Islam in Turkey and Modernization: The Tanzimat Period

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Introduction

Westerners with a tradition of separation of church and state often have difficulty in seeing Islam as both a religion and a civilization. The West has defined modernization as including state bureaucracy, urbanization, industrialization, mass media, role of women, mass economic development, mass education, all-encompassing technology and, most recently, information processing. It also includes the tradition of secularism, which is anathema to many Muslims, even those who espouse other aspects of modernity.

Islam emphasizes universal truth that transcends historical events and individual ethnic events. There is no difference in the "verbatim word of god" between text and context. There may be differences in political, legal, philosophical, and theological interpretations, but basic adherence to the main precepts in the Quran and the Haditha (the sayings of the Prophet) remain.¹

Finally, Islam contains prescriptions on commerce, law, government, and even etiquette. Other aspects of culture such as art, architecture, music, and dress have distinctive religious overtones. Until the last two centuries, there was no separation between religious law and civil/criminal law. The oneness of church and state was typified by the Sharia—the divine law of Islam that covered all ethical, legal, social, and ritualistic aspects of society. There were five schools of interpretation: the Maliki, Hanafi, Shafii, and Hanabali, by the majority Sunni and the Jafari followed by the Shia. The differences among these schools were minimal. All followers of Islam belonged to a religious/legal/political community called the umma. As a result, Islam permeated the social institutions of society—economic, political, educational, and political — in Turkey as elsewhere.²

The waqf (religious endowments) created and maintained mosques, hospitals, sanitariums, homes for the elderly, hospitality homes for religious pilgrims, meditation centers, wells, fountains, bridges, roads, and many other public works. However, its most important function has always been educational. Before reforms associated with moderniza-
tion in the 19th century, endowments (income from the religious tax) supported educational institutions from the elementary Quranic schools in the mosques to the higher educational madrassahs which tended to resemble medieval western universities. Even today, the waqfs, although registered by the secular government in Turkey, fund many educational institutions.

The Quran and Haditha regulated business. They dictated the appointment of officials; governed weights and measures; oversaw market transactions; and forbade the use of interest or usury. However, a differential rate was levied between Muslims and protected non-Muslims (dhimmis). It authorized the establishment of an official money-lender. The various crafts or guilds had specific masters who taught apprentices not only techniques, but also moral and spiritual principles related to the production of the object. These principles derived from the Islamic precept that all objects produced had some aesthetic and divine purpose—even everyday objects. These goods produced by craft guilds were part of one harmonic existence as part of the supreme art of perfecting the soul and bringing it close to Allah. Specific laws identified with the Quranic law schools governed fishing, farming, and shipping, as well as bills of exchange, liability, and investment. The shayk-al-Islam was put in charge of the business endeavors. However, all religious laws were interpreted by the ulema (religious scholars).

Islam also influenced military and political institutions. Islam permitted the slavery of non-believers and slave armies such as the Mameluks, who ruled Egypt, and, for a time, Syria, first directly, and then under Ottoman Turkish overlordship, until the early 19th century. In the 14th century, the Ottoman Turkish ruler took advantage of this Islamic ruling to initiate the practice of devisirme. Youths from Christian communities would be taken at a young age and trained as elite soldiers and administrators. These "new troops" or janissaries became the backbone of the Ottoman military. Although technically slaves and the property of the sultan, they could convert to Islam and thereby gain legal status. Often, they rose to the rank of the commander or high administrator, and a few rose to the position of Grand Vizier, or Prime Minister.

The legality of this system was based on the prohibition of enslaving free-born Muslims. The recruitment of the janissaries was permitted by the religious scholars in lieu of the poll-tax on non-believers. However prisoners of war, as non-free people who came from the world
outside of Islam, could be recruited as soldiers.\footnote{4}

Finally, political institutions derived from Quranic authority. Islam did not differentiate between politics and religion. Muhammad and his immediate successors were religious and political leaders. The concept of a political/legal/religious community under a single leader existed from the time of Muhammad. Allah was the ultimate ruler of the Muslim community and the Prophet, Muhammad, was the representative of the supreme deity. His successors, the Caliphs, first in Damascus under the Ummayads (660-750) and then in Baghdad under the Abbasids (750-1258), were the vice-regents of the Prophet, at least for the Sunni majority.

