Hegemony vs. Balance of Power Within and Between Civilizations in World History

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In the last quarter of the 20th century, a preference for balance of power outcomes among international political realists was challenged by other scholars, also realists, who believed that hegemonic dominance was more desirable.

Those who focused on the balance of power argued that the most stabilizing, if not the most peaceful, situation for an international or state system is one in which the most powerful state, the hegemon, is balanced by an alliance of other less powerful states that prevent it from attempting to conquer all the states in the system.

Those who focused on the hegemon argued that, on the contrary, a clearly established hegemon or core state tends to maintain stability, intervening in secondary conflicts where necessary, but allowing other less powerful states to maintain stability within their own regions.

In the early phase of a state system, it is most often the case that the political entities first interact locally or regionally. But eventually they tend to coalesce, in Arnold Toynbee’s phrasing, into a single vortex though some civilizations may contain more than one such system (Toynbee IX: 261). Usually this enlarged system occurs within a single civilization, although states on the periphery are likely to interact with peripheral states in neighboring civilizations (Toynbee III: 301-306, Wilkinson 1985, Wesson 1978: 10-18).

Eventually these more centralized entities begin to encounter one another and conflict between them ensues. Such a system would seem to be unstable in that power obviously increases and decreases within the states as leadership changes, economies fluctuate or succeeding generations acquire or lose the taste or skill for governance and warfare. Yet such a system can also have long-term stability, continue for centuries, and experience recurrent warfare, but also long periods of relative peace. The wars determine which of the states become great powers, capable of influencing or withstanding other states within the system. (Toynbee IX: 234-287; Coulborn 1966: 414-416; Wight 1977: 46-72, 110-152; Wesson 1978: 28-35; Wilkinson 1985).

How do groups of states, having no dominant government, maintain stability? The prevailing realist view has been that if one state
threatens to become too powerful, others may form alliances against it. Thus a balance of power may come into existence and preserve the system. This leads to frequent changes of alliance as perceptions of power change, yet a balance of power is eventually recovered. Something like this has been the prevailing view of the realist school of thought in the West, perhaps because it describes the European state system from 1618 to 1945 (Morgenthau 1978: 171-228; Wight 1977: 66-67, 96-97, 150-152; Levy 1983: 8-49; Waltz 1979: 117-128, 163-170).

While dominant states have conquered all others and created spectacular empires that have received much attention from historians, it is probable that dominant powers more often could not or did not seek to conquer all other states. More frequently what Morgenthau calls a status quo policy (1978: 42-47) emerged because the leaders of the dominant power considered their present situation preferable to the risks of further conquest and the difficulties of maintaining distant territories. In the past few decades the concept of hegemony has been greatly elaborated and perceived as a normal and recurrent aspect of state systems. The consensus goes something like this. One state, over a period, becomes dominant, but usually that does not mean the termination of the state system. Whether or not other states combine to prevent that from happening, hegemony represents the height of that state’s ambition or its leaders’ perception of its power. Its rulers are satisfied to lead within the system, and other states accept this, because they perceive that this situation brings systemic order. There will be other great powers within the system, that is, states strong enough to disrupt the order if they choose to do so. But so long as they have sufficient power to control their own sphere of influence, usually over secondary powers within their region, they may accept the status quo for many decades.

Such a system is recurrently susceptible to violence, however, and conflict can result because of a change in leadership within any great power; because a new great power arises, its leadership perceiving insufficient scope; or because the hegemon, overburdened with its responsibilities or preoccupied with domestic concerns, weakens and is no longer able to perform its stabilizing functions. This can lead to a period of warfare among some or all of the great powers, with the result that the hegemon retains its position, or is replaced by another great power, or for a period there is no hegemon. Only occasionally does one power conquer all and establish an imperial system. Even if it does, it may be soon challenged and deposed, and the state system restored (Toynbee III: 299-306; Doran 1983, Levy 1985, Modelski 1987: 7-50,
From the hegemonic perspective, then, the stable periods of a state system are those in which a hegemon is clearly established. This view seemingly challenges the earlier balance of power perspective, which views stable periods as those when no hegemon threatens to dominate.

