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Editor's Note

Matthew Melko
He Kept the Candlelight Aglow, Ever Brighter
Matthew Melko and the Study of Real Peace

Civilizational Trauma and Value Nihilism in Boccaccio’s “Decameron”

Brokers of Legitimacy: Intellectuals and Politics in Early Republican China

Evidence for a Belarusian-Ukrainian Eastern Slavic Civilization

A Biosystematic View of Civilizations: Western Europe and Japan Before and After the Industrial Revolution

Cerebral Predestination?

Book Reviews

46th Annual ISCSC Conference at Monmouth University, N.J.
June 2016

International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations
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Submittals
The Comparative Civilizations Review publishes analytical studies and interpretive essays primarily concerned with (1) the comparison of whole civilizations, (2) the development of theories and methods especially useful in comparative civilization studies, (3) accounts of intercivilizational contacts, and (4) significant issues in the humanities or social sciences studied from a comparative civilizational perspective.

By “a comparative civilizational perspective” we mean (1) the use of evidence from more than one civilization (the various national traditions of the modern West being regarded, in this respect, as constituents of a single civilization) and (2) a method likely to throw new light either on the origins, processes, or structures of civilizations or on the problems of interpreting civilizations.

This is a peer-reviewed journal. Please submit your papers in MS Word, Times Roman 12 font, as an email attachment for the reviewer’s consideration. Be sure to include on your paper itself your email address and your academic affiliation and position, or note that you are an “independent scholar.” Send your paper to CCR Managing Editor, hiphecht@gmail.com

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The Comparative Study of Civilizations is a fascinating field that grips the imagination of many people. Don’t agree? To prove the affirmative, let facts be submitted to a candid world, as the American authors of the Declaration of Independence so forcefully wrote.

1. If you Google “comparative civilizations,” you are greeted with the possibility of 37,200 citations. On Bing, the total is 13,000.

2. If you Google “comparative study of civilizations,” you confront a listing of 49,200 citations. On Bing, it’s 9,940.

3. And if you Google “graduate study in comparative civilizations” (the Boolean delimiters one inserts diligently being removed by the computer program even without permission), an astounding total of 2,030,000 results will be presented. Bing’s calculations are a bit more modest -- with 214,000. For masters programs in comparative civilizations, you’ll find a total of 663,000 cites (Bing falls in at 280,000), and for doctorate programs in comparative civilizations, fully 584,000 citations are possible (with Bing, the number is an even more astounding 6,430,000).

So, there is your evidence. Objectively, there is a great deal of interest in and comment upon the topic of comparative civilizations. To the scholarly world, and others, it is even more clear that the topic has a magnetic quality, drawing thousands to it. Clearly, this field is not moribund.

But you might concede these points and yet still wonder, how successful is our journal at tapping into that considerable universe of interest, scholarly and general? It’s certainly a question that this editor has pondered. Are we just talking to each other? Is there really a big public yearning to read more or does scholarly fascination with comparative civilization drive the subject, and are we serving that set of communities if the topic persists to entrance so many?

One way to find out is to try to garner some data on our journal. Truth be told, we circulate currently about 150 paper copies of the journal to members and libraries, not a huge number, to be sure.

So how many people read us in the virtual world, that is, electronically? How often is the journal searched by students and scholars of the field?

To find out the answer, we turned to Editor Connie Lamb. She is the intrepid, highly professional and knowledgeable Social Sciences Librarian at Brigham Young University, which graciously hosts our journal’s electronic publication. We contacted her to find out

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol73/iss73/16
how popular the journal has been since it was first loaded onto the site via Brigham Young and launched into the online ether back in the fall of 2011.

“As for the statistics, the only one I can readily get is this: since its launch in the fall of 2011, there have been 826,676 page views (an average of over 206,000 a year),” Prof. Lamb reports.

What an amazing total! Imagine the hundreds of thousands of times – closing in on one million – that our articles have been accessed. The medium of paper is wonderful, and from Gutenberg on, the world has been reading and learning without regard to wealth or station, with the access this implied before the invention of movable type now available to all.

But electronically we reach so much further, and so much quicker.

But I wanted yet further proof of our reach. So, I next took a look at the ISCSC website and blog. As members know, our Civilitas blog, currently run by CCR Managing Editor Peter Hecht, can be accessed online either via www.wmich.edu/iscsc or by going directly to the URL www.civilitasblog.blogspot.com. And it’s been around even longer than the online version of the journal. In fact, Civilitas has just passed its five-year mark.

According to Mr. Hecht, since inception in May 2010 there have been 35,545 page views. In June 2015, there were 915 page views.

Further, a total of 156 posts have been uploaded to Civilitas, with fully 41 posts this year so far. In other words, we have seen a terrific gain in popularity over the past year and a half.

“That’s 26% of the total for all five years, “Mr. Hecht noted. “Further, participation is increasing, with rising numbers of views from over 20 countries and five continents.”

“Contributions are coming in from scholars around the world, and they cover the widest possible variety of topics. The entries on the blog are the opinions of the authors, of course, and not necessarily the opinion of the ISCSC. However, blog entries are reviewed before posting to ensure that content is representative of the intellectually stimulating and universally respectful spirit of the ISCSC,” he says.

Now the evidence comes in from three fronts: the topic of comparative civilizations itself, the reach of the CCR as a journal of record for comparative civilizations, and the central role of the International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations in its field; all are established and surging forth.

Given all this attention, and activity, we at the journal have responded by inaugurating several changes designed especially for this new era: two major steps are being taken. First, guided by Prof. Lamb at Brigham Young, we are in the process of migrating to a new and more powerful electronic platform upon which to mount the CCR’s online edition. It is
called Digital Commons, and it is operated by bepress. The transition will be completed before the snow flies later this year. This is a powerful search and presentation vehicle.

Second, following diligent research by Peter Hecht, we have moved our printing operations to The Sheridan Press. It’s a nationwide operation, but our presses will be located in Hanover, Pennsylvania. This move will ensure that those reading the journal in hard copy will get their edition on time, every time. Additional services are going to become available to our subscribers. The Editorial Board will be weighing the value of these services against the projected expense in the next few months. Expect more details next time.

In tandem with these two steps, the society has seen a jump in participation of new scholars at our annual conferences. At the just-completed successful conference, held in beautiful Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, the first annual meeting of ISCSC ever held in South America, the discussions were vivid and exciting. Since the Proceedings might not be published this year, I thought it would be good to at least list the topics that were covered in Rio.

The plenary session was addressed on Thursday evening, June 11, by Professor Emmanuel Carneiro Leão, Distinguished Professor at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Sidetracked by an illness, his paper on the topic “Our Crisis,” was read by Ms. Noni Geiger.

On Friday mid-day the assemblage heard Pedro Geiger, Distinguished Professor of the State University of Rio de Janeiro, and major host of the event, offer his personal insights via “An Introduction to Brazil.”

Overall, there were 14 panels held, involving 58 papers and presentations featuring representatives from 16 countries. Not unusually for an ISCSC annual conference, the papers and their panels dealt with a wide range of subjects. Here they are.

Panel Sessions 1
Room A
David Rosner, Chair

Theodor Damian, Metropolitan College of New York, USA.
“The Signs of the Time: With or Without Postmodernism.”

Marek Jakubowski, Nicolaus Copernicus University, Torun, Poland.
“The Theory of Civilization by Felix Koneczny – Archaic or Inspiring?”

Adnan Çelik, Selçuk University, Turkey.
“Have the Global Crises a Philosophy? Who Creates Them and Why?”

David Rosner, Metropolitan College of New York, USA.
“On Civilizational Trauma: The Black Death and ‘Values at the Crossroads’ in Boccaccio’s Decameron.”
Room B
Michael Andregg, Chair

Dina Moscovici, Artigo de, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
“The Nomad Space of Art.”

Rochelle Almeida, New York University, USA.
“A Clash of Titans in India: Post-Modernist Quasi-Capitalism versus Socialism in Literature and Film.”

David Wilkinson, UCLA, Los Angeles, USA.
“Was there a pre-Columbian Civilization in the Amazon Basin?”

Michael Andregg, University of St. Thomas, St. Paul, USA.
“Book reviews of ‘The Lowland Maya in the Late Pre-classic: The Rise and Fall of an Early Mesoamerican Civilization’ (2011) and Marek Celinski’s ‘Civilizational Crisis and Renewal’ (2015).

Panel Sessions 2

Room A
Lynn Rhodes, Chair

David Wilkinson, UCLA, Los Angeles, CA, USA.
“Matthew Melko: A Civilizationalist Looks at Real Peace.”

Tereza Coni Aguiar, Consultant on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
“Lebret’s Legacy to Humanistic Planning.”

Randall Groves, Ferris State University, Big Rapids, MI, USA.

Room B
Michael Andregg, Chair

Abdulmajed Muhammed Wali, King Saud University, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
“Education Means Influencing the Sons and Daughters.”

Khalid Aleid, King Saud University, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
“The Impact of Islam on Strengthening Family Ties: A Value of the Civilized.”
Abdullah Saleh Alsaif, King Saud University, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
“Islamic Cultural Values Regarding the Treatment of Children and Children with Special Needs.”

Essa Nasser Alduraibi, King Saud University, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
“Civilizational Values in Dialogue, and Means for Promotion of Dialogue in Education.”

Panel Sessions 3

Room A
Michael Andregg, Chair

Carla Monteiro Sales, Rio de Janeiro State University, Brazil.
“Representations of North South Relations in an Inverted Map of South America.”

Mauricio Goncalves Silva, with Maria Monica Vieira Caetano O’Neill, and Claudio Stenner, Instituto Brasileiro de Geografae Estatística, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
“Population Arrangements and Urban Concentrations in Brazil: Conceptual Aspects.”

Evandro La Macchia, with Jacob Binsztok and Julio Wasserman, Universidade Federal Fluminense, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
“Petroleum Exploration and Production Policy: Brazilian Winding Paths.”

Mehmet Huseyn Bilgin, Istanbul Medeniyet University, Turkey.
“The Effects of Religious Beliefs on the Working Decisions of Women: Some Evidence from Turkey.”

Room B
Randall Groves, Chair
Abdulmajeid Aldarwish, King Saud University, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
“Civilized Values of Dealing with Neighbors in Islam.”

Abdulaziz Saud Aldhowaihy, King Saud University, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
“The Determinants of Prestigious Values in Islam.”

Khalid Alsharidah, Qassim University, Burayaday City, Saudi Arabia.
“Socio-Cultural Transformations in Saudi Arabia: Displacement vs. Resistance Theories of Change.”

Abdullah Alfauzan, Qassim University, Alqassim City, Saudi Arabia.
“Contributions of Civilization towards Social Freedom and Alienation in the Arabic City: A Literary Point of View.”
Panel Sessions 4

Room A
Michael Andregg, Chair

Hisanori Kato, Chuo University, Tokyo, Japan.
“Philanthropic Aspects of Islam: The Case of the Fundamentalist Movement in Indonesia.”

Juri Abe, Rikkyo University, Tokyo, Japan.
“The Role of Foreign Teachers in Modernizing Meiji, Japan.”

Room B
Lynn Rhodes, Chair

Sami Alkhalil, Mohammed A. Alsuhaim, Ahmed M. Alkhalil, and Omar A. Alsedees
King Saud University and Qassim University, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
“Islamic Values that Regulate Finance and Economy.”

Kamel Saud Alonazi, King Saud University, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
“Economic Crises: Reality and Solutions.”

Adel Mohammed Alabisy, King Saud University, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
“Samples in the Economic System from an Islamic Perspective, and its Effect on Building Values.”

Bandar Al Anazi, King Saud University, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
“The Values of Faith and Moral Values in Islamic Economics.”

Panel Sessions 5

Room A
David Rosner, Chair

Zoltan S. Novak, Budapest, Hungary.
“’Panta Rhei’ as the Central Idea of Spengler’s Life Work.”

Vincent Ho, University of Macau, Macau, China.
“Chinese Heritage in East Asia: Comparative Approaches in Literature, Religion and Culture.”
Room B
George Von der Muhll, Chair

Habibollah Babaei, Academy of Islamic Science and Culture, Qom, Iran.
“Standards of Islamity of Civilization.”

Fahad Mohammed Alsultan, Qassim University, Buraydah City, Saudi Arabia.
“Was there an Ideological Impact on Saudi-Iranian Relations Prior to the Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979?”

Saeed Ali Alghailani, King Saud University, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
“Alexis de Tocqueville and Muhammad on War: A Comparative and Historical Perspective.”

Nasser Mohammed Almane, King Saud University, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
“The Motives of Ethical Commitment in Islam – a Comparative Study.”

Panel Sessions 6

Room A
Lynn Rhodes, Chair

Ronald J. Glossop, Southern Illinois University Edwardsville, Illinois, USA.
“The Meaning of the Twenty-First Century: From Inter-Nationalism to Globalism.”

Anna Sobolewska-Bujwid, Wroclaw University of Technology, Wroclaw, Poland.
“Together or Separately? The Problem of Social Capital in Central Europe.”

Yitzhak Weismann, Haifa University, Haifa, Israel.
“Salafi Interpretations of the Civilizational Values of Islam.”

George Von der Muhll, University of California, Santa Cruz, California, USA.
“Civilizations and Their Frontiers: Identities and Imagery.”

Room B
David Rosner, Chair

Hamza Ates, Istanbul Medeniyet University Center. for Civilizational Studies, Turkey.
“Ethics-Based Civilization: What Can Islam Contribute?”

Sultan S. Alsaif, King Saud University, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
“Values between Religions in Islam.”
Ahmed Allhaib, King Saud University, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
“Civilized Values and Dealing with the Other in Islam.”

Ibrahim Guran Yumusak, Istanbul Medeniyet University Center for Civilizational Studies, Turkey.
“Economic Development: Management from Al-Siyasah Al-Shar’iyah.”

Panel Session 7
Michael Andregg, Chair

Nissim Mannathukkaren, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada.
“Replicating or Reinventing Modernity? The Case of Kerala India.”

Ashok Malhotra, State University of New York (SUNY), Oneonta, NY, USA.
“Reflections on Clash or Reconciliation of Civilizations.”

Joseph Gualtieri, University of Hong Kong, China.
“Nature and the Crisis in Global Civilizational Values.”

Ahmed Alshbaan, Qassim University, Buraydah City, Saudi Arabia.
“The Role of Social Endowment Institutions in Promoting Geographic Trips to the Orient From the Sixth to the Eighth Century AH (1122 – 1322 of the Common Era).”

Panel Session 8
Lynn Rhodes, Chair

Andrzej Szahaj, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Torun, Poland.
“The Values of Multiculturalism.”

Ahmed Almazyad, King Saud University, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
“Values in Islam.”

Tarkan Oktay, Istanbul Medeniyet University, Istanbul, Turkey.
“Sister City Relationships of Municipalities in Turkey in the Context of Soft Power.”

Lynn Rhodes, Royal Oaks, California, USA.
“Community Trust and Law Enforcement around the World: a Key to Peace and Prosperity Everywhere.”

Two of the above presentations are being carried in this issue: the presidential address by Dr. Rosner and the Melko analysis by Dr. Wilkinson.
Thanks go out to all those who hosted this amazing conclave. We look forward to seeing everyone at future annual meetings and, as always, we on the journal invite those who wish to submit their papers to our peer review process to do so. If published, you will be widely read, that’s for certain.

This year, as always, the annual meeting of the International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations involved people from all over the world. Many flew very long distances to be present. The ideas proposed at our annual get-togethers force a person to consider many new and challenging perspectives. The reason is that each annual conference features a wide range of papers, all offering what might be to most in attendance one or more unique perspectives on civilizations in our world; the presentations are almost universally rigorously constructed, thought-provoking, well worth the listening. Surely the same spirit and scholarly, institutional vigor will prevail next year, as the organization meets once again, this time at the beautiful campus of Monmouth University in New Jersey.

See you then!

Joseph Drew
Matthew Melko:
He Kept the Candlelight Aglow Ever Brighter

Tseggai Isaac
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The onset of the 21st century was a period of hope and despair for the International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilization (ISCSC). The despair arose as a result of a few of its luminary scholars departed in death while its prospects for rejuvenation were getting brighter. One of its luminaries who always kept the intellectual fire burning and the candlelight of scholarship aglow was Matthew Melko. Unfortunately, he too is no longer with us since his death in 2010.

During the Society’s 2005 annual conference in St. Paul, Minnesota, Lee Snyder, then President of the Society, but now he too is no longer with us, in his presidential address to the Society stated: “I see us as heirs of the tradition started by Spengler, and continued by Sorokin, Toynbee, Quigley, Melko and others.”

Snyder’s testimonial to the effect that Melko stood with the giants in his penetrating methodology on comparing civilizations was accurate to the point, as can be observed from Melko’s books and illuminating articles. Among the scholars who have vouched for Melko’s contributions to research are the illustrious Crane Brinton, Arnold Toynbee, Andrew Quigley, Andre Gunder Frank, Andrew Targowski, and David Wilkinson.

They all noted the essential values of Melko’s work as detailed in the following books of Melko and his coauthors:

- *The Nature of Civilizations*, 1969
- *Fifty-Two Peaceful Societies*, 1973, Canadian Peace Research Institute
- *Peace in Our Time*, 1990, Paragon House
- *Single Myths and Realities*, (with Leonard Cargan), Sage Press, 1982

Melko delved into the dynamic political and diplomatic atmosphere at the end of the Second World War and the beginning of the Cold War. He was recruited to active duty in the United States Army where he served in Korea from 1952-1954 after he earned his master’s degree from the University of Chicago in 1952. Upon his return from the Army, Sergeant Major Melko went to pursue a second Master’s of Science degree from Columbia University. He then went to London to pursue his doctoral studies from the London School of Economics.
and Political Science where he studied under the incomparable historian, Arnold Toynbee. His military and pedagogical training, in addition to the vibrant and optimistic post-World War II years, allowed Melko to flourish in intellectual depth.

After his honorable service to his country in Korea, Melko’s career span the fields of journalism, teaching, research and publication and university administration as a dean. In all of these fields, Melko offered himself as a dutiful leader and a scholar of impeccable accomplishments. He has authored and coauthored eight books, published over 70 articles and served as a president of the International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations.

During his tenure as president of the ISCSC (1983-1986), he endeavored to increase membership and focus the Society’s mission on describing and articulating the meaning of civilization. Beginning as early as the 1980s and continuing after the year 2000, the Society also oriented its agenda on the problem of articulating civilization in terms of time and geographical space.

The approach that Melko and his colleagues at the Society selected was a comparative study of civilizations. This approach opened up the way to naming, categorizing, ranking/classifying and assigning origin, influence, evolution, and identification of civilizations. The prominent civilizations that were not disputed as historically visible were not sources of controversy. Melko stated, “The mainstream civilizations are Egyptian, Mesopotamian, Classical, South Asian, East Asian, Andean, Mesoamerican, African, Byzantine, Islamic and Western.”¹ These civilizations were accepted as units of analysis and open fields of research. They were recognized, in their due times, as having impact in terms of culture, language, diplomatic, and trade influences.

On the other hand, “the boundary of civilizations” and the character of their cultural, diplomatic, ideological, and socio-linguistic contents with respect to war and peace may vary. Melko emphasized the prevalence of war and peace and the extent to which war is an abnormal occurrence and peace throughout the centuries, an abiding norm.

The problem arises from the fact that comparing civilizations involves examination of the topic from a spatial perspective. In the spatial perspective, the intellectual panorama and the methodological landscape are amorphous, with the structural lines in terms of origin and influence difficult to articulate. Even if painstaking research efforts manage to produce cogent conclusions about time-tested civilizations, the identifying features of a specific civilization, such as the Greek or Egyptian civilizations represent problems of certainty.

- Do we identify a specific civilization when scholars found the wherewithal to observe, define, and enumerate its identifying characteristics, when it was firmly institutionalized into the soil and soul of space and time, or do we possess the

essential perspicacity to clearly say that other civilizations have or do not have a role in its origination.\textsuperscript{2}

- The time horizon and the “boundary” with which we associate civilizations is obscured by the material facts the researcher must rely upon to articulate the civilization’s origin, its internal characteristics, and the extent of its influence.

Along these lines, Melko queried the tendency of emerging and vibrant civilizations attracting the glare of light to obscure other equally established civilizations. He asked, “Is it conceivable that the great explorations beginning in the fifteenth century, and the tremendous improvements in transportation and communication that followed, may have stultified attempts to isolate and understand individual cultures at the very time such study was beginning?”\textsuperscript{3}

His answer was to be mindful, and circumspect in our selection with respect to the “boundaries of civilization in space and time” and to be sensitive as to the scientific bases of our research. Failing to do so, we risk accepting predetermined historical and civilizational realities shrouded in subjectivity and devoid of scientific objectivity.

Professor Melko became the Society’s president in 1983 when its intellectual energy was dynamic and substantive. Internationally recognized scholars enriched the Society and Melko’s capacity to integrate scholars of various disciplines and steer them to the study of comparative rigor revitalized the Society. They built on the Society’s founding principles under the able leadership of Sorokin, Quigley, Melko, Wilkinson, and Wallerstein.

Melko received accolades for his edited book, \textit{the Boundary of Civilizations}. Some were glowing reviews recognizing his command of facts and the analytical force that he brought to bear on his work. Some reviews were mixed, but nonetheless they celebrated Melko’s scholarship and analytical creativity as setting new standards for the study of civilizations.

Quigley viewed Melko with reserve, but appreciated Melko’s book, \textit{The Nature of Civilizations}, stating:

“The successful accomplishment is his succinct exposition of the present state of the study of this orphaned subject, which finds a home in no academic department or discipline but turns up as frequently in sociology or philosophy as in anthropology or history, and may, indeed, even be found resident in two of these simultaneously on the same campus without anyone recognizing the fact.”\textsuperscript{4}

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{krejci2004}
\bibitem{melko1969}
\bibitem{quigley1970}
\end{thebibliography}
Even though Quigley in his praise of Melko is not so generous, other towering scholars have credited Melko’s creativity and the meticulous tenacity of his scholarship. Arnold Toynbee, who must have sensed Melko’s contribution to the advance of the comparative studies of civilization, said of Melko:

Melko, in his present book, recognizes handsomely his debt to his predecessors, and at the same time he uses their work to help him to carry his and their common study farther than the points reached by them. As a survivor of the preceding generation, I am delighted by this. If one has taken a hand in any branch of study at a fairly early stage in this branch’s development, when the workers in this particular field have still been few, one hopes that the number of one’s fellow workers will increase and - speaking, here, simply for myself - I gauge the success of my own work by the speed and the extent of its replacement by the work of younger colleagues. Melko’s *The Nature of Civilizations* covers much ground in few pages.\(^5\)

Melko himself was pugnacious when he felt the need to assert the parameters of comparative studies of civilization within the orbit of liberalism. He was not so parochial as to easily be type-casted as Eurocentric. He was a progressive internationalist with most of his research aimed as studying civilizations from their peaceful characteristics.

To that extent, he argued that Western Civilization is no different than any other civilization. In its case, however, a difference is that Western civilization used technology to harness its environment. Western science complemented Western Civilization. It was not encumbered by religion or the overbearing demands of a command ideology. Equipped with its scientific resources, it exhibited secular and progressive character. Its secular temper unleashed bounties of technological innovations enabling it to extend its reach to the highest firmaments and deepest shoals.

As the Society was expanding its influence, a few great scholars from the field of World Systems theory added intellectual vigor to the Society’s stature. Andre Gunder Frank, Immanuel Wallerstein, and Christopher Chase-Dunn were members who looked at the study of civilization from the center-periphery perspective. They argued that Western capitalism, rationalized by liberalism, emboldened with technological innovations, endowed with industrial infrastructure and oriented for exploiting primary resources of the less developed countries has subjugated the vast humanity of the Third World. Melko disagreed with the substance and the tenor of the World Systems argument. Melko’s stance was combative without being offensive in his criticism. He showed his sharper edges when he confronted the World Systems approach for its vertical analysis of the colonial and the pre-colonial evolution of powers. The vertical analysis was masterfully addressed by such Society members as Andre Gunder Frank, Christopher Chase-Dunn, 

Immanuel Wallerstein, and David Wilkinson, all Melko’s friends and fellow members at ISCSC.

These scholars took approaches that were laser-focused on delineating global configurations of economic and political power from the perspective of “center-periphery” relationships. They argued that military, industrial, and economic power were the determining factors in the progress and development of societies. Whereas Melko was “cosmopolitan”, patient, and circumspect so as to accord past civilizations their due reverence on account of their glorious past, the scholars who propounded the World Systems theory looked at the Third World states basically as plaintiffs helplessly needing advocacy before the court of global jurisdiction. That jurisdiction is more responsive to the Western interests, however. It is structured to facilitate exploitation and compound the dependency status of the poor societies at the periphery.

From the World Systems approach camp, Andre Gunder Frank was imputative of the West. He indicted European powers for the “accumulation” of the wealth of the periphery. Ever since the European exploration and subsequent colonization, the primary resources of the peripheral states were gutted by European powers to enrich their treasuries and feed their ever gluttonous industrial establishments. The outcome, he argued, is “the Development of Underdevelopment” or the slow, but progressive, impoverishment of the periphery and the enrichment of the Center at a compound rate of exploitation.\(^6\)

The year 1492 figured prominently in Frank’s analysis. He argued that it kick-started the dynamic forces of European colonialism. Ever since then, the world was set to be configured in accordance to the cultural tastes and industrial appetites of the “metropolitan” states.\(^7\) That was the extent of Western civilization, according to Frank. As direct consequences of this civilization’s actions, Europe reigned supreme and its former colonial possessions lay supine, prostrated under the iron fetters of neocolonialism. Frank was vocal, angry, apostolic in his denunciations, and supremely rich in his details. He has not gone so far as to call for revolutionary uprising in the tone of the *Communist Manifesto*, but did not hide his socialist beliefs and his rejection of the promises and possibilities of liberalism.

Melko took exception to Frank’s theses and he expressed his protestation by calling Frank’s argument a “Faustian delusion.”

Equally forceful and meticulously elegant in the scope and range of his historical, sociological, and political analysis was Immanuel Wallerstein. His book, *The Modern World-System*, trail-blazed a comprehensive and causal look at power, again from the perspective of Europe’s insatiable appetite for industrial input.\(^8\) The raw materials of Africa, Asia, and the Americas meant more to European powers than did the humanity and soul of the natives. In Wallerstein’s conclusion, the causal link between the economies of the poor

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countries, which he identified as the “periphery,” and those of the Europeans, identified as “the center,” is irrevocably linked to a horrible and inevitable result -- the dismal impoverishment of the periphery.

