TABLE OF CONTENTS

A Letter From the Editor ........................................................................................................1

View-Shaping, First Personal Authority, and the Asymmetry between Providing and Withholding
Clara W. Cullen ..................................................................................................................3

Local Partisan Agreement and Trust
Mike Pulsipher and Kelsey Eyre .....................................................................................19

Party Contacting, Group Identity, and COVID-19: An Analysis of Asian American Voter Turnout in 2020
Suzy Yi ..................................................................................................................................33

The Growing Greens: How Young Postmaterialists Delivered Electoral Success for the German Green Party in 2021
Isaac Lamoreaux ...............................................................................................................55

The Impact of Gender on the Acceptance of Surveillance Technology
Jody Messick .....................................................................................................................69

Explaining Guatemalan Vigilantism
Bryant McConkie ............................................................................................................89

The Sino-Soviet Split: A Domestic Ideology Analysis
Caleb Ringger ...............................................................................................................107

An Ironic Alliance: The Domestic Foundations of Qatar’s Support for Democratic Revolution Abroad
Jonah Phillips ..................................................................................................................125
A Letter From the Editor

Dear readers,

In this age of globalization and technology, the world is closer than ever. Yet often we struggle to understand the people around us, especially when their cultures and beliefs are different from our own. Lack of understanding leads to fractures in our global community caused by marginalization, polarization, and conflict. Taking time to understand the differences in our world will help us to be more aware of our own logical fallacies, inherent privileges, and personal responsibilities to make this world a better place.

In this edition of Sigma, you will find research intended to increase awareness of historical, modern, and psychological factors that may limit our perception of the world. These articles include an analysis of the history between China and the Soviet Union, the rise of political groups such as the German Green Party, vigilantism in Guatemala, changes in Asian-American voter turnout, gender’s relationship with surveillance technology acceptance, and the role that authority figures can play in shaping how individuals view the world, in addition to other topics.

As students, we have a unique and important role to play in influencing the political discourse of our time. Through our research and writing, we hope you will gain a deeper understanding of this world and feel inspired to engage in meaningful dialogue and action.

This journal is the result of dedicated time and energy from many organizations in the BYU campus community, principally the Political Science Department and the Kennedy Center for International Studies. Special thanks to the rest of the editing staff, Amelia Watterson and Elle Diether, our copy and content editing team, the advising professors, and our faculty advisor, Scott Cooper. We especially thank the authors for sharing their work and passion with us.

I am proud to present the 2022–23 edition of Sigma.

Marissa Gerber Pinnock
Editor-in-Chief, Sigma
Introduction

In her paper, *Freedom and Influence in Formative Education*, Kyla Ebels-Duggan addresses the debate regarding the moral justification of parents and educators raising children under a particular normative outlook, with normative outlook and beliefs referring to one’s perspective on what actions, behaviors, outcomes, or beliefs are acceptable or correct. This normative outlook pertains not just to moral judgments but also views on the superior way of life. This debate questioning if parents and educators are morally correct in shaping their children according to their normative beliefs is of particular importance amidst rising political contention regarding the content and methods of public education. In contrast to many philosophers who favor an “open future” approach, where important choices are left undecided until the child is able to choose for themselves, Ebels-Duggan argues that parents should raise their children according to their own normative beliefs. Ebels-Duggan agrees with her counterparts that respecting autonomy is a crucial requirement when teaching children, yet she suggests doing so does not prohibit educators from offering their own well-reasoned normative views. However, Ebels-Duggan’s argument remains somewhat ambiguous as to the methods of view-shaping; is it, for example, morally justifiable to deliberately withhold information, narratives, or views in attempts to shape another person?

This paper will side with Ebels-Duggan in the view that parents and those with influence can and likely should attempt to raise children within a normative outlook they believe to be good. Although I agree with the general claim Ebels-Duggan presents, I believe her argument leaves ambiguity as to what methods of view-shaping are morally justifiable. View-shaping can occur through at least two means: providing information and withholding information. Yet, Ebels-Duggan’s argument would suggest that both
providing and withholding are morally justifiable means of view-shaping. In this paper, I argue that intentionally withholding information as a method of view-shaping is morally objectionable because it disrespects the other’s first personal authority, or the ability and right of an individual to know and own their own psychological state and character more than anyone else (Parrott 2011).

This paper has four major sections. First, I present Ebels-Duggan’s view and argument on view-shaping and discuss the ambiguity she leaves regarding withholding information as a method of view-shaping. I then present a case to highlight asymmetry between providing and withholding to display the moral difference between the two methods. My third section will discuss first personal authority as a foundation for respecting autonomy and a crucial requirement for view-shaping, leading to my alteration to Ebels-Duggan’s argument. Lastly, I provide four additional cases as examples of the moral distinction between providing and withholding as methods of view-shaping.

Educating and View-Shaping

In his work, *The Child’s Right to an Open Future*, Joel Feinberg argues that educators and those who influence the upbringing of children need to educate them while treating their autonomy rights as rights in trust, or “rights to be preserved for them” (Feinberg 1994). To Feinberg, this includes leaving all options open for a child until they are able to choose between those options themselves. This upbringing, he argues, excludes educators from teaching a particular normative outlook because doing so would limit the options available to the child, thus violating their autonomy.

Ebels-Duggan explains Feinberg’s view is problematic because he must either support a maximization of options open to a child or allow for some influences to be blocked. Yet, a maximization of options would still allow some other outlook to influence the child, just not the educator’s outlook. As an example of this consequence, she points to profit-seeking corporations that aim to shape children; she explains that directionless teaching leaves the child vulnerable to inevitable, less valuable influences that would still violate Feinberg’s understanding of autonomy because the child is being shaped nonetheless. Ebels-Duggan then points out that the second possibility of allowing some influences to be blocked would require a principled way to draw the line between possibilities a child is entitled to and those that can be closed. Yet, this line can only be drawn through a judgment call on what is right and wrong, valuable or harmful. Thus, it is impossible to raise a child in a way where all options remain open to them independent of the educator’s normative outlook.

Ebels-Duggan’s central critique of Feinberg and those who argue against normative instruction for children is that they misunderstand autonomy, or the freedom to guide one’s own life according to their own value judgments. To Feinberg, it would be incorrect to interfere with an adult’s choices and way of life for the reason that their choices are poor ones. Following the Kantian conception of autonomy, Ebels-Duggan critiques Feinberg’s principle of autonomy saying it regards desires and inclinations as authoritative; such innate desires would signify which options must surely be left open for a
child. For Feinberg, the options that must be kept open for children are those which the child would choose between once reaching the age of maturity. However, those matured decisions and desires will inherently depend on the child’s upbringing. One could rely on innate or pre-social tendencies of the child, but these are likely to include selfishness, unkindness, or other tendencies that parents are responsible to rear children away from. It would be impermissible, for example, for children to view stealing, lying, or bullying as good or acceptable.

Kant, however, views inclinations as a threat to our autonomy because they occur within us passively, not because of our reason or other characteristics that make us agents (Kant 1998; Ebels-Duggan, forthcoming). So, if the goal is to educate for autonomy, it would be inappropriate to design such an education from the child’s (or anyone’s) inclinations or unreasoned desires. Instead, Kant views autonomy of thought or values as a matter of first personal authority (Ebels-Duggan 2018; Moran 2001). As Ebels-Duggan explains, “Our principles, or maxims, of action count as our own because we determine their content through our own assessment of the reasons supporting them” (Ebels-Duggan 2018). Thus, to honor the autonomy of others is not to encourage inclinations, but rather to respect one’s authority over their own reasoning and appreciation. Practically speaking, this may include shaping views in a way that allows the agent to provide their own attention and thinking to the reasons provided.

To Ebels-Duggan, and as taken on in this paper, this is the understanding of autonomy that should limit or approve what educators teach to children. As such, she believes we are not morally justified in shaping views through methods reliant on inclinations of the agent. She again uses for-profit corporations as an example, explaining that such corporations seek to shape outlooks without regard to reasons or principles. Such corporations largely rely on associations of products with desires, often without a basis in reality. They shape views and motivate actions by using the other’s inclinations instead of their capacity to reason. Such unprincipled view-shaping disrespects first, personal authority, as it disregards the agent’s reasoning and is thus unjustified. Likewise, she explains, if a parent instrumentally shapes their child’s views for their own ends and does not care about putting the child in a position to appreciate the reasons of their outlook, this disrespects the first personal authority of the child.

