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## Critical Language Pedagogy in the Classroom: The TV Talk Show '60 Minutes' as a 'Lesson' on Russian Propaganda

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## **Critical Language Pedagogy in the Classroom: The TV Talk Show *60 Minutes* as a 'Lesson' on Russian Propaganda**

**EVA BINDER, MAGDALENA KALTSEIS**

### **1. Introduction**

Due to the increasing influence of audiovisual media on the way we perceive ourselves and the world, it is crucial to enable young people to understand and interpret media messages. A critical awareness of audiovisual media and their impact on viewers and consumers is, therefore, an essential constituent of media literacy. This central 21<sup>st</sup>-century skill is commonly defined as “the ability to access, analyze, produce and act upon media messages” (Cubbage, 2018, p. 2). Following Hobbs (2010, p. vii), the ability to analyze encompasses “identifying the author, purpose and point of view, and evaluating the quality and credibility of the content.” Accordingly, promoting media literacy also includes the ability to discern propaganda and fake news from factual information.

Our article is dedicated to the TV talk show *60 минут* [60 Minutes], one of the main pillars of Russian television propaganda. After providing general information on talk shows on Russian television, we will suggest ways to integrate this TV format into the Russian language classroom. Thereby, we adopt a critical language pedagogy (CLP) approach to teaching political and controversial issues in the foreign language classroom, which generally aims at promoting social and democratic responsibility, respectful interaction, and reflection on social inequality (Gerlach, 2020, p. 24). The goals of CLP include exposing actions that serve ideological purposes and educating students to become critical citizens who actively shape their common future (Gerlach, 2020, p. 25). Russian talk shows are particularly suitable for this endeavor, as they provide insights into the values and moral concepts prevalent in today's official Russia. By critically analyzing and questioning the assumptions made in these talk shows the students will improve their discourse competence and reflect on current communication practices.

To demonstrate how CLP can be adopted in the Russian language classroom, we examine a short segment of a 2020 broadcast of the talk show *60 Minutes*, entitled *Границы толерантности* [Limits of Tolerance]. The practical tasks we propose aim at raising learners' awareness of the manipulating strategies used in Russian talk shows. By analyzing this segment, they will learn how anti-Western and conservative values are merged with nationalistic and racist thought under the guise of an 'open' discussion.

## **2. Talk shows in Russia: From public debate to propaganda**

While talk shows have been a staple of Western television since the 1950s, they were absent from Soviet television screens because of their “dangerous verbal promiscuity and defiance of the dominant rhetoric of the written word” (Hutchings & Rulyova, 2009, p. 89). However, this changed in the era of perestroika and with the introduction of glasnost. The emergence of talk shows in the late Soviet Union was closely linked to social and political change, which led to an increased demand and need for public debate.

In the first decade after the fall of the Soviet Union as well as in the early 2000s, the talk show format enjoyed growing interest on Russian television. In the liberal 1990s, the newly founded TV channel *HTB* [NTV] took a leading role in producing (critical) political talk shows. After Vladimir Putin assumed the Russian presidency in 2000, however, the interest in political debates on television dropped significantly. Subsequently, the number of (critical) political talk shows declined, while non-political, trivial discussions along Western lines became widespread and popular. An example of a talk show originating from this period is *Пусть говорят* [Let Them Talk], which was inspired by the American *Jerry Springer Show*, and soon became the most popular trivial talk show on *Первый канал* [Channel One], one of the dominant state TV channels in Russia.

To this day, talk shows remain one of the most popular and frequently broadcast formats on the three main state-controlled TV channels in Russia, *Первый канал* [Channel One], *Россия-1* [Russia-1] and *HTB* [NTV]. Before February 24, 2022, these channels broadcast a wide range of talk shows, some short-term and some which ran successfully over several years.<sup>1</sup> In addition

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<sup>1</sup> Few talk show series last for years on television. Because of the high turnover, only examples of talk shows that ran for several years on one channel are given here.