Next, Christopher Chase-Dunn elaborated on World Systems theory from the structural perspective. He was more in consonance with Melko and praised Melko’s work as an “excellent introduction to an alternative way of conceptualizing and bounding of civilizations.” Chase-Dunn argued that the superstructure of the World Systems theory needed to look at the bureaucratic grassroots of colonialism.9

Both Frank and Wallerstein are ideological in their analysis. They have identified global politics as structured along the lines of capitalism. Liberalism rationalized and enthusiastically praised capitalism and countenanced its “tentacles” for global exploitation. Capitalism cultivates the rise of avaricious industrial and commercial enterprises. These enterprises are driven, restless in their quest to expand the horizons of scientific frontiers and the “boundaries” of their domination. They push to the outer horizons of the periphery irrespective of the inevitable human rights abuses and widespread corruption they cultivate in the Third World. Liberalism, regardless of its stated principles of democracy and human rights, lacks the capacity to harness multinationals and capitalist enterprises in the face of massive human rights abuses and economic plundering.

The World Systems School saw this symbiotic link between liberalism and capitalism as a detrimental force endlessly working against the prospects of Third World development. Melko disagreed. Melko focused on liberalism and praised it for its ability to motivate citizens, its endless capacities for creativity, its endorsement and championing of individual freedoms, and its open and broad celebration of the sciences. He rejected the laying of blame on liberalism. He is lukewarm on capitalism but warmhearted on liberalism for its measures of natural rights and individual freedoms irrespective of its imperfections.

Melko’s forceful rejection of the World Systems approach and its pairing of capitalism and liberalism was assertive and biting. He aroused the anger of its champions by calling the World Systems theory a “Faustian Delusion.”10 The drama that unfolded and the disquiet that Melko ignited on Frank, who has earlier commended Melko’s work as an excellent scholarly endeavor, is revealing.11

Neither ideological nor polemical is the work of David Wilkinson who answered back to those scholars often referred to as the radical school. Wilkinson’s identifying markers are meticulous analysis, great craftsmanship in presenting data, tireless energy in amassing and tailoring details, and mastery of historical, political, and cultural details. He exhibits

scientific sensitivity and masterful scholarship. He catalogues the evolution of civilizations to bring to bear scientifically grounded pedagogy. In Melko and Wilkinson’s analysis, the analytical details and the spirited marshalling of arguments are visible; they share the same ideological and intellectual template.

Disagreements notwithstanding, Melko felt at home with the scholars mentioned above. The range of Melko’s analysis and the trajectories of the World Systems theory overlapped and shared reciprocal “interdependence.” The sense of collegiality and the civility with which they debated their ideas are instructive. They can be categorized into the conventional classification of scholars that had prevailed since the end of the Second World War.

Whereas Frank and Wallerstein are at home with the spirit of socialist analysis, Melko, Wilkinson, and Chase-Dunn are progressive liberals in the sense they empathize with the Third World, but they do not credit socialism or communism to serve as the panacea for the Third World ills. Melko, particularly, railed against these ideologies. He struck punches courageously as a valiant soldier and received reactive punches, but these neither fazed nor dispirited the Ohio thinker.

Melko was a great scholar and professor, a man of integrity, and a gentleman in the truest sense of the word. He had gravitas, but he would also be the least enthusiastic to accept words of endearment coming from people like me who observed him and who were edified by the intellectual wealth of his vast scholarship and the gravitas of his character. Few praises would be too many, given his sense of humility, but he would also be confirmed by many who knew him as deserving the accolades and praises becoming a father to his beloved children, a loving husband to his wife, and a great colleague to those who had the great fortunes of knowing him.

Dr. Matthew Melko was a man of a few words, but he was full of intellectual wisdom emanating from a context of tolerance, a gracious and unassuming giant. He was a scholar of tenacious energy, enthusiasm, foresight and superior grace. He was a heavyweight, but he liked to obscure his luminary force, opting to work from the depth of the deep trenches, laboring, sweating, and exerting endless energy to recruit new members for the ISCSC. He faithfully encouraged young scholars to increase their participation in the field of comparative civilization studies, and he charted ways by which the ISCSC would sharpen its vision and expand its horizon. His labor was not in vain as the ISCSC is growing in those very areas that Melko envisioned.

Matthew Melko and the Study of Real Peace

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Matthew Melko (1930-2010), leading civilizationist and peace scientist, left a substantial body of books and articles on the comparative study of actual peace, the condition of not-being-at-war-with-one-another that is in fact (Melko, 1996) the real and historic norm for human societies. Melko’s work will in due course prove foundational for the comparative and scientific study of the character and causes of peace.

Melko’s main work on empirical peace is to be found in four books published between 1973 and 1990: *52 Peaceful Societies* (1973a), *Peace in the Ancient World* (with Weigel, Katary and McKenny, 1981), *Peace in the Western World* (with John K. Hord, 1984), and *Peace in Our Time* (1990). The first three books survey human history in order to locate what Melko called “peaces” or “zones of peace,” or what Robert Whealey labeled (disparagingly, 1986: 15) “pockets of peace,” and what I shall more often call “peace domains”—places and periods bounded in space and time, with the periods being a century or more, where violence was notably low. *Peace in Our Time* examined what Melko elsewhere (1985, 1989) called the “Great Northern Peace,” or “the remission of violence” in the West since the end of the Second World War.

*52 Peaceful Societies* collected fifty-two peace domains. *Peace in the Ancient World* and *Peace in the Western World* replicated and corrected *52 Peaceful Societies* for 10 and 12 cases respectively. A replication study summation (Melko, Hord and Weigel, 1983) integrated and slightly modified the collection.

REAL PEACE

Carlyle’s phrase (attributed to Montesquieu) “Happy the people whose annals are blank” (1888: 128) could be seen as governing for Melko’s groundbreaking survey of history. In that survey, absence of evidence of war was taken as evidence of absence of war, i.e., evidence of the presence of peace. Peoples, places and intervals of time whose histories lacked records of dramatic and bloody events were considered to have been at peace, absent evidence to the contrary, on the reasonable assumption that historians find wars interesting and important, and so would have recorded them had they been fought.

Real peace as a domain, pocket or interval that can exist between places and times of war is an old concept. Imperial German general Erich Ludendorff’s concept of peace as “merely” an interval between times of wars was not an original notion. The views of ancient Indian lawgivers were summed up almost identically by Tähtinen: “Peace is the interval between two wars.” (1976: 91) Ambrose Bierce presented the same idea even more cynically: “PEACE, n. In international affairs, a period of cheating between two periods of fighting” (2000, s.v. PEACE).
Some writers both admit the possibility of peace that is real but not durable, as does the nuclear physicist Leo Szilard: “The traditional aim of foreign policy is to prolong the peace, i.e., to lengthen the interval between two wars.” (Szilard preferred measures that would instead establish a “state of permanent peace” 1947: 102.) Others, more idealistic perhaps, reject real peace as unreal, e.g. Orchard: “A peace that is nothing more than an interval between two wars is not a real peace” (2003). Hobbes might concur: “the nature of War, consisteth not in actual fighting; but in the known disposition thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. All other time is PEACE.” (Leviathan, ch. 13)

Rather less disparagingly patronizing is John Ogilvie’s Imperial Dictionary, which, at “Interval,” proposes “The space of time between two paroxysms of disease, pain or delirium; remission; as, an interval of ease, of peace, of reason.” (Ogilvie, 1863, s.v. Interval)

Melko’s approach is close to Ogilvie’s, and also to Mao Zedong’s: “Politics is war without bloodshed, while war is politics with bloodshed” (1954: sec. 64). For Melko, “Peace is considered to be an absence of [violent, physical conflict among political entities or among substantial factions within these entities]. It includes situations in which anger or hostility is openly expressed, and in which arms buildups occur, if there is little physical conflict. A situation of mutual war preparation between potential adversaries who nevertheless do not fight would be a period of peace. The term cold war has been used to describe such a period, but it could better be described as a cold peace.” (2010: 22)

Melko’s method of peace-locating work was inverse to A.L. Kroeber’s method for locating cultural creativity. Kroeber (1944) used general sources to find major cultural creators and achievements, and these to map times and places of exceptionally high cultural activity. Melko “looked for periods when nothing was happening” (2001c: 28) and then focused more specifically upon the locations, circumstances and phenomenology of such nothingness.

PEACE DOMAINS

Table 1 lists 46 peace domains, and reflects Melko’s 1975 summation (1975b: 550-551) as modified by the 1983 partial replication by Melko, Hord and Weigel. I have partitioned the list of domains among the civilizations (as bounded in Wilkinson, 1987, 1992, 1993) within which they were space-time “pockets” of peace.

In choosing the cases, Melko faced ontological issues and resolved them in ways that could have been reversed. An interrupted peace was treated as continuous; peace in domains as small as a city-state was not negated by the size of the unit; peace in contiguous areas was treated as being in a single domain; regions at peace within a state undergoing war were not treated as peace domains, except for one long hinterland peace (Hispano-Roman) that was treated as separate from its “parent” *Pax Romana*; interruptions judged “minor” were discounted; and war outside a peace domain did not negate the peace within (Melko, Weigel et al., 1981: 10-11; Melko and Hord, 1984:2-3).
### Table 1
Melko Peace Domains

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PEACE DOMAIN</th>
<th>DURATION</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Egyptian Civilization:</em> (1 peace domain):</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Kingdom</td>
<td>1991-1720 BC</td>
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<tr>
<td><em>Egyptian Civilization to c. 1500 BC, then Central Civilization</em> (1):</td>
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<tr>
<td>New Kingdom Egypt</td>
<td>1565-1231 BC</td>
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<tr>
<td><em>Central Civilization</em> (25):</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phoenician</td>
<td>1150-722 BC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Athenian</td>
<td>683-513 BC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corinthian</td>
<td>655-427 BC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achaemenid</td>
<td>520-331 BC</td>
<td>Iran and Mesopotamia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ptolemaic</td>
<td>332-216 BC</td>
<td>Egypt and Cyprus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roman Republican</td>
<td>203-90 BC</td>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pax Romana</td>
<td>31 BC-AD 161</td>
<td>Southern Europe, Asia Minor, Levant, North Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispano-Roman</td>
<td>19 BC-AD 409</td>
<td>Iberian Peninsula</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Byzantine</td>
<td>838-1071</td>
<td>Asia Minor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venetian</td>
<td>1033-1310</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Scandinavian</td>
<td>1262-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mameluke</td>
<td>1250-1517</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hungarian</td>
<td>1312-1428</td>
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<tr>
<td>Polish</td>
<td>1410-1606</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brandenburger</td>
<td>1486-1527</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>British</td>
<td>1485-1940</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Spanish Imperial</td>
<td>1492-1808</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Brazilian</td>
<td>1654-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific</td>
<td>1788-</td>
<td>Australia, New Zealand, Hawaii, Tonga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rican</td>
<td>1842-1948</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swiss</td>
<td>1856-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian</td>
<td>1885-</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><em>South Asian Civilization:</em> (4)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Gupta</td>
<td>336-450</td>
<td>Northern and Central India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mughal</td>
<td>1585-1707</td>
<td>Northern and Central India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anglo-Indian</td>
<td>1818</td>
<td>Southern India and Ceylon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepalese</td>
<td>1846-</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><em>SE Asian/Indonesian Civilization</em> (8):</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cham</td>
<td>650-952</td>
<td>Southeast coast of Indochina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khmer</td>
<td>813-921</td>
<td>Central Indochina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burmese</td>
<td>1084-1277</td>
<td>Irrawaddy and Sittang Valleys</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laotian</td>
<td>1373-1564</td>
<td>Upper Mekong Valley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mon</td>
<td>1426-1535</td>
<td>Irrawaddy Delta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arakanese</td>
<td>1546-1684</td>
<td>East Coast, Bay of Bengal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Javanese</td>
<td>1830-1942</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T’ai</td>
<td>1802</td>
<td>Menam Valley</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PEACE DOMAIN | DURATION | LOCATION
--- | --- | ---
East Asian Civilization (5):
Han | 202 BC-AD 184 | China, Annam
T’ang | 626-868 | China, Annam, Manchuria, Korea, Tibet, Taklamakan Desert
Sung | 1004-1235 | China
Ming | 1403-1629 | China, Korea
Manchu | 1682-1852 | China, Manchuria, Korea, Taiwan
Japanese Civilization (2):
Fujiwara | 600-900 | Honshu, Kyushu, Shikoku
Kamakura | 1185-1331 | Honshu, Kyushu, Shikoku

STUDENTS OF PEACE

Other scholars have examined actual non-war relations from various approaches. Lewis F. Richardson summarized the views of several philosophers and other writers who puzzled over “The fewness of wars among Chinese”; Richardson concluded that the most likely explanation had been cultural-educational, i.e. Confucian instruction (1960: 240-242). Karl Deutsch (1977), Adler and Barnett (1998) and others have examined “security communities” of persons who share the belief that their mutual problems must be addressed by nonviolent means. With roots in the writings of Immanuel Kant, Thomas Paine and Alexis de Tocqueville, there has developed a massive body of work pro and con the “democratic peace theory” that democracies are to some degree inhibited from making war upon one another by their institutions and/or their sense of kinship. (Wikipedia, s.v. “Democratic Peace Theory.”)

Somewhat closer to Melko’s line of work is a school inspired by Kenneth Boulding’s concept of “stable peace’” (“a situation in which the probability of war is so small that it does not really enter into the calculations of any of the people involved”: 1978, 13). Alexander George (2000, 12-13) contrasts stable peace with “precarious” peace teetering upon the brink of violence, and “conditional” peace based upon the calculative rationality of deterrence. Stable-peace research as most recently represented by Arie Kacowicz and Charles Kupchan (Kacowicz, 1998; Kacowicz et al, 2000; Kupchan, 2010) tends to confine itself to international peace. Thus Kacowicz conceives of a “zone of peace” as “a discrete geographical region of the world in which a group of states have maintained peaceful relations among themselves for a period of at least thirty years—generations span—though civil wars, domestic unrest, and violence might still occur within their borders, as well as international conflicts and crises between them” (1998: 9).

Kacowicz identified (1998: 15) the following “zones of peace” since 1815:
- Europe, 1815-1848
- Europe, 1871-1914
- Western Europe, since 1945
- Eastern Europe, 1945-1989
North America, 1917 to the present
South America, 1883 to the present
West Africa, 1987 to the present (again, K wrote in 1998)
East Asia, since 1953
Australasia, since 1945
The ASEAN countries of Southeast Asia, since 1967.

Of the real-peace researchers Kacowicz is probably closest to Melko in spirit, none of their approaches is identical to, subsumes, or builds upon Melko’s research line. Some confine themselves to international peace, as Melko does not. Others are theory-driven or practice-driven. Like L.F. Richardson’s study of wars, Melko’s study of “peaces” is first of all a data-collection exercise, driven by the need for more comprehensive data-bases for the various uses of reflection, theory and practice. It is an undertaking deserving to be continued much in its own terms.

MOVING FORWARD

How might the study of real peace along the lines defined by Melko go forward? I would suggest the following program.

1. Replications.
   (a) The history-search should be replicated by area historians, to reduce the frequency of false negatives (genuine peaces erroneously rejected or overlooked). Melko, Hord and Weigel (1983) mention as candidates for a possible false negative-status an Egyptian Old Kingdom peace 2650-2350 BC, a Mesopotamian peace 1540-1220 BC, a Bohemian peace 1197-1394, a North Italian peace 1538-1701, a Dutch peace 1794-1940, and West Indian peace (in the Guianas as well as the West Indies) 1815. That 1983 replication also added a Roman Republican peace, a Spanish Imperial peace, and a Brazilian peace to the collection. It removed the United states post 1866 from a previous “North American” peace, but with doubts that should be addressed (Melko, Hord and Weigel 1983: 42).

   (b) The existing list of peaces should be scrutinized by area historians to reduce the frequency of false positives (unpeaces misclassified as peaces). The 1983 replication moved the 6 candidate peaces cited above from the prior list to a “not validated” list, and withdrew a previously listed “Habsburg” peace 1711-1848, and a Sassanian peace AD 363-590. The Middle Kingdom and new Kingdom peace carried the note “interrupted”; the interruptions will need attention.

   (c) Time-boundaries of peace domains should be scrutinized closely. The 1983 replication made minor changes in the time boundaries of the Middle Kingdom, New Kingdom, Phoenician, Achaemenid, Ptolemaic, Hungarian, Brandenburger, and Swiss peaces.
(d) Spatial boundaries of peace domains should also be reviewed. The 1983 replication shrunk a North America peace (1866-) to a Canadian peace (1885-) because of uncertainty regarding the scale of racial violence in the United States, while expanding the boundaries of a former Australian peace to take in Tonga and Hawaii as well as Australia and New Zealand.

The first round of replication was not done (Melko, Hord and Weigel, 1983: 39) for the South Asian, Southeast Asian/Indonesian, East Asian and Japanese civilizations. These should accordingly receive priority in any future replication study.

2. Ontology.

Complex issues arise in war-analysis when different areas enter and leave violence at different times. Did World War II begin in 1937 in China or in 1939 in Poland? America and Russia entered in 1941, but were they in the same war in 1941, or was one in a European war and the other in a Pacific war?

Peaces offer similar ontological challenges. Melko, Weigel and Hord combine the formerly separate Icelandic (1262-) and Scandinavian (1721) into a single Scandinavian peace, and must then note five different dates for the five participant societies: Iceland (1262-), Norway (1371-1940), Denmark (1660-1801), Sweden (1721-), and Finland (1809-1918). The peace of the British Isles was shorter in Ireland (1690-1919) and Scotland (1746-1940) than in England and Wales. The Pacific peace began for Australia in 1788, for Hawaii in 1824, for Tonga in 1845, and for New Zealand in 1872. The Spanish Imperial peace of 1492-1808 lasted in New Spain only from 1590 to 1780.

The most controversial ontological choice made by Melko was to accept that the government of a peace domain might be fighting elsewhere, even fighting continuously, and yet the external war was not treated as negating the peace that held within the domain. Leitenberg (1975) and Whealey (1986) took particular exception to the British Isles peace domain 1485-1940. The matter must be considered, but if Melko’s criteria are chosen that peace must be recognized.

Such issues must be discussed in terms of definitional criteria for the concept being applied, and in terms of historical evidence of connectedness between the various parts of the phenomenon. When statistics are to be employed, it will be prudent to determine the maximum expected error by analyzing the disputable data twice (at least), once with any variable defined with maximum strictness, once with maximum leniency.

3. Reflection and conjecture

As the list of peace domains becomes better attested and its problems and probabilities become better known, a reflective, insight-generating, discursive phase will be in order. Essays and conferences in which dueling specialists propose, for those peace periods they jointly accept, their alternative historical explanations for their inception, continuance and termination. Especially urgent would be the contemplation of long
intervals of peace between great and general wars (in which Melko will also proved a forerunner—cf. Melko, 1997, 1999, 2001a, 2001b). Melko’s own explanations should be a part of, and can be seeds for, the discussion.

4. Comparison and hypothesis
With a fair number of cases in hand, it becomes appropriate to compare cases, educe a typology (like George’s stable vs. precarious vs. conditional peace) and conjecture causality. Melko will be a companion here as well: see especially the Recapitulations chapters in 52 Peaceful Societies, Peace in the Ancient World and Peace in the Western World, his major analytical articles (1973d, 1975c, 1985, 1992, 2010), and the entirety of Peace in Our Time. Within these, his theories of peace termination via institutionalization and via saltations in the evolution of military technology demand special consideration.

5. Hypothesis testing.
The human social sciences are the truly “hard” sciences when what is at stake is the researcher’s ability to test hypotheses. The subjects of hard-science study can render it harder by financing and biasing, appropriating and abusing, or resisting and preventing it. The ethics and governance of any real-world hard-science experimental testing of peace theories, were that feasible, would be doubtful at best. Substitutes, however unsatisfactory, must be sought.

Partitioning sets of historical peaces, deriving hypothetical generalizations from one half, and trying them against the other, may offer a route to an approximation of an inductive historical science of peace. Games of various sorts, and an enormous variety exists, would seem the best agenda for an observational science of real peace.

6. Practice
Aeronauts rose to their heights (and flew, or fell), while aeronautical theory was nourished by their successes and their disasters. Practice rarely awaits science; unsatisfactorily tested theories are nonetheless constantly being tried out upon unforgiving reality. Real peace is no different. Consider the diplomatic efforts surrounding (in 2015) the Libyan, Ukrainian, Syrian, ISIS, Iranian nuclear, Afghan, and South China Sea crises and wars. These and all such crisis diplomacies are inescapably grounded upon incomplete information and inadequately verified or partly-baked theory.

Crisis diplomacy concerns itself with the short term: peace now. Matthew Melko’s work is concerned with the longue durée of peace, peace at the century scale. Melko (1989, 1990, 1992) observed that the powers of the West (or the North) had entered after World War II into a period of “remission of violence,” a point with which the security-community, stable-peace and democratic-peace schools of real-peace theory would not at all disagree. But Melko’s view was that this remission should be perceived, as Leo Szilard would have perceived it and despaired of it, as a shaky and wasting asset, an
Indian Summertime destined to fade, as social instruments once functioning for a general good—e.g. states, corporations—ossified into institutions for the benefit of their owners. Melko’s theories offer a starting point for a practice of long-peace prolongation and extension at least as well-founded as the short-term pacifying efforts of the crisis diplomats.

If we were to concur with Melko’s assessment of the key variables in the termination of durable peaces, we would want to proceed on the one hand with a Quigleyan economics of reform or circumvention (Quigley, 1961: 78; Melko, 1972a: 601-603), and on the other with the selective advancement of military technologies designed to frustrate and obstruct major power shifts based on the rapid exploitation of new technique.

Other schools of real peace propose other priorities, which merit discussion. But Melko’s line of work satisfies the criteria needed for civilizationists to move ahead through the worlds of discourse of history, science and practice (Oakeshott, 1933) in a lively and durable direction for the historical, scientific and practical study of peace.

References


Civilizational Trauma and Value Nihilism in Boccaccio’s Decameron

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Introduction: Civilizational Trauma and Values Crises

In the introduction to their edited volume *The Cultural Life of Catastrophes and Crises*, Carsten Meiner and Kristen Veel discuss catastrophes and crises as “disruptions of order”¹. They argue that “through consequences of varying severity, catastrophes and crises change and subvert what we have become accustomed to as the normal state of things, thereby exposing what was previously taken for granted.”² Yet their book explores not merely the particular catastrophic events themselves, but in the “multi-layered and complex interlinkage between actual events and the cultural processing of these events”³, i.e., how they “understood in terms of their cultural life….how they are interpreted once they occur, and what kinds of cultural representation they subsequently engender.”⁴

This paper traces what happens to a civilization’s fundamental values during times of catastrophe and specifically how civilizational values are affected by collective psychic trauma. The specific case under consideration here is the Black Death plague, which ravaged Europe starting from around 1348. The paper examines how some themes in Boccaccio’s *Decameron*, perhaps the most influential literary production created in reaction to the plague, can also be considered one of the West’s earliest chronicles of a moral/epistemological crisis, and how certain themes in the work, understood as a reaction to the Black Death, can even be seen to reveal elements of trends towards what we now call value nihilism (at least according to Nietzsche’s definition of the term).

This paper will also address the more general question of how crises and catastrophes are to be properly studied, as part of the “methodology” of civilizational studies. I will thus follow the theoretical lead of Meiner and Veel above (and civilizationalists like Pirritrim Sorokin) in that, for this paper, the crucial moment to be studied is not necessarily the external catastrophic event itself (e.g., all of the details concerning an earthquake, economic collapse or world war--in this case the Black Death plague) but rather the internal “void of ethics” (Cf. Patrizia McBride) that this event left in its wake, and the implications this “void of ethics” has had upon those of us living in Western Civilization today.

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² Ibid.
⁴ Ibid.
The Abandonment of Values in Desperate Times

According to the Brown University Decameron Web:

in 1334 an epidemic which would eventually kill two-thirds of China’s inhabitants struck the northeastern Chinese province of Hopei, claiming up to ninety percent of the population...carried along trade routes, the ‘Black Death’, as it soon would be called, began to work its way east...In 1346 the plague came to Kaffa, a Genoese cathedral city...plague ridden ships from Kaffa brought the disease to Italy. Some cities lost almost all their inhabitants. In Venice at least three-quarters died. In Pisa seven tenths of the inhabitants died, and many families were completely destroyed...Estimates of the dead vary greatly...throughout Italy, at least half the population died.5

Boccaccio describes the physical symptoms and progression of the disease in the first chapter of Decameron: First there would be the appearance of certain swellings in the groin or armpit, which then would begin to spread, soon appearing at random all over the body. Later on, the symptoms changed, and many people began to find dark blotches on their arms, thighs, and other parts of the body...At this point, this was a certain sign that the person would die...”6

The question for this inquiry is how did this affect medieval civilization on a spiritual plane, in terms of its basic values? Part of the experience of trauma here was the unique sense of hopelessness spreading through Christendom, due to the fact that no matter who one was or what actions one took (or didn’t take), nothing proved effective to stop the plague’s deadly progress. Boccaccio thus writes: “against this pestilence no human wisdom or foresight was any avail.”7 Whether priest or layman, Christian or Jew, rich or poor, man or woman, all fell victim. Neither prayer nor medicine worked. Some desperately beseeched God, seeking penance through self-flagellation or participation in novenas, while others (perhaps equally desperately) attempted to “carpe diem,” trying to find a modicum of pleasure wherever possible. But it didn’t really matter what the people did, as the plague progressed relentlessly and indiscriminately across Europe. While the mass death wrought by the plague in itself was horrific enough, the accompanying realization of futility must only have exacerbated the collective trauma experienced in Europe at this time.

This sense of despair led to a widespread breakdown of morals. Boccaccio writes that in the face of mass death, (and with the hysteria, hopelessness and social disorder attendant upon the recognition that nobody, including the medical establishment and the clergy, could do

anything to stop the plague’s progress) “the revered authority of the laws, both divine and
human, had fallen and almost completely disappeared.”

How, more specifically, was this moral breakdown made manifest? For one thing, we see
that civilization’s most basic family ties and relations were abandoned out of sheer panic
and fear for self-preservation. Boccaccio writes:

…brother abandoned brother, uncle abandoned nephew, sister left brother, and very
often wife abandoned husband…even worse, almost unbelievable, fathers and
mothers neglected to tend and care for their own children, as if they were not their
own.

Moreover, in their desperation to quickly rid themselves of diseased corpses, the most sacred
rituals in Christianity concerning death and funerals were also suddenly abandoned. People
died alone in the streets and were then simply thrown into mass graves:

The city was full of corpses. Things had reached such a point that the people who
died were cared for as we care for goats today…so many corpses would arrive in
front of a church every day and at every hour…when all the graves were full, huge
trenches were dug in all of the cemeteries of the churches and into the new arrivals
were dumped by the hundreds, and they were packed in there with dirt, one on top
of another….until the trench was filled.

