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Ricardo K. S. Mak
Hong Kong Baptist University, China

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GLOBAL VISION OF WORLD HISTORY IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA

RICARDO K. S. MAK
HONG KONG BAPTIST UNIVERSITY, CHINA

1. Introduction

According to Malcolm Waters, the 400-year-old term "global" has been used widely only after 1960. Although "globalization" has become a fashionable concept recently, it means different things to different people. Generally, it refers to the growing interconnectedness and deterritorization among nations. In an economic sense globalization dissolves national boundaries that have long restricted capital, labor and technological movement, and creates a global economy dominated by multinational incorporations, long distance trade, foreign direct investment and international division of labor.

For political scientists, globalization is characterized by increasing supra-national activities that weaken the capacity of national governments for settling international disputes and for implementing policies within their sovereign territories. At a time when elite as well as popular cultures are exchanging days and nights in the media- and cyber-world, national cultures founded on particular values, symbols and languages find little place to plant their feet. Even pollution, religious conflicts and many other social issues have become international problems in this global era.

Globalization is in fact the product of a historical process that has been emerging for centuries or even millennia. While economists, sociologists and political scientists deal principally with the product, historians strive rather to explain the historical process. More than 2,000 years ago, ancient Western historians such as Herodotus and Julius Caesar were fascinated by the differences in the cultures they encountered. In tracing the expansion of the Christendom, medieval historians drew different peoples, though mostly Eurasians, into their historical narratives.

While practitioners of Universalgeschichte (universal history) and Weltgeschichte (world history) in early modern Europe, such as Jacques Benigne Bosseut and August Ludwig von Schlosser, limited their focus to the history of European nations, such intellectual leaders of the Enlightenment as Voltaire and Condorcet displayed much greater interest in the manners, customs and mentality of non-European peoples. The penetration of European nations into the areas that today form the
Third World gave rise to the Eurocentric world history writings of the 19th century.\(^5\)

Without a doubt, world history or global history has gained importance in the 20th century because international economic, social, and political movements increase at unprecedented speed. Historians today can no longer avoid the tasks of explaining the world historical process in a macro-analytical manner and of repositioning national histories in a global context. However, the vast study area that covers the human past and present and nations inhabiting the five continents seems too huge for historians to handle.

Historians are themselves cautious. Wolf Schäfer questions: "...it never managed to overcome the doubts of the research historians. If one does not read all the languages of the world— and who does?— and if one has not searched all the archives of the world— and who has?— how can one tell the story of world history professionally?"\(^6\) The veteran historian Peter Stearns proposes to replace the vague term "world history" with comparative studies of societies, but he fails to argue convincingly which societies and which aspects of societies should be selected for comparison.\(^7\)

Apart from the above technical problems, bias is also a problem that few historians can overcome. Western world historians of the last two millennia only covered what they knew; therefore the history of non-Western nations were marginalized. Herodotus' *Historie*, that confined its scope to the war between despotic Persia and the civilized West, gave rather little coverage to nations that were beyond the orbit of Western civilization.

Universal history focusing on the history of Christendom did not cover ancient civilizations like China. Although Hegel's philosophy of history succeeded in building all nations into a single scale of historical development, his bias against the non-Western nations reduced his powerful arguments to a Eurocentric historical scheme.

Marx's in-depth analysis of the expansion of Western capitalism provided a hitherto partly comprehensive framework for the understanding of the emergence of modern Western world. Afro-Asian nations, however, were discussed in his *Capital* for illustrative purposes only. Though disheartened by the decline of Western civilization, Oswald Spengler and Arnold Toynbee never treated non-Western civilizations disinterestedly in their speculative philosophy of history.