It was noted by Toynbee that the state that dominates or conquers the others in a system is often peripheral to the state system. The Akkadian Empire, the Middle Kingdom, the Achemenid, the Mauryan, the Qin-Han, the Mughal Empire, the Inca, the Ottoman, the British Raj would fit that description and, in Toynbee’s time, the United States and the Soviet Union appeared to Europeans to be potential peripheral contenders for imperial domination. Today, the United States is still widely perceived as posing that threat. This idea of peripheral domination has been developed by civilizationists and world systems analysts as the concept of core-peripheral relationships (Toynbee III: 301-306; Quigley 1979: 57-58; Wallerstein 1974: 38, 100-103, 116-119; Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997: 35-37, 224-225).

Both hegemons and multipower systems have often extended across civilizational borders. Western, Byzantine and Islamic civilizations have often been involved in each other’s systems along the Russian frontier, in the Balkans and in Anatolia. In the second millennium BCE there were a few centuries in which great powers from Egyptian, Mesopotamian and Hittite civilizations formed a system well integrated by diplomacy and war. In the latter half of the 20th century and at the beginning of the 21st, however, the current hegemon appears to be the first that has attempted global reach.

In 2004, writing on the subject of diplomacy, American Secretary of State Colin Powell argued that the problem for his government was to deal with threats to system stability while gathering support from other major powers within the system. Otherwise leaders in other states might perceive the hegemon as either failing to preserve that stability if it appears to be too weak, or threatening the system if it appears to act too forcefully and without support.

Given the difficulties of identifying systems, not to mention hegemons, multipower situations and outcomes, and given the situation at the beginning of the 21st century, after the apparent hegemon has intervened in several cases in East Asian, Latin American and Islamic civilizations, what can be said about the desirability of either clear hegemony or balance of power for achieving or maintaining systemic stability or peace?
The difficulty of looking for patterns in state systems may be illustrated by the concept of general war developed by Toynbee. His idea was that within state systems, great powers periodically fight one another, and that a rhythm could be discerned in these conflicts. The great powers would fight a general war, the resolution would be partial and there would be a breathing space; then a second round of general war would reach some kind of resolution in terms of balance of power among these states, and a general peace would follow, only to end, after a time, in a new general war.

The idea was picked up in the 1970's, particularly by American political scientists, beginning with L. L. Farrar (1977), articulated by Jack Levy (1983, 1985), and continued into the 1990's, by which time Toynbee's thesis had been modified, but tested mostly against Western cases. By this time the consensus suggested that general wars ended in the establishment of a hegemony in which a dominant power intervened in potential conflicts, and kept warfare at a secondary level, while other great powers fought minor wars to control or intervene in the affairs of secondary powers within their spheres of influence. Eventually the hegemon would be challenged by a new rising power, leading to a new general war and the reestablishment of hegemony, either by the resident hegemon or by a new great power (Melko, 2001a: 21-46).

I attempted to test this consensus by studying general wars in what I considered to be mainstream civilizations, but as I did, I became aware of how much reification has to go into the constructing of such a test. Civilizations are themselves reifications, I then decided somewhat arbitrarily that general wars had to last two decades to be considered, then had to make decisions about the wars themselves, including when and where they began and ended, in the process creating wars that possibly no one had ever heard of before. I don’t mean that the wars did not occur, only that they were not perceived as single wars, just as the Thirty Years War was initially perceived as four separate wars or, in our own time, the World Wars were perceived as two, but since the 1970s are being perceived by many scholars as one (e.g. Farrar 1977, Goodspeed 1977).

By this process I found 38 general wars in ten civilizations, and could say that they did not fit the concept of cycles or hegemony that I had found in the consensus. As often as not there was not a clearly established hegemon at the beginning or the end of these wars. Nor was general peace a recurring phenomenon, as Toynbee believed. All that can be said is that in most state systems, general wars occur rarely, gen-
erel peace is equally rare, but in normal times peace is normal, war sporadic and regional.

By my assessment of the 38 cases of general war, 19 ended in hegemony, 15 in state systems lacking a hegemon and four in empires (2001: 275-276). The paucity of imperial outcomes in this study reflects the probability that civilizationally wide imperial systems are rare. We note the few that emerge for long periods and fail to give much attention to many more that emerge and quickly dissipate. My assessments—findings is surely too strong a term—correlate with those of David Wilkinson, who has been patiently examining political forms over quarters of centuries, and in one case by decades, for several major civilizations. Recently (2005) he has summarized his ongoing, painstaking research on fluctuations in political consolidation. His studies of 14 centuries of East Asian history, 21 centuries of South Asian history, 41 centuries of Mesopotamian history, 13 centuries of Egyptian history and eight centuries of three combined Mediterranean civilizations indicate that empires have been infrequent while the most common political form by far is a multistate political system lacking hegemon or alliances.

