Spatial-Temporal Boundaries of African Civilizations Reconsidered: Part 2

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West African/Western Sudanic cities. None appear on Chandler’s list through AD 622. Thereafter the picture (with sporadic supportive or alternative readings from other workers) is:

<table>
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<th>City</th>
<th>Size</th>
<th>Lower limit</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AD 800</td>
<td>Gao</td>
<td>72,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Awdaghost</td>
<td>no estimate</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sijilmessa (Morocco) at 24,000 may also be mentioned as the nearest trans-Saharan city to West African civilization on Chandler’s city lists. Sijilmessa became an important political and economic center around AD 780. (Lewicki, 1988:280) It would be reasonable to suppose that this was due to a trans-Saharan trade, and therefore that at least one similar prosperous sub-Saharan urban terminus must have arisen no later than this time. Songhay began trans-Saharan trade with Tahert, Algeria in the mid-8th century, and developed the trade town of Gao north of the old capital Kukiya. (Levtzion, 1978:677-678)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AD 900</td>
<td>Gao</td>
<td>40-36,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
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</table>

Sijilmessa appears with 35-32,000.

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Year</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Size</th>
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<tr>
<td>AD 1000</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>30,000</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tademekka</td>
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Spatio-Temporal Boundaries of African Civilization: Part I was published in Comparative Civilizations Review 29 (Fall 1993) : 52-90.
Sijilmessa appears with no estimate. Awdaghost was "a big town," "a town of several thousand inhabitants, very busy in the tenth and eleventh centuries and undoubtedly struck by a disaster in the middle of the latter century." (Devisse, 1988:414-416)

AD 1100

Gao 35-32,000 30,000

Songhay moved its capital to Gao by the mid-10th century. (Levtzion, 1978:677-678; Niane says toward the end of the 11th century, 1984:123; Cissoko says in the 12th century, 1984:187-188)

AD 1200

Gao 25,000 +
Ghana 25,000
Walata 25-20,000
Zagha none

Sijilmessa also appears with no size estimate. Takrur city (site not located; Chandler's Zagha) was a metropolis according to al-Bakri. (Niane, 1984:123)

AD 1300

Mali 40,000
Walata 25-20,000
Gao 25,000
Jenne 20,000 none

Probably during the reign of Mansa Musa I (1307-1332), Walata started to become important, and Jenne and Timbuktu "started to develop into cities that were to be world-famous a century later." (Niane, 1984:151)

AD 1400

Mali 50,000
Gao 40,000
Walkokh 30-20,000
Jenne 20,000
Timbuktu 20,000
Ouagadougou none none

"The [Mali] capital, Niani, had at least 100,000 inhabitants in the fourteenth century." (Niane, 1984:156) Walkokh (Jolof), in Senegal, had its connections with the Upper Niger. From the second half of the fourteenth century, Timbuktu replaced Walata as the chief southern caravan terminus.
OUAGADOUGOU (of the Mossi), though not on the Niger, is near enough to Jenne, Mali (and Gao) for it to be most unlikely to have constituted a new civilization. Mossi politicomilitary relations at this period were with the Middle Niger.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Gao</th>
<th>Mali</th>
<th>Walkokh</th>
<th>Jenne</th>
<th>Ouagadougou</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AD 1500</td>
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<td>40,000</td>
<td>25-20,000</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Niane gives Mali/Niani some 60,000 inhabitants at the start of the sixteenth century. (Niane, 1984:156)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Timbuktu</th>
<th>Segu</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AD 1600</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD 1700</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD 1800</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cissoko gives figures of 30-40,000 for Jenne, 80,000 for Timbuktu (vs. Mauny's 25,000), and nearly 100,000 for Gao—the "three largest towns"—toward the end of the 16th century. (Cissoko, 1984:206) Presumably these figures predate the catastrophic demise of the Songhay empire, which Chandler's reflect.

_Earlier datings for a West African civilizational startup?_ There are suggestions that there was a state of Ghana as early as the 10th century BC or at all events in the third century AD. (De Medeiros, 1988:129) "Community life" or "town life," with trade, division of labor, and metalworking was to be found sub-Sahara starting as early as the second century AD. (Devisse, 1988:376) There was trans-Saharan trade with Roman and Byzantine North Africa. (Andah, 1981:618) Niane asserts that Jenne-Jeno (Old Jenne) was settled in the third century BC, and at its greatest extent, some 34 hectares, around AD 500. (Niane, 1984:117-118) Niane sees new Jenne as a major commercial center by about AD 800. (Niane, 1984:118)

A "town" existed at Jenne-Jeno between 400 and 900; it "developed greatly" from 900 to 1400. (Devisse, 1988:417) Chandler estimates it at 20,000 by 1400. Evidently more digging will be needed to locate the crossing of the demographic threshold, and to decide whether Kumbi Saleh, Awdaghost, Kugha and Jenne grew by accretion or by sudden condensation.

_West Africa in the 9th century AD._ There were complex states as well as
cities. Ghana was certainly an empire, i.e. a kingdom with a king-of-kings, by no later than AD 872. (Levtzion, 1978:667) Levtzion notes a gift-deputation from the ruler of Tahert, Algeria, to the “king of the Sudan” about AD 871, but attributes no political substance to it.

The question of whether the Upper Niger and Middle Niger areas formed a single sociopolitical network is worth raising. Apparently they did so, and quite early. Already by the 9th century, Tademekka dominated an area to its south, opposite Gao on the Middle Niger (9 days walk away), secured gold from Ghana (Upper Niger area), and warred with it. (Lewicki, 1988:306)

West Africa in the 10th century AD. By the middle of the next century, the far western and far eastern ends of the system were in touch: apparently around AD 960, the king of Awdaghost exchanged gifts with the ruler of Kugha (i.e. old Gao). (Levtzion, 1978:671) These gifts had political meaning: Kugha “was at that period so powerful that the King of Awdaghost thought it prudent to make presents to the king of that place (the King of Songhay), in order to prevent him from making war upon him.” (Barth, 1965:III, 658)

Sijilmassa and Awdaghost were the northern and southern termini of the major western trans-Saharan commercial routes. But trans-Saharan political bonding well postdates this trade, leaving a window for the autonomous development of at least one sub-Saharan civilization. There was plenty of politicomilitary activity at both ends of the route. In the tenth century, Fatimids, Umayyads, and their local allies fought over Sijilmassa. In the tenth and eleventh centuries sedentary Ghana and the nomadic Sanhaja contested for Awdaghost. But between Sijilmassa and Awdaghost control of the routes belonged to nomads. (Levtzion, 1978:647-652) Devisse argues cogently that the trans-Saharan route from Tahert was open from the second half of the eighth century, but infirm until the tenth. (Devisse, 1988:370-389)

Sijilmassa was two months from Awdaghost according to Ibn Hawkal (c. 950); the latter was ten days’ march from Ghana city. The tenth century writer al-Muhallabi gave forty days rather than two months, through sand and desert. (Lewicki, 1988:310) Absent reports to the contrary, it is fair to assume that this journey prevented significant politico-military interaction, even though the desert was notoriously permeable by trade.

West Africa in the 11th century AD. When was the intercivilizational
politico-military barrier finally breached? With the Almoravids? Levtzion believes that “the Almoravids’ exploits marked a decisive stage in a long process in which black sedentaries retreated south to the Sahel as the Berber nomads advanced.” (Levtzion, 1978:665) For nomads to displace a civilization (because a great drought made its way of life untenable) (Levtzion, 1978:665-666) surely implies that it is less integrated, rather than more so, with neighboring civilizations. Consistent with Levtzion’s argument is the fact that rather than controlling Awdaghost the Almoravids destroyed it in 1055. (De Medeiros, 1988:135) Their alleged justification was its submission to Ghana. (Lewicki, 1988:311) From our perspective, what is significant is that (a) they could destroy it at all—it was weakened; and (b) it was not refounded—its viability must have been marginal already.

Levtzion nonetheless asserts that with the Almoravid conquest “the western Sudan...became more closely attached to the Maghrib” far beyond the period of the occupation, after having “previously been connected with the Maghrib by enterprising traders only.” (Levtzion, 1977:331) But the connections cited are economic—more trade—and cultural—more proselytization—rather than politicomilitary.

As regards the politicomilitary connection, the victorious Almoravids found it both necessary and impossible to be on both sides of the Sahara at once. They had to cross and recross between northern and southern termini in the 1050’s, and then to divide into northern and southern wings in the 1070’s and 1080’s, to conquer both Morocco and Ghana. (Levtzion, 1977:333-335) In 1083 the Almoravids and Ghana enforced Islamic orthodoxy in Tademekka. (Levtzion, 1977:349) But Almoravid political domination in the Sudan was brief, perhaps only a decade, and left but a few linkage-traces. (Levtzion, 1977:335-336, 349)

The Almoravid legacy was also one of intracivilizational political dissolution rather than integration. After the Almoravid conquest, Ghana became but one of several states: Diafunu to its west, Mema to its east, Susu to its south (Levtzion, 1977:351), Tekrur further west extending its authority up the Senegal to the former sphere of Ghana. (Levtzion, 1977:353) Again, this was a continuation rather than a reversal of previous trends: the provinces of Mande (Manding) and Takrur had thrown off Ghana’s rule “as early as the middle of the eleventh century.” (Niane, 1984:119)

West Africa in the 12th century AD. Takrur reached its zenith between
the end of the eleventh and the middle of the twelfth century, controlling the city of Barissa and the salt-mines of Aoulil. (Niane, 1984:120) Soso (its city unidentified) expanded toward the end of the twelfth century. Its king Sumaguru Kante fought with Mande nine times, ruled all the ex-Ghana provinces except Mande and made that a vassal, driving it into revolt. (Niane, 1984:125-126) This is not a well-documented century. Between the fall of Kumbi Saleh to the Almoravids around 1076 and the victory of Sundiata in 1235, little is written about the Western Sudan. (Niane, 1984:118)

West Africa in the 13th century AD. Sundiata of Mande, with a force from Mema, led the Malinke revolt against Soso and razed the town of Soso. He conquered most of what Ghana had controlled. Jolof, Diafunu, Takrur and Gao were all conquered by him or his immediate successors between 1220 and about 1310. (Niane, 1984:130-147) Takrur, contemporary of Ghana, had been independent of it, but fell within the sphere of Sundiata Mali (c. 1230-1260). (Fage, 1977:484-486) In the 13th century, the Mali empire "seems to have imposed its hegemony over the whole of Senegambia" for a century. (Person, 1984:313)

West Africa in the 14th century AD. Mali conquered Songhay by about 1300; Songhay however shrugged off Mali's yoke by the end of that century. (Niane, 1984:147, 161) Mali under Mansa Musa (1312-1337?) seems to have had authority over the emerging Jolof kingdom of the Wolof people of the lower Senegal. Until about the second half of the 14th century the Wolof remained within Mali's sphere of influence, and then became independent under the Jolof "empire." (Levtzion, 1977:381,456) The Jolof "confederacy" had formed after 1360, and became hegemonic over northern Senegambia (Barry, 1992:263), taking over Takrur, further inland. (Fage, 1977:484-486)

There were tentative trans-Saharan politicomilitary interactions in this century, which promised more than occurred. Princes of the Maghrib asked Mansa Musa for help in recovering their thrones. (Niane, 1984:164) Apparently they got none. After the Marinid Moroccan conquest of Tlemcen in 1337 brought the main western-route north-end caravan termini under one authority, Mali and Morocco were in diplomatic touch until 1360, but the decline of both states broke off this potential linkage. (Levtzion, 1977:357,395-396) For about two centuries after 1360 the dynastic struggles in Morocco kept it out of politico-military touch with the Sudan. (Levtzion, 1977:410) Succession crises also began in Mali about 1387. (Ly-tall,
Under such circumstances, serious connections could hardly have been maintained. Ibn Battuta recounted the difficulties of the journey from Sijilmassa to Walata in 1352. Without guides, the routes could not be found; water for ten days had to be carried; a water party had to come four days' travel out from Walata to reach the caravan. (Levtzion, 1977:370-371) Sustained politico-military relations would evidently have required coordinated commitments on both ends of the route.