To be fair, technical and ideological problems never prevent great historians from working on macro-history that embraces historical
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experiences of different nations. In the 1960s UNESCO encouraged the study of world history by publishing the six-volume *History of Mankind*. Fernand Braudel’s grand system doubtless carries his interpretation of world history. William McNeill’s *The Rise of the West and World History* have been standard textbooks of many relevant courses in American colleges for decades. Immanuel Wallerstein’s world system theory, founded on Marxist concepts such as proletariat revolution and class struggle, still finds supporters in the age of post-communism.

Western historians have come to realize that the writing of a truly global history requires the collaboration of historians from different nations and intellectuals from different disciplines. Braudel, in addition to requesting the aid of geographers, sociologists, economists and psychologists, emphasizes that “...any attempt at a global explanation — like the history of civilizations — needs a more eclectic approach. One must consult many different snapshots of the past, each with its own exposure time, then fuse times and images together, rather as the colours of the solar spectrum, focused together, combine at last into pure white light.” Similarly Geoffrey Barraclough and Ernst Breisach see the construction of a theoretical framework in which different histories can fit as a real challenge for world history. However, it seems that a more fundamental issue is to create a cross-cultural dialogue in which non-Western historians can play a significant part.

World history has become the intellectual pursuit of numerous Chinese historians since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. Confined by an ideological straitjacket and plagued by the lack of experts, world history in China before 1978 merely sought to reconfirm the Soviet Union’s worldview. As a result of continuous political and economic liberalization in the last two decades, Chinese historians are more eager and better equipped to explore the outer world and to redefine China’s position in the world. Embedded in their worldview is a new global vision that has broken with the communist orthodoxy. This paper attempts to explain the development of this new global vision of world history in China since 1978, with reference to the works entitled "world history" given since 1982 in the *Zhongguo Lishixue Nianjian* (Annals of Historical Studies in China), which is the most important bibliography of historical studies in China. I will emphasize the development of the Chinese global vision in the 1990s.

II. Modern Chinese Historians and the World: A Prologue

Aiming at "learning from the barbarians in order to control the bar-
Chinese intellectuals of the mid-nineteenth century began to acquaint themselves with foreign cultures and nations. Scholar-officials such as Wei Yuan (1794-1856) and Lin Zexu (1785-1850), for instance, who became aware of the danger to China from its isolation, strove to gather information about China's enemies and possible allies. In face of the new rising Western civilization, they admitted, though reluctantly, that the so-called "Middle Kingdom" concept that presumed China's material and spiritual superiority had lost its validity. Chinese diplomats and travelers visiting Europe and the USA in the next decades strongly felt that modernity characterized by industrialization, science and individualism was spreading out from the West in different directions. Guo Songtao (1818-1884), Xue Fucheng (1838-1894) and Wang Tao (1828-1897) came to realize that modernization might benefit as well as threaten China. Yan Fu (1854-1921), who translated Huxley's *Evolution and Ethics* into Chinese, went so far as to warn that China now faced a "struggle for survival."

World history bore special meaning for the intellectuals of Republican China. With the dynastic rule gone, the new Chinese political and intellectual leaders devoted their energy to reconstructing the Chinese government, culture, and economy and to fending off foreign aggression. In their search for a solution to China's problems, they looked to foreign civilizations, especially the Western ones, for inspiration. Young professors who had studied in Western nations, such as Hu Shih (1891-1962) and Fu Shinian (1896-1950), enjoyed a surge of popularity. The story of the successes of other nations became subject of investigation; Britain, France, and Germany appeared to be national models for imitation.

Even the "traditionalists" who confronted the vanguards of the new cultural movement in the 1920s had reasons to better understand world history. Encountering cultural iconoclasm, the traditionalists endeavored to reinvent China's tradition not only through reconsidering the limitations of traditional historiography, exploring new historical sources, and acquiring new historical methods, but also through comparing Chinese civilization with Western civilizations and reassessing China's contribution to the world.

