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MIND, CAUSATION AND CHINESE MENTALITY

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Mentality

Of the characteristics of a nation, civilization or culture that may be taken as definitive of its identity, mentality is certainly an important one. The study of mentalities is a long and venerable one, but it is also very much a contested concept. Mentality is a broad concept that refers to how a people think about religion, philosophy, literature, marriage, love, sex, the family and so on. The broadness of the concept has led some to regard it as “soft,”¹ and there is some justification for this negative view. In spite of the problems with the concept, it is possible and, indeed, necessary to study mentality.

Thinkers such as Hajime Nakamura,² Roger Ames, David Hall,³ Lucien Febvre,⁴ and Stephen Schwartz⁵ are just a few examples of scholars who work in the area of comparative mentalities. While there are significant disagreements among these scholars of mentality, there is also agreement that the enterprise is possible to one degree or another. On the other hand, since Edward Said’s critique of Orientalism⁶, scholars have been somewhat wary of making overly general essentialist claims about cultures and civilizations. The task is to say something substantive about a civilization’s mode of thinking while not falling prey to an overly essentialist ambition.

My conception of mentality builds on notions of mentality developed by Nakamura and Febvre, but with scaled back claims and joined with the hermeneutic concept of a horizon. Lucien Febvre was the main proponent of the study of mentality in the Annales School of historiography. Febvre writes, “Social realities are a whole. One could not pretend to explain an institution if one did not link it to the great intellectual, emotional, mystical currents or contemporaneous mentality... This interpretation of the facts of social organization *from the inside* will be the principle of my teaching.”⁷ LeFebvre was more interested in particular notions and the ideas of individuals than in the logical and rational frameworks underlying thinking generally, which is the research space of this paper.

The conception of mentality used in this paper is closer to that of Nakamura, who uses the term “ways of thinking” instead of mentality,

but who means roughly the same thing. He writes: The phrase "ways of thinking" refers to any individual's thinking in which the characteristic features of the thinking habits of the culture to which he belongs are revealed...his ways of thinking are, in fact, conditioned by his culture's habits and attitudes when he communicates his thoughts.⁸

Nakamura begins with a consideration of "the characteristics of their ways of thinking as discernible in the forms of expression of the simplest judgments and inferences."⁹ My discussion below of causal thinking fits with Nakamura's inclusion of forms of inference as key to comparative mentality. My approach, however, is not as broad as Nakamura's. I will limit myself to the specific notions of causation and mind and attempt to show that their instantiation in China is problematic. I will thus be providing a view of the horizon of Chinese mentality, where Western and Indian mentality fail to overlap with Chinese mentality. Our interpretations that use the concepts of mind and causation must end at the door of the Great Wall. This is precisely the result we want from the study of mentality.

As Andre Burguiere writes, "The study of mentalities is the surest way of avoiding anachronism, that is, the absence of distance, the loss of meaning of change and of what is relative that affects our reasoning when we project our own categories onto another epoch."¹⁰

In this paper I will therefore be operating with a minimalist concept of mentality that looks for a "significant absence" in the conceptual tools available to a group of people. This notion of mentality is less essentialist than those that attempt to characterize a basic outlook for a civilization, and is therefore less objectionable to those hostile to essentialist arguments. In this paper I will argue for two sorts of significant absences in pre-Buddhist Chinese thought, namely dualist approaches to the philosophy of mind, and causal approaches to understanding nature. Both these approaches are present, however, in Western and Indian thought. Western thought has a dualist line of argument stretching back to Plato and Aristotle, and the causal approach goes back even further to the pre-Socratics. Indian thought also contains dualist strains of thinking, although non-dualist thinking seems to be more influential. The key, however, is the presence of dualism as an option in Indian thought. The Nyaya tradition is a venerable and defensible dualist approach to the philosophy of mind in Indian thought,¹¹ and thus constitutes definitive evidence of the dualist strain of thinking in India. Causal thinking is also present in Indian thought.¹² The presence of dualism and causal thinking in India and the West leads to the question of whether

such thinking is universal. It turns out that it is not. China seems to have significant absences in these areas. I will argue that these absences are key to understanding Chinese mentality, which is, in turn, important for understanding the idea of Chinese civilization.

