsuits, and the United States had Title VII that should have provided some protections at work for protected classes (race, gender, age, national, origin). Table 1 provides a comparison of data reported by Hollis (2015) for the United States and by McKay et al. (2008) for Canada.

### Table 1

**Comparison of Higher Education Bullying in the United States and Canada**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Canada</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Data collection process</strong></td>
<td>N = 401</td>
<td>N = 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Response rate</strong></td>
<td>14.5%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Affected by bullying /HBBFemale</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Affected by bullying/HBBMale</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rate of bullying</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 months previous/ over 5 years</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 to 3 years/ Longer than a year</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Considering leaving</strong></td>
<td>15.19%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Applied/interviewed /Searching for job</strong></td>
<td>21.62%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Did nothing/Would not make a difference</strong></td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*USA “Affected by bullying” means endured or witnessed bullying, as literature on workplace bullying indicates that the witness is directly affected (Hollis, 2015). ^HBB is an acronym for have been bullied, used by McKay (2008).*

In addition, 19.76% of the US respondents had left a previous higher education job due to a bullying, and further 24.32% were considering leaving higher education altogether. In the surveys, both United States and Canadian respondents reflected on how workplace bullying affected their work environment and productivity in higher education. Further, Hollis (2016c) found that civility remains an important element in the classroom, especially for developmental students. Job performance was adversely affected in both societies, as exemplified by synonymous remarks from respective respondents. Effects of workplace bullying extended beyond a mere distraction, as the respondents in both studies perceived bullying itself as demoralizing and psychologically paralyzing. Table 2 provides examples from both United States and Canadian respondents about how workplace bullying hurts work productivity.
Table 2

*Effects of Bullying in Canadian and US Higher Education Institutions on Workplace Productivity*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Canadian responses about work productivity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1C) More time wasted . . . need to talk it out with a colleague (more than once) before I could focus (p. 87).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2C) My various experiences at XYZ cannot be fully isolated. It has been more like a snowball rolling down a hill. I felt so frustrated and angry I could not hide it. One event leads to another leaving me unable to manage the whole job.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3C) He made my life a living nightmare. This impacted my self-esteem and my ability to operate effectively in the classroom. (McKay 2008).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>US responses about work productivity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1USA) It's draining on the person managing this individual and it has an impact on an entire area when they are dealing with the nonsense. It's an unhealthy workplace when this is allowed to continue week after week.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2USA) Overall, it is a toxic and hostile environment for those who are not part of the boss group (Hollis, 2015).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In regard to organizational support, Canadian and American respondents provided similar remarks regarding bullying and reported the lack of support from human resources, supervisors, and the management. In the McKay et al. (2008) study, 49% of respondents stated that reporting workplace bullying would not make a difference, as shown in Table 3.

Table 3

*Canadian and US Respondents’ Statements on Administrative Support*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Canadian Comments</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1C) Management not only does nothing about protecting myself and others from bullying.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2C) I have also seen them [HR] protect those who bully. This enables the cycle to continue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3C) Equity Services are the enemy! A consistent record of uselessness, a bad PR joke.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>United States comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1USA) Many times, HR errs on the side of management.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2USA) This is a real problem in higher ed—we are not immune. HR and legal counsel &quot;get it&quot; but don't want to address it with a policy—they suggest our non-discrimination policy is strong—but bullies are equal opportunity discriminators. I left my university once because of a bully.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3USA) I think bullying is overlooked and Human Resources work for the institution and not the employee. I therefore think that HR is hoping that it will just go away!</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Canadian researcher Westhues (2006) echoed the findings on bullying reported by many researchers, noting that those who were perceived as different or weaker tended to be the bully’s prime target. Further, Westhues (2006) examined the origins of ‘mobbing’ studied by Konrad Lorenz, the Austrian-German founder of ethology. Lornez (2002) noted that mobbing or ganging up on an individual, much like members of the same animal species turning on each other, was a survival technique. Arguably, humans are intrinsically wired to be aggressive, supporting the “survival of the fittest” point of view of some anthropologists.

In addition, Westhues (2006) identified conditions that increased vulnerability to mobbing in academia, such as being foreign-born and having a foreign upbringing and/or accent, or being different from most colleagues in an elemental way (e.g., sex, sexual orientation, or credentials). His arguments were consistent with the findings of American researchers (Hollis & McCalla, 2013; Hollis, 2016b). He also posited that amorphous structures and ambiguity are conducive to bullying, as there are no guidelines to govern behavior (Westhues, 2006). Similarly, Powell and KRC Research (2013) reported that financial strife and economic hardship, such as the recent Great Recession in 2008, would also increase the frequency of bullying, because threats to livelihood arouse the survival mechanism in humans to prevail in a challenging environment.

Westhues (2006) noted that the extent of bullying overall is directly related to the organizational culture. Organizational culture may contribute to employees’ lack of awareness regarding bullying, or lack a systematic method to identify the bullying behavior. Therefore, when an organization does not have a clear policy for managing bad behavior, incivility and abuse are dealt with individually and in isolation. Instead, with a policy, an organization can reflect on the organizational culture as a whole and develop proper interventions. In addition, the organization may be inconsistent in its response to workplace bullying. “As a result, some faculty, instructors and librarians believe they are not supported when they raise concerns. This also contributes to the ineffectiveness of administrators in addressing such issues as best practices” (Westhues, 2006, p. 82).

The Canadian findings seem to indicate that, even with national policy, the organizational leadership needs to be accountable, police abusive conduct, and protect vulnerable employees. With such organizational commitments in mind, many Canadian organizations include mediation as part of workplace bullying intervention (Hollis, 2016; Satov, 2004). In many Canadian higher education organizations, leaderships support a mediation process.

The more economically aggressive United States culture calls for strong anti-bullying policy. The capitalistic ideology that prevails in the US society often subordinates human civility for capitalistic gain. If aggression is linked to survival, then those with power will continue to bully as a means to survive, unless the work environment and its respective leadership is legally held accountable for bullying behaviors of the perpetrators. However, even once a state, country, society or perhaps civilization works to prohibit bullying behavior, the community does not automatically comply. For example, although the
American Civil Rights Act was passed in 1964, prohibiting workplace racism and sexism, harassment and discrimination have continued. Similarly, bullying and harassment continue in Canada, despite anti-bullying legislation in several provinces.

Conclusion

At the time of this writing, in March 2017, Utah, California, Tennessee, and Minnesota are the only US states that have passed healthy workplace laws. The United States has started to prohibit workplace bullying at the state level; however, the history of such legislation in both Canada and the United States shows that passing laws prohibiting workplace bullying is a necessary starting point, rather than a finish line. Federal and state or provincial legislation are beneficial for holding organizations accountable in court; however, organizational leadership has to craft and fairly apply anti-bullying policy. As McKay et al. (2008) noted, “The solution requires an organizational culture approach wherein policies and guidelines are used to steer individuals in the environment to more appropriate social interactions” (p. 95).

In short, the solution cannot be limited to the mere introduction of a policy that states that bullying will not be tolerated within an organization. As Westhues (2004) commented, the focus should be on prevention, instead of remedies or resolutions. A compliance strategy, relying on codes, regulations, and guidelines, will have an effect in changing the organizational culture. Nonetheless, true change occurs when leadership, reflecting the emergence of broader cultural values, is committed to prevention and prohibiting workplace bullying at the organizational level.
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Essays

Leveraging Diasporic Power for Nation Building
William McGaughy

Five Epochs of Civilization, a book that I published in 2000, proposes a way to organize world history that is focused upon the development of society. The suggested periods of history each exhibit characteristic topics and themes.

In the first period or epoch of world history (the centuries before Christ), humanity would be organizing in cities, states, and ultimately world empires such as the Roman and Han Chinese. In the second epoch (the next fourteen hundred years), world religion would come to dominate human societies. The Renaissance, which marked the beginning of the third epoch in world history (from the 15th through the early 20th centuries), saw the development of commercial and educational institutions as dominant influences in people’s lives. We have now (since the 1920s) moved into a fourth epoch focused on news and entertainment. A fifth, computer-driven age is on the horizon.

Along with the changes in society have come a transition from ideographic and alphabetic writing in handwritten forms to printed literature, to images broadcast electronically, and finally to computer messages. And so we have changes both in the structure of society and in communication technologies associated with each age.

All this is by way of introduction to my talk. The book, Five Epochs of Civilization, describes world-historical trends in broad strokes; but where are we specifically in the process? Clearly, the age of large political empires is past. Christianity and other world religions no longer dominate society with the exception of Islam in some places. That brings us to the epoch of commerce and education. It is still with us though, I would suggest, in a stage of terminal decline.

World civilization has gone through several cycles of growth and decay. Now, in the opening decades of the 21st century, I think there is a crisis in the third civilization, the type of society that emerged in Europe during the Renaissance. This was a society given to commerce—to trade, production of goods, and financing mechanisms—as well as to the study of literature, the fine arts, and other subjects as a preparation for leadership in career fields.

In that tradition, young people today study these and other subjects to obtain college degrees, which they will need to convince employers to hire them in promising entry-level positions. The connection between education and employment is a defining characteristic of our culture. With a college degree comes a good job, we believe.

Higher education is therefore at the center of the impending crisis. While our colleges and universities should be treasured as repositories of knowledge and culture, the fact is that
students attend such institutions mainly for the sake of degrees that will help them obtain attractive jobs. To become exposed to intellectual challenges and interests is of secondary interest.

Employment opportunities in stimulating and lucrative fields depend on obtaining an academic degree. A threat is found in the fact that, as such opportunities become less plentiful and the experience of higher education becomes common, the years devoted to higher education lead increasingly to debt and disappointment rather than to a successful career. That may not be the fault of the educators so much as changing conditions in the economy. We simply do not need all the people educated for intellectually challenging careers.

We need therefore to rethink the relationship between occupations and educational preparation. The state of technology dictates how many people will be needed to handle particular economic functions given a certain level of demand. The key concept is labor productivity. In a common definition, productivity equals output divided by the product of employment and average working hours.

The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics has kept track of working conditions since the late 1940s. Its statisticians have gathered information from manufacturing industries and other sectors of the economy to show trends in economic output, employment, work hours, and productivity. Output and productivity have shown large and steady increases, except during recessions, while employment has increased to a lesser degree. Average working hours per person have remained largely the same.

Government statistics show that the productivity of labor in the U.S. business sector increased by around five times between 1947 and 2013. Output increased nine fold during the same period of time. The hours of work roughly doubled. This doubling of hours, representing man-hours of labor, reflects a two-fold increase in the number of persons employed rather than changes in their work schedules.

In theory, we could have had a smaller increase in output if working people had worked fewer average hours and the other factors had remained unchanged. But the U.S. economy did not go that way. When in 1933 the U.S. Senate passed a 30-hour-workweek bill, the incoming Roosevelt administration would not support it. Instead, the administration sponsored legislation to support a 40-hour week. The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 provides for time-and-a-half pay after forty hours of work in a week.

The ultimate effect of keeping work schedules the same since the 1940s has been to push U.S. employment out of productive sectors of the economy and into occupational areas such as government employment, health-care services, business and professional services, educational services, and hospitality, which are less productive. In 2010, those activities together claimed 59.2% of total U.S. employment, compared with 10% for manufacturing and 1.6% for agriculture.
I see a threat both to businesses that depend on tapping consumer purchasing power and to educational institutions that promise their graduates employment with high incomes. It is a threat to the twin pillars of the society that emerged in Europe during the Renaissance. Higher education promises to put everyone in the category, to paraphrase Garrison Keillor, of being “above average.” Supposedly, we can all be leaders and none of us followers.

Greatly increased productivity without an hours reduction is a threat to continuing high levels of employment and income. If working hours are not substantially reduced, employment will be pushed out of productive enterprise into activities that might be called “necessary evils.”

For instance:

The United States incarcerates more people than any other nation. There were 2.22 million adults in prisons and jails in the United States in 2013, compared with around 300,000 in 1970. More than six million Americans are under “correctional supervision.”

We Americans spend far more money for military preparedness and activity than do the citizens of any other nation. In 2015, the United States spent $597.5 billion for military purposes. China was in second place at $145.8 billion; and Saudi Arabia, in third place at $81.8 billion.

Our health-care system is, by far, the most expensive in the world. In 2014, such spending reached $3.0 trillion or $9,523 per capita. Americans spend fifty percent more on health care relative to GDP than those living in western Europe, Canada, Australia, and Japan but experience worse outcomes in the rate of chronic conditions, obesity, and infant mortality. Prescription drug costs are much higher here than in other industrialized nations.

The point is that waste and correction of erroneous behavior seem to be driving economic growth rather than activities that improve the human condition. If that is so, output in those forms could be sharply curtailed without ill effect. But it will take political will to do that and, so far, the will has been lacking.

I would argue that we Americans are approaching a point of crisis in our policies regarding work. Because productivity increases reduce the manpower needed in productive enterprise, the superfluous workers are pushed out into areas of economic activity that offer less real benefit to society.

Not only have we Americans failed to maintain balance in the supply and demand for labor by reducing work hours but we have pursued policies that aggravate the oversupply of labor. In the 1980s and 1990s, there was a sharp increase in outsourced production to low-wage countries such as Mexico and China. Free-trade agreements such as NAFTA and CAFTA and permanent trade relations for China have made this possible. How so?
The concept is simple: The U.S. government agrees not to burden products imported from certain countries with tariffs or other import restrictions. American manufacturers then close down factories in the United States and build new factories in the low-wage countries to produce goods for the U.S. market. They are sold at the same price as before. The money saved in wages for production of those goods boosts corporate profits. With higher profits, the corporate managers persuasively argue that they deserve a share of the increased profits because of their superior managerial performance. Managerial salaries and benefits skyrocket as a result.

U.S. government officials ought to look out after the interests of U.S. workers but incentives are great to do otherwise. Union wages are said to be too high. Prudent, tough-minded management would, of course, want to seek a better deal in purchasing laboring services. And so, with free trade pushed to the limit, we have an economy where production is done in one country and consumption in another. That arrangement is not sustainable.

In summary, we have technology making it possible for American workers to produce five times as much output in an hour as their counterparts did seventy years ago. We have production from low-wage countries, primarily in East Asia, supplementing what is produced in the United States and beating it soundly on price. We have low-paid foreign guest workers replacing Americans in certain jobs under the H-1B visa program. And, finally, we have illegal immigration to the United States from low-wage countries, said to be 11 million persons strong. It’s a quadruple whammy that adds to the U.S. labor supply while the demand for laboring services is steady or shrinking.