Ebels-Duggan argues that view-shaping through internally held and well-reasoned principles does not disrespect a child’s autonomy. In fact, doing so may facilitate the child’s use of their own first personal authority. When educators present concepts or viewpoints, this generally provides opportunities for the student to attentively think through their reasons. Ebels-Duggan does not suggest educators should force views on others, as this would indicate lack of respect for their reasoning and thus autonomy, but believes educating by presenting their own beliefs and views on what is good or bad does not present a conflict for autonomy as many philosophers have suggested (e.g., Callan 1997; Feinberg 1994; Gutmann 1999). Because view-shaping relies on and is responsive to the reasoning capacity of the individual being educated, Ebels-Duggan views normative education as morally acceptable.
Ebels-Duggan suggests that the best thing parents and educators can do is thoroughly think through their own beliefs and rationalizations. She explains, “The responsible parent does not merely expose her child to the largest and most random set of influences, but rather makes considered judgments about which influences are salutary and which are rightly excluded and actively seeks to close certain existential possibilities.” When parents shape views according to their good principles, they work through the child’s reasons and not inclinations because the child must internally evaluate those principles. Ebels-Duggan believes a child’s right to autonomy offers important guidelines for parents, but that it does not conflict with educating by principled conceptions of the good because the child can still assess such conceptions themselves. Ebels-Duggan’s argument on view-shaping can be presented as follows:

1. Education should respect autonomy.
2. Respecting autonomy requires respecting first personal authority.
3. View-shaping through reasoned principles is compatible with first personal authority.

Conclusion: Educating by view-shaping on reasoned principles is acceptable

Yet, as in Premise 3, Ebels-Duggan does not differentiate between different methods of view-shaping that can exist under reasoned principles. For example, when she says that parents can exclude and actively close possibilities, she does not acknowledge that an educator could do so through providing or withholding. The educator could provide information and reasons in order to close the options, or the educator could hide the information and never provide the child with reasons. Furthermore, Ebels-Duggan’s language to describe justified view-shaping throughout her paper remains similarly ambiguous. She says educators can guide, educate, teach to value, communicate their views, and shape values and normative outlooks. Again, such shaping can occur through providing information or withholding. Because she does not distinguish between these two methods of view-shaping, the following premises and conclusion naturally follow her argument:

4. View-shaping can include both providing and withholding information.
5. So, principled providing and withholding are compatible with first personal authority.

Conclusion: Principled providing and withholding are acceptable for educating by view-shaping.

As Ebels-Duggan’s argument stands, one could conclude that both providing and withholding information are morally justified forms of view-shaping. I suggest that there is a moral distinction between the two methods.

While Ebels-Duggan herself posits that first personal authority is crucial, her view on acceptable methods of view-shaping within the scope of first personal authority is largely ambiguous. For Ebels-Duggan, parents must believe their views to be right,
and if they do, they can generally trust that they respect the first personal authority of their children, as long as they shape in a way that is responsive to the child’s reasoning and not inclinations. If having reasoned principles is the key factor for respecting the other’s first personal authority, as Ebels-Duggan seems to suggest, then providing and withholding information would both meet the moral requirement for shaping views. Yet, although an educator could believe in a view and then provide or withhold information to another in a way that is responsive to and reliant on their own reasons, doing so through intentionally withholding information generally disrespects the other’s first personal authority by disregarding their capacity to reason through the withheld information. In the following section, I present a case to show the asymmetry between providing and withholding information as they relate to first personal authority. This asymmetry shows that having good principles behind view-shaping is not enough to justify it, although I maintain that having reasoned principles is one moral requirement for view-shaping.

Providing and Withholding Asymmetry

Ebels-Duggan’s argument suggests two requirements for view-shaping: first, that the view-shaper respects the other’s first personal authority, and second, that the view-shaper must have well-reasoned principles supporting the normative outlook they teach. Her argument seems to suggest that first personal authority will be naturally respected when the view-shaper has well-reasoned principles. By this view, what matters is that the outlook-shaping stems from good principles and works through reasoning. If the educator has reasoned through their outlook and believes it to be good, they are in the right to educate according to those principles. Because Ebels-Duggan does not distinguish between methods of view-shaping, her view indicates that both providing and withholding information are acceptable forms of view-shaping when the educator is principled in their own reasoning.

Yet, when examining providing and withholding information side by side, it is no longer clear that having good reasons is enough to meet the requirement to respect first personal authority or that the two requirements are automatically compatible. Consider the case George Tsai presents regarding providing another with reasons or evidence in attempts to shape their views.

Claire, a recent college graduate living at home, has just this afternoon received acceptance letters from some law schools and philosophy PhD programs. Peter, her father, is anxious about the decision she has to make a month from now either to go to law school or philosophy graduate school. Peter thinks that Claire is insufficiently capable of carefully considering everything that she ought to be considering before making her decision and worries that Claire will make the wrong decision. Peter strongly prefers that Claire choose law over philosophy, believes that Claire would be making a serious mistake should she choose the latter, and is not open to Claire persuading him that he is wrong. This evening, Peter presents Claire
with lots of information—income statistics, placement data, labor market outlook, testimonials on the climate for women, and so on—about both professions. Peter provides this information with a view to getting Claire to choose law school over philosophy graduate school, making his intentions plain to Claire. (Assume for the sake of argument that the information Peter presents to Claire is relevant, accurate, and unbiased. So, Peter presents Claire with good evidence.) (Tsai 2014, 94)

George Tsai argues that although Peter acts by rationally persuading Claire, he is wrong to do so. Peter’s paternalism is morally objectionable, Tsai believes, because he provides Claire with the information on the same day that she has the opportunity to consider her options, so Peter interferes with Claire’s personal assessment of her options (94). Tsai explains that this form of paternalism shows that Peter does not trust Claire to “adequately recognize or weigh reasons that bear on her good” and believes she is “insufficiently capable of engaging with those reasons” (111). So, to Tsai, Peter provides information out of distrust of Claire’s capacity to gather reasons and to independently assess the given reasons.

Yet, Ebels-Duggan’s piece suggests Peter is right in his attempts to shape Claire’s views to prefer law school. For Ebels-Duggan, providing these reasons early would be morally acceptable, and often preferable, as it allows opportunities for Claire to assess the given reasons she might not otherwise have. Furthermore, it would seem that for Ebels-Duggan, Peter is not providing reasons out of distrust of Claire’s reasoning, but instead because he values her capacity to reason and assess the information when she has it. He wants to provide Claire with additional reasons and information that she can internally think through and form a conclusion from.

From Ebels-Duggan’s two requirements of having good principles and respecting first personal authority, it seems to be morally acceptable for Peter to provide this information to Claire in attempts to shape her views. He does so based on his well-reasoned principles, and he respects Claire’s first personal authority because he respects her ability to assess the information he provides and to make an informed decision. So, providing information as a method of view-shaping is morally acceptable.

Now, imagine that during Peter’s research, he comes across information he thinks Claire would assess to decide against the law, such as evidence on the soul depleting nature of practicing law and the soul enriching nature philosophy (again assuming for the argument that such evidence is relevant, accurate, and unbiased). When taking all information into account, Peter still regards law as the optimal choice for Claire and in general. Yet, he believes that if Claire were to know the evidence regarding souls in law and philosophy, she would form the opposite conclusion he did and decide to pursue philosophy. So, he deliberately withholds the evidence in favor of philosophy as he presents his argument to Claire.

There seems to be an intuitive difference between the morality of the two versions of this case. Where the first version seems acceptable under Ebels-Duggan’s framework of first personal authority, the second feels morally questionable under that same framework, causing us to evaluate what made the difference. In both versions of this case,
Peter attempts to shape Claire based on his reasoned principles and attempts to shape views in a way that is responsive to Claire’s reasoning, acknowledging that she will think through and make judgements on the information she has. The only difference with the new iteration is that Peter withholds information. Because the only difference is that Peter deliberately withholds information, it appears that withholding information as means of view-shaping is morally questionable.

As laid out, Ebels-Duggan’s argument would suggest that Peter is still in the right in his attempts to shape Claire’s views because the view-shaping is based on Peter’s good principles, even when intentionally withholding information. Yet, when the second case is examined in light of first personal authority, it is no longer clear that Peter’s attempts to shape his daughter’s views are acceptable. Although he is responsive to Claire’s capacity to reason and assess (he believes Claire will understand the reasons and form a conclusion from them), he is no longer respectful of that capacity. He withholds the information because he fears she would use her capacity to form a different conclusion than he desires.

The asymmetry between providing and withholding information, even in the context of good principles, seems to deny Premise 5 of Ebels-Duggan’s argument, that providing and withholding are both compatible with first personal authority. Following Ebels-Duggan’s view on first personal authority, I suggest that withholding information is a violation of first personal authority. As such, it is not a morally acceptable method of shaping views.

**First Personal Autonomy**

Liberal Political Theory stipulates that each person should be free to choose for himself what is good and to live his life by these self-decided principles. Yet distinguishing which principles and views are our own fuels much of the debates on autonomy and first personal authority in relation to raising children and more generally.