The minimalist conception of mentality I am using avoids the objection that conceptions of mentality are indefensibly essentialist. Having identified two key forms of thought in the Ancient West and Ancient India, I then ask whether or not Ancient China has these forms. (I work with early cultures because of the problem of later cultural exchange and influence. China eventually came under the influence of Buddhism and later, Western philosophy, which bring dualist and causal concepts with them.) If we already know that certain concepts or ways of thinking are important in other traditions, then we are in a position to argue that it is significant that China does not have these concepts or ways of thinking. And that is all that is needed to make significant comparative statements.

Notice that I am not claiming that these absences are the most important aspects of Chinese mentality. Doing so might still open oneself to objections of essentialism. But I am not identifying any kind of "core" Chinese notions. Nevertheless, I do argue that they are important absences since so much Indian and Western thought has a causal and dualist orientation. They are also important since these absences are indicative of deep structural differences between China on the one hand and India and the West on the other. Structural differences are more important than differences in content since differences in content may simply be the result of contingency. If a certain discussion, say, of the existence of God, takes a different path in Descartes and Hume, it probably does not tell us much about France and England. Such differences can be attributed to the creativity of human minds. On the other hand, if there are no discussions of God or any sort of transcendent being at all in some culture, that might very well be significant.

Mentality and Civilization: although this paper assumes that ancient China was a civilization, I will not argue for the claim. Rather, I will argue for the importance of mentality in understanding Chinese civilization. There are many aspects of a civilization worth considering and comparing to other civilizations. Mentality refers to how a people think about things. To know something about how a group of people think is an important thing to know about them. It is particularly important if there are structural differences between the ways groups think. Structural aspects of thought create boundaries or horizons, and these

are crucial to understanding a civilization.

If we know that a certain way of thinking is not present in a civilization, then we are less likely to misinterpret the texts or institutions of that civilization. Hall and Ames write, for example, "One of the principal barriers precluding the Westerner from understanding China on its own terms involves the persistence in Western cultures of what Robert Solomon has so aptly termed the "transcendental pretense."¹³ Hall and Ames also write that "when Western students of Chinese culture see *tian* translated as "Heaven," they may naturally assume that connotations of transcendence and spirituality attaching to the notion of "heaven" in their tradition apply to *tian*. And when Chinese students of Western culture see "God" translated as *tianzhu*, *the Master of tian*," or as *shangdi*, the ancestral lord, they contextualize this term by appealing to an ancestral continuum analogous to our family structure."¹⁴ These sorts of mistakes are fairly common, and it is part of the job of comparativists to make them less common. Understanding the mentality of a civilization is therefore crucial for avoiding misunderstandings in studies in comparative civilization.

The Mind: In the area of the philosophy of mind, India and the West find themselves making nearly parallel arguments¹⁵. This is not the case with China in comparison with either the West or India. The Chinese do not seem to have the Cartesian dualism that is so characteristic of Western views of the mind and that gives rise to the arguments that characterize the philosophy of mind in India and the West. Jacques Gernet writes:

"Not only was the substantial opposition between the soul and the body something quite unknown to the Chinese, all souls being, in their view, destined to be dissipated sooner or later..."¹⁶

If this is true, however, what is one to make of the following lines from the *Chu Tzu*? In the *Chao Hun* (Summons of the Soul), we read the following;

"O soul, come back! In the south you may not linger.
O soul, come back! For the west holds many perils."¹⁷