Accordingly, the American worker is thrown on the defensive. Labor supply chronically exceeds demand. Worst hit are the young who lack work experience but are expected to compete on the basis of educational credentials. With an increased educational requirement, the American dream becomes converted to “opportunity for a price.”

Under those circumstances, the price of admission for landing a well-paying job is to obtain a four-year degree from a certified institution of higher learning or, in some cases, an advanced degree. If the student or his parents cannot pay for the education, the recommended solution is to take out a student loan. The average student-loan debt in 2015 is estimated to be $35,000, up sharply from $20,000 in 2005 and from less than $10,000 in 1992. Educational debt has risen twice as fast as inflation. Borne by society’s more vulnerable persons, it has now reached $1.2 trillion in the United States.

In conclusion, today’s young generation will bear the brunt of inadequate incomes if real job growth does not keep pace with need. Not only will people become disillusioned with the bargain that educators propose for their service with respect to careers, but defaults on educational debt may become common. Far fewer may then choose to go to college. If that happens, it may signal the end to a dream that has inspired western societies for more than a hundred years.
In my opinion, this is nothing less than an existential threat to world history’s third civilization.
Meaning of the Twenty-First Century: From Internationalism to Globalism
Ronald Glossop

In the *The Meaning of the Twentieth Century*[^1] economist Kenneth Boulding makes the point that the 20th century is significant because it marks the time when the industrial revolution, what he calls the second great transition in the life-style of humans, had spread beyond the “developed countries” to almost all the nations of the world. He notes how much more rapid this transition has been than that of the agricultural revolution, the first great transition in the way that humans live. It started about 10,000 years ago and still has not reached a few remote places in the world.

The industrial revolution greatly changed not only the way that goods are produced but also the kinds of goods that get produced. New means of transportation (bicycles, trains, airplanes, automobiles, and jet planes) changed the distances people could and would travel. New means of communication (telegrams, telephones, radios, films, television, the internet, and cell phones) changed the ways people communicate with each other. As is often said, "Modern technological developments in transportation and communication are making the world smaller every day."

These changes brought about by the new products of industrialization are in turn producing changes in ourselves and in our society as we move from the internationalism of the 20th century to the globalism of the 21st century.[^2] I want to call attention to the cultural shifts taking place in three areas: (1) how we think of ourselves, (2) how we communicate with each other, and (3) what kind of political commitments we make, that is, where our political loyalties lie.

The Transition from Nationalism to Internationalism

Just as the transition from an agrarian society to an industrialized society didn’t occur everywhere at the same time, so the transition from nationalism to internationalism hasn’t taken place everywhere at the same time. Internationalism came to Europe much earlier than to the United States. The first international governmental organization was the Central Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine, created by the Europeans in 1815; and the second was the European Commission of the Danube created in 1856. The first worldwide international organization was the International Telegraphic Union. It was established in 1865 and incorporated into the International Telecommunication Union in 1932. Its work and that of other international functional organizations created about the same time was much more important in Europe than in other parts of the world.

The formation of the European Union in the last part of the 20th century is moving Europeans toward internationalism, but there is still much nationalistic restraint on that effort toward integration. The nationalism in Europe is being overcome to a large extent by the feeling that European integration is necessary to compete with the United States.

[^1]: *The Meaning of the Twentieth Century*
[^2]: I want to call attention to the cultural shifts taking place in three areas: (1) how we think of ourselves, (2) how we communicate with each other, and (3) what kind of political commitments we make, that is, where our political loyalties lie.
Japan, and China, but the use of many different national languages is a major obstacle to unification.

The United States, separated by oceans from both Europe and Asia, tended to view internationalism as a matter of U.S. domination of Latin America as proclaimed in the Monroe Doctrine of 1823. The intent of the Monroe Doctrine as originally expressed was to warn the Council of Europe powers not to support Spain in any effort to reconquer their Latin American colonies. It is the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine (1904) that represented a certain degree of US domination of Latin America. One indication of the extent to which nationalism has remained the prevailing outlook in the United States is the fact that it is one of only three countries in the world (the others are Burma and Liberia) which still does not use the International System of Units (the metric system of measurement), despite the fact that Congress adopted a law in 1866 saying that no contract using the metric system can be invalidated by a court plus the fact that other more recent laws declare it to be the preferred system of weights and measures in the United State.[3]

Despite some movement toward internationalism, nationalism is still a very powerful force in Europe as well as elsewhere. Nations continue to compete with each other economically and for status in all areas (science, entertainment, sports, art, literature). The two world wars were motivated by struggles for status between Germany and Britain, between Japan and China, and between Russia and Germany while the Cold War was a struggle for status between the Soviet Union and the United States. Similar struggles for status are now developing between nations such as the United States and China as well as between India and China. Nationalism is hardly a spent force.

**The Transition from Internationalism to Globalism**

Now let us look at the transition from internationalism to globalism. The difference between these two outlooks is one of viewing the world as made up of a collection of nation-states as contrasted with viewing it as a single planet where national boundaries are relatively insignificant. The appropriate image for internationalism is a map of the world or a traditional globe where the different countries appear in different colors, each one bordered by a solid black line. The appropriate image for globalism is the photo of Earth from space where there are no national boundaries and the unity and solitariness of the planet in space are most evident.

The word “internationalism” comes from Latin and means “between” or “among” nations. In this framework people do not relate directly to each other as individuals but usually interact with each other as citizens of different nations and in formal settings by means of national representatives. Crossing a national boundary usually means getting inspected, being subject to different laws, using a different language, and using different money.

Although it is not possible to point to some single moment when the transition from internationalism to globalism begins, it seems that a significant event relevant to this transition...
was the photographing of the Earth from space which was done in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

We are living in the age of globalization. That term “globalization” is usually taken as applying to the domination of the global economy by transnational corporations, and that shift certainly is a major factor in the way that the global society is changing. It is these corporations more than any other institutions that are operating in a world where national borders are more and more irrelevant.

But we are also witnessing globalization, that is, the progressive diminution of the importance of national borders, in all facets of human life: disease (avian flu, HIV/AIDS), the internet, music, science, education, athletics, tourism, crime (drug trafficking, smuggling people and weapons across national boundaries, pirating patents and copyrighted material), and so on. Consider how a growing proportion of people are even marrying across national borders. Is there anyone who doesn’t know at least one such couple?

Another indication of globalism is the growing concern for preservation of the environment of the whole Earth. When we think of problems such as global warming, depletion of the ozone layer, the growing disparity in the average standard of living in different countries, and unrestrained consumption of non-renewable resources, it is obvious that national governments focused on limited geographical areas and acting separately in terms of national interest are not likely to deal successfully with these problems which are global in scope.

Identity, Language, and Loyalty in the Global Community

Let me focus now on how the three areas of identity, language, and loyalty change as we shift from internationalism to globalism.

The first area of personal identity refers to how people identify themselves. In the age of internationalism people regard themselves as definitely members of one country, but have come to be aware that their country exists in a world where there are other countries with which cooperation is possible in many circumstances. In the age of globalism people think of themselves primarily as members of humanity on the planet Earth, and only secondarily as citizens of this or that country. One does not cease to be a citizen of a particular nation, but it is even more important to be an Earthling. Consider how most residents of the U.S.A. think of themselves first as Americans and only secondarily as citizens of a particular state such as Missouri or Illinois. Think of that and go up one more geographical level to where people think of themselves first as citizens of the whole Earth and only secondarily as citizens of a particular country. One recent book focused on this new view of personal identity is Joseph Rotblat’s *World Citizenship: Allegiance to Humanity.*[4]
The second area to be noted as we shift from internationalism to globalism is language use. With internationalism one accepts the situation that different nations and different nationalities often use different languages and that communication may require interpreters and translators, possibly assisted now by various kinds of modern technology. This internationalism will also function better when individual persons learn to use several different national languages. But in the case of globalism there must be one common language for all Earthlings, not only to facilitate communication but also to promote global solidarity. We cannot ignore the connection between identity and language use. When people do not use the same language, it is difficult for them to view themselves as belonging to the same community. Consider the difficulties that occur when there is no single language for the whole society such as with Quebecois in Canada, the Basques in Spain, and the Hungarians in Romania. Consider also the present problems with regard to language use as efforts are made to create a European Union.

When we begin to think of one language for the whole Earth, the natural question to ask is, which language should it be? At the moment, it seems that English is on its way to becoming the single language for the whole world, but the proportion of the world's population which uses English as its first language is declining, from about 10 percent in 1950 to about only 5 percent now. There are two and three quarters times as many people who use Mandarin Chinese as their first language (and the economic influence of China in the world is increasing rapidly), and the native speakers of Spanish now outnumber the native speakers of English. Furthermore the influence of Spanish within and outside the United States is growing.

There is a justice problem with using any existing national language. The speakers of that national language are a minority of the world's population, but they are given a huge advantage in international communication. This injustice arouses resentment, as is now occurring in much of the world against the use of English on the internet and in international contexts. And why not? After all, there are 23 languages in the world with at least 60 million native speakers.

The logical and morally appropriate solution to this world language problem is to use a created language which is no one's native language but which has been designed to be easy to learn and to use. That was the aim of Polish physician L. L. Zamenhof when he created Esperanto and gave it to the world in 1878, just two years after the invention of the automobile with an internal combustion engine. Unfortunately, Esperanto has not received nearly as much attention as cars, but neither has it been completely forgotten. The use of Esperanto has spawned a movement of idealists committed to the welfare of a global community based on a common language which at the same time will help to preserve the use of national languages within the national communities. Esperanto is used in addition to the national languages, not instead of them. The development of the internet has made Esperanto even more useful.
The third area influenced by the shift from internationalism to globalism is the locus of people’s political loyalty. In internationalism the primary loyalty of individuals is still to the national governments. International policy-making organizations such as the League of Nations, the United Nations, UNESCO, the World Health Organization, the Universal Postal Union, and the International Atomic Energy Agency may be created to deal with international problems, but these organizations aim to assist cooperation among the national governments, not individuals. In globalism the primary loyalty of individuals would be to a global government, some kind of democratic world federation which is over the national governments, similar to the way that the U.S. national government is over state governments.

Patriotism (loyalty to the nation-state) is not eliminated, but it is subordinated to humatriotism (loyalty to all of humanity). Even now some individuals may have a greater commitment to the welfare of the global community as a whole than to their own national government, but until the political institutions are changed, such global citizens are likely to face many obstacles as they try to act in accord with that commitment. They can try to work through various non-governmental organizations, but they often find it difficult to get around the restraints placed on them by the national governments. National governments typically require primary loyalty to themselves, and they will be reluctant to relinquish that requirement until they decide to become part of a larger political unit, as occurred in the United States when the U.S. Constitution replaced the Articles of Confederation and as is now occurring in Europe as the various countries there agree to become part of the European Union. Globalism will be fully implemented only when the idea of unrestricted national sovereignty is abandoned[9] and the various national governments of the whole world are integrated into a democratic world federation, just as the U.S. state governments have been integrated into the United States of America.

Conclusion

Kenneth Boulding noted that the significance of the 20th century is that it was when the new products of industrialization spread from the industrialized West or “developed countries” to the whole world. The significance of the 21st century is that that is when the new products of industrialization have produced the unprecedented transformation in human society from internationalism to globalism, a change that is reflected in the way people identify themselves (as citizens of the world rather than a particular country), in the way language is used in the global community (a common global language in addition to a large number of national languages), and in the shift in political loyalty (from the nation-state to a democratic world federation).

Our educational systems should be enlightening our students (and our mass media should be raising the awareness of our adults) about this transition from internationalism to globalism currently taking place. We should be preparing our children (and our adults too!) both intellectually and emotionally for life in this emerging 21st century world community. Consider what life is going to be like in a democratically governed global community where
all people (children and adults) everywhere think of themselves as citizens of planet Earth and where all are able to communicate with each other via the internet using a common neutral global language familiar to everyone.

Endnotes


[2] Many but not all the changes related to this transition from internationalism to globalism are discussed at length by Peter Singer in *One World: The Ethics of Globalization*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002; 2nd ed., 2004. Singer presents his thesis in these words on page 9: “Rawls’s model is that of an inter-national order, not a global order. This assumption needs reconsidering.”


[5] The case for a common global language is presented by Amitai Etzioni in “A Global, Community Building Language?” *The Federalist Debate*, XXI, No. 2 (July 2008), pp. 16-20, and he argues that it is going to be English.


[7] *The World Almanac and Book of Facts, 2015*, p. 716. French is now fourteenth in the world in number of native speakers. Four of these 23 languages are mainly in India.

[8] Ronald Glossop, “Language Policy and a Just World Order,” *Alternatives*, XIII (1988), 395-409. Unfortunately, even those globally minded thinkers such as Peter Singer who address the problem of cultural imperialism (see pp. 139-144 of *One World*) generally completely overlook the issue of linguistic imperialism.

Spengler’s Worldview: A Retrospective Analysis
Rudolph Zalter

Next year marks the centenary of Spengler’s prophetic, prescient, and master work of history and philosophy, *The Decline of the West*. Its impact on generations of political and academic figures during the 20th century cannot be underestimated. A lifelong disciple, I find his historic predictions of the state of our world today to be a mirror image of his poetic prose, nothing short of a Biblical revelation.

Reading through the complex text it becomes clear that this monumental thesis is anchored in the subtle implications and specific connotation of one single key word -- *soul*. Without full appreciation of this key word, his world view remains a difficult concept to grasp. But we must first dissociate the implied meaning of the word from standard definitions, such as these:

*American Heritage Dictionary* (1975)

“Soul”

1. The animating and vital principle in man credited with the faculties of thought, action and emotion and conceived as forming an immaterial entity distinguished from but temporally coexistent with his body.

2. Theology: The spiritual nature of man considered in relation to God, regarded as immortal, separable from the body at death, and susceptible to happiness or misery in a future state.

3. The disembodied spirit of a dead human being; a ghost, shade.

*The Columbia Encyclopedia, Second Edition*

Pantheism declares the individuation of human soul and materialism declares the soul nonexistent. One of the most widely accepted concepts in the world is immortality and this almost always postulates the existence of a soul to live apart from the body after death.

The idea of body vs. soul is conventional in language and thought.