The Shia minority, however, saw the descendants of Muhammad’s son-in-law, Ali, the fourth caliph) as the head of Islam and did not regard any Caliphs not of the direct line of the Prophet as legitimate. They considered themselves entitled to promulgate the Divine Law and appoint judges to the Sharia courts. Over time, the military power of the Caliphs at Baghdad diminished and local rulers assumed political and military power. Thereupon Sunni jurists developed the theory that even though the caliph remained the symbol of Muslim unity for the rule under Sharia law, the secular ruler, or Sultan in Turkey, could exercise military/political power in order to maintain public order and protect the borders of the Islamic world.

With the fall of the Abbasid order in 1258 C.E., the relatively recent Ottoman Turkish Sultan assumed the office of the Caliphate so as to legitimate his authority among the Sunni majority of his Muslim subjects.\footnote{5}

Nevertheless, the ulema, waqf, and janissaries were to be traditional barriers to the development of a modern bureaucratic state, including the modernized army, civil and criminal law, secular education, and modern economic development, because they represented the central message of Islam that Allah ruled and good Muslims must submit to him in all matters both temporal and spiritual. To remove these barriers to modernity was the object of the Tanzimat movement that culminated in the years of 1839-76.

The Turkish background

Turkey has had an indigenous and evolving approach to modernization. The attempts at modernization via Western influences through the years can be divided into distinct eras: before 1800; the 19th century; the Young Turk period of 1908-1920; and the period since 1920.
Unlike polyglot Iran and the more homogeneous Egypt, for example, modern Turkish identity has not been as closely aligned with Islam. The nearly 50 percent of non-Farsi speakers in Iran profess Islam, whereas there are groups in Egypt, such as the Copts which represent 10 percent of the population, that follow the Christian Orthodox religion. In contrast to Egypt and Iran, the only challenge to the Turkish sense of nationalism is the Kurdish movement, which represents 20 percent of Turkey’s population. Therefore, with fewer divergent tendencies, another option exists to reinforce Turkish consciousness apart from Islam. Among the majority of Turks, Islam is more a matter of faith to be honored and personal identity than a determinant of national identity.

Unlike significant segments of the population in both Iran and Egypt, the majority of Turks do not view Islam as the reason for the country’s glorious past. They have evolved an identity that stems from 19th century efforts to reinvent a pre-Islamic period. The doors to Turkey’s past have also been with the state, in this case, the Ottoman Empire. Although Islamic, this state viewed the Turks as a separate group. Modern Turkey has, therefore, adapted an autonomous identity that embraces Islam, rather than Islam embracing the state identity.

The melding of modernization derived from the West and the Turkish identity is particularly ironic. Whereas Iran and Egypt have used Islam as a shield to resist Western influences, including modernization, Turkey views the latter as enhancing the Turkish identity. Unlike Iran and Egypt, the Turks have used Western tinged modernization, not as a post-Islamic mechanism, but as a tool for their own purposes.

The rediscovery of pre-Islamic national identity in Turkey began during the cosmopolitan Ottoman Empire of the 15th-19th centuries. Since the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire sought to define itself not only through Islam, but also through the secular authority of a Sultan, as well as a Caliph based in the capital as a religious leader. After Turkey became a republic in 1923, it was important to establish national identity in terms of unique Turkish characteristics. The Turks wanted to distinguish themselves from both the Arabs and the Persians, since they had relied on aspects of the Arab language and the Persian culture after conversion to Islam in the 10th century. In order to break with the imperial past, Turkey had to develop a new identity and sense of nationalism. Westernization reinforced this development since it promoted the nation-state and the concept of civic participation.
There are other factors that worked to encourage Turkish efforts toward modernization. One was the view that modernization would serve to support Turkish independence. Secondly, the Turkish struggle for freedom as an independent country was not confused with establishing a new entity based on Turkish ethnicity. Further, Turkey had a tradition of interacting with the Western world for more than three centuries. Modern influences imported through the West were not forced upon Turkey; in fact, they were sought by Turkey in order to maintain power during the Ottoman period.