These lines certainly seem to indicate that the soul can leave the body. And if it can leave the body, then is not this a form of dualism? It seems that there is evidence for at least the conceptual prerequisites for dualism. We should add that this is not merely poetic evidence, as it has been shown that these lines are reflective of a common ritual in which family members give the soul of the deceased a chance to return to the

body before final acknowledgement of the death of the individual.¹⁸ How are we to make sense of this? For what would an immaterial soul have to fear? The key lies in the second line, which indicates the almost material nature of the soul. One might conjecture that there could be spiritual dangers, but this is not born out by the poem. The dangers are listed as human sacrifice, a great fox, coiling snakes and so on. One line even worries that 'You will be swept into the Thunder's Chasm, and dashed in pieces, unable to help yourself.'¹⁹ The dangers are therefore material dangers; thus this concept of the soul must be unlike the Western, Cartesian view. This soul that separates with the death of the person is not meant to be thought of as composed of immaterial substance in the Cartesian sense.

It is helpful to take a brief look at the evolution of the idea of the soul in China. In an important article, Ying-Shih Yu shows how distinct ideas of the soul from northern and southern China combine with the Yang-yin cosmology and get refined into a complex view of the soul. In early China of the Eleventh century B.C.E. the only evidence for a soul is the *p'ò*. Interestingly, one can lose one's *p'ò* soul and still linger alive for some time, although it is an indicator that death is near.

Later the *hun* notion from the north enters the picture, first as just another idea similar to the *p'ò*, but later given a different role in conjunction with the addition of *yang-yin* theory. When a man is created the *p'ò* is created first. The yang part, coming later, becomes *hun*, or conscious spirit. If a person does well in life, then the *p'ò* and *hun* grow very strong. If such a person meets with a violent death, these souls can linger and cause trouble as ghosts.

Notice, however, how material life nourishes the souls. As Ying-Shih Yü notes, "In his emphasis on physical nourishment as the foundation of the soul, Tzu-ch'an's analysis strongly suggests a materialistic point of view."²⁰

Later, the *hun* becomes a "breath-soul" which rises to heaven at death, while the *p'ò* becomes a "bodily-soul" which returns to the earth. In the poem cited above, it is the *hun*-soul, that leaves the body. One might be tempted to reconstruct Cartesianism from the *hun*-soul, and interpret the *p'ò* as the Chinese equivalent of a pineal gland, but that would be incorrect. Even the *hun* is understood to dissipate eventually, generally no more than seven generations (and only that long for the noble—the souls of common people last a much shorter time) after death, and when they do they reunite with the primal *ch'i* that makes up all things, whether body or spirit.

Daniel Gardner summarizes the complexity of this framework of body and souls as it occurs in the Chinese philosopher, Chu Hsi. Chu Hsi believes that man is born with a *hun* or heavenly soul and a *p'o* or earthly soul; these *hun* or *p'o* souls are constituted of *ch'i*, with the heavenly soul identified with *ch'i*'s expansive aspect (*shen*) and the earthly soul identified with its contractive aspect (*kuei*). At death, the *ch'i* of man disperses and the heavenly soul ascends to heaven as *shen*; the earthly soul returns to the earth as *kuei*.²¹ The key to this explanation for our purposes is that ultimacy of *ch'i* as a metaphysical commonality of all things.

I believe that it is this metaphysics of *ch'i* that closed off or more likely, lengthened the path to anything like a Cartesian dualistic metaphysics of mind. It was certainly not there in Confucius, and it does not really take hold even after the introduction of Buddhism.