“Soul”

1. The principle of life, feeling, thought, and action in humans, regarded as a distinct entity separate from the body, and commonly held to be separable in existence from the body; the spiritual part of humans as distinct from the physical part.
2. The spiritual part of humans regarded in its moral aspect, or as believed to survive death and be subject to happiness or misery in a life to come: arguing the immortality of the soul.

3. The disembodied spirit of a deceased person.

These definitions are not Spengler’s intended meaning of the word. To Spengler, the following excerpts from volume one of his great work come nearest to a definition:

- “A culture is born in the moment when a great soul awakens out of the proto-spirituality of ever-childish humanity and detaches itself, a form of the formless, a bounded and mortal thing from the boundless and enduring.

  “It blooms on the soil of an exactly definable landscape to which plant-wise it remains bound. It dies when this soul has actualized the full sum of its possibilities in the shape of peoples, dogmas, arts, states, sciences, and reverts into the proto-soul.”

- “Every soul has religion, which is only another word for its existence. All living forms in which it expresses itself – all arts, doctrines, customs – are ultimately religious, and must be so. But from the setting-in of Civilization they cannot be so any longer. As the essence of every culture is religion, so - and consequently – the essence of every civilization is irreligion – the two words are synonymous.”

I would like to offer another definition, one that clarifies and extracts the implicit, though not the overtly stated, essence of the intended meaning: The “soul” is a quasi-evolutionary, transient mindset.

“Quasi-evolutionary” implies a biological, organic phenomenon that is not a response to environmental challenge nor a simple conditioned reflex, but an evolutionary mutation that transcends causality. It is an organic entity that spans a predetermined initial phase of a biphasic sequential dichotomy, generic to Homo sapiens, specific to members of a given particular culture.

“Transient” is a corollary of its organic nature. It implies a limited, allotted timespan (a millennium at most).

“Mindset” is a psycho-neural turn in any given member of a live culture that perceives the world in a distinct specific way and then acts in compliance with that specific outlook. It is a mental process that infuses reality with a set, specific pattern.

Alternatively, the mindset may be viewed as the working “format” of the waking consciousness, specific to any given culture.
For Spengler, the soul is a unique living expression whose existence is deduced from its fulfillment, life, covering the sequential unfolding of its potentiality over its life span. As such it is transient and spontaneous, an unplanned and unpremeditated phenomenon that has arisen in various formats some twenty-six times in the course of recorded human history, following Arnold Toynbee’s calculations.

None of today’s civilizations, including our own Western civilization, is in the cultural phase, excluding perhaps Russia. Thus, the impact of the soul is strictly historical, according to Spengler.

Graphically, we may say that the soul is analogous to a fully loaded but unused cassette tape. Playing out its full contents is analogous to the actualizing of all possible potentialities of the soul. And finally, the play-out time simulates the allotted lifespan of any given live culture as an organic entity. A fully wound unused cassette is thus analogous to the end of what Spengler sees as the culture phase.

This analogy, however, breaks down at the rewind mode. Unlike the playing out of a real tape recorder, what is to come in the virtual recorder is irreversible and directional conjuring the concept of time, implicitly that of destiny. Thus destiny is the true expression mode of time.
Spengler wrote in the first volume of *The Decline of the West*: “The world of incident is the world of once-actual facts that longingly or anxiously we live forward to as the future, that raises or depresses us as the living present, and that we contemplate with joy or with grief as the past. The world of causes and effects is the world of the constantly possible, of timelessness.”

For Spengler, “culture” refers to the transient phase and “civilization” to its post-expiration phase. Reviewers have often denoted the sequential phases that characterize the evolving nature of any given civilization in Spengler’s thought but most have failed to take into considering this dichotomy.

Yet, once the transient nature of the key word *soul* is accepted and assimilated, the dichotomy between “culture” and “civilization” is transformed from an arbitrary choice to a necessary logical, sequential phase, the organic living culture phase and then the strict and necessary successor, the civilization phase.

For Spengler the Enlightenment marked the end of the culture phase and the advent of the civilization phase. In contemporary terms we may say that for Spengler, Western culture has been fully played out, having exhausted all its potentialities, and thus we are now in the final, civilized phase of existence. The United States Constitution would be, therefore, a reflection of the post-Enlightenment phase.

At the conscious level, the potentials of the soul, fulfilled in the stream of life, are mutated to the perceptible view of nature and governed by the principle of causality. This is manifest throughout Spengler’s text by the emphasis assigned to the attributes of the living organic culture and through the stress on its reverse manifestation in the rational causal worldview.

**Consciousness**

Consciousness is thus the manifestation or outward display of the unique, genetically transcribed and evolved program played out on the complex neural circuitry, energized metabolically during lifetime.

The Human brain has about 100 billion neurons ($100 \times 10^9$) with an estimated average of one thousand connections between each neuron and its neighbors. We have about 100 trillion connections ($100 \times 10^{12}$), each capable of simultaneous calculation. That’s massive parallel processing.

Consciousness, then, is the manifest expression of the ON state, the simultaneous depolarization of trillions of neurons. Death is the OFF state, and Sleep is the temporary partial suspension of consciousness. Time is therefore a derived parameter of the ON state.
For the first time in the history of life, an organic form turned its power of perception back upon its own self, rendering it aware of its own existence.

While being unaware of the underlying physical chemical process, one is acutely aware of its overwhelming presence in the affirmative tone of ‘I am.’

To invert Descartes famous dictum into “Je suis, donc je pense” is to stress that consciousness precedes thinking. It reverses the traditional idea, that thinking is the prime essence of the self. The dichotomy between organic life flowing unconsciously and the inorganic construct of its conscious counterpart is the essence of Spengler’s worldview.

Unless each of these categories is fully comprehended, the flow of the historical panorama remains elusive. It can only be fully cognized by reference to its opposite, to its reverse. To this end a tabular approach to might prove helpful in bridging the gap confronting the reader.

Using the very same words of Spengler’s magisterial text, the juxtaposed dichotomy of the table reinforces and explains the essential divide.

The following table is a brief illustration of a silent dichotomy that permeates this entire thesis. It offers a brief selective sample of the necessary correlation between the perceptible actual word and its life flow counterpart.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fulfillment</th>
<th>Actuality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Becoming: Fact of Life</td>
<td>Become: Result of Life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symbol</td>
<td>Notion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destiny: Logic of Time</td>
<td>Causality: Logic of Space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inner Certainty</td>
<td>Law-bound Reasoning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destiny: Existence Mode of the Prime Phenomenon</td>
<td>Causality: Existence Mode of Objects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morphological element destiny = Idea</td>
<td>Morphological element causality = Principle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creative Art</td>
<td>Physical Epistemological System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logic of Direction</td>
<td>Logic of Extension</td>
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<tr>
<td>Future</td>
<td>Past</td>
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<tr>
<td>Organism</td>
<td>Mechanism</td>
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<tr>
<td>World as History</td>
<td>World as Nature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organic world-impression</td>
<td>Mechanical world-impression</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symbol and Picture Ordering according to plan</td>
<td>Formula and System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordering according to plan</td>
<td>Dissecting according to scheme</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Organic necessity in life, that of Destiny: The Logic of Time
Chronology and the idea of Destiny lead to a historical ordering of the world
World as Organism
Every Culture has its own Civilization: Strict and necessary organic Succession
The old landscape of the culture
Philosophy of Becoming
Proper: involved in the basic fact known as feeling, i.e., the Inner Life
Life – becoming – Direction
In Direction: The possible is called the Future

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<tr>
<td>Organic necessity in life, that of Destiny: The Logic of Time</td>
<td>Mechanical necessity of cause and effect: The Logic of Space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chronology and the idea of Destiny lead to a historical ordering of the world</td>
<td>Mathematics and the principle of causality lead to a naturalistic ordering of the world</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World as Organism</td>
<td>World as Mechanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Every Culture has its own Civilization: Strict and necessary organic Succession</td>
<td>Civilization as the organic logical sequel, fulfillment and finale of a Culture. It is a conclusion, the thing become succeeding the thing becoming, death following life. An irrevocable end</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The old landscape of the culture</td>
<td>In place of a world, there is a city, a point; here a new sort of a nomad, the parasitical city dweller lives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philosophy of Becoming</td>
<td>Philosophy of Being (having become)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proper: involved in the basic fact known as feeling, i.e., the Inner Life</td>
<td>Alien: Related to Perception, i.e., the Outer World, the life of sensation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life – becoming – Direction Time</td>
<td>Hard Set – become – Death Extension</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Direction: The possible is called the Future</td>
<td>In Direction: The actualized is called the Past</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Still to be accomplished   LIFE  [?]  

Accomplished Life: The form in which the actualizing of the possible is accomplished

The Accomplishing: The present

Higher History is the actualizing of possible culture

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fulfillment</th>
<th>Actuality</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Becoming possesses the property of Direction (irreversibility)</td>
<td>Become possesses the property of Extension</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chronological number is linked with becoming, with life, with the necessity of destiny</td>
<td>Mathematical number is the symbol of causal necessity, the ultimate meaning of the world-as-nature. The essence of mechanical demarcation, akin to word</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Form: world of history</td>
<td>Mechanical: causal picture of the world</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art: works are not calculated or thought out</td>
<td>Calculation and cognition are kin</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Cultures are organisms, and world history is their collective biography. Systematic natural science is based on causality. Organic logic: logic of direction. Inorganic logic: logic of extension. History: The physiognomy of all becoming. Nature: The system of all things become. Destiny is the true existence-mode of the prime phenomenon. Causality is the existence-mode of objects. Destiny is the true existence-mode of the prime phenomenon. Space is a conception out of which the projected image time, the phantom time, is derived. Time is a word, made by thinking. Irreversible directional time is transmuted into a quantitative dimension that can be mathematically manipulated, a fourth dimension of the spatial concept. Numbering and drawing are a becoming, numbers and figures are things become. That I calculate is the business of organic logic. What I calculate is the business of inorganic logic.

The main thesis of Spengler is that the organic aspect of life is regulated by a necessary logic governing life in the time domain, while the laws governing the intellectual aspect of life are promulgated in the domain of space.

Further, each culture and each civilization is genetically endowed with a unique soul mindset that transforms its organic living and becoming life into an inorganic format depicting the world as Nature-Science.

Civilizations are thus biological phenomena. They are the expressive forms of distinct historical racial entities, the material expression of their quasi-genetic origin. This view is the exact opposite of that stipulated by the “Ascent of Man” in which a linear progression of ideas from one civilization to the next is postulated. Thus, to Spengler, history, art and science are culture-specific.
Book Reviews


Reviewed by Leland Conley Barrows

Some fifty-two years ago, the eminent journalist-turned-historian, Basil Davidson, published *Which Way Africa? The Search for a New Society* (London: Penguin, 1964), a book that asked questions about the future of economic and political development in Africa, pan-Africanism, the role of elites, the colonial heritage, and much more. It ended with a number of question marks but with the hope that by adopting a radical reform agenda enlightened leaders would be able to offer Africa a bright future.

Half a century later, the five contributors to the present volume, two of whom are its editors, have asked the same question. Their answer falls somewhere between non-committal and pessimistic given what they consider to have been the negative heritages of Islam, the slave trade, and colonialism—“400 years of Africa’s devastation by outsiders…” (p. ix). Modernization, the editors assert, is required, and they group modernization policies under four headings: Westernization, Africanization, Sinozation, and Globalization, proposing to evaluate them “with the civilization approach which is characterized by a big-picture view of the integration of society, culture (including religion), and infrastructure over a long-time on a large territory” (Ibid).

The leading spirit behind this book, who is also its co-editor, is Professor Andrew Targowski, a Polish-born Informatics specialist. Currently Distinguished Professor of Computer Information Systems at Western Michigan University, his reflections about the effects of the communications revolution pushed him to become a humanist, mastering the social sciences and the humanities. In addition to co-authoring the “Foreword” along with Dr. Tseggai Isaac, Associate Professor of History and Political Science at the Missouri University of Science and Technology, Professor Targowski has written five of the fourteen chapters of this book including the concluding chapter; Professor Isaac, four chapters; Professor Sisay Asefa, Director of the Center for African Development Policy Research at Western Michigan University, two chapters, and Dr. David Wilkinson, Professor of Political Science at UCLA and Professor Herménégilde Rwantagbugu, Professor of Comparative Intercultural Education at the University of Burundi, one chapter apiece.

The various chapters do not necessarily speak to one another in a systematic way. Many of them give the impression that they were written as conference papers or for publication as journal articles but ended up as contributions to this volume. Nevertheless, the first five chapters, two by Professor Targowski, two by Professor Isaac, and one by Professor Wilkinson, propose varying approaches to the identification, conceptualization, and characterization of civilizations, particularly African civilizations. The remaining chapters of the book elaborate further on points raised in the first five chapters. The emphasis of the
book is on Sub-Saharan Africa even though the title designates Africa as a whole. Also, given that Professor Isaac is of Eritrean origin and Professor Asefa, of Ethiopian origin, the book as a whole offers a strong Ethiopian/Eritrean slant. The editors strive to present African civilization in holistic terms. They stress the importance of Africa as the continent on which humanity evolved and spread to the rest of the world. They recognize that the Nile Valley gave rise to one of the earliest and greatest civilizations, that of ancient Egypt.

Although Professor Isaac states in Chapter 1, “The Civilization Approach to Analytical Orthodoxy: Solution for or Conveyor of Political Decay to Africa’s Post-Colonial Struggles in the 21st Century” that he “will defer in providing a definition of civilization” (p. 3), he nevertheless asserts that “What is civilized is not coarse or pedestrian. Civilizations empower and ennoble human beings, because a civilized social or political environment is a reflection of an enlightened mind” (p. 1). He criticizes the attempts made by western scholars to deny the African origins of the civilizations of ancient Egypt, Nubia, Axum, and Ethiopia. In Chapter 4, “Making the Case for Ethiopian Civilization”, he stresses the originality and richness of Ethiopian civilization that received Christianity from outside Africa in 330 CE and survived as a distinct Christian African civilization, despite serious challenges.

In Chapter 2, “Africa as the Hub of Mankind and Its Civilizations”, Professor Targowski, acknowledging eastern Africa as the birthplace of humanity, cites the pioneering efforts of African societies to develop iron smelting. In parallel he characterizes the evolution of civilizations in terms of the developing information-communication system (INFOCO) that he traces through six stages: speech, writing, the printed book, computerization, telecommunication networks, and virtual civilization (pp. 34-37). Today a billion people have access to INFOCO 5 and 6 Some 5.2 billion do not have access. Which group has the better chance of survival, Targowski asks, homo electronicus or homo tributus (those with no computer access)? Targowski does not answer his question but indicates that Africa has not yet reached the stages of INFOCO 5 or 6 (p. 37).