Ebels-Duggan relies on a Kantian understanding of autonomy to answer these questions. For Kant, autonomy seems to depend on active and internal reasonings. As Ebels-Duggan explains, “when we consider the reasons that support acting a certain way, determine that these reasons are sufficient, and act on this determination, we bring our own activity to bear and so act autonomously.” Inclinations, on the other hand, are passive and thus not indicators of autonomy or the attributes of an agent. Thus, she claims, Kant views autonomy as a matter of first personal authority. First personal authority attributes thoughts, values, and beliefs to a person’s free agency only when they are the result of their judgments or assessment of the reasons for them (Smith 2005; Scanlon 2010; Hieronymi 2014). Principles of action are “subject to the authority of our judgments,” while inclinations or desires are “motivational states that simply happen in or to us” (Ebels-Duggan 2018). She explains:

If I were to encounter a poisonous snake while hiking, I would be afraid. But the fear does not seem to be a mere force, some arational part of the causal order. It
is, rather, an intelligible, warranted response to the danger of the situation. When all is going well, the fear arises through my attention to and thinking about actual features of my situation and would change in response to changes in my interpretations of these features. Upon realizing that what I took to be a poisonous snake is really perfectly harmless, my fear would dissipate, replaced by relief. Fear that is describable in this way is fear over which I have first personal authority. (396)

Contrast a phobia: if I am subject to a phobia of snakes, my feeling of fear persists even in the face of my wholly sincere and considered judgment that there is no danger. In this case the fear does incur on me as an alien force, something that happens in me and is not subject to my authority. (397)

For Ebels-Duggan’s first personal authority, attitudes, including judgments, desires, and emotions are one’s own when they respond to one’s own assessment of the reasons supporting them. If they do, it makes sense to attribute such attitudes to free expressions of one’s own agency, not to “alien forces occurring in me” (Ebels-Duggan 2018). Thus, using first personal authority to choose normative outlooks requires being attentive to and thinking about the reasons for the normative outlook.

If a child is to be educated in a way that respects their first personal authority, they must be educated in a way where they are able to exercise their first personal authority. The outlook they develop must be responsive to their own appreciation of the reasons and values that support it; they must be “able to affirm it from the inside” (Ebels-Duggan 2018). As such, providing reasons to a child does not disrespect their first personal authority. The child can internally evaluate those reasons and then abide by them or reject them.

Yet, providing reasons is not the only way parents can teach children an outlook. Ebels-Duggan’s argument does not fully address other methods or if those methods respect the child’s first personal authority. In her argument, Ebels-Duggan does rule out cases when the influencer motivates the child’s outlook through the child’s inclinations and desires as opposed to interacting with her first personal authority. Yet, as shown in George Tsai’s case of Peter and Claire, it is possible for educators to be aware of and responsive to another’s first personal autonomy and still disrespectful of that authority. In Tsai’s case, Peter recognizes and relies on Claire’s ability to reason, and he desires to present and withhold information to facilitate her reasoning. However, when he decides to withhold information because he thinks she would use the information to form a different conclusion than he has, he no longer respects her first personal autonomy, although he remains aware of and responsive to it. I suggest that most cases of intentionally withholding information for the purpose of view-shaping in fact disrespect the first personal authority of the other person. My argument revision can be stated as follows:

1. Education should respect autonomy.
2. Respecting autonomy requires respecting first personal authority.
3. Educating by view-shaping can include both providing and withholding information.
4. Providing information respects first personal authority.
5. Intentionally withholding information does not respect first personal authority.

**Conclusion:** It is acceptable to provide information but unacceptable to intentionally withhold to educate by view-shaping.

To clarify this discussion, withholding information for the purpose of view-shaping as discussed here remains distinct from broader debates on the morality of lying, misleading, and reticence. If lying is to say X when X is false (Mahon 2003), then withholding as a method of view-shaping is distinct from lying because one does not say something that is false when withholding. Rather, withholding is more about what one does not say. Further, withholding for view-shaping remains distinct from misleading. Misleading is to influence another to believe X when you yourself do not believe X to be true (Berstler 2019). Although there are surely cases where someone does not believe the view they spread, and would thus be misleading, such cases already lack moral justification by the requirements for view-shaping because it is not done through well-reasoned principles the view-shaper believes in. In cases of morally justified view-shaping, the view-shaper must believe their view to be true; so, such withholding is not a type of misleading.

Withholding for view-shaping is perhaps comparable to the concept of reticence, as reticence is to not say X when X is true. As Kant and others have discussed, one can be truthful without telling the whole truth (Mahon 2003). Similarly, one can shape views without providing all information. Yet, withholding for the purpose of view-shaping is distinct from the more general debate regarding the moral justification of reticence. The morality of withholding (reticence) as discussed in this paper specifically evaluates withholding with an intent to shape another’s views. As discussed in this paper, the actions of view-shaping have at least two justifications that must be fulfilled independent of the broader debate on reticence. This paper examines if withholding information meets those two requirements. It may be the case that withholding for the purpose of view-shaping must also meet the general moral requirements for reticence, but those requirements are beyond the scope of this paper.

**Application to Additional Cases**

Here I present four cases of withholding information as means of shaping views of those one has influence over. I will examine each case according to Ebels-Duggan’s two moral requirements for view-shaping and evaluate if these cases of view-shaping through withholding information are morally justified.

**Case 1: Parents Teaching Abstinence**

Imagine a parent who believes in chastity and abstinence until marriage. For them, sexual intimacy within marriage is a good thing, but sexual intimacy outside of marriage is a bad thing. They believe the purpose of intimacy is to create and raise children and to forge bonds of emotional connection between a couple. Yet, they believe these things can only happen in a positive way when a couple is wholly committed to each
other to a degree that requires marriage. As they believe adopting this view would benefit their child, they aim to raise their child with this perspective. They do so by expressing their feelings and beliefs described above and the reasons for them.

As this case stands, these parents meet the first requirement of view-shaping to teach by well-reasoned principles. They have thought through their beliefs, and they use those principles to teach their child. Similarly, the parents meet the second requirement of respecting the first personal authority of their child when they present their reasons to her. They allow their child opportunities to apply their own assessment to the principles they believe in.

Now imagine that these parents also intentionally withhold information that they believe would discourage their child from their own view. These parents do not, for example, teach their child about forms of birth control or safe sex. They fear doing so would encourage their child to consider and form what is to them an incorrect rationalization about sexual intimacy, namely that it would be appropriate outside of marriage. If their child were to ask about potential options, they would immediately disregard, attack, and ignore such options without meaningful discussion.

This case provides another intuitive distinction between the morality of view-shaping through providing information and withholding information. These parents still have and use well-reasoned principles in their attempts to shape their child’s views. They believe they were better off for abiding by abstinence, and they believe their child will be if they do so too. They do not desire to spread the view to their child because they believe it will advantage them as parents, but rather because they genuinely believe it is the right lifestyle. Yet, they no longer respect the first personal authority of their child. They withhold information because they think their child would form beliefs and make choices they do not agree with if it had such information. This fear of their child’s opposing reasoning indicates a lack of respect for its first personal authority.

Note, these parents are different from parents who more unintentionally neglect teaching their children about safe sex because they are too uncomfortable to talk about it. These uncomfortable parents may also have reasoned principles supporting abstinence until marriage, even though they avoid teaching about it, and they may respect their children’s ability to reason and rationalize on their own. In such instances, their withholding of information emerges from their own insecurities. Although problematic for other reasons, this does not intrinsically violate the child’s first personal authority because it does not stem from disrespect of the child’s own assessment.

Similarly, the intentionally withholding parents are different than parents who think the school will take over the responsibility of sex education, or parents that merely forget or never get around to teaching about it. It may be the case that they themselves do not view premarital sex as an option and thus unintentionally withhold the information because they do not think to teach about it, but their motivation is not to limit or avoid their child’s reasoning. The outcomes of this may be problematic for practical reasons, yet the intention of these parents separates them from the intentionally withholding parents regarding respecting autonomy. The intentionally withholding parents fear that teaching about premarital sex would lead their child to develop views
different than their own, and thus do not respect the child’s autonomy in their intent to withhold such information and possibilities from them.

**Case 2: Amish Parents**

Consider now a case presented by Feinberg and objected to by Ebels-Duggan. Feinberg argues that the traditional Amish upbringing violates a children’s right to an open future because it passes on a particular normative outlook and blocks other viable options. Yet, as Ebels-Duggan provides, the Amish parents presumably offer their children all options that they believe to be worthwhile and good.

Ebels-Duggan’s response to Feinberg regarding the Amish parents seems to stem from the requirement for good principles. Like other parents, the Amish parents view their values to be superior to the alternatives. Like other parents, they may attempt to close off options and alternative views to exclude possibilities they view as inferior or wrong. As Ebels-Duggan points out, objections to the Amish parent’s attempts to shape their children’s views may in fact be objections to the Amish tradition and values, not to their qualification of this first requirement as many responsible parents aim to shape their children’s outlooks.

Yet, Ebels-Duggan’s evaluation of this case does not respond to the requirement to respect the first personal authority of the one whose views you try to shape. It may be that parents in this case close options through providing reasons against the undesirable options, in which case they maintain respect for their child’s first personal authority. However, if these parents intentionally refuse to introduce information to their child on the undesirable options because they think their child would internally conclude that the alternative options are superior, then they do not respect their child’s autonomy, although for different reasons than Feinberg originally suggests. In such a case, they fear that the authority of their child’s reasoning will differ from their own reasoning, and by intentionally withholding information because of this fear, they also seek to limit the reasoning opportunities of their child.