to *Let Them Talk*, the ‘long-term’ popular shows on Channel One included the celebrity talk show *Познер* [Pozner] (2008–2022) as well as the late-night talk show *Вечерний Ургант* [Evening Urgant] (2012–2022). In addition, *Модный приговор* [Fashion Verdict], first broadcast in 2007, was part of the channel’s regular programming until the Russian invasion of Ukraine. On Russia-1, the political talk show (*Воскресный*) *Вечер с Владимиром Соловьевым* [(Sunday) Evening with Vladimir Solov’ev] has been on the air since 2012 and was the leading talk show in the country until 2022 (Kiikov, 2022). In 2016, another political talk show was added to the channel’s program—*60 минут* [60 Minutes], which has since then gained high popularity: According to a telephone survey conducted by the state-owned ВЦИОМ [Russian Public Opinion Research Center] in 2022, *60 Minutes* was indicated the best program (Sostav, 2023). The talk show’s popularity was also confirmed by a survey conducted by the non-governmental Levada Center, which ranked the two hosts Evgenii Popov and Ol’ga Skabeeva among the three most popular TV journalists in Russia (Levada, 2023).

Along with news programs, TV talk shows have become one of the most important and effective means of Russian state propaganda. Since 2014—the year of the annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of the war in the Donbas region—the number of *political* talk shows on Russian television has increased tremendously. As early as 2013-14, many critical voices linked this increase to the desire of the political authorities to “control public opinion” (Dolgova, 2015, p. 160). And indeed, since then talk shows have played a crucial role in promoting fake narratives and conspiracy theories (Binder & Kaltseis, 2020), discrediting Kremlin opponents (Gulenko, 2021), and legitimizing the war against Ukraine (Kaltseis, 2022; 2023).

### 3. Talk shows in the Russian language classroom

Both political and non-political talk shows belong in the Russian language classroom. Like news programs, talk shows deal with the current problems a society faces. In comparison, however, the talk show format has several advantages, among them being the question-answer structure, which facilitates audiovisual comprehension. Furthermore, talk shows aim to entertain the audience and deal with the most emotive and ‘hot’ topics of a country’s society. Apart from that, talk shows are didactic per se, as they shape public opinion and convey dominant values and norms

that are accepted in a particular society at a particular time (Zvereva, 2012, p. 95). These features can be harnessed for language teaching: unlike news programs, the messages conveyed on talk shows are clear and easy to understand. They are repeated several times and presented in a lively manner, which is why they are already comprehensible at the Intermediate High level (ACTFL, 2012).

Our CLP approach aims at analyzing Russian talk shows in the language classroom as means of contemporary political propaganda, thereby promoting students' media literacy and critical reflection on the communication practices employed. For this purpose, it is important to examine content and form, or, in other words, what is said and shown as well as the various ways how it is presented. Hence, a critical analysis of TV talk shows can inform language learners about the values and moral concepts prevalent in Russia, about viewpoints and opinions that are acceptable and that are not. In Russian TV talk shows the guests are pre-selected on the basis of their official opinion and, in the case of *political* talk shows, their ideological alignment with and support for the Kremlin. As a result, only one point of view prevails in these broadcasts – the one agreeing with the Kremlin and the ruling party *Единая Россия* [United Russia]. Although guests with a liberal and/or oppositional political or social stance also appear on these shows, they are often interrupted, and their statements are claimed to be false or absurd. Sometimes these ideologically 'non-conformist' guests are even attacked physically. The promotion of traditional conservative values and patriarchal gender roles, among others, is at the top of the agenda; LGBTQ groups are excluded, defamed, and subject to legal persecution. In 2013, Russia outlawed depictions of homosexuality or "non-traditional sexual relations" to minors. In 2022 the law was expanded to prohibit all forms of so-called LGBTQ or gay propaganda, including statements that homosexual relationships are normal.

The issue of sexual orientation and Western tolerance of non-heteronormative partnerships and family models, together with so-called Western multiculturalism, lay at the foundation of a political talk show broadcast on February 17, 2020 on Russia-1. In the final part of the show *60 Minutes* (min. 00:43:51–00:57:04), entitled *Границы толерантности* [Limits of Tolerance], a heated discussion evolves about a photo shared on a social media platform by the American clothing company Levi's on Valentine's

Day. In this photo, two individuals hold hands: one hand is white, while the other hand belongs to a person of color. In the following section, we will demonstrate how this segment can be discussed and analyzed in the Russian language classroom. Thoroughly examined, it can serve as a 'lesson' on Russian propaganda, as it illustrates the normalization and dissemination of conservative values, which are underpinned by racist statements and public defamation of people outside the heteronormative gender model. Before discussing the *Limits of Tolerance* segment of the *60 Minutes* talk show broadcast in detail, however, we will introduce the show itself by outlining its main characteristics.