In Chapter 5, “The Civilization Index and African Civilization in the 21st Century”, Professor Targowski assesses the status and role of African civilization with regard to what he calls “rising Global Civilization in the 21st century” (p. 85). Taking into account the criteria of a Civilization Index that he has devised and that includes “communication system”, “power system”, and “infrastructure system” (p. 95), he concludes that Africa is the lowest-ranked among the civilizations of the contemporary world. For African civilization to escape from this negative situation, it must strive to become a “Wise Civilization” (p. 104).

“Wise civilization” is a concept that Professor Targowski has developed to designate a society that is ecologically sustainable in every way and that rejects the excesses of “Turbo-Capitalism” that is oriented towards global business and excessive profits, democratic socialism that he judges to be excessively expensive, and communism that he views as murderous to people and dangerous to the environment. African Civilization, indeed
humanity in general, must develop what Professor Targowski calls “Ecologism...a new socio-political system” (p. 101) that includes a number of ecology oriented subsystems: “eco-education”, “eco-democracy”, “eco-justice”, “eco-infrastructure”, “deep economics [that] includes environmental and social costs alongside those of business and administration into cost-effectiveness calculations” and “deep media” [that] informs the society of the plight and development of the sustainable civilization” (Ibid). Professor Targowski insists that Africa must vastly reduce its rate of population increase, invest heavily in education to create a “sustainable intellectual elite”, expand its sources of clean water, improve governance and end regional conflicts, and define “the goals and strategies which are specific for African Civilization” (pp, 97-99). The cement holding together the components of a Wise Civilization is a kind of social gospel that Professor Targowski labels as Spirituality, a composite of the most positive teachings of the world religions and secular philosophies having the greatest universal relevance. Thus Africa can strive to modernize without necessarily westernizing and, as Targowski hopes, can “correct the actual model of world development, which is based on super-consumerism, never-ending industrialization and unwise applications of technology” (p. 104).

Altogether, it is evident that Professor Isaac and Professor Targowski approach African Civilization in ways that are holistic, humanistic, and subjective. In Chapter 3, “The Civilizations of Africa”, Professor David Wilkinson, proposes a different approach. He conceptualizes African civilizations strictly in terms of quantifiable data and thus argues that only independently developing societies that have evolved “citified” population centers—cities—with over 10,000 human inhabitants apiece can be counted as civilizations. Prior to incorporation into “global civilization”, according to him, there were six independently developing civilizations in Africa: Egyptian/Northeastern African, West African, Gold Coast, East African Coastal, West Central African, and South African. Added to these, six more civilizations may have had independent origins, and five are extensions of these twelve. An additional civilization labeled African Great Lakes may also have been an independent civilization (p. 41). For him, “civilizations are societies of states and cities networked by war, diplomacy and power (and not cultures)... [and] judgments as to the civilizational status of societies [are] a mere matter of fact (and not of value)....” (p. 53).

The eight topical chapters that follow develop specific points raised in the first five chapters. In Chapter 6, “The Impact of Religion on African Civilization in Light of the 21st Century”, Professor Isaac evokes the role of Africans in establishing the early Christian churches. Later, as Isaac argues, indigenous African Christian civilization was snuffed out by Islam except in Ethiopia where it survived heroically. The Christianity brought to Africa by Western European missionaries was tainted by its involvement first in the slave trade and then in colonialism. Africa, he concludes, became a “victimized Continent, transgressed by Islamic and European Civilization”. (p. 105).

In Chapter 7, “Language and Education in African Civilization in the 21st Century”, Professor Isaac deplores the poor development of education in the post-colonial societies
of Sub-Saharan Africa. He cites the poor linkages between the use of indigenous languages at local level and colonial languages at national level. Children, he argues should receive their primary education in their mother tongues. While he recognizes the usefulness of the colonial languages, he would like to see greater use made internationally of certain regional languages like Swahili and Hausa. Education, he insists, must be made available to everybody, a difficult task in Africa given that the many dictators who seized power in various African countries restricted the scope of education so as to reduce threats to their power. Ultimately and despite Professor Isaac’s doubts about the pervasiveness of the colonial languages, he believes that Africans should continue to rely on them while becoming increasingly multi-lingual.

In Chapter 8, “Globalization and the Fate of African Traditional Institutions: The Case of the Bashingantahe Order in Burundi in the 21st Century”, Professor Herménégilde Rwantabagu makes the case for reviving the Bashingantahe, a council of wise and righteous elders in pre-colonial Burundi that safeguarded peace and social harmony. The colonial and post-colonial regimes marginalized the Bashingantahe. In post-conflict Burundi a modernized Bashingantahe is being restored to its traditional place. Modernizing and restoring such organizations in other African societies, Professor Rwantagagu states, will assist in maintaining stability and peace and will contribute to the revalorization of traditional African institutions in a globalizing world.

In Chapter 9, “The Impact of Global Geopolitics on the Ethiopian Civilization, One of the Earliest in the World”, Professor Sisay Asefa traces the history of Ethiopia from its Axumite origins to the present stressing its location in that part of Africa where humanity arose, its resistance first to Islamization and then to Italian colonialism, its attempts to modernize under Emperor Menelik II and Emperor Haile Selassie, and its involvement in the Cold War. For Professor Asefa, the overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie in 1974 and the establishment of a Marxist government was a disaster from which Ethiopia and Eritrea have not completely recovered even though this government was overthrown in 1991.

In Chapter 10, “African Civilization and Infrastructure in the 21st Century”, Professor Targowski judges African infrastructure to be inadequate in almost every respect. He points out that “long-distance trade and commerce [functioned] better during colonial times…” (p. 194). Africa is urbanizing rapidly, but the cities cannot support their inhabitants, increasing numbers of whom live in slums. A success, however, has been the African adaptation of wireless communication which has enabled many Africans to expand their possibilities of communication with the world at large.

In Chapter 11, “The Impact of Agriculture on African Civilization in the 21st Century”, Professor Targowski recognizes the potential for Sub-Sahara Africa to feed itself many times over; however, this potential is not being realized because of bad governance, poor planning, and water shortages. Indeed, half of the African population lacks access to clean water. Nevertheless, various African countries have initiated projects to increase agricultural output, and Africa continues to be the recipient of agricultural aid from
international organizations like the FAO, from NGO’s, and from individual donor countries. Greater success has been achieved in promoting small-scale but modernized farming rather than large-scale agricultural projects.

In Chapter 12, “The African Governance Challenges in Global Economy and Society in the 21st Century, the Case of Ethiopia”, Professor Asefa suggests that the authoritarianism of colonial rule led to the takeover of many African countries by military and/or civilian dictators whose self-serving regimes set back the economies of the given countries, hindered education, and destroyed popular participation in government. The end of the Cold War in 1991 and the ending of apartheid in South Africa have sped up the democratization of African countries that had begun slowly in the 1980’s.

In Chapter 13, “African Civilization versus Global Waves and Civilization in the 21st Century” Professor Targowski asks whether African Civilization can compete with other civilizations in a globalized world given that prior globalization waves harmed Africa. According to him, the first of these waves that was initiated by the Portuguese in the 15th and 16th centuries led to the Atlantic slave trade that removed around 20 million persons from Africa (p. 236). The second wave, the “Pax Britannica”, contributed strongly to the generalization of colonial rule which limited economic development, particularly manufacturing, and eventually led to mass poverty. Arbitrarily set colonial frontiers led to ethnic violence. Although the Third Globalization Wave in the 20th century, the “Pax Americana” and the “Pax Sovietica”, did stimulate decolonization, the involvement of the newly independent countries in the Cold War often had negative consequences. The Fourth Globalization Wave, the Pax Consortia, which began in the 1990’s has led to greater prosperity for some countries through increased investment in the extractive industries in Africa.

Today African Civilization is faced with what Professor Targowski calls the Fifth Globalization, the “Pax Virtualiziana”, the global economy supported by the “integrated information infrastructure”. Will Facebook, as a result, become the first example of the Global Virtual Nation? “Can Africans be part of the Global Virtual Nation or could they develop the African Virtual Nation” (p. 246)?

Professor Targowski has doubts about the capacity of Africa to profit from globalization. He fears that the continent will continue to be used as a source of raw materials the extraction of which will not benefit the African masses even though such exploitation enriches a westernized elite. He is particularly worried about what he calls the second scramble for Africa: the competition of China, the United States, and the European Union to carve out economic niches for themselves in Africa, the Chinese being particularly persistent in doing so. He ends the chapter by suggesting that the UN-sponsored Millennium Developmental Goals, although laudable, are not all too suitable for Africa because they do not include the need to reduce the rate of population increase by promoting efficient birth control methods. Thus he proposes a set of African Sustainability Goals that stress birth control and environmental education and protection.
In Chapter 14, “Where is Africa Heading?” that concludes the volume, Professor Targowski once again evokes the importance of his African Sustainability Goals arguing that they will “bring in a new perspective on the sustainable development of African Civilization” (p. 268). But will these goals be adopted and if so, how and by whom?

Altogether this book is a very good read for non-experts wishing to obtain a broad spectrum of information on contemporary Sub-Saharan Africa even if it is overly focused on Ethiopia. For readers who wish to learn more about given topics, the chapter bibliographies offer many suggestions for further reading. The figures, graphs, and charts appearing in the chapters written by Professor Targowski are useful learning aids. Unfortunately Nova Press did not copyedit and proofread the manuscript before publication. There are numerous typographical, stylistic, and grammatical errors. Frequently references cited in the text are not included in the lists of references appearing at the end of each chapter.

Reviewed by Marek J. Celinski

This book is recommended to scholars interested in the opportunities and limits which the human brain and mind reveal to us about who we are and how we are able to make sense of our experiences which shape our relationships to each other and to the world at large.

The book has two parts: *The Divided Brain* and *How The Brain Shaped Our World.*

*The Divided Brain* describes how our divided brain (and mind) appreciates reality, an appreciation which is then projected back on the psychosocial and physical environment. The primary reference is to the anatomical structure of the brain, which consists of two hemispheres that create two fundamentally opposed visions of the world; these world images and representations need to be integrated, but there is a tendency of one hemisphere to dominate over another one which is reflected in cultures and civilizations.

The differences between the hemispheres are not attributed to language, which is a specifically human ability, but, more deeply, to the phylogenetic development of vertebrates. The differences are noted in attention, perception and an attitude to reality and others. Some differences in divided attention are observed even in the lower animals and birds. On one hand, there is a need to focus attention narrowly and with precision, for example, to focus on the grain of corn that must be eaten; on the other hand, and at the same time, there is a need for paying attention as much as possible to guard against a possible predator.

The point is that hemisphere functional specialization brings evolutionary advantages particularly in carrying out dual attention tasks. The right hemisphere enables breadth and flexibility of attention, whereas the left hemisphere provides a capacity for focused attention. This has the related consequence that the right hemisphere sees things as a whole and in their context, whereas the left hemisphere sees things abstracted from the context and broken into parts from which it then reconstructs a whole which becomes different from the original object. In general, the right hemisphere seeks to identify individuals, whereas the left hemisphere’s tendency is to classify them; but both hemispheres are involved in recognition.

Each hemisphere helps us to make sense of reality by creating a recognizable image which otherwise would be an amorphous mass of impressions. The right hemisphere’s version is a more global and holistic recognition of similarity, giving an idea of how a particular object is positioned in the relations to other objects, whereas the left hemisphere identifies single features that would place the object in a certain abstract category.
The right hemisphere has an affinity with whatever is living; the left hemisphere has an equal affinity with what is mechanical. The left hemisphere’s principal concern is utility. It is interested in what is made and in the world as a resource to be used. It is, therefore, natural that it has a particular affinity for words and concepts for tools, man-made things, mechanisms and whatever is not alive.

It turns out that the capacities that help us, as humans, form bonds with others (empathy, emotional understanding and so on) involve the broadly spread awareness of the world which is largely a function of the right hemisphere. Self-awareness, empathy, identification with others, and, more generally, intersubjective processes are largely dependent on right-hemisphere resources. When we put ourselves in another’s shoes we are using the right inferior parietal lobe and the right lateral prefrontal cortex which is involved in inhibition of the automatic tendency to impose on others one’s own point of view. The right hemisphere plays an important role in what is known as “theory of mind,” a capacity to put oneself in another’s position and to see what is going on in that person’s mind. This capacity emerges in primates along with self-recognition and self-awareness, and is closely linked to it.

It is the right hemisphere that understands the emotional or the humorous aspects of a narrative and recognizes emotions through facial expression.

There is some evidence that whereas control of body functions through the sympathetic nervous system is more influenced by the right hemisphere, the parasympathetic nervous system is more under left hemisphere control. Whereas the parasympathetic nervous system produces relaxation of autonomic functions appropriate as responses to the familiar, the known and the emotionally more neutral environment, responding to new, uncertain and emotionally demanding situations is the special domain of the vigilant right hemisphere. The right hemisphere is more intimately connected with the unconscious and automatic systems for regulating the body and its level of arousal through the sympathetic nervous system that modulates heart rate, blood pressure and neural endocrine functions in connection to emotions.

In the perception of time, the right hemisphere is required for sustained monitoring of temporal information, whereas the left hemisphere is more efficient for detection of brief temporal flow interruptions where there is needed focus on the moment.

Moral judgment involves a complex right hemisphere network (particularly the right ventral, medial and orbitofrontal cortex as well as the amygdala in both hemispheres). Damage to the right prefrontal cortex may lead to frank psychopathic behaviour. Our sense of justice is underwritten by the right hemisphere, particularly by the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. With inactivation of this area, we act more selfishly. This is probably related to the right frontal lobe’s capacity to see the other’s point of view and to exhibit empathy in general.
The self is a complex concept but the self is intrinsically, empathically inseparable from the world in which it stands in relation to others and the continuous sense of self is more dependent on the right hemisphere, whereas the self as an expression of will is generally more dependent on the left hemisphere. The personal sense of the self with a history and emotional memory as well as what is sometimes called the self-concept, appears to be dependent to a very large extent on the right hemisphere. The self-concept is impaired by a right hemisphere injury, wherever in the right hemisphere it may occur, but the right frontal region is of a critical importance here. It is also the right hemisphere which is responsible for maintaining a coherent, continuous and unified sense of self. Right frontal damage impairs the sense of self over time, which relies on the self narrative and gives us a sense of a continuous flow-like existence.