Sexual (Im)morality in Decameron: Crisis or Catharsis?

In what other ways did mass trauma in medieval Christian civilization lead to the
questioning of the most basic values of Christianity and of civilization itself? Decameron
is interesting in large part because of its specific focus on the loosening of sexual morality.
Hence Nancy Reale in her interesting paper “Boccachio’s Decameron: A Fictional Account
of Grappling with Chaos,” writes:

Decameron is a recording of a deep crisis in Italian life in the largest sense and
simultaneously Boccaccio’s personal crisis of faith. The text repeatedly and
courageously questions received assumptions about religion and social organization
and offers views of trecento Italy that are diverse, often destabilized and
destabilizing, and sometimes devoid of an overarching religion faith that would
otherwise (?) have been assumed.

8 Decameron (Musa & Bondanella) 5.
9 Decameron, (Musa & Bondanella) 5.
10 Decameron, (Musa & Bondanella) 8.
We know that medieval Europe was a civilization saturated in religion and dominated by Christianity; religious explanations were offered and accepted without question in response to almost all events in life. Themes of salvation and sin were read into all aspects of human behavior and punishment, and the fear of eternal hellfire was on almost everyone’s mind consistently. (This obsession explains one of the origins of the indulgence controversy initiated by Luther, et al.) Thus the devastation of the Black Death was commonly explained as God’s punishment for human wrongdoing and transgression. Yet the destabilization described above is in many ways the central theme of Decameron. This destabilization becomes apparent also when Boccaccio’s fictional account focuses upon (through the various tales told by the young people in the “brigata”) the loosening of Christian sexual morality as a consequence of the plagues’ devastation.

While Decameron is a fictional account of Late Medieval Europe’s reaction to catastrophe, it is also crucial to note that works of art often act as mirrors, reflecting pre-existing cultural patterns and tendencies (albeit sometimes lying just under the surface). Such works of art are not simply created “ex nihilo,” completely without context. And the loosening of sexual morality has often been viewed as a basic feature or symptom of societies in breakdown. The civilizationalist Pitirim Sorokin discussed the tendency for civilizations to become increasingly “sensate” as part of the process of gradual disintegration. So one might ask, with medieval Christendom in mind: Did the Black Death trigger, at least as reflected in Decameron, the fading of medieval Christendom’s more “ideational” culture (in which life’s fundamental frame of reference was religion and its transcendent God) and thereby herald the dawning of a more “sensate” culture, now focusing on forbidden sex and decadence?

Decameron is famous for its tales of seduction, including those involving clergy, especially nuns. While perhaps the author was going for some “shock value” here, as background it should be noted that sex among clergy was not completely unknown at this time, and contrary to the modern stereotype that men desire sex more than females, during the Middle Ages women were viewed as more lustful than men. Thus Decameron has many instances of women overcome by lust, women with insatiable desires, women needing younger lovers because their older husbands can no longer satisfy them sexually, etc. According to R. Hastings, there is also in Decameron a new implicit value system being put forth by Boccachio, which was certainly “not the general morality of his time,” arguing that morality is “based on nature.”

14 Brown Decameron web - www.brown.edu/Departments/Italian_Studies/dweb/society/sexual-desire.php
16 Ibid.
the Tenth Story of the Second Day): “I shall show the…foolishness of those who, overestimating their natural powers…attempt to mold people in their own image, thus flying in the face of nature.” According to Hastings, he then goes on to tell of an old man who cannot sexually satisfy his young wife, a recurrent theme in the Decameron…according to this…interpretation of the laws of nature, a young woman needs to be sexually satisfied and the old man, by failing to do so, quite justly loses her.17

We thus see in Decameron many instances where Christian morality seems to be conveniently discarded when it is found inconvenient and in conflict with more “natural” sexual desires. For example, one nun confesses to another her lust for a young man (in the story of the ‘deaf-mute’ gardener) and the question is then asked “don’t you know that we have promised our virginity to God?” This question is met with the interestingly pragmatic and somewhat jaded rationalization from the other nun: “how many promises do we make him every day which we can’t keep?”18 This example clearly reflects a break with the established Christian morality which dominated Europe during the Middle Ages. Moreover, no one could ever confuse the above emphasis on “nature” with any sort of natural law theology (e.g., that put forth by St. Thomas Aquinas) justifying Christian morality either.

What are we to make of this sudden and clear deviation from traditional Christian sexual morality in Decameron, a morality so dominant in medieval Europe, a culture long dominated by the values of religion? Is this apparent disintegration of traditional values in the text an almost nihilistic rejection of Christian morality? First, it should be noted that instances of premarital sex and adultery were much more common during the Middle Ages than many have supposed, and that despite very strong religious and cultural prohibitions, the temptations of the flesh were no less powerful then than they are now.19 Moreover, even if “nature” is now touted by Boccaccio as a new moral value, this is not, strictly speaking, nihilism (defined as the absence of values altogether) but rather it is just the substitution of new (perhaps more permissive) values for old values. Or could the above serve merely as an extreme and desperate example of “carpe diem,” indeed a rationalization for sexual license? After all, when bodies litter the streets at every turn, when the smell of death is everywhere, when your relatives and friends have all died horrible deaths in front of your very eyes, when your own chances of survival are slim to none, when none of the doctors have any idea what to do, when the priests themselves are all either dead or have abandoned their sick parishioners, perhaps the only honest way to view the situation is to take the position that nothing makes any sense, there is no cosmic justice, nothing matters anymore, so why not take pleasure in this life while one still can? Tendencies towards decadent sexuality are further detailed by David Herlihy, who writes how “plague mortalities reminded survivors of their own fragile grasp on life, and prompted some of them to spend...

17 Ibid.
18 Boccaccio, Decameron, in Musa and Bondadella (ed. and trans.) p. 66.
19 Brown University Decameron Web.
www.brown.edu/Departments?Italian_Studies/dweb/society/sex/fornication-adultery.php
their remaining hours in revelry.”  People seemed to desire a temporary victory over death, however illusory, and Herlihy describes how people sacrilegiously danced, played trivial games or committed “unseemly acts” in cemeteries, “over the graves of the dead. Prostitutes solicited in cemeteries, and fornicators and adulterers trysted among the graves”.

Given the context of total catastrophe and existential hopelessness, the impetus towards short-term pleasure must have been strong. This is especially interesting given the belief of most religions (including Christianity, cf. Saint Augustine) that this life is merely preparation for the much more important life to come, thus justifying delaying gratification in the present. We have seen how the element of hopelessness was evident in light of the impotence of both science (medicine) and religion (prayer) to stem the tide of death. How did this affect the prevailing value system? Christoph Jedan writes:

Boccaccio notes that …in this situation, religion proved ineffective: it did not prevent the outbreak, it did not protect the faithful and it could not prevent the complete disintegration of social structure.”  Boccaccio notes the widespread disillusion with religion e.g., by referring repeatedly to the inefficacy of prayer and devotion…”

Regarding the widespread licentiousness (especially in the descriptions of the behavior of nuns) described in the tales told by the brigata, “religious values and religious experience…are depicted as a façade, concealing a uniform human nature in which desires that are repressed or denied by Christianity are the motivating force.”

Some critics might argue here that I’ve looked at this through too dark a lens and fundamentally misunderstood Boccaccio’s point. By this view, Decameron is not nihilistic in any sort of serious philosophical sense, but is actually a more playful work that refreshingly pokes fun at the seriousness of medieval religious fundamentalism (e.g., Dante, etc.). Decameron takes a fresh look at human beings as they really are (often lustful, light-hearted, imperfect and pleasure seeking) rather than as the haughty, humorless, pious and cerebral creatures that medieval Christianity seemingly would’ve liked them to be. Hence the tales told during the brigata, tales of infidelity, lust and adultery, are retold by Boccaccio in a light and almost playful manner. Like the Florentine Renaissance thinkers soon to come (e.g., Machiavelli), Boccaccio has a more human-centered, realistic and “this-worldly”

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21 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
approach to life, and has to some degree tried to leave behind the sterile, theocratic worldview of the recent past. This is the view, for example, of Francesco De Sanctis.\(^\text{25}\) Moreover, according to De Sanctis, the emphasis on sensuality, almost ridiculing medieval piety\(^\text{26}\) was already present and established in the Italian spirit (many think Italy always took its religion with a few grains of realism and salt anyway—as opposed to the more dour Northern variants of Christianity). De Sanctis writes: “the book seemed to respond to something in people’s souls which had been wanting to come out for a long time…”\(^\text{27}\) It was, he says, “a time of transition.” Yet, on the other hand, and admitting the truths in this incisive analysis, we must remember also that the Decameron was written against the backdrop of the Black Death, the horrors of which Boccaccio himself vividly describes in the Proem. Perhaps going through the horrors of the plague functioned as a catharsis for the Italian people—ironically not as part of a pattern of moral disintegration, but instead as part of the progress from crisis to renewal. Yet Decameron was nevertheless still a reaction to an epic crisis, and in such times of crisis, value systems are questioned and often rejected.

Reactions to catastrophe are complicated and many-faceted. Of course we know that most citizens of medieval Europe retained their religious beliefs in the wake of the plague and many might even have increased in the intensity of their religious belief, as often happens during desperate times. Herlihy thus describes in detail “flamboyant movements of penance” such as the flagellants who “stripped to the waist and whipped themselves with knotted cords”, scourging themselves in expiation for their own sins and those of society.”\(^\text{28}\) Religious explanation was still the overarching conceptual framework of the time, the basic prism or conceptual framework through which all human experience was inevitably filtered. And these religious impulses were similarly taken to extremes in these desperate times. On the other hand, Boccaccio’s text, while certainly illustrating his own personal crisis of faith, perhaps also reflected a repressed undercurrent of a more radical sort of doubt beginning to simmer under the surface of medieval civilization itself during this horrific time.

Works such as Decameron are not conceived or written in a vacuum, but often reflect larger crises on the civilizational level. Interestingly, Pitirim Sorokin uses Decameron as evidence of the complexity of the phenomenon of civilizational disintegration (that of medieval Christendom). Sorokin observed that often during this process there occurs a splitting between ideational and sensate tendencies. He writes:

the soul of the society in the transition will be split into the Carpe Diem on the one hand and on the other into ideational indifference and negative attitude towards all


\(^{26}\) F. De Sanctis in Musa and Bondanella (ed.), 216.

\(^{27}\) DeSanctis, 217.

\(^{28}\) Herlihy, Op Cit, 68.

\(^{29}\) Ibid, 67.
the sensory pleasures. Society itself will be increasingly divided into open, perfectly cynical sinners with their ‘eat, drink, and love, for tomorrow is uncertain’ and into the ascetics and saints who will flee the sensory world into a kind of new refuge...such a split has uniformly occurred in small and great transitions and especially in the period of the great transitions from one culture to another. Boccaccio’s Decameron with its hedonistic company, and the medieval flagellants, mystics and ascetics are the concrete examples of such a split in the transition of the fourteenth century.³⁰

This “splitting” thus illustrates the complexity of the reactions to the Black Death (and catastrophes generally) and in all likelihood, the matter was complicated—so much so that all of these patterns in the realm of psychology and morality were perhaps occurring simultaneously.

**Aporia in the Later Middle Ages**

What does all this mean? The widespread, indiscriminate death caused by the plague called into question the most basic assumptions of Christian Europe and left it in a state of widespread spiritual aporia. Robert Gottfried writes:

> People were traumatized. They lost faith in their own abilities, in the old values, and if not in God then in the traditional ways in which He had been propitiated. Europe was plunged in a moral crisis. The old order was collapsing and the new one was not yet in place.³¹

At the heart of the moral crisis was also a crisis of understanding and explanation—an epistemological crisis. What is an epistemological crisis? Alasdair MacIntyre describes this as “a problem about the rational induction of inferences from premises...to conclusions...that would enable us to make reasonably reliable predictions.”³² What one “took to be evidence pointing unambiguously in some one direction now turns out to have been equally susceptible of rival interpretations.”³³ MacIntyre continues:

> it is not only that an individual may rely on the schemata which have hitherto informed all his interpretations...and find that he has been led into...error...so that for the first time the schemata are put in question...but the individual may come to recognize the possibility of systematically different possibilities of interpretation, or

the existence of alternative…schemata which yield mutually incompatible accounts of what is going on.\textsuperscript{34}

Or, perhaps more to the point of this pre-modern situation (as opposed to the “post-modern” one MacIntyre describes), the epistemological crisis was even more dire. The dominant religious interpretation (in which there exists a coherent moral order or overarching cosmic justice) had been called into question by the indiscriminate nature of the plague, yet there were no other rival explanations to confront, no larger set of alternative explanations among from which to choose. Moreover, there were no coherent or convincing scientific explanations at the time. One couldn’t even find another alternative explanation, so there was basically no coherent understanding or explanation of the event at all.

The Spectre of Cosmic Disorder

Perhaps in its starkest form, catastrophes like the Black Death raised (and still raise) the prospect of the complete lack of a cosmic order and any moral justice in the universe. This theme goes back much further than medieval times; it paradoxically goes back to the Bible itself. Consider the following quote from the Book of Job, as Job, by all accounts a righteous and religions man, loses inexplicably everything he has in the blink of an eye. In the midst of his inexplicable suffering, Job laments of God: “It is all one. He destroys wicked and blameless alike.”\textsuperscript{35}

This astonishing exclamation by Job helps us understand how it must have felt to experience not merely the wholesale nature of death through the plague but its indiscriminate nature as well. In fact, the quote suggests the entire cosmic order or system of divine justice that religion is built upon either has been somehow overthrown, or perhaps it never really existed in the first place. Perhaps the universe is simply amoral, and things just happen as they must, regardless of any human concerns, any discernible patterns of human behavior or any considerations of morality whatsoever.\textsuperscript{36}

Let’s look at this more closely and how this is played out in the case of the Black Plague, specifically with regard to the indiscriminate nature of the plague’s destruction. One illustration of this indiscriminateness is that there apparently were higher rates of mortality among the clergy than among the general population, especially in England.\textsuperscript{37} Clergy generally were among those who ministered to the sick and dying, so this might make sense, yet it on the other hand revealed to many the fundamental impotence of the clergy and the church in the face of this crisis. Moreover, in a great many cases, priests actually abandoned their sick flocks to save themselves. Although priests generally would have been thought to exist on a higher spiritual plane than the average citizen, (though perhaps there has always

\textsuperscript{34} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{35} \textit{Oxford Study Bible}, Job (9-22).  
\textsuperscript{37} Gottfried, 62.
been some cynicism on this score) the abandonment of their flocks by many clergymen caused many citizens to further question the moral integrity of the clergy, and the anger of the masses began to simmer.\footnote{Gottfried, 84.} Gottfried writes:

> Many parish priests fled, leaving no one to offer services, deliver last rites and comfort the sick. Flight might have been intellectually explicable, but it was morally inexcusable.\footnote{A.M. Campbell, \textit{The Black Death and Men of Learning} (NY: Columbia University Press, 1931), as cited in Pitirim Sorokin, \textit{Man and Society in Calamity}, p. 175.}

Pitirim Sorokin, in \textit{Man and Society in Calamity}, devotes a chapter to how calamities affect the spiritual life of society. He cites A.M. Campbell’s \textit{The Black Death and Men of Learning} to furnish examples of how the demoralization of clergy was decried by a number of chroniclers during this time, e.g., John of Reading’s lament that many mendicant priests have “become unduly rich through confessions” and were now “seeking after earthly and carnal things,” or the Archbishop of Canterbury’s charge that the priests “now desire voluptuous pleasures to such an extent that souls are neglected and churches and chapels are empty.”\footnote{Hermann Broch “The Dissolution of Values” in \textit{The Sleepwalkers} (London, Quartet, 1986), 480.} This priestly abandonment of their flocks and general bad behavior paved the way for further skepticism of the masses towards the clergy itself, as phenomenon which in turn helped the eventual cause of Wycliff, Luther and the Reformation. This is relevant further as the Reformation helped usher in, according to Hermann Broch, “the dissolution of values” characteristic of modernity, which it seems to me we still face today in post-modernity. Broch writes:

> In the Renaissance, that criminal and rebellious age, the unified Christian worldview was broken in two halves, one Catholic and one Protestant. With the falling asunder of the medieval organon, a process of dissolution destined to go on for five centuries was inaugurated and the seeds of the modern world were planted.\footnote{Hermann Broch “The Dissolution of Values” in \textit{The Sleepwalkers} (London, Quartet, 1986), 480.}

In this sense, the Black Plague contributed to the Reformation, the decline of religious authority, and the general erosion of the values of medieval civilization as it had traditionally been known.

David Herlihy also discusses another important aspect of the widespread perception of cosmic disorder--how it impacted fundamental debates in late medieval philosophy. Herlihy notes how St. Thomas Aquinas’ thought, perhaps the dominant philosophical system of this time, “argued that the universe possessed an underlying order, and that the human intellect

\footnote{This anger was also taken out elsewhere. The Jews of Europe, traditional scapegoats of Christendom, were predictably accused of poisoning the wells and spreading the plague, and were often massacred en masse throughout this time.}
could achieve at least a partial understanding of its structure.” 42 Yet Herlihy reports how Aquinas’ late medieval critics, the nominalists, “claimed that he was wrong on both counts.” 43

According to this nominalist perspective, “the human intellect had not the power to penetrate the metaphysical structures of the universe. It could do no more than observe events as they flowed.” 44 Again, of course, this viewpoint did not entail the wholesale rejection of religious belief, as the nominalists (like the other major schools of medieval European thought) were always thoroughgoing theists. Yet the nominalists still had to reconcile their religious beliefs with “the experience of plague—unpredictable in its appearance and…unknowable in its origins, yet destructive in its impact.” 45 Herlihy describes how the conception of God put forth by these late medieval critics of Aquinas involved an interesting view of divine omnipotence. This divine omnipotence “meant in the last analysis that there could be no fixed order. God could change what He wanted when He wanted. The nominalists looked on a universe dominated by arbitrary motions,” and thus their criticism of Aquinas was “consonant with the disordered experience of late medieval life.” 46

**Boccaccio’s Lessons for Modernity**

It might be interesting to now view in more depth this state of affairs from a more modern philosophical lens. The larger questions here are these: what happens to a civilization when its most basic assumptions and values are ripped asunder? What were the symptoms of the values crisis engendered by the Black Death, and how did this crisis help usher in the eventual disintegration of medieval European civilization? And how did this values crisis reveal the problem of nihilism, in my view still the most important moral question facing humanity today?

Is *Decameron* in some important sense a nihilistic work? After all, Boccaccio’s depiction of the Black Death with its indiscriminate destruction, chronicled the dissolution of a number of basic Christian values. Or is it rather (to paraphrase Patrizia McBride writing on modernity specifically through the writings of Robert Musil) that such crises with their revealing of the indiscriminate, relentless nature of death and suffering “merely provide the conditions” through we can somehow see that a coherent moral order “never really existed in the first place?” 47 And if the latter option is true, how can we deal with this? Nietzsche, the first thinker of modernity to deal comprehensively with the problem of nihilism, argues

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43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
46 Ibid, 73.
the problem of nihilism arises when “the problem of why receives no answer”\textsuperscript{48}. The questioner (in this case the survivor of catastrophe) experiences only a deafening cosmic silence. But Nietzsche seems somewhat unclear on some other key points here. He suggests at one point that nihilism arises when values devalue themselves and no longer hold\textsuperscript{49}. But elsewhere he suggests that the problem is that human beings seek “meaning in events that is simply not in them”\textsuperscript{50}, and then attempt to fabricate this meaning “solely out of psychological needs”\textsuperscript{51}. But exactly what are these psychological needs?

This is a complicated question, but basically we need the events in our lives to make sense in order to survive psychologically and spiritually in this world\textsuperscript{52}. It is a basic human need to make sense of things. An unintelligible world is for many an unlivable one.

But what happens when events don’t make sense, and we have no scientific, psychological, religious or philosophical tools at our disposal to help us make sense out of the events? Survivors are then left bereft in the aftermath of catastrophe; without a guiding set of coherent and consistent principles or values, they are then at a loss to explain properly the events, integrate them, predict future events, and/or put the entire situation into a larger context. Long standing values and cultural assumptions have proven themselves ineffective, but they have not yet been replaced with new ones. A spiritual void or aporia is thus what is revealed during moments of moral crisis, and as this aporia becomes more widespread and more pervasive in the collective consciousness of a civilization, it increasingly becomes a relevant factor in the process of this civilization’s gradual disintegration—until which time a new moral paradigm is somehow eventually put in its place.

The lessons of \textit{Decameron} are important for us to learn because the human need for a coherent guiding value system is still the central philosophical question of our postmodern age. After all, we currently are living at the dawn of the twenty-first century. What lessons can we apply from the devastation of the Black Death, an event that occurred in such a completely different time and place than our own today? Is it even possible to make intelligible comparative judgments (e.g., the comparative study of civilizations), given the considerable foreignness of the world-picture of medieval Christendom as compared with our own, postmodern civilization? I believe that human nature, if there is such a thing, probably doesn’t change dramatically over different times and places. Given certain similar conditions, human beings feel (as they always have and always will) emotions like jealousy, lust, hopelessness and joy, and they will act and react to stimuli and situations in similar, often predictable ways. Thus, I believe some important applications apply.

\textsuperscript{49} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{50} Ibid, 12.
\textsuperscript{51} Ibid 13.
\textsuperscript{52} See also Peter Berger, \textit{The Sacred Canopy} (NY: Image/Doubleday, 1967).
First, we are beginning to see the rise and spread of another plague or epidemic—the Ebola outbreak—which may be revisiting many of the issues we have already discussed above. A recent (May 9, 2015) *New York Times* article, “Liberia Conquers Ebola, but Faces a Crisis of Faith” highlights some of these similar themes. The article describes how congregants of a Liberian church ceremoniously laid hands on an ailing parishioner, and soon thereafter, “the disease tore through the church, killing eight members, or about a tenth of the congregation.”\(^{53}\) The article reports that many of these otherwise religious people began to have “doubts in their minds about God” in large part because “Ebola’s apparent randomness…took a toll. Scientists believe that some people have a greater resistance to Ebola, or even immunity. But to church members, the deaths of some, though not others, challenged their faith.”\(^{54}\)

Herlihy discusses similar reactions to the AIDS virus:

> Many persons today do not believe what the experts relate about AIDS and its modes of transmission. They still want infected children taken from schools and contacts with the sick severely limited. We seem to witness here too a crisis of confidence in expert opinion, much like the one that occurred in the Middle Ages.\(^{55}\)

Of course, some panic in the face of widespread epidemic will perhaps always be a part of human nature, as most of us fear death, and are still terrified by the fact that all the expertise and technology we currently possess simply cannot completely protect us and our loved ones in many such cases.\(^{56}\)

Moreover, on the moral level, we who live in the postmodern West are actually experiencing a “void of ethics” right now. We still have yet to intellectually and spiritually process the catastrophic events of the twentieth century—perhaps history’s bloodiest century ever. After the horrors of the twentieth century, what enduring value system can we now ascribe to in the postmodern West? We may have advanced technology today, but can this technology, or science generally, ever explain which values we should believe in, and why, in an age


\(^{54}\) Ibid.

\(^{55}\) Herlihy, *Op Cit*, 69.

\(^{56}\) Certainly our own age, even with its advanced science and technology, remains vulnerable to scenes of disaster and catastrophe. In fact, as I write this today, a horrific disaster of another sort (a massive earthquake) has just ravaged the country of Nepal, with the latest death count exceeding 6200 people. Scientists apparently had been expecting a massive earthquake in this part of the world for some time. But given the current limits of seismological science, they simply could not predict exactly when such an event would occur, and thus authorities could not realistically order mass pre-emptive evacuations. Moreover, because such events are caused by shifts of tectonic plates deep inside the Earth, there apparently really wasn’t much anyone could’ve done about it anyway, short of simply abandoning their country (an ancient and fabled land with a rich spiritual heritage) permanently. Living in such an area is more or less a gamble, one which 5000 people (and countless other wounded and traumatized survivors) simply lost. Exactly how the Nepalese people attempt to process the horror of the event remains to be seen.
which featured two brutal world wars and culminated in Auschwitz—a scene of mass death almost incomprehensible in its scale and scope? Further, much postmodern philosophy has offered us nothing beyond various forms of skepticism and relativism. Mark T. Mitchell writes:

modernity has reached a dead end. The optimism in which the modern world was conceived and nurtured has been replaced by a thoroughgoing skepticism that denies the possibility of making meaningful truth claims, especially as those claims bear on morality and religion...From a certain vantage this situation might appear a stable solution to the...bloodletting that moral and religious truth claims spawned. Yet on another level such a position is simply intolerable, for it is inhuman. It is not possible to deny for long the very things for which human souls most yearn. If these sorts of claims are denied...they will invariably assert themselves in perverted and often violent ways.57

Perhaps the rise of (increasingly violent) religious fundamentalism that we now are witnessing worldwide is an attempt by some to fill this void of truth and meaning. But it also seems that in many cases (ISIS, etc.), the fundamentalist cure may be worse than the disease. We in the West have actually been down this path many times before--consider also the bloody cycles of Reformation and Counter-Reformation, the wars of religion, mass killings of “heretics,” witch burnings, etc., that characterized the early modern period on the European continent, in light not only of the Protestant Reformation but also of the scientific revolution and other major upheavals of thought. During this time, the poet John Donne famously wrote of the anomie and spiritual dislocation experienced so acutely by thoughtful people when “a new philosophy calls all into doubt.” This spiritual dilemma thus reveals to us another important pattern in the history of civilizations--that with regards to the question of values in times of crisis, the more things change, the more they remain the same.

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This article discusses the role of intellectuals in Chinese politics in the twentieth century. I will argue that intellectuals, particularly what I call political intellectuals, emerged as a category of identity in the early years of the Republic of China between 1912 and 1927. I will then try to argue that political intellectuals positioned themselves as brokers of political legitimacy. Political intellectuals thereby formed a part of a rapidly evolving political culture at that time, one which saw the emergence of mass politics based on political parties.

The historiography of twentieth-century China tends to depict intellectuals after the 1910s as wholly different from earlier intellectuals. Standard textbook accounts rarely mention intellectuals before the 1910s -- with a few outstanding exceptions such as Kang Youwei 康有為, Liang Qichao 梁啓超, or Zhang Binglin 章炳麟. Yet after the 1910s the term “intellectuals” surfaces increasingly, and the historiography describes a greater number of people than ever as intellectuals who intervene in culture and politics. One might argue that the main thing that changed was not the position of educated elites in politics but rather their role in writing history and that after 1920 they dominated much of the history writing, depicting therefore their own social group as crucial to the events of the time.\(^1\) Others might argue that this is merely a matter of terminology.\(^2\)

While there is much to support these views, they do not preclude an actual change in the role of intellectuals in society. I therefore propose that not only the historiography changed after 1919 but also that educated elites did indeed carve a new role for themselves in a political culture that they helped remold.