Recently I have followed the hegemons from my general war study for another two centuries following the general war from which they emerged or survived. Since in four cases a second general war was experienced by the hegemon, I wound up with 15 cases to follow.

The 15, organized civilisationally, are: Thebes after the Herakleopolitan Wars (2108-2052); Assyria after the Second Assyrian General War (744-702); Seleucid Persia after the Diadochid Wars (321-281); Parthian Persia after the Wars of Parthian Accession (161-113); Sassanid Persia after the Wars of Sassanid Consolidation (243-268); Rome after the Punic Wars 254-188); Chalukya after the Chalukyan General Wars in India (610-680); The Delhi Sultanate after the Khalji-Tughluq Wars (1296-1351); The Tepanecs after the Wars of Tepanec Hegemony in Mesoamerica (1367-1418); Byzantium after the Abbasid-Bulgar Wars (803-824); Byzantium after the Seljuk Wars 1068-1098); The Ottomans after the Wars of Byzantine Decline (1326-1389) and the Wars of Ottoman Ascendancy 1514-1551); The Abbasids after the Wars of Abbasid Decline (869-907); France after the Thirty Years War 1614-1648), the Wars of Louis XIV (1688-1713), the Wars of Frederick the Great (1740-1763) and the Napoleonic Wars (1792-1815); and the United States after the World Wars (1914-1945).
Six of these never depended on alliances: Assyria, the Parthians, the Sassanids, Rome, the Delhi Sultanate and the Ottomans; the Middle Kingdom and the Seleucids consolidated without renewing alliances; the Chalukyans and French experienced frequently changing alliances before and after the general wars; Byzantium after the Seljuk Wars and the Abbasid Caliphate were definitely weakened by lost alliances and for three of the hegemons—the Tepanecs, Byzantium after the Abbasid Wars and the United States—a key ally became the principal challenger. Of these, the fracture of the alliance was crucial in the loss of Tepanec hegemony, and a factor in the loss of Abbasid hegemony.

Other great powers remained or arose in all cases, and only the Romans were not at some point seriously challenged. The hegemons were about as likely to initiate as to respond to challenge. The Middle Kingdom, Ottomans and French initiated attacks against formidable opponents. The Romans and Americans initiated several wars, but never against a great power. The French were challenged several times, but never initiated a general war, not even the Napoleonic.

Recalling Secretary Powell’s concern about the hege mon appearing to be neither too strong nor too weak, the Assyrians, Seleucids, Chalukyans and Tepanecs did not survive as states and the Delhi Sultanate and Abbasids also lost their hegemony. Eight states maintained their hegemony for two centuries following the general war and five of these—the Middle Kingdom, Sassanid, Roman, Post-Abbasid Byzantine and Ottoman—reached dominant or imperial status. The United States has maintained its hegemony for the first six decades following its general war.

Economic decline was a major factor in the weakening of the Byzantine Empire after the Seljuk Wars and the Abbasid loss of hegemony; probably it was less of a factor in the Delhi Sultanate’s relinquishing of hegemony. In the other twelve cases, economies were robust, stable or resilient.

Eight of the hegemons appear to have been little affected by evils of maturation, and three seem to have managed it. It was definitely a factor in the decline and weakening of the Delhi Sultanate, Byzantium after the Seljuk Wars, the Abbasids and the Ottomans after the Wars of Ascendancy. The Romans, French and Americans were also affected but the first two, and the Americans so far, appear to have compensated for seemingly excessive consumption by correspondingly resilient economies.

Seven of the 15 hegemons could be said to have presided over peri-
periods of peace and stability for the two centuries following the end of preceding general wars. The United States, so far, has presided over if not preserved peace in its own civilization and over Latin American civilization as well. Whether its interventions in other civilizations have contributed to peace is a question that will have to be left to later historians.

To say that state systems maintain stability over very long periods of time does not, of course, say that they maintain peace. War has been a recurring though not ubiquitous part of this stability. I have, however, over the past four decades been involved, with colleagues, in the study of peace in history. From this I can make a few brief observations, the provisional nature of which will demonstrate why they have not yet achieved world fame.