#### **4. The talk show *60 Minutes***

As mentioned above, *60 Minutes* is one of the most watched television programs in Russia and can justly be regarded as a centerpiece of Russian TV propaganda. Even before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the show frequently featured anti-Western resentment, defamatory content about Ukraine, attacks on opponents of the Putin regime inside and outside the country, as well as patriotic assertions of cultural conservatism and national sovereignty—two pillars of Russian state ideology. The opposition journalist Vladimir Kara-Murza characterized the talk show as a mixture of loud roaring, hysterical guests and the obnoxious grimaces of the hosts: “Generally speaking, the entire show *60 Minutes* is not a broadcast, but something incomprehensible. It consists of the screams and hysterics of ‘experts’ and the disgusting grimaces of the hosts, who pretend to be celestial know-it-alls.”<sup>2</sup> (Kara-Murza, 2018) These features altogether make *60 Minutes* a prime example for the analysis of Russian state mass media.

The talk show is hosted by the husband-and-wife team of Evgenii Popov and Ol’ga Skabeeva (one of the few women in the male-dominated talk show business). Although the schedule of the broadcast has changed slightly over the years, the broadcast has always been the lead-in to the main evening 8:00 pm newscast *Becmu* [News]. Except for temporary interruptions during the COVID-19 pandemic, a separate edition of the show has appeared at noon since 2017. On the heels of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, news talk replaced much of the entertainment in TV

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<sup>2</sup> All translations in this article are by the authors.

programming. News shows and special reports were included in the talk, but despite its extended wartime two-hour length, the show is still called *60 Minutes*—a catchy title.

The talk show's slogan is "60 минут о самом главном по горячим следам" [60 minutes hot on the trail of the most important]. The topics are predictable, and the invited experts are mostly the same. As in other political talk shows, men far outnumber women. Among the show's permanent guests are journalists and supposed, self-proclaimed political experts, such as Igor' Korotchenko, Sergei Markov, or Dmitrii Galkin. The three of them are also featured in the February 17, 2020 edition of *60 Minutes*. Korotchenko's opening salvo during the *Limits of Tolerance* segment perfectly illustrates the ideology of Russian cultural distinctiveness. In response to the question of why the Levi's photo has caused such an outrage in social media, he says that Russians have their own understanding of "what is good, what is bad, what is acceptable and what is not."

### **5. *Limits of Tolerance* in the Russian language classroom**

The *Limits of Tolerance* segment covers the final 15 minutes of the *60 Minutes* broadcast from February 17, 2020. It encapsulates conservative versus liberal attitudes to different partnership and family models as well as everyday racism. Unlike other national or foreign policy issues, these topics require little prior knowledge, but they are sensitive and may provoke strong reactions from students. Anticipating learners' reactions is thus an important part of preparing the lesson, for example, by allowing enough time to discuss the questions in the post-viewing activities, setting clear norms and boundaries for the discussion, and explaining to the learners why watching and reflecting upon the segment is important for developing their critical discourse competence.

The goal of showing and discussing this segment in the Russian language classroom is twofold. First, students learn to recognize the strategies applied in talk shows in order to shape and manipulate public opinion. Second, they reflect on democratic values and compare them with the traditional, right-wing, and ultra-conservative values conveyed in the talk show. In this way, they learn to understand the "conservative turn" (Shcherbak, 2023) that official Russia has undergone since the presidential election in 2012. This turn encompasses "the rise in the

political influence of the Russian Orthodox Church, the ideological shift to traditional values, and the growth of authoritarianism” (Shcherbak, 2023, p. 194). These elements, in particular the shift to traditional values, become evident in *Limits of Tolerance*.

In order to comprehend the propaganda strategies applied in *Limits of Tolerance*, it is advisable to distinguish between formal techniques, which primarily concern image and sound, and discursive structures, i.e., the question of what is actually said. From a visual standpoint, the viewer is confronted with a rapid change of frames, camera angles, and text graphics, which make it difficult to perceive all the visual details and signs displayed. Various photos are projected on the studio screen as well as on the circular stage floor, where the hosts are standing. First, a photo of Levi’s shows two individuals holding hands, one hand belonging to a white person, the other one to a person of color. The other photos showcase two women kissing each other, and a white woman kissing a black man. Moreover, a text graphic appears saying “Смешение рас — это уничтожение своего народа” [Miscegenation is a destruction of one’s own people], and finally a photo of two kissing faces, one belonging to a white person, the other one to a person of color, is projected on the stage floor. In the case of the white face, the gender identity remains indeterminate.