Tentative politicomilitary nibblings at the fringe occurred toward the end of the century, presaging the larger-scale intrusions of the next. In the 15th century European explorers found five vassal kingdoms of the Jolof empire (whose capital was inland) upon the Senegal-Gambia coast. (Niane, 1984:130-147) In 1455 the Portuguese established commercial relations with the Wolof south of the Senegal river. (Levtzion, 1977:452) By the 1480's the Portuguese were using state power on the coast and the seas to monopolize the Senegal sea trade. (Fage, 1977:503-504) In the 1480's Portugal intervened in internal struggles in order to support a candidate for the Jolof empire, which broke apart instead. (Levtzion, 1977:456-457, Fage, 1977:508) The Portuguese sent embassies to Futa, Timbuktu and Mali between 1481 and 1495. (Ly-tall, 1984:182-183) Portugal and Mali established diplomatic relations from “the fifteenth century onwards.” (Ly-tall, 1984:174. Fage however refers to attempts to establish diplomatic relations with Mali as unsuccessful; 1977:508) The Portuguese trade assisted small coastal kingdoms—Waalo, Bawol, Kayar, Siin, Salum—in freeing themselves from Jolof. (Barry, 1992:267-268. Ly-tall mentions Mali rather than Jolof; 1984:182-183)

**West Africa in the 16th century AD.** Askiya Muhammad of Songhay
(1492-1528) controlled Teghaza in the north and Hausaland in the east. (Cissoko, 1984:194) Adamu (1984:280-281) questions the latter assertion despite the particularity of Leo Africanus’ account. Even so, however the argument over control is resolved, politicomilitary contact was clearly established (via Kebbi) with whatever civilizational network extended over Hausaland (q.v., infra.)

About 1501 or 1502 Zara (Diara) fell to Songhay under Askiya Muhammad. The Fulani Futa Toro state attacked Zara around 1512 but were driven out by Songhay forces, but then attacked Jolof, expanded against it, and dominated it till the first half of the eighteenth century. Futa Toro attacked Mali’s Bambuk gold fields about 1534 and controlled them by 1600. (Ly-tall, 1984:181-182; Levtzion, 1977:457-458) In 1537, Kaabu, the western province of Mali, became independent, gradually evolving into the local empire of southern Senegambia. (Wondji, 1992:389) Kaabu survived as a state until 1867. (Person, 1984:313-315)

In 1537 diplomacy again crossed the Sahara. The Sultan of Marrakesh demanded that Songhay hand over the salt mines of Taghaza, but was rebuffed. (Levtzion, 1977:410) In the 1540’s the Moroccan sultan sought to control Wadan and Taghaza, but “was unable to employ military force in the desert.” (Levtzion, 1977:411) The Moroccans seized Taghaza in 1556-1557, but agreed to share salt revenues with Askiya Dawud of Songhay. (Abitbol, 1992:300-301)

Both the Portuguese and the Ottoman Turks showed an interest in the middle Niger about this time, the Portuguese trying in 1565 to reach Timbuktu via Senegal, while the Turks sent expeditions into the Sahara from Algeria in 1552 and 1578-1579, and conquered the Fezzan in 1557. (Abitbol, 1992:301) The Portuguese were detained by struggles involving Bainuk and Kasanga interests on the Senegambian coast, which had organized themselves sufficiently to fight c. 1570-1590. (Barry, 1992:266-267)

By the 1580’s Morocco had become able to extend itself militarily in the Sahara. The Moroccan caliph al-Mansur seized Saharan Algeria in 1582, accepted an alliance with Bornu, doubtless against the Turks, in 1583, made an abortive attack on Senegal in 1584, nearly attacked Songhay in 1586. (Abitbol, 1992:301) With Songhay badly weakened by its civil war of 1588, musketeers providing Morocco with military superiority, and the prospect of gold and slaves to be acquired, Morocco finally invaded the Sudan 1590-1591 and defeated Songhay at Tondibi. (Levtzion, 1977:411-414, 440-442)
A puppet Askiya was established in Timbuktu, while an independent resister set himself up at Dendi. (Levtzion, 1977:443) The Moroccans conquered Gao, Kukya, Timbuktu, Jenne and other river ports and destroyed the Songhay empire 1590-1594. (Abitbol, 1992:304) In 1599 Morocco defended Jenne from attacks by Mali. (Levtzion, 1977:455)

The role of military technology in establishing politicomilitary connections has here to be acknowledged. In his first, failed attempt on Songhay "the Emperor of Morocco sent a very numerous host, said to be 20,000 strong.... But this time also the danger passed by, the numbers of the army themselves causing its ruin in consequence of hunger and thirst." (Barth, 1965:III, 673-674) The second, successful Moroccan army numbered only 3600—but 3600 musketeers, and "the Songhay do not seem to have possessed a single musket." (1965:III, 675, 676)

West Africa in the 17th century AD. By now the penetration and entrainment of the Western Sudan by Central states and processes was well advanced. In the seventeenth century, the Dutch, French and English broke the Portuguese trade monopoly on the Guinea coast. (Barry, 1992:268-271) In 1641, the Dutch compelled the other European states to acknowledge their trading monopoly over the whole Guinea coast. (Wondji,1992:390) But France and England, among others, soon undertook to break that monopoly too; forts and trading posts went up in Senegambia and elsewhere. (Wondji, 1992:390-391) The process of fortifying trading posts meant that during the seventeenth century the Senegambian coast was partitioned into Dutch, French, English and Portuguese spheres of influence. The French eventually got the lion’s share. (Barry, 1992:262, 268-271) The sultans of Morocco turned their thrust west from the Niger basin, to counter and rival the Europeans, undertaking to penetrate, subjugate and raid in Mauritania and Senegal. (Abitbol, 1992:314-315)

Morocco stopped appointing or reinforcing the pashas of Timbuktu after 1618, and the pashalik developed into an autonomous settler-colonial state, with the Bambara state of Segu and the Tuareg confederacy as its neighbors. (Abitbol, 1992:307) The pashas of Timbuktu generally gave allegiance to the sultans of Morocco, who made few or no demands on them. (Abitbol, 1992:314-315) By the late seventeenth century the pashalik had devolved into four more or less autonomous garrison states. (Abitbol, 1992:308) A residual Songhay state, with the help of Kebbi, maintained some independence. (Abitbol, 1992:310-312)

The disruption caused by the Atlantic slave trade provoked c. 1659-1677
a nominally anti-slavery religious and revolutionary war in the vicinity of the French sphere in Senegal; however, the war was economically based on the trans-Saharan (slave, etc.) trade. In the first phase of the war, Berber marabouts overthrew local aristocracies. The French, preferring to face small, warlike aristocratic states rather than a large Islamic political grouping which might have broken the monopoly and controlled terms of trade on the Senegal river, intervened to restore the fallen aristocracies 1674-1677. (Barry, 1992:274-277)

West Africa in the 18th century AD. Through the eighteenth century, the French intervened in succession crises on the Senegambian coast to keep the states there small; they fought the Dutch and English there, with local allies and enemies also involved. Morocco also became militarily entangled in the Senegambian struggle. (Barry, 1992:279-285) The seventeenth century defeat of the Muslim marabout movement on the coast was followed by repression, diaspora, Muslim revolutions, and Muslim theocracies. But even in the inland revolutionary jihad states it was possible for the French to intervene: Futa Toro, the nearest to St. Louis on the Senegal and the most aggressive toward the end of the eighteenth century, found its influence limited by French aid to its rebels, secessionists, and external enemies. (Barry, 1992:295-299)

Analysis. There was a historically autonomous civilization in West Africa, from Senegambia through the Middle Niger, which maintained an autonomous politicomilitary process despite brief episodes of linkage to Central civilization via Morocco in the eleventh and fourteenth centuries. Already jeopardized by Portuguese penetration of Senegambia toward the end of the fifteenth century, its autonomy was definitively ended in the sixteenth century by a successful Moroccan invasion of the Niger basin, forestalling attempts at penetration both by Portugal via Senegal and by the Ottoman empire via Algeria. This successful preclusive imperialist venture was followed by a passive exercise of Moroccan suzerainty on the Niger and a shift in the locus of penetration. The 17th and 18th century saw a struggle among Moroccans, Europeans and local states and revolutionaries in Senegambia.
Chadian cities. None appear on Chandler’s lists through AD 900. Then:

<table>
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<th>Year</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>AD 1000</td>
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</tr>
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<td>AD 1100</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>25-20,000</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD 1200</td>
<td>Njimiye</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD 1300</td>
<td>Njimiye</td>
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<td>Krenik</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Masenya</td>
<td>30,000</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other data and datings may be noted. The place Kanem, under the Zaghawa, with “no towns,” is mentioned by al-Yakubi AD 872. (Lange and Barkindo, 1988:445) Al-Muhallabi (late 10th century) mentions “two towns, Manan and Tarazaki.” (Lange and Barkindo, 1988:450) Between the 9th and 10th century the Zaghawa nomads of Kanem had thus acquired two towns, Manan being the capital, and become settled. (Levtzion, 1978:680-681) Al-Idrisi, writing AD 1154, mentions Manan and Njimi as towns. (Lange and Barkindo, 1988:457) In the mid-12th century, Manan was still a small town. (Levtzion, 1978:681-682) Manan had been the Zaghawa permanent capital for at least a century prior to the shift to Djimi about 1100; Djimi was the Sefuwa capital for three centuries. (Lange, 1984:244)

Chadland to the 9th century AD. The record is confused and will not be clarified without considerable archaeological work. The So mounds south of Lake Chad show occupation AD 500-1300. There may or may not have been politico-military ties with the Niger delta. (Fage, 1977:473-474) Lange and Barkindo (1988:447-448) propose that a large trading state of Kanem is already implied in a report of Wahb b. Munabbih (d. AD 730). “The extent of Nubia’s relations with Kanem-Bornu...remains uncertain pending further systematic archaeological work. The key area for investiga-
tion is Darfur...." (Kropacek, 1984:420) Arkell sees Tundjur rule in Darfur as under Nubian protection, and flourishing between the 8th and 10th centuries. (Kropacek, 1984:420-421)

Chadland, 10th century AD. A more conventional view is that Bornu-area states were beginning to form about the 10th and 11th centuries. (Fage, 1977:476-477) Lange and Barkindo assert that there were "diplomatic relations" and "diplomatic missions" between North Africa and Kanem, perhaps from AD 992, certainly from 1228. The examples they cite (gifts of slaves and a giraffe) could however be interpreted as trade-promotion only. (Lange and Barkindo, 1988:452)

Chadland, 11th century AD. In the middle of the eleventh century, Arku b. Bulu, Zaghawa king of Kanem, established slave colonies northward into the Fezzan. (Lange and Barkindo, 1988:453) Evidence of reciprocal southward politicization is currently lacking. Lange and Barkindo date the Islamization of Kanem, and the replacement of a Zaghawa by a Sefuwa dynasty, to the last half of the 11th century. (Lange and Barkindo, 1988:454-460)

Chadland, 12th century AD. The trade route from Kanem north ran through Kawar (past the salt mines of Bilma and Agram) to the Fezzan and Tripoli. In the first half of the 12th century Kawar and the Fezzan were independent. In 1172-1173 the Mamluks of Egypt conquered the Fezzan. (Lange, 1984:249-252).

Chadland, 13th century AD. In the first half of the 13th century Kanem took control of Kawar and the Fezzan. (Lange, 1984:251-252) Lange and Barkindo give 1228 as the date from which there were certainly diplomatic relations between Kanem and North Africa. (1988:452) Arkell sees a conquest of Darfur by Dunama of Kanem c. 1240, with strong influence for the next 400 years, until the establishment of Fur Kayra power about 1640. (Kropacek, 1984:420-421) By the mid-13th century, Kanem was a powerful expanding kingdom. (Levtzion, 1978:681-682)

Chadland, 14th century AD. Kanem probably continued in control of Kawar and the Fezzan to the middle of the fourteenth century. (Lange, 1984:254) Toward the end of the fourteenth century the Bulala people conquered Kanem, driving the Sefuwa into the previously vassal state of Bornu to the west. (Lange, 1984:257-260) Bornu made a diplomatic complaint to Egypt in 1391 concerning Arab slave-taking (Kropacek, 1984:422), which
could imply that during this period—when Makuria had almost vanished in Nubia—Bornu regarded Egypt as a neighboring state.