Herbert Fingarette, in a very influential book on Confucius,²² argued that there is no inner psychology in Confucius. As Benjamin Schwartz has noted, Fingarette's interpretation of Confucius was heavily influenced by British Analytic philosophy, particularly that of Ryle, who is known for his rejection of the mind-body distinction.²³ Schwartz does follow Fingarette in believing that the Western and Cartesian view of the mind-body distinction is not operative in Chinese thought, even though he has some quibbles with exactly how this should be conceived. Schwartz states that "the inner and outer aspects of the *Analects* refer not to mind and body, as conceived by Descartes, but to the person (as a fusion of both mind and body) as the inner locus of moral attitudes and dispositions (the "heart/mind" is both mental and physical), and to the pattern of behavioral rules, conventions, institutions, and so forth as the outer which constitutes what might be called the objective, normative socio-cultural order."²⁴

Roger Ames and David Hall have made the most radical claims about the Chinese idea of the self, for they not only deny the Cartesian duality of mind and body, they deny even the idea of the atomistic self. They write, "If we are to be strictly limited to the interpretive categories associated with Western theories of the self, the Chinese are, quite literally, selfless."²⁵ But how can this be? How can any group of people possibly be without selves? Ames and Hall realize the radical nature of their statement, but they believe that it is defensible if one thinks of the following components of the Western notion of the self:

1. rational consciousness
2. physiological reduction

3. volitional activity
4. organic functioning²⁶

Beginning with the idea of a rational consciousness, Hall and Ames argue that the closest thing for Chinese thinking is *xin*, or heart-mind, but this term also refers to feeling as much as it refers to thinking or judging. There is also no real possibility of physiological reduction in Chinese thinking about the self, since China does not have the conception of the body as reducible to a material substance. Rather, the Chinese conception of the body is intimately tied up with ritual practice, and as such is integrally related to the project of self-cultivation, which involves what a Westerner would think of as both body and mind. Further, this performance of ritual connects the person to the community as a whole in a network of ritual and relationships.

The idea of volitional activity in the Western, Augustinian view that thinks of distinct faculties of the will deciding on a course of action and then a distinct action is also foreign to China. These are simply not distinct in the Chinese mind. Nor is the idea of a willing self engaged in a struggle with other, antagonistic selves part of the Chinese conception.

The notion of an organically functioning self is more controversial. Hall and Ames find it inappropriate to the Chinese case, but others, such as Joseph Needham and Benjamin Schwartz, find this approach useful. Hall and Ames believe that organicism means something very different when applied to Chinese philosophy since Chinese philosophy does not imply the teleology that is central to the Western conception of an organism. Further, the organic metaphor is actually closer to an analogy with the state than with a biological organism. Because of these differences, Hall and Ames choose to make little use of the organic metaphor.

Hall and Ames then turn to their positive account of the Chinese concept of the self: the "focus-field concept of the self." The "focus-field" is a nexus of social relations "constituting and constituted by the person."²⁷ This kind of self can therefore not be really independent of the selves around it nor of the culture framework in which it is immersed. Hall and Ames write that "It is through patterns of deference to recognized excellence that an individual extends himself to encompass a wider range of 'presencing' or 'arising'.²⁸

The Confucian emphasis on *shu*, or reciprocity, is central to this conception of the self. The self is created in a reciprocal set of relationships that define the person in the act of interaction with others. *De* is also crucial in this regard, since "When *de* is cultivated and accumulated such that the particular is integrated efficaciously into its environ-

ments, the distinction between *dao* and *de* as field and focus collapses and the individuating capacity of *de* is transformed into its integrating capacity.²⁹ This means that the very act of engaging in the world as an individual is done in such a way in the Chinese context that the individual is immediately submerged into the totality.

The Chinese tradition thus contains nothing comparable to Europe's or India's deep interest in the mind, at least until Indian Buddhism makes an impact on China, and certainly nothing like Cartesian or Nyaya dualism even then.

Correlative thinking: One can divide scholars of Chinese mentality into groups: those who believe that correlative thinking is characteristic of much of the Chinese philosophic tradition and as such distinguishes it from Western thought, such as Ames, Hall and Granet, and those who believe that it is simply a early form of reasoning that is eventually left behind with the increasing sophistication of thought.