In addition to the photos, the talk show presents animated text graphics, including social media posts intended to serve as evidence of a mass outrage against Levi’s post “14 фев. 2020: С днём всех влюбленных!” [Feb. 14. 2020: Happy Valentine’s Day!]. To attract the attention of the television audience, selected user comments are highlighted on the screen or superimposed on a blue background at the bottom of the screen. The outrageous user comments all belong to an ultra-right, racist, and at the same time anti-Western discourse, for instance “Мультикультурализм — это омерзительно.” [Multiculturalism is repulsive], “Великое замещение. Не покупайте у этих глобалистов.” [The Great Replacement. Don’t buy from these globalists.] or “Ваш маркетинг - г\*\*\*о. Это вам не Запад, за ЛГБТ или мультирасовую пропаганду вас о\*\*\*\*т и выкинут все ваши вещи.” [Your marketing is bullshit. This isn’t the West; for LGBT or multiracial propaganda you’ll be beaten up and all your stuff will be thrown away.] Additional on-screen text graphics highlight individual statements made by the discussants.

It is crucial to understand that in both the displayed photos and the text graphics, two different issues are intertwined in order to demarcate an alleged Russian moral sentiment from the West: the question of skin color and race on the one hand and that of sexual orientation or gender identity on the other. While the visual cues refer to both race and sexual orientation, the alleged expert Korotchenko pleads for traditional Russian family values in his opening statement and fiercely rejects what he calls “tolerant Europe.” To make sure that the propaganda message is perceived, Korotchenko’s loud voice and authoritarian tone drown out the other participants:

**Игорь Коротченко:** Ну, во-первых, у нас есть свое понимание в обществе — что хорошо, что плохо, что приемлемо, а что нет. И не надо нам тыкать, понимаете? Я, например, выступаю за то, чтобы российские дети своих родителей называли «папа» и «мама», а не «родитель № 1» и «родитель № 2». Может быть «родитель № 3», как в толерантной Европе. Для них это норма. Для нас — нет. Очевидно, что для большинства простых людей подобного рода реклама была воспринята, что это оскорбление их личное. Еще раз я говорю: надо считаться с традициями общества. Мы помним к чему привели попытки американцев насаждать демократию в странах северной Африки и на Ближнем Востоке — чудовищная гражданская война. Поэтому не надо орать, надо уважать российское общество. Если нашим людям это не нравится, извините, им это не нравится.

**Евгений Попов:** Почему не нравится? Давайте попробуем это понять.

**Игорь Коротченко:** Нам не надо родитель № 1 и родитель № 2. Нам не надо целующиеся лесбиянки в качестве рекламы в других, понимаете, фирмах. Это не наше. Поэтому я очень рад, что в поправках конституции будущей Российской Федерации четко будет записано, что семья — это традиционный союз мужчины и женщины, а не наоборот. (60 Minutes, 17.02.2020, 00:45:50–00:47:39).

**[Igor' Korotchenko:** Well, first of all, we have our own understanding in society of what is good, what is bad, what is acceptable, and what is not. We do not need to be told what to do, you see? I, for example, am in favor of Russian children calling their parents "dad" and "mom," not "parent #1" and "parent #2". Maybe "parent #3," as in tolerant Europe. For them this is the norm. For us, it's not. Clearly, for the majority of ordinary people, this kind of advertising was perceived as a personal insult. Once again I say, we have to reckon with the traditions of society. We remember what happened when the Americans tried to impose democracy in North Africa and the Middle East—it led to a monstrous civil war. Therefore, there is no need to shout, but to respect Russian society. If our people don't like it, sorry, they don't like it.

**Evgenii Popov:** Why don't they like it? Let's try to understand that.

**Igor' Korotchenko:** We don't need parent #1 and parent #2. We don't need lesbians kissing as advertising from other, you know, brands. That's not us. Therefore, I'm very happy that the amendments to the constitution of the future Russian Federation clearly state that the family is the traditional union between a man and a woman, and not the other way around.]