**Case 3: Doubting Missionaries**

Consider now the efforts of missionaries to persuade an individual to commit to their religious faith and outlook. These missionaries provide their student with lessons, church doctrine, scripture references, and other information that they believe in. Up to this point, the missionaries rely on both well-reasoned principles and respect the first personal authority of their religious student. Now imagine that these missionaries also avoid topics and information they believe would dissuade their student from adopting their views. For example, they may deliberately avoid teaching about their church’s controversial history with race. They themselves do not understand the history and cannot provide reasons they believe in to explain it beyond a more general and overpowering belief in their religion overall.

Conceivably, the missionaries may withhold the information on their church’s controversial history knowingly but not deliberately. They may, for example, forget or never get around to teaching the history due to limited meeting time. Although their
undeliberate neglect is perhaps problematic for other reasons, it is not problematic in its relation to respecting autonomy.

Alternatively, the missionaries may be aware that they have not yet mentioned the controversial history, but this may be a result of a plan to first teach principles they find to be most important and foundational. It may be their intent to provide information on the controversial history once they have laid the groundwork to support their reasoning for maintaining their faith in light of the controversy. They respect that their student may still come to a conclusion different than their own once they have finished their lessons, but they will have provided their student with a foundation to understand their own conclusions and consider it as a viable option. In this variation, the missionaries seem to maintain an overall respect for their student's first personal authority because they respect their capacity to assess and plan to provide them with all of the information as their lessons continue; they simply need time to present the entirety of their principles. In a sense, this form of withholding is more comparable to a prolonged, long-winded providing case.

However, if the missionaries avoid the controversy and intend to continue to do so because they think their student would not accept their views if offered the history, they would disrespect the first personal authority of the individual they are teaching. Although the missionaries use well-reasoned principles to teach, they indicate disrespect for their student's authority for their own reason.

Interestingly, this case of view-shaping may also be morally unjustified by Ebels-Duggan's argument if the missionaries do not genuinely believe in the reasons behind their withholding. In this case, the missionaries withhold information about their church's history that they themselves do not understand or support. They do not genuinely believe its history was a good thing or that it would be good for their student to believe so. Yet, the missionaries do believe in the church overall, and they think it would be good for their student to believe in their church overall. Their acceptance of their church's history comes from their belief in their church, which they believe to be more important than their doubts about its history. So, they would be unjustified in teaching their student that the controversial history was a good thing since they do not genuinely believe it, but they would be justified in teaching reasons for their overall belief in their church.

Case 4: Return of the Ex-Lover (Lindsey)

Your son Brett recently broke up with his girlfriend Lindsey, who abandoned Brett and moved directly after their breakup. You consider the breakup to be for the best since their relationship was always rocky, and Lindsey was emotionally abusive to Brett. Brett is still distraught over the breakup, and although he knows the relationship is over, you suspect he would still get back together with Lindsey if he had the chance. Thus far, the only reason Brett does not attempt to renew his relationship with Lindsey is because she disappeared, so he believes she does not want to get back together. Since the breakup, you have done what you can to help Brett recover and to view the breakup as a good thing, and from an objective view it really is best for Brett not to date the
controlling and abusive Lindsey. Although you have thoroughly presented your reasons on this view, Brett does not agree.

Now suppose that you run into Lindsey while at the grocery store. She tells you that she moved back into town and suggests a desire for you to inform Brett. You then talk to Brett about Lindsey to again try to convince him that she was bad for him, but you deliberately do not tell Brett of Lindsey’s return or her desire to reconnect with him. You do not tell him because you think he would form the wrong conclusion and do the wrong thing if he were to know.

As I have argued, you would be morally incorrect in attempting to shape Brett through withholding in this way. Yet, this case offers a meaningful objection to my argument: it is objectively better for Brett not to know of Lindsey’s return and her desire to reconnect because they had a harmful relationship. Getting back together would be the wrong choice. One could argue against my second premise which is that respecting autonomy requires respecting first personal authority. Instead, autonomy may be more about exercising your capacities to achieve the right result. In this sense you would be right to withhold the information from Brett because if he were to know of Lindsey’s return, he would make the objectively incorrect choice.

It seems to be the case that when first personal authority is required for autonomy, individuals like Brett may make a wrong or harmful decision. Brett’s reason and assessment of the situation would have led him back into a harmful relationship. However, getting the right result seems to be a problematic guide for respecting autonomy, since the “right result” is often highly subjective. Although the right result may appear more obvious in this case, many cases do not have such a clear, right answer. Notably, even though we, from an external viewpoint, may view their continued separation as the right result, this is not what Brett would believe if he knew. Autonomy by exercising capacities to achieve the right result seems to rely on a reality that there is a right result. However, if there is an objectively right result for each circumstance, we lack the capacity to consistently discover those right results. Or, if the right result is subjective to an individual’s values or reasoning, as Brett might contend, this concept of autonomy still must account for reasoning in a way it currently lacks. Thus, autonomy defined by exercising capacities to achieve the right result does not seem to be a viable alternative requirement for view-shaping.

Alternatively, someone considering Kant’s arguments against acting according to inclinations could offer different objections to my argument against withholding. They could suggest that if Brett knew of Lindsey’s return and chose to get back together, this would not be truly autonomous as this decision would be based on emotions and longing rather than self-legislated principles. They might suggest that even if the parent were to provide the information, Brett would be acted upon by these emotions and inclinations nonetheless. So, by withholding, the parent could relieve Brett from those forces which he would fall prey to.

However, the parent withholding, even with these intentions, transforms a situation where external forces (i.e. Brett’s emotions) may potentially determine Brett’s choices, into one in which external forces (i.e. the parent’s interference) are definitely
determining Brett’s choices. By withholding information, the parent not only shows disrespect for Brett’s reasoning and self-regulating capacity, but they also limit the choices Brett has. So, withholding is not justified by the withholder believing the other would be overtaken by their own emotions rather than reasoning and principles.

In this case I argue that the right result, be that an outcome or the protecting the agent from acting according to emotion instead of reason, does not justify withholding. Even if there were a definite right result that we could identify and bring about, I would argue that we would still be wrong in withholding the information as means of view-shaping because a respect for an individual’s own reasoning and assessment would be disregarded. Although the requirement to respect first personal authority does allow for individuals to potentially make wrong choices, or to make them influenced by their emotions instead of their reason, I maintain that respecting the first personal authority of others is a crucial moral requirement for view-shaping.

**Conclusion**

Although I agree with Ebels-Duggan that parents and educators are morally justified in their attempts to spread their genuine normative views in ways that respect autonomy, I suggest that withholding information or options as a method of view-shaping generally indicates disrespect for first personal authority, even when responsive to the reasoning capacity of the individual. Those with influence might genuinely believe in the view they hope to spread through intentionally withholding information, yet such withholding indicates disrespect for the internal reasoning of the other individual. Surely it is not practical or required to provide all information or viewpoints to another at all times, and future discussion could elaborate on this distinction. Still, intentionally withholding information should meet the two requirements to justify withholding as means of shaping another’s views: the view-shaper must work through well-reasoned principles, and they must respect the other’s first personal authority.

Notably, even if both requirements are met and the educator manages to withhold while respecting the other’s autonomy, it seems generally unwise to intentionally withhold information for the purpose of view-shaping. If educators are aware of alternative views and can provide reasonings to support their own views in favor of those alternatives, they likely do their students a disservice by not offering these reasons. In most instances, those they seek to influence will nonetheless come across reasons or inclinations in favor of the undesirable outlook, even if the educator does not themself provide the information. Educators that refuse to acknowledge such views miss opportunities to provide reasons in support of their preferred views.

Although there are surely cases where those with influence withhold information while not meeting the requirement for well-reasoned principles in support of their normative view, I would agree with Ebels-Duggan that such attempts are not morally justified, even if the influencer could simultaneously respect the first personal authority of the individual. Yet, genuine belief in a view and responding to the reasoning capacity of the individual is not enough to justify view-shaping. For shaping views to be morally
justified, educators must maintain respect for the first personal authority of the individual; they must respect the other’s ability to assess reasons and form values from their own assessments. This is true for parents, public and private educators, and other individuals and institutions with the responsibility to teach or inform others. While providing information is a method of view-shaping that maintains this respect, intentionally withholding information for the purpose of view-shaping generally indicates disrespect for such autonomy.
Works Cited


Ebels-Duggan, Kyla. "Bad Debt: The Kantian Inheritance of Human Desire."


Introduction

Americans are more distrusting than ever. On every metric, there has been a noticeable and substantial decline in trust of government, media, and business. This important trend has received a lot of academic and press attention and has been identified in nearly every state and every demographic. Curiously, despite decades of falling crime, fraud, and corruption, Americans are also less trusting in each other. While changes in trust for government, media, and business have looked quite different for Democrats and Republicans, partisans have shown similar declining trends in general trust.