As Turkey continued to adapt Western ideas, nationalistic influences from Europe, where many Turks studied, began to develop pan-Turkism or pan-Turanism—similar to the pan-Germanic and pan-Slavic movements during the 19th century. Nationalists, led by Kemal Ataturk, fought for the integrity of Turkey against the attempt of the allies to divide Turkey into spheres of influence after World War I. These nationalists considered Turkey to be a discrete territory, and defined their people as pre-Ottoman ethnic Turks by virtue of language and customs. As a result, a primordial Central Asian connection, eventually termed pan-Turanism, was prompted that combined with the concept of a state coterminous with the Anatolian or the Asia Minor land mass. Patriotism and nationalism became identified with territory not an ideology, let alone a religious one.

Although Turkey has a vigorous Islamic identity, it has developed an alternative tradition rooted in geography, politics and history. Turkey has long ago made a distinction between church and state; it recognizes the role of faith, but expresses its identity in secular terms.

Turkey is located between the two worlds of Europe and Asia with the Straits of the Bosporus connecting these continents. Turkey in Asia has often been governed by Turkey in Europe, even though Turkey in Europe has only 12,000 square miles, but it does include the former capital city of Istanbul (called Constantinople until 1919). In chronological terms, the Turkish Empire took over from the Byzantine Empire that lasted from 395 B.C. to 1453 A.D. Many patterns in this predominantly Greek Orthodox Empire continued under the Muslim Ottomans after 1453, particularly with regard to local and provincial administrative divisions where Greek was the primary language, such as in the Balkans and parts of Anatolia and along the Aegean and Black Sea coasts. Thus, elements of Western tradition as a conduit for change were becoming evident even during the Ottoman Empire.

Accordingly, many officials and many soldiers in the Ottoman
Empire were European. The linkage between Europe and Asia Minor goes back several millennia. Although Turkish is part of a different language family than the Indo-European, the early people arrived via the Caucasus, as did the earlier Aryan invasions into the Middle and Near East. The Turkish heartland, the Anatolian landmass, has been the destination of many people coming from the steppes of current day Russia through the turnstile of the Caucasus and through the Black Sea into Eastern Anatolia and the Iranian Plateau. Historically, these areas have been connecting links between the Eurasian landmass and Europe. There was significant intermarriage between existing Christian populations in both Anatolia and the Balkans, as well as a fair amount of conversion by Europeans to Islam in both of the above areas.

The extended character of interactions with the West also promoted an open attitude to modernization by Turkey. Turkish advances into Europe took place from the end of the 14th century to the end of the 17th century. Moreover, intermittent warfare with European powers and the Ottoman Empire exposed the latter to innovations to military reforms and related technology.

Last, it should be noted that as has been shown in the various works of Edward Said, as well as in other writers on traditional religions, the "Orientalist view" which characterized non-European faiths as exotic, obscure, backward, sometimes threatening, and impervious to change is not a complete picture. This monolithic view of Islam as the opposite of modernization is, as in most generalizations, subject to revision in regard to local cultures and societies. As will be shown, this has been the case with Turkey. This paper will concentrate on the period between 1839 and 1876 known as the Tanzimat period or "the restructuring" era.