Theoretically, the early Chinese Marxists, impressed by the material conception of history, should have acquired a more comprehensive worldview. However, given their immature understanding of Marx's system, few of them were able to produce any solid world historical writings. Non-Chinese histories were mentioned in their works unsystematically. For instance, it was only in their discussion of the nature of
Chinese feudalism that the special features of European feudalism were highlighted. The study of world history in this period, however, was limited to the teaching of a number of general Western historical subjects in major universities and the introduction of historical methods and findings from the West. He Bingson (1890-1946) and his colleagues, who received their postgraduate training at Columbia University, contributed much to modern Chinese historiography by translating James H. Robinson’s *The New History*, James Shotwell’s *An Introduction to the History of History*, and Robinson and Charles A. Beard’s *An Outline of European History and History of Europe: Our Own Time* into Chinese. Similarly, thanks to the introduction of intellectual leaders of the New Cultural Movement of the 1920s such as Fu Sinan and Yao Congwu (1894-1970), the Rankean tradition made its way into China. However, few of the above historians made much effort to conduct research on world history in a strict sense. A tradition of world history studies had yet to take shape.

III. World History in China before 1979

Since 1949, Marxist ideas became the guiding principles of almost all academic disciplines, above all in humanities and social sciences. While appearing as a political straitjacket for researchers, Marxism enabled Chinese historians to look at world history from a new angle. Basically Marx’s analysis of labor, productivity, mode of production, class struggle, and the march of history from primitive society to the ideal state of communism provides a ready theoretical framework for the study of individual societies as well as the world as a whole. Although Marx had little to say about the historical development of China, Chinese historians in the post-liberalization period were apt to reinterpret the Chinese past from a Marxist perspective.

Generally speaking, world history in China concentrated on a few questions, including 1) How far had Chinese society, compared with other societies, developed in Marx’s scheme of history? 2) Was there a stage of capitalism in China? If yes, when had it begun? If no, why did it not occur? 3) What were the impacts of imperialism on China?

It is to be remarked that in Chinese historical scholarship, the term "world history" was seldom carefully defined. In effect, it referred to the study of non-Chinese history, with particular emphasis on Western history. A macro, thematic and comparative study of mankind as a whole that some Western historians looked for was still remote to many histo-
rians in China. Despite the calling for the study of the human race as a whole, world history written by Chinese historians appeared to be a mosaic of different national histories repackaged in the Marxist language.

One major exception was Zhou Guchen's *Shijie Tongshi* (General World History, 1949). Though containing little original research, it broke new ground by adopting a non-Marxist materialist conception of history. Beginning with a general survey of the natural history of the earth, this work was followed by an analysis of the material improvement of mankind in the earliest years. The question of how these conditions gave rise to ancient civilizations in Mesopotamia, the Aegean coast, and China was then addressed.

Zhou, who seemed to be quite familiar with the diffusion theories of F. Graeber and A. J. Toynbee, was aware of interaction between civilizations. He made a great effort to depict the intercultural exchange facilitated by the Graeco-Persian War, the conquests of Alexander the Great, the Arab expansion, the Crusades and the Mongol invasions. For him, most civilizations developed independently before the seventeenth century. Western nations at their zenith of power began to pull the non-Western nations into their orbit of development and to create a world historical process. In strict sense, Zhou's *Shijie Tongshi* was one of the very few works that embraced a non-Marxist perspective of the world.

The lack of historical sources and of qualified teachers and researchers was another obstacle to the development of world history in China in this period. As a result of China's political isolation, a "scientific community" specializing in non-Chinese history was slow to grow. According to Dorothea Martin, two-thirds of the Chinese historians in the 1950s concentrated on studying Chinese history, while the other third, many of whom were unqualified, focused on the rest of the world. The Chinese practitioners of world history had to be content with the task of translating official publications and high school history textbooks of the Soviet Union into Chinese. World history in China got rid of the "Soviet Model" only in the late 1960s after China had broken with the Soviet Union.