These thinkers, such as Graham and Bodde, believe that in the classical period correlative thinking is mostly limited to diviners and physicians and absent from the philosophic tradition from Confucius to Han Fei. Graham traces the influence of correlative thinking from 240 BCE in Lu-shih ch'un-ch'iu (Mr. Lu's Springs and Autumns) to its dominance in cosmological, scientific and proto-scientific fields such as medicine, biology, alchemy and geomancy from the collapse of the Han in CE 220 to the beginning of the twentieth century.³⁰ Interestingly, most scholars believe correlative thinking is at least present in other traditions, such as Western and Indian, and in some instances is still active today.

Graham, taking a universalist stance, sees the distinction between correlative and causal thinking as one between proto-scientific and modern scientific thought (Graham, 1989, p.320). Ames, Hall and Granet see the distinction as one between cultural traditions, namely China and the West. Hall and Ames write, "Our view, however, is that Marcel Granet was essentially correct in identifying what we are here calling correlative thinking with a fundamental commitment of the Chinese sensibility."³¹ The key question then is whether correlative thinking is simply an earlier form of reasoning that gives way to modern causal thinking or whether it is a distinctive "Chinese" mode of mentality. In this paper I side with Hall, Ames and Granet, for I believe they have made the more convincing argument.

The key difference between Hall and Ames on the one hand, and Graham on the other, is in their understanding of correlative thinking.

Graham bases his notion on the structuralist theory of Levi-Strauss, while Hall and Ames utilize a more informal interpretation of correlative thinking. The key to correlative thinking, according to Hall and Ames, is the employment of aesthetic over logical senses of order.³² In fact, Hall and Ames believe this is precisely where Graham goes wrong, for by imposing Levi-Strauss' structuralist interpretation of the correlative first explained by Granet, he violates the very premise of aesthetic relatedness that is essential to Chinese correlative.³³

What then is meant by the idea of correlative thinking? A.C. Graham's approach to the idea of correlative thinking has set the stage for the key arguments, so it is best to begin with him. Graham draws upon the work of Levi-Strauss, who formalized the idea of correlative as it was explained by Marcel Granet in his *La pensee' chinoise*. Graham, following Levi-Strauss, distinguishes between metaphorical relations, or relations of similarity and metonymic relations, or relations of part and whole or temporal connectivity. He also distinguishes between paradigmatic (similarity and contrast) and syntagmatic (contiguity and remoteness) relations. Graham explains these terms with the following sets of informal equations: Day/Night = Light/Darkness is paradigmatic and grounded in metaphor while Day/Light =Night/Darkness is syntagmatic and grounded in metonymic contiguity.

In the paradigmatic relation, day compares with night as light *compares* with darkness. In the syntagmatic, day *connects* with light as night connects with darkness. Graham uses the comparison of kings and lions to correspond with men and beasts, thus yielding the metaphor of kings as lions among men and the lion as king of beasts. Metonymically, monarchy can be associated with thrones and chairmanship with chairs. In an unrationalized lifeworld, the associations also take on a moral character. Night and darkness are associated with evil while light and day are associated with goodness. As Graham puts it, "the distinguishing of oppositions is guided by desire and aversion," as one would expect before the forms of thought are rationalized and morality, science and art are separated.

The benefit of this way of thinking is that "someone thinking correlative is satisfied not only of what to expect but of what to approve and disapprove; values appear self-evident."³⁴ Applying these distinctions to Chinese thinking, Graham believes he has found a rigorous method for understanding the systems of classification contained in *yin-yang* cosmologies, the *Book of Changes* and the various numerological

classifications that abound in Chinese cosmology.

Hall and Ames believe that Graham's formalization of correlativity serves to undermine the possibility of understanding it in its Chinese sense. They think of it as "a non-logical procedure in the sense that it is not based upon natural kinds, part-whole relations, an implicit or explicit theory of types, or upon causal implications or entailments of anything like the sort one finds in Aristotelian or modern Western logics."³⁵ Correlative thinking operates instead with analogies that employ image clusters and metaphors that would be regarded as ambiguous, vague or even incoherent in formal thinking.