The right hemisphere (usually involving the right frontal lobe) plays the principal role in activities that involve creative imagination, the capacity for spiritual (religious) inspirations and morals, music, dance, love of nature, a sense of humor and laughing, and the ability to change one’s mind. Whereas the left hemisphere’s relationship with the world manifests as reaching out to grasp, use and control, the right hemisphere’s activity appears to be one of reaching out without purpose. The main difference between the hemispheres is that the left hemisphere always has in view the purpose or use, and is more the instrument of our conscious will than the right hemisphere. The fundamentally opposite tendencies are for the left hemisphere to evaluate the objective reality for its personal utility, whereas the right hemisphere tendency is towards the sense of connectedness and a relationship with whatever lies outside the self. One tendency drives people to acquire power and control in the service of unitary survival; the essentially opposite drive is toward cooperation, synergy and mutual benefits based on collaboration in the service of the survival of the group.

The two hemispheres give us an opportunity to understand reality from their two opposite perspectives. The left hemisphere makes sense of reality by amalgamating the parts from the bottom up to create a cohesive structure, while according to the right hemisphere, our understanding of reality is derived from the whole since it is only in the light of the whole one can truly understand the nature of the parts. The right hemisphere gives a global intuitive impression of the world that was a whole before the left hemisphere’s separation and analysis transformed it into something else, a “representation” of reality which eventually needs to be reintegrated in the light of the whole.

By representing the world in a more abstract way, the left hemisphere provides us with the more detached representation of reality, whereas the right hemisphere gives an opportunity for experience of reality in a more direct manner and to take us beyond to something new, something other than ourselves. The right hemisphere is always open to nature, to whatever is new that comes from experience from the world at large. The left hemisphere’s dependence on language and abstraction yields the clarity and power to manipulate things that are static and isolated but ultimately lifeless; by contrast, the right hemisphere yields a wealth of individual experiences with the nature of things that are never fully graspable and can potentially cause harm because of their uncertainty. This is an inspiration for
philosophy which begins with wonder and sense of incompletion and ambiguity. The process of acquiring knowledge typically proceeds from the right hemisphere to the left hemisphere and back to the right hemisphere.

Western philosophical thought, especially Heidegger's or Nietzsche’s, represents a combination of the right hemispheres desire for understanding something beyond immediate reach and the left hemisphere efforts to achieve that ends. McGilchrist connects his ideas with Heidegger’s concept of truth. Heidegger regards truth as “unconcealing,” a process moving towards something which is hidden but never fully seen. This is in contrast to understanding truth as correctness, which assumes that in principle complete knowledge can be achieved.

However, the story of the Western world is one of increasing the left hemisphere domination. This is specifically addressed in the second part of the book, “How The Brain Has Shaped Our World,” which documents how in the Western civilization the balance between the hemispheres has switched towards the left hemisphere, which makes us believe that we can do anything, and achieve everything through our own efforts. By comparison the hemispheric balance in the Far Eastern cultures is based on more equal representation of the two hemispheres. The left hemisphere dominates our understanding of reality as viewed through the selection of words and through an organization resembling a mechanistic system. Heidegger noted a gradual encroachment of rationality on the natural territory of intuition or instinct. We transmit this attitude through culture when we select the behavioral models to imitate, and we become what we imitate. The contemporary hemispheric imbalance represents not a structural shift in the brain but a functional shift which was initiated by imitation of beliefs and practices of how reality was seen and by ways of being in the world which favor one or the other hemisphere. In the next generation such habits of mind and brain may be replicated by epigenetic mechanisms that encourage the trends. As we rely on choosing our own values and ideas, this process is guided by the left hemisphere.

It is McGilchrist’s thesis that in recent Western history our contemporary world skills have been downgraded and converted into algorithms so that we are busy imitating machines. Initially there was more symmetry and balance in manifestations of the hemispheric functions in our behavior; however advancement in the functioning of the frontal lobes (whose major purpose is to allow for appreciation of distance in space and delay in time) caused our detachment from our world and from ourselves.

There are positive implications of such an attitude, reflected especially in the Western culture and civilization. This attitude enables us to rise above the world in which we live, to plan, to think flexibly and inventively, and, in brief, to take control of the world around us rather than simply responding to it passively. This development at its best offers far greater capacity to speculate, to consider the lessons of the past, to project a vision of the possible into the future. It requires recording to externalize and establish more permanent traces of the mind’s working. This results in a huge expansion of written words in
documenting observations of nature and keeping records of historical events, as well as a development of diagrams, formulas and maps. But it also stops the flow of life and necessitates more reliance on the left hemisphere.

Ancient Greeks began the process of standing back by theorizing about the political state, developing maps, and observing the stars and the objective natural world, all activities that may be mediated by the left hemisphere, even though the urge to perform them comes from the right. The story of Prometheus portrays human nature as facing a dilemma of the two hemispheres which ends in tragedy; there is a desire to help people and a downfall through hubris. This represents the paradox of self consciousness and the beginning of the mind coming to know and understand its own nature.

From the perspective of bicameral brain diversity McGilchrist offers an insightful analysis of the Ancient World, Renaissance, Reformation and Enlightenment, Romanticism and Industrial Revolution along with Modern and Post Modern Worlds. These sections may be particularly interesting for students of civilizations. Those readers who do not wish to go through the anatomical and functional details that underlie evolutionary societal changes may go directly to these chapters based on the summary of the previous chapters that I provided in this review.

I consider this to be an important book for understanding who we are because of our brain structure and what our brain compels us to discover about ourselves in the course of our individual lives and historic development. Knowledge of brain-related inclinations and predispositions also forces us to ask the question how predetermined we are by our brain structure (and the corresponding functions) and whether there is room for it to be transcended.

Reviewed by Toby Huff

It has been known for some time that the glory days of science within the Muslim world occurred between the late tenth and the end of the thirteenth century. Other outstanding astronomers, mathematicians, physicians and philosophers have appeared in the centuries since then, but no revolutionary developments occurred like the 11th century revolution in optics pioneered by Ibn al-Haytham (d. 1040/2). A great many resources were devoted to astronomy but aside from some minor technical innovations, no revolution in astronomy occurred. Over time the burst of energy stimulated by the translation from Greek into Arabic of seminal works in science and natural philosophy between 750 and 950 C.E. dissipated. Some observers have suggested that it was the autocratic ways of the Ottoman Turks who became the dominant ethnic group across the Middle East after the conquest of Mamluk Cairo in 1515. While that is probably an exaggeration, it is true that the Ottomans scarcely measured up to the earlier advances in Arabic-Islamic science.

Other scholars have given us glimpses of seventeenth century Ottoman science and the exceedingly cautious assimilation of elements of the European scientific revolution which also illustrated the fact that the Ottomans had little interest in the work of Copernicus, Galileo, Kepler and Newton.

Now we have this new work, *Learned Patriots*, which sheds light on the nineteenth century debates taking place mainly in Istanbul. This interesting book is both informative and dispiriting. The author provides a comprehensive discussion of the many nineteenth-century Ottoman discussions of the importance of science to Ottoman society. The problem was that neither Arabic nor Turkish had an exclusive word for “science.” Instead from the outset the parties to the debate had to use some variant of the Arabic word ilm that generically means knowledge, and in the Islamic context it meant religious knowledge. As such, ilm was taken to be the highest, most profound and ethically correct knowledge available to humankind. Beyond that, Islamic religious scholars contrasted that knowledge to the “foreign” or ancient sciences (meaning the Greek tradition). As Yalcinkaya shows us, all the way to the early twentieth century, defenders of “useful knowledge” or the new “needed knowledge” (meaning the applied and modern sciences) had to offer subsidiary arguments that this “new knowledge” contributed to both the well-being of society and the moral quality of the individual. For the view persisted that the “foreign” sciences were inherently unIslamic.

Unfortunately the author gives us only a hint of the historical context during which the Ottoman education system and especially the medreses (Islamic colleges), took over the model of education established in the eleventh and later centuries by the Arab ulama, the religious scholars. As we recall the madrasas (using the Arabic transliteration) were totally devoted to the “religious” or “transmitted sciences,” meaning Quranic exegeses, hadith
studies, Arabic grammar and genealogy, some mathematics, and with the highest esteem given to the study of Islamic law, the shari’a. No natural philosophy or natural sciences were allowed in. Consequently, it was just because the Ottomans thoroughly took over and institutionalized this form of education, based essentially on rote memorization, that no graduates of the medreses were prepared for scientific inquiry as practiced in Europe, and this hundreds of years after the scientific revolution. The medreses failed to produce a cadre of “scientists” (for which there was no Turkish word), and due to external pressure, it was only diplomats, bureaucrats and “science appreciators” who called for the importation of the European-based sciences, technology and new learning.

This is why the book’s focus is on the occasional appearance of Ottoman scholars or bureaucrats rather than indigenous scientists who rose to champion the new “knowledge.” For it was only those who had visited or been trained in Europe, or perhaps trained in the Ottoman Military Academy or Ottoman School of Medicine, who had sufficient familiarity with the new sciences and saw them as the indispensable new and “needed knowledge” that could rescue the Ottoman state and Empire from its slow drift downward.

The story told by the author is largely about these aspiring bureaucrats and job-seekers who, with their greater or lesser understanding of the modern sciences, jockeyed for state positions, sincerely hoping that their understanding of the “new knowledge” could be introduced to Ottoman society, through the use of new textbooks, or more effectively, by introducing new institutions of higher education, most of which failed. Perhaps the most ambitious of these was the proposal to create a Darülfünun, an Ottoman styled university, but which only materialized in the first years of the twentieth century.

As mentioned, defenders of the new knowledge faced a great deal of opposition from those who suggested that this new knowledge could be dangerous to the youth and harmful to the Empire. The opposition had to be reassured that this new knowledge would not corrupt its possessors, especially the youth. It is clear that the prime motivation for all this self-reflection came almost wholly from the competitive international context within which it was plain to Ottoman observers that a major reason for the West’s ascendency and domination was its great abundance of science, technology and new learning.

The debate ended inconclusively with pro-science and anti-science expostulators presenting convoluted arguments about whether education had to be basically religious (Islamic), whether there was once a Muslim contribution to the new sciences, whether such masters of the new sciences could be real patriots, and so on, all of which barely advanced the discussion. Yalcinkaya needs to dig deeper into the religious and philosophical contexts that so inhibited nineteenth century thinkers from making more profound arguments than they did for the pursuit of modern science. For other scholars have long noted an interesting temporal comparison between Turkey and Japan in the early twentieth century: both hoped to modernize and acquire modern science, yet only the Japanese succeeded, leaving many scholars puzzled about the Turkish case. This could be a useful supplementary book for history of science courses yet it is just the author’s greater knowledge of the social sciences
than the history of science, especially Middle Eastern science, that weakens its appeal. A case in point, apparently unknown to the author, is the arrival of the telescope in Ottoman lands in the 1620s. It generated no interest among Ottoman astronomers who might have used it as a new discovery machine and served to reform Arab-Islamic astronomy. In a word, the Ottoman nineteenth century discussion of the role of science in society remains flat-footed, barely cognizant of its previous history.

The young Turks championing the modern sciences lacked what Europeans always had, namely, the idea that there are objective techniques and logical means for getting at the truth, what the Greeks (and Newton) called natural philosophy. Such a position assumes that whatever is found out using such means transcends religious and “denominational” boundaries. The new Turks had to convince the traditional knowers (ilmiyye, Turkish; ulama, Arabic) that there is such a thing as objective knowledge of the natural world (and how it operates), and such knowledge transcends “good and evil,” so that we do not have to question the religious commitments or moral standing of such seekers after truth. These deep philosophical questions elude the writer, who otherwise gives us a valuable starting point.

Reviewed by Connie Lamb

This book is part of the series, Themes in World History, which proposes to provide exciting, new and wide-ranging surveys of the important themes of world history. Each theme is examined over a broad period of time allowing analysis of continuities and change. Manning’s book certainly fits this pattern, in its broad time coverage, analysis of local movements, and historical methods for discussing migration. Manning defines human migration simply as the “movement from one place to another and from one social context to another” (191).

Patrick Manning is a well-known world historian and is currently the Andrew W. Mellon Professor of World History at the University of Pittsburgh. He is also a specialist on Africa and has written many books and articles on world history and African topics. Besides being a teacher and author, Manning is the president of the World History Network, Inc. a nonprofit corporation fostering research and graduate study in world history. His education includes a BS in chemistry with a minor in history from the California Institute of Technology and a Masters in history and economics as well as a PhD in history from the University of Wisconsin-Madison. He was trained as a specialist in the economic history of Africa and went on to explore demographic, social, and cultural patterns in Africa and the African diaspora. Manning has published numerous articles and several books and teaches classes on world history and interdisciplinary methodology, the use of which is evident in his world migration book. He has been active in the American Historical Association and is currently serving as the President of that society.

This book on migration seems to build on his past work about Africa and global history, especially two of his books, *World History: Global and Local Interactions* (2005) and *Migration History in World History* (2010). *Migration in World History* is organized chronologically but by topic within time periods. There are many books on migration, but Manning’s has a unique approach, covering the entire history of the world with a broad scope of places and topics. Most other authors discuss current migrations globally or focus on particular places or peoples.

Chapter one, as the introduction, talks about modeling patterns of human migration, giving various methods of research and Manning’s own way of studying local and global human migration. Chapter two covers the emergence of human beings and their earliest migrations to 40,000 BP. The next seven chapters discuss large time periods and issues that characterize them: peopling northern and American regions, agriculture, commerce, modes of movement, spanning the oceans, labor for industry and empire, and urbanization to 2000.

Many disciplines may be used to study migration including sociology, anthropology, economics, linguistics, history, archaeology, demographics, genetics, chemistry and political science. Manning sets out his theory or model of migration by defining a human
community as the speakers of a given language, so he bases his work mainly on linguistics. He then identifies four categories of human migration: home-community migration, colonization, whole-community migration, and cross-community migration. Manning focuses mainly on the last one: cross-community migration (7).