Precursors to Tanzimat

The 19th century saw greater changes as Turkey became more involved with what was the status quo of Europe. Although periods of reform, such as the Tulip Era and the early years of Sultan Selim III (1789-1807), were followed by conservative reaction, a new era of reform began between 1808 and 1826, in part because the Ottoman Empire felt threatened by rebellious European provinces and by Egypt under Mohammad Ali. In 1826, mercenaries (or janissaries) were suppressed and a regular army with an official code of regulations was established. A medical school and a military school were established in 1834. By 1840, the first grammar school and music school were opened. During the early 1840s, texts began to be translated into
The government also began to centralize with a bureau being appointed to survey the Empire. The first census was taken in 1831, and a land survey was consequently conducted.

Perhaps the most significant social change in Turkey during the 1830s was the abolition of feudalism. Turkey was similar to medieval Europe in one respect; military officers were given land on which to live in return for service. By the beginning of the 19th century, much of the land was allocated to religious organizations and therefore untaxable. Turkey abolished this practice in 1831 in order to recover the lands. This action proved very costly because the people who held these lands had to be compensated. This abolition marked the end of the feudal system in Turkey.

Other reforms were instituted that served to accelerate the modernization process. The Islamic religious foundations and revenues were separated and placed under the control of the Sultan (which paralleled the assumption of land confiscated from the medieval church by the monarchs in early modern Europe during the period of 1500-1700). These revenues and foundations were gradually directed to the state rather than to religious organizations. It was clearly an effort by the state to establish control over the church. Other reforms involved transportation and communication. Between 1830 and 1850, Turkey modernized its roads, started to construct railways, and began to encourage newspapers. The first newspaper (in French) was established in 1831. A Turkish language paper was founded in 1832, followed by other newspapers in the 1840s.

The Tanzimat period and its immediate aftermath

The period between 1839 and 1876 is known as the Tanzimat (restructuring) period. The significance of this era is that the initiative for modernization came from government officials with the compliance of the sultan. The charter issued at the beginning of the period sanctioned equality of all citizens—Muslim and non-Muslim—before the law, and no punishment without trial (due process). The power of the ruler to execute a subject and confiscate his property at the ruler's whim was ended. Tax-farming was abolished. During this period, the Great Powers of Europe were often involved by the reformers to serve as a brake in case the sultan of the day swerved from reform.

Bureaucratic efforts continued to strengthen, and, in the 1840s, separate ministries of education and justice were put in place to oversee the legal and educational systems in the country. Other departments were
also established during this period, including the department of transportation, the department of interior security, and the department of finance. By 1840, there was a Prime Minister in charge of the cabinet. Other social and cultural reforms took place during the early to middle of the 19th century. A high council of justice was established as an adjunct to the justice department to supervise judicial appointments. In addition, independent commissions similar to the American Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and Federal Trade Commission were put in place to assume economic regulatory powers.

Although the traditional Islamic legal code still existed, a separate legal department that administered civil justice began to function in 1840. The council of justice was joined by another council in 1854, the High Council of Reform, which had the power to legislate in matters of civil, penal, and commercial and maritime law. An assembly of notables was also initiated during this period; the purpose of the assembly was to present ideas to the prime minister subject to the approval of the sultans.23

Further reforms were realized in the 1850s and 1860s. In 1861, land tenure was reformed so that cultivators acquired the right to own land, as well as the right to derive revenue when leasing land. A civil code was enacted in 1870 and another one in 1876 that enabled the establishment of secular courts and courts of appeal.24 In 1876, a constitution was formally adopted that called for a permanent assembly of notables, as well as a lower house and an upper senate. Unfortunately, this action was not well received; during a revolution in 1878 this reform was abolished.25 Nevertheless, progress had been made, and modernization and Westernization of Turkey was well on its way.

The major developments during the Tanzimat period were the weakening of the forces representative of traditional Islam—the military, the religious endowments, and the clergy (ulema), and the rise of a critical mass of reformers within and without the government committed unequivocally to modernization. The fewest changes made were to the military. The emphasis here was on a movement away from traditional influences including religious-sanctioned recruitment.