My question then can be formulated as follows: what is it that changed in the role Chinese intellectuals played after 1920?

I will open with a few remarks on the term “intellectual.” Then, I will sketch the role of educated elites, or intellectuals, in the imperial period, the role before the changes took place in the waning years of the Qing and the early Republic. I will then argue that in the late


1910s and early 1920s the role of intellectuals changed as they became what I call “brokers of political legitimacy.”

**Intellectuals**

The term “intellectual” was coined at the turn of the twentieth century by nationalist French thinkers as a pejorative term for supporters of the alleged traitor Alfred Dreyfus. These thinkers appropriated the term, and it became their identifier. The term has come to denote social groups and individuals usually based upon their education and occupations that have to do with abstract thinking. As its history shows us, the term itself originated in a context of political strife and, perhaps for this reason, the term often retains its association with politics and with political dissent.

The classical formulation of the intellectual as political dissenter was outlined by Julien Benda in *La Trahison des Clercs*, who accused intellectuals of not living up to an ideal of resistance. For some, the term “intellectual” has come to imply conscientious dissent—speaking truth to power—in the name of higher ideals. We might question whether a term that originated in such a specific context is universally applicable and whether it accurately describes different societies.

For the purposes of this essay suffice it to say that much of the scholarship that discusses intellectuals, in any case, does assume that the term is universally applicable. Indeed, the idea or trope of the loyal intellectual scholar official remonstrating against political power in the name of higher ideal existed in China as well.

**Intellectuals in Imperial China**

In order to understand the position of educated elites in Chinese society in the late imperial period, we must take into account two factors. The first has to do with the institutional setting within which intellectual elites operated. The second has to do with an ethos that this group adopted.

Regarding the institutional framework: the relationship of Chinese intellectuals to the state and their position in society was determined above all by means of the imperial civil service examination system (*keju* 科舉). As early as the second century BCE, the Chinese empire used exams to recruit at least some bureaucrats. Examinations for the civil service began to be implemented again during the Sui dynasty (581-617); and in the course of the Song

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dynasty (960-1279) the examination system became firmly institutionalized as the premiere channel for attaining government positions. Due to the centralized nature of the Chinese state passing the exams became the most promising channel to attaining and maintaining power, status, and wealth. The examination system tested mastery of classical, canonical texts and commentaries, which were presumed to convey moral principles, which were to direct governance, and the ability to produce texts in a similarly refined style. There were different levels of exams, and the success in the highest level of examinations held in the national capital promised a position in the governmental bureaucracy. Most education in imperial China was therefore directed toward the civil service exams.

In this system, the pinnacle of scholarly knowledge was therefore identified with government position, not merely as a scholar, but as an official. The ideal official was a scholar, and the ideal scholar a dedicated official. The state was ideally taken to be one whose bureaucracy is composed of scholar-officials, ideally men of worth (junzi 君子) who implement a moral order. Naturally, many of the most celebrated cultural figures in Chinese tradition were either officials or had failed to pass the exams. For example, the essayist and poet Su Dongpo 蘇東坡 (1037-1071) was also an official, whereas the renowned poet Li Bai 李白 (or Li Po, 712-770) failed the exams.

This leads to the second point I wish to make, that is, there was an ethos that accompanied the institutional position of intellectuals or educated elites. Ideally, Chinese educated elites were to serve the state. However, rulers themselves were presumed to draw legitimacy from the so-called “mandate of Heaven.” Thus, many of the scholar-officials saw themselves as serving the state, but under the aegis of a yet higher source of legitimacy, or serving the state but beholden to standards that were not identical with the policies of the reigning court.

This ideal was exemplified in the well-known maxim (Xian tian xia zhi you er you, hou tian xia zhi le er le 先天下之憂而憂，後天下之樂而樂) coined by the Song dynasty scholar-official Fan Zhongyan 范仲淹 (989-1052): “Be the first to worry about the worries of the world, the last to take pleasure in its pleasures.”

This maxim itself is cited to this day by Chinese intellectuals as a justification or explanation for their actions, views, and position in the society.6

The ideal of serving the state so as to benefit the society by imparting moral principles to the ruler (not as a scholar-official but as an independent adviser) was exemplified by the ancient scholar Mencius (Mengzi 孟子) in the text that bears his name. Most of the Mencius consists of dialogues between the itinerant scholar (though not an official) Mencius, and kings of kingdoms in the pre-imperial period. In these texts Mencius remonstrates with the

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6 For the persistence of this image, which is also self-serving, see for example Davies, Worrying About China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), p.17 and passim; Perry Link, Evening Chats in Beijing: Probing China’s Predicament (New York: Norton, 1992), p.12 and passim. For an inquiry into late Ming and early Qing literati as dissidents see Frederic Wakeman Jr. “The Price of Autonomy: Intellectuals in Ming and Ch’ing China” in in Daedalus Spring 1972.
kings, calling on them to rule in a just manner, which, he argues, will also be efficacious. The important point is that Mencius became canonized as one of the four books (四書) which were fundamental texts in preparing for the exams and were used to teach small children as well. It therefore formed part of the basic curriculum at all educational levels between the 10th and 20th centuries.

The image of the intellectual as one who dissents against a particular regime, often in the name of the people, persisted far beyond the demise of the imperial examination system and well into the twentieth century, for example in the events and student protests of spring 1989. Recent expressions of this view can be found in the political stances of dissident critic and winner of the 2010 Noble Peace Prize Liu Xiaobo and the contemporary novelist Yu Hua, who in a recent collection of essays states “when in this book I write of China’s pain, I am registering my pain too, because China’s pain is mine.”

The End of the Imperial Order

However, by the late nineteenth century the relationship between the educated elite and the imperial court had become frayed due to social, political, and intellectual changes. During the previous hundred years China had experienced vast rebellions and civil wars (most notably the Taiping war, 1851-1864), and was challenged by expanding European imperialism and gunboat diplomacy. Members of the educated elite increasingly viewed the bureaucratic structure and its intellectual underpinnings as inadequate for addressing China’s pressing problems. At the same time, alternative routes to social mobility emerged, most prominently the accumulation of wealth.

Together these developments meant that the status of scholarly learning was eroded and the linkage between classical learning, the examination system, and the imperial bureaucracy was weakened. This fraying finally received official institutional recognition when the examination system was abolished in 1905. It is no coincidence that the imperial regime itself crumbled in 1911 and it was replaced by a new “Republic of China.”

The new Republic was born with many high hopes among the educated elites. Hopes, however, soon disintegrated, as political strife emerged and China degenerated -- first into a dictatorship and then into a weak state partitioned among local strongmen (or warlords), and finally into a civil war. This period of social ill, however, proved to be a period of great creativity. Chinese intellectuals, in an attempt to respond to the crises of the times,

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7 See Benjamin Elman, A Cultural History of Civil Examinations in Late Imperial China (Berkeley, University of California Press, 2000), pp.79-80. The limits Mencius professed in serving kings sometimes caused authorized versions of the text to be censored. Ibid, ibid.


experimented with various schemes for ordering the state and society along with the new ways of defining their own position in Chinese society.

In a period dubbed in retrospect “the May Fourth Movement” (parts of which were called the “New Culture Movement”), Chinese intellectuals enthusiastically explored foreign cultures and ideas. Intellectuals now translated, read, and discussed ideas in a plethora of fields, from science to music, to health, family, gender relations, sports and physical fitness, theology, and politics. This explosion of intellectual exploration was enabled by a growing readership and a growing publishing industry, primarily in the form of periodicals. These periodicals varied in circulation and in scope from several dozens to around 16,000. Some periodicals sustained publication for several years, while others published a mere handful of issues or even a single issue before collapsing or being shut down.10

Another crucial venue for these discussions and explorations were small cultural-political societies that sprang up in urban centers across China. This intellectual and cultural fermentation climaxed in the summer of 1919 during “The May Fourth Movement” when students, merchants, and other urbanites took to the streets to protest increasing Japanese incursions into China and the ratification of these incursions by the Versailles Conference.

Intellectuals levelled criticism at the policies of the weak, putative national government, and the warlords who dominated most of China. Moreover, they launched fierce attacks on traditional values and institutions—such as filial piety, the traditional family structure, and Neo-Confucian thought—which they saw as responsible for China’s crises.11 These criticisms were very much informed by the study of foreign ideas, state and society as well as of social order.

Educated elites debated the merits of different views of social order, introduced these views to the right audience where possible, and even tried to implement them. The most noted examples of the study of foreign systems of administration, ideology, and politics would be the interest of Chinese intellectuals in different forms of socialism, liberalism, and nationalism.

One fine example of the curiosity of intellectual elites and of the eclectic and probing nature of their inquiries is a young teacher, journalist, and activist named Yun Daiying. In his journal Yun recorded his readings of Thomas More’s Utopia as well as the Chinese novel Dream of the Red Chamber (also known as The Story of the Stone).12 When planning a book series for one of the most important cultural societies of the time (the Young China Association 少年中國學會), the topics that Yun proposed included Kropotkin and his

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theories, Russell and his theories, Dewey and his theories, Darwin and his theories, Proudhon and his theories, the materialistic vision of history, democracy, Bolshevism, experimentalism (試驗主義), foundations of morality, the question of labor, the question of women, elementary-level village education, research on middle education, anarchism, Japan, the international movement, and mass psychology.13

The ideological experiments and explorations of educated elites, especially the youth, led to a new wave of organizations. Now like-minded youth gathered to explore similar cultural and political interests. Some of these explorations also resulted in the construction of small communes, though most of which were short-lived.14

In the late teens and early twenties these interests and experiments resulted in a host of small cultural-political societies diffused across China, mainly in large urban centers such as the Mutual Aid Society and Benefit the Masses Book Society in Wuhan; the Marxism Study Society in Beijing; the New Citizen Society in Changsha, of which Mao Zedong was a member; and the Young China Association. These small societies formed an infrastructure out of which new political organizations eventually emerged, including such parties as the Chinese Youth Party (Qingnian dang 青年黨), the Nationalist Party (國民黨), and the Communist Party (共產黨). These parties shaped China in the twentieth century and have remained central to Chinese politics to this day; the Communist Party still rules China whereas the Nationalist Party, although it now operates in a democracy, remains a major factor in Taiwanese politics and currently holds power.

The emergence of Chinese political intellectuals then is closely tied to the appearance of mass political parties, that is, parties claiming to speak in the name of the masses or the people. As such they have based their claim to authority on their representing the best interests of the people or the nation.15

Brokers of Legitimacy

In China’s post-imperial political chaos one acute problem that not only actual contenders for political power such as politicians and warlords but also all those who had an interest in politics or in national affairs have faced was the absence of a clear source of political legitimacy.

14 For example the “new village movement” that took root in 1919 and 1920 and led to several urban communes, such as the Beijing Work Study Mutual Aid Corps [Beijing gongdu huzhu tuan], the Morning Garden Scoeity [Xi Yuan], or the Wuhan Benefit the Masses Book Society [Liqun shushe]. I elaborate on some of these groups in “A May Fourth Peach Garden” in Twentieth Century China, November 2007; “Yun Daiyng and the Rise of Political Intellectuals in Modern China”, Ph.D. dissertation, Berkeley 2007.
15 Political parties appeared in China during the 1910s as well. These, however, were mostly small and elitist organizations that were designed to leave power in the hands of their members rather than to recruit lay people and mobilize the masses.
The absence of a clear and agreed-upon source of political legitimacy had also to do with a crisis of identity. Historian Joseph Levenson highlighted the dilemmas of Chinese intellectuals of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as they struggled to determine their own identities. For the problem, as Levenson pointed out, was not simply a matter of describing oneself but of searching for a morally acceptable basis for one’s identity; in other words, consolidating a foundation for one’s identity that he or she would see as legitimate.

In the small cultural-political societies of the time, educated young men and occasionally women cultivated their moral identities. These identities provided the basis and legitimacy for a critique of politics and society, a critique that was based on these youngsters’ sense of their own moral rectitude. Relying on their image and aspiration to be moral paragons, and on the historical legacy of the role of educated elites under the imperial regime, young intellectuals felt justified in positioning themselves as social critics who adjudicated the legitimacy of ideas, policies, and politicians. At the same time they suggested alternative social and political arrangements. By pointing to alternative possibilities of organizing state and society, they expanded the political discourse and the political imagination of their peers. In so doing they were part of the changing political scene, as organizations and institutions were created to try to embody these ideals. They thus had an essential role in shaping the emergence of political parties.

Criticisms of the current order along with proposals for alternative orders were made in speech and writing. As print media circulation grew, its producers gained influence. Writers, editors, and publishers—the producers of media—therefore rose in importance. May Fourth left a legacy of significant ties between politics and the press and therefore between politics and the producers of media. By the mid-1920s the print media had established itself as a tool for political mobilization.

Ideological parties, the press, and its producers therefore all grew together. The process by which they grew also meant a transformation of political culture. Producers of the new media introduced and developed new cultural and political concepts, thereby assuming a role as mediators of legitimacy. In the course of the May Fourth movement and the new culture movement, intellectuals changed from advisers (who due to the civil-service examinations had been reliant on the state) into brokers of legitimacy, mediating between the contenders for power—the political parties and the state—and the masses, whose will or support was invoked as the basis for legitimacy.

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17 Reed, “Advancing the (Gutenberg) Revolution” in Christopher Reed and Cynthia Brokaw eds., *From Woodblocks to the Internet: Chinese Publishing and Print Culture in Transition, circa 1800 to 2008* (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 275.
Political power increasingly drew its legitimacy from the putative support of the people, and therefore sought to mobilize large numbers of people in its support. The 1920s saw larger numbers of people than ever commenting on political affairs, taking part in demonstrations and strikes, and increasingly joining political parties.

**Conclusion**

The more politics involved mass political parties, the more intellectuals constituted an indelible part of political culture. Intellectuals positioned themselves as what sociologist Zygmunt Bauman has called “legislators” of social and political norms who make authoritative statements which arbitrate in controversies of opinions and which select those opinions which, having been selected, become correct and binding. The authority to arbitrate is in this case legitimized by superior (objective) knowledge to which intellectuals have a better access than the non-intellectual part of society.¹⁸

As legislators of social and political norms, intellectuals now became brokers of political legitimacy. A new political culture was thus constructed in a way which provided for the interests of its different constituents. Those who aspired to power required intellectuals to articulate ideas and convey them to the wider public as well as to recruit supporters. The political public benefitted from intermediaries who could serve as conduits to the leadership while providing insight into the leadership’s aims. In return, intellectuals themselves gained power from their position as mediators.

The new role of intellectuals was also reflected in the changing ways in which they referred to themselves as a distinct social group with its own characteristics and interests.¹⁹ Since the early twentieth century, intellectuals were viewed as constituting a zhihijieji 知識階級—“intellectual class” (though not in a Marxian sense), a term based on ancient concepts of occupations. In the 1920s, under the influence of Marxist theory, intellectuals began to refer to themselves as zhishifenzi 知識份子— which literally means “knowledgeable elements,” a term that the Communist Party adopted and later became a category of formal classification.²⁰

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¹⁹ For example, May Fourth activist Yun Daiying implicitly and explicitly discussed intelligentsia as distinct from masses in e.g.: Yun Daiying riji, 328–329, 332; Yun Daiying, “Geming de jiazhi”, Yun Daiying wenji, (Beijing: Renmin chuban she, 1984) vol.1, pp.224-227.

It should be noted that this change in the position of intellectuals occurred in tandem with the emergence and growth of many new professions and occupations in China—such as lawyers, journalists, then academics and scientists—and the change in its labor structure with the expansion of urban labor (or proletariat) that provided a basis for socialist labor organizing.²¹

The emergence of these new social identities, together with the emergence of politically involved intellectuals resulted in a new political culture, conceived by its components as composed of a political leadership, an intellectual class, and a mass citizenry which was to be mobilized, shaped, and recruited. Intellectuals now became the linchpin that connected people and politics to each other. This role determined the way in which they were subsequently treated by China’s governments, both Nationalist and Communist.

Evidence for Belarusian-Ukrainian Eastern Slavic Civilization

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This article argues for the existence of a distinct Eastern European Slavic civilization on the territories of modern Belarus and Ukraine. One group of Slavs migrated to Eastern Europe from the fifth century to the ninth century and then, for various reasons, separated and formed two civilizations – an Eastern Slavic civilization (Belarusian-Ukrainian) and an Eurasian civilization.

The critical factors for this division were the Mongol-Tatar invasion and the emergence of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the Principality, which saved Eastern Slavs from “Eurasian influence.” Belarus and Ukraine share a number of characteristic Western features.

Today it is obvious that including Belarus and Ukraine in the Orthodox, Eastern or Eurasian/Russian civilization must be revisited. Including the two civilizations as one has resulted from the prevalence of created myths and misinterpretations of history, such as the asserted threefold nature of East Slavic people (Great Russians, Little Russians and White Russians); on the claimed Slavic nature of the Russian Empire; on a supposed historical continuity between Kievan Rus’ and modern Russia; and on Muscovy’s role in uniting the Eastern Slavs.

Introduction: Was Rurik in Polotsk -- or who wrote our history for us?

Kievan Rus’ emerged at the end of the ninth century on the territory occupied by the Eastern Slavs. The term Kievan Rus’ is used by many investigators, both in scholarly and in popular literature, to refer to the ancient land around Kiev that is today part of Ukraine and, to some extent, Belarus (Zacharii, 2002; Plochy, 2006). Modern Russia emerged out of the area known as Muscovy (the territories around Suzdal, Murom, and Rostov).

The change in meaning of Russia-Rus’ began in the early eighteenth century, especially during the reign of Empress Catherine II (1762-1796). She ordered a history of Russia to be written that included the Normanist theory of the origin of Rus’ and Tatischev’s (1686-1750) and Karamzin’s (1766-1826) histories of Russia. In fact, all these works, as well as some later ones (Solovyov, 1820-1879), were used to justify the de facto annexation of the Polish Republic and the 'reunification' of the Eastern Slavs (Great Russians, Little Russians, and White Russians), confirmation of both the Slavic nature of the Russian Empire, and the legitimacy of historical continuity from Kievan Rus’ to modern Russia.

For a long time, the history of the Russian state was official in Belarus and Ukraine. Karamzin’s and Solovyov’s histories of Russia were based on the Normanist theory, developed by G. F. Mueller (1705-1783), who worked at the Russian Academy of Sciences.
According to the Normanist theory, a major role in the creation of Kievan Rus’ [not Russia - PM] was assigned to Scandinavians, Germans and Varangians (Vikings), and these alien peoples were called “Rus’”. The territory of Rus’ has often been known in the West as “Ruthenia.”

This theoretical formulation was familiar to people of the region since the end of the Russian Empire, although Soviet historians were anti-Normanists. There is a political bias to the topic. Obviously, it was necessary to maintain the Slavic unity of the three nations that had formed the basis of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, supported unconditionally in both cases by the Orthodox Church. During the reign of Catherine II, it was needed to prove the leadership of Scandinavians and Germans in governing the Slavs; in the Soviet era, between the two world wars, it was necessary to keep the unity of the Slavic spirit. No wonder that the Second World War saw the release of the film on Alexander Nevsky who defeated the Teutonic Knights (Germans) on Lake Peipus.

Mikhail Lomonosov did not accept a history of Russia written by German scholars and he accused Mueller of falsification. Lomonosov believed that the Rus’ hailed from Slavic lands and they were not Varangians (Bielawski, 1955). Only the first part of the first volume of Lomonosov’s *Ancient Russian History* was published posthumously by Mueller, while Lomonosov’s archives have vanished. It should be noted that Muller managed the archives of the Academy of Sciences from 1766 until his death. Such was the case also with the works of Tatishchev, with Mueller posthumously publishing five volumes of Russian history based on Tatishchev’s notes. Again, as in the case with Lomonosov’s archives, the Tatishchev manuscripts mysteriously disappeared, along with earlier and now unknown chronicles on which these manuscripts had been based.

Perhaps it is no coincidence that the ideas contained in such works of Lomonosov are similar to those of Mueller. So what were they arguing about? That’s why it is crucial to create today an accurate understanding of the actual place of the Eastern Slavic states of Belarus and Ukraine in the modern world.

The starting point for the Normanist theory was ‘The Tale of Bygone Years’ or ‘The Chronicle of Nestor’. For more on Normanists, neo-Normanists, and anti-Normanists see the historical reviews of Zakharii, 2002, Klein, 2009). *The Tale of Bygone Years (Povest’ Vremyan’nykh Let)* (PVL), which dates back to 1113, was written by a monk named Nestor, and perhaps not only by him (Pihio, 1981), based on lost chronicles, legends, and Byzantine documents.

The first mention of the Slavs in PVL dates them back to 862. This means that the chronicle was written more than 250 years after the events it was describing could possibly have taken place. PVL tells of the arrival of the Vikings/Varangians, whom the Slavs had invited to reign over them. Three semi-mythical brothers (Rurik, Truvor, and Sineus) began to rule in Novgorod, Izborsk, and Beloozero in 862.
However, there is no further information on the latter two brothers anywhere. Moreover, the current reading of PVL gives the following explanation of the names ‘Rurik, Sineus, en Truvor’ as ‘Rurik, his relatives and companions’ (‘Rurik, sine hus, en tro(gna) vär (ingar),’ Scand.; ‘Rurik, his house/relatives, and true companions, Eng. (Katsva, Yurganov, 1996).

Catherine II, who certainly believed this theory, even commanded a medal in honor of Truvor; on the front side of that medal was an imaginary portrait of Rurik, and on the back, the Truvor mound and the inscription: “Before this day is memorable,” and below “Truvor died in Izborsk in 864.” Perhaps nobody of that name existed, but there was a medal struck.

As for Rurik himself, the original version of his sojourn in Novgorod was not confirmed. Given that modern Novgorod, according to archaeological research, appeared only in the second half of the tenth century, the principality of Beloozero (“White Lake”), where ‘Sineus’ might have ruled, did not even exist at that time.

There is a hypothesis that Rurik, in contrast, founded his settlement on the shores of Lake Ladoga, but, again, so far there is no evidence for this. Rurik, like Truvor and Sineus, may have been a fictional character. Therefore, it is a major question whether there was a man named Rurik in the late ninth century. But thanks to Mueller this idea was taken up by Russian historians, and Prince Rurik and his successors reigned in Muscovy until the end of the sixteenth century. Karamzin wrote that Rurik came to Novgorod, Sineus to the Finnic Ves in Beloozero, and Truvor to Izborsk, the city of the Krivichi. Smolensk, also populated by Krivichi, and Polotsk itself still remained independent, and they had no involvement with Vikings.

Consequently, the power of the three rulers, connected by ties of kinship and reciprocity, extended only from Beloozero to Estonia, where we can still see the monumental ruins of the old Izborsk fortress, not far from the contemporary border between Russia and Estonia. This part of the current St. Petersburg, Estonia, Novgorod and Pskov provinces was then called Rus’, named after the Scando-Russian Princes. Two years after the deaths of Sineus and Truvor (864) the elder brother, Rurik, attached their areas to his principality and founded the Russian Monarchy.

Thus, at a time when neither Moscow, Beloozero, Novgorod, nor maybe even Truvor, Sineus, or Rurik, actually existed, in Karamzin’s interpretation they more or less founded a Russian Monarchy, and Karamzin himself called a certain territory ‘Rus’ for the first time. Yet, neither the PVL nor Karamzin’s history mention Polotsk or Smolensk as cities that invited the Varangians to reign. In addition, Karamzin wrote that Polotsk was independent, i.e., he acknowledged that the city had its own history, independent from the history of Kiev and moreover from Russian history, where automatically, due to the imperial 'traditions' of the Russian Empire, the history of Kievan Rus’ is included.
We can also find a free interpretation of the PVL in Solovyov’s history; there, Polotsk was independent according to Karamzin, and according to Solovyov the ‘Polochans in the south’ were already under the authority of Rurik.

It is doubtful that the arrival of a few Vikings could have had more than a superficial effect on the development of the Slavic tribes that had lived there for a long time. Although there is a hypothesis that they controlled the trade route 'from the Varangians to the Greeks', Scandinavian colonies seemed 'islands in the sea of the Krivichi of Polotsk, the Slovene of Novgorod, or the Polyane of Kiev. (Kotlyarchuk, 2002).

There are many contradictions in the interpretation of the past by Russian historians, but these history tales, using documentary material, lead the reader to the main idea that Russia’s statehood began with Rurik and Kiev.

The free interpretation of the most famous and ancient Eastern Slavic chronicles, even if written with deviations, is one thing. But by contrast, the record of this historically fundamental chronicle (PVL) was repeatedly rewritten and reworked.

For example, since the reign of Vladimir Monomakh (1113-1125, from whom the line of Muscovy’s Rurikid princes descend) in Kiev, the PVL had been crafted by the monk Sylvester and other scribes in the Monomakhs' interests (first in Kiev, then in Novgorod during the reign of Monomakh’s son Mstislav). See Cross, Sherbowitz-Wetzor, 1953, Talochka PP, and Talochka OP, 1998.

So there appeared new PVL editions which were later included in the Laurentian (1377) and Hypatian (early fifteenth century) chronicles, and that information, supplemented with additional explanations, was included in Russian history textbooks.

One cannot deny that the PVL and its later versions are important documents reflecting simultaneous or related changes and accretions.

However, the constantly changing examples of past events, as well as later ones distributed worldwide (the trinity of the three eastern Slavic peoples, the Slavic character of the Russian state, the historical continuity from Kievan Rus’ to modern Russia, the role of Muscovy in unifying the Eastern Slavs) all suggest the necessity for a more critical reading of the previous history and the identification of the true events in Belarus and Ukraine, especially given the contextual analysis of those who were favored by the myths created.

**Migration and demarcation of the East Slavic tribes**

There are several theories of the origin of the Eastern Slavs, starting from that they came from the Scythians or Goths, that they had always been living in nearly the same territories which they currently occupy, and, finally, that they gradually migrated from the regions of central Europe to the South, East, and partly to the North.
It is now believed that the Slavs emerged over a fairly large area, stretching from the Oder in the West to the Danube in the South, and all the way to the Dnieper in the East (Curta, 2001; Geary, 2003). The Eastern Slavs probably migrated in the fifth through the seventh centuries from the Elbe (now Pomerania in Germany) and Vistula areas to the territories they currently occupy.

However, some researchers consider it unlikely that the Slavic tribes were able to occupy the territory of the Eastern and central-Eastern Europe in such a short period of time, especially because the Slavs were farmers and, therefore, led a life that was tied to the land they occupied (Halsall, 2006).