Understanding general trust, the extent to which one finds other people trustworthy, among partisans has become an increasingly meaningful and important topic to many political scientists. Past research has focused on individual-level influences like race and education, but questions remain regarding the importance of external variables such as local partisanship. Using a national survey in the United States, we explored the relationship between local partisan agreement and generalized trust. By local partisan agreement, we mean the degree to which a person’s neighbors and fellow community members are politically similar. Using multivariate regression with data from the American National Election Studies (ANES), Federal Election Commission (FEC), and the U.S. Census Bureau, we found that the level of similarity between an individual and their local partisanship is strongly correlated with levels of generalized trust. If an individual agrees with their neighbors politically, they will generally be more trusting in people. Our findings highlight the significant lack of scholarship on external influences of generalized trust and the importance of future research on these types of influences.
Literature Review

Our research aims to contribute to the large body of scholarship addressing various implications and contributors to social capital (Woolcock and Narayan 2000; Uslaner 2002; Sztompka 1999). Few scholars have been as influential in understanding social capital and trust as Robert Putnam, who defines social capital as “features of social life—networks, norms, and trust—that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives” (Putnam 1995). While Putnam’s work proposes several components of social capital, our research focuses on one key aspect: general trust.

Although there is no universal definition or conceptualization of general trust, we embrace the definition provided by Carl and Billari: general trust is “trust in other members of society; . . . distinguished from particularized trust, which corresponds to trust in the family and close friends” (Carl and Billari 2014). General trust is also distinguished from political trust: trust in political institutions and governing bodies (Hooghe and Oser 2017). Carl and Billari link higher general trust “to a variety of positive outcomes at the individual level, such as entrepreneurship, volunteering, self-rated health, and happiness” (Carl and Billari 2014). Because of the importance placed on generalized trust, many scholars have looked for significant indicators of general trust to understand how societies generate this kind of social capital.

Many factors are correlated with general trust. Putnam and Helliwell found a positive relationship between education and general trust (Putnam and Helliwell 1999). Additionally, general trust is highly correlated with race with whites generally showing higher trust than blacks and Hispanics (Stets and Fares 2019). Hooghe and Oser found that individual partisan strength is positively correlated with political trust but negatively correlated with generalized trust (Hooghe and Oser 2017). Furthermore, higher trust is generally associated with community wealth in a positive way (Leigh 2006). Most of the existing scholarship examined individual-level indicators of generalized trust while few scholars have looked at community-level factors. The lack of research on community-level indicators makes it difficult to compare our results to existing theories and explanations of general trust.

Previous research by Diana Mutz shows that cross-cutting exposure and diverse political networks lead to increased tolerance and more political ambivalence (Mutz 2006). However, this research does not necessarily indicate whether people trust each other more because of cross-cutting exposure. Mutz’s work also begins to highlight the differences in attitudes in homogeneous and heterogeneous densities. However, it is based on social networks, not geography and general attitudes of trust. An individual’s social network is not solely determined by geography. Therefore, though important, this research is not sufficient to understand the relationship between local partisan agreement and general trust. The work of Diana Mutz creates a great opportunity and space for new work on general trust.

Some research has addressed how geography and demographics often intersect. Most notably, Dr. Kathy Cramer lays out a framework on rural resentment in *The Politics of Resentment*. This background clarifies our understanding of resentment,
especially between rural conservatives and those they label as the “liberal elite” within their neighboring urban cities. Cramer’s book argues that one of the most influential divides in our country is not due to race or religion but the divide between rural and urban residents (Cramer 2016). The divide she identifies runs deep, creating classist divides between conservatives and liberals through measures including income and education. The implications of these findings inform our study in a very important way by helping us understand and differentiate between findings of class and findings of political parties.

Various scholars have examined the effects of intergroup contact. Ryan Enos investigated how intergroup contact impacts exclusionary attitudes, including support for policies that would harm ethnic minorities. Enos finds that when individuals have geographic intergroup contact, individuals have an increase in exclusionary attitudes. His research focused on racial and ethnic groups rather than political groups, but he also found results suggesting that “repeated exposure to an outgroup can mitigate initial negative reactions” (Enos 2014). This work suggests the effects on trust resulting from partisan intergroup contact may dissipate as an individual interacts more with the community and has repeated contact. However, Enos’s research does not exactly translate to local partisanship and how perceived political differences impact various aspects of social capital. Nevertheless, Enos raises interesting questions about how time may interact with geography to impact social attitudes. We will return to this question in our theory and hypotheses.

Past scholarship has significantly touched on various attitudes and perceptions that result from cross-cutting social interactions but has failed to adequately examine locality-based political attitudes in relation to social capital. This research is crucial to understanding the role that these different political aspects play in social dynamics, especially in creating prejudice and distrust. Surprisingly little research has been done to understand the direct relationship between local partisanship and general trust. Our study aims to tackle this important question.

As mentioned earlier, previous research addresses how partisanship on the individual level impacts trust. Most notably in this body of research, Hooghe and Oser investigate how partisan identity impacts generalized trust. According to the researchers, partisan strength is negatively associated with generalized trust (Hooghe and Oser 2017). However, we believe an important piece of the puzzle is sorely overlooked: how partisan identity interacts with local partisanship. Our research is inspired by the work of Hooghe and Oser, and we aim to provide a more robust framework for how partisan identity/strength impacts generalized trust through understanding the interaction between local partisan agreement and partisan strength.

Theory and Hypotheses

Given the evidence that those exposed to out-groups tend to adopt exclusionary attitudes (Enos 2014) and people tend to associate with and trust members of their own party, it is important to study the impact of local partisan agreement on generalized
trust. While individuals tend to trust members of their own party, there may be a spill-over effect as people view the public within the context of their own community. Because of the past research and our theoretical framework, we hypothesize:

**H1:** Generalized trust is positively influenced by local partisan agreement with higher levels of trust among individuals that live in areas with higher proportions of like-minded party members and a less prevalent opposition party.

Enos finds that “repeated exposure to an outgroup can mitigate initial negative reactions” (Enos 2014). In the context of our research, this could indicate that long-term residency and repeated exposure to the community, whether as a minority or a majority, could lead to a decrease in any measured effect between local partisan agreement and generalized trust. Due to this literature, we hypothesize:

**H2:** The positive relationship between local partisan agreement and trust will be weaker for longer-time residents.

Our theoretical framework anticipates that individual partisanship interacts with local partisanship to impact generalized trust. It stands to reason that a stronger partisan identity will lead to a stronger effect. Therefore, we hypothesize the following:

**H3:** The positive relationship between local partisan agreement and trust will be stronger for individuals whose party identity is more important.

**Data and Methods**

To test our three hypotheses, we used three separate linear regression models, each with trust as the dependent variable. Because no past research has quantified local partisan agreement, our independent variable is a novel operationalization we labeled win/loss proportion. We will thoroughly explore the creation of this measure for clarity and future replication. Furthermore, previous research highlights other important factors that contribute to levels of general trust. We control for these factors and include our new measure for local partisan agreement.

**Dependent Variable: General Trust**

Using data from the American National Election Studies (ANES), general trust is measured through the response to the question: “Generally speaking, how often can you trust other people?” Respondents reported trust on a five-point scale: *Never, Some of the time, About half of the time, Most of the time, or Always*. For quantitative purposes, we coded responses to this survey question on a scale of 1 to 5 (1=Never, 5=Always). This metric serves as the dependent variable in our analysis. The distribution of reported trust is skewed left with few respondents stating that other people can be trusted always or never.
We chose this measure of general trust because it is standardized with easy accessibility for replication in the future. Furthermore, it carries high internal validity as it directly measures the subject of our analysis: general trust. Finally, this measure employs a multi-point scale which is proven to significantly outperform dichotomous scales of general trust (Lundmark, Gilljam, and Dahlberg 2016). However, while this metric is both reliable and easily replicable, past research has indicated potentially better measures of general trust. We will explore this limitation further in our analysis.

**Independent Variable: Local Partisan Agreement**

Due to limits in the data available and lack of scholarship regarding local partisan agreement, we operationalized our independent variable of local partisan agreement using a new metric we called win/loss proportion. Using Federal Election Commission (FEC) 2020 congressional district election return data, we calculated the win/loss proportion through the difference between in-party and out-party vote shares in the 2020 congressional races (exclusively among Democrats and Republicans). In-party refers to the candidate of same party that the individual self-identifies with while out-party indicates the opposition: Democratic candidates for self-identified Republicans and vice versa.

The following is an example to further illustrate this metric. For a respondent self-identified as a Republican in Utah County (in Utah’s 3rd Congressional District), that individual’s win/loss proportion is the difference of vote share between the Republican candidate John Curtis (in-party) and Democratic candidate Devin Thorpe (out-party). Curtis received 68.73% of the vote while Thorpe received 26.77%. The individual’s win/loss proportion is then calculated as 0.6873 − 0.2677 = 0.4196, indicating the
in-party candidate beat the out-party candidate by roughly 42 points. Inversely, a self-identified Democrat in that same district would have a calculated win/loss proportion of –0.4196.