Chadland, 15th century AD. Kanem and Bornu were both strong states around the end of the fifteenth century, with Kanem in good relations with Egypt. In the late 15th century the city of Gazargamo was built to serve as the Sefuwa capital, as it would for more than 300 years to come. (Lange, 1984:257-260, 265) Gazargamu was built as a fortress in about 1472. (Barkindo, 1992:493)

Chadland, 16th century AD. The Bulala of Kanem and Sefuwa of Bornu fought indecisively and sporadically in the first half of the sixteenth century. (Barkindo, 1992:493-494) Around 1564-1577 Alawoma of Borno embarked on a course of local imperialism, conquest, deportation, enslavement and colonization. Kanem was partly conquered and partly subjected by the 1580’s. (Barkindo, 1992:496-498)

By the early 1500’s many small states had appeared south of Borno, among them Bagirmi; some it fought, some it subjugated, some cooperated peacefully. (Barkindo, 1992:494) In the first half of the sixteenth century Borno had conflicts with Kano, perhaps over control of the expanding settlements on the Chad-Hausaland trade route. (Barkindo, 1992:494) Bornu developed a deep military penetration, with a tribute system, in Hausaland in the sixteenth century. (Fisher, 1975:114-115)

In the sixteenth century Borno had diplomatic and trade relations with the Maghrib, Tripoli and Egypt. (Barkindo, 1992:496) The Ottoman Turks conquered the Fezzan in 1557. (Abitbol, 1992:301) Bornó made several demands on the Ottoman empire around 1574 as regarded security cooperation and the government of the Fezzan, which were conceded in 1577. (Barkindo, 1992:502-503) Nevertheless, in 1582 the king of Bornu sought military assistance from Morocco, possibly against Ottoman incursions, and pledged homage to him. (Levtzion, 1977:414-415)

Late in the sixteenth century the subject-allies Mandara to the south and Bagirmi to the southeast began to assert their independence and were attacked by Borno. (Barkindo, 1992:504)

Chadland, 17th century AD. The Bornu empire was stable in the seventeenth century. Vassals were installed to east and west and buffer states set up along the desert fringe. Wadai was set up beyond Bagirmi, probably to
check it, within Borno's political ambit. (Barkindo, 1992:511-512) Wadai was created somewhere in the vicinity of 1611-1635; it emerged in the seventeenth century as the principal power east of Bornu. (Fisher, 1975:136, 139) Around the same time a Darfur state emerged, to become Wadai's suzerain. "Sometimes Wadai paid tribute both to Bornu and to Darfur.” (Fisher, 1975:139-140)

In the mid-seventeenth century, the Kwararafa pressed on Hausaland, and Bornu helped repel them. (Fisher, 1975:116) In that period, Bornu had diplomatic (gift-exchange) relations with Tripoli. (Fisher, 1975:121-122) Borno, Tripoli and Fezzan cooperated in an unsuccessful attempt to monopolize trans-Saharan trade. (Barkindo, 1992:512)

Chadland, 18th century AD. In the early eighteenth century, Bornu marched against Kano, and Zaria joined the ranks of its tributaries. (Fisher, 1975:116) The Kwararafa fought Bornu in the 18th century; by its end they were tributary. (Fisher, 1975:134-135)

In the late eighteenth century, the Borno hegemony withered and Bagirmi, Wadai, Mandara, and Gobir in Hausaland successfully revolted. (Barkindo, 1992:513) Wadai also got free of Darfur in the second half of the eighteenth century, becoming overlord of Kanem, and even subjugating Bagirmi early in the 19th century. (Fisher, 1975:139-141) Though Bornu’s influence in Hausaland declined by 1800, the Hausa princes appealed to Bornu to protect them against the jihad of Usman dan Fodio. (Fisher, 1975:66)

Analysis. Repeated indications of political contact with Central civilization make the historical autonomy of a Chadland civilization suspect; repeated lapses in the record, or weaknesses in the contacts, render it nonetheless possible.

Both the size of Chadian settlement and the degree of Central involvement are at their most ambiguous before AD 1000. Nubia was expansive militarily and diplomatically in the 8th-10th centuries. A colonial, imperial or reaction state forming at Kanem under Nubian pressure through Darfur cannot be ruled out; nor can a So-nomad interface formation. Excavation in Darfur, the So mounds, and Manan (when located) must be sought to shed light on the period; not even a guess can be reasonably ventured.

The 11th-14th centuries show alternation in Kanem and Egpyt control-
ling the Fezzan, and signs of (sporadic? consequential?) diplomatic relations with North Africa. Kanem’s 13th-century expansion into Darfur seems concurrent with increasing Egyptian pressure on Nubia; was it coordinated? After the Kanem-Bornu split, Egypt seems to have shifted its connections from the previous to the later rulers of Kanem, i.e. to have maintained state rather than personal relationships, a realpolitik approach which suggests a calculation of advantage.

Contacts were particularly strong in the sixteenth century, when Bornu was at its most expansionist. The silent record for the next two centuries most likely indicates that Bornu was a status quo power, and Turkey and Morocco busy expanding or defending elsewhere.

A Chadland/Central Sudanic civilization cannot be ruled out. The Darfur and Fezzan connections may prove tenuous, the diplomatic relations inconsequential before the 16th century. I would however treat such a historically autonomous civilization as no more than possible, and expect rather that European ignorance that there was a significant regional power of the Central system in Chad after about the 13th century stemmed from the fact that it was both non-coastal and Muslim, and in no position to be a threat or a target, and not in need of other allies than those locally available to it.

8. HAUSALAND

Hausaland cities. None appears on Chandler’s list through AD 1100. Then:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Size</th>
<th>Lower limit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AD 1200</td>
<td>Kano</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fage dates the formation of Hausaland states to about the 10th or 11th centuries. (Fage, 1977:476-477) Adamu dates the founding of the city of Kano about 1100, its walls completed by 1200, but its hinterland not entirely subdued till c. 1400. (Adamu, 1984:271)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Size</th>
<th>Lower limit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AD 1300</td>
<td>Turunku</td>
<td>40-30,000</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kano</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD 1400</td>
<td>Kano</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Turunku</td>
<td>30-20,000</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Durbi</td>
<td>30-20,000</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD 1500</td>
<td>Kano</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Agades was a caravan and political center from the fifteenth century. (Levtzion, 1977:433) “Gobir” may have existed at Marandet from the ninth to the fifteenth century, but was reloacted to the present Gobir from the middle of that century, where it protected a salt route. (Adamu, 1984:276) Katsina was established as a walled city in the last half of the fifteenth century and conquered a local kingdom. (Adamu, 1984:273)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1600</td>
<td>Zaria</td>
<td>60,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Katsina</td>
<td>60,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kano</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Surame (Kebbi)</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gobir</td>
<td>35,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agades</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Kebbi was a Songhay sub-province in the late fifteenth century. (Adamu, 1984:277-278) Zaria was established at about the end of the fifteenth century by the merger of two growing town-kingdoms from perhaps the fourteenth century, Turunku and Kufena. (Adamu, 1984:274-275)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1700</td>
<td>Katsina</td>
<td>60,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Zaria</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agades</td>
<td>45,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kano</td>
<td>35,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Naya/Chibiri</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kebbi</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Zamfara</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Puje</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Zamfara may have had a permanent capital from early in the sixteenth century. (Adamu, 1984:276-277)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1800</td>
<td>Katsina</td>
<td>70,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alkalawa</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Zaria</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kebbi</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kano</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kiawa</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

_Hausaland in the 14th century._ Kano subjugated its hinterland and...
destroyed its rival city Santolo in the late 14th century. (Adamu, 1984:271) The Jukun empire in the southern Benue basin, whose capital Adamu identifies as Kwararafa, was a powerful state in the fourteenth, perhaps even the thirteenth century. (Adamu, 1984:282-283) In the late 14th century Kano fought the Kwararafa/Jukun and Zaria/Zegzeg, i.e. Turunku and/or Kufena. (Adamu, 1984:272, 274-275)

Malian traders built up trade and proselytized in Kano in the second half of the 14th century. (Levtzion, 1977:375) But Adamu avers that Mali "never played any political role in Hausa history." (Adamu, 1984:280) Bornu ties to Hausaland began to develop with the foundation of Bornu shortly before 1400. (Fisher, 1975:114)

Hausaland in the 15th century. Hausa-Bornu political relations became critical after 1425, when the deposed Bornu ruler Uthman Kalnama sought refuge in Kano. Bornu regarded this as a threat, and reduced Kano and Katsina, and perhaps all Hausaland, to vassal status. (Adamu, 1984:279) In the middle of the fifteenth century Kano paid tribute to Bornu and began an unsuccessful hundred years' war with Katsina. (Adamu, 1984:272) Laya (1992:458) says the first Kano-Katsina war broke out in the late fifteenth century and lasted eleven years without result. In the same period Katsina fought Nupe (which had fought the Yoruba as well; Adamu, 1984:274) and Borno fought Jukun (Fisher, 1975:134-135).

Hausaland in the 16th century. Hausaland was polarized between Songhay, later replaced by Kebbi, in the west, and Bornu in the east. Askiya Muhammad of Songhay sent military expeditions to Agades and Hausaland in the early 16th century. (Levtzion, 1977:430) He sought to close Hausaland's trade with Borno. (Laya, 1992:456) He twice attacked Agades, once in 1499/1500, once in 1515, and secured tribute. He is described by Leo Africanus as having conquered Katsina, Zaria and Gobir, depopulating them, and made Kano tributary. (Levtzion, 1977:433.) Adamu doubts that Songhay conquered all Hausaland, as the Hausa chronicles do not mention the event (1984:280-281); Barth believes Leo misattributed the conquest of Hausaland by Muhammadu Kanta of Kebbi, a Songhay vassal who revolted in 1515, to Songhay itself and to Askiya Muhammad. (1965:III, 669-670)

Assuming Leo to be correct, however, the 1515 revolt of Songhay's vassal state Kebbi let Hausaland resume independence of Songhay. (Levtzion, 1977:433) Kebbi then built cities, Surame, Birnin Leka and Birnin Kebbi, by merging villages and fortifying the resultant towns against
Songhay. (Adamu, 1984:277-278) Kebbi then seized Air/Agades from Songhay, itself conquered Hausaland and parts of Bornu, and invaded Nupe and Yawuri. Bornu counterinvaded the Hausaland vassal states but was defeated. (Adamu, 1984:277-278) Songhay unsuccessfully attacked Kebbi in 1533 and 1553. (Laya, 1992:456) Borno conquered Agades about 1532. Kebbi raided it and Borno was called on in 1561, with violently indecisive results. (Laya, 1992:456) Kebbi’s empire did not much outlast its founder, Muhammadu Kanta, who died in 1556; by the end of the 16th century, Hausaland and Agades were lost to Kebbi. (Adamu, 1984:278) Bornu developed a tributary system in Hausaland (Fisher, 1975:114-115); the Hausa states fell “completely within the Bornu sphere of influence.” (Levtzion, 1977:433)

Kano, Katsina, Zaria and Jukun/Kwararafa were all active on a more local scale in the sixteenth century. Zaria fought to expand against Nupe and Kwararafa. (Adamu, 1984:274-275) Toward the middle of the sixteenth century, late in its war with Katsina, Kano inflicted a defeat on Zaria. (Adamu, 1984:273) (Laya, 1992:455, 456, sees the second and third Kano-Katsina wars occurring around 1570 and 1580, again without decisive results.) Kwararafa defeated Kano in 1582, causing its people to flee to Daura until 1618. (Laya, 1992:457)

When Morocco conquered Songhay in the late sixteenth century, Kebbi sheltered the Songhay resistance despite Moroccan threats. (Laya, 1992:456) In the 1590’s, the Sultan of Morocco believed that Kebbi had interfered with the attempt of Katsina and Kano to pay him allegiance. (Levtzion, 1977:415)

Hausaland in the 17th century. Kebbi and Bornu were contending great powers. Kano, Katsina, Azbin (Agades and its Air vicinity), Gobir, Jukun, Zamfara and Adar (NW of Gobir) were all active, Nupe and Zaria quiet.

A succession struggle in Azbin in the early seventeenth century led to Kebbi and Borno supporting rival claimants, with Kebbi successful. (Laya, 1992:456)

There were repeated Kano-Katsina wars in the first half of the seventeenth century; then Kano and Katsina signed a peace treaty c. 1649-1651, which held, out of fear of the Kwararafa. Indeed in 1653, the latter attacked and drove out the ruler of Kano. (Laya, 1992:457, 460)

In 1674, with Gobir fighting Kano and Katsina, Zamfara attacked and
defeated Kebbi and Adar; Adar then revolted against Kebbi (or was conquered by Borno). (Laya, 1992:456, 462) In 1675, Zamfara defeated Azbin and was in turn defeated by Azbin. (Laya, 1992:456) Borno fought and defeated the Kwararafa in 1680. (Laya, 1992:457) Azbin attacked and defeated Gobir in 1689. (Laya, 1992:456)

**Hausaland in the 18th century.** Kebbi declined, as did Kano. Azbin and Zamfara rose, to be overtaken by Gobir, which finally outclassed Bornu.