So perhaps, it was the second wave of Slavic migrants who joined the Slavs who had already settled there, in the new lands, earlier, in the fifth through the seventh centuries. According to Shakhmatov (1919) Slavic tribes from the Elbe and Vistula moved from west to east in two groups. The western group, gradually moving to the north, northeast and east, occupied the territory of present-day Belarus and the Pskov, Novgorod, and Smolensk areas. The second, moving south and southeast, gradually settled the territory of modern Volhynia, Ukraine, and the Carpathians. Thus, the Slavs had gradually occupied the territory which later historians called Kievan Rus’.

However, by the period of settlement and under Kievan Rus’ the division of the Eastern Slavs into groups by language had not yet emerged. The Eastern Slavs of the pre-Kievan and Kievan periods (Rus’, Rusyns, and Ruthenians) can be assigned to one ethno-nationality (Plokhy, 2006). But the start of their split can be seen as early as the latter period, and it is conceivable that this process may have become clearer with the collapse of Kievan Rus’.

Eastern Slavs are divided into tribes based on archaeological and other studies. It is believed that to northwest Eastern Europe came such tribes as the Dregovichi, Drevlyane, Duleby, Krivichi, and Polochane peoples, who were then assimilated by the existing Baltic tribes. Indeed, some authors argue for the Baltic theory of the Belarusians’ origin (Dzermant, Sanko, 2005; Deruzhynsky, 2009; Goldenkov, 2009). The Slavs who reached Kiev and border areas (Drevlyane, Polyane) were assimilated by the Sarmatians and gave rise to the modern Ukrainians.

The Slavic tribes (Ilmen and Novgorod Slavs, Krivichi, Radimichi, and Severjane) who later moved to the north, northeast and east, reaching the territories occupied by Finno-Ugric tribes, gave rise to another East Slavic branch, later called Great Russians (people who occupy the land of what became known in the rest of the world as “Russia proper”, i.e., the land that formed the basis of Muscovy and, then, Russia).

The north and eastwards movements of the Slavic tribes were constrained by both natural factors such as unsuitability for agriculture (forests, grasslands, cold climate), and by their...
lack of sufficient numerical preponderance in order not to be assimilated by the Finno-
Ugric tribes who occupied these territories (Mordovians, Merya, Ves, Meshchera, Muroma).

One passage in the PVL indicated that there were tribes speaking non-Slavic languages: these included the Chud, Merya, Ves, Muromians, Cheremissians, Mordovians, Permians, Pechora, Iam, Lithuanians, Zemigalians, Kors, Narva, and Livs (in Russian: чудзь, меря, весь, мурома, чарамісы, мардва, перм, пячера, ям, літва, зімігола, корсь, нарова, лівы). They lived by the lakes (Rostov, Beloozero, Kleshchyna) and the Oka river and paid tribute to Rus’, which means that the Slavs from Novgorod region and the Dnieper, coming to the North-Eastern lands, inevitably were assimilated with non-Slavic tribes.

Assimilation of the 'Great Russian Slavs' by those tribes (the first wave of assimilation) was one of the reasons for the subsequent separations of the Eastern Slavs. This indicates that the split of Eastern Slavs into 'Belarusians, Ukrainians, and Great Russians' did not happen in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, but started much earlier, even before the collapse of Kievan Rus’.

**Internecine war as a reason for separation of Eastern Slavs**

Feudal fragmentation was one of the reasons not just for the collapse of Kievan Rus’, but also the prerequisite for further ethno-national division of the Eastern Slavs.

Kievan Rus’ was not united. It had three centers (Kiev, Polotsk, and Novgorod) constantly at war and struggling for supremacy. The wars did not contribute to the unity of the Slavs; on the contrary, multiplied by tribal characteristics, they led to local concentrations of population around the local leaders and traditions, control over the occupied territories, and the emergence of new ethnic groups with the development of linguistic differentiation.

The documented history of Kievan Rus’ begins with the reign of Prince Igor (912-945). However, there is no evidence that he was the son of Rurik, apart from the description in the PVL. Obviously, Prince Igor existed, and he had a father who has gone down in history under the name of Rurik, and from whom many Rurikids originated, including the line of Muscovite princes and tsars. The main point is that he was the prince of Kiev who extended its influence over the lands inhabited by Slavs.

Was Kievan Rus’ strong during Prince Igor's reign? If we accept that Prince Igor mounted two campaigns against Constantinople, it is possible that the principality of Kiev was beginning to be established, albeit still heavily dependent on the powerful trading kingdom of the Khazars, a longtime Turkish buffer state between the Byzantines and the Umayyad Caliphate which flourished for three centuries between 650 and 950 and that became Jewish.
Certainly, in the middle of the ninth century, the Khazars controlled the territory south of a line drawn from Smolensk to Murom, and ruled over Kursk, Chernigov, and Kiev. All these cities paid tribute to the Khazars. Even after 967, the Khazars’ defeat at the hands of Prince Svyatoslav I of Kiev (Igor's son), and his capture of Itil, their capital, did not protect Kiev from further clashes with the Pechenegs, the successors of the Khazars. It is from that moment that we can talk about the beginning of the flowering of Kievan Rus’ during the reign of Prince Svyatoslav (945-972), Princess Olga (945-969, as regent), the brothers Princes Yaropolk (972-980) and Vladimir (980-1015), and Yaroslav the Wise (1019-1054).

It is believed that during the reign of Yaroslav the Wise, the population of Kievan Rus’ totaled about 7.8 million. Yaroslav’s power was especially strong in the principalities closest to Kiev, such as Chernigov, Pereyaslav, and Galicia. At the same time, we should not conclude that Kievan Rus’ as a whole was a real feudal power.

Why? Polotsk kept its independence and specific position, among the three centers - Kiev, Polotsk, and Novgorod. Yaroslav the Wise was the Prince of Kiev, Novgorod, and Rostov, but not the Prince of Polotsk. So was Polotsk ruled by Kiev? The first known prince of Polotsk was Rogvolod (920-978). According to one hypothesis, Rogvolod was one of the Varangians (Orlov, 2005); another hypothesizes that he was the son of Princess Predslava of Polotsk who came to the throne after his mother's death, returning to her ancestral lands 'from overseas' (Ermolovich, 1990).

Prince Rogvolod and his family were destroyed by Kievan Prince Vladimir Svyatoslavovich, who went on to become king of Kievan Rus’. Vladimir was very tough and during the struggle for power he killed his brother Yaropolk while the latter was the Grand Prince of Kiev. The daughter of the Prince of Polotsk, Princess Rogneda, became Vladimir’s prisoner and then his wife at age 13 and gave birth to Princes Izyaslav (Prince of Polotsk 988-1001), Yaroslav the Wise (Grand Prince of Kiev 1019-1054), Vsevolod (Prince Vladimir-Volyn), Mstislav (Prince of Chernigov and Tmutarakan), Princess Predslava (married to the Czech Prince Boleslav III) and Pramislava (married to the Hungarian Prince Ladislas the Bald).

Even if we consider only Yaroslav the Wise, who reigned in Kiev for 35 years, we can note the significant role played by Princess Rogneda in the formation of Kievan Rus’. If Vladimir is considered the godfather of Kievan Rus’, Princess Rogneda is the mother of Kievan Rus’. As Prince of Polotsk (986-1001), their son Izyaslav continued to pursue the policy of independence of Kiev that started by his grandfather, Prince Rogvolod. Yermolovich’s 1990 monograph documents that there was no decade where Polotsk was not at war with either Novgorod or Kiev. The Principality of Polotsk saw its greatest flowering during the reign of Vseslav the Seer (1044-1101). For a short period (1068-1069), he even reigned in Kiev. Many researchers now believe that in the ninth through the thirteenth centuries, the Principality of Polotsk was the first form of statehood on Belarusian territory.
Thus, except for the short period of Prince Vladimir’s attack on Polotsk, we can assume that Kiev did not control the activities of the Principality of Polotsk. In other words, all Rurik did was cast a shadow over Polotsk. This independence of Polotsk from Kiev is a positive factor, or if you will, a valid reason for Belarusians not to participate fully in the struggle for the full heritage of Kievan Rus’ now underway between Ukraine and Russia.

Historically, there were constant wars between other principalities of Kievan Rus’. As a result, this feudal structure fell apart after the death of Yaroslav the Wise in 1054. The land was divided into small principalities among his sons, who began quarrels that signaled the beginning of the disintegration of Kievan Rus’. The actual struggle for the throne of Kiev also contributed significantly to this (the continuity of the position of Prince of Kiev is one of the fundamental issues of historical disputes involving Kievan Rus’ and Russia).

Power transferred in Kiev according to seniority, i.e., from highest to lowest in the whole clan, and not from father to son. In 1093, the eldest prince Svyatopolk Izyaslavich of Turov, a cousin of Vladimir Monomakh (1053-1125) took power. After Svyatopolk’s death in 1113, the Kiev throne by right of seniority was claimed by Svyatoslav’s sons. However, their cousin Vladimir Monomakh, a top military leader, ascended the throne instead. According to Russian historians, this event was at the invitation of the elders and with the consent of the people of Kiev. What is significant is that from the time of Vladimir Monomakh, the rotation system governing changes of power was broken.

The violation of the rules of heritage led to the war between the sons of Oleg of Chernigov, the sons of Monomakh from Pereyaslavl, the sons of Izyaslav from Turov/Volhynia, and the Princes of Polotsk.

Over 45 years, from 1125 to 1169, the throne in Kiev changed hands twenty-one times. Some of them, after a hard struggle, had sat on that throne three times (e.g., Yuriy Dolgorukiy, son of Vladimir Monomakh, Izyaslav Davidovich, Rostislav Mstislavich, and Vyacheslav Vladimirovich). Even the sons of ‘Oleg’ of Chernigov, Igor and Vsevolod Olegovich (1139-1146), were able to prove their right to the throne of Kiev.

Although it is written in Russian sources, they (the sons of Oleg) forced Monomakh’s descendants to recognize their right. See the first and fourth chapters of Solovyov’s History of Russia from Ancient Times (‘On the prince's relationship at all’ and ‘Events involving the great-grandchildren of Yaroslav’; Volume 1) regarding the cause of these quarrels.

The descendants of Vladimir Monomakh personally undertook the literal destruction of the city of Kiev in 1169: Kiev was destroyed by the army of Andrew Bogolyubsky, Prince of Rostov-Suzdal, (grandson of Vladimir Monomakh and the son of Yuri Dolgorukiy, the founder of Moscow) and then in 1203, Kiev was sacked by Rurik Rostislavich (great-grandson of Monomakh -- who had married three times -- by his second line), together with the sons of Oleg and including the Polovtsians. (It should also be remembered that Rurik Rostislavich held the great Kiev throne six times at various intervals.) Then finally, at the
end of 1240, Kiev was seized and destroyed by Batu Khan’s invading Mongol armies. They massacred most of the population of the city, and then proceeded on their way to capture much of Europe.

Thus, the strife between the principalities of Kievan Rus’ was one of the main factors in its disintegration. The collapse of Kievan Rus’ led to the strengthening of existing centers and the created conditions for the development of new eastern Slavic centers with their own specific features. The separate nature and independence of the Principality of Polotsk (the predecessor of the future Belarusian State) became even stronger, as did that of the principality of Volyn-Galich (the precursor of the future Ukrainian State). In the same period, the Republic of Novgorod (1136) was formed with limited power given princes, as well as the principality of Vladimir-Suzdal (1157), the first North-Eastern Duchy, which became the nucleus of the future Muscovy, on the territory of the Finno-Ugric tribes. But that was nearly 200 years after the establishment of the principalities of Polotsk and Kiev.

The Mongol invasion and the formation of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania - the main factors distinguishing the Eastern Slavs

The migration of the Eastern Slavs south and south-east of Kiev was impossible, not because of the endless, agriculturally unfriendly steppes, but because the steppes were longtime centers of activity and control by the nomads. The Black Sea - Caspian steppe joins the Kazakh steppe, and thus becomes part of the vast Eurasian steppe. For thousands of years, warlike tribes of nomads moved across the steppes from east to west, and even reached and occupied significant regions of Europe. There were Scythians (700-200 AD), the Sarmatians (200 BC -200 AD), the Huns (370 - 453 AD), the Alans (500-1100 AD) Avars (600-800 AD), the Khazars (600-1000 AD), and later the Pechenegs (800-1100 AD), Kipchaks and Cumans (1100-1300), and Genghis Khan’s Mongols (1300-1500) (Riazanovsky, 1993).

According to some Russian historians (most notably L. Gumilev, the classic Eurasianist), the nomads and the steppes played a huge role in the further establishment and development of Russia. The Mongol-Tatar invasion was one of the key factors dividing the Eastern Slavs into two civilizations – Eastern Slavs/ Belarussian-Ukrainian civilization and Eurasian/Russian civilization.

This line between civilizations is readily apparent if one follows territories captured by the Mongol Empire. The former remained free of the invaders from the Eurasian steppe, while the latter were reduced to the status of vassals. The defining feature of the Mongol campaign -- relevant to this paper’s civilizational division argument -- was that the Mongols bypassed principalities located on the territory of modern Belarus and part of Ukraine. As a result, the Eastern Slavs living in the territory of Belarus and Ukraine, in contrast to the inhabitants of the Northeast, avoided the empire being established by the Mongols. They remained apart, avoiding domination by the Turkic peoples.

By the mid-thirteenth century, the Eastern Slavs living in what is now Belarus had come
under the sway of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (GDL), while the north-eastern and southern principalities fell under the influence of the Mongols’ Golden Horde khanate.

Thus, Mongols contributed to the separation of the Slavic ‘Great Russians’ who fell under their power for two and a half centuries (up to 1480) from other Eastern Slavs, including ‘Belarusian’ Slavs, free from the Mongols, and ‘Ukrainian’ Slavs, some of whom came under the influence of the nomadic Mongols for 100 years. However, the Ukrainian lands were freed after 1362, when troops under the leadership of Prince Olgierd defeated the Tatars at the Blue Waters.

Subsequently, the southern and south-western parts of the former Kievan Rus’, as well as the territory of modern Belarus, were gradually incorporated into the GDL, which had played a special role in unifying the East Slavic lands.

In the GDL at the end of the fourteenth century, only one out of nine people was of Lithuanian origin (O'Connor, 2003), i.e., almost all the rest were Ruthenians. At that time the word ‘Russian’ meant Ruthenian. But, the official language of the GDL was Old Belarusian. Starting from the early fourteenth century, the full name of GDL was The Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Ruthenia and Samogitia, the last a region in northwestern Lithuania.

The GDL stopped the ‘Eurasianization’ of a large part of the Slavs, the future Belarusians and Ukrainians. Hence, the unification of the Eastern Slavs in the GDL was the major factor in creating and saving East Slavic European civilization.

Russia as a State originated in the lands located to the northeast of Kievan Rus’ (Suzdal or Zalesie, Rostov, Murom). These were remote areas separated from Kievan Rus’ by forests and frequently arable farming regions.

The Slavs assimilated relatively unwarlike Finno-Ugric tribes, and subsequently they combined into the principality of Suzdal, a first for these lands (1157). The fact that Suzdal emerged as a principality two centuries later than the Polotsk and Kievan principalities points, on the one hand, to a slow migration of the Eastern Slavs and to the length of the time involved in their peaceful assimilation by the local population.

Mikhail Pogodin (1800-1875), one of the ideologues of pan-Slavism, claimed that the Slavs in Russia were actually immigrants from Kievan Rus’ who, under pressure from the Mongol-Tatars, had been forced to migrate to the area which was to become Muscovy.

In fact, he denied the existence of a Ukrainian people, saying that the Ukrainians had come to the lands of the former Kievan Rus’ from the Carpathian Mountains later, in the fifteenth to sixteenth centuries. However, Pogodin’s hypothesis on a mass migration of Slavs has not confirmed (see Plochy, 2006).
It is obvious that the Slavs’ assimilation in Muscovy substantially accelerated with the Mongol-Tatar invasion, and actually led to an even greater degree of dissociation from the eastern Slavs of future Belarus and Ukraine. From this period the formation of a new East Slavic civilization based on Ruthenians (Belarusians and Ukrainians) became more in evidence, as well as the formation of a Eurasian civilization which first arose on the territory of Muscovy. The Mongol-Tatar invasion occurred at about the same time as the disintegration of Kievan Rus’, but did not cause it, as some maintained.

A number of facts point to the interaction between Muscovy and the Horde for about 240 years.

The Mongols, after returning from campaigns in Western Europe, stayed in the Lower Volga region, where they founded the town of Sarai, the capital of the Golden Horde. In 1243-1246, the principalities of Kiev and of the North-Eastern edge acknowledged their dependence on the Golden Horde, i.e. they became its vassals. In 1245 Yaroslav, Grand Prince of Vladimir, suggested that the Russian princes should recognize Batu Khan as their king. In 1246, Prince Yaroslav was poisoned while in Mongolia, however, and his son, Alexander Nevsky, allied with the Horde in 1257.

According to Lev Gumilev, the Horde and Russian principalities agreed to establish a defensive alliance against the Teutonic Knights and the pagan Lithuanians. Since the conclusion of such an agreement, almost 20 years after Batu’s campaign, subordinate principalities started to pay tribute to the Golden Horde, and the Khans of the Horde gave out *yarlyki* (permission and right to Russian princes to govern a designated territory) to reign.

The interaction between the enslaved principalities and the Horde was not solely negative. Alexander Nevsky was the adopted son of Batu Khan, and he was named a brother to the Khan's son – Sartak. In Sarai, thanks to Alexander Nevsky, the Orthodox bishop established a farmstead. Thus, the Orthodox faith began officially to exist in the Horde.

In addition, Academician Halikau has compiled a list of more than 500 noble Russian family names derived from Tatar (see Magazine *SAKAVIK*, №1, 2013). Recently, the debate has been focused on the Tatar origins of such prominent Russian leaders as Ivan IV (the Terrible), Boris Godunov, and Peter I (Abdullaev, 2011; Garyfullin, 2012).

In the early fourteenth century, Sarai, capital of the Golden Horde, had a population of 600,000 (Encyclopedia Britannica), while Moscow had 30,000 in 1350. Muscovy gradually borrowed systems and characteristics from the Horde government, pursuing military, monetary, and fiscal reforms, studying military skills, and finally taking on an authoritarian and centralized management style.

The principality of Muscovy was formed in 1263, under the rule of the Golden Horde, 23 years after Batu’s aggressive campaigns, i.e. not against the Horde, but thanks to it.
Muscovy and the Golden Horde used the strife between the northeastern principalities; so the Tver Uprising (1327) was brutally suppressed by the Horde army led by Prince Ivan Kalita of Muscovy. Thanks to Russian historians, that prince has gone down in history as the “Collector for Rus.” Note that when he “united the Slavs”, he did it with the help of a punitive Mongol army.

In a certain sense, the Golden Horde was an artificial and unsustainable state. Its population consisted of Mordva, Slavs, Greeks, Bulgars living permanently in the Volga area, as well as nomadic Turkic tribes (Kipchaks, Tatars, Turkmens, and Kyrgyz). In addition, the Horde was greatly weakened by internal strife between Tokhtamysh and Tamerlane in the late fourteenth century; this led to Moscow’s transformation from a vassal state into a semi-vassal state. Still, even the Mongol-Tatars’ defeat at the battle of Kulikovo on September 8, 1380 did not end their dominance, which lasted for about another century.

On the other hand, Moscow, with the establishment of a vassal Tatar principality in Kasymov, actually became the successor to the Golden Horde (Vernadsky 1968: 17). Thus the vassal Kasymov Khanate lasted in the lands of Muscovy for nearly 250 years (1452-1681, the modern Ryazan region).

It was the first of the great heritage of Eurasia, and Muscovy’s first step in the conquest of peoples of the Eurasian steppes and North Asia, which led to the formation of the Eurasian civilization. Nowadays, the Eurasian steppes alone are home to many peoples of Russia’s autonomous republics and peoples (Bashkir, Mari, Mordovians, Tatar, Udmurt, Chuvash, Adyghean, Ossetian, Balkarians, Ingushetians, Kabardians, Kalmyks, Karachai, Chechens, and Circassians).

Thus, one can conclude that Russia, by absorbing over the course of a long history these and other Eurasian territories and the populations that inhabit them, is arguably the result of the east-west Eurasian movement commenced by the Mongols.

**Relations between the East Slavic and Eurasian civilizations in the thirteenth to nineteenth centuries**

After the collapse of the Golden Horde for internal reasons, Muscovy gained freedom of action and directed its predatory interests to the fragmented and scattered Khanates over the Eurasian steppe: the Khanates of Kazan (1552) and Astrakhan (1556), the Great Nogai Horde (1557), the Siberian Khanate (1582), and the Skewbald Horde (1619). As a result, by the late sixteenth century, the territory of the Muscovite state was about 5.5 million square km, with a population of about 10.9 million people (whereas in 1450 it was only 430,000 square km with a population of 3,000,000).

The only region still unattainable for Moscow from the fourteenth century to the eighteenth century was westward expansion, for there was a strong State, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (GDL), blocking the way. In fact, people who lived in what is now Belarus,
Lithuania, and Ukraine had created a strong European power; the bulk of the population were Ruthenians (Belarusians and Ukrainians), and within the GDL, they were protected from absorption by the Eurasian civilization.

Unlike Muscovy, this State, the GDL, as has been noted above, barely experienced the Tatar-Mongol yoke and developed under completely different conditions. It became even more powerful in 1569, forming along with the Kingdom of Poland, a federation called the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

Before the conclusion of Union of Lublin (1569), the GDL in many respects had been an independent principality. Even after the annexation of the GDL in the late eighteenth century, Tsarist Russia did not dare to infringe on the rights and freedoms of people for a further 30 years: thus, the GDL statutes remained in force, and the institutions of the nobility (Szlachta) and the Uniate Church (more than 70% of Belarusians at the time were Uniates) still existed.

Data at the end of the fourteenth century (i.e. to the time after which the gradual annexation to Muscovy of territories inhabited by Turkic peoples had been started), demographic data show that in the GPL in 1493 there were about 3.75 million Ruthenians, i.e. Belarusians and Ukrainians (Pogonowsky, 1987). At about the same time (1450), Muscovy had about three million inhabitants, and in 1500, after the accession of the neighboring rival principalities – the Republic of Novgorod (1478) and Tver (1485) – about six million inhabitants (The Great Soviet Encyclopedia, 1969-1978). How many of them were Slavs is unknown, because along with the Muscovites there lived Komi, Udmurt, Tatar, Mari, Chuvash, Mordovians, Karelians and other Finno-Ugric peoples.

However, if we extrapolate the results of the latest census for the population of Russia (2010), the Slavs might have totaled a maximum of 4.8 million (77.7% Russians out of 6 million). Thus, the ratio of Muscovy Slavs to the Slavs of Belarusians and Ukrainians could be pretty close (such as, e.g., 1.3:1, respectively).

With the expansion of the territory of the GPL under the Treaty of Deulino, which concluded the Polish–Muscovite War (1605–1618) between the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth and Russia, the population rose. There were 12 million inhabitants, of which Ukrainians made up 3.5 million and Belarusians 1.5 million (the Ruthenian portion was 5 million). But half of the population of Belarus was killed during the GDL’s next war with Muscovy (1654-1667); only 1.4 million survived out of 2.9 million (Saganovich, 1995).

By the end of the eighteenth century, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth had disappeared. Belarus was annexed by Russia, under the rule of Empress Catherine II. According to current estimates, there were 11-14 million people living in the Commonwealth in 1770 (Bideleux, Jeffries, 1998, Lukowski, Zawadzki, 2001), and in the Russian Empire about 19 million in 1762, while in 1800 there were as many as 35.5 million
(Falcus). It is easy to calculate the source of this increase, if we recall that the Commonwealth was divided among Prussia, Austria, and Russia. Russia took the entire territory and population of present-day Belarus and Ukraine. These were forcibly seized and became part of the Russian and Eurasian empire. They thus acquired the status of Eurasians, surrendering their European status.

In sum, Russia’s history involves permanent territorial expansions during the existence of Muscovy (1263-1547), the Russian kingdom (1547-1721), the Russian Empire (1721-1917), Soviet Russia (1917-1922), the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (1922-1991), and the Russian Federation (since 1991). Additions and changes in the Russian population were not only quantitative but also qualitative.

Now there are more than 180 nations in multinational Russia, in accordance with official statistics. Simple calculations show that the ratio of the Great Russians to the Ukrainians and Belarusians for five centuries is growing in the favor of Russians. So, if at the end of the fourteenth century this ratio may have been 1.3 to 1, then according to the Russian census of 1897, the ratio of the Great Russians (55.7 million) to Ukrainians and Belarusians (22.4 and 5.9 million, respectively) accounted for about 2:1 (calculated on linguistic criteria). According to the census of the USSR in 1989, the proportion was already 2.7:1 (Russians, 145.5 million; Ukrainians, 44.2 million; and Belarusians, 10.0 million).

These calculations show that for five centuries, the relative strength of the Great Russians has been increasing twice as fast as that of the Belarusians and Ukrainians.

It should be noted that these calculations were made by this author’s conservative estimate (PM). It may well be argued that this increase cannot be explained by assimilation alone, and most likely points to the direct admission of other nations to the Slavic population of the Great (Russian).

To this day, many Russians deny that the Finno-Ugric and Turkic peoples assimilated Great Russian Slavs. However, recent studies have shown a significant difference in the distribution of genetic material, with a gradient from north to south and from west to east in the North-Eastern Slavic lands where Russia emerged; this points to the migration of the Slavs and their assimilation into the non-Slavic peoples of Russia (Malyarchuk et al., 2004; Balanovsky et al., 2008).

We are clearly discussing the emergence of two different civilizations in the eastern regions of Europe.

**Characteristics of the East Slavic and Eurasian civilizations**

According to the foregoing analyses, we can conclude that a number of factors influenced Eastern Slavs to be split and to form two civilizations - East Slavic European civilization (the Belarusian-Ukrainian) and Eurasian civilization (Russian).
Objective factors that contributed to the formation of these civilizations were tribal specifics of the Eastern Slavs; assimilation of eastern Slavs with local tribes; the internecine war between various lands and kingdoms; the Mongol-Tatar invasion, a historical continuation of the movements of nomads of the Eurasian steppes; and the emergence of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the unifier of the Eastern Slavs.

Today, the East Slavic civilization is represented by two relatively ethnically homogeneous countries: Belarus and Ukraine; and Eurasian civilization – Russia and the countries that adhere to the Eurasian ideology. We can distinguish three periods in the development of both civilizations, the pre-Kievan and Kievan period, the formation period, and the modern period (Table 1).