The first five minutes and thus one-third of the talk show segment *Limits of Tolerance* appear sufficient to achieve the didactic goal of making learners understand how Russian television propaganda works. The analysis of this segment reveals three crucial factors that determine the propaganda strategies employed. First, information regarded as important is launched on several levels and emphasized in different ways, while the sensory perception of the audience as a whole is overwhelmed by a multitude of stimuli. These include jumbled talking and yelling at each other, rapid changes in camera angles, camera movements, image fade-ins, and animated text graphics. Consequently, viewers are engaged on an emotional level that stimulates indignation or approval instead of being addressed on a rational level that allows judgment. Second, the talk show nourishes the illusion of an open debate by presenting an opposing

voice. In the case of *Limits of Tolerance* this voice belongs to Mikhail Konev, a 30-year-old political activist who has been active in various oppositional initiatives, but is constrained here by the role he has to play. The clash between the two opposing positions culminates in a verbal duel between Korotchenko and Konev. Konev is repeatedly interrupted and fails to articulate a coherent thought, whenever he tries to launch a liberal statement, such as “Для меня ужасно стоять здесь, в стране, которая победила нацизм, и обсуждать, что черная рука с белой рукой вместе это плохо.” [It’s horrible for me to stand here, in a country that defeated Nazism, and discuss that a black hand together with a white hand is bad.] Third, the talk show debates are informed by current political issues and ideological principles. With regard to *Limits of Tolerance*, the proximity to Kremlin authorities becomes evident in Korotchenko’s reference to the constitutional amendment of spring 2020, according to which marriage is to be protected as a “union between a man and a woman” (see Gosudarstvennaia Duma, 2020, Article 72.1 zh1).

The segment *Limits of Tolerance*, however, not only reveals the shift toward conservative and traditionalist values but also exposes the racist and neo-fascist foundation upon which this shift is built. This underpinning comes to the fore in the concept of *великое замещение*, a literal translation from French *grand remplacement*, and goes back to Renaud Camus’ 2011 homonymous treatise. Today, the idea of *grand remplacement* has become one of the core concepts of the New Right and serves as inspiration for conspiracy theories. The concept of *Umwolkung*, a German term originating from Nazi ideology, is frighteningly close to the contemporary ideas of population replacement. It is the convergence of this whole complex of illiberal thought, condensed within this short piece of TV propaganda, that truly makes *Limits of Tolerance* unique<sup>3</sup> and useful for critical language learning.

## **6. *Limits of Tolerance*: Practical tasks for the Russian language classroom**

In Russian language classes, the 15-minute broadcast *Limits of Tolerance* requires extensive preparation and appropriate reflection tasks. If critically discussed and purposefully dealt with, however, the segment

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<sup>3</sup> We would like to thank our friend Oleg Aronson from Moscow, who pointed out this piece of TV propaganda to us.

will be highly productive for developing media literacy. Due to the complexity of the talk show segment, we recommend its utilization with students at college or at university starting from the ACTFL Intermediate High level, at the threshold of Advanced (ACTFL, 2012), as well as in classes with heritage speakers. The language level appears appropriate given the visual and textual support of the main statements. Pre-activities (see Section 6.1), which acquaint learners with the most important words and expressions, as well as silent viewing (see Section 6.2) help with overall audiovisual comprehension. As for learners' speaking skills, at Intermediate High they can "recombine learned material in order to express personal meaning" but might experience difficulty in maintaining "paragraph-length discourse" (ACTFL, 2012, p. 7). For this reason, depending on the learners' proficiency level, we recommend allowing them to use English in the post-viewing activities (particularly for tasks 8–9) as a resource to facilitate communication and to ensure that potential language barriers do not impede critical analysis and reflection on political propaganda and its mechanisms.

### *6.1 Pre-viewing activities*

Before watching the talk show segment, we suggest asking learners about their viewing habits and activating their prior knowledge. For this purpose, they ask each other questions (1) which can then be discussed in class.