For continuity of results, we did not include self-identified independents in our analysis as they cannot have a degree of local partisan agreement when they themselves are not partisan. Similarly, we excluded respondents self-identified with third parties because these individuals are always in the political minority and do not experience a sufficient degree of variation in local partisan agreement to adequately examine. This calculation of win/loss proportion resulted in a distribution with theoretical values ranging between –1 and 1 (–1 indicates an entirely dominating out-party, 1 indicates an entirely dominating in-party, and 0 indicates a perfect balance between party vote shares). The actual values ranged from –0.8206 to 0.8206 with a mean of 0.1054 and a median value of 0.1325. The distribution was slightly left-skewed with most observations in the positive because most partisans live in districts where their respective in-party outperformed the out-party, hence they are in the political majority of their locality. The distribution of win/loss proportion can be seen below.

We posit there are several significant advantages with this operationalization of local partisan agreement. Win/loss proportion is an effective measure because it measures the extent to which one’s in-party performs in contrast to the out-party. Another advantage is that this metric employs a direct measurement of partisanship through election returns, which provides a more precise measure than survey methodology because it has no margin of error.

This operationalization of local partisan agreement also contains a few disadvantages. First, our measure does not account for partisans other than Democrats and
Republicans. However, among ANES respondents, less than 4% of respondents reported self-identification with a third party. Second, our measure of win/loss proportion only accounts for one election result (2020) and is therefore more susceptible to outlier congressional races or unusual circumstances that would be impossible to adequately control for in our analysis. Future analysis should include a more comprehensive picture of local partisanship. Finally, this measure is on the congressional district level and may not accurately reflect the true locality or community of the respondent because of gerrymandering. Gerrymandered or unusually drawn congressional districts may not reflect the true social geography of our respondents. We will explore these and other limitations further in our analysis. However, with all limitations considered, we argue that the win/loss proportion remains an effective and reasonably reliable metric for measuring local partisan agreement given the difficulty of measuring this factor with limited geographical information.

**Additional Variables**

Past scholarship highlights the importance of controlling for other indicators of general trust. Perhaps most importantly is a measure of partisan strength as discussed by Hooghe and Oser (2017). Using ANES, we use party importance as a measure of partisan strength with the question: “How important is being [a Democrat/a Republican] to your identity?” Respondents reported party importance on a five-point scale: 
*Extremely important*, *Very important*, *Moderately important*, *A little important*, or *Not at all important*. We coded responses to this survey question on a scale of 1 to 5 (1=Not at all important, 5=Extremely important). This metric serves as a control variable in Models 1 and 2 and an interaction variable in Model 3 to test our third hypothesis that the relationship between local partisan agreement and trust will be stronger for individuals whose party identity is more important. Similarly, to test the second hypothesis, we include a variable measuring how long they have lived at their current address (logged years) as an interaction in Model 2 and a control variable in Models 1 and 3.

ANES also includes information for important control variables including party affiliation, education, income, sex, age, race and ethnicity, marital status, religious affiliation, and region. Finally, to control for confounding variables on the district level, we used data from the U.S. Census Bureau to control for district education, median income, median house value, unemployment, and racial demographics.

**Model**

To test the first hypothesis, we analyzed the relationship between each respondent’s local partisan agreement and measure of trust through multivariate regression (Model 1). To test the second hypothesis, we included an interaction variable between local partisan agreement and the number of years the respondent lived at that address (Model 2). To test the third hypothesis, we included an interaction variable between local partisan agreement and party importance (Model 3).
Results

Through multivariate analysis, we investigate the relationship between local partisan agreement (win/loss proportion) and trust, controlling for other relevant factors. Model 1 shows this relationship, without any interactions, is positive and statistically significant. These results indicate that when individuals identify with the political majority, they tend to report higher levels of generalized trust. The larger the win/loss proportion is, the greater the impact on generalized trust. These findings corroborate our first hypothesis.

Predictors of General Trust

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
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<td>0.0893</td>
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<td>(0.124)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.0484)</td>
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Includes controls for income, sexual orientation, region, and other individual and district level factors.

See Appendix for full regression table.

To investigate our second hypothesis, that the relationship between local partisan composition and trust will be weaker for longer-time residents, we employed an interaction between local partisan agreement and the number of years the respondent lived at
that address in Model 2. All other control variables remained the same. As expected, the first variable measuring local partisan agreement remained positive while the interaction was negative, indicating that the relationship was strongest among newer residents in each area. However, this interaction was not statistically significant. This may be the result of insufficient data; therefore, we recommend future analysis on our second hypothesis.

Our third hypothesis, that the relationship between local partisan composition and trust is stronger for individuals with higher levels of party importance, was tested using Model 3. Model 3 employed another interaction term between local partisan agreement and party importance. As hypothesized, the interaction term was positive, indicating the relationship between local partisan agreement and generalized trust was stronger for individuals reporting higher party importance. However, neither the win/loss proportion nor the interaction was statistically significant. These results were unsatisfactory for a full conclusion; therefore, we also recommend future analysis on our third hypothesis.

Of the three models tested, Model 1 appears to be the most robust model for measuring the effect of local partisan agreement on general trust. Using Model 1, the relationship between win/loss proportion and trust while holding all other factors constant can be visualized below.

The results show a moderately substantive relationship between win/loss proportion and general trust. A significant increase in the win/loss proportion results in a modest increase in general trust. This could be the result of several factors. As mentioned earlier, the distribution of our five-point measure of general trust was very narrow because of the limited number of response options. With a low variance of responses,
detecting large and interpretable effects becomes a near impossibility. Therefore, the practical implications of our findings will be better understood through future analysis and research.

**Discussion**

Our analysis also opens the door for important comparisons to be explored in the future. Several comparisons of predictors of trust can be seen below by comparing Model 1 coefficients. The full table of results and coefficients for all three models is included in the appendix.

According to our analysis, some of the most statistically significant predictors of trust include party affiliation, education, age, race, religious affiliation, and some community factors. Most of these factors were anticipated and past scholarship explored their relationships. Interestingly, some community-level factors including unemployment and racial composition of the congressional district appear to have no significant effect on the level of trust while the level of partisan agreement has a significant effect. However, as we will explore later, some limitations may apply especially when comparing coefficients of win/loss proportion and racial compositions.

Although future analysis is needed to best interpret the practical implications of our findings, we are confident in our first hypothesis of the relationship between local partisan agreement and general trust as substantiated through Model 1. However, we found no evidence to suggest that the relationship between local partisan agreement and trust is weaker for long-term residents. Finally, no evidence supported hypothesis that the relationship between local partisan agreement and trust is stronger for
individuals with higher levels of party importance. However, several limitations to our analysis apply.

**Limitations**

As mentioned earlier, one major limitation is that the smallest unit of analysis for local partisan agreement available was on the congressional district level. This may not reflect individuals’ local partisan reality due to the size of the unit of interest, as well as possible gerrymandering that could significantly impact the community one is associated with. This large and often manipulated unit of analysis hinders our internal validity as we are likely not accurately measuring local partisan agreement for many individuals in our study. Little can be done to address this limitation besides more comprehensive future research. These limitations around our independent variable of local partisan agreement should be considered when evaluating the difference of coefficients in our linear regression model. This particularly applies to coefficients of district-level variables, including racial demographics.

Another important limitation involves our dependent variable of general trust. Past research suggests the most accurate measures of general trust involve a seven or eleven-point scale for responses (Lundmark, Gilljam, and Dahlberg 2016). While our measure does not allow for that high of response variation, our use of a five-point scale appears to be sufficiently accurate. Nevertheless, our analysis, and future analysis, would be improved through a seven or eleven-point scale or an index of questions. This increased accuracy would allow for a more comprehensive analysis of the practical impacts of local partisan agreement.

Our final major limitation applies to the scope of our study. Our research only examines the relationship between local partisan agreement and general trust for Democrats and Republicans in the United States. While most individuals in the United States identify as either a Democrat or a Republican, it is important to note that our results have no relevance to the relationship between local partisanship and trust for independents or third-party members. Furthermore, the scope of our data limits our conclusions to the United States; future analysis is required to study general trust in other democracies.

**Conclusion**

Our findings indicate that local partisan agreement acts as a reliable predictor of generalized trust after controlling for other relevant factors. These findings strongly support our first hypothesis that generalized trust is positively influenced by local partisan agreement. Interestingly, we found no evidence to support the hypotheses that local partisan agreement interacts with time lived in the community or party importance. This reality suggests our theoretical framework may be lacking and future analysis is needed.
The results of our analysis also highlight the importance of further investigation into the relationship between one’s political reality/surroundings and generalized trust. Our analysis alone cannot reliably generate a causal relationship between these factors; therefore, further research is needed to determine the causal link between local partisanship and the level of generalized trust.