The leftist radicalism of the 1960s and 1970s left little room for independent and apolitical historical studies. Zhou Gucheng's world history writings were criticized during the "Cultural Revolution" simply because he did not employ the concept of "class-struggle." World history that focused on "capitalist and imperialistic" countries suddenly became something to be avoided. However, it gained ascendancy...
again in the era of Deng Xiaoping’s reform. China’s growing contact with foreign nations obliged Chinese historians to acquaint themselves with the outside world. The fact that 30% to 40% of the teaching staff at departments of history in various universities were specialized in world history showed that this once forgotten area now attracted public interest. In China there were sixteen national associations for the study of world history by 1989.

The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences also established the Institute of World History in 1984. Major journals about world history such as Shijie Lishi (World History), Shijie Lishi Yanjiu Dongti (Trends in the Study of World History), Weiguoshi Jixi (Knowledge of Foreign Nations’ History), and Shijie Lishi Pingcong (Critical Studies in World History) were founded in the 1980s. Zhongguo Lishixue Nianjian began to provide bibliographical information about world history in China starting in 1982.

Concomitant with these quantitative changes was the development of new approaches to world history. Historians came to realize that, in addition to studying the history of different nations, it was incumbent that they examine how different histories developed into a coherent whole. A veteran historian Liu Jiahe emphasized a few years ago that a possible way to study world history was to reorganize the history of different nations in a thematic and organic manner. Due to the large number of nations on earth, he believed, it was impracticable to include every one of them in a world history.

Chinese historians in the early 1990s were aware that world history was still a developing discipline in China. For instance, they faced the dilemma that though tired of the Marxist historical scheme, they had no new macro-historical framework, in which the histories of different nations were unified organically, to replace it. The Eurocentrist scheme of history was not welcome, but an alternative was not yet available.

IV. World History and Worldview in the Reform Era

Although the government gradually loosened its grip on intellectuals and academics after 1979, most Chinese intellectuals and academics remained cautious. For this reason, few Chinese historians went so far as to abandon the Marxist conception of history. Basically, most world history written in the first decade of reform was still built upon the Marxist concepts of labor and economic determinism. Strictly attached to this Marxist orthodoxy, they reiterated that social and material devel-
Development began when primitive peoples met their basic needs by inventing languages, tools, means of communication, and early social organizations. With the help of concepts such as class struggle, dialectical materialism, and the antagonism of productivity and production relations, world history in China attempted to explain the rise and fall of slave society — the first "class society" in Egypt, Mesopotamia, South Asia and the Greece.

Taking the decline of the Roman Empire as a classical example, these works argued that slavery upon which the Roman Empire was built reached its maximum in the third century A.D.\(^\text{29}\) Intensified class struggle had weakened the Empire before the barbarians rolled over Rome.

The discussion of the rise of and fall of feudalism and the development of capitalism also conformed to the official ideology. Even works published in the 1990s, such as Wu Yujin and Qi Shiyong’s *Shijie Shi* (World History) and Cui Lianzhong’s six volume *Shijie Tungshi* (A General World History) do not go far beyond this narrative structure.

Even in the West, however, a glance at the major works of world history published in China in this period is enough to show that they give little if any coverage to the history of China. Only a few issues such as the feudalism and absolutism in imperial China,\(^\text{30}\) China’s economic stagnation compared with Western industrial nations,\(^\text{31}\) and China’s response to Western imperialism\(^\text{32}\) are thoroughly studied. A Chinese reader will probably ask why Mayan, Aztec and Incan civilizations carry more weight in world history than China.

A Western reader will wonder why China, which occupies a significant position in William McNeil’s *World History*, is neglected by the Chinese historians. Again, the fact that world history in China, in most cases, means the history of non-Chinese nations partly explains this phenomenon.

Although the practitioners of world history in China wanted to study the history of mankind as a whole, they made little progress in their investigation of cross-cultural communication in the premodern era. Nations still appear in these works to have developed independently before the great Geographical Discovery.