(1) Поработайте в парах и ответьте на вопросы:

1. Какие у вас любимые телепередачи и на каких телеканалах вы их смотрите?
2. Смотрели ли вы когда-нибудь российские телепередачи? Если да, то какие? Какие российские телеканалы вы знаете?
3. Известный шахматист Пётр Свидлер еще в 2018 г. посоветовал изучающим русский язык не смотреть российское телевидение, так как это «вредно для здоровья». Как вы думаете, почему Свидлер считает, что российское телевидение может быть «вредным для здоровья»?<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Svidler, 2018, min. 01:14:48-01:15:20.

Depending on the learners' prior knowledge, they should be provided with some background information on Russian talk shows in general and on *60 Minutes* in particular (see Sections 2 and 4). This information can be either presented by the instructor or learners can search for the information themselves (e.g., names of the hosts, channel, format, main topics). In the next step, learners receive lexical guidance and become familiar with the key words and expressions used in the show. This lexical scaffolding consists of two tasks that foster better listening comprehension. In the first task (2), learners match the words and expressions in the left column with the explanations in the right. In the second task (3), learners try to form adjectives or verbs from the given nouns. This should activate their existing knowledge and grammar skills and help them find the words' meaning. At the end, they check their results with a dictionary.

(2) Найдите подходящие соответствия (а–й) следующих слов (1–10).

Пример (0.) сделан.

- |                                     |  |
|-------------------------------------|--|
| 0) <i>вызывать бешенство</i>        | а. когда представители различных рас создают семью и заводят детей |
| 1) омерзительно                     | б. <i>вызывать гнев</i>  |
| 2) победить нацизм                  | в. попробовать   |
| 3) попытаться                       | г. продвижение собственных убеждений                               |
| 4) оскорбление                      | д. женщины, которые целуются                                       |
| 5) целующиеся лесбиянки             | е. победа над фашизмом   |
| 6) смешение рас                     | ё. обида   |
| 7) болезненно реагировать на что-то | ж. меньшая часть какой-л. группы (людей)                           |
| 8) толкать свои идеи                | з. проявлять сильную негативную реакцию на что-то                  |
| 9) безобидный                       | и. противно, отвратительно   |
| 10) меньшинство                     | й. неопасный, невредный  |

(3) Образуйте от существительных (1–6) соответствующие прилагательные и/или глаголы и укажите значение этих слов на английском языке. Проверьте ваши результаты со словарём. Пример (0.) сделан.

0) смешение – смешивать/смешать что-л. с чем-л., смешанный:  
*mixing, confusion, mixture*

- 1) мерзость
- 2) уважение
- 3) оскорбление
- 4) уничтожение
- 5) замещение
- 6) бешенство

### 6.2 *Silent viewing activities*

Although the entire segment of *Limits of Tolerance* has a running time of 15 minutes, our tasks are limited to the first five minutes, because the first part contains the crucial moments of the debate (see Section 5). As a start, we recommend watching the selected talk show segment (min. 00:43:51–00:49:36) without sound in order to focus the learners' attention on the visual elements and text graphics. This silent viewing approach aims at sensitizing learners to the formal characteristics of the show and, at the same time, encourages them to make assumptions about the content of the broadcast. To focus the learners' attention, they are divided into two groups (A and B): Group A focuses on the images and brand logos displayed on the studio screen (4A), while Group B pays close attention to the text graphics (e.g., the comments on social media displayed on the screen) (4B). In the plenary session that follows, the instructor leads a discussion about the findings of both groups, and together they make assumptions about the topic of the segment (4B).

(4A) Посмотрите фрагмент (мин. 00:43:51 – 00:49:36) без звука. Какие картинки и логотипы брендов можно увидеть на экране? Отметьте все описания картинок и логотипов, которые вы видите в этом фрагменте.

- чернокожий мужчина и белокожая женщина держатся за руки

- две девочки в белых свитерах
- ZARA
- две женщины, которые целуются
- чернокожий и белокожий человек, которые целуются
- Levi's
- чернокожий мужчина и белокожая женщина целуются
- H&M
- два мальчика в черных свитерах

(4Б) Посмотрите фрагмент (мин. 00:43:51–00:49:36) без звука. Какие текстовые вставки/надписи можно увидеть на экране во время ток-шоу? Отметьте все текстовые вставки/надписи, которые вы видите в этом фрагменте.