Zamfara defeated Kano in the early eighteenth century. (Laya, 1992:462) Early in the century, Bornu marched against Kano, and Zaria joined the ranks of Bornu tributaries. (Fisher, 1975:116) Azbin attacked Surame and killed the Kanta of Kebbi in 1721. The Kebbi court moved west in 1722. (Laya, 1992:456-457) Gobir fought Kano repeatedly in the middle of the eighteenth century, with greater and greater advantage. Zamfara intervened against Gobir, but was attacked and severely diminished about 1762. (Laya, 1992:462-463) The Kwararafa fought Bornu in the 18th century; by its end they were tributary. (Fisher, 1975:134-135)

Toward the end of the century an empire was finally formed out of the city-states of Hausaland, which had previously all managed to survive their 16th-18th century warfare. The imperial capital was Sokoto; the empire extended to the Bornu frontier and penetrated Yorubaland; the method was holy war; the founder was Usman dan Fodio, fl. c. 1774-1817. (Hiskett, 1976:134-141) Gobir had successfully revolted against Bornu (Barkindo, 1992:513); it was to Bornu that the Hausa princes appealed against the jihad of Usman dan Fodio. (Fisher, 1975:66)

**Analysis.** The enormous amount of local city-state interaction does not conceal the fact that Hausaland was strongly connected politically and militarily to Chadland from at least the 15th century, and that such a connection appeared almost as soon as Kano began to assume more than very local political significance. Connections to the lower Niger appeared late in the 15th century; those with the Middle Niger (and Morocco) came in the 16th century, but seem less salient.

The question of the urban status and history of Kano is important. If it was a city AD 1200 (Chandler) or 1100 (Adamu) and had not even peaceful political relations with Chadland prior to the struggle with Bornu in the 15th century, or with the Middle Niger prior to the struggle with Songhay in the 16th, then a Hausaland civilization (or perhaps a Nigerian civilization—
Lower Niger, *infra*-existed for several centuries, till engulfed from Chadland. But the sudden florescence of cities in the 15th century, the assertion that Kano did not even control its own hinterland until the late 14th, and the concern with which Bornu reacted to the flight of Uthman Kalnama, would be consistent with treating Kano as developing from a market town to a city with politico-military significance very late in the 14th century, in the semiperiphery and under the watchful eye of Bornu. Finally, an earlier dating for the city, but also for calculating political relations with Chadland, would place Hausaland in the Bornu semiperiphery, within a system of states whose core power was stimulated to imperialism only when semiperipheral Kano began to grow and to behave assertively (by harboring Bornu’s enemies). The third alternative currently seems in accord with the preponderance of evidence: Hausaland was an extension of the civilization previously established in Chadland.

A question for future research is how Hausaland’s growth is connected to the decline of Western Sudanic cities, whether this is a trade route shift driven by economic developments or the result of political assertion of control “upstream” on a trade route. The latter would imply that the Songhay invasion of the 16th century was a response to a mercantilist assault; that the trans-Sudanic trade routes were relatively more important than has commonly been thought; and perhaps that Hausaland had to the 15th century been a shared semiperiphery of the Middle Niger and Chadland cities and powers. The archaeology of Kebbi and Zamfara will be important to testing these propositions.

Hausaland problems are particularly challenging in that the area had “bridge” states and cities in five directions. To the west, Kebbi and Zamfara linked it to the Middle Niger. To the north, Agades was a bridge to the Mediterranean. To the south, Zegzeg/Zazzau (Turunku, Zaria) and Nupe were bridges to Yorubaland. To the north of Kano and east of Katsina, Daura was a bridge eastward to Chadland. (Jukun to the southeast fought, i.e. was a politico-military bridge to, but is not currently cited as an economic bridge to, Chadland.) Dates of urbanization and contact-politicization in all directions are as important to establishing Hausaland’s civilizational status as the dating of events at and around Kano. Chandler’s dates would imply that the eastward connection to Chadland came first, in the 12th century; then the southeastward connection (via Turunku and Jukun), in the 13th century; then the southward (via Turunku, Nupe and Oyo), in the 13th and 14th centuries; then the northward (via Durbi, Katsina, Gobir, Agades) in the 14th and 15th; finally the westward (via Surame) in the 16th. The eastward dating is
much earlier than Adamu’s discussion of politico-economic ties to Bornu in the early 15th century (1984:272, 279). The southeastward dating is consistent with Adamu’s discussion of Jukun and Zaria (1984:272, 274-275, 282-283). The southward dating is much earlier than Adamu’s (1984:283-284) or Nadel’s (1942:75) 15th-century dating of Nupe. The northward dating is consistent with Adamu’s dating of Katsina and Gobir (1984:273, 276) and Levitzion’s of Agades (1977:433). The westward dating is later than Adamu’s for Kebbi (1984:277-278). I suspect that an E-SE-S-W-N ordering will ultimately emerge, implying that urbanization moved from Chadland to Hausaland and Jukun, to the Lower Niger, and that urban bridges were then built to the already-urbanized Middle Niger (along established and new trans-Sudanic routes) and then the Mediterranean (along the more challenging trans-Saharan route). Politicization was probably concurrent, since any adjacent bridge city was immediately perceivable as a potential ally, looter, lootee, vassal and suzerain.

9. LOWER NIGER

Lower Niger cities. None appear on Chandler’s list through AD 1200. Then:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Size</th>
<th>Lower limit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AD 1200</td>
<td>Bussa</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Bussa, in Borgu, is a possible bridge city to Hausaland, or to the Middle Niger.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Size</th>
<th>Lower limit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AD 1300</td>
<td>Ife</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bussa</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nupe</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nupe would also be a bridge to Hausaland.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Size</th>
<th>Lower limit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AD 1400</td>
<td>Oyo</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nupe</td>
<td>50-30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ife</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adamu dates the Nupe state in the Niger-Benue confluence to the fif-
Alternative datings exist. *Ife*: Fage dates Ife at its site to the 10th or 11th century. (Fage, 1977:476) Andah and Anquandah date a cultural and political ascendancy of “Ife town” in Yorubaland between the seventh and eleventh centuries. (Andah and Anquandah, 1988:513)

*Benin*: Fage dates Benin as a flourishing city by AD 1200-1300. (Fage, 1977:476) For Ryder, Benin became a city (no size estimate), under Ewuare in the fifteenth century. (Ryder, 1984:352-353) “Benin City” of Edo may have had a city wall by the eleventh century and certainly had one by the mid-fifteenth. There the “true urban unit” was to be dated to Oba Ewuare in the fifteenth century; prior to that there was a “town,” a fusion of scattered villages. (Andah and Anquandah, 1988:514, 516)

*Igbo-Ukwu*: Igbo-Ukwu is an Iboland urban complex whose dating presents problems, with arguments for ninth to sixteenth-century dates available. (Ryder, 1984:361-366) Igbo-Ukwu, a “town” or “small settlement” with a state, dates from the ninth century. (Andah and Anquandah, 1988:517-520)

*Cross River*: there may have been an Akwanshi centralized state in the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AD 1500</td>
<td>Oyo</td>
<td>60,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nupe</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ife</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ijebu</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD 1600</td>
<td>Oyo</td>
<td>60,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gbara (Nupe)</td>
<td>33,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ife</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD 1700</td>
<td>Oyo</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jima (Nupe)</td>
<td>35,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD 1800</td>
<td>Oyo</td>
<td>80,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ilorin</td>
<td>40-30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gbogun</td>
<td>40-30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ife</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ogbomaso</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Kiama</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gbara</td>
<td>24,000</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Cross River Valley sometime after the 7th century AD and before the onset of the trans-Atlantic slave trade. (Andah and Anquandah, 1988:524-526)

In the eastern Niger delta, city-states were established by the eighteenth century in Bonny, New Calabar, Okrika and Nembe, based upon the slave trade and the wealth thereby gained. (Alagoa, 1992:447)

In general Andah and Anquandah refer to the urban centers of Guinea in the seventh to eleventh centuries as “towns,” though with complex specialization and trade. (Andah and Anquandah, 1988:526-527)

Lower Nige through the 15th century AD. Centralized states in Yoruba, Benin, Nupe, Igala, and Kwararafa/Jukun may have begun to form about the 10th and 11th centuries. (Fage:1977:476-477) Nupe and Igala (Idah) had developed state systems before the 15th century. (Fage, 1977:496, 512) Benin became a large kingdom, conquering some Edos, Ibo and Yoruba peoples, under Ewuare in the fifteenth century. (Ryder, 1984:352-353) At the end of the 15th century, Benin dominated Yorubaland. (Fage 1977:497) In the fifteenth century, Borgu, Idah and Kwararafa were “major states” north of Yorubaland. (Ryder, 1984:351)

Alagoa gives an early date for the rise of Oyo: it began after trouble with Nupe in the 15th century. (Alagoa, 1992:442)

Lower Nige in the 16th century AD. Fage gives a later dating: Nupe was continually at war with the Yorubas from the early 16th century, invading Oyo around 1535; the Oyo kings fled to Borgu, and likely received Borgu aid in their later return, c. 1610. (Fage, 1977:502-503) For Alagoa, on the contrary, Oyo pushed back Nupe with Borgu help by the beginning of the sixteenth century, and then began to expand against Borgu too. (Alagoa, 1992:442)

Another dating is more secure. The Portuguese, seeking to monopolize the sea trade, by the start of the 16th century tried to ally themselves with the administration of Benin. (Fage, 1977:505) They could not however deal with Benin from a position of political strength, though they missed a chance to arm the Oba in 1514. Instead, they opened trade with, and provided a political counterweight to, Benin’s smaller, weaker eastern neighbor Warri. (Fage, 1977:515-518; Itsekiri, capital Ode Itsekiri, says Alagoa, 1992:445)

Lower Nige in the 17th-18th century AD. This is generally agreed to
have been a period of Oyo empire in Yorubaland. Ryder judges Oyo to have "developed its 'imperial' character quite late, perhaps in the early seventeenth century," perhaps after struggling with Borgu and Nupe. (Ryder, 1984:348) Oyo expansion stopped at Ijebu and Benin to south and southeast, but reached southwest as far as Dahomey in the 18th century. (Alagoa, 1992:442) Oyo had strong influence and involvement in the states for one or two hundred miles to its south and east, and complementary spheres of influence with the Benin empire beyond. (Asiwaju, 1989:704-706) The Oyo empire began to fragment in the late eighteenth century; defeated by Egba c. 1774, Borgu 1784, Nupe 1791, the empire collapsed about 1835. (Asiwaju, 1989:706)

Lower Niger in the 19th century AD. The collapse of the Oyo empire was followed by Hausa intervention from Sokoto against Borgu and Oyo in 1836 and 1840, by three post-imperial intra-Yoruba wars between 1820 and 1893, and by the independence—and intervention—of Dahomey from the early 1820's to the French conquest of 1892. (Asiwaju, 1989:707-709) The British acquired Lagos in 1861, the French Porto Novo in 1863. The British-French struggle to control trade, to end slavery, to pacify the interior and to outstrip one another led in due course to the French conquest of Dahomey in 1892, the British conquest of Benin in 1897, and the partitioning of Borgu in 1895. (Asiwaju, 1989:717)

Analysis. Was Benin a city in the eleventh century, or the Fifteenth? If in the eleventh, it becomes possible that there existed a Lower Niger civilization separated from events in Hausaland. More likely, the rise to urban status above and below the Niger-Benue confluence was simultaneous, and a system of states arose in what is now Nigeria, with Borgu, Nupe, Igala and Jukun playing key intermediary roles.

Chronology is problematic, for the area's cities, states and empires alike. The datings of the sizes of Ife, Benin, and the towns in Nupe and Jukun are especially critical here. If Ife and Benin far predate the Nupe and Jukun evolution of cities, then such a Lower Niger civilization was a reality, lasting until fusional bonds were established through Nupe, Jukun, Borgu, Igala, to Hausaland—and, less significantly, through Benin to Portugal—by the 16th century. If Benin did not become a city until the 15th century, and even postdates urbanization in Nupe, then this area is a semiperipheral pressure-extension of the civilization to its north.