In the West, the formalization of thought was initiated by Aristotle and carried on via his enormous influence in the subsequent Western tradition. China had no Aristotle. Instead, China operates from the beginning with a mode of thinking that explains an item or event by placing it "within a scheme organized in terms of analogical relations among the items selected for the scheme," and then reflects, and acts in terms of, the suggestiveness of these relations. "Correlative thinking involves the association of image- or concept-clusters related by meaningful disposition rather than physical causation"³⁶ or logical relationships.

"Correlative thinking investigates the "concrete items of immediate feeling, perception, and imagination related in aesthetic or mythopoetic terms,"³⁷ and associates concrete items, usually without recourse to any supramundane realm. This reference to the supramundane is interesting since it was Needham's contention that the idea of laws of nature as they evolved in the West ultimately derived from the idea of a divine law-giver, who lays down both natural laws for the regulation of human society, and laws of nature for the regulation of the natural world.

Needham writes: "One of the oldest notions of western civilization was that just as earthly imperial lawgivers enacted codes of positive law, to be obeyed by men, so also the celestial and supreme rational creator deity had laid down a series of laws which must be obeyed by minerals, crystals, plants, animals and the stars in their courses."³⁸

Needham believes that while the Chinese developed the idea of natural laws, they failed to develop the idea of laws of nature precisely because they did not have the idea of a creative divinity.³⁹ Thus one of the key ideas, the idea of laws of nature, that contributed to the creation of formalistic and causal thought in the West was not available to the Chinese. Instead of causal thinking or logical analysis, China utilized correlative thought, which related image or concept clusters in terms of

their meaningful dispositions. Accidental analogies based on human interests are all that are available if one has no recourse to laws of nature, and their ultimate terminus, creative divinity. Ames and Hall support this view by noting that in Book 10 of Plato's *Laws*, Plato argues that "without the guarantee of a guiding, ordering intelligence, the world would be left to its own immanent devices and order would be accidental."⁴⁰

It is important to note that Hall and Ames do not limit correlative thinking to analogies. Hall and Ames believe that in Western thinking "all the principal types of argument—analytic, dialectical and analogical—have been rationalized."⁴¹ Hall and Ames, in turn, believe that analytic, dialectical and analogical reasoning can all take on a correlative cast. Both casts of thought are present in both traditions, indeed in all cultures, but the Chinese give priority to the correlative while the West gives priority to causal thinking. The view that correlative thinking is merely an early pre-logical or pre-scientific form of reasoning is a result of viewing correlative thought from the perspective of causal thinking. If we begin instead from the perspective of correlative thought we realize the interdependence of the two modes. Ames and Hall point out how concepts like matter and cosmos were originally the result of correlative thinking.⁴² Beginning as lumber (matter) and housekeeping/cosmetics/military organization (cosmos), these concepts were originally the result of aesthetic association and only later became rationalized into a logical and scientific mode.

Correlative thinking is best suited to "process" understandings of the world, while causal thinking better accommodates "substance" views. We have already seen the importance of the lack of substance metaphysics for understanding the Chinese idea of the self, but the significance goes beyond conceptions of self. 'Material cause accounts destroy the sense of process by substituting static entities for transformative events.

Process is then reduced either to the translation of matter through space or alterations in the material constitution of the complex."⁴³ Thus if our beginning point is causation we are inevitably led to substance. The reverse is also true. If we begin with substances, particularly with atomism, and add the assumption of the priority of rest over motion, we are led to understand process in terms of the rearrangement of complex items via causation.

The priority of rest and the need for causal explanation also lends support to the idea of a divine creativity that initiates motion as well as

the more general notion of transcendence.