Cross-community migrants are generally rather small in number and the author categorizes them as settlers, sojourners, itinerants and invaders. Settlers are those who move to join an existing community with the intent to remain there; sojourners are those moving to a new community with the intent to return to their home community; itinerants move from community to community but have no single home to which they expect to return; invaders are those who arrive as a group in a community with the objective of seizing control rather than joining. Migrants may journey on their own, but, more often than not, their movement is facilitated by cross-community networks that involve cooperation across distance and across boundaries of language and culture, aiding the movement of migrants from one place to another (8-9). As individuals and groups move, they may absorb the culture and language of their new locale, and they may, in turn, affect the community they enter. Thus migration results in stories of human development, the complex process of transformation in human society (10). Manning discusses how migration affected human behavior and culture by presenting individual stories of migration to illustrate the experience of each type.

Migrations, whether of long or short distance or duration, are central to human experience. This book emphasizes the continuity of human migration over our long history, and the similarity of processes and functions of migration over time and space (191). Looking at the migration process world-wide, Manning draws on examples from a broad range of geographical regions and thematic topics throughout history. His use of both global and local examples provide readers both an overall view and insights into specific areas and topics.

In his chapter on agriculture, Manning states that agriculture developed in several regions of the world and that agricultural development was mainly a long process of experimentation and discussion (59). Certain crops originated in particular areas: yams, millet and sorghum in Africa, rice in China, taro and bananas in Indonesia and squash in South America. Later, beans, potatoes, maize, and manioc were developed in South America. The spread of agriculture to every area of the world was accomplished both by colonization by the original developers of agriculture and as the result of crop migration through a long term pattern of cross-community migration (74). Using his linguistics model, Manning states that agriculture affected the distribution of subgroups of the great linguistic families rather than the movement of entire language groups.

The period from 3000 BCE to 500 CE was a formative period for today’s societies, which saw accelerated human development, the spread of agriculture, and increased commerce, especially through the development of civilizational centers. Migrations brought about interactions of groups and the increase in commercial ventures (77).
In the chapter “Modes of movement, 500 to 1400 CE,” Manning states that habitual human patterns of cross-community migration linked regions to each other, spread earlier innovations, and brought about new innovation. Such travel took place by foot, on horseback and by boat, not only mixing cultures and languages but also spreading diseases (83-94). The author speaks of these modes and how settlers, warriors and merchants changed the old world.

In his chapter on “Spanning the oceans, 1400 to 1700,” Manning discusses how improved maritime technology helped humans to succeed in encompassing the globe. Those involved in such travel included explorers, conquerors, merchants, missionaries, and family groups. All their travels resulted in the carrying and borrowing of cultures revealed through changes in language and material culture (109).

From 1700 to 1900, humans endured forced migrations and difficult race relations. It was a time of empires, nation building, an increased global economy, and unprecedented voluntary migration throughout the world. In the 1900s the world experienced even greater human mobility especially from rural places to the cities, diasporas of certain groups, and the increase of refugees. Ideas, literature, culture, religion spread from place to place. “Migration brings the connections that spread innovations all across the planet, but it also brings the improvement in communications that enable people to resist or transform global influences” (182). Language communities remain significant even in this global world and are important to further innovation and development especially through migration.

As a summary, the book covers the following:

- the earliest migrations and the spread and development of Homo sapiens;
- the rise and spread of major language groups;
- exams civilizations, farmers and pastoralists from 3,000 BCE to 500 CE;
- trade patterns including the early Silk Road and maritime trade in the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean;
- the effect of migration on empire and industry between 1700 and 1900;
- the resurgence of migration in the later twentieth century, including movement to cities, refugees and diasporas; and
- the various leading theories and debates surrounding the subject of migration.

Manning’s writing is very readable and his subheadings make the book easy to follow. His vast knowledge is evident in the many places and topics he discusses, his use of various disciplines, and his discussion of the controversies about migration theories (given in the appendix). In his book, Manning traces the movement of people, crops, diseases, religion, technology, ideas, and, of course, language. The figures and maps he provides, which include several maps of language groups and movement, plant origins, and large group migrations, are especially helpful as visual companions to the discussion. *Migration in World History* is a fascinating read for anyone interested in the history of the world through the lens of migration.

Reviewed by Shi Yuanhui

In 2014, Professor Fang Hanwen of Soochow University, China, published his 5-volumed monograph, A Study of Comparative Civilizations, offering his understanding of the main civilizations in the world. Professor Fang won his doctorate in Beijing Normal University in 1990, and he continued his studies of comparative literature and comparative civilizations, having published 34 books. As he wrote in the epilogue, he had been working on the book, A Study of Comparative Civilizations, since he was still reading for his doctor’s degree and finally completed it when he was invited to be a full-time research fellow in Peking University. (p. 414-15, Vol. 5)

The first volume of the book consists of an introduction and discusses the origin and systems of civilizations. Volume 2, Volume 3, and Volume 4 describe the major civilizations in the world in terms of historical growth, political factors such as nations, states and powers, as well as religion and spiritual belief. In the last volume, Professor Fang makes a comparative study of western and eastern civilizations, and gives his own judgment about the future of the world.


Contrary to Max Weber’s judgment that Confucianism preaches getting accustomed to the world rationally, Professor Fang affirms the value of traditional Confucianism, which, Professor Fang believes, advocates the active transformation of the world. Professor Fang accepts the idea of Guo Moruo about the origin of Confucianists, who Guo believes derived their belief from the change of spiritual human belief from primitive worship of oracles and witches to humanism. (p. 128-29, Vol. 4) In this sense, Confucianism is actually focused on how to improve human life, and thus make a more habitable world and a more peaceful and friendly human community. Fang states his disagreement with Weber in the viewpoint of the latter, pointing out that firstly Weber shouldn’t have drawn analogy between Christian priests and Confucianists; secondly Weber neglected the demand of Confucius and Mencius that true man should make efforts to implement the principle of tiandao (“Way of Heaven”) to establish a Chinese Garden of Eden for people, and thirdly Confucianism is not a religion as Weber argued. (p. 10-17, Vol. 4.) In fact, in The Analects one of Confucius’ disciples once said, “The true man has to be strong-minded and persevering, for he is taking a very formidable mission with an endless journey ahead” and in the same book Confucius was once frowned on by a common gatekeeper for he believed the sage was “one who knows that what he pursues is impossible and yet persists anyway.” (14.38).
Zhang Zai, a Confucianist in Northern-Song Dynasty, tasked the intellectuals to “Find the central principle of the natural world, defend the normal life of the people, learn and pass down the doctrines of the past sages, and establish eternal peace for thousands of generations.” The strong sense of responsibility to make a more humane world is self-evident in Confucianists.

Of course, Fang doesn’t deny some defects of traditional Confucianism. He points out that the golden mean of Confucianism, preaching being open-minded and tolerant, is at the same time liable to suffocate deep and metaphysical recognition and understanding of things, especially paying little attention to science and technology and often making compromise between truth and fallacy, for the traditional idea emphasized that people should be moderate and always ready to achieve a comprehensive balance between various things, thus making the world more harmonious, instead of pursuing some particular and detailed knowledge by being interested in only one thing, or several things. (p. 137-140, Vol. 4)

In this sense, Fang believes that Confucianism, especially Neo-Confucianism which exerted profound influence over Chinese psychology for about 800 years, as a moral philosophy, could make a complement to western rationalism. He wrote in the book, “Chinese Confucianism, as a humanism doctrine, will make a better spiritual support for the human future than monotheisms. This is an advantage in Chinese civilization, although this doesn’t mean Confucianism is the best. But it is undoubtedly a far-reaching social ideal, and of course, western science and technology will still certainly function as a motivation in social history.” (p. 410, Vol. 5.) Here Confucianism, as Professor Fang said, could provide the human future with spiritual or psychological reassurance and guidance which western rationalism would most probably fail to offer. But it shouldn’t be denied that western rationalism, although problematic in some ways, would still be the backbone and driving force to human history, especially western science and technology. In this sense, Confucianism would function as a complement to western rationalism, for the latter seems to be focused too much on some profoundly mechanical, instrumental and logical methods of thought, while the sense of compromise, tolerance of ideological differences, and mutual care and help in Confucianism would bring to human world, especially different civilizations, some means of getting united peacefully and staying as different ones at the same time, softening largely or even diminishing the excessive rigidity of western rationalism.

In the book, Professor Fang points out that the deep root of western-centricism of rationality can be found in Hegel’s doctrine. In his Lectures on the Philosophy of History, Hegel once declared that rationality should be the only factor in whose yardstick history could be measured in terms of philosophy and that world history was actually a course of rationalization, for rationality was the arbitrator of the world. Hegel was obviously preaching western rationality and at the same time rejecting eastern mode of thought, thus exhibiting a western-centricism of rationality. In his Lesser Logic, Hegel often mentioned the two conceptions of identity and disparity and declared the two co-existed side by side, but he believed at the same time that absolute rationality could bring itself to reality, making
idea identical with existence. In this sense, Hegel highlighted identity more than disparity. (p. 377-78, Vol. 5)

In 1993, Huntington published his article “The Clash of Civilizations?” in Foreign Affairs, arguing that after the collapse of the Soviet Russia, Islam would be the foremost challenge to western civilization. That article was expanded in 1996 into a book entitled The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. Huntington believed that the world, after the Cold War, would have to face the cultural clashes instead of the ideological ones, and conflicts between major civilizations would be most likely to occur for the cultural tensions were irreconcilable. The September 11th Attack in 2001 and some other Islamic terrorism incidents seem to be some confirmations of Huntington’s understanding of civilizations. But in fact, Huntington’s conception is a new version of Hegel’s emphasis of identity, only preaching the predominating position of western civilization, neglecting the mutual cultural understanding and tolerance and thus being very dangerous to the peace of the world. After all, those Islamic terrorists shouldn’t be considered as true representatives of all Muslims, and what’s more, the imposition of western values and the frequent military interference are the direct causes of the terrorism. In cultural communications, it is undeniable that each person has his or her own judgment whether some certain cultural values are acceptable or not, and that those universal ideas such as democracy, freedom, equality and human rights established in Enlightenment have their own life and would sooner or later bloom in the world. That is to say, we should be pretty self-confident that with the gradual cultural communications, those truly universal western values would be finally accepted by the world, while their rude imposition through violent interventions would only lead to disorder and trouble, even though these actions are justified regarding their purpose. Besides, it should be mentioned that even though those universal ideas have been accepted by the whole world, cultural differences will still exist, because identity and disparity coexist side by side. In this sense, the west ought to be patient and respectful to cultural differences.

Fukuyama’s end of history is another version of Hegel’s highlighting of identity, because Fukuyama believed that western democracy would be the last and eternal social system, or the world politics would be westernized with the end of Cold War and the collapse of Soviet Russia. In this sense, the conception of end of history also preaches the predominating role of western political system in the whole world, believing the western political system would be sufficiently applicable to the whole world and ignoring the fact that different civilizations would absorb western political conceptions with their various choice based on their various national tradition and culture. What’s more unacceptable is that Fukuyama believes that since individuals have achieved their “equality” and needs, they would lose the desire to be superior to others and then the history of human race would be static without the motivation of individuals. About this point, Professor Fang points out that Fukuyama has put his studies of human history on the foundation of individual psychology, that he has misunderstood Hegel’s relationship between master and slave, and that his doctrine has
something to do with Reich’s idea that human psychology was determined by social politics. (p. 344-49, Vol. 5.)

In his book, Professor Fang writes about his own understanding of the human future. First, he argues against theological and secular conceptions of Utopia, declaring that they, although pursuing progress, are actually denying continual historical progress by saying that Utopia is the final and perfect social state. Secondly, he talks about Fukuyama’s end of history. Finally, he rejects any prophecy that the human world will end in doom. He believes that the human world will persevere in spite of many problems and that in the future western rationality will be eventually replaced by a New Dialectical Rationality that would grow out of the long communication between western rationality and Chinese rationality as articulated in the ideas of The Book of Changes and Mohist Canon. Of course, although he expresses his deep concerns about social problems provoked by the unlimited overuse of rationality, especially instrumental rationality, Professor Fang doesn’t deny the true value of western rationality, which he believes has brought about such progress in the world and will still function as the motivation of human history. (p. 336-410, Vol. 5.)

As is mentioned at the beginning of this paper, Professor Fang has been working on this book for more than 20 years, and he has put his own insightful understanding of world civilizations in the book. But will his ideas be accepted by readers? We have to wait and see.


Reviewed by Laina Farhat-Holzman

These two books treat one important subject that dominated 20th century history: the rise, fall, and influence of Germany.


In 1989, the Berlin Wall fell, a dramatic end to the cold war between the west and the Soviet Union. Shortly thereafter, the Soviet Union collapsed too, greatly reducing the size and power of what had been a de facto Russian Empire.

This monumental event, when analyzed later from the accumulated archives, shares with many such events a confluence of accidents, mistakes, and unintended consequences. Historians who present events as predictable and inevitable are missing the mark.

The November 9th fall of the wall surprised everybody. Officials who could have prevented this were ill, traveling, or otherwise indecisive. In the book, we meet the players: the young radicals, the Stasi officer on duty at the wall that night, and the Politburo member who decided to open the wall to a press conference that included (by chance) Tom Brokaw from NBC News. As crowds massed, nobody seemed to know what to do. This had not been the case for decades, when an East German citizen daring to cross into the West usually ended with death or imprisonment.

The Fall of the Berlin Wall should remind us of the confluence of events that triggered the French Revolution, the Russian Revolution, and (not yet acknowledged) the Iranian Revolution.

This should also be a reminder to all tyrants that they cannot count on their oppression to keep people permanently in line. Oppressors do fall.

Not only did the imprisonment of the East German population collapse during one night, but the reunion of East and West Germany has been so successful that Germany is now being led by two East Germans, the most famous of whom is Angela Merkel. Under Gorbachev, the Soviet Union was already going through a reformation, but the collapse of the wall overwhelmed this careful process and brought the roof down on the USSR.

This is a book worth reading and mulling over how accidents can change the world.
Barry Rubin & Wolfgang G. Schwanitz, Nazis, Islamists, and the Making of the Modern Middle East.

Not long ago, Israel's Prime Minister Netanyahu commented in a speech that Hitler was influenced by his ally, the Palestinian Grand Mufti, Amin al-Husaini, to murder rather than expel Europe's Jews. There was an immediate uproar that this statement was historically incorrect, and that by saying this, he was diminishing Hitler's role in the Holocaust. It seems that it was not incorrect, and this book, written by two very solid scholars, has not only validated this assessment, but has provided documents, letters, and photographs hitherto not widely available.