During the Tanzimat period, the Ministry of War, established in 1827, was placed under a civilian. The army was initially composed of 12,000 men (later expanded to 65,000) who were stationed at the capital and divided into eight sections. The soldiers served for periods of 12 years. In 1845, police functions were placed under a separate department. In addition, the School for Military Sciences founded in the pre-
The Tanzimat period (1834) was expanded and a preparatory school for children became a part of the school.26

However, it was in the religious domains of the religious endowments and the clergy, specifically in education and the legal system, that the great movement from the sectarian to the secular took place. The madrassahs (including the quranic and mosque schools) were supported by the endowments and staffed by the religious scholars and were usually conducted in Arabic. However, even before the Tanzimat, the newly established Board of Useful Affairs had suggested a separate department of primary and secondary education under the direct control of the government.

As part of these suggestions in the late 1830s, endowment revenues were diverted more and more often for state purposes during the Tanzimat period and afterward.27 In 1846, a report recommended a system of non-religious government-run primary and secondary schools. A permanent Council on Public Instruction came into existence in 1846, and a Ministry of Public Schools (1846-1856) was followed by the Ministry of Education in 1856. Instruction in the proposed public schools was to be in Turkish and emphasize technical and scientific subjects.28

The movement to modernization was implicit in the enabling law or edict of 1839, which officially ushered in the Tanzimat Era. This decree tacitly drew a line between the religious and the temporal in public affairs and indicated that there should be true equality under the law between Muslims and non-Muslims in the other recognized religious/ethnic communities (millets). In fact, the ulema continued to offer education through the madrasahs.29

Nevertheless, educational institutions began operations, starting with schools for adolescent boys from 10 to 15.30 By the early 1860s, several secular secondary schools were in operation. Teacher training normal schools for boys (1846) and girls (1870) were begun. The existing professional training schools in areas such as engineering, music, and military science saw their curriculum offerings increase to include secular subjects at post-secondary levels.31

By the 1860s, both the Ministry of Education and the military encouraged local authorities to fund secular elementary and secondary educational units. The so-called children’s schools (elementary schools) became quite common in the 1870s, backed by the Ministry of Education, while the army used the extant adolescent boys’ schools to add elementary sections and then started new middle schools and new
Elementary schools, whether as part of the madrassah networks or as secular schools, were made mandatory in 1869. Villages of 500 households were to have public elementary education units with separate schools for boys and girls and for Muslims and non-Muslims, if the affected areas were sufficiently heterogeneous in nature. The schools had lessons in religion (appropriate to the students) in Turkish, Arabic, or Persian; arithmetic and accounting; mathematics, geometry, world and Ottoman history, and geography; and the most important language of the area (since elementary could be through the early teens, some of these subjects such as accounting or geometry were meant to be related to professional training).

Middle schools were to be established in towns or cities of 1,000 households or more and were to be three years of instruction. The curriculum include Turkish and French, logic, economics, geography, world and Ottoman history, mathematics, algebra, accounting, physical sciences, and lower draftsmanship. Senior secondary schools were to be placed in provincial capitals and had to accept all graduates of middle schools. Because these schools charged tuition, only the wealthier families could afford them. Nevertheless, a very good student could attend on scholarship. The curriculum included humanities, Arabic, Persian, French, economics, international law, history, logic, engineering, algebra, trigonometry, all sciences, and land surveying.

The emphasis on the pragmatic so evident from the above was reinforced in the new and newly-enlarged technical training colleges by the 1870s. By the 1870s, The War School, the Civil Services School, the General Staff School, the Army Engineering School, the Naval Engineering School, the Imperial School of Medicine, and the Civilian Medical School all had concentrations in additional to their named purpose in the humanities, social sciences, and foreign languages so as to prepare for professions outside of the official designation in areas such as law, diplomacy, and architecture.