Further, Hall and Ames believe that both western and Chinese mentality are contingent in that they could have turned out differently. I have already mentioned the importance of Aristotle, but even before Aristotle, if the West had developed the Heraclitian and Anaxagoran understandings of process and continuity instead of Parmenidean notions of being and rest and the Pythagorean mysticism of number it may have taken a more Chinese path into the future, for good or ill. If China had taken a more Mohist path, or if it had been influenced more by metaphysical concerns earlier in its history, it might have done more in the areas of theoretical science.

Together, the discussions of the Chinese concept of mind and the Chinese mode of correlative thinking give us a basis for an approach to the idea of Chinese mentality. These discussions show that large areas of the Chinese conceptual landscape are shaped rather differently than that of the West and India. Both India and the West operate with a Cartesian view of the mind-body distinction and thus a whole set of issues arise that play a relatively small role in Chinese intellectual history. The Augustinian tortured soul's self-reflection upon its sinfulness is simply not possible in the Chinese context. The same holds true of correlative thinking. The Western and Indian focus on abstract "being" is not of great concern to Chinese thinkers, whose thought is much more concrete. The Chinese are not interested in the reductionism that so often concerns Western thinkers. Although there is certainly more to Chinese mentality than certain views of the mind and ways of thinking, these two issues are sufficiently central to the cultural self-understanding that we are justified in basing civilizational distinctions upon them.

These key differences between China on the one hand, and the West and India on the other are useful to the scholar interested in comparative civilization. The comparativist requires difference in order to individuate and describe civilizations. If area specialists seem to concur on the broad outlines of Chinese mentality, then this concurrence can be utilized by the comparativist for his or her purposes. A comparativist wants to know what is universal and what is particular in the human thought. This paper makes it clear that correlative thinking, although common to all cultures up to a point, is distinctive of Chinese thought. This paper also makes it clear that Western and Indian dualism is not applicable to Chinese culture.

There is still the question concerning the relative importance of Chinese mentality in relation to Chinese civilization. Civilizationists are

always concerned with boundaries, but they generally focus on geographic boundaries. But there is another sort of boundary, the boundary of thought. Mentality can be a useful way of characterizing a civilization if it is sufficiently distinct from other mentalities to enable us to draw fairly clear lines of demarcation between them. If not, we must turn to more subtle differences, such as style or relative emphasis. If clear lines can be drawn, then we are led to ask if these core differences in mentality have an effect on other areas of the culture in question.

The exploration of the relationship of Chinese concepts of mind and modes of thinking to other important areas of culture, such as science, poetry, painting, music and so on is beyond this paper, but it is my hunch that we will find that there are, in fact, deep resonances across the whole spectrum of Chinese culture that ultimately come down to one of these two key aspects of Chinese mentality.

The treatment of correlativity, for example, allows us to understand the genius of the two traditions. With causal thinking ascendant, the West was poised to make great strides in the realm of science. With correlative thinking dominant, with its constant reference to the social order, China achieved a social and cultural stability found nowhere in the West.

Beyond the task of comparing civilizations, explorations of this type into mentality can lead us to comparisons that are implicitly critical of one or both traditions. Westerners can be made more aware of their connectedness to the other people around them. The Chinese, on the other hand, can be made to see the usefulness of a higher valuation of the individual. The identification of broad differences can teach both sides new ways of thinking about things. There is a reciprocity involved in the study of mentality. When we get clearer about the other we also become clearer about ourselves.

NOTES

- ¹ See, for example, "Mentalitie or Cultural System: A Reply to Sheila Fitzpatrick," *Russian Review*, Vol.58, No.2 (Apr., 1999), 210.
- ² Hajime Nakamura, *Ways of Thinking of Eastern Peoples*, East-West Center Press, 1964.
- ³ David L. Hall and Roger Ames, *Thinking from the Han*, SUNY Press, 1998, is just one of their several works on Chinese mentality.
- ⁴ See, for example, Lucien Febvre, *The Problem of Unbelief in the 16th Century: The Religion of Rabelais*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985.