Why should this matter? The Holocaust was a Nazi program, no matter what the inspiration for it. But it does matter in another way: it reveals something that has not been widely understood: the long-standing parallel developments during the 1920s and 30s of a murderous brand of fascism that allied the Nazis with the Muslim world. We see the continuum of this ideology today in the similarity of ISIS genocidal practices in their conquered territories with those of the Nazis as they rampaged through Poland and Russia. The values are the same.

The authors spell out their rationale: “The story of Nazi Germany's involvement in the Middle East has hitherto largely been viewed as a dramatic tale of might-have-been that was nevertheless marginal to Middle East history and the course of World War II. In fact, however, this episode was central to the modern history of the Middle East and continues to reverberate many decades later given its profound effects on Arab nationalism, Islamism, and the course taken by the Palestinian Arab movement” (ix).

The rise of the Nazis after World War I paralleled fascist movements all over the world at that time. Dictatorships blossomed, all sharing the same disdain for democracy, votes for women, and tolerance for some ethnic diversity. The Muslim world, such as it was (ethnically divided) followed the same track. What that world had in common were authoritarian rule in their newly minted countries, a religion frozen in the Middle Ages, and injured pride over their obvious backwardness.

The new Nazi party played on this commonality, and one charismatic figure who emerged in the Palestinian territory (still under British control) was a man of Circassian ancestry (blond and blue-eyed), claiming descent from the Prophet Mohammad, and through family pull, appointed as the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem. Al-Husaini was not a cleric, nor was he pious; he was, however, ferociously ambitious and aspired to become the next Caliph, a dictator over all Muslims. (The last “Caliph” had been the Ottoman Sultan, both roles abolished when the Ottomans were defeated during World War I.)

Hitler and the Grand Mufti became allies, an alliance ignored in history until now. They met several times and the Nazis protected him throughout the war, even though the jihad he promised never materialized. Husaini had little luck in organizing an Arab army, but he
did better with the Muslims of the USSR, India, Afghanistan, and the Balkans, creating Muslim corps who assisted the Nazis in their holocaust.

Husaini was definitely a war criminal and was on Britain's list for trial and (hopefully) execution. The Swiss would not give him refuge as Germany fell, but the French did, out of spite against the British, and they released him to create decades of Islamist mayhem in the Middle East. The French did it again when they gave refuge to the Ayatollah Khomeini. Without these two men, world history would have been very different.

The great irony here is that the Muslim world always managed to choose losers: first the Nazis, and then the Communists. Now they are following the latest Islamo-fascist cult, ISIS. Saudi money is still supporting that movement, along with stolen oil, extortion taxes, “Islamic” fines on their conquered subjects, and criminal enterprises such as human trafficking and drugs. National borders are in meltdown, hordes of citizens fleeing, and the region's anarchy moving global.

The connection between the Nazis and the Muslim World is alive and well, but is doomed to the same end that the Nazis earned. This is a definitive book on this very current subject.

These reviews demonstrate how important Germany’s involvement was in the worst 20th century events. Nothing that they did in World War II was a one-time only. The seeds were already planted in World War I, and before that, in the encouragement of the Muslim Arab world to revolt against their colonizers (Ottoman, and later British and French) and side with Germany in the world wars and after.

This is a sad observation when one thinks of the wonderful contributions of Germany before that to science, music, literature, and philosophy.

Reviewed by William McGaughey

Peter Demetz, a retired professor of comparative literature at Yale, has written a comprehensive, detailed history of his home town, Prague, in the Czech republic. A Yale graduate in the class of 1964, I remember Demetz as an occasional lecturer in the “Directed Studies” program given freshmen and sophomores in the humanities.

The book is not easy reading because of the great number of unfamiliar names and places that enter into the story. Our world history tends to neglect nations not neighboring the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic. Prague is in central Europe as a kind of bridge between Germanic and Slavic cultures. Yet it has a fascinating history which Demetz brings to life.

The city of Prague begins with Duke Borivoj, a Christian ruler of the late 9th century A.D., around the time when two missionaries from Greece, Cyril and Methodius, invented the Slavic script. He belonged to the Premyslid clan. A virgin soothsayer named Lubussa had rescued Czech people from the plague and, on her advice, they built a castle called Praga.

Lubussa then married a clever plowman named Premysl who became the ruler of people living in that area. She is the mythological founder of Prague, prophesying that it was destined to become “a great city whose fame will touch the stars.”

Demetz describes how the city of Prague was initially a collection of villages on both sides of the Vltava (Moldau) river. The Prague castle was constructed on the Hradcany plateau to the northwest. It became an early seat of power and center of various churches and communities. Another ancient community was Vysehrad, near the junction of the Vltava and Botic rivers. The royal residence shifted between these two places. North of Vysehrad and east of Hradcany was the “Old Town”, a much larger community. A “New Town”, south of the other, was settled later. The settlements consisted of Czech, German, Jewish, and Italian peoples. Their principal landmarks were churches, synagogues and monasteries.

The first noteworthy ruler of Bohemia was Otakar II, 1233-1278, whose mother was a granddaughter of the Byzantine emperor. By strategic marriages and divorces he built a powerful kingdom which extended between the Baltic and Adriatic seas. Otakar’s nemesis was Rudolf of Hapsburg, who outmaneuvered Otakar in the election for Holy Roman emperor and later defeated him in battle.

Demetz’s book focuses upon the principal Bohemian monarchs of late medieval times. The ongoing struggle between Popes and Holy Roman Emperors or, as they were called, the Guelf (pro-pope) and Ghibelline (pro-emperor) factions, became a distinguishing feature
of European politics. Otakar’s kingdom attracted Italian refugees from the Ghibelline camp.

Czech political power may have reached a peak during the reign of the 14th century monarch, Vaclav, who was later named Charles. Prague went through a period of political turmoil after Otakar’s death in 1278. An agreement was reached for the youngest son of King Henry of Carinthia, John of Luxembourg, to marry Eliska of the Premyslid family and become the future king of Bohemia. King John was not much interested in Prague or its people. John sent his son, Vaclav (Charles), to France to be educated. Later, Charles was sent on diplomatic missions for his father. Before long, Charles and his father became political rivals.

After Charles ascended to the throne, he embarked upon an ambitious building project for Prague. He established a New Town south of the Old Town, replete with new churches, monasteries, and markets. He also renovated the Vysehrad area. Charles ordered the fortifications dividing the New and Old Towns to be demolished but then, after turmoil, ordered the old division to be restored. Most notably, in 1347, Charles established a university, authorized by Pope Clement VI, to serve the Bohemian people. This was to become politically important. The university was organized in separate blocs or “nations” for the Bohemians, Poles, Saxons, and Bavarians.

Charles took an interest in literature and in codifying law. He became a patron of Petrarch, the Italian humanist, and also became acquainted with the political visionary, Cola di Rienzi, who wanted to restore the Roman Empire. As Holy Roman Emperor, Charles had much political influence at a time when the Papacy was divided between Avignon and Rome. Under Charles, Prague became a center of European culture. The King cultivated the political legacies of Charlemagne and of his Premyslid forbearers.

In the second half of the 14th century, cracks began to appear in the structure of culture and power. The Inquisition became more aggressive. In 1389, eleven years after Charles’ death, Jews were massacred in Prague after Jews were supposed to have abused a priest. Charles’ son, Vaclav IV, was not much interested in his royal duties, preferring to hunt game, carouse with his friends, or get drunk. He also had to contend with rebellious barons.

The Hussite revolution of 1415-1422 completely upset the political order. Jan Hus was a well-respected scholar and preacher at the Bethlehem church. John Wycliffe’s influence was becoming strong. Passions were aroused by corruption in the church. Hus himself condemned the selling of papal indulgences. King Vaclav ordered Hus to leave the country. Pope John XXIII convened a grand council at Constance to reform the church. Jan Hus went to Constance hoping to participate in the reform but was instead arrested. After refusing to recant his heretical beliefs, Hus was burned at the stake.

The treatment of Hus at Constance galvanized his supporters in Prague. A group of powerful barons came to his defense. Soon preachers were speaking to audiences at mass
rallies. Church loyalists and the Hussites engaged in battles in and around Prague. By trickery, the Old Town alderman lured the principal Hussite general, Jan Zelivsky, to his death and displayed his severed head to crowds before they themselves were killed. Eventually, peace was restored.

The Hussite rebellion was a precursor to Luther’s successful protest a century later as well as to similar events in 17th century England, 18th century France, and 20th century Russia and China. So, in a way, these early events in Prague laid the foundation for future revolutionary or democratic governments.

A number of Bohemian kings followed Vaclav - the Polish king Louis, Ferdinand of Hapsburg, Ferdinand II, and Maximilian II. Demetz focuses, however, upon Maximilian’s son, Rudolf, who had a Spanish mother. Rudolf was an active and effective ruler in the early part of his life. He was also a notable collector. He collected paintings, writings, and even scientists.

King Rudolf was a patron to the Danish astronomer Tycho Brache and to Brache’s assistant Johannes Kepler. Alchemists, including charlatans, also gathered at Rudolf’s court. This was a golden age of Jewish culture. Rabbi Lowe, best known for his association with the golem, was a leading intellectual. After 1600, Rudolf became increasingly detached from his public duties. A revolt broke out between religious factions in 1618 which led to the Thirty Years war.

The book goes on to describe Mozart’s time in Prague, the counterrevolution of 1848, and the career of T.G. Masaryk around the time of World War I. This review does not do justice to Peter Demetz’s magnificent work, more productive than grading papers at Yale. The book Prague in Black and Gold: Scenes in the Life of a European City is recommended.

Reviewed by Laina Farhat-Holzman

Peter Zeihan launched his own firm: Zeihan on Geopolitics, in 2012, after working for 12 years with the geopolitical analysis firm, Stratfor (Strategic Forecasts), where he was Vice President of Analysis.

Zeihan’s definition of geopolitics explains how important this discipline is to understanding the world we live in. “Geopolitics is the study of how place impacts...everything: the clothes you wear, the food you eat, the size and serviceability of your mortgage, how long you live, how many children you have, the stability of your job, the shape and feel of your country’s political system, what sorts of war your country wages or defends itself against, and ultimately whether your culture will withstand the test of time. The balance of rivers, mountains, oceans, plains, deserts, and jungles massively influences everything about both the human condition and national success.”

He warns, however, that geopolitics is not the ONLY determinant. Human agency can provide surprises. But geography cannot be ignored. It just cannot be used to say that some human beings are better than others; they are just luckier; and sometimes the less lucky can use what they have with more intelligence.

“At its core,” he says, “The Accidental Superpower is about the advantages and disadvantages that geography imposes. How such characteristics interact to create the world we now know. How fluctuations in those interactions are about to turn that world on its ear. How the most powerful state of the ending era will evolve into something far greater in the new.”

The book begins with the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944 (during WWII), which set up an agenda that established a global system of rule of law. Out of it came the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. These were all institutions for putting back together devastated Europe and the foundations of the free-trade-dominated global economic systems that endure to this day. The US called the shots; they were the war effort in manpower, money, and materiel.

And this was what they were fighting for: the closed systems of the past (European colonial networks) would no longer be permitted. What was new was that America would open up all the world with our Navy to free trade. No more closed systems. No more excuses for war. None of these empires (British, Dutch, French) would have rival navies after this war. They would have to give up their empires. Including Japan, of course.
The book details the rebuilding of Europe and Asia, and the enormous prosperity it engendered, despite the USSR’s attempt to undo it.

Now, says Zeihan, it is time to retire the Bretton Woods deal. It is winding down. This will not mean the end of US American power, but it is the end of this particular phase and the beginning of a period of chaos and the rise of a new one in its place. The US will be the only stable one in a world of collapse.

The second section of the book covers how geopolitics works: Place matters. Zeihan analyzes the benefits of nature and culture of the US and then every other possible major power of our time. There is little contest, he believes. The US has the balance of transport, deepwater navigation, and industrialization. In all three cases, the US enjoys the physical geography most favorable to their application. (More than any place else in the world.)

The next chapters look at our military defenses, a hard-eyed estimate of which seems to render us invulnerable. This invulnerability is not a matter of our cleverness but rests on the extraordinary geopolitics we command. He asks: Who could duke it out with our population of 300 million of us? China? India, The combined EU and Russia? Even combined, it appears that we are secure.

The book provides a keen analysis of World War II, its deadly costs and its aftermath in which the United States was the only intact superpower.

We could have been a nasty victor, but we were not. The US could have occupied by force, but we did not. The Russians did. We made alliances and did everything through voluntary cooperation. We waged peace, using trade as a weapon.

But our largesse was expensive. Free trade isn’t cheap from a military point of view. The Cold War ended in 1989. Now what? Do we still patrol the world? He addresses next the energy revolution and demographics.

In a final chapter on migration and terrorism, he notes that Militant Islam will continue to roil the world, but much less so for us. We will be the beneficiaries of a flood of immigrants who are already educated and are looking for a safe place for their families and their money. This is all to the good for the United States.

This book might seem to some triumphalist about the United States. I don’t see it that way. Zeihan is a geopolitical analyst and he has provided a hard-eyed look at our recent past, present, and future. Most of what he has written makes sense to me.

Reviewed by Mary Tepfenhart

Michael Romann and Alex Weingrod are professors at Tel Aviv University and Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, both residents of Jerusalem. This comprehensive study focuses on the everyday ethnic relations between Jews and Arabs, both in residential and business locations within the ancient Holy City. Utilizing a mix of documents, studies, official reports, field interviews and observations, detailed investigations in large factory and a major hospital, the book covers two decades from 1967 to 1987. As the authors stated, the study is an attempt to present “Jerusalem’s realities without ideological preconceptions” and to examine the variety of exchanges from the viewpoint of both Jews and Arabs.”(xxii)

The first of the nine chapters of the book deals with the history of this very contested city, from biblical times to the 20th century. The Jews cannot envision a state without Jerusalem as the capital. The city holds great religious significance for the Arabs, Muslims and Christians, who inherited that land for thousands of years. In time, Jerusalem was divided according to religious and ethnic times into four sections: Muslim, Jewish, Christian and Armenian. Despite this voluntarily segregation, there were frequent contacts between them. In the 19th and 20th centuries, the political forum in Jerusalem was made up of a Muslim mayor and Christian and Jewish councilors. The same pattern continued under the British Mandate system.