### Table 1.
#### Characteristics of the periods of development of East Slavic and Eurasian civilizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Short Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-Kievan and Kiev period</td>
<td>The initial division of the Eastern Slavs in the 9th to 11th centuries on the basis of the features of Slavic tribes themselves, their assimilation with local tribes, and the feuds between lands and kingdoms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formation Period</td>
<td>Emergence of European East Slavic civilization (the Belarusian-Ukrainian) in the 13th and 14th centuries and the beginning of the formation of Eurasian civilization in the 13th to 15th centuries (modern Russia and the countries sharing Eurasian ideas now)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development Period</td>
<td>Continued to present</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

East Slavic civilization began to emerge from Slavic migration from central Europe, and from their settlement in the territory of modern Belarus and Ukraine. We can assume that East Slavic civilization has existed for eight centuries, as far back as the mid-eighth century, while Eurasian civilization was just beginning to take shape.

It should be noted that some of the features in the modern period of the development of the East Slavic civilization are most relevant to its 'Ukrainian' part: firstly, they are due to the temporary Mongol occupation of Ukraine territory in 1240-1362, and secondly, due to the characteristic features of the Ukrainian national liberation movement during the Hetmanate (the Ukrainian Cossack State between 1659 and 1764) (Bohdan Khmelnytsky, Ivan Mazepa).

There are several major points that show significant differences between East Slavic and Eurasian civilization, and are at the same time proof of their existence (Table 2).
East Slavic civilization is much older, and it has existed for almost three more centuries than the Eurasian for two main reasons: first, due to the slow migration of the Slavs in the land of future Muscovy as evidenced by the considerably later emergence of the Principality of Suzdal in comparison to the principalities of Polotsk and Kiev; second, Muscovy’s status as a vassal of the Tatars for 240 years (such features as assimilation and changes in the territory occupied were also mentioned earlier).

The populations of Belarus and Ukraine have been largely ethnically homogeneous for nearly eight centuries, while in the North-East the Slavs assimilated first the Finno-Ugric tribes, and later the Turkic peoples.

The principal difference in the population in our time might be noted when calculating the ratio of Slavs to other ethnic groups (30:1 and 24:1 for Belarus and Ukraine, respectively; contrasted with 4.8:1 for Russia); and the ratio of Christians to Muslims (90 or 180:1 and 27:1 for Belarus and Ukraine, respectively; and 7:1 for Russia). When calculating the group of Slavs, Great Russians, Bulgarians, Belarusians, Poles and Ukrainians were included (similar results were obtained by calculating the ratio of the eponymous nation to a portion of other ethnic groups [not shown - PM]. Religious affiliation to Islam was chosen for the calculations because the corresponding figures for all comparison groups were available.

There are a number of features typical of both Belarusian-Ukrainian civilization and Western civilization.

There is enough scholarly evidence (Bekus, 2011; Kuplevich, 2013) to assign Belarusian-Ukrainian civilization to Western civilization. (Also, Szporluk, 2001 and Kohut, 2001). Kuplevich (2013) highlights 15 key factors pointing to Belarus’s European nature, including:

- the 1000-year history of Belarusian traditions,
- the presence of European civilization processes in Belarus (the Renaissance, the Reformation, the Counter-Reformation, the Union of Brest, the Enlightenment),
- the presence of the European institutions (parliaments, the Sejm, Magdeburg Law, the Town Hall),
- the modern nation-building process, and
- the integration of Belarusian elites into the European political, cultural, economic processes, etc.

Recently, a substantial difference in mentality between the two civilizations was discussed (Zgerski, 2014). Additional research, however, is required to study the mentality, behavior and traditions, typical of representatives of the two civilizations.
There are a number of approaches to the classification of civilizations (Toynbee, 1934; Huntington, 1993; Kuzik & Yakovets, 2006; Targowski, 2009; Kuplevich, 2013). According to Huntington, there are eight civilizations—Western, Orthodox, Islamic, Chinese, Indian, Japanese, Latin, and sub-Saharan Africa. Huntington assigned Belarus and Ukraine to the Orthodox civilization. But that is a moot point. As mentioned above, many features of Slavic East European civilization (Belarusian-Ukrainian) can be assigned to Western civilization.

Not assigning Belarus either to the Eurasian or the Orthodox civilization is supported by postulating a separate Belarusian civilization (Maldis, 2003) or border civilization (Titarenko, 2009).

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According to Kuzik and Yakovets, the early twenty-first century should see the discussion about the creation of fifth-generation local civilizations; the authors divide them into three groups: Western group – West European, East European, North American, Latin American and Oceanic; an East group – Chinese, Japanese, Indian, Buddhist, and Islamic; and mixed – Eurasian (Russian), and sub-Saharan African.

If one adheres to that classification, Belarus and Ukraine may be involved in Eastern European civilization, and as shown in this essay, even more specifically to Eastern European Slavic civilization. However, Russian authors carried the two countries into Eurasian/Russian civilization: it can be seen on the maps of the future development of Russian civilization (until 2050); the rationale for including Belarus and Ukraine on those maps is generally not given.

According to the classification proposed by A. Targowski (2009), Belarus, and Ukraine, in our opinion, could be assigned to the West-central civilization, for the reasons described above, and not to the Eastern civilization where the author assigns two countries, along with Russia and Bulgaria. Targowski’s definition of civilization consists of a number of factors, but if the predominant religion (Orthodox Christianity) was taken as a basis in assigning Belarus and Ukraine, then one would have to take into account the ratio of Orthodoxy with other religions. For example, the relationship between Orthodoxy and Islam among believers in Russia and Bulgaria is around 6:1 and 7:1, while among the believers in the Ukraine and Belarus, 50:1 and 150:1 respectively.

In a post-industrial society in the era of globalization, the general existence and role of local civilizations varies greatly, and their future depends on the nature of the relationship between them – whether conflict or cooperation. Conditions for the development of the East European Slavic civilization were more favorable in Boris Yeltsin’s time.

However, it is believed that the reforms initiated by Boris Yeltsin, just like the reforms of Peter I, were 'null and void' because they did not correspond to the values of Eurasian Russia (starting from as far back as Alexander Nevsky, Russia has engaged in anti-Western rhetoric). The Yeltsin period replaced a time of uncertainty and transition with a new Eurasian policy, which included the change from pro-Western to anti-Western, and which may now be partially observed in the organization of the Eurasian Economic Union.

As recently noted (Kuzik, Yakovets, 2006), Western civilization has incorporated Baltic countries, and intends to include Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia (v. II, p.69). But there is no mention of Belarus at all. The authors also add that Russian strategy for the twenty-first century was not formulated yet, so soon after the fall of the Soviet Union.

The authors do predict a possible split of the Eurasian/ Russian civilization, where central Asia might fall under the influence of Islamic civilization, while the Russian Far East and Siberia could fall under the influence of Chinese, Japanese, and North American civilizations.
In this case, as the authors say, Eurasian civilization will have no choice but to be Russian or East Slavic civilization. The same authors, in speaking of 'Russian' civilization, seem to incorporate Belarusians and Ukrainians into that civilization.

Attempts by Russian researchers to learn Russian history more profoundly during the transition period following the collapse of the Soviet Union were subject to severe criticism. The concept of Tartary, a country that existed, according to the authors, in the northern part of Asia (Nosovskiy, Fomenko, 1999; Agrantsev, 2005) was condemned as unscientific by a special commission of the Russian Academy of Sciences (Commission, 2007). The politicization of the issue under consideration may be observed arising once again.

Evidently, a period of uncertainty in the restoration of Russia's strategy is to be replaced by Eurasian ideology. It is clear that the movement of the Eurasian civilization back to the east was forced or, from the point of view of modern Eurasianists, was wrong. It is obvious that the new Eurasianists, as with the classic ones, will continue to implement their ideology to legitimize the existence and expansion of empire. M. Danilevsky (1822-1875) saw Russia as a distinct civilization, which should absorb and assimilate the whole of Europe, and called on the Slavs to rid themselves of Turkish and German influences and to form a Slavic empire.

The ultimate goal for classic Eurasianists was -- and remains -- to end the hegemony of Western culture by demonstrating the superiority of the East (Vernadsky, 1927).

Classical Eurasianism was founded by Russian émigrés in the 1920s, primarily by Prince Troubetzkoy (1890-1938), Karsavin (1882-1952), Savitsky (1895-1968), Vernadsky (1887-1973), Jakobson (1896-1982), Shuvchynski (1892-1985). The more recent proponents of this theory include L. Gumilev (1912-1992), Panarin (1940-2003) and his contemporaries, A. Dugin, V. Surkov, N. Nazarbayev, S. Karaganov. The main theses of the classical Eurasianists were that Russia has a unique culture, one peculiar only to Russia, and that Eurasian culture is the basis of Russian civilization. This includes an ideology based on the Christian Orthodox religion and culture, reflecting Russia’s national interests and unique destiny, as determined by its geo-strategic location as a bridge between Asia and Europe and by specific ethnographic mixture of Eurasian peoples.

According to these thinkers, Russia is not truly a Slavic country. It was a great surprise and even 'shock' to B. Haggman, a Western scholar, most recently (2011). The classical authors of this movement argued that Russia was not even genuinely Slavic. What's so shocking, even if the Russians admit it?

However, the West still reads the myths and legends-clichés of Rurik, of Russia as a Slavic country, written by eighteenth and nineteenth century Slavophiles. For more on the history of the Eurasian ideology, see recent reviews (Laruelle, 2006; Matern, 2007; Pry, 2013).
Classic Eurasianists did not recognize the rights of Belarus and Ukraine to independence in the 1920s, considering the peoples of these countries as a separate branch of the Russian people, while at the same time noting the major role played by the Turkic peoples in the development of Russia. Gumilev wrote that in fact the Russians were closer to the non-Slavic people, and that the empire of Genghis Khan was transformed into Moscow; “The merger of Genghis Khan’s military and political experience with Russian Orthodoxy in the fourteenth century gave birth to Muscovite Russia” (from the preface to Khara-Davan, 1992).

In turn, P. Sawicki in a letter to Gumilev wrote, “I still consider our great and terrible father of Genghis Khan as one of the greatest figures in the history of pre-Leninist Eurasia. Lenin was only surpassed by its scope and strength of his purpose” (cited from M. Laruelle, 2006). Classical Eurasianists’ idea did not find support in the USSR, but they themselves had subsided when they saw that after World War II, Eurasia-Russia extended up to central Europe, signifying that in fact, their ideas were being implemented.

However, no matter the views adhered to by Russian historians and leaders (Normanist or anti-Normanist theories, or the Eurasian, Pan-Slavic or Slavophile currents), few of them rejected Kiev/Kievan Rus’ as his historic fiefdom. From the today's point of view it is not quite true because of the existence of an independent state – Ukraine, which is primarily based on claiming the history of Kievan Rus’.

After all, the recognition that modern Russia has nothing to do with Kievan Rus’ currently leads to the absolute recognition of the independence of Ukraine and Belarus and, as a consequence, to the loss of those claims on Slavic territory and to the loss of ‘informed' historical influence on these countries, which the imperial mindset cannot afford.

The idea of the Slavophiles, Eurasianists, and Pan-Slavists, including Russian national patriots, was to consider Russia a Slavic country (“Russian Russia”) or as a country where the leading role of the Slavs led to the crisis in the explanation of the current situation. This meant that, on the one hand, the former Russian Empire included no countries from East Slavic civilization, such as Belarus and Ukraine yet, on the other hand, there was a need to solve national problems in their own country. Imperial thinking is a logical counterweight to the normal process of self-reflection as a Eurasian state, which led to its strengthening.

For East Slavic civilization, the treatment of Russia in such a situation by Western civilization is important. Until recently, everything to the east of the Brest-Lvov line was called “Russia” by many Westerners, not even called the Soviet Union. It is now gradually becoming known that the East Slavic world was not so united, and that the Eastern Slavs had their own civilizational values that cannot be attributed to Eurasia or Moscow.

Some might even argue that the war between Russia and Ukraine nowadays is a convincing argument for the existence of two civilizations – East Slavic civilization and Eurasian/Russian civilization. Certainly, its historic roots should not be ignored.
Whether Western civilization is interested in supporting an independent development of the East Slavic civilization and its possible movement to the West will determine the future of a Slavic civilization. If such support does not occur, it can be swallowed by Eurasian civilization, sharing the fate of many other territories and peoples from the fifteenth century to the twentieth century (now parts of the Russian state).

The Eurasian Economic Union came into being on January 1 of this year. When Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev first called for an organization in 1994, it was to be based on economics, a regional trading bloc, and it was not to be a political union. Still, there is historically justified suspicion among the peoples of the East Slavic civilization, caused by constant westward movement of Eurasian forces, although in a time of globalization, aggression will have to be perceived to be limited.

The disadvantage of East Slavic civilization today is that two of its components, Belarus and Ukraine, are pulling in different directions. But nothing stands still: the centuries-long development of the East Slavic European civilization has its own continuation.

**Summary**

The article explains the existence of a separate East Slavic civilization in the modern European territories of Belarus and Ukraine.

The Slavs migrated to Eastern Europe in the fifth to ninth centuries; under the influence of various factors, they separated and formed two civilizations – East Slavic (Belarusian-Ukrainian) and Eurasian.

The disengagement of the Eastern Slavs was determined by the characteristics of their tribes, natural conditions of the Eastern European plain and the Eurasian steppes, assimilation to local tribes, internecine wars between lands and kingdoms, the influence of the Mongol Empire, and the emergence of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania as a unifying factor for the Eastern Slavs.

It seems that the ethno-national division of the Eastern Slavs began in the tenth and eleventh centuries, regardless of the processes of formation of Kievan Rus’, and even before its collapse.

This division emerged between the Slavs living in what is now Ukraine and Belarus, and the Slavs who had migrated to the North-East (the territory of the future Muscovy), where they mingled during “first wave” assimilation with Finno-Ugric peoples (Mordvins, Mari, Vepsians, Meshchera, and Muromians).

A second wave of assimilation with Turkic peoples continued for centuries, as under the rule of the Golden Horde and later, the Muscovy Slavs were separated even further from the Slavs of Belarus and Ukraine.
Muscovy/Russia’s Eurasian culture is based on interpenetration, lifestyles, mentalities, traditions and knowledge amongst Slavic and Finno-Ugric and Turkic peoples. We can assume that Russia, including during the long history of the Eurasian territory and its population, is the successor of the Eurasian movement from east to west. However, many Russians still consider Russia, in defiance of the facts, an exclusively Slavic nation, and do not recognize the separate existence of the Belarusian and Ukrainian ethnicities.

Infighting between the principalities of Kievan Rus’ was one of the major factors in its decay, but perhaps counterintuitively, it led to the strengthening and separation of coeval centers (the principalities of Polotsk and Galicia-Volhynia) and to the creation of new feudal formations of the future Muscovy (the Republic of Novgorod, and the Principality of Rostov-Suzdal). The Belarusian and Ukrainian Slavs preserved their identity and civilization largely because of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (GDL) which actually united the Eastern Slavs after the collapse of Kievan Rus’. At the time that sort of unifying role could not have been performed by Muscovy, itself a vassal dependent on the Mongol Golden Horde.

East Slavic civilization is nearly three centuries older than Eurasianism, both because of the slow migration of the Slavs to the future lands of Muscovy (as evidenced by a much later formation of Suzdal compared to the principalities of Polotsk and Kiev) and due to Muscovy’s status as a Tatar vassal for over 240 years. The population of Belarus and Ukraine, dating back almost eight centuries, is largely ethnically homogeneous and has been resident in the same territory, while the North-Eastern Slavs were assimilated in Russia, first by the Finno-Ugric tribes, and later with the Turkic peoples.

A principal difference between the populations of the two civilizations is understood at present by calculating the ratio of the Slavs to other ethnic groups, and the ratio of Christians to Muslims.

Belarus and Ukraine are assigned to the Orthodox, eastern or Eurasian/Russian civilization (although they share a number of characteristic features of Western civilization) on the basis of myths and conclusions resulting from the interpretation of historical facts viewed from the prism of geopolitics.

These myths address the assumed trinity of the three Slavic nations –‘Great Russians,’ ‘Little Russians’ and ‘White Russians.’ They are based on the supposed Slavic character of the Russian Empire, historical continuity between Kievan Rus’ and Russia, and Muscovy’s claim for a role in the union of the Eastern Slavs.

The development of civilization requires a long time, and it is clear that East Slavic European or Belarusian-Ukrainian civilization will take its proper and appropriate place in an era of global change in the world through the understanding and co-operation of its constituent parts, which still have a great deal in common.
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A Biosystematic View of Civilizations: Western Europe and Japan Before and After the Industrial Revolution

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Abstract

Civilization may be regarded as a biosystem. The relationship between the roles of civilization and its building blocks in relation to the environment is analogous to other biosystems at different hierarchical levels (a biosystematic view of civilization). Recently, a conceptual view of history was translated into English as An Ecological View of History: Japanese Civilization in the World Context. Its method was successfully adapted to comparative studies of civilizations in the Eurasian continent. However, this approach has not yet been applied to the evaluation of New World civilizations.

Here, we consider the evaluation of the behavior and structure of civilizations in the New World. The analysis describes the parallel behaviors of Western Europe and Japan around the time of the Industrial Revolution.

Introduction

The idea that history can be evaluated from the standpoint of natural science is not readily accepted, for history itself is traditionally discussed from the viewpoints of the humanities and the social sciences. Yet is it not evident that human societies can be treated as adaptive units?

We can begin by asserting that group selection is a basic aspect of evolution. Many analyze human history through the lenses of such academic fields as the humanities, history, social sciences, and anthropology. But let us consider the principles of evolution. We can define civilization by extrapolating from human cultures and cultures may be evaluated in relation to Darwinian adaptation. Some scholars have attempted to draw the characteristics of civilizations from the viewpoint of systems research and from the viewpoint of the interaction between society and nature.

I would like to draw your attention to the fact that an Eastern scientist attempted to explain the evaluation of history as a natural phenomenon more than half a century ago. Tadao Umesao proposed an ecological view of history in 1957 for the first time. The approach he proposed is not been well recognized by Western scholars in social sciences, history, and anthropology, even though the work has now been translated into English.

The idea was that Eurasian history can be primarily evaluated based on the principle of ecology. There are parallels between the history and modernization of Western Europe and that of Japan, just as there are parallel historical phenomena among other societies such as
China, India, Arabia, and Russia. Clearly, we can adapt the principles of ecological succession and parallel evolution in biology to the behavior of human history.

Umesao comparatively evaluated Japanese civilization as a system along with Western European civilizations. He divided Eurasian civilizations into two groups, as shown in his original conceptual illustration (Figure 1). Is this hypothesis oversimplified?

Figure 1. Classification of the civilizations in Eurasia proposed by Umesao in 1957

He classified Western Europe and Japan as Area 1, and the other civilizations on the Eurasian continent (Arabia, India, Russia, China, Eastern Europe, and Southeast Asia) he categorized as Area 2.

In the past, many have written of a parallel history between Western Europe and Japan. However, via Umesao’s method, we can clarify the behaviors and the differences between the two groups by demonstrating why Japan modernized at the same time as Western Europe. Why? The differences between the two groups of civilizations are mainly attributable to the ecological and geological locations of the groups on the Eurasian continent.

Umesao did not apply his method to the New World; indeed, he mentioned not having an idea of how the New World should be evaluated via his ecological theories. Thus, the evaluation of civilizations in the New World—such as North America, South America, Australia, and New Zealand—mounts an interesting academic challenge.

I have attempted to develop a unified theory that describes the behavior of biosystems at different hierarchical levels such as chemical evolution, prokaryotes (unicellular), eukaryotes (multicellular), social insects, ecosystems, and civilizations. One can easily deduce the principle of the theory by observing the roles of a biosystem and its building blocks in relation to their environment. The building blocks in a biosystem do not tend to interact directly with the environment. The biosystem itself relates to the environment (Figure 2).
The interaction between a biosystem and the environment, where the biosystem interacts with the environment although the building blocks do not interact directly with the environment

The theory successfully demonstrates the unique properties of biosystems at different hierarchical levels; this principle constitutes the biosystematic view of civilization (BVC). Furthermore, the principle of the BVC may be applied to the description of the behaviors of civilizations.

The biosystematic view of civilization is ecological, an extension of the idea that we may look at civilizations ecologically; both the biosystematic view and the ecological view see civilization as a system. The idea that civilization can be evaluated as a system since groups of organisms at higher hierarchical levels can be evaluated as an organism is actually not new. We all know that groups of organisms at higher hierarchical levels such as social insects can be evaluated as organisms themselves. Looking at civilization from a biosystematics point of view and from an environmental point of view, we observe analogies and differences among biosystems at different hierarchical levels. Principally, the latter applies more widely to different biosystems since biosystematics views derive from wider-ranging observations of biosystems than an ecological view, which focuses merely on civilizations and human societies.

Let us evaluate civilizations in the New World and deduce the parallel emergence of hierarchical levels among civilizations in relation to Western Europe and Japan, using systematic theory.

**A Reevaluation of the Ecological View of History in Relation to the Industrial Revolution**

The ecological view of history builds upon the observation of parallelism in the histories of Western Europe and Japan, and of Arabia, India, China, Russia, Eastern Europe, and Southeast Asia. This contrasts with the idea that cultures would involve characteristics formed by the evolutionary adaptation of human societies since the ecological view rests on applying succession theory in plant ecology to human history.
We may classify Old World civilizations — including the Eurasian continent and the part of North Africa bordering the Mediterranean Sea — into two: Area 1 includes Western Europe and Japan, which are far from the center of the Eurasian continent, and Area 2 includes all other civilizations and societies of the Eurasian continent.

The parallelism within the civilizations in Areas 1 and 2 -- and the differences between the civilizations in Areas 1 and 2 -- arises when we take the view that the history of these civilizations can be evaluated from an ecological viewpoint. Note that the Eurasian continent and North Africa are an oval area in which the arid region extends from the northeast to the southwest (Figure 1). The ecologically important factor is that the civilizations in Area 2 directly face the arid region; the civilizations in Area 1, however, are far from the arid region.

That is why Umesao concluded that this factor was a central cause of the different patterns of history in Areas 1 and 2. He deduced it by using an analogy, the succession of ecosystems. The civilizations in Area 1 developed gradually since Area 1 is very far from the arid region; thus, attacks on the civilizations in Area 1 by the peoples of the arid region were not fatal (Figure 3, top).

**Figure 3.** Simplified model of the transformation of society in Area 1 and Area 2 on the Eurasian continent according to an ecological view of history by Umesao. Top indicates smooth transformation of society in Area 1 and Bottom indicates that the societies in Area 2 did not experience smooth transformation.

We may note that Asian societies in Area 1 experienced several gradual transformations: an ancient kingdom, feudalism, absolute monarchy, and the people’s revolution. The continuous institutional changes in Japan have been pointed out by Western scholars as well. Although Western science and technology after the Age of Discovery and
before the Meiji Restoration were continuously transferred into Japan, the spontaneous development of social systems and institutions by Japan itself was a necessary factor for modernization. During the spontaneous transformation of the social system, colonialism and the Industrial Revolution occurred. These transformations produced an accumulation of wealth, social capital, infrastructure, and technology. In other words, the parallelism of the histories in Area 1 is primarily attributable to the similar ecological circumstances in these areas.

In contrast, the peoples in the arid region repeatedly destroyed all the ancient civilizations in Area 2, even though these ancient civilizations had originally emerged in Area 2 (Figure 3, bottom). Indeed, the civilizations in Area 2 did not experience the Industrial Revolution until very recently. On the contrary, the industrial revolution began in the United Kingdom and spread out smoothly to USA, other Western European countries, and Japan a few decades later. This is because the civilizations in Area 2 did not smoothly experience spontaneous transformation from the ancient civilizations.

We may consider the spontaneous transformation in Area 1 to have been the main driving force that determined the histories of Area 1. Modernization is but an extrapolation of the spontaneous transformations of civilization.

Although there are obvious minor differences between Western Europe and Japan, the parallel histories of Western Europe and Japan are evident. For instance, take the extension of colonization from the 16th to the 19th century. Japan colonized Southeast Asia around the middle of the sixteenth century, and it ended the colonization of Southeast Asia at the beginning of the seventeenth century. During that time, one hundred thousand Japanese people traveled to Southeast Asia. Japan’s national isolation occurred at the beginning of the seventeenth century. This substantially delayed the accumulation of wealth in Japan during the seventeenth through nineteenth centuries.

By contrast, the accumulation of wealth accelerated during the Industrial Revolution in Western Europe. Although the Industrial Revolution in fact started in Western Europe, Japan might have had an Industrial Revolution on its own if Western Europe had not developed.

Ecological historians can discern the parallel historical behaviors of civilizations — especially up until the modernization of Western Europe and Japan — by observing that the ecosystems of those civilizations were substantially important factors until the Industrial Revolution (Figure 4). In other words, the environmental perspective of history is limited in describing the behavior of civilizations after the Industrial Revolution and in the New World. The importance of a civilization’s ecosystem becomes relatively weak after the Industrial Revolution. In addition, the principle of ecosystems does not readily apply to the behaviors of civilizations after the Industrial Revolution.
Thus, because a civilization can be regarded as a biosystem, the biosystematics approach helps explain the behavior of civilizations.

**The Principle of the Biosystematic View of civilization (BVC)**

If we can agree on a definition of civilization, we may proceed to analyze the structure and function of civilizations.

There are several definitions of civilization, including the idea that civilization is an extrapolation of human cultures. Civilization is also sometimes evaluated as an organism or system. As readers know, however, there is little agreement on the actual meaning of the terms civilization and culture. According to Umesao, civilization is a system that includes human beings as well as instruments, technologies, and social systems. In addition, he defines the cultures of a civilization as the relationships amongst individuals, institutions, and so on within the civilization.

On the other hand, based on the comparative analysis of biosystems at different hierarchical levels, I deduced in a previous paper that a civilization corresponds to a biosystem, and the cultures in the civilization constitute the assignment between information and function developed by humans. The term “assignment” used here was extrapolated from the term of “assignment” between genotype and phenotype of molecular biology.
The importance of hierarchical levels in organisms is frequently pointed out. So, based on this analysis, we may define civilization as a biosystem in which there is a hierarchy of individual humans as the building blocks of the civilization. This definition reflects a trend in modern society wherein individual humans in civilization do not interact directly with their environments. I would note that the biosystematic principle of historical analysis is based on the importance of the relationship between a biosystem and its environment, and this assumption is consistent with conventional principle regarding the importance of the environment for organisms. This trend resembles the relationship between the system and its building blocks.

Furthermore, the trend of humans interacting indirectly with environments through civilization becomes clearer when the civilization has experienced an industrial revolution. Naturally, the role of civilization as an upper-hierarchical level for humans would not exist in a non-civilized society.

This definition contrasts with the conventional view of civilization; that view is that civilization arises as an extrapolation of human cultures. The presence of boundaries supports the analogies among these biosystems as well as the requisites for lifelike systems.

The requisites for a biosystem include the following: metabolism (Requisite I); self-reproduction (Requisite II), although it is sometimes said that cultures are unlikely to self-reproduce; mutation (Requisite III); assignment between information and function (Requisite IV); and individuality and stability (Requisite V). Civilization — especially after the Industrial Revolution — satisfies these requisites.