- Границы толерантности.
- 14 фев. 2020: С Днём всех влюблённых!
- 14 фев. 2020: С Днём рождения!
- Смешение рас — это уничтожение своего народа.
- У нас есть свое понимание в обществе — что хорошо, что плохо.
- Мультикультурализм — это омерзительно.
- Дорогие товарищи расисты, успокойтесь!
- У нас в России никогда не было рабов.
- Толерантность — это дружба.
- Мультикультурализм требуют наши сердца.

(4В) Как вы думаете, о чем говорят гости и ведущие в этом шоу?

### 6.3 *While-viewing activity*

Following the silent viewing activity, the talk show segment is shown with sound (min. 00:43:51–00:49:36). As a while-viewing activity, we suggest focusing on what hosts and guests say. For this reason, learners are asked to match the statements with those individuals (hosts or guests) who make them (5). We recommend watching the segment two times.

(5) Посмотрите сейчас фрагмент из ток-шоу 60 минут (мин. 00:43:51–00:49:36) со звуком дважды. При втором просмотре

соотнесите высказывания с ведущими (Ольга Скабеева—ОС, Евгений Попов—ЕП) и гостями (Игорь Коротченко—ИК, Михаил Конев—МК). Пример (0.) сделан.

- (0) «Почему такая болезненная реакция, и почему она такая массовая?» \_ОС\_
- (1) «У нас есть свое понимание в обществе — что хорошо, что плохо». \_\_\_\_\_
- (2) «Для меня ужасно стоять здесь, в стране, которая победила нацизм, и обсуждать, что черная рука с белой рукой вместе—это плохо». \_\_\_\_\_
- (3) «А может быть попытаетесь понять, почему люди думают, что это плохо? Может быть потому, что этого у нас нет». \_\_\_\_\_
- (4) «Нам не надо родитель №1 (номер один) и родитель №2 (номер два). Нам не надо целующиеся лесбиянки в качестве рекламы в других фирмах. Это не наше». \_\_\_\_\_
- (5) «Это ни хорошо и ни плохо. Это нормально». \_\_\_\_\_

#### 6.4 Post-viewing activities

In the post-viewing activities, learners are encouraged to identify the propaganda strategies employed in the talk show segment and to recognize the conservative to ultra-right values that are conveyed. As a first reflection task, we suggest that learners examine the asymmetrical distribution of speech (6), which becomes apparent when watching the segment: Korotchenko, who represents the state ideology and the conservative position, is given the opportunity to express his opinion without interruption, while Konev, who shows a more liberal attitude, is repeatedly interrupted by the host. If the language instructor is well informed about TV talk shows in the U.S., learners can be encouraged to compare *60 Minutes* with what might be familiar to them from U.S. TV content (7).

(6) Если обратить внимание на речь участников, что вы наблюдаете: кто говорит больше и громче? Кого постоянно перебивают? Какая точка зрения доминирует в эфире?

(7) Какие высказывания по тону и содержанию соответствует тому, что можно услышать на американских ток-шоу? Видите

ли вы сходство между участниками *60 минут* и выступающими на консервативных американских каналах?

In the following activity the learners are guided to discern and reflect on the anti-Western, conservative values conveyed in the talk show (8). To this end, learners work in small groups and discuss the questions (1–3), which are subsequently presented and discussed in class. The aim of the discussion task is to find a thorough reasoning why the statements of Korotchenko and Popov are discriminatory and contradict democratic values.

(8) Обсудите следующие вопросы (1–3) в маленьких группах, а потом представьте результаты всем.

1. Игорь Коротченко считает, что в Европе [на Западе] замена слов «мама» и «папа» терминами «родитель №1» и «родитель №2» — нечто обычное, норма. Прав ли он? Слышали ли вы такое обращение к родителям в повседневном общении?
2. Какие для вас главные демократические ценности? Какие ценности, о которых говорят в ток-шоу, противоречат вашим представлениям о демократическом обществе / ценностям вашего университета?
3. Какие высказывания Коротченко являются дискриминационными и почему?

In the last task, we suggest working with statements from social media presented in the talk show segment (9). To understand that these statements are ultra-right and racist, learners are encouraged to examine the terms in bold and answer the following questions by searching online for explanations and definitions.

(9) В ток-шоу на экран выводятся некоторые высказывания (1–3) из социальных сетей, которые содержат явно расистские идеи. Прочитайте высказывания и ответьте на вопросы ниже. По указанным ссылкам вы можете найти краткую информацию о значениях выделенных слов и словосочетаний.