Current judgments on the size and date of Igbo-Ukwu, and of the eastern
Niger delta, do not change this situation; it is not yet possible to speculate meaningfully on what might emerge out of future Cross River archaeological work.

The timing of the political (vs. the economic) effect of European contact is also in question. This may not have been critical until after the Hausa expansion of the 18th century, and may initially have involved no more than an automatic response to the power vacuum created by Oyo’s collapse, attempting to assure the survival of weaker coastal states when the stagnant inland Oyo empire was replaced by the more dynamic jihadist state. But it is also possible, and more probable, that European powers were politically concerned and involved from the 16th century, but that their policy was relatively invisible because until the Hausa and Dahomey irruptions it was a status quo policy content with the order maintained by the Benin and Oyo empires. The relative speed and decisiveness with which Britain and France counter-intervened against inland expansionism suggests that they had established balance-of-power policies for the Lower Niger which were previously unnoticed because unchallenged. This would imply the semiperipheralization of the area by Central civilization from the 16th, rather than the 19th, century, and should not be assumed but investigated. The promptitude of the Hausa exploitation of the vacuum created by Oyo’s decline suggests that they were similarly connected politico-militarily to Yorubaland in the centuries of Oyo’s strength, but calculated their interest lay in watchful waiting. In this case, however, the jihadist coup, and the change in the power balance brought about by the unification of the formerly clashing and stale-mated Hausa city-states, may also have motivated a shift from a status quo to an imperialist policy.

It is intriguing to see in Niane (1984:155) a 14th-century trade route running from Egypt to Nubia, Darfur, Kanem, Hausaland and Ife. If cities grew up successively zone by zone along this route, each new foundation adjacent to and politico-militarily in touch with its predecessor, then the whole route constituted an oddly shaped (because elongated) semiperiphery of Central civilization, in which case the overseas contacts of the 16th century via the Bight of Benin are of the same character as those via the Indian Ocean and Red Sea: the meeting of two antipodal semiperipheries that bypass the core states, achievable only on a map favorable to, and with the techniques necessary for, seapower.
DAHOMEY

Dahomeyan cities. None appear on Chandler’s list through AD 1600. Then:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Size</th>
<th>Lower limit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AD 1700</td>
<td>Allada</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD 1800</td>
<td>Abomey</td>
<td>24,000</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dahomey, 16th-17th century AD. Allada and satellite kingdoms developed around 1575, probably founded by refugees from Yoruba state-building. (Fage, 1977:515) The Dutch had agents at Allada’s capital Assin early in the 17th century. The French set up a station at Whydah in 1671. Thereafter Allada and Whydah became rivals. Refugees from Allada settled Abomey, beyond European reach, and founded the absolutist state of Dahomey, around 1625. (Alagoa, 1992:439)

“The political development of the Kingdom of Dahomey and of the neighboring states of Allada, Whydah, Popo and Jakin was largely related to the activities of the European slave-traders on the coast, and to the influence of the Yoruba kingdoms to the north-east.” (Alagoa, 1992:436) The effect of the slave trade was to weaken small states and traditional institutions. Dahomey stepped in to fill a vacuum, becoming a major power by 1700. (Alagoa, 1992:437-438)

Dahomey, 18th century AD. Oyo expansion from Yorubaland reached southwest as far as Dahomey in the 18th century. (Alagoa, 1992:442) Dahomey conquered the older smaller states around Abomey 1724-1727, but was then subjugated by Oyo. (Alagoa, 1992:437-438) Oyo attacked Dahomey after c. 1740, rendered it tributary by 1748, and retained it so until the 1820’s. (Asiwaju, 1989:704) Oyo and Yorubaland may have looked upon Allada and the other Aja communities as both colonies and hinterland, and stopped the Dahomeian attempt to overthrow the traditional order for culture-conservative as well as realpolitik considerations.

Dahomey, 19th century AD. The collapse of the Oyo empire was followed by the independence and further expansion of Dahomey. After the 1820’s, independent Dahomey began a series of attacks on Yorubaland that ended only with its conquest by the French. (Asiwaju, 1989:707-711) The French acquired Porto Novo in 1863, in response to the British acquisition
of Lagos in 1861. The British-French struggle to control trade, to end slavery, to pacify the interior and to outstrip one another led in due course to the French conquest of Dahomey in 1892. (Asiwaju, 1989:717)

Analysis. There is no evidence of a historically autonomous civilization in the Dahomey area. It appears to have been an extension of the states system in Yorubaland which was semiperipheral to that area from the start, and to overseas powers from the core of Central civilization as well from almost the same moment.

11. GOLD COAST

Gold Coast cities. No cities appear on Chandler’s list through AD 1500. Then:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Size</th>
<th>Lower limit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AD 1600</td>
<td>Kikiwhary</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD 1700</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD 1800</td>
<td>Kumasi</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yendi</td>
<td>30-24,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Salgha</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Salaga/Salgha was in the eighteenth century a very wealthy town, the main southern entrepot of the north-east trade. (Boahen, 1992:405-406)

The Gold Coast through the 15th century AD. Akan monarchies arose at Begho and Bono-Mansu, associated with the trade from Jenne in the upper Niger delta, but beyond the reach of Mali. (Fage, 1977:491) Begho may have been large and prosperous from the mid-15th to the early 18th century, Bono from the early 15th or even 14th century to its conquest by Asante 1722-1723. (Fage, 1977:491)

Kipre declares that the Akan had set up kingdoms and city-states before the arrival of the Portuguese, towards the end of the fifteenth century, though only Begho, the kola-nut and gold market of the Bron section of the Akan, is actually identified as a “capital” and “metropolis,” without a population estimate. (Kipre, 1984:336, 337) Actual estimates of Begho as size are fairly modest. Andah and Anquandah describe Begho proto-urban AD 965-1125, with an area of about one square km (1988:496), a “town” that peaked at about 5000 people in the fourteenth century. (1988:504)

Andah and Anquandah (1988:494) date “urban, commercial, high-
level technology complexes” to AD 1200 and after in the Gold Coast, with “urbanization, state formation, and long-distance trade ... in Adanse, Denkyira and Asante.” (Andah and Anquandah, 1988:499) But the only other early urban site they mention is Bono Manso, state capital of the Bono kings around the tenth century, which they describe as “one of the large villages and towns” in its area. (Andah and Anquandah, 1988:505)

**The Gold Coast in the 16th century AD.** Portuguese connections to the Gold Coast involved the forts of Mina/Elmina, begun 1482 (Fage 1977:509) as an attempt to bring the Guinea trade under Portuguese state control and enforce a monopoly of the sea trade by Portuguese state power—which succeeded until the Dutch challenge of the 1590’s. (Fage, 1977:503-504, 507, 509-511) The Portuguese forts, soldiers and ships worked both to attack Africans who traded with other Europeans, and to attack those Europeans. They must have had the collaboration of local African states in this policy until 1576, when the Ga of Accra attacked them. (Fage, 1977:513-514)

The struggle for control over the gold trade stimulated the rise of Bono, Dagomba and Gonja. (Fage, 1977:510-511) Dagomba’s capital is Yendi, Gonja’s Salgha/Salaga.

**The Gold Coast in the 17th century AD.** This would have been the period of florescence of Kikiwhary in Assin, which was visited by Dupuis (1824:35-37), but seems to have been somewhat neglected by later writers. Fage sees this as a period of prosperity for Begho and Bono, ended early in the next century by events in the forests to their south. (Fage, 1977:491) 38 states were known on the Gold Coast by 1630. In the 1670’s Aowin, Denkyira and Akwamu began imperialist courses of conquest and consolidation. (Boahen, 1992:412-420) The three major Akan forest powers of the late 17th century—Denkyira, Akwen and Akwamu—were oriented to the coastal (European) trade. (Fage, 1977:495)

Through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, European policy was to prevent the ascendancy of any coastal state. This involved substantial interference in coastal states’ internal affairs, up to the point of war (e.g. the Komenda-Dutch wars of the 1690’s). Inland states, with less interference, accordingly became the successful local empires. (Boahen, 1992:423)

**The Gold Coast in the 18th-19th centuries AD.** The rise of the Denkyira and Akwamu empires in the late 17th century was followed by that of the Asante empire in the early 18th. Around 1700 Asante overthrew Denkyira
and began a course of conquest of its own; Akyem overthrew Akwamu and was conquered in turn by Asante. (Boahen, 1992:408, 412-420) British support kept the coastal Fante state independent of Asante through the eighteenth century. (Boahen, 1992:420) Otherwise, in the eighteenth century, Asante expanded greatly. It achieved suzerainty over tributary Gonja, Dagomba and Mamprusi to the north by 1794 (in the process, as Dupuis—1824:II,xxxix—points out, acquiring via Salgha a common border point with the Dahomey empire). Asante attained suzerainty over the peoples to the coast 1807-1814. There it entered diplomatic relations with Britain, defeated it in 1824, and was in turn defeated in 1826, the whole Gold Coast thereafter becoming enmeshed in the complications of British policy. (Arhin and Ki-Zerbo, 1989:662-672)

Analysis. The political development of the Gold Coast seems to be that of a semiperiphery to Central civilization from the 16th century Portuguese enforced monopoly to the seventeenth and eighteenth century suppression of coastal empires and (involuntary) stimulation of inland empires instead, to the nineteenth century subjugation of the surviving inland empire by an overseas suzerain. Only if urban archaeology at Begho and Bono Manso forces an upward reevaluation of their populations pre-1500 is this judgment likely to change. When Bron and Bono states were overshadowed by forest empires, an embryonic “Gold Zone” civilization was apparently prevented by processes of semiperipheralization.

12. SOUTH CENTRAL AFRICA

South Central African cities. None appear on Chandler’s lists through AD 500. Thereafter:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Size</th>
<th>Lower Limit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AD 622</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>24,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD 800</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD 900</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD 1000</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD 1100</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD 1200</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD 1300</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD 1400</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD 1500</td>
<td>Chitako</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD 1600</td>
<td>Chitako</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD 1700</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD 1800</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chandler gives Zimbabwe two urban periods, c. 600-c. 1075 and c.

**South Central Africa before the 14th century AD.** Most current writers do not treat of the alleged first urban period at Zimbabwe, but acknowledge only the gold-trading state linked to coastal Sofala.

Settlements in the Sofala country are mentioned by the Arab geographer al-Idrisi (d. 1165), while for al-Biruni (d. 1050/1) Sofala was a coast with trade as far as India, exporting gold (from the Zimbabwe area: Masao and Mutoro, 1988:601-602, 615). Sofala town may date from the twelfth or thirteenth century. (Masao and Mutoro, 1988:606)

Huffman argues that the origin of the Zimbabwe Culture lay at its first capital Mapungubwe AD 1075-1220 rather than at Great Zimbabwe. The ivory and gold trade with the coast led to an increase of wealth, of population, of political power, and of class stratification, which produced the Zimbabwe culture. (Huffman, 1988:680)

Huffman’s diagram of Mapungubwe AD 1150 (Huffman, 1988:677) shows under 300 huts, which suggests that this capital was still a town of under 10,000. (Cissoko, 1984:206, correlates 7626 houses in Timbuktu before 1600 with a population of nearly 100,000, or about 12 per household; Niane, 1984:156, uses 10 per household to calculate Mali’s population soon after 1500. 12 per household would place Mapungubwe at around 3500, 10 per around 3000; 33 per household would be a required average to produce a 10,000-person city.)