By the end of the Tanzimat era, the opportunity for education on a non-sectarian and non-class basis had expanded, in keeping with premise of equality for all. Both elementary and trade schools were made available to orphans and poor boys. Trade schools were opened to retrain adults. Muslim adults were given continuing and adult educations in Istanbul. In 1873, a free secondary school was established for Muslim orphans. The Ministry of Education established provincial educational councils which disbursed money for buildings, teacher salaries,
books, and libraries. Under the Public Education Law of 1868, teachers were certified, as were lessons, curriculum, and texts.

This certification applied to the numerous foreign missionary elementary and secondary schools which were established in the 1860s and 1870s. By the 1890s, over 90 percent of all school aged boys and over one-third of school-age girls were attending elementary school. By that time, secular elementary and secondary school attendance including non-Muslims outnumbered madrassah attendance especially in the cities. Even though the religious endowment system remained active in charitable affairs, it was no longer dominant in education.

The clergy which had staffed the religiously endowed schools found itself weakened in other areas. The increasing bureaucratization (the totality of government officials) was called the Porte after 1838. The clergy lost their previous financial and administrative autonomy to government agencies. The appointment of teachers and control of educational institutions passed eventually to the Ministry of Education. Between 1840 and 1876, the appointment of judges and administration of law passed under the overall control of the Ministry of Justice, including aspects of religious law.

As early as the 1840s, for instance, the issuance of religious decrees (fatwas) was conferred upon legal specialists appointed by the government. The head of Islam, or Grand Mufti in the Ottoman Empire, was appointed by the government and limited to an advisory role. Ultimately, the upper clergy were co-opted by the government, and a subsequent gulf opened between the upper and lower clergy. The lower clergy, especially in the countryside, considered themselves the last bulwark of religious tradition.

It was the emergence of a critical mass of intellectuals in the latter years of the Tanzimat period that facilitated the tradition that Turkey was a country where modernization was not to be considered in total opposition to Islam. The Young Ottomans from the 1860s posited that modernization could derive from Islam. They forwarded the belief that the political theory found in the Quran and related writing such as the Haditha provided the strongest basis for freedom of the individual.

The Quran came from Allah, they said, and therefore was the ultimate source of government for all members of the Muslim community. It was a component of submission (the literal meaning of the word “Islam”) and an integral part of the covenant between Allah and man. The successors of Muhammad (the caliphs) had exercised two functions defined by the Almighty: the executive and legislative. The interpreta-
tion of the law, or judicial function, was exercised by the clergy as scholars of Islamic law. The civilian/military rulers, however, according to the Young Ottomans, sought to centralize all powers under their control. The ulema, in this point of view, could be viewed as a bulwark against the unduly secular lawmaking of the Ottoman sultans in the 19th century, especially as it felt its own power threatened by temporal powers in the Turkish Muslim states.  

Turkish rulers, including the reforming sultans during the Tanzimat period, based their ability to make laws or interpret legal situations on the Muslim concept of Urf. Urf stated that if the Sharia did not provide a solution to an existing problem, the ruler could make or interpret a rule in such a way as to develop a secular law. In this fashion, Turkish rulers including the Ottoman ruler began to execute all types of legislative acts beyond the specifications of the Quran or the Sharia, especially in the realms of administrative and criminal law.

Ultimately, by the end of the Tanzimat, only matters of private law, such as inheritance, marriage, and torts, were left to the Sharia and its interpreters (the clergy). The latter viewed the Sultan, or rather the new bureaucracy set up to implement the changes associated with modernization, as imposing a despotism which they construed a threat to the Muslim community. By the 1870s, the Young Ottomans believed that the sharia had been undermined by these “accretions.” They believed that only a truly constitutional regime could reign in the more recent abuses. Accordingly, the welfare of the Muslim community depended on the reinstitution of old safeguards that protected individual members of the community. The new political elites built by some modernizers were not called to account and were conceived as potential tyrants.