According to a biosystematics approach, the behavior of a civilization, as illustrated in Figure 4, rests on the following three factors:

- the inherent nature of a civilization as a biosystem (Factor 1),
- the interaction of a civilization with the environment (Factor 2), and
- the interaction of a civilization with other civilizations and societies (Factor 3)

This model is similar to the evaluation of an organism in the environment and of chemical phenomena.

**Civilizations in the New World**

Let us define “New-World Civilizations” -- North America, South America, Australia, and South Africa -- as Area 3 in the present paper. We should ignore for the time being ancient civilizations that emerged in Central to South America or Central Africa. In other words, the societies and civilizations of Area 3 were more or less isolated from the civilizations formed in Areas 1 and 2 until the Age of Discovery and colonialism. Naturally, isolation is an important factor in determining the behaviors of human societies in relation to Factor 3.
The characteristics of the present civilization in Area 3 after colonization may be evaluated by applying Factors 1 through 3.

For Factor 1, regarding the inherent nature of civilization, let us classify the civilizations in Area 3 into two types. Some civilizations in Area 3 such as North America and Australia experienced industrial evolution simultaneously with the civilizations in Area 1 up until the end of the nineteenth century. Industrial revolution in the civilizations in Area 1 synchronizes with the transplant of the civilizations of Area 1 to Area 3. However, some societies in Area 3 such as Central America and South America did not experience industrial revolution.

Thus, the civilizations at present in Area 3 might be also classed together into two groups based on whether they experienced industrial revolution simultaneously with Area 1. If we divide the civilizations in Area 3 into two groups, one involves the civilizations that experienced industrial revolution, and the other involves those that did not experience it. These trends relate to the origins of the civilizations in Area 3. The civilizations in Central and South America, for instance, came mainly from Spain and Portugal. There is no evidence that Spain and Portugal had experienced spontaneous transformation through feudalism and absolute monarchy; their suzerains were strongly influenced by Islamic civilizations. On the other hand, the civilizations of North America and Australia came mainly from England and partly from the Netherlands, and France. The original civilizations in Area 1 experienced spontaneous transformation through feudalism and absolute monarchy before and after colonialism.

Regarding Factor 2, the ecological environments of the civilizations in the New World in Area 3 (the first group above) are generally temperate climates, and those in the rest of Area 3 are tropical-to-temperate climates.

For Factor 3, the present civilizations in Area 3 are still geographically isolated from Areas 1 and 2. Thus, the interaction of a civilization in Area 3 with Areas 1 or 2 is geographically weak. However, the influence of geographical isolation decreases in the face of technological innovation.

The Stages of Civilizations and Societies Classified According to Interaction with the Environment

Since the strength of the interaction between a civilization and its environment is notably different before and after industrial revolution, one may profitably classify civilizations into two stages—before (Stage 1) and after (Stage 2) industrial revolution. This becomes significant when we observe the impact on society of natural disasters before and after the Industrial Revolution in Area 1. For instance, during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in Japan, famines caused hundreds of thousands of deaths. Such famines have not emerged...
since the Japanese industrial revolution. This suggests that the improvement of the civilization decreases the influence of the environment on the civilization.

Such trends are useful for classifying the stages of human societies. The interactions of civilized and non-civilized societies with the environment are notably different; humans in non-civilized societies interact directly with the environment, and the humans and its society are merely building blocks of a surrounding ecosystem.

We can classify societies and civilizations into three stages, based on the interaction between society and the environment. Non-civilized societies are Stage 0, civilizations before the industrial revolution are Stage 1, and those after the revolution are Stage 2. Thus, all human societies past and present resolve into nine types: Areas 1, 2, and 3 at Stages 0, 1, and 2 (Figure 5 and Figure 6).

![Figure 5](https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol73/iss73/16)

Figure 5. Classification of the societies and civilizations present and past

Certain classes, such as Stages 0 and 1 in Area 1, have already disappeared, have been incorporated into present civilizations, or were found to transform into a different stage. For instance, there are neither non-civilized societies nor civilizations at Stage 1 in Area 1. Some non-civilized societies are isolated from other civilizations and still maintain traditional social styles. Figure 6 indicates the civilizations with the above classifications in simplified continents at present. Areas 1 and 2 are drawn on the basis of an the ecological view of history, and Area 3 includes North America, Central America, South America, Australia, New Zealand, Africa, Hawaii, and Hokkaido.

Natural environments include solar energy, the location of the civilization or societies, geographical features, the distribution of continent and ocean, and disasters emanating from the earth’s interior (such as earthquakes and volcanoes). The stability of the civilization or society regarding these natural perturbations increases in the order of Stage 0 < Stage 1 < Stage 2 (Figure 7).
Let us consider the societies at Stage 0 as systems that have a minimum consumption of materials and energy from the environment. Although several societies at Stage 0 possess technology, cultivation, and pastoralism, the surplus is not sufficient to form civilizations. Thus, the society is strongly dependent on the natural environment. Many societies in the past have disappeared following climate change or natural disaster. From this viewpoint, the relationship between a society at Stage 0 and the environment is similar to that of a society composed of earlier representatives of the family of man and the environment.

Stage 1 civilizations, although they possess a notable surplus compared to societies at Stage 0, are mostly dependent on large-scale irrigated agriculture and pastoralism where the primary energy source is solar energy. The continuity of the large civilizations in Area 2 at Stage 1—such as Arabic, Indian, and Chinese civilizations—from the emergence of these civilizations to the present indicates that these civilizations are stable for long periods against climate change and/or natural disasters. The surplus acts as energy and materials to maintain the civilization, and the extensive area, including the large population, stores the information necessary for the civilization. Such civilizations are, therefore, more stable than non-civilized systems against environmental changes.

Civilizations at Stage 2 have more independence from environmental changes than those at Stage 1. In other words, Stage 2 civilizations are strongly autonomous systems. This autonomy is supported and protected by several factors—such as the consumption of fossil fuels, natural resources, and technologies—that are not adopted by Stage 1 civilizations (Figure 7).

We may cite statistics such as primary energy consumption, level of education, and GDP to support the importance of a difference between civilizations before and after the industrial revolution. For instance, the disappearance of Chilean nitrate and Peruvian guano in the early twentieth century was overcome by ammonium manufacturing—that is, the Haber-
Bosch method. Many chemical industries today are maintained by fossil fuels. This does not necessarily mean that a civilization at Stage 2 is totally independent of its environmental ecosystems; natural disasters frequently destroy highly modernized civilizations. So while it is mostly true that civilizations at Stages 1 and 2 develop inventions that enhance independence from the environment, the trend at Stage 2 is clearer than it is at Stage 1.

The great difference in average energy consumption between Stages 1 and 2 becomes obvious when the civilizations in Areas 1 and 2 are compared. For Stage 2 civilizations, fossil energy and its substitutions maintain the civilization. The energy consumed by humans maintains the civilization’s autonomy against environmental fluctuations and feeds the individual humans as living organisms. This phenomenon shows that agriculture and pastoralism at Stage 2 are strongly dependent on fossil fuels rather than solar energy. This also shows that the nature of Stage 2 civilization is quite different from that of Stage 1 civilization. Naturally, a part of the energy consumed in a Stage 1 civilization maintains civilization itself, although the contribution of total energy is much smaller than that of Stage 2 (Figure 7). Using excess energy and materials to maintain civilization itself is a significant characteristic of Stage 2 civilizations. One might even maintain justly that having a surplus in both Stage 1 and Stage 2 civilizations maintains the civilization itself and is a useful tool for distinguishing between civilized and non-civilized societies (Figure 7).

The characteristic of Stage 2 civilizations -- being more independent of the environment than those at Stage 1 -- synchronizes with the trend of individual humans not directly interacting with their environments. Once the civilization has experienced industrial revolution, this becomes clearer. While energy consumption in Stage 2 comes principally
from fossil fuels, the energy consumption used for the metabolism of individual humans as living organisms— that is, food—is indirectly provided through the machinery, equipment, and transportation used to maintain the civilization.

In other words, the necessities for individual humans as organisms—such as food and water—in Stage 2 civilizations are regularly provided though the systems of the civilization. Stage 2 civilizations behave as autonomous systems relatively independent of environmental changes. This coincides with the trend of individual humans involving behaviors as the building blocks of the civilization.25

From the Dynamics of Ecosystems to the Dynamics of a System Consisting of Civilizations

The importance of each factor mentioned above for determining the behaviors of civilizations past and present depends on whether the civilization is classified at Stage 0, 1, or 2 and is located in Area 1, 2, or 3. What are the characteristics of these factors and the spontaneous transformations of the stages?

Factor 1, regarding the inherent nature of civilization, derives from the fact that a biosystem possesses inherent characteristics. Biosystems—such as prokaryotes, archaea, eukaryotes, ecosystems, and social insects—possess different inherent characteristics.25 Analogous to these biosystems, we may deduce, is that civilization should possess inherent characteristics.

First, some begin by assuming that it is required to have humans as building blocks for civilization to determine the inherent nature of civilization. For instance, apes and even fossil human species could not construct a civilization. Hypothetically, intelligent organisms on a planet could build different types of civilizations where the intelligent organisms behave as building blocks for their civilization. The inherent nature of civilization is independent of race and ethnicity, since it is primarily dependent on the ecological environment and geography.13 However, the inherent nature of the civilizations in relation to the people in Areas 1, 2, and 3 and at Stages 1, 2, and 3 will be an important issue in the future. Here I only wish to point out that the common characteristics of Stage 2 civilizations are great energy consumption, high technology, and several social systems, as compared to Stage 1 civilizations.

In addition, the consumption of Stage 0 societies is much smaller than that of Stage 1 and Stage 2 societies.

Regarding Factor 2—the relationship between civilization and the environment—natural environments affect civilizations and societies differently. This is analogous to the way organisms interact with their abiotic and biotic environments.59 As described earlier, Stage 2 civilizations are becoming independent of environmental changes and events. The historical change regarding the interaction between a civilization and the environment and between a civilization and other civilizations is illustrated in Figure 8. The black solid in
Figure 8 indicate the interactions between civilizations and the environment, and the gray dashed arrows indicate the interactions among civilizations. The influence of the environment has become relatively small over human history.

Regarding Factor 3, behavior and history arise from the interactions among civilizations and societies. Interactions among societies and civilizations are important for analyzing the behavior of civilizations. Naturally, important events in history regarding such interactions are simplified for heuristic purposes. In addition, there are several phenomena in which civilizations and societies affect each other mutually. Interactions among the major and local civilizations on the planet are indispensable to each civilization; interactions have grown gradually over the course of history.

First, ancient large-scale civilizations appeared almost independently on the Eurasian continent (Figure 8a). At the beginning of history, interactions between civilizations were not strong, and trade and human exchange grew gradually since the population was much smaller than today. Second, the non-civilized societies in Area 1 became civilized societies by copying the systems of the civilizations that originally emerged in Area 2 (Figure 8a). The copying of the original ancient civilizations occurred not only in Area 1, but also in the remote regions of Area 2.

Third, the civilizations in Area 2 were strongly affected by the societies in the arid region until the early modern age (around the time of colonialism). See Figures 8b and 8c. On the other hand, the influence of the societies in the arid region did not reach to Area 1 although they sometimes overran Western Europe.

Fourth, after colonialism, the civilizations in Area 2 interacted with those civilizations at Stage 2 in Area 1 which were primarily maintained by civilizations in Area 1 (Figure 8d). Finally, most of the former colonies in Area 2 are no longer controlled by Area 1. On the
other hand, the indigenous societies in Area 3 either were incorporated into the system of Area 1 civilizations or were destroyed by invaders from Area 1. The rapid growth of several developing countries at the end of the twentieth century indicates that societies in Areas 2 and 3 at Stages 0 and 1 are transitioning to Stage 2 by transplanting technologies and social systems the appeared in Stage 2 civilizations.

**Figure 8.** (Continued)
The Emergence of Hierarchical Levels Among Civilizations

The relationships among civilizations and societies become domination and equilibrium—in other words, competition and cooperation. Here, domination means the phenomenon of hierarchical levels forming between societies, unless the dominated society is destroyed. The spontaneous emergence of hierarchical levels and the complexity of organisms are regarded as general phenomena in biota. 61-63 Although it is obvious that hierarchical levels among humans appear within civilizations at any Area and Stage, the emergence of hierarchical levels between civilizations and societies is a focus here since civilization is considered as a biosystem.

The domination of Area 2 civilizations by Area 1 civilizations during colonialism is an example of the emergence of hierarchical levels. This phenomenon resembles the emergence of hierarchical levels appearing between herbivorous and carnivorous animals by adaptive radiation in long-term evolution, although it is very controversial. The formation of hierarchical levels of organisms is primarily due to interactions among organisms. Similarly, hierarchical levels emerge spontaneously among civilizations by the interactions among civilizations (Figure 9). The domination of one civilization by another is usually achieved through military force that emanates from the dominating civilization.

Because Stage 2 civilizations are more independent of the environment, the influence of Factor 2 becomes relatively weak compared to Factors 1 and 3. We postulate, therefore, that at Stage 2 the inherent nature of the civilization (Factor 1) and the influence of the relationship between the civilization and other civilizations (Factor 3) become more important in determining the behavior of the civilization than Factor 2.

North America as a Civilization

Stage 2 civilizations in Areas 1 and 3 such as Western Europe, Japan, and North America are normally maintained by energy sources from fossil fuels. These civilizations are relatively unleashed from constraints imposed by their environments. Applying the analogy between the behaviors of civilization and living organisms, the domination and equilibrium
regarding Factor 3 would be important in determining the relationships among civilizations (Figure 9).

North American civilization, which was a copy of Western European civilization, started extensive colonization around the beginning of the seventeenth century. The civilization of the New World was established by continuous immigration and maintained by the continuous development of the frontiers required for the construction of the civilization, including cities, farms, factories, and military; also, it more or less obliterated the history of the indigenous people. The expansion of North American civilization by military force maintained the civilization; it is a fact that Area 1 civilizations tend to expand and incorporate other societies.

North American civilization has become a civilization of the highest hierarchical level. Its concentration of wealth, human resources, production, intellectual property, and military force supports this assumption. How concentration and unilateral flow occur is not important, but the presence of concentration and unilateral flow is important from the biosystematic view of civilization. This phenomenon resembles the formation of hierarchical levels between the societies of Mongolian pastoralism and the surrounding civilizations such as China, Arabia, India, and Russia, during the Middle Ages. In addition, the colonization of Area 2 by the civilizations in Area 1 led to the formation of hierarchical levels among the civilizations. These facts indicate that the emergence of hierarchical levels among civilizations and societies constitute spontaneous phenomena regarding history as a natural phenomenon (Figure 9).

We evaluate the question of why North America settled at the highest hierarchical level from a biosystematics view of history. Military force is one of the most important factors in producing hierarchy. The prosperity of Mongolia in the Middle Ages supports this assumption. In this, human history is analogous to other biosystems, with their hierarchies, such as the food chain, in which carnivorous animals possess much more physical strength than herbivorous animals. The number of civilizations located at higher hierarchical levels may be determined by the size of the earth, population, and geographical conditions. This assumption follows from the fact that the number of hierarchical levels in the food chain structure is dependent on the size of the ecosystem. If the earth were larger, the hierarchical complexity would be greater. This is analogous to the differences between the sizes and complexity of the ecosystems in Eurasia and Australia. It indicates that the complexity of the whole ecosystem on a continent would increase if the size of the continent increased. If this rule can be applied to the behavior of civilizations, the complexity of the relationship among civilizations and societies would be determined primarily by the size of the ecosystem, that is, ultimately, the size of the earth.
Analogy Between Hokkaido for Japan and North America for Western Europe from the Early Modern to the Modern Periods

The parallel histories of Area 1 at the west and east ends of Eurasia—that is, Western Europe and Japan—include developments during ancient society, feudal society, absolute monarchy, colonialism, and the Industrial Revolution.\textsuperscript{13,36} The colonization of Area 2 by both Western Europe and Japan started at the beginning of the sixteenth century in parallel. The colonization by Western civilizations in Area 1 expanded to Areas 2 and 3. It is generally considered, however, that Japan suddenly quit colonization and entered into seclusion in the early seventeenth century\textsuperscript{13, 39, 67} while Britain and other Western countries continued to manage colonies in India, Southeast Asia, and North America. The colonization of Area 2 by Japan started again at the end of the nineteenth century, as national isolation subsided.

We see a parallel phenomenon regarding the colonization of societies in Area 3 by Japan. The indigenous societies in North America, Australia, and New Zealand in Area 3 were absorbed by Western European civilizations. The Japanese incorporation of the indigenous society of Ainus in Hokkaido, which is now part of Japan, started in earnest at the beginning of the seventeenth century.\textsuperscript{66-69} This colonization was mainly a result of Tokugawa absolutism, which would also be regarded as an extrapolation of the continuous expansion of Japan toward the northern area of the Japanese islands from around the eighth century (Figure 10). Although Japan quit the colonization of Southeast Asia in 1639, it did not release the substantial colonies in the Ryukyu Islands and on Hokkaido. The colonization in the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries occurred under the absolute monarchy of Tokugawa Bakufu. Hokkaido was a frontier for Japan at the beginning of the seventeenth century, which was the era of absolute monarchy in both Japan and Western Europe. Finally, Hokkaido and the Ryukyus were incorporated into Japan until the end of the nineteenth century. Before the seventeenth century, the Ryukyu were an independent country, and Hokkaido was the land of the Ainu people. Thus, the situation of Hokkaido and the Ryukus after the seventeenth century, occupied by Japan, was very similar to that of societies in India, Southeast Asia, North America, and South America that were all occupied by Western civilizations.

Hokkaido is located along the northern boundary of Japan, but it is not considered to constitute a society categorized in Area 2. The Ainu people were not influenced by the civilizations in Area 2 and had not enough experience to build even an ancient style of kingdom. This is different from other societies in the Far East and Southeast Asia such as Korea, Thailand, the Ryukyus, and Vietnam. Korea and Ryukyu had built ancient-style civilizations, mostly copied from Chinese civilization, especially regarding the political system based on the Ritsuryo codes; it is noteworthy that some civilizations in Southeast Asia have been influenced by the civilizations of both India and China.

From this viewpoint, the situation of indigenous people in Hokkaido is different. The society of Ainu would be similar to that of the Native American people in North America, although
there are obvious geographical differences between Hokkaido and North America. The area of Hokkaido faces Japan’s Honshu island, which is categorized in Area 1; only a short strait of about 20 kilometers separate the two, while the distance between Western Europe and North America reaches over 5,000 kilometers; the distance between Tokyo and Hokkaido is roughly 900 kilometers, and the distance between London and New York is 5,500 kilometers. Second, the area of Hokkaido is notably smaller than that of the North American continent. The area of Hokkaido is 0.08 million km$^2$; the area of the North American continent is 25 million km$^2$. However, according to the definition of Area 3, which we may categorize as neither Area 1 nor Area 2, the location and the size of Area 3 do not matter.

Neither North America nor Hokkaido were influenced by the civilizations that emerged in Area 2 before these were affected by the civilizations in Area 1. The influence on these areas by Area 1 civilizations was indeed very weak until the beginning of the seventeenth century. This indicates that both Hokkaido and North America should be considered as Area 3 from the viewpoint of the relationship between the indigenous people and the civilization of Area 1. On the other hand, Ryukyu should be categorized as a civilization in Area 2, along with Korea and Southeast Asia.

The invasion and occupation of Hokkaido by Japan from the early-modern period to the modern period is comparable to the invasion of North America, Australia, and New Zealand by Western Europe (Figure 10).

**Figure 10.** Parallel phenomena between the New World for Western Europe and Hokkaido for Japan
First, Area 3 experienced industrial revolution simultaneously with Area 1 until the end of the nineteenth century. South America, however, had not experienced industrial revolution until the end of the nineteenth century. North America obtained modernity through the Industrial Revolution following the absolute monarchy of Britain. Similarly, Hokkaido was modernized as a part of Japan through industrial revolution up until the end of the nineteenth century.

Second, in these areas, the hierarchical structures for the society of the indigenous people and that of the invader are analogous. From this viewpoint, the invasion of Hokkaido by Japan parallels events in Western Europe. The similarities of the hierarchical levels—that is, the formation of colonization—that emerged at the similar age and situation of the societies of indigenous people in Area 3 forced by Area 1 are clear.

We should point out the following differences between the New World and Hokkaido: North America, Australia, and New Zealand in New World became independent countries from Britain in the eighteenth to the twentieth centuries, and Hokkaido remains a part of Japan. Although the USA, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand are independent from the suzerain, these countries still possess strong interactions with the original suzerain. For instance, the monarch of Britain is also the monarch of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.

These facts suggest that the differences between Hokkaido for Japan and the New World for Western Europe just reflect variations: the interactions between the newly developed civilizations in Area 3 and the civilizations in Area 1 are in a broad spectrum. The interactions would be dependent on the inherent nature of the civilizations in Area 1 and the societies in Area 3, the distance between Area 1 and Area 3, the size of the civilizations in Area 1, and so forth.

To analyze the differences between North America and Hokkaido let us apply three factors. About Factor 1, concerning the inherent nature of civilization, the fundamental cultures and humans as building blocks of the civilizations are different in Japan and Western Europe. The aspects of culture — including agriculture, politics, military, and education — that laid the groundwork for the growth of modern civilization in the social system, technologies, and cultures of Hokkaido, were primarily transported from Japan, although some modern technologies were transferred from Western civilizations. Besides, those from North America were mainly transported through Britain.

Naturally, some useful cultural manifestations and technologies remain in the newly seeded civilizations, although the technologies and cultures of indigenous people have mostly disappeared (for instance, in the West, cultivation, such as corn in North America, originally developed by indigenous people). In the case of Hokkaido, the cultures present amongst the Ainu built on a method of salmon fishing; this remains the modern style of fishing in Hokkaido. Regarding Factor 2, concerning the interaction with the ecosystem surrounding the civilization, the size and geological location of North America and Hokkaido are quite different. In addition, although both the civilizations are located in the middle latitudes,
Hokkaido is a relatively small island and a cool temperate zone, although North America is a continent with a huge area and several ecosystems, from frigid to subtropical. Thus, production and surplus by cultivation in these areas are different.

Regarding Factor 3, concerning the interactions with other civilizations and societies, Tokugawa rule curtailed Japan’s interaction with other countries in the early modern age. Hokkaido was an exception. In addition, Hokkaido is located adjacent to the north of Japan, while North America is located far from Western European civilizations. Hokkaido is indeed a local municipality of Japan today. This fact implies that Hokkaido in Japan constitutes a symbiosis incorporated into the system of Japanese civilization.

Conclusions

1. The biosystematic view of civilization shows that the behaviors of civilizations can be evaluated from the three factors and stages of civilization. This view supports the fact that the formation of the New World for Western Europe and the incorporation of Hokkaido in Japan are parallel phenomena.

2. In determining the behavior of a civilization, the relationship between a civilization and other civilizations is more important than the relationship between the civilization and the environment after the Industrial Revolution.

3. The spontaneous formation of hierarchical levels is a system found in many civilizations and societies. This indicates that (a) multiple hierarchical levels and complicated interactions appear among the civilizations and societies while (b) it seems that the societies and civilizations are becoming a singular system.

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Cerebral Predestination?
A Review of CCR’s Issue No. 72

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The theme that underlies this issue of *Comparative Civilizations Review* is that observable parallels in the development of human thought, particularly during the pre-modern period, among societies that had little or no contact with one another (China vis-à-vis Hellenic and Hellenistic Greece; both vis-à-vis Mesoamerican civilizations) owe their similarities to “the [common] structure of the brain, which, in turn, reflects a structure that can be described as fractal-like” (p. 7).

The principal article, “Commentary Traditions and the Evolution of Pre-modern Religious and Philosophical Systems: A Cross-Cultural Model” (pp. 22-59) first published in 1997 by Steve Farmer, John B. Henderson, and Peter Robinson along with an introductory update by the same authors (pp.12-21) (and a preceding introductory article, “The Commentarial Engine” by J. Randall Groves (pp. 5-11) compose the topic section of the Review to which two critical responses by Andrew Targowski and Michael Andregg are appended (pp. 60-63).

The lead authors, Farmer, Henderson, and Robinson along with Groves propose a system of computer modeling of the “structural growth of pre-modern religious and philosophical systems” that are themselves “pictured as byproducts of exegetical processes operating in manuscript traditions over long periods of time”. This modeling has enabled the authors to identify similarities at five levels of thought: brain organization, correlative thought, myth, religion, and philosophy in China, India, the Graeco-Roman world, and medieval Europe (p 7); however, these similarities collapse at the dawn of modern thought (Voltaire and post-Voltaire). Presumably, human thought patterns became more heterogeneous at this time and cannot be so easily modeled. However, the lead authors claim that the modeling techniques that they have developed might be refined and adapted so as to anticipate future intellectual developments.

Although Farmer, Henderson, Robinson, and Groves do soften the impact of what seem to be very deterministic theories with a number of soothing caveats, one cannot resist the thought that humanity, in their eyes, has rather limited control over the unfolding of its fate, that the human brain and therefore human actions have more limited possibilities for independent action than such philosopher/historians as Wilhelm Dilthey or Paul Oskar Kristeller might have assumed.

But, citing the human traits imposed by the realities of human genes, Mariana Tepfenhart, the reviewer of *Ethnic Conflicts: their Biological Roots in Ethnic Nepotism* (2012) by Tatu Vanhanen (pp. 167-168) warns that “because ethnic nepotism is encoded in our genes, it is expected that ethnic conflicts will continue in the future”. (p. 168). One could add that in
the recent past, ethnic rivalries certainly contributed to the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, despite the favorable light in which Anthony M. Stevens-Arroyo presents its post-1848 history in his article, “Austria-Hungary 1914: Nationalisms in a Multi-National Nation-State” (pp. 99-113). Indeed two of this empire’s successor states, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, collapsed after 1990, the one peaceably, the other violently, mostly because of ethnic conflicts.

The lead articles along with the article on the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the book review by Mariana Tepfenhart provide, on balance, rather pessimistic reading. As for the other articles, they can be interpreted from either an optimistic or a pessimistic point of view. Vytautas Kavolis’ “The Sociological Location of Art” (pp. 64-74) tells us that although art is defined as such by the beholder, an overly powerful beholder (i.e., sponsor) can skew the legitimate purposes of art. Thomas Kiefer’s “Collective Wisdom and Civilization: Revitalizing Ancient Wisdom Traditions” (pp. 65-98) suggests that while it is possible to revitalize and to profit positively from ancient wisdom traditions, the danger is that the wrong traditions, like ethno-centrism, might be what is revitalized rather than idealized conceptions of human solidarity. Lynn Rhodes, who discusses environmental precarity in her article, “Verge of Collapse? Survival of Civilization in the Anthropocene” (pp. 115-130) anticipates that civilization will survive but suggests that its survival is seriously threatened by a number of factors, particularly environmental deterioration. Bertil Haggman, however, author of “The Global Civil War: Will the West Survive” (pp. 131-136) avoids the question of whether or not the West will survive but predicts continuing local conflicts like the Russian attempts to dominate Ukraine, Islamic terrorism, and the like. So universal peace will not reign.