Appendix

<table>
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<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
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<td>0.00551**</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.00232)</td>
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<td>(0.0148)</td>
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<tr>
<td>% District Black</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(0.220)</td>
<td>(0.220)</td>
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<tr>
<td>% District White</td>
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<td>0.123**</td>
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Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
References


Introduction

Many scholars have examined what affects voter turnout rates among racial minorities compared to that of White voters. Racial minorities consistently turn out to vote in elections at lower rates than White voters. One method of combating low voter turnout is through party contacting, in which political parties mobilize people who are most likely to vote through activities such as door-to-door canvassing or individualized contact through mail, phone calls, and texts (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1992; Wielhouwer and Lockerbie 1994). However, because political parties direct their efforts towards those who are most likely to vote, they are more likely to favor White voters over minorities. As a result, minorities are often filtered out of the party contacting process (García-Castañon et al 2019; Stevens and Bishin 2011).

Although significant research details Black and Latinx voter turnout, there is a dearth of information on Asian American voter turnout (Fraga 2016b; Filer, Kenny, and Morton 1991; Rocha et al 2010). In addition, current research lacks the necessary links to explain Asian voter turnout in 2020. Asian American turnout in 2020 showed unusual voting patterns for the traditionally uninvolved racial group, increasing from 70% in 2016 to 83% in 2020 despite being consistently low in previous elections. What led to this sudden increase in voter turnout? A few studies suggest that Asian Americans who hold a pan-Asian identity are more likely to be involved in political activities (Sadhwani 2020; Chen and Nakazawa 2017). Consequently, I posit that a heightened sense of Asian racial group identity contributed to the high turnout rates for Asian Americans.

To test my hypotheses, I use American National Election Studies (ANES) data from 2016 and 2020 to study the impact of party contacting and racial group identity on
Asian American voter turnout. I conduct a series of probit regressions on self-reported voter turnout with an interaction effect between party contacting and measures of racial group identity. Voter turnout and party contacting are measured as dichotomous variables, and racial group identity is measured by an index that averages responses from four questions about group identity asked in the ANES survey. Although the relationship between party contacting and racial group identity was linear in 2016, the model shifted to a quadratic relationship in 2020. To account for the shift in the model, I added a quadratic term for racial group identity in 2020.

I find that the relationship between party contacting and racial group identity differs between 2016 and 2020. Asian Americans who were contacted by a political party and have a stronger sense of racial group identity were more likely to vote in 2016. In contrast, Asian Americans who had the strongest and weakest sense of racial group identity were more likely to vote in 2020, regardless of party contacting. Whereas the interaction between party contacting and group identity was a significant indicator of voter turnout in 2016, it was not significant in 2020. Rather, the model for Asian group identity shifted in 2020 and became a significant indicator of voter turnout in 2020. I find that Asian Americans who had the highest and lowest racial group attachment were more likely to vote in the 2020 election.

The results of the study raise questions on how the changing political and social context could affect voter turnout for different racial minorities. The shifting political context in 2020 could have contributed to an explanation for the differences in racial group identity and voter turnout compared to the data from 2016. The heavy racialization of COVID-19 likely affected the rise in racial group identity for Asian Americans, which then increased voter turnout and political participation generally. My study also suggests that further research could examine the effects of nontraditional mobilization efforts on various minority groups by considering how indicators of voter turnout likely vary between racial and social groups.

**Literature Review**

**Voter Turnout for Racial Minorities and Party Contacting**

While voter turnout rates across the United States are typically low, racial minorities are less likely to vote than White citizens in presidential elections and are often viewed as less politically active overall (García-Castañon et al 2019; Hill and Leighley 1999; Berry and Junn 2015). Political parties can pursue various strategies for electoral mobilization of minority populations, some of which can be more effective than others. However, the perception of low minority turnout often causes political parties and organizations to direct less attention to minorities in their mobilization efforts, which in turn cyclically affects low turnout rates. Various studies offer explanations for the racial discrepancy in voter turnout with suggestions on how to increase minority turnout, including greater descriptive representation of candidates for African American and Latinx populations (Rocha et al 2010; Whitby 2007; Griffin and Keane 2006) as well
as nominating minority candidates in areas that have a larger proportion of minority groups compared to the general population (Fraga 2016a; Bhatti and Hansen 2016; Oberholzer-Gee and Waldfogel 2005). Despite these mobilization efforts, racial minorities continue to fall behind White citizens in voter turnout rates.

Beyond descriptive representation and group size, political parties can contact voters to increase turnout rates. Party contacting involves mobilizing people who are most likely to vote through activities such as door-to-door canvassing, mail, phone calls, emails, texts, and social media outreach, with personal face-to-face interactions generally increasing voter turnout more than impersonal methods (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1992; Wielhouwer and Lockerbie 1994; Niven 2004; Gerber and Green 2000). Several studies on Black and Latinx voter turnout have shown that party contacting is an effective form of mobilization that tends to increase turnout rates among minorities (Philpot, Shaw, and McGowen 2009; Diaz 2012; Wielhouwer 2000). One study (Philpot, Shaw, and McGowen 2009), for example, studied the turnout and surrounding circumstances in 2008 to determine that the increase in Black turnout rates was due to increased party contacting for Black voters rather than Barack Obama’s nomination alone. Minority voter turnout is more complicated than factors related to racial group identity, as seen in Obama’s election in 2008. Turnout involves methods of mobilization used across social and racial groups. Party contacting is an effective method for mobilizing voters, especially those that have traditionally been ignored by parties. Political parties, therefore, have a direct role in mobilizing minority voters beyond descriptive representation.

However, the two major political parties still seem to direct less effort into contacting racial minorities compared to the heavy mobilization efforts towards White voters (García-Castañon et al 2019; Stevens and Bishin 2011). Because parties strategically use the most effective and expensive face-to-face methods to contact voters who are most likely to vote, they can often overlook racial minorities and other groups with lower turnout rates. As a result, many ethnic minorities are contacted by nonpartisan organizations more than by major political parties, which leads to varying levels of effectiveness in increasing voter turnout (García-Castañon et al 2019; Stevens and Bishin 2011; Kim 2015). Partisan contacting, however, is generally a more effective strategy in increasing turnout rates for racial minorities. I chose to study the effects of party contacting because of its effectiveness in increasing minority turnout.

Interestingly, there is a substantial dearth of information on Asian American voter turnout. Studies on voter turnout and political participation that focus on differences between races typically compare White, Black, and Latinx voters without much regard for Asian voters (Fraga 2016b; Filer, Kenny, and Morton 1991; Rocha et al 2010). Additionally, studies that focus on the political participation of either Black voters (Philpot, Shaw, and McGowen 2009; Gillespie 2015; Clark 2014) or Latinx voters (Arvizu and Garcia 1996; Highton and Burris 2002; Fraga 2016b) are common, but studies on Asian American voters are minimal compared to other minority groups. The few studies that have examined Asian American political participation generally explain low turnout as a result of low mobilization efforts towards immigrant groups and a lack of adequate descriptive representation (Kim 2015; Diaz 2012; Sadhwani 2020).
Several different factors could contribute to the lack of research on Asian American voters. Asian Americans are often viewed as less politically active than other racial groups, which leads to fewer mobilization efforts by political parties, politicians, and interest groups and thus decreases overall participation levels (Jo 1984; Diaz 2012). The model minority myth is a stereotype that portrays Asian Americans as high achievers in academics and occupations (Chou and Feagin 2015). The stereotype delegitimizes racism towards Asian Americans and could also frame Asian Americans as an unproblematic group that doesn’t warrant further studies (Li and Nicholson 2021). Even within racial minorities, Asian Americans tend to be among the least politically active (Lien et al 2001; Lien 2004; Sadhwani 2020). In their mobilization efforts, parties are more likely to ignore Asian and Latinx populations because immigrant groups are associated with lower turnout rates (Kim 2015; Berry and Junn 2015; Jang 2009). Because parties focus on mobilizing those who are most likely to vote for them (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1992), they often strategically pass over immigrant populations as being unlikely to vote at all. However, this immigrant effect does not explain the differences in attention between Asian and Latinx voters. Asian American voters are often overlooked by parties and scholars, leaving many questions about their political behavior.

Pan-Asian Identity

Existing theories of social identity claim that a strong group identity can enhance political participation and engagement of certain groups by providing cues and strategies for people to follow (Fowler and Kam 2007; Bernstein 2005; Ben-Bassat and Dahan 2012). Group identity can be described as a sense of belonging, group cohesion, and a personal connection to group experiences (Ashforth and Mael 1989). If a social group that an individual identifies with is involved in politics, the individual is more likely to be involved in politics themselves, especially when the shared identity lies in the group’s race and/or ethnicity. Racial group identity can create a collective group consciousness, where members of the group believe that what happens to the group as a whole will affect them personally. Racial group identity can also cause group members to believe that their race is a more salient aspect of their identity (Philpot, Shaw, and McGowen 2009). This identity can be self-created by the various ethnicities to coalesce into a collective unit or can be imposed by self-serving politicians and organizations. Examples of this effect include distinct African tribes that politicians have lumped together to maximize mobilization efforts (Posner 2004). Pan-ethnic identities often serve strategic purposes related to maximizing the group’s political influence and effects.