Qiao Mingshun’s *Jianmin Shijie Shi* (Simplified World History) for example, though maintaining that Eurasia is the historical setting in which different peoples interact peacefully and violently, offers a thin description about the contact between the East and the West before the fifteenth century. It touches rather briefly on the influence of the
Crusades. Instead of assessing the role that the Arabian and the Turkish Empires played in Sino-Western cultural exchanges, it is principally interested in the oscillation between tribal struggles and political centralization in these empires. Similarly, the relations between China, Korea, Japan, and India are underestimated. By contrast, feudal warfare and political struggle in these countries form the core of its narrative.

Before the 1990s, world historical writings in China generally conceive that a real global process came gradually to shape in the 16th century when Western capitalism began to expand. One historian even emphasized that a structural study of world history is not possible before the modern era, because in the premodern period, the development of most nations relied little on external stimulus. Instead of one world, there were a number of cultural spheres dominated by religions such as Confucianism (China, Japan and Korea), Islam (Central Asia and the Near East), Buddhism (India and South Asia) and Christianity (Europe and North America). However, things began to change in the sixteenth century when continuous accumulation of capital compelled European nations to look for overseas markets. Their search for new routes to the East was only a prelude to the European overseas economic and military expansion that reached its first peak in the 19th century.

The story of the continuous growth of capitalism in Western European nations since the 17th century and its transmission to North America, the rise of the bourgeoisie and their quest for political power, the decline of feudalism since the late 18th century, the bourgeois revolution throughout the 19th century and the formation of the modern state became major subjects of world history in China.

According to these works, in the 19th century almost all Western countries were capitalized in various forms, including Junker-capitalism (Germany), expansionist capitalism (Britain), financial capitalism (France), trust capitalism (USA), feudal-military capitalism (Japan), early capitalism (Russia). They joined forces to pull non-Western nations into a world capitalist market by both peaceful and violent means. The Leninist argument about the partition of the world ran through most of these works. With the exception of Japan, which eventually became a capitalist country with the help of positive government policies, few nations, which form today the so-called Third World, could escape from Western domination.

The persistent influence of Marxist historical theories was particu-
larly visible in Chinese historians’ study of the 20th century world. The rise of socialism, the inner contradiction of capitalism, the struggle between capitalism and socialism, and the eventual triumph of the latter are interwoven into a theme that runs through most of these works.

The formation and the social and political development of the Soviet Union, which was the first socialist country on earth, is naturally a focal point of analysis. Because Lenin and Stalin maintained that nationalists in the non-Western world who waged war against industrial-imperialistic powers should be the natural allies of the Soviet Union in the early phase of socialism, Chinese historians who still follow this line of argument pay special attention to the independence movements in China, Korea, Vietnam, Indonesian, the Philippines and India. On the other hand, they accentuate the crisis of Western capitalist societies, which had been predicted by Marx and Lenin. Seeing fascism as an alienated form of capitalism, these works carry the implication that the decay of capitalism has paved the way for the triumph of socialism. The cooperation between capitalist countries and socialist countries in the war against fascism could not reverse the trend of history. The further struggle between these two groups, they asserted, would continue until capitalism is destroyed.

Despite the relaxation of political control, Chinese historians dared not forsake the Marxist conception of history before the 1990s. Although the theme of capitalist expansion and the consequential confrontation of capitalism and socialism seem to provide a useful framework for the organization of national histories, it oversimplifies the history of individual nations. In their narrative, different nations proceed at different speeds in the scale of human history. While some are trapped in the stage of a primitive society, some have reached the stage of a slave society much earlier, but then proceeded no further. China, for instance, became in the Han Dynasty the first centralized country founded on feudalism, but it soon lost its momentum to grow.