Only the final article, “Witchcraft in the Early Modern West” by Larry Gragg (pp. 137-148) ends on a note of quiet optimism, at least from the point of view of thinking people: “After generations of trying to eradicate witchcraft, secular leaders in Europe simply concluded that there was no reasonable way to try witches and repealed the statutes prohibiting its practice” (p. 148). Of course, European (and American) leaders remained irrational in other ways but at least the ending of the brutalization of women and men who were perceived as being different in certain occult ways ended. In this particular instance, civilization certainly took a major step forward.
Can there be a larger problem confronting mankind than the fact that we are approaching the limits, the end, of our civilization? This is the looming disaster examined in depth by one of the world’s leading civilizationists, Prof. Andrew Targowski, in his new book, *The Limits of Civilization*.

The book begins with Targowski’s probe of the near and distant future. Of course, life on Earth is ultimately doomed with the expiration of our sun; but much sooner, in about 3,000 years, or less, we will have exhausted all resources necessary for our survival. The present simultaneous crises of overpopulation, depletion of resources, and deteriorating ecology are not likely to be reversed. We face this “Triangle of Civilizational Death” now, and it can only be confronted by the emergence of a wise universal civilization, one which substitutes more intelligent economic and social systems for those currently leading us to the pit.

Dr. Targowski divides his examination into three parts: “Introduction to Civilization,” “Civilization in Crisis,” and “The End of Civilization?”

Civilization began about 6,000 years ago and has been manifested in 26 separate, discrete examples, of which nine currently exist: Western, Eastern, Chinese, Japanese, Islamic, Buddhist, Hindu, African, and Global. These civilizations shape the way we view the world, and they also interact with each other. Moreover, each civilization gradually transforms into something else.

The author provides an excellent review of the leading thinkers about civilizations. He explains the theories of the Russian Danilevsky; the German Spengler; the English Toynbee; the Polish Koneczny; the Russo-American Sorokin; two earlier Americans, Kroeber and Kluckhohn; the French Braudel; the American Coulborn; three recent Americans, Quigley, Melko, and Wilkinson; and himself.

We have arrived at what Dr. Targowski labels a Twenty-First Century Global Civilization. Unfortunately, we have reached, simultaneously, a second Great Crisis of Civilization, the first having been the fall of the Roman Empire. This one arrives in stealth -- it is relatively unnoticed. Comprising this new great crisis are subsidiary crises in ideas/morality, politics, religion, ecology, and technology, plus twelve others.
The first great crisis was resolved when the Renaissance arose. Today, Dr. Targowski fears, we have to await a second Renaissance. Will it come, and in time? The rapacious workings of global business – a religion in itself – have already destroyed much of the world. What is needed is wisdom to save the planet and its people. Will we generate the necessary wisdom?

Perhaps we can begin to answer that by looking at how well we have met subsidiary problems – for example, the population explosion. The United Nations set out Millennium Development Goals to be reached this year: eliminating extreme poverty; securing basic education; promoting gender equality and reinforcing the position of women; reducing infant mortality; improving mother health; fighting disease such as HIV/AIDS, malaria and others; securing environmental indestructibility; and developing global partnership for development (see page 62).

Addressing these eight areas of concern would not solve the problem of overpopulation. Yet, even meeting these seems too difficult; any observer today can see the paucity of mankind’s responses to such goals. It’s too little, too late. By the year 2050, we are going to need three worlds like ours simply to maintain even the present civilization at current levels of quality of life, he projects. Human life is likely to become extinct or vastly reduced, just as species of animals have disappeared. To avoid catastrophe we need to reduce mankind’s population down to five billion by 2050, drop the fertility rate dramatically (fewer than two children per mother), and meet the Millennium Development Goals. Even if we do all that, climate catastrophes loom.

In a more general sense, to save ourselves we need to replace what we call capitalism with a more sustainable political and economic system. Second, we must recognize that consumerism has become the new opiate of the masses; it depletes the planet of resources rapidly, while making humans less intelligent. And so, third, while praising science and technology, which have brought great advances and have been seemingly friendly to man, let us recognize that they have resulted in culture being subservient to technology. What is needed, therefore, is a more sophisticated culture, and wise regulation of science and technology. But, can we act wisely and in time?

Surely, neither capitalism (today’s “turbo-capitalism” oriented toward generating exorbitant profit for the elite), nor socialism (too expensive for seven-to-nine billion people), nor communism (a murderous system cavalierly destructive of the environment) will provide the wisdom we need. Neither will the virtual world. True, we have become more connected to others, but these connections are impoverished and impersonal, says Dr. Targowski, with educated humanity less and less responsible for the content of what is being communicated.

So what can we hope for? A new civilization based on tolerance, wisdom, kindness, equal access, and sensitivity to ecology and sustainable development points the way. Unfortunately, assesses Dr. Targowski, mankind most likely will fail to overcome the crises now facing it. Thus it will not develop such a new civilization based on wisdom, and the beginning of the end will be manifest this century.
Let us hope that while his prescription is right, we, given our 200,000 years of existence and adaptability, ultimately will rally and thus, will prove his prediction wrong.
Barry Cunliffe, *Europe Between the Oceans: 9000 BC to AD 1000*
Yale University Press, 2008

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Scholars are once again exploring why Europe, which appears to be just an insignificant geographic appendage to Asia, has risen to world dominance in the past thousand years. In the nineteenth century, scholars such as Arthur de Gobineau (1816-1882) took up the racial superiority theory that Aryans, speakers of Indo-European languages, were a special breed, blessed with superior intelligence whose mission was to civilize the rest of the world. He added to this the physical element of pale skin. The lighter the complexions of the Aryans, the more superior they were to the dark-skinned Aryans, and certainly all of them were superior in mind, morals, and talents to the other human “races.”

During the first half of the twentieth century, the European fascist movement, particularly Nazi Germany, cited Gobineau’s work as proof that the Germans were the epitome of Aryan purity and that it was their duty to purge “inferior races” from their midst—and from the world, if they could. Nazis, and their racial theories, were disgraced after they lost World War II, and younger scholars launched the movement toward racially-sensitive historicity which eventually spawned a movement of studying every culture except for that of the Western world. “Western Civilization” nearly disappeared from university curricula.

Once more, the pendulum is swinging and we have such scholars as Ricardo Duchesne exploring why European (Western) civilization has had such enormous and far-reaching vitality and power. Duchesne attributes this in part to a certain “restlessness” of Indo-European peoples from their very beginnings. Certainly they have been the most mobile of all humans since at least 1,000 BC, as can be observed in the widespread tenure of Indo-European languages. In addition, there has been a strong strain of individualism that still permeates our culture.

Another scholar, Barry Cunliffe, a leading archeologist in Europe and emeritus professor at Oxford, has produced an interdisciplinary tour de force with his latest work: *Europe Between the Oceans*. Here he explores Europe’s history from 9000 BC to 1000 AD, the period before which Europe’s global domination began. He attributes this domination to the same “restlessness” that Duchesne is exploring, but also looks at the role of geography (as Jared Diamond has done)—the peninsular nature of Europe, surrounded by seas and cut up by navigable rivers. This geography, of course, played an enormous role in river trade and going out to sea for trade and conquest.

Cunliffe addresses a new way of looking at space, time and people, and their interaction. He takes up the geography of land between oceans, the foods available for gathering, the first farmers (7500-5000 BC), movement into the Maritime regions (6000-3800 BC), the infinite variety of Europe’s geography and botany, taking to the sea (2800-1300 BC), the
300 years that changed the world (800-500 BC), interlude of empire (140 BC-300 AD, the dark ages (300-800 AD), and the longue durée (an approach to the study of history, which gives priority to long-term historical structures over events).

The book is well illustrated with photos, maps, and drawings. It seems to me a perfect text book for a course devoted to the long history of the Indo-European peoples—and is fascinating reading for us in the ISCSC, who so often take the long and interdisciplinary view of civilizations.
In August 2014, it will be exactly one century since the beginning of a small war that became a global conflict. Many historians are revisiting this war, but two earlier works stand out as classics of the genre: *The Guns of August* by Barbara Tuchman (1962) and *The First World War* by John Keegan.

Tuchman’s work focused on the first month of a war that could have been avoided had the major European powers used judgment. However, a combination of foolish (and stupid) misreading of the intentions of others spiraled into a war that killed off nearly a whole generation of young men across Europe and destroyed the entire historic culture of Russia. Three empires collapsed and a number of new nations were born, few of them to survive the second stage of World War I, World War II.

Keegan is an excellent military historian, whose book, *A History of Warfare* (1994), has become a classic and is much admired in military institutions.

*The First World War* is comprehensive, full of maps, photos, and detailed accounts of every battle fought in that war, but what makes it most valuable to me are the author’s insights about the consequences of that war. It produced its second phase, the very different World War II. All of us getting immersed in the centennial of World War I should read this work. If you read nothing more than Chapter 1, “A European Tragedy,” you will see what a horror was created by a handful of national leaders who were rash and foolish, and upon whose heads should fall the blame for the turmoil that characterized the rest of the century.

Keegan notes: “The First World War was a tragic and unnecessary conflict. Unnecessary because the train of events that led to its outbreak might have been broken at any point during the five weeks of crisis that preceded the first clash of arms, had prudence or common goodwill found a voice; tragic because the consequences of the first clash ended the lives of ten million human beings, tortured the emotional lives of millions more, destroyed the benevolent and optimistic culture of the European continent and left, when the guns at last fell silent four years later, a legacy of political rancor and racial hatred so intense that no explanation of the causes of the Second World War can stand without reference to those roots. The Second World War, five times more destructive of human life and incalculably more costly in material terms, was the direct outcome of the First. On 18 September 1922, Adolf Hitler, the demobilized front fighter, threw down a challenge to defeated Germany that he would realize seventeen years later: ‘It cannot be that two million Germans should have fallen in vain…No, we do not pardon, we demand---vengeance!’”
Keegan describes the deaths of so many in the First World War, but notes that by comparison with the war of 1939-45, it did little material damage. For all the carnage on Europe’s young men, the First war was rural and the carnage took place on fields and in some villages, all of which were restored by a few years later. “The war inflicted no harm to Europe’s cultural heritage that was not easily repaired,” he writes. The civilian populations involved suffered almost none of the deliberate disruption and atrocities that were to be a feature of the Second World War. Except in Turkish Armenia, no population was subjected to genocide. “The First, unlike the Second World War, saw no systematic displacement of populations, no deliberate starvation, no expropriation, little massacre or atrocity. It was, despite the efforts by state propaganda machines to prove otherwise, and the cruelties of the battlefield apart, a curiously civilized war,” he concludes.

Even so, that war set the tone for what was to almost destroy European civilization, its values, its Enlightenment, forever, had the Nazis won. It set the tone for the demise of democracy (or the promise of it) in Germany, Italy, Russia (and Greece, Spain, and Portugal). We are all paying for these horrors today, as a new cadre of religious fascists attempt to derail liberal modernity throughout the world.

I would recommend a new movie, The Monument Men, as a companion piece to this book. Not only had the Second World War’s horrific destruction devastated the architectural treasures of Europe’s 2,000-year history, but a new group of Vandals, the Nazis, undertook the looting of all the paintings, sculptures and altarpieces that they confiscated from museums and private collections to display in private Nazi homes and in a proposed enormous museum to be built in Hitler’s home town in Austria. Hitler had even given orders that if he were to die during the war, these treasures were to be destroyed.

The ‘Monument Men’ were mostly American art experts, well beyond the age of soldiers, who volunteered to find and save Europe’s art treasures, not for our own use, but to be returned to the owners. Unfortunately, many of the private art collectors were European Jews, most of whom had been murdered by the Nazis. These brave men risked their lives in the last days of the war to find these treasures before either the Nazis destroyed them or the Soviets looted them for their own collections.

It is amazing that in the midst of a brutalizing war, some values of the humanity and decency of Western Civilization could still exist and accomplish such good.
Andrew Targowski, *The Deadly Effect of Informatics on the Holocaust*
Tate Publishing and Enterprises, 2014

Reviewed by Peter Hecht
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*The Deadly Effect of Informatics on the Holocaust* reveals how one of the most important inventions of the industrial age was turned against civilization and used to facilitate the nearly successful attempt, by the Nazis, to murder all Europeans of Jewish descent. Prof. Targowski first examines the historical significance of the German people throughout Europe in the centuries leading up to the Second World War. Leaders of European superpowers, Queen Victoria of England and Catherine the Great of Russia, are shown to be German by birth, along with many of Europe’s greatest philosophical and artistic thinkers. How then was it possible that such a sophisticated nation could so readily and completely capitulate to the insane whims of a radically sociopathic political party? After more than a decade of suffering after World War One the German population was emotionally distraught. The Nazis were able to use this weakness to manipulate the Germans, presenting the notion that it was necessary to “secure the hygiene” of the German people in order to regain the greatness of the past. The evil philosophy delivered to the German people in the most effective way by the Nazi party’s overwhelmingly effective propaganda apparatus, made it clear that it was patriotically necessary for the German people to conduct a campaign of ethnic cleansing.

Technology became the greatest tool of the Nazis. The energy that reshaped civilization through the period of the Second World War brought advances in technology at a pace that had never been achieved, and has not been matched since. It transformed the world from the industrial revolution to the technological revolution and the information age.

In Europe Prof. Targowski reports that 7,365,194 Jews were murdered by the Gestapo. As the Third Reich entered into each country, a detailed accounting of the ethnic makeup of each nation was required. In some cases there was direct resistance, and sabotage, of the efforts to collect this data. After careful calculation of Jewish populations in several countries, compared with actual deportations and executions, and comparing countries that resisted accurate tabulation of ethnic groups by the Nazis, Targowski arrives at a sobering figure. His calculations indicate that the IBM Hollerith machines, diligently maintained by IBM employees and their "contractors" throughout the holocaust, were directly responsible for 4.4 million deaths.

Herman Hollerith’s “punch card” invention was originally an entrant in a contest held by the U.S. Census Bureau in the mid-1890s. The goal of the contest was to find innovative ways to manage data for the good of the people. Forty years later Thomas Watson, CEO of IBM, like Hitler, Stalin, Roosevelt, and Mao, was yet another win at all costs 20th century ideologue who sadly invested his considerable assets, and the eternal reputation of Hollerith and IBM, to work for the Third Reich.
Prof. Targowski is one of the world’s most accomplished experts in the field of informatics, the science of data processing through the design of intricate, and often elegant, processing systems. He engineered and implemented the Polish equivalent of the American social security system in the early 1970’s by designing computer programs that processed many millions of points of data about the Polish citizenry. After proudly and successfully contributing to the evolution of his native Poland for nearly two decades, Prof. Targowski’s efforts were suddenly seen as a threat to the establishment, and he was forced out of public life. For more than forty years in the United States Prof. Targowski has taught and conducted research in the fields of Cognitive Informatics, Civilizational Studies, and Philosophy. Expertise in each of these areas contributes to his recent publication.
Bruce Mazlish & Ralph Buultjens, eds., *Conceptualizing Global History*  
Westview, 1993  
New Global History Pr, January 2004

Reviewed by Vitaliy Sholokhov

This collection of works on globalization is worthwhile to revisit, or to ponder for the first time, if you are unfamiliar with it. Its essays reveal that the philosophical problems of globalization have been for twenty years a focus of the international scientific community, since global history is the only source for justifying the correctness of any scientific sociological theories. But global history requires a conceptualization, a formulation of its general ideas and concepts.

The contents of the book are as follows:

**An Introduction** to Global History, Bruce Mazlish

**Part One: The Theory of Global History**
1 The Rounding of the Earth: Ecology and Global History, Neva R. Goodwin
2 Global History: Historiographical Feasibility and Environmental Reality, Wolf Schafer
3 Global History and the Third World, Ralph Buultjens
4 From Universal History to Global History, Manfred Kossok
5 Global History in a Postmodernist Era? Bruce Mazlish

**Part Two: Applied Global History**
6 Migration and Its Enemies, Wang Gungwu
7 A Globalizing Economy: Some Implications and Consequences, Richard J. Barnet and John Cavanagh
8 Human Rights as Global Imperative, Louis Menand III
9 The Globalization of Music: Expanding Spheres of Influence, John Joyce

**Part Three: An Overview**
10 On the Prospect of Global History, Raymond Grew

Let us consider briefly the contents of the collection. In the introduction to the collection editor Bruce Mazlish describes the time since 1993 as "the era of globalization." But he also writes that, as sociologists and historians know, there is nothing absolutely new. Well before 1993, scientists had identified industrial processes as global and gave them the definition of "industrial revolution." Travel around the globe had created a vision of the world as a "whole." Time zones for the globe were established in the nineteenth century. Already at that time it was possible to identify the early signs of a global era. However, new factors like international migration, ideas of universal human rights, the expansion of the transnational corporations, and environmental problems created by the scientific and technological revolution, have increased the intensity of the processes of globalization.
Raymond Grew and Neva R. Goodwin consider questions of method. Should Global History be mainly descriptive or analytical? Answer: it is necessary to describe the experience of globalization, and the structures and processes must be obtained by analysis. If the states are no longer the object of historical study, who are now the principal actors of global history? Answer: international movements and transnational corporations.

Wolf Schafer considers the historiographical possibility and reality of the “environment.” Ralph Buultjens, Manfred Kossok and Bruce Mazlish considered theoretical issues in connecting Global History with Third World History, Universal History and Postmodern History. All of these sections of history are intertwined with Global History. National histories will continue, and the boundaries of histories are difficult to establish, and will affect the development of the structures and processes of global history.

In the section on Applied Global History, Wang Gungwu addresses international migration; Richard J. Barnet and John Cavanagh examine issues of economic globalization; Louis Menand III explores human rights, and John Joyce considers the globalization of culture.

But the main problems are, so to say, philosophical. In Russia and in Britain, N.Y. Danilevsky and Arnold Joseph Toynbee had already created their own concepts of the philosophy of history. Bruce Mazlish writes that in the United States, Marshall McLuhan felt intuitively what happens when he wrote, misleadingly, about the "global village."

New problem-areas for global history have emerged: the growth of cities in a globalizing society; science as a universal force; religion in the same perspective; gender issues; problems of communication and media; problems of globalism and localism.

The book under review prefigured extensive research that has since been carried out worldwide on the problems of globalization. For example, in 2003, Raduga Publishers, Moscow, produced a Global Studies Encyclopedia, edited by Alexander N. Chumakov, Ivan I. Mazour and William C. Gay. This book provides brief expositions of the central concepts in the field of Global Studies. Former President of the Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev says, “The book is intelligent, rich in content and, I believe, necessary in our complex, turbulent, and fragile world.” Three hundred authors from 50 countries contributed 450 entries.

The contributors include scholars, researchers, and professionals in social, natural, and technological sciences. They cover globalization problems within ecology, business, economics, politics, culture, and law. This interdisciplinary collection provides a basis for understanding the concepts and methods within global studies and for accessing lengthier and more technical research in the field. The articles treat such important topics as biosphere, ozone depletion, land resources, pollution, world health challenges, education, global modeling, sustainable development, war, weapons of mass destruction, and terrorism. The book also promotes academic cooperation, political dialogue, and mutual understanding.
across diverse traditions and national identities that are needed to engage successfully the many daunting challenges of globalization.
CALL FOR PAPERS
46th Annual Conference of the International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations

June 29-July 2, 2016

Monmouth University, West Long Branch, New Jersey, USA

“The West” and its Discontents: Contemporary Challenges to Western Domination

Since 1500, the West has moved from the edge of Eurasia, from insignificance to dominate the world politically, culturally, and economically. Since the end of World War II, its values have established the de facto “global system” of trade, economics, and preferred governance. The last challenges to these particularly Anglo-Saxon values survived bitterly-fought wars against Fascist Nazi Germany and Fascist Japan in World War II and prolonged surrogate wars against the Soviet Union ending in the collapse of their empire in 1991. The Western Global System seemed to be without challenge.

But now challenges come from all sides.

- **Islam**, a religion whose dominance had begun a decline in 1250, is having a renewal of militant zeal. To what degree is the West at war with Islam, contrary to the repeated assurances of our leaders? How can this be thought of as a “clash of civilizations”? Can the revival of the model of the ancient Caliphate: a single religious dictatorship, replace the western Global System?

- **Environmental Crisis**. Pope Francis has issued an Encyclical urging his believers and the world to heed the danger of global warming. He warns that rampant industrialization has created luxury for the rich nations but undue suffering in the way of pollution and misery for the poor. To what degree has capitalism, with its ethos of materialism, contributed to the environmental crisis? Can technologies address the adverse effects of environmental damage? Can a global system of mandatory environmentalism replace capitalism without increasing global poverty?

- **The Crisis of Capitalism**. Is capitalism really working? For whom? The gulf between rich and poor seems to be growing ever wider. Is the “American Dream” even relevant anymore? How are the cost-saving mechanisms of outsourcing and technological innovation contributing to the unemployment crisis in the US? Yet many of the world’s poor have been lifted out of poverty by science, technology, and democracy in this past century. Capitalism has worked in ways that no other ideologies have managed to do. Or was much of that prosperity built on “borrowed” money and deferred payments? Perhaps the Great Recession” of 2008 has made it painfully clear that it is now time to pay the overdue bill.
• **China and Russia: Challenges to the Western System.** China is a newly awakened ancient culture that has its own amalgam of the old and the new. To some degree China rejects the hegemony of the Western Global System, though it also appears to have lately appropriated elements of it to its own benefit. Russia also indicates unwillingness to accept Western hegemony. What institutions do they offer that provide better societal solutions?

• **Multiculturalism.** Many European countries have attempted the model of multiculturalism, admitting large numbers of immigrants and abolishing internal borders in an attempt to create a united Europe. Has this model succeeded? Can it really succeed when immigrants are not willing or able to integrate into their host country’s culture? Is this model now under fire? Also interesting to consider are the challenges to Western culture in the realm of art and music. As globalization progresses in the cultural realm we are seeing unprecedented cultural exchange in these areas. While non-Western music and art do not represent challenges per se to the West, they are an important part of the encounter of the West with the other. Of particular interest will be modes of cultural appropriation and synthesis.

• **The Energy Revolution.** As the United States becomes energy independent and an energy exporter, how does that affect the Global System? Do we still need the Middle East? Israel has become a water exporter in the Middle East, the only country with technologies dealing with water. How does this affect the relationships in that region and the Global System?

• **Decadence and Moral Decay: The Challenge from Within.** Why are so many people in the US more interested in the latest cell-phone app, online video game, or “reality TV” distraction, than they are about the urgent issues facing civilization today? Was Spengler right about the "Decline of the West," not only in terms of the political or economic spheres, but in a spiritual sense as well? What are the implications of this for civilizational study?

The world is changing at a rapid pace. How are we to understand these challenges to Western hegemony? What are the positives and what are the negatives?

Papers are invited on the above topics, and any other topics of civilizational relevance.

Please send abstracts by April 15 to Program Chair, Dr. Laina Farhat-Holzman

Lfarhat102@aol.com
Books by Matthew Melko

[Image showing book covers]
The International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations

In October 1961, in Salzburg, Austria, an extraordinary group of scholars gathered to create the International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations. Among the 26 founding members from Austria, Germany, France, Switzerland, The Netherlands, Spain, Italy, England, Russia, the United States, China and Japan were such luminaries as Pitirim Sorokin and Arnold Toynbee.

For six days, the participants debated such topics as the definition of “civilization,” problems in the analysis of complex cultures, civilizational encounters in the past, the Orient versus the Occident, problems of universal history, theories of historiography, and the role of the “human sciences” in “globalization.” The meeting was funded by the Austrian government, in cooperation with UNESCO, and received considerable press coverage. Sorokin was elected the Society’s first president.

After several meetings in Europe, the advancing age of its founding members and the declining health of then president, Othmar F. Anderle, were important factors in the decision to transfer the Society to the United States.

Between 1968 and 1970 Roger Williams Wescott of Drew University facilitated that transition. In 1971, the first annual meeting of the ISCSC (US) was held in Philadelphia. Important participants in that meeting and in the Society’s activities during the next years included Benjamin Nelson (the Society’s first American president), Roger Wescott, Vytautas Kavolis, Matthew Melko, David Wilkinson, Rushton Coulborn and C.P. Wolf. In 1974, the Salzburg branch was formally dissolved, and from that year to the present there has been only one International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations (ISCSC).

The presidents of the ISCSC are, in order: In Europe, Pitirim Sorokin and Othmar Anderle; in the United States, Benjamin Nelson, Vytautas Kavolis, Matthew Melko, Michael Palencia-Roth, Roger Wescott, Shuntaro Ito (from Japan), Wayne Bledsoe, Lee Daniel Snyder, Andrew Targowski, and the current president David Rosner. To date, the Society has held 45 meetings, most of them in the United States but also in Salzburg, Austria; Santo Domingo, The Dominican Republic; Dublin, Ireland; Chiba, Japan; Frenchman’s Cove, Jamaica; St. Petersburg, Russia; Paris, France; New Brunswick, Canada; and Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

More than 30 countries are represented in the Society’s membership. Its intellectual dynamism and vibrancy over the years have been maintained and enhanced through its annual meetings, its publications, and the participation of such scholars as Talcott Parsons, Hayden White, Immanuel Wallerstein, Gordon Hewes, André Gunder Frank, Marshall Sahlins, Lynn White Jr., and Jeremy Sabloff.

The Society is committed to the idea that complex civilizational problems can best be approached through multidisciplinary analyses and debate by scholars from a variety of fields. The Comparative Civilizations Review, which welcomes submissions from the Society’s members as well as other scholars, has been published continually since its inaugural issue in 1979.

Prof. Michael Palencia-Roth
Membership Information

If you are not a member of the ISCSC please consider joining. For a $60 yearly membership fee members receive a one-year subscription to this journal, are invited to attend the annual conference, receive the ISCSC newsletter, and may participate in ongoing dialogues. Membership is open to all interested in civilizations. Visit www.wmich.edu/ISCSC for further information.

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We thank the Brigham Young University for providing this service worldwide to all who are interested in the topics our journal covers.

We will be switching to a new electronic platform via Brigham Young University for the next issue.

Upcoming 2016 ISCSC Conference

The 46th Annual Meeting of the International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations will take place at Monmouth University in Monmouth, New Jersey, U.S.A.

Look for conference information soon on the ISCSC website:

www.wmich.edu/ISCSC