Peace is normal in state systems. General wars involving most of the great powers of a civilization take place less than 10 per cent of the time, and even they involve only sporadic fighting. Even during the World Wars, more than 85 per cent of the months were free of fighting. The rest of the time there may be a regional or local war here and there, but most of the states are at peace. Individual states may maintain peace for centuries. Occasionally there will be decades of peace for an entire civilization. General peace, which Western Civilization is currently experiencing, does not follow general war in any particular pattern (Melko 1973, 1996: 90-92, 2001a: 202-203, 208-11; Melko, Weigel et al 1981; Melko and Hord 1984).

It is probably more satisfactory to say that there are wars and peaces in history that are reminiscent of others in the same or other civilizations. If we look for similarities and differences in each we may be able to gain some insights into a present situation by comparing it with the past, but we are unlikely to be able to predict the future in any detail, and often not at all.

Peace is achieved when great powers are satisfied with the current situation to the extent that they think war will not improve it. This applies whether a hegemon exists or not. It may be that a hegemon is perceived as preserving a situation that is better than any other that is likely to be achieved, or it may be that the defeat of a hegemon creates a situation in which no power poses an overwhelming threat to others. These perceptions can change over time by the advent of an aggressive government or by changes in the strength of various powers including the hegemon. When the normative consensus about the adequacy of the present situation exists, peace is likely to continue. All of this, of course,
is quite unsatisfactory for finding a formula for peace, nor does it resolve the disagreement between balance of power and hegemonic theories, nor does it take into consideration varieties of civilizational pattern.

Impotence appears to be a recurrent factor in peace. States do not attack one another because of exhaustion from previous wars, or because—as is often the case—defense is superior to offense and attack is unlikely to be worth the cost, or because states cannot reach one another. Impotence because of inability to defend against nuclear counter attack has not been sufficiently tested.

Economic integration, a great hope for the future, received mild support from our research, though it was far from a guarantee.

Democracy is a relatively recent event and is still being appraised. The same is true of the idea that there may be stages of peace in the process of evolving.

The conclusions of our group were that circumstances supporting the achievement of peace were “highly contextual, achievable under many different circumstances, and often dependent on the desire of rulers and policy makers to achieve or maintain peace, and their ability to assess and respond to existing and perhaps changing situations.”

Neither this conclusion nor the following of hegemons for two centuries produce a very helpful formula for future policy makers, but they do not preclude the possibility that the combination of an increasing number of democracies, a great increase in world trade, and the long term development of zones of peace will create a political equivalent of the industrial revolution, increasing possibilities for world harmony as the economic transformation has for world production.

How does the United States compare to hegemons of the past? The United States has not been weakened by perceived responsibilities, whether defending or expanding. It somewhat resembles Rome in that it has engaged no other great power in warfare, and Sassanid Persia in that it has not expanded its territory.

The economy of the United States, like most of the hegemonic economies, has been strong: more resilient and growing than most. But the economy, and the ability to carry out hegemonic interventions, may be weakened over time by some indications of state maturity: an orientation toward consumption, the incurring of debt that may exceed productive capacity, and a greater desire for domestic comfort and security than for arcane responsibilities of hegemony.

While loss of alliances was a factor in the loss of hegemony in two
cases, most of the successful hegemons did not depend on alliances. While in its early decades the United States could possibly have been successful without allies, it was more assiduous than any of the others except France in building alliances.

Like all hegemons except Rome, the United States was challenged, in this case by Russia. What was unusual was that the three great powers of the period—a declining Russia, a continuing Japan, and a rising China—were all peripheral to the civilization of the hegemon.

While the United States was one of the hegemons that initiated wars, like the Romans these were never against a major power. Looking at the Russian challenge in historical perspective, it was more like Roman relations with the Sassanids—not friendly, but not directly violent either. On three occasions the United States became strongly involved in secondary wars in East Asian, South Asian and Islamic Civilizations.

The United States is one of the hegemons that has so far presided over if not preserved peace in its own civilization and over Latin American civilization as well. Whether its interventions in other civilizations have contributed to peace in other civilizations is a question that will have to be left to later historians.