- (1) «**Мерзость. Межрасовая мерзость. Когда через безобидную публикацию толкают свои **левые идеи.****»

— Что означает «левый» и «правый» в политическом смысле? Откуда происходит это различие? Какие идеологии традиционно относят к левым, какие к правым течениям? Какие политические идеи и взгляды ассоциируются с «левыми», а какие с «правыми»? Какие идеи подразумевает автор поста?

Краткую информацию об этой теме вы можете найти здесь: [https://aif.ru/politics/world/v\\_chem\\_otlichie\\_levyh\\_ot\\_pravyh\\_v\\_politike](https://aif.ru/politics/world/v_chem_otlichie_levyh_ot_pravyh_v_politike)

- (2) «**Мультикультурализм— это омерзительно.**»

— Что такое «мультикультурализм» и с какими ценностями это понятие связано? Какие социальные группы в государстве получают защиту благодаря мультикультурализму? Какие положительные стороны имеет мультикультурализм и какие критические замечания существуют в его адрес? Как вы думаете, какая политическая или общественная позиция стоит за высказыванием «Мультикультурализм— это омерзительно.»?

Информацию об этой теме вы можете найти здесь: <https://bakuforum.az/ru/multikulturalizm-dostizheniya-i-problemy/?fid=2257>

- (3) «**Великое замещение. Не покупайте у этих глобалистов.**»

— Из какого языка заимствовано понятие «великое замещение»? Какой писатель использовал это понятие в своем романе? Какую ключевую идею содержит это понятие? Какими политическими партиями или группировками и для какой цели оно было использовано в последние годы?

Краткую информацию об этой теме вы можете найти здесь: <https://trends.rbc.ru/trends/social/62ffaa099a7947418b562d72>

## 7. Recommendations for using material from Russian TV in the language classroom

Finally, we would like to provide some general recommendations for the use of audiovisual media in language teaching, particularly concerning material from Russian television. Although Russian TV is a source of authentic material, freely available on the internet, finding suitable programs and broadcasts appears to be a challenging task, especially due to the heavily propagandistic content, such as the war in Ukraine and anti-Western resentment. Therefore, instructors should carefully choose programs and broadcasts and design appropriate tasks for the language classroom. As this endeavor is challenging and time-consuming, we recommend working in instructor teams. Furthermore, the crucial question is what the students should learn from the material. As we have tried to demonstrate in this article, we recommend refraining from the use of Russian talk shows or news broadcasts merely for listening tasks or grammar exercises. However, if combined with tasks aimed at promoting CLP, i.e. critical thinking, reflecting on social and moral issues or democratic values, Russian talk shows can be highly informative and instructive. Alternatively, non-political talk shows can provide useful options from Russian TV that are easier to work with. A suitable example is *Fashion Verdict*, which was closed when the war started and reintroduced on NTV as *Модный vs Народный* [Fashionable vs. Folk]. The show provides light entertainment for Russian-speaking audiences and is useful for discussing gender-based stereotypes or family and partnership relations in the Russian language classroom.

## 8. Conclusion

In this article, we have characterized talk shows as one of the most important propaganda tools in the Russian media environment. A prominent example is the Russia-1 talk show *60 Minutes*. Even before the full-scale war, defamation of Ukraine and propagation of right-wing ideology and conservative and traditional values were frequently on the show's agenda. The segment *Limits of Tolerance*, aired in the February 17, 2020 broadcast, demonstrates values and statements currently promoted on Russian TV. It is a prime example in this regard, as it illustrates how traditional and conservative values—together with racist statements—are declared “ours,” while tolerance of non-heteronormative family models is rejected and portrayed as Western, flawed, and abnormal.

Through close analysis, with level-appropriate scaffolding, in the Russian language classroom, this segment can thus serve as a ‘lesson’ on Russian TV propaganda and can promote media literacy and strengthen critical thinking – two primary 21<sup>st</sup>-century skills.

Analyzing the purposes and attitudes embedded in media messages and identifying highly biased information and propaganda is more important than ever. Accordingly, in this article, we suggest tasks that focus on the main ideas and ideological concepts conveyed in the segment *Limits of Tolerance*. These tasks are consistent with a CLP approach that addresses socially and politically relevant and controversial issues in the language classroom to encourage students to become critical thinkers and responsible citizens.

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