In contrast, capitalism emerged first in Western Europe and expanded in all directions since the 19th century. One major breakthrough in this period is that world history begins to shift the emphasis from class struggle to the growth of productivity. In explaining China’s continuous growth of productivity, Chinese historians need to take into consideration a wide range of factors, political and cultural, internal and external. It is no wonder that interactions between nations became a central question of world history in China at the turn of the 20th century.
V. The Conception of Multi-polarity in World History in China

A chain of events in the 1990s changed the world even more dramatically. The collapse of the Communist Bloc, the formation of the European Union, the consolidation of American supremacy after the Gulf War, China’s continuous reform and integration into the world economy and the tremendous development of Southeast Asia have produced a new international setting that the Marxist scheme fails to explain properly.

At the same time, liberalization in China continued despite a short interruption at the end of the 1980s. New generations of Chinese historians who have greater exposure to the outer world and are less attached to the Marxist orthodoxy have begun to produce world historical writings differing from their forerunners in many ways. One major characteristic of the world history written in China in the 1990s is that it calls our attention to global development in the 20th century.

Four of the six-volume Shijie Tungshi (General World History), edited by Cui Lianzhong, are about the world since the 17th century. Li Ji’s Ershi Shiji Shijie Shi (Twentieth Century World History) and Jin Zhongyan’s Ershi Shiji de Shiji: Bainian Lishi de Huisu (The World in the Twentieth Century: A Retrospection of the last Hundred Years) deal particularly with the problems of mankind in the last decades of the 20th century.

World history in China pulls together a number of elements, such as the emergence of primitive societies in different regions, different manifestations of feudalism, the rise and the expansion of Western capitalism, and the eventual triumph of socialism over capitalism. Under the cloak of socialist doctrine, however, lies a new global vision that not only explains what happened to the human race as a whole in the last hundred years, but also predicts the world in the near future.

Historians in China continue to search for a new theoretical framework in the post-Communism era. As early as 1992, Wu Yujin, concluding his Shijie Shi (World History), challenged his colleagues to formulate a new theory of world history. He himself made the bold attempt to handle the 20th century world as a coherent whole. However, his analysis of different nations in the global context is much too scanty, making only three pages in a book of 427 pages.46 Li Ji’s Ershi Shiji Shijie Shi made a similar effort. Agreeing with Wu and many other Chinese historians, Li Ji combined the development of different national histories into a single world history in the 20th century.47 He broke new ground by seeing peaceful cooperation and non-ideological conflicts among
nations as the most important subjects of world history. For him, growing international contact and increasing conflicts among nations have become irresistible.

While common economic and political interests and problems that threaten the survival of mankind urge nations to cooperate, historical experience has shown that the struggle for power, the unequal distribution of wealth, and territorial disputes are still major sources of conflicts. The growing interdependence greatly reduces the roles of national governments. This is a dilemma that few nations can overcome.

In contrast to orthodox Marxist historians who hold capital as the leitmotif of modern historical development, historians in China have begun to refocus their attention on the role of technology in the contemporary world. For many of them, if the first industrial revolution created Britain's trade and financial power in the 18th century and the first half of the 19th century, and the second industrial revolution began the era of German industrial and military supremacy in the late 19th century, the third industrial revolution has consolidated the hegemony of the United States in the 21st century.

Although capital has lost little of its influence, it becomes a real power after it is converted into technology. The third industrial revolution intensifies international division of labor, gives rise to multinational enterprises, transforms the way of life, and widens the gap between the "have" and "have not" powers. Technological advancement now becomes the only indicator of national strength. This explanation, although apolitical in a strict sense, is in line with the China's reform program which gives increasing weight to technological development.

It seems passé to see the confrontation of communism and capitalism as the essence of contemporary world history. In fact, the last decades of the 20th witnessed the transference of wealth and power from the East and West blocs to other regions. The formation of the European Union, whose members such as Germany and France have long been trying to overcome the American influence; the establishment of economic cooperation organizations in various regions; the enviable growth of South East Asia; the rise of China; and the growing military strength of India testify to this new trend.