The influence of these Young Ottoman reformers eventually led to the revolt of 1876 and the proclamation of a constitution designed to rein in the non-responsive governmental bureaucracy through the popular assembly. The suspension of the constitution in 1878 led to an underground opposition initiated by Young Ottomans in both the military and ulema, which culminated in the Young Turk revolution of 1908. Although that movement ultimately became less democratic and constitutional, the notion had been introduced that true modernization was the spirit of the will of the people, not a few technocratic bureaucrats. Islam and modernization were not necessarily antithetical, especially if the latter occurred without undue Europeanization or westernization.

Although the reign of Abdul Ahmed II (1878-1908) is considered a
period of political reaction, in other respects it continued and expanded
the modernization introduced by the Tanzimat. Telegraph and railroad
construction proceeded apace. A Department of Public Debt was creat-
ed to service loans from abroad and encourage foreign investment in the
infrastructure. An agricultural bank was established in 1888 to provide
credit and loans to small farmers. As a result, cash crops were developed
for export, such as tobacco, figs, cotton, and olives. Industrialization
also proceeded apace.

Although the old Ottoman crafts had been obliterated due to com-
petition from western (primarily British) machine goods, foreign invest-
ment stimulated new industrial enterprises. Between 1845 and 1876,
silk factories, carpet-making plants, flour mills and oil-extraction
plants, canning factories, and paper and glass factories were started, as
well as general textile establishments. These enterprises expanded so
that by the end of the century, there was a small but growing urban class
of artisans and merchants.46

The most important step in modernization was in education; during
this era there was a dramatic increase in schooling, especially in the pro-
liferation of middle and secondary schools, as well as service academies
for military personnel. The availability of these schools provided an
avenue of mobility and advancement for members of the middle and
lower classes. Communications also increased during this era as postal
service increased from 11.5 million to 24.5 million letters and postal
packages between 1888 and 1904. Telephone service began as early as
1881 in the capital city.47

Urban life developed as street and sidewalks were paved and lit
with gaslight. Modern health services were established. Urban admin-
istration—with various service department—was set up as townships
were organized for localities with populations between 5,000 and
10,000 people. Towns with more people gradually came under munici-
pal law, with specific budgets and governing councils. Concurrent
reforms led to schools for civil service as well as civil service reform in
both provinces and municipal areas.48 It is interesting to note that sim-
ilar reforms were being undertaken at the same time in the United States
during the Progressive Era.

Conclusion

Because of reforms during the Tanzimat period, the Turkish polity,
although continuing to pay obeisance to Islam, had developed a series
of civil, economic, judicial, educational, and military institutions. These
marked the increasing influence of modernization and provided a basis for the reforms which were to characterize the 20th century.

NOTES
2 Ibid., pp. 74-78.
4 Ibid., pp. 105-108
8 Held, pp. 464-471.
9 Ibid., pp. 13-35.
13 Berkes, pp. 78-82.
14 Ibid. pp. 89-93.
15 Lewis, pp.81-88,
16 Ibid.
17 Berkes, p.59, passim. Note: the first translation had been in 1750 during the Tulip Era; see also Lewis, p. 346.
18 Lewis, pp. 88-90.
20 Ibid.

Lewis, pp. 100 ff.


See the following texts for the background of these events.


Lewis, pp. 80-81.

Shaw, pp. 44-45.

Lewis, pp. 90-93.

Shaw, pp. 106-107

Ibid. pp. 60-61.

Ibid. pp. 106-117.


Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Consult the following for an overview: Michael Meeker, A Nation of Empire: The Ottoman Legacy of Turkish Modernity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), pp. 58-60. Also, Shaw, p. 111.

Shaw, pp. 112-14.

Ibid.

Ibid.


Lewis, 98.

Mardin, pp. 133-140.

Ibid. pp. 102-103.

Berkes, op. cit.

Mardin. pp. 81-106.
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46Shaw, pp. 241-147.
47Ibid.
48Ibid.

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