The United States, then, is unusual in its seeking of alliances, its economic support of other states including major powers, and its intercivilizational reach. But undoubtedly all the hegemons would be anomalous in some respects. On the whole, therefore, it would appear that the United States is so far experiencing what might be considered a normal hegemony.

NOTES
Editor’s Note: Our peer review system is anonymous on both sides. In this case, after the peer review and the author’s response, we found the exchange so interesting that we secured permission to identify both the reviewer and author to each other. The reviewer was George Von der Muhll, Matt Melko’s response is below.

Background
This article was a paper was intended for presentation in 2006 at the 35e congres de la Societe internationale pour l’étude comparee des
civilizations, but the hard copy was lost when the bag it was in was stolen from the train going from the airport to Paris. Since I was heavily engaged in chairing sessions, David Wilkinson generously agreed on short notice to replace me at the designated session. Working from hastily written notes, Wilkinson presented a paper entitled “The Paper Melko Should Have Given.” The notes and tape of the session were subsequently sequestered. If I recall correctly, though the notes appeared to be in English, Wilkinson gave the presentation in French.

**Peer Review**

The paper was rediscovered on the computer as two articles on hegemony were being considered by the CCR editors. It was suggested that it might be interesting to juxtapose the paper with the articles to provide a wider range of views on hegemony in world history. Accordingly the paper was submitted for peer review, and the reviewer quickly responded with an excellent, nuanced response. Fortunately, for the author, his ignorance far exceeded his inventory, and there just wasn’t time to fill the gaps. So it was decided to borrow from Toynbee (1934-61: v. 7-10), who often presented comments from his colleagues in the notes without attempting to revise his text.

**Arcane Controversies**

“From the outset,” writes the reviewer, “terms are introduced that seem more contestable to the lay reader than to those who have taken part in these controversies over the years, and at several points these controversies are referred to rather than explicated.”

I can see how this might seem, but probably these controversies should be deleted rather than explicated. The main controversy is explicated, though it may be that it has been infrequently addressed directly. Writers from the late decades of the 20th century, focusing on the benevolent functions of hegemony, usually do not notice that they are contradicting the balance of power theorists of earlier decades. The inferred question, put bluntly, is whether state systems fare better with or without a hegemon.

**Arcane Hegemons**

“Even members of our society may know little about the Chalukya state and its neighbors or what territory the ‘Tepanec’ state/empire (?) encompasses and when it flourished, and those uncertainties can raise questions in lay minds about what kinds of entities are being compared and whether their use in analytic comparisons is appropriate.”
Alas, I possess one of the lay minds. I would have to go back to the source (Melko 2001: 92-94, 117-120) to find out a little more about Chalukyas or Tepanecs. For purposes of this essay, I can only say that they appeared to me to have been the strongest states in a civilizational state system.

Exhaustive or Merely Illustrative?

"It was not clear to this reader whether the states being compared are to be considered an exhaustive list or [a] merely illustrative set drawn from several thousand years of history; many familiar names (the Maya, the Inca, the Khmer Empire, the Mongols) are missing, and while that may be because of the definitions used by the author for inclusion or exclusion, some explanation and justification for his procedures would be helpful."

The set considered was neither exhaustive nor illustrative. It was chosen from 38 cases of longer than two decade general wars gathered from perhaps a year's (certainly not exhaustive) survey of world history. The Incas and Mongols were not included because they were not involved in such general wars. I don't remember about the Mayas or Khmers; once I exclude I tend to focus on what I retain. In any event, the 15 cases I followed further and listed were all of those that emerged from a general war or, in four cases, more than one general war. So the list was more than illustrative, but exhaustive only within a limited context.

Unfriendly Lists

"At some points, the paragraphs consist of mere lists of state names that would seem better placed in a systematically constructed appendix. Such paragraphs can leave the impression that one is reading a transcript of a research professor's discussion with a sophisticated team of graduate students rather than a reader-friendly essay designed to draw the general reader into a hitherto-unexplored domain of potential interest."

Agreed. An appendix would have been better. The list of 15 hegemons, many arcane, seems particularly boring until you get to the West.

Other Questions

"Other Questions concern the operational definitions used in the argument, the boundaries defining the units in question, the relationship of the analytic scheme to other comparable discussions of hegemonic state systems, the logical structure of the explanations offered, and the
ultimate objective of the essay’s arguments.”