Roughly speaking, Europe, China, America and South Asia, though not equal in strength, have become the four centers of power in the world. Chinese historians also have begun to conceive of the world as a multi-polar one in which different international groups interact and compete with each other in many ways. For them, confrontation does...
not rule out cooperation between these areas.

For instance, despite growing competition in international capital and technology markets, international organizations such as GATT and IMF become forums in which economic problems are handled. Apparently the great wars that devastated the world twice in the last hundred years should not be a threat today, because few nations have the abilities and reasons to wage a war that will only leave a nuclear holocaust. Instead, pollution, poverty, population growth, and the draining of resources, are problems threatening mankind. Even drugs, AIDS and terrorism are no longer exclusive problems of Western societies. For this reason, in addition to a North-South dialogue and South-South cooperation, what we need in the 21st century is a cross-civilizational dialogue.

China's position in the contemporary world, a subject that has long been ignored, has finally become a major theme in world history in China. What concerns Chinese historians most is China's relationships with other nations. Their discussion converges on the point that China should develop a multi-directional foreign policy that helps maintain friendly relationships with all major powers on earth. Since national independence is the wish of all nations, China should refrain from interfering into other countries' domestic policies. Peaceful coexistence of different nations, instead of a Marxist Utopia, is what they are looking for in the near future.

VI. Concluding Remarks

The dissolution of the proletarian outlook opens the eyes of Chinese historians to the world surrounding them. They came to realize that the contemporary world, plagued by various kinds of conflicts, economic or racial, regional or international, is much more complicated than the class-struggle paradigm can explain. At the same time, they are now realistic enough to admit that war, poverty, inequality and natural disasters, which have been important matters of world history, will continue to threaten mankind. Worse still, as nations are more interconnected with each than ever before, a crisis in one region is likely to have global impacts. This is a fate that all members of the global community, which is taking shape, can never escape. However, embedded in world history in China is an optimistic view that common interests move nations closer together. Understanding, reconciliation, and cooperation will enable us to overcome problems ahead.
Notes


4. Thinkers such as Immanuel Wallerstein and Stuart Hall welcome the eclipse of national cultures, because, for them, these are created by oppressive national governments. See Stuart Hall, "The Local and the Global, Globalization and Ethnicity," in Anthony D. King’s *Culture, Globalization and the World System: Contemporary Conditions for the Representation of Identity* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 19-39 and "Old and New Identities, Old and New Ethnicities," in Ibid., 41-68 and Immanuel Wallerstein, "The National and the Universal: Can there be such a thing as World Culture?" in Ibid., 91-105. On the other hand, Anthony D. Smith and John Tomlinson question whether a global culture can replace national cultures. See Anthony D. Smith, *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era* (Cambridge: Polity, 1995) and John Tomlinson, *Globalization and Culture* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1999).


15. Ibid., 76-107.


17. Ibid., 127-57.


22. Ibid., 17.


25. Ibid., 25.

26. Ibid., 29.


28. Jiang Guowei, Sheng Quan and Tang Tongming, *Shijie Shigang*


31. Qiao, Jianmin Shijie Shi, 315.

32. Li and Hai, Shijie Shi Jianbien, 569-86 and Jiang, Sheng and Tang, Shijie Shigang, 656-59.

33. Qiao, Jianmin Shijie Shi, 177

34. Ibid., 217-225.

35. Li and Hai, Shijie Shi Jianbien, 180-206.


40. Liu and Han, Shijie Shi: Jindai Shi, 28-37.


42. Jiang, Shang and Tang, Shijie Shigang, 881-919, Qiao, Jianmin Shijie Shi, 404-517; Liu and Hai, Shijie Shi Jianbien, 569-601; Yam, Zhang and Li, Shijie Tungshi Gangyi, 214-36.

43. Qiao, Jianmin Shijie Shi, 640-661; Yam, Zhang and Li, Shijie Tungshi Gangyi, 172-95.


48. Ibid., 1: 12.

49. Ibid., 1: 20.

50. Ibid., 1: 32.