After the war in 1948, the city was partitioned into two different and disconnected entities. The border line became dangerous and both communities moved away, in opposite directions. Jerusalem was reunited in 1967 under Jewish jurisdiction, and this created different kinds of problems. There were problems regarding the legal status of the Arabs (some had Jordanian passports, some took Israeli citizenship). The Jewish government wanted to impose laws on the Arabs, who did not recognize their authority. Arabs expressed their resistance in different forms such as demonstrations, strikes, terror or noncooperation. However, many worked for Jewish companies and have continued to do so.

The authors exemplify the complexity of problems with an example of a village, Abu Tur, inhabited by Arabs before 1967, where Jews moved in after the war. The two groups have separate schools and hospitals. There are few incentives for these two groups to interact. Jews are apprehensive of Arabs for terrorist attacks. Arabs are also afraid the Israeli police might pick them up following an incident in the neighborhood. However, this does not mean the groups have no contacts whatsoever. Many Arabs work for Jewish companies and stores, though it is not common to see Jews working for Arabs. There are Jews who rent apartments from Arab landlords. In the past, some of these landlords dealt with British and Jewish citizens. There is an economic incentive. Many times, these Jewish renters
would act as brokers for the Arab landlords and for other Arabs. At the same time, the landlords became “protectors” for their tenants against any kind of harassment.

Michael Romann and Alex Weingrod continue the study with an analysis of work relations between Jews and Arabs. According to Israeli Labor Legislation, Arabs are entitled to the same wage and benefits as Jews. Arabs are represented in local labor committees. However, Arabs find it difficult to climb the professional ladder. This is the result of lack of the certifications required to obtain a better position. The classes offered for these certificates are conducted in Hebrew.

There are some paradoxical situations where Jews have complained that they are discriminated against and Arabs favored by a boss:

“When one of the Arabs asks the boss for a loan, he’ll always get it. Let’s say that it’s a few days before payday and the Arab comes along and says that he has a big payment that he must make now. The boss will say: “How much do you need?” and he’ll give him an advance on his salary. And then, let’s say that a Jew comes along and asks for the same thing. The Jew will be refused. He’ll tell him that he must learn to live within his means, has to budget his money and all of that. That’s the way he is, I’m telling you. He helps Arabs but not Jews.” (135)

Jews and Arabs work together out of economic necessity. They can have very good relations at work, but outside, these relations do not continue. There are other constraints for both groups. The Jews will work with the Arabs but not for the Arabs. The Arabs are confronted with the dilemma that they are employed by a Jewish company.

The last chapter and the conclusions cover the problem of integration. Their research showed that there is a “widespread segregation” (221) in commercial and residential public institutions. Because of deeply rooted antagonism, differences in religion, and cultural-ethnic prejudice and violence, neither the Jews nor the Arabs want to be totally assimilated to the other. Low-level integration in commercial locations and employment enables both groups to keep their identity and avoid conflicts.

Segregation in Jerusalem is more intense than in other cities such as Haifa and Acre, which have large Arab minorities, and where Arab businesses have moved into Jewish neighborhoods. There, Arabs vote in municipal and national elections. They also participate more in politics, setting up exclusive Israeli Arab parties.

Occasionally, there are outbreaks of violence (like the intifada) or civil disobedience, such as refusal to pay taxes. Arabs have been urged by their leaders to boycott Jewish businesses and products, but this has had negative effects on both communities from an economic point of view, since Jewish merchants use Arab brokers to channel their products to the Arabs while the Arabs do the same thing to channel their products to the Jewish population.
The authors conclude that low-level integration based on everyday interests will continue in the future but that major issues such as political rights and fair distribution of resources, and employment still remain unresolved. It rests upon these ethnic groups to decide how much compromise they are willing to accept in order to reach peaceful coexistence.

Grounded in important issues of our time, this book addresses questions of integration, tolerance and making a living in changing times. This volume offers thought-provoking observations, and is an excellent source of information for everybody interested in the topic.

Reviewed by Michael Andregg

This was among the last books published by the UN University Press before it went out of business due to chronic funding shortages at the United Nations. That is testament both to this book’s importance to the UN system, and to the profound challenges that the UN faces today fulfilling its ideal missions with an organizational structure created in 1945 by the major powers that won the largest and costliest war in human history.

That noted, Professor Schwartzberg (an emeritus geographer at the University of Minnesota who has devoted his life to promoting fairer, and more functional forms of international governance) did the best any scholar could to address both obvious flaws in the current system. It would include the five vetoes on the Security Council, and more obscure problems such as how tiny island and municipal nations like Nauru, Monaco and Singapore have the same weight in General Assembly voting as great powers like China and the USA.

He starts with the General Assembly where he introduces his most comprehensive reform idea, a weighted voting system to replace the archaic one state one vote principle in place today. Simply expressed, Dr. Schwartzberg suggests adding measures of national populations and state contributions to the UN budget to one state one vote, and grouping the world into regions. Populations and budgets obviously change every year, so this would be a dynamic way of scoring actual votes on issues under consideration. That is complicated, but it would also match much more closely the actual power of states to influence events at the UN and elsewhere.

Then, Schwartzberg suggests creating an entirely new body of parliamentarians selected by nation-states, a World Parliamentary Assembly whose fundamental and ultimate purpose would be representing people instead of just nation-states. Schwartzberg envisions a three-step process going from an advisory body with MPs selected by existing governments to a body with real powers elected by actual people of the world, according to the one person one vote principle. That would be change of a truly transformational nature at the UN. If, of course, the dominant powers of the existing UN would allow and fund this new World Parliamentary Assembly. Which they probably will not unless battered by new existential threats. Those come.

Prof. Schwartzberg is well aware of such obstacles, which he notes explicitly in many chapters and in great detail. But he is not deterred from asking how things could be made better anyway. His fourth chapter deals with that pesky veto in the UN Security Council, which alone is empowered to act on life-and-death security challenges. But since the five permanent members of that Council all have vetoes (the USA, China, Russia, Great Britain and France) little if anything can be done about dozens of conflicts and issues that bedevil the world, from Chinese expansions in the South China Sea to nuclear issues involving Iran.
and Israel to what to do about Syria, if any one of those five legacy nations with vetoes objects. They often do. Meanwhile, much of the world wonders why Britain and France still have such power, when much larger countries in the 21st century like Japan, Brazil, India and Germany are excluded.

Schwartzberg is very thorough. He marches on through weaknesses in environmental protection (Ch. 5 on reforming ECOSOC) human rights (Ch. 6 to create a credible human rights system instead of the sad and sometimes morbid joke that now exists) and reform of the international judicial system (Ch. 7). In every case he is searching for solutions to daunting problems that he tends to see very clearly. Along the way he provides as much education as space allows on how the UN system evolved to where it is today (or was in 2013). The ossified UN bureaucracy we all observe changes more slowly than glaciers today, so that is just another problem to be solved.

But Prof. Schwartzberg is not done. Subsequent chapters outline the many great things that UN functional agencies have done, and continue to do despite such obstacles, like the World Health Organization eliminating smallpox and almost polio, rationalization of global air travel protocols and international postal regulations. In Chapter 10 he calls for greater engagement with tens of thousands of NGO s and other civil society groups. And in Chapter 11 he takes on the perennial problem of UN funding which is chronically held hostage to the desires of major powers.

In Chapter 12 he takes on the porcupine of UN Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding operations, and in Chapter 13 the daunting challenges of creating more sustainable economies as globalization, technology, and emergent phenomena like climate change tear existing institutions apart.

Every one of these problems has stimulated many books searching for solutions in isolation. Dr. Schwartzberg is exceptional in trying to tackle them all together in an integrated effort focused on helping the UN to better do the jobs it was created for.

Chapter 15 is devoted to the obvious elephant in the room, how to get from here to there. He does the very best he can. But here, publisher’s constraints have the greatest impact. He had to reduce his magnum opus by almost half to meet the constraints of the soon to close UN University Press. Anyone who has written such books knows how painful such reductions can be. I think Dr. Schwartzberg felt his careful explanations of how to fix existing structures required the detail he gave them. How to get publics that seldom see the UN at work to care about improving those systems is another vast problem that he attempts in the last chapter, but in much less detail than elsewhere.

Schwartzberg ends with two extensive appendices loaded with data and a 14 page index. His work has been endorsed by a really stellar list of international thinkers and practitioners, like former UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, and former US Ambassador to the UN, Thomas Pickering, among 18 others.
So, in my final analysis Professor Schwartzberg’s work is an essential reference for anyone serious about UN reform or concerned about the generally weak state of international governance institutions in the 21st century. Despite its daunting topics, the text is clearly and lucidly written for any general audience. It includes a long list of abbreviations of bureaucratic acronyms necessary to get a grip on the UN System as it exists today. He presents dozens of good ideas that might be implemented someday when circumstances allow, and provides dozens of maps, charts and tables to illustrate them, in addition to his big ideas about transformation. That might require an invasion of space aliens or another catastrophic world war to stimulate. My note is that if we wait long enough, nuclear and other WMDs will probably be used again.

So I say press on with the search for solutions to global problems in our time. And I thank Dr. Schwartzberg for his seminal contribution to that noble task. When he passes on as we all must, the world will be better for the path breaking work he created.
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Begin the document with title, author’s name, author’s position (e.g. professor, lecturer, graduate student, independent scholar), author’s academic department and affiliation, if any, and the article’s abstract (maximum 200 words).

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Carolyn Carpentieri Potter
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**REGISTRATION, LODGING ACCOMMODATIONS AND MEALS**

We have a great package for this year’s conference! Conference Registration includes a one-year membership to the ISCSC for new and any renewing members! All lodging and meals for the conference are provided on-site.

Attendees make their own Conference Registration ($275), and lodging arrangements directly with the ISCSC. Registration has been extended to May 15. Lodging cost includes all meals, occupancy tax AND sales tax for all 3 nights. Rates are the equivalent of: $245 Single; $165 Double or $135 Triple per person, per day. Meals begin with dinner on the arrival date and end with lunch on departure date. Lodging/meal package reservations will be for the entire 3 days. It will be important to use the on-line link via the ISCSC website to make your room/meal reservation which must be paid in advance. It is part of our conference package and ensures the agreed upon rates. Attempting to make individual reservations through the Marconi Conference Center, even if available, will result in much higher costs to participants and are not part of our conference package and activities.
CONFERENCE REGISTRATION

Conference Registration includes conference attendance, welcome reception on June 30th, invitation to submit abstracts for conference presentation, necessary technical amenities for the presentation and fully paid year-long membership in the ISCSC with its many benefits of professional affiliation, subscription to the organization’s acclaimed journal, Comparative Civilizations Review, and, last-but-not-least, fun raffle prizes.

AIRPORT AND TRANSPORTATION OPTIONS

Attendees will most likely fly directly to San Francisco International Airport (SFO). From there, transportation to Marconi Conference Center can easily be accomplished via rental car or a shuttle service called Marin Door to Door: http://www.marindoorto door.com/ or telephone at +1-415-457-2717. Marin Door to Door will take you directly to the Marconi Conference Center for $115 each way. If more than one person is traveling in your group, the second person is only charged $12.00. It is beneficial to book more than one person for the shuttle ride for cost-savings. Booking the shuttle should be done at least 48 hours in advance.

Please visit the ISCSC and Marconi Conference Center websites for additional trip planning references, local sites of interest, and detailed information about the lodging and dining facilities. If you have any questions, please contact Vice President, Lynn Rhodes, 831-600-5209 or lynn.rhodes@iscsc.org or Executive Director Peter Hecht 917-494-8936 or peter.hecht@iscsc.org.
In October 1961, in Salzburg, Austria, an extraordinary group of scholars gathered to create the International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations. Among the 26 founding members from Austria, Germany, France, Switzerland, The Netherlands, Spain, Italy, England, Russia, the United States, China and Japan were such luminaries as Pitirim Sorokin and Arnold Toynbee.

For six days, the participants debated such topics as the definition of “civilization,” problems in the analysis of complex cultures, civilizational encounters in the past, the Orient versus the Occident, problems of universal history, theories of historiography, and the role of the “human sciences” in “globalization.” The meeting was funded by the Austrian government, in cooperation with UNESCO, and received considerable press coverage. Sorokin was elected the Society’s first president.

After several meetings in Europe, the advancing age of its founding members and the declining health of then president, Othmar F. Anderle, were important factors in the decision to transfer the Society to the United States.

Between 1968 and 1970 Roger Williams Wescott of Drew University facilitated that transition. In 1971, the first annual meeting of the ISCSC (US) was held in Philadelphia. Important participants in that meeting and in the Society’s activities during the next years included Benjamin Nelson (the Society’s first American president), Roger Wescott, Vytautas Kavolis, Matthew Melko, David Wilkinson, Rushton Coulborn and C.P. Wolf. In 1974, the Salzburg branch was formally dissolved, and from that year to the present there has been only one International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations (ISCSC).

The presidents of the ISCSC are, in order: In Europe, Pitirim Sorokin and Othmar Anderle; in the United States, Benjamin Nelson, Vytautas Kavolis, Matthew Melko, Michael Palencia-Roth, Roger Wescott, Shuntaro Ito (from Japan), Wayne Bledsoe, Lee Daniel Snyder, Andrew Targowski, David Rosner, and the current president Toby Huff. To date, the Society has held 46 meetings, most of them in the United States but also in Salzburg, Austria; Santo Domingo, The Dominican Republic; Dublin, Ireland; Chiba, Japan; Frenchman’s Cove, Jamaica; St. Petersburg, Russia; Paris, France; New Brunswick, Canada; and Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

More than 30 countries are represented in the Society’s membership. Its intellectual dynamism and vibrancy over the years have been maintained and enhanced through its annual meetings, its publications, and the participation of such scholars as Talcott Parsons, Hayden White, Immanuel Wallerstein, Gordon Hewes, André Gunder Frank, Marshall Sahlins, Lynn White Jr., and Jeremy Sabloff.

The Society is committed to the idea that complex civilizational problems can best be approached through multidisciplinary analyses and debate by scholars from a variety of fields. *The Comparative Civilizations Review*, which welcomes submissions from the Society’s members as well as other scholars, has been published continually since its inaugural issue in 1979.

Prof. Michael Palencia-Roth
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