**South Central Africa, 14th-15th centuries AD.** Fagan discusses Great Zimbabwe as a major center of a powerful and influential state in the 14th and much of the 15th century, associated with long-distance trade, local concentration of wealth and centralization of power. But he is skeptical of the degree of population concentration that could have been sustained by the surrounding countryside absent irrigation and fertilization. Accordingly, he speaks of Great Zimbabwe as a “settlement,” a “centre,” a “monument,” a “site,” but not a “city” nor even a “town.” (Fagan, 1984: e.g. 533, 535, 542, 548, 550)

Great Zimbabwe declined around the mid-fourteenth century, probably due to exhaustion of local gold deposits. It was succeeded by a state of Torwa or Butwa to its west, with its capital at Khami, then Danangombe,
flourishing c. 1450-1650, and by the Mutapa empire to its north, with several successive capitals, strong at the start of the sixteenth century. (Bhila, 1992:640-642, 656-657)

_South Central Africa, 16th-18th centuries AD._ The Portuguese, starting from Sofala, and having established trade centers at Tete and Sena in 1531, found their way into Mutapa politics. In 1540 they established diplomatic relations with Mutapa to regulate trading activities. The Portuguese of Barreto’s 1569 expedition used force to expel the Muslim traders at Sena and establish themselves as local subordinates to Mutapa. (Marks and Gray, 1975:386-393)

Mutapa lost control over its provinces in the sixteenth century. Between 1569 and 1575 the Portuguese fought for and got treaties and trade rights with the eastern Mutapa ex-provinces, now kingdoms, of Uteve and Mankya. (Bhila, 1992:640-642, 648-649, 675) By 1592 they were acting as Mutapan allies. (Marks and Gray, 1975:386-393) Civil wars in Mutapa allowed the Portuguese to sponsor successful claimants Gatsi Rusere and Mamvura in 1607 and 1629, securing concessions and property and tribute from Mutapa while weakening it in the process. (Bhila, 1992:649-651) Mutapa extracted taxes from them by force in 1610 and 1616. Mutapa fought and was defeated by Portugal in 1628-1629 and 1631-1633, and was reduced to vassal status, though it remained rebellious even in 1682. (Marks and Gray, 1975:386-393) It dwindled away after 1629, though a remnant statelet only vanished in 1917. (Bhila, 1992:640-642)

Southwest of Mutapa was Butua, which was briefly invaded by the Portuguese in 1644. (Marks and Gray, 1975:393) It fell into decline shortly thereafter. The Rozvi people under the Changamire dynasty, once Mutapa vassals, took over Torwa/Butwa in the late seventeenth century, and set about imperial expansion. (Bhila, 1992:640-642, 656-657) The Changamire dynasty attacked and defeated the Portuguese in 1684, 1693 and 1695. (Marks and Gray, 1975:395-396) Between 1684 and 1695 the Rozvi empire was able to reverse the relations with the Portuguese inside the frontiers of territory it conquered (Bhila, 1992:657), which corresponds roughly to the boundary between present-day Zimbabwe and Mozambique. These victories coincided with the defeats Portugal was suffering under Omani pressure in East Africa. (Bhila, 1992:660-661) Rozvi/Butua kept control over the gold trade in the 18th century. (Marks and Gray, 1975:400-401)

North of the Zambezi, in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries,
the large state of Maravi arose, with a commercial and political center at Manthimba with which Portuguese from Tete were trading briskly by 1624. (Phiri, Kalinga and Bhila, 1992:615-618) From the 1590's through the 1630's Maravi interfered in the Portuguese sphere south of the Zambezi, seeking to control the river traffic and the Mutapa mines. The Maravi state also functioned as several states with named chieftdoms, Kalonga and Lundu notable. The Lundu attacked the Portuguese from the mid-1570's, leading them to ally with his rival the Kalonga to subjugate the Lundu by 1622. Both Kalonga and Lundu were called upon in the first half of the seventeenth century to help the Portuguese and their allied factions in Mutapa. The Kalonga established local dominance over the Portuguese, and kept it till the end of the seventeenth century, when he was displaced among the Maravi by the Chewa’s Undu kingdom till about 1750, when Afro-Portuguese kingdoms began to grow. (Alpers and Ehret, 1975:516-522; Phiri, Kalinga and Bhila, 1992:619-625)

**Analysis.** It is clear that from 1540 on South Central Africa had ceased to have an autonomous political history and had become part of a larger states system, with whose colonial elements its states, once reformed in reaction to penetration, were able to deal effectively on at least equal terms by the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. If Chandler’s figures are correct, there was previously a South Central African civilization. This seems possible; but the apparently limited size of Mapungubwe, and Fagan’s strong reservations about the population of Zimbabwe, impede certainty. Demographic archaeology is required at both sites, and desirable at Sofala, Khami and Danagombe. Until then a South Central African civilization should be treated as possible but not proven.

### 13. EAST AFRICA

**East African cities.** None appears on Chandler’s lists through AD 1100. Then:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Size</th>
<th>Lower limit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AD 1200</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD 1300</td>
<td>Kilwa</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD 1400</td>
<td>Kilwa</td>
<td>30,000</td>
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<td>none</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD 1800</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Kilwa was not alone. Other coastal towns included Mogadishu, Malindi,
Mombasa, Zanzibar, Mozambique. As regards Kilwa, Chandler gives a foundation date c. 975, stone mosques built in the 1100's, then a drastic rise after 1300 with a palace and emporium built and much mosque-building in the 14th and 15th century followed by a great reduction in the 16th century to 18,000 by 1587 and 12,500 c. 1650 (1987:286).

Chittick (1977:209-210) quotes estimates for Kilwa in 1505 of 4000 and 12,000, and himself estimates its maximum size at 11-12,000; he also cites an estimate of 10,000 for Mombasa and finds 6,000 too low and 18,000 too high for Lamu.

In 1498 Mombasa was “the most powerful city-state on the coast,” “a great city of trade”; Malindi was a walled town perhaps 600 x 240 meters, with a stone-house population of about 3500, plus the poor. Kilwa’s population was estimated at 12,000 by Da Gama in 1502. (Salim, 1992:751-753)

East Africa to the 11th century AD. Masao and Mutoro (1988) discuss the coastal “towns” in their relation to Asia and the African interior in the seventh to eleventh century AD. They argue an African rather than an Arabo-Persian foundation for the coastal settlements, their dependence on agriculture and fishing, without significant exterior trade except for Sofala’s, with Zimbabwe (for which see South Central Africa). The East African interior in the 7th to 11th centuries was organized on a smaller-than-town scale. (Ehret, 1988:635-636)

East Africa, 14th-15th century AD. Matveiev alleges a Swahili civilization among the “towns”—trading centers, Islamic centers—of the East African islands and coast, rapidly developing from the early 14th century (Matveiev, 1984:461) with trade transforming “small settlements into large towns” (Matveiev, 1984:467) and a rise to politico-military dominance of Kilwa after the mid-13th century (Matveiev, 1984:461, 465), a civilization destroyed when the coastal towns were plundered and destroyed by the Portuguese. (Matveiev, 1984:479-480) Matveiev does not speak of “cities,” and gives no size estimate of the town populations.

Before Portugal arrived, the major local vicissitudes included the decline of Kilwa (which lost control over Sofala), the rise of Zanzibar (which sought to control Kilwa), a rivalry between Mombasa and Malindi, and some extension of control toward the continental hinterlands of the towns. (Salim, 1992:751) No political interaction with Central civilization’s Egyptian, Arabian or Ethiopian components is mentioned by Salim.
East Africa, 16th century AD. In the sixteenth century the Portuguese interfered violently and destructively with the East African city-states, usually fighting Mombasa. (Alpers and Ehret, 1975:527-528) Portuguese occupation of the Swahili towns was at first often brief, but this represented “a politico-economic compromise ... Swahili towns remained independent as long as no conflict of interest arose with the Portuguese.” (Salim, 1992:760)

The Ottoman Turks soon began to take an interest in the area, sending two fleets to harass the Portuguese and promote Swahili resistance in 1585 and 1588. The Portuguese fought back successfully, garrisoned Mombasa, and imposed and enforced vassal status elsewhere along the coast. (Salim, 1992:761-764)

East Africa, 17th-18th century AD. In the seventeenth century, the Portuguese were politically dominant along the East African coast despite rebellion and resistance. (Alpers and Ehret, 1975:529-532) In the 1640’s, the new Yarubi dynasty of Oman drove the Portuguese out of Muscat, and fought them in East Africa (with Swahili towns on both sides) in 1652-1688 and 1696-1698. (Salim, 1992:767-775)

In the first half of the eighteenth century there were struggles between Oman and Portugal for dominance, and by the Swahili towns for independence. (Alpers and Ehret, 1975:532-533) In 1728-1730 many Swahili towns drove out the Portuguese, thereafter becoming hostile rivals of Portuguese Mozambique. (Salim, 1992:767-775) In the second half of the eighteenth century, Oman and Mombasa divided the coast into spheres of influence and struggled for control. (Alpers and Ehret, 1975:533-536) After 1784 Oman began to take firm control of the towns. (Salim, 1992:767-775)

Analysis. Da Gama’s demographic estimate seems crucial, likewise the absence of any prompt Arab/Turkish counterblow to the Portuguese intrusion. If there were in fact no significant politico-military ties between East Africa and Central civilization until the arrival of the Portuguese, if da Gama’s estimate for Kilwa is correct and the other towns were of about the same size, then there was, as Matveiev contends, a Swahili or (coastal) East African civilization. Matveiev sees it as having developed from the fourteenth century; Chandler’s figures would take it back to the twelfth. The settlement-size data are evaluated by Salim as “rough estimates if not speculative” (Salim, 1992:753); but the order of magnitude seems the same. Demographic archaeology may refute it, but the proper current assumption would seem to be that there were East African cities from the fourteenth century.
An important data source for checking the judgment that East Africa was politico-historically autonomous until the Portuguese arrived will be Ottoman history. The Turks conquered Egypt in 1517, soon sent a fleet against the Portuguese in India, fought them in Ethiopia in 1541-1543, set up a Red Sea base against them in 1571, and harassed them in East Africa in the 1580's. The dilatoriness of the Turkish response to the Portuguese in East Africa (vis-a-vis their promptness in India) militates in favor of the idea that until the late sixteenth century East Africa was, politically speaking, not in their "world"—nor in that of their less navalistic Mamluk predecessors ("the land-minded Mamluk horsemen were averse to everything connected with the navy"—Hrbek, 1977:64). That would put it in a world of its own, which is what is required of a historically autonomous civilization.

The isolated autonomy of the East African civilization will then have ended in 1502, in consequence of Portuguese threats, landings, force, tribute and vassalization. The politico-military interactions with Central civilization which the Portuguese arrival began appear to have continued unabated. Later history thus supports the idea that 1502 is the proper date of incorporation and loss of historical autonomy for East African Coastal/Swahili civilization.

14. WEST CENTRAL AFRICA

West Central African cities. None appear through AD 1300. Then:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Size</th>
<th>Lower limit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AD 1400</td>
<td>Ambessi/Mbanza</td>
<td>35,000+</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD 1500</td>
<td>Sao Salvador</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sao Salvador was the prior Ambessi/Mbanza Kongo/Congo city, capital of Kongo c. 1400-1576.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Size</th>
<th>Lower limit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AD 1600</td>
<td>Dongo</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Loanda</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Loango</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dongo (Pundu n'Dongo) was capital of Angola after Angoleme, overrun by Portuguese 1671. Loanda is Luanda, the Portuguese capital for Angola, founded c. 1576. Loango was the capital of a state so named.
West Central Africa to the 16th century AD. The Portuguese, who arrived in 1483, found two great kingdoms on the coast, Kongo and Loango, and another in the interior, the Tio kingdom of the “great Makoko.” (Vansina, 1984:571) The West Central kingdoms may have been formed between the 13th and 14th centuries, in part by the amalgamation of lesser states formed sometime after AD 1000. (Vansina, 1984:575) Vansina and Obenga (1992) cite a dating of the foundation of the Kongo kingdom to the fourteenth century; its northeast neighbor Tio is thought to be older, its northwest neighbor Loango and southern neighbor Ndongo (from about 1500) to be younger. (1992:547-550)

West Central Africa, 16th century AD. Portuguese were politically influential in Kongo from the reign of the Christian Afonso I (1506-1543), who made Christianity the state religion, sought to monopolize the slave trade and evangelize the country, had Portuguese and Afro-Portuguese as the main court factions, allowed the Portuguese a trade monopoly but denied them control over mines. (Vansina and Obenga, 1992:555-557)

Afonso’s successors tried to limit European influence and cut it off in 1561, but the state collapsed in war with Tio and Jaga warriors 1566-1567, after which Kongo recalled the Portuguese. They re-established its state in 1571-1573, but also founded Angola (Luanda) in 1575 just south of Kongo. (Vansina and Obenga, 1992:557-558)

The Portuguese fought Ndongo in a long war 1579-1671. The Jaga state of Kasanje was first their ally, then enemy. When the Dutch occupied Luanda, the Ndongo leaders (now in Matamba to the east) allied with them. Kongo fought Portuguese Angola and played diplomatic games with Spain and the Dutch. (Vansina and Obenga, 1992:558-559)

West Central Africa, 17th century AD. Loango cooperated with the
Dutch after 1600. (Vansina and Obenga, 1992:562) The Dutch took Luanda in 1641 and formed an alliance with Kongo against the Portuguese and Kasanje. Kongo came to terms with Angola after 1645, fought it again in 1665 and was defeated, again in 1670 and was victorious. Angola conquered the last of Ndongo in 1670 and imposed peace on Matamba and Kasanje by 1680. Civil war in Kongo destroyed the capital in 1666 and led to its abandonment in 1678. (Vansina and Obenga, 1992:564-566)

Analysis. The evidence favors the hypothesis of an autonomous civilization, despite the somewhat disquieting shift from "city" to "large town" as a description of Mbanza Kongo between Vansina (1984) and Vansina and Obenga (1992). It seems clear that this area lost its politico-historical autonomy by 1506 and never regained it, becoming instead more deeply involved in the spheres of influence and the political struggles of the Central states system. It seems equally clear that such autonomy existed prior to 1506, with the civilization probably starting up around AD 1400.