Gulp. I’m not very good at this. In these three articles on hegemony we may differ somewhat on these concepts, which may account in part for some other differences that may be apparent. I see a state system as a relationship of autonomous political states, usually within a single civilization, though sometimes a state external to the civilization may be drawn into a particular general war. Within this system some states are great powers, strong enough to influence other powers. A hegemon would be a state that is perceived to be the strongest in the system. There are reifications here with regard to the system, the great powers, the hegemon and the general war. As for the logical structure, this is always a problem for me because whatever you present first always seems to require something prior that has been omitted or is presented later.

As for the ultimate purpose of the essay, on rereading I cannot find it. I infer that the author, in combining the results of the study of what happened to the 15 hegemons, with previous studies, was led to the conclusion that the evidence that either dominant hegemons or balanced great powers produce peace or stability is, at best, weak. Added to this, since it might be of interest to Westerners, is the perception that so far, except that it ranges farther than usual beyond its own civilization, the United States appears to be behaving as a comparatively normal hegemon.

Only One World War?

One operational definition that disturbed the reviewer was the conflation of World Wars I and II as a single war. He thinks this “a profoundly unsatisfactory stretch . . .” and in about ten or eleven lines makes an impressive case against this conflation. He concludes: “To make one war out of two in light of the exigencies of an operational definition seems to me to be a clear example of the implausible intrusion of a certain kind of misplaced social science methodology into history.”

But the study of civilizations is a social science intrusion into history. Four of our earlier presidents were sociologists. Lenski and Sanders are macrosociologists. Toynbee once wrote to me that he considered Spengler, Kroeber and himself, as well as Sorokin, sociologists. Many of the general wars I listed, e.g. the Thirty Years War, were conflated previously by historians, and I conflated a few more. General Wars, Great Powers, hegemons and civilizations are all reifications. Our empirical work consists largely of quantifying reifications. Medical
sociologists are quantifying speculative diagnoses of varieties of autism or of memory loss such as mild cognitive impairment or mild degenerative dementia and telling us whether or not they are increasing. We can’t get along without reification. I do think, however, that this is the first time any idea of mine has been associated with profundity.

**Hegemony Scaled**

The reader asks if, on a scale of relationships based on dominance and subordination, the sequence might be empire, hegemony, bipolar system, balance of power system and isolated system.

I would agree with that sequence of organization but add, after balance of power, a multipower system that lacked either hegemon or great powers. Wilkinson, examining a much greater sample, finds this to have been the most common system in world history (2005).

**Limitations of this Study**

The reader thinks that the absence of such a schema illustrates “what seems to me one of the ways in which the essay under consideration seems to me to need a more explicit adumbration of the context presupposed but not explicitly identified in the discussion of hegemonic relationships and their alternatives.”

True. In this article only hegemonic and balance of power systems were compared, only hegemonic research was cited for support, the weakness of balance of power systems in preserving stability or peace inferred but not demonstrated from earlier research.

**Tautological Explanations**

It is important “to express concern over the prevalence of tautological explanations in the essay. There are simply too many explanatory sentences such as ‘Peace is achieved when great powers are satisfied with the current situation to the extent that they think war will not improve it.’ How do we know when ‘great Powers’ have reached such levels of satisfaction? Not because of any independent evidence that such calculations have in fact been performed by the actors, but simply because the other states in a hegemonic system have not in fact sought to attack the hegemon—which is, purportedly, what is to be explained.”

The hegemons do not attack because the status quo seems preferable to the cost and risks of trying to achieve imperial control. The great powers do not attack because the status quo seems preferable to attempting to dislodge the hegemon. It does seem to be a tautological explanation, but all powers are practicing a policy of the Status Quo.
which is, in fact, the policy most nations have practiced most of the time. This is why peace is normal, and partly why historians and political scientists spend more time and effort trying to explain the situations in which one or another nation does not follow this policy.

The Benefits of Competition

Robert Wesson "offers a broad range of stimulating hypotheses concerning other economic, scientific, aesthetic and other benefits from non-hegemonic competition among states, but these possibilities aren't even hinted at in this essay as possible subjects for future research. . . . This reviewer would have liked to have seen either a few suggestions of that nature or else an explicit justification for inquiring solely into the conditions promoting war and peace."

Wesson's is a wonderful book (1978) that has received inadequate attention. There certainly should be more attention given to these subjects. Thanks for this challenging and constructive review.

REFERENCES


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