- ³ Stephen Schwartz, *The World of Thought in Ancient China*, Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1985.
- ⁶ Edward Said, *Orientalism*, New York: Vintage Books, 1979.
- ⁷ Cited by Georges Duby in his preface to the re-edition of Marc Bloch's *Apologie pour l'histoire* (Paris: A Colin, 1974).
- ⁸ Nakamura, 5.
- ⁹ Nakamura, 11.
- ¹⁰ Andre Burguiere, "The Fate of the History of Mentalities in the Annales," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol.24, No.3. (July, 1982), 430.
- ¹¹ See Kisor Chakrabarti's *Classical Indian Philosophy of Mind: the Nyaya Dualist Tradition*. SUNY Press, 1999.
- ¹² See Jonardon Ganeri's *Philosophy in Classical India: The Proper Work of Reason*, Routledge, 2001.
- ¹³ Hall and Ames, *Anticipating China*, SUNY Press, 1995, xiv.
- ¹⁴ *Anticipating China*, xvi.
- ¹⁵ See Kisor Chakrabarti's *Classical Indian Philosophy of Mind: the Nyaya Dualist Tradition*. SUNY Press, 1999 and my own, "Indian and Western Philosophy of Mind," *Journal for Study of Indian Philosophy and Religion*, 2005.
- ¹⁶ Gernet, 1985, p.147.
- ¹⁷ Ch'u Tz'u. *Songs of the South*, trans. David Hawkes (Boston: Beacon Press, 1962) 104.
- ¹⁸ Ying-Shih Yu. "'O Soul, Come Back!' A Study in the Changing Conceptions of The Soul and Afterlife in Pre-Buddhist China," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, Vol.47, No.2 (Dec., 1987).
- ¹⁹ Ch'u Tz'u, 104.
- ²⁰ Ying-Shih Yü. "O Soul, Come Back!" 372.
- ²¹ Daniel K. Gardner. "Ghosts and Spirits in the Sung Neo-Confucian World: Chi Hsi on kuei-shen," *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, Vol.115, No.4 (Oct.-Dec., 1995) 606.
- ²² Herbert Fingarette, *Confucius: The Secular as Sacred*, New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1972.
- ²³ Benjamin Schwartz. "Review of Disputers of the Tao" in *China and*

Other Matters (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1996) 144.

- ²⁴ Schwartz, *China and Other Matters*, 145-6.
- ²⁵ *Thinking From the Han*, 23.
- ²⁶ *Thinking From the Han*, 24.
- ²⁷ *Thinking From the Han*, 43.
- ²⁸ *Thinking From the Han*, 40.
- ²⁹ *Thinking From the Han*, 40.
- ³⁰ See Bodde's brief summary of Graham's history of correlative thinking in *China. Chinese Thought, Society, and Science: The Intellectual and Background of Science and Technology in Pre-modern China*, 1991, University of Hawaii Press, 103.
- ³¹ Hall and Ames, *Anticipating China: Thinking Through the Narratives of Chinese and Western Culture*, Albany: SUNY Press, 1995, 257.
- ³² *Anticipating China*, 257.
- ³³ *Anticipating China* (AC), 141.
- ³⁴ A.C. Graham, *Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China*, LaSalle, Illinois; Open Court Publishing, 1989, 321-2.
- ³⁵ AC, 124.
- ³⁶ AC, 124-5.
- ³⁷ AC, 124.
- ³⁸ Joseph Needham, *Science and Civilization in China*, II, 518, quoted in Bodde, 300.
- ³⁹ SCC, II, 582, in Bodde.
- ⁴⁰ AC 129. The passage referred to is 889-890, *The Collected Dialogues of Plato*, Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (eds.), 1961,
- ⁴¹ AC, 129.
- ⁴² AC, 136-7.
- ⁴³ AC, 138.