15. CENTRAL AFRICA

Central African cities. The specific location is "Shaba," ex-Katanga, in Zaire, and vicinity; the Luba/Lunda complex. No cities appear for the area through AD 1600 in Chandler’s lists. Then:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size</th>
<th>Lower limit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AD 1700</td>
<td>Rund (&quot;Lunda’s capital&quot;) none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD 1800</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chungo is cited as Lunda’s capital c. 1750 (1987:299).

The Lunda metropole thrived during the first three-quarters of the nineteenth century. Its capital, the royal compound or musumba, "was rebuilt anew by each successive king." A successful and long-lived ruler would have a capital that "came to resemble a town." (Birmingham, 1976:226) The Lunda capital was larger than Luanda in the nineteenth century. (Birmingham, 1975:370-374)

Luba had capitals at Cifinda, Mwibele and Munza. (Nziem, 1992:592-599) Nziem does not discuss the sizes of the capitals.

Central Africa to the 16th century AD. Vansina dates state formation in
the Shaba area from AD 1000-1500. A Luba state was formed by clan fusion perhaps before 1500, a Lunda state before 1450, in a region favorable to “the emergence of large towns.” (Vansina, 1984:586-587) Most other writers prefer more cautious datings.

Central Africa, 17th-18th centuries AD. In present Zaire, sometime before the eighteenth century, a Luba kingdom came into existence; a Lunda state followed, before 1680. (Nziem, 1992:589)

The Luba had four kingdoms by the seventeenth century: Kikonja, Kaniok, Kalundwe, Kasongo. Lunda attacks led to successful Luba resistance. (Birmingham, 1975:377-378) Small till the eve of the eighteenth century, Luba expanded to include an area roughly 300 miles square in that century and the next. (Nziem, 1992:592-599) Toward the end of the eighteenth century, Luba Kasongo defeated Kalundwe and expanded into an empire. (Birmingham, 1975:380)

The Lunda state arose to Luba’s southwest, from the state of Rund, about 100 x 200 miles in 1650, with a capital of the same name, to an area about 400 x 800 miles with two major subsidiary (tributary) states, Yaka and Kazembe, each with a capital so named, by 1760. They came into contact with and fought the Luba. (Nziem, 1992:601-603)

The Lunda state was developed into an empire in the eighteenth century, via trade route control, importation of slaves, colonization, imperial conquest and tribute. (Birmingham, 1975:370-374) “The Lunda empire probably governed a million or more subjects....” (Birmingham, 1975:375)

“During the eighteenth century, neither Africans nor Portuguese from the Atlantic regions succeeded in gaining direct access to the Lunda sphere of influence. Their trade, however, spread far and fast....” (Birmingham, 1975:374) Kazembe came into diplomatic touch with the Portuguese at Tete and Sena 1798-1799. By the latter contact Kazembe acquired more autonomy and equality vis-a-vis the Rund core. (Nziem, 1992:601-603)

Other states arose in the vicinity by secession, colonial expeditions of conquest, and resistance. (Nziem, 1992:603-607) A Bemba empire began to form toward the end of the eighteenth century under Lunda pressure. (Birmingham, 1975:380)

Central Africa, 19th century AD. Vellut (1989) discusses the persis-
tence of the Lunda state of Kalagne, flourishing in the first half of the nine-
teenth century and more and more connected to the Portuguese coastal set-
tlements by trade, but not by politico-military links. (1989:316-319) On
the other hand, aside from Nziem’s cited remarks on Lunda and the
Portuguese, Birmingham notes that Swahili-Arabs from the east coast
arrived in the eastern Lunda state of Kazembe in the early 19th century and
slowly gained political influence. (Birmingham, 1976:244)

A large Luba empire formed by conquest c. 1780-1870 north of Lunda.
(Birmingham, 1976:250-251) The Luba empire reached its height in the
first half of the nineteenth century, with the Mulopwe state, capital and
court, likewise trade-linked by caravan to the Swahili area and Angola, but
not politically bonded. (Vellut, 1989:316-319)

Southeast of Lunda, west of Kazembe, the trader Mwenda/Msiri by
1880 built up the Yeke conquest state of Katanga/Garenganze with its capi-
state appeared southeast of Kazembe in the 19th century. (Birmingham,
1976:247-249) Lunda was also pressured by the formation on their frontier
of the Chokwe trading and raiding empire. (Birmingham, 1976:229, 236-
238)

The Luba empire split into Yeke and Swahili-Arab spheres in the 1870's
and 1880's, while Yeke and Chokwe broke up the Kazembe and Lunda
states. (Birmingham, 1976:253) The area was conquered by Leopold's
Congo Free State, by Belgium, and by Rhodes’ British South Africa compa-
nny, to about 1908. (Stengers and Vansina, 1985:331-333; Marks, 1985:451-
453)

**Analysis.** The Shaban system of states and empires would seem to have
been politically isolated during its late seventeenth and eighteenth century
consolidation, until contact with the Portuguese at the end of that century.
Had the system cities? There are no demographic estimates. A Central
African/Shaban civilization seems probable, autonomous from the late 17th
to the early 19th centuries. Earlier dates are not inconceivable. The ap-
propriate exploration procedure would be the excavation of Lunda musumbas.
The degree, timing and source of Central politico-military penetration in the
nineteenth century would also require research to settle differences of opin-
ion on that score.
16. AFRICAN GREAT LAKES

African Great Lakes cities. No cities appear on Chandler’s list through AD 1600. Then:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Size</th>
<th>Lower Limit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AD 1700</td>
<td>Rubaga (&quot;Mengo&quot;)</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD 1800</td>
<td>Rubaga (&quot;Mengo&quot;)</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

African Great Lakes region to the 16th century AD. Ehret sees no large-scale polities in this area before AD 1100. (Ehret, 1988:637) Ogot dates major state formation processes to the fifteenth century. (Ogot, 1984:499) The oldest state system was probably the "Kitara complex" northwest of Lake Victoria. (Ogot, 1984:500)

Ogot accepts the historicity of the Bachwezi dynasty, with Ndahura as the creator of a late fourteenth-century imperial state with its capital at Mwenge and then Bwera, which collapsed into a polarized system of Luo-Babito and Bahima-Bahinda states that struggled for control in the area. The population of Mwenge is not estimated (Ogot, 1984:502-508). The new states had marked pastoralist elements. (Ogot, 1984:515) Oliver names "Mubende" and "Bigo" as successive capitals of a fifteenth-century Chwezi state, but estimates the population of Bigo at only a few hundred. (Oliver, 1977:631-634)

African Great Lakes, 16th-18th centuries AD. Webster, Ogot and Chretien (1992) give a capsule history of interactions in the Great Lakes region in the 16th-18th centuries, centuries of state consolidation, then of ecological disaster and migration with the rise of Buganda and Rwanda as regional dominant states. (Webster, Ogot and Chretien, 1992:799-802)

By the seventeenth century, a process of conquest and consolidation of larger states had occurred. One great kingdom, Bunyoro, predominated, with a ring of smaller tributary states around it, and, beyond them, in military touch, such independent states as Buganda, Rwanda and Karagwe. (Alpers and Ehret, 1975:470-472) Bunyoro may also have had its capitals at Bigo (after c. 1480) and then near Mubende, and vigorously attacked Buganda, Nkore/Ankole and Rwanda in the mid-16th century. (Oliver, 1977:636-645)

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, succession crises, provincial revolts and imperialist failures combined to somewhat reduce Nyoro

In these studies, demographics are not discussed and the word “city” is absent. Nevertheless, the descriptions of Buganda’s stable agricultural and waterborne-trade and mineral economy, its centralized bureaucracy, imperialist policy, nationalist sentiment, and militaristic mobilization, would be fully consistent with its having a central city and being the founding core of a civilization. (Cf. Eckhardt, 1992, on the relation between civilization, empire and war.) If this occurred, it would probably date from the reign of the first great centralizing king, Mawanda (c. 1674-1704). (Webster, Ogot and Chretien, 1992:801)

A noteworthy feature of this period is the apparent amount of local, i.e. intra-regional, politico-military interaction and the absence of significant external politico-military pressure. If this apparent isolation holds up under critical scrutiny, the prospects of accrediting an African Great Lakes civilization from about AD 1700 become rather good.

African Great Lakes, 19th century AD. The Great Lakes kingdoms in the 19th century comprised four major states—Buganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and, later-reviving, Bunyoro. These expanded at the expense of other states, conquered, subjugated, incorporated. Two hundred or so other smaller states in the region grew weaker, by and large. (Cohen, 1989:273-276)

In this period, merchandise, then traders, then teachers, explorers and agents began to penetrate the Great Lakes region from the coast. (Cohen, 1989:287) Kimambo gives 1844 as the first arrival of traders from the coast (in Buganda), which soon induced Buganda to seek to extend its control along the new trade routes, and Bunyoro to try to open up new and unhindered routes. (Kimambo, 1989:252)

Towards the end of the nineteenth century, increasing resistance to statism within and imperialism by the states of the system was noted. (Cohen, 1989:290-291) This was however overtaken by the collision between British imperialism (and Zanzibari) and that of Bunyoro and Buganda in the 1880’s and 1890’s. (Mwanzi, 1985:152, 160-162) In fact, in the early 1870’s, it was Egypt, under Khedive Ismail, which placed officials on the Upper Nile, created “Equatoria province,” and came in politico-military touch with Bunyoro and Buganda. (Wright, 1985:541) Buganda replied by
seeking ties with Zanzibar and the West. (Wright, 1985:543) Religious civil wars among the proselytes of the various Central sects ensued, followed by the incorporation of the core states in the British protectorate of Uganda. (Wright, 1985:574-575)

Analysis. It is probable that there was an African Great Lakes civilization in existence from the late seventeenth to the late nineteenth century, when it was engulfed by Central civilization via Egyptian, Zanzibari and British agency. Confirmation would require excavation of Bugandan kibuga sites in search of demographic estimates. An earlier startup is possible, and would have to be verified by excavations at the Chwezi and Bunyoro capitals.

17. MADAGASCAR

Madagascan cities. No cities appear on Chandler’s lists through AD 1700. Then:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size</th>
<th>Lower limits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AD 1800</td>
<td>Majunga (“Mouzangaye”) 25,000 none</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other sources suggest that there may have been more. Esoavelomandroso cites a number of the Islamized settlements in northwest Madagascar, established from perhaps the twelfth and at least the sixteenth centuries, as “true city-states,” but gives no population estimates. (Esoavelomandroso, 1984:604, 607-608) In 1613 Luigi Mariano described Massalagem in Boina Bay as having six to seven thousand inhabitants and Sadia in Menabe as having about 1000 homesteads. (Marks and Gray, 1975:460) Sadia (i.e. Menabe) had a capital (i.e. Sadia) with 10,000 people in 1614. (Kent, 1992:869) By 1741 the Boina capital of Marovoay consisted of “thousands of houses.” (Marks and Gray, 1975:465) Deschamps reports a population of 75,000 for Tananarive (Antananarivo), the Merina capital, in 1828. (1976:415) It had been made Merina capital in 1796, but Merina’s major conquests came between 1817 and 1827.) (Deschamps, 1976:399-405) There were cities, then. Was there simultaneously historical autonomy?

Madagascar, 16th and 17th centuries AD. Majunga, on the northwest coast of Madagascar, appears to be the successor to Boina town (New Mazalagem), Lulangane (Old Mazalagem), and Bombetock, three Swahili trading-post islands in the bays of Boina, Mahjamba, and Bombetock. In
1506 the Portuguese attacked two of these posts, then began an annual trade with Mozambique, stimulated state formation onshore, had politico-military squabbles with the "Moors" in the 1580's, signed treaties with local rulers in 1613, triggered a civil war in Sadia after 1616. (Kent, 1992:859-862) Kent: "in the early 1600's Madagascar was a honeycomb of mostly small and self-contained chiefdoms. Before the end of the century much of western Madagascar went under a Sakalava empire and several kingdoms emerged...." (Kent, 1992:849) About 1650-1680 the Sakalava kingdom of Menabe was formed by Andriandahifotsy's extensive conquests; his younger son Tsimanatona founded the northwestern kingdom of Boina (Iboina) by conquest before 1700. (Marks and Gray, 1975:462) Sakalava warriors subjugated the northwestern trading posts. "Majunga grew into the commercial capital of Iboina." (Kent, 1992:870)

**Madagascar, 18th century AD.** Iboina was stable and prosperous toward the end of the 18th century. (Kent, 1992:871) Sakalava power began to decline in the last quarter of the 18th century, as the influence of the recently founded trading post of Majunga rose. (Marks and Gray, 1975:467)

In about 1785 the small Merina kingdom in the central plateau of the island acquired a king Andrianampoinimerina, who moved his capital to Antananarivo and attempted to conquer the whole island, failing in particular however to overcome Boina (Matibwa, 1989:413-416)

**Madagascar, 19th century AD.** Seeking to eliminate intermediaries at Majunga and the increasingly important east coast port of Tamatave, and to trade directly with Europeans—especially British—the Merina king Radama I made diplomatic contact with the British in Mauritius, signed treaties of friendship and commerce, agreed to suppress the slave trade, received a subsidy and missionaries, got support in his claim for the whole island, secured military assistance, and was able to extend his control over most of Madagascar. (Matibwa, 1989:416-422)

Thereafter Madagascar walked a diplomatic tightrope between France and Britain, internationalism and isolationism, friendship and hostility. (Matibwa, 1989:423-443) Even when isolationist, it was however not isolated; isolationism is a foreign policy that seeks to cope with the lack of a desired isolation, not its existence.

**Analysis.** It is not probable that a separate and historically autonomous Madagascar civilization ever developed. The early towns on the northwest
coast were, if ever of city size, extensions of the East African system. Significant urbanization and large-state formation appear to have been stimulated by dangers and opportunities provided by direct pressure from Central civilization. Portuguese pressure, and perhaps also pressure from the French settlement of Fort Dauphin (1643-1674), which had local vassals and accelerated the formation of the Sakalava state of Menabe, from which Iboina was a cadet branch, was particularly important. (Kent, 1992:864-866,868,870) The process of state-building seems to have been held back on the coast by the strength of intruders, and stimulated inland by the limits on their (sea)power and the value of the coastal targets—economic centers in a political power vacuum—they had deliberately created, which offered inland states an opportunity. A power calculus is implied, in which the Portuguese (and the French) figured. Similar calculi appear to have influenced inland states in Senegal, the Gold Coast and Dahomey, with mixed success; in Madagascar the local power did very well.

The eighteenth century, when Oman, Portugal and the Swahili states struggled for power on the African coast, invites further examination in Madagascar. Its politico-military interface with the rest of Central civilization may have temporarily shifted from European to Arab and African.

18. SOUTH AFRICA

South African cities. No cities appear on Chandler’s lists through AD 1800. Denoon gives the population of Cape Town as 15,000 at the end of the 1700’s (1992:701), but Cape Town was an outpost of Central civilization, well involved in its wars via the British occupations regardless of any isolationist desires of its burghers. However, an interesting point is raised by Marks and Gray regarding two Sotho-Tswana settlements, Kaditshwena (about 25 S, 26 30 E), one capital of the Hurutshe lineage (1975: 413, 426), and Dithakong (about 27 S, 22 30 E), the Tlhaping lineage capital. (1975:417, 421)

Until the end of the 18th century, Sotho-Tswana lineages “proliferated and dispersed” by segmentation and fission. But by the late 17th or early 18th centuries, hegemonies and states had begun to form. By 1813, Kaditshwena had “well over 15,000 people.” (Marks and Gray, 1975:413) By 1801, Dithakong “contained some 15-20,000 inhabitants.” (Marks and Gray, 1975:417) These are city-size entities. Doubt of their stability however arises with the report that Dithakong “was to fragment shortly thereafter” (1975:417), presumably by the same lineage-fission process that had
already made Kaditshwena only one of two Hurutshe capitals, and of a junior lineage at that (1975:412-413); perhaps they were transient phenomena. In any event, their development was interrupted: Dithakong, still Tlhaping capital, was attacked in 1823 by a Mfecane component, the (future) Kololo, and others, was saved by Griqua gunmen at the instance of the local agent of the London Missionary Society, strengthening the Tlhaping state (Ngcongco, 1989:115-116, 121) while entraining it to Central processes; the (by then) Kololo then sacked and destroyed Kaditshwena, scattering its inhabitants. (1989:116)

Nevertheless, any such figures raise the question of whether a civilization-forming process was occurring in South Africa, and if so whether it occurred within or beyond the pressure-boundary of the local outpost of Central civilization.

There is ample evidence that politico-military processes which would be expected to culminate in cities had rather recently gotten underway. Large confederacies—Sobhuza’s Ngwana-Dlamini (proto-Swazi), Zwide’s Ndwandwe, Dingiswayo’s Mthethwa—had begun to form in the eighteenth century by a process of population pressure, settlement, conquest, militarization, specialization, and further conquest. (Ngcongco, 1989:98-100) These events culminated in the Mfecane revolution of the early nineteenth century, which suddenly destroyed a system of small farming states and produced a set of “large-scale centralized kingdoms” and “empires.” (Ngcongco, 1989:91) In particular, one Mthethwa confederate tribe, the Zulu under Shaka, rose to prominence after 1818, subordinated the Mthethwa, established a barracked army, and conquered or dispersed the Ndwandwe. (Ngcongco, 1989:103-105) Other conquering states—Gaza and Ndebele—and defensive-reaction states—Lesotho, Swazi, Kololo—arose nearby as part of the process. (Ngcongco, 1989:103-123)

The formative process seems to have been historically autonomous at its beginning, but not for long. Denoon asserts that “the emergence of the strong confederacies, which led ultimately to the formation of the Zulu state, was entirely independent of events at the Cape.” (Denoon, 1992:702) But the effects of the Mfecane, which probably began about 1815 with a war between Sobhuza and Zwide, began to be felt in the form of refugee waves in the Cape Colony around 1823. (Mashingaidze, 1989:129-132) Organized conqueror formations began to arrive in 1828, leading to the battle in which British, colonists, Xhosa and Thembu broke Matiwane’s Ngwane. Meanwhile the leading Mfecane state, Shaka’s Zulu, was trying “to establish
diplomatic contacts” with the Cape. (Mashingaidze, 1989:136-137) In fact, the formative process was expansive as well as condensing, creating local depopulations and concentrations, throwing off condensed units which traveled great distances to establish new centers. Accordingly, the rise of the Zulu produced a set of wars, migrations and states which brought the new-state area into politico-military touch with British, Boers and Portuguese in the early nineteenth century. (Omer-Cooper, 1976a, 1976b) The ensuing series of wars with European settlers and their descendants, who were themselves in an expansion process, effectively absorbed the whole area into Central civilization.

**Analysis.** There may have been a South African civilization in its earliest city-forming phase in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. If so, it was engulfed by Boer, British, and Portuguese elements of Central civilization in the mid-nineteenth century. The history and archaeology of Kaditshwena (and further data on that of Dithakong) would be determinative here: were they genuine cities which accumulated and persisted, or transient clusterings of lineages which fissioned into townlets on the demise of the common ancestor? The latter seems probable for Dithakong, but unexamined for Kaditshwena. Had there been a lineage fusion and hierarchy-forming process that stabilized its population numbers and condensed the society? If not, there were only embryonic or protocivilizational formations. At the moment, it seems proper to treat a South African civilization as possible, not as probable.

**CONCLUSION**

1. **Egyptian/Northeast African civilization.** An autonomous civilization until fusion with Mesopotamian c. 1500 BC to form the (still surviving and current sole survivor) Central civilization.

2. **Nubia.** Not isolated; semiperipheral to Egyptian and then to Central civilization.

3. **Ethiopia.** Not isolated; semiperipheral to Central civilization.

4. **Kaffa.** Possibly isolated and autonomous 18th, perhaps 15th, to 19th centuries AD; much missing data.

5. **Northwest Africa.** Not isolated; Punic cities and empire semiperipheral
to Central civilization.

6. **West African/Western Sudanic civilization.** An autonomous civilization from at least the 8th century AD, perhaps earlier; engulfed by Central civilization in the 16th century.

7. **Chadland.** Possibly an autonomous civilization from as early as the 8th or as late as the 13th to the 16th century AD, but more probably a semiperiphery of Central civilization, with connections through Nubia, Darfur and Fezzan.

8. **Hausaland.** Possibly an autonomous civilization from the 12th through the 14th century, then engulfed from Chadland by its civilization (whether Central Sudanic or merely Central); but probably developed as a semiperiphery of that civilization.

9. **Lower Niger.** Possibly a separate civilization from the 11th to the 16th century, when attached to the dynamics of Hausaland by land and of Europe by sea; but more probably not urbanized separately from Hausaland, both being extensions of a network and process from Chadland.

10. **Dahomey.** Semiperipheral to Lower Niger, and to Central civilization from the 16th century.

11. **Gold Coast.** Semiperipheral to Central civilization from the 16th century.

12. **South Central African (Zimbabwe) civilization.** Possible, 13th to mid-16th century AD, when engulfed by Central civilization; remotely possible earlier.

13. **East African (Coastal/Swahili) civilization.** Extant, 14th to 15th century AD, possibly since 12th century. Engulfed by Central civilization early 16th century.

14. **West Central African (Kongo/Tio) civilization.** Extant, 15th century AD; possibly earlier. Engulfed by Central civilization early 16th century.

15. **Central Africa (Shaba).** Probable an autonomous civilization, late 17th to early 19th century, when engulfed by Central.

16. **African Great Lakes civilization.** Probable, late 17th to late 19th cen-
tury, when engulfed by Central; possible earlier.


18. South Africa. Possibly an autonomous civilization, late 18th to early 19th century, when engulfed by Central; but probably in early and tentative startup.

The reappraisal yields, of 18 candidates, four (rather than two, as previously) sufficiently probable to be treated as extant: Egyptian/Northeast African (later, Central) and West African, as before; plus East African (Swahili) and West Central African (Kongo/Tio). Two more are rated as "probable," anticipating the results of archaeological work: African Great Lakes and Central African (Shaba). Six are "possible," in varying degrees: Kaffan; Chadland/Hausaland/Lower Niger separately or more likely as one Central Sudan/Niger complex; South Central African (Zimbabwe); South African. The remainder are more likely semiperipheral formations of Egyptian (Nubia), Central (Ethiopia, Northwest Africa, Gold Coast, Madagascar) or a previously mentioned "possible" civilization (Dahomey, of Lower Niger).

The later-forming civilizations are of particular interest. They are easily overlooked, because overrun early in their formative process. But, so overrun, in historical times, they offer an unusual opportunity to study early phases, small-scale civilizations, and comparative engulfment processes.

Are there more African civilizations yet? The Fezzan (Jerma of the Garamantes), Tuat, and other Saharan sites, Darfur, the So mounds, Nok, Igbo-Ukwu, Begho, Kong, the Mossi states, the upper Ubangi basin, may yet have stories to tell. The empirical resources of documentary history have not been exhausted, nor of oral history. But the further testing and refinement of the enumeration of African civilizations will mostly be the province of systematic archaeology. Deserving of particular attention from demographic, political and military archaeology are: the Buganda kibugas; the Lunda musumbas; the reappraisal of Great Zimbabwe and Mapungubwe; Shadda and Bonga, the other Kaffa capitals and the other Cushite states; Manan and the Darfur connection; Kikiwhary; and Kaditshwena.

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