Similarly, a pan-Asian identity serves to unite diverse groups of people and cultures with shared experiences under a common name, although the identity is usually aimed at a political goal. Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders, though ethnically diverse, are often lumped together into a single pan-Asian identity to maximize their political influence (Kim 2015; Espiritu 1992; Omi and Winant 1994; Xu 2002). Because Asian Americans are typically more assimilated than other immigrant groups, a pan-Asian identity has varying effects on civic participation depending on the political context at the time of identity formation (Junn and Masuoka 2008). Political parties and organizations can
strategically turn a latent racial identity into a salient one to appeal to voter preferences. Studies have shown that increased use of a pan-Asian identity by political parties can increase civic participation and socialization by strengthening feelings of trust and understanding between group members (Sadhwani 2020; Kim 2015; Chen and Nakazawa 2017; Junn and Masuoka 2008). People who hold a pan-Asian identity can be more politically active by participating in elections and social movements. Accordingly, a pan-Asian identity can serve a useful purpose in bringing diverse communities of Asian Americans together to achieve a common goal.

**Racialized Effects of COVID-19**

More recently, a pan-Asian identity has been used by organizations and individuals to mobilize Asian American activists in the wake of heightened racism from COVID-19. The COVID-19 pandemic significantly increased racialized comments towards people of Asian descent because the virus originated in China. Many people viewed Asians as an easily identifiable embodiment of the pandemic, and targeted fear and xenophobia towards Asians (Jun, Kim, and Woo 2021; Li and Nicholson 2021; Chan, Kim, and Leung 2021; Gover, Harper, and Langton 2020). The initial reactions of politicians and private individuals who associated the virus with Asia reignited racist and xenophobic attitudes towards Asians, causing hate crimes against Asian Americans nationwide to rise significantly (Tessler, Choi, and Kao 2020; Gover, Harper, and Langton 2020; Jun, Kim, and Woo 2021). Consequently, the pandemic has also created a stronger pan-ethnic identity that has united various Asian ethnicities to combat anti-Asian racism (Li and Nicholson 2021; Jun, Kim, and Woo 2021). Increased attention to Asian Americans with COVID-19 caused an increase in racial group identity. Organizations such as Stop Asian American Pacific Islander Hate were formed to unite the larger Asian community under a common identity and purpose of reporting and reducing anti-Asian hate crimes nationwide.

The interaction between coronavirus-related racism and a stronger pan-Asian identity has led to greater Asian American activism as people are more willing to speak out against racism as a collective unit. Masouka (2006) stated that racial discrimination and political involvement encourages pan-ethnic identity for Asian Americans, which highlights the importance of racial context for the political participation of minorities. The relevance of COVID-19 as a racial threat against Asians has led to a need for a stronger group identity, which in turn could have contributed to the increases in voter turnout in 2020. Some studies have primarily focused on anti-Asian racism and the rise in Asian American activism at the beginning of the pandemic but have not analyzed voter turnout as a clear indicator of increased political participation among Asian Americans (Li and Nicholson 2021; Jun, Kim, and Woo 2021). A few studies suggest that the relative strength of a group identity will increase the efficiency of group appeals by increasing voter turnout (Valenzuela and Michelson 2016; Kim 2015), which suggests that racial group identity could have impacted voter turnout and political participation overall.
Although voter turnout overall surprisingly increased in 2020 despite concerns over the COVID-19 pandemic (Santana, Rama, and Bértoa 2020; Baccini, Brodeur, and Weymouth 2021; Galdieri, Lucas, and Sisco 2021), Asian Americans saw the highest rate of increase in voter turnout across all racial groups. To determine what caused this sudden increase in voter turnout rates, I examine both party contacting and a salient group identity caused by reactions to the coronavirus as factors that led to the record-high turnout rates for Asian Americans. Relatively few studies have analyzed party contacting for Asian American voters (Wong 2005; Kim 2015; Ramírez and Wong 2012), and none have yet studied the effect of party contacting on turnout rates for Asian Americans in the 2020 election. Furthermore, while a few recent studies have examined the effects of COVID-19 on strengthening a pan-Asian identity generally (Jun, Kim, and Woo 2021; Gover, Harper, and Langton 2020; Tessler, Choi, and Kao 2020; Li and Nicholson 2021), no study has yet researched the heightened group identity as a cause of increased voter turnout of Asian Americans in 2020. The 2020 election was especially important for Asian American political activity because of the politicization of COVID-19 that largely reignited anti-Asian racism, which reframed the model minority into a physical threat (Li and Nicholson 2021). Because a stronger pan-Asian identity became salient due to racial responses to the pandemic, the racial context and importance of Asian American political participation likely shifted in 2020 compared to previous election years.

Hypotheses

I theorize that the increase in party contacting towards Asian Americans combined with the spread of a pan-Asian identity due to the racialization of COVID-19 mobilized Asian American voters in 2020 in an unprecedented way.

I expect party contacting and racial group identity to both play important roles in increasing minority voter turnout. I hypothesize that racial minorities who were contacted by a major political party leading up to the election and who also have a stronger sense of racial group identity were more likely to vote (H1). I assess my hypothesis for Asian, Black, and Latinx voters from the 2016 and 2020 ANES data.

I also expect Asian American group identity to be stronger in 2020 than in 2016 (Hypothesis 2a). In line with this hypothesis, I expect that racial group identity will be a stronger indicator of Asian American voter turnout in 2020 than in 2016 (H2b). The 2020 election was important for Asian Americans because of racialized responses to COVID-19 and subsequent hate crimes against Asians that brought them into the forefront of the political atmosphere.

Finally, I hypothesize that the combination of party contacting and racial identity together increased Asian American voter turnout in 2016 (H3a) and that the effect is stronger in 2020 because of higher racial identity (H3b). Although I speculate that this increase was due to the racialized effects of COVID-19, I am unable to test this hypothesis with the given ANES survey data because the survey does not directly ask respondents about the pandemic.
Method and Design

I use data from the American National Election Study (ANES) from 2016 and 2020 to examine variables for voter turnout and party contacting for each racial group, focusing on data for Asian Americans. I chose to use ANES because the survey asks respondents about the level of racial discrimination they perceive as a group and individually. I use these questions to create an index of racial group identity. In my analysis of Asian American voters, I rely on responses from people who self-reported as belonging to the “Asian or Native Hawaiian/other Pacific Islander, non-Hispanic alone” racial group as specified in the ANES survey. I also compare my initial analysis of Asian Americans to White, Black, and Latinx voters.

My dependent variable is self-reported voter turnout from ANES in 2016 and 2020. My independent variables are party contacting and measures of group identity strength, also self-reported by survey respondents in ANES. Voter turnout is measured as a dichotomous variable for whether the respondent voted in the 2020 election. Party contact is also a dichotomous variable for whether the respondent was contacted by either of the two major political parties before the election. I measured racial group identity by creating an index with the average values from four questions in the ANES survey. I examined questions that asked about the importance of being Asian to one’s identity (measured from 0 being “not at all” to 4 being “extremely important”), how much what happens to other Asians will affect one’s life (measured from 0 being “not at all” to 4 being “a lot”), the perceived level of discrimination against Asians (measured from 0 being “none at all” to 4 being “a great deal”), and how important it is for Asians to work together to change laws that are unfair to Asians (measured from 0 being “not at all” to 4 being “extremely important”) as reported by ANES. Because ANES categorizes all Asian ethnicities and Pacific Islanders into one large racial group, I consider these factors to be indicators of a pan-Asian identity rather than identities about a specific ethnic group. The racial group identity index variable ranges from 0 being no sense of group identity to 4 being the highest sense of group identity. I also created similar racial group identity variables for White, Black, and Latinx voters.

Statistical Modeling

I test my hypotheses using a series of probit regressions for the interaction between party contacting and Asian group identity on Asian American voter turnout across 2016 and 2020. I chose a probit model because voter turnout is a dichotomous variable. In these regressions, I control for gender, age, income, education level, marital status, and religiosity. I then run the same regressions for White, Black, and Latinx voters. After establishing the interaction between party contacting and racial group identity for each racial group, I focus on the relationship for Asian American voters. I conduct another regression with the interaction between party contacting and racial group identity on Asian American voters in 2016 and 2020 to determine if and how the relationship changed between the election years. The model showed the relationship was linear in 2016 and parabolic in 2020, meaning that people who were contacted by
a political party and had the lowest and highest racial group identities were the most likely to vote. To better fit the initial data model visualization, I added a quadratic term for Asian group identity in 2020. A quadratic model in the 2016 data did not follow the initial data visualization and did not yield any statistically significant results. I then show the probability of voter turnout based on different values of Asian group identity in marginal effects plots.

Results

Changes in Voter Turnout, Party Contacting, and Group Identity

Based on the ANES self-reported data, average voter turnout increased substantially in 2020. Moreover, voter turnout for each racial group reported in the survey increased as well. Average party contacting, however, decreased. These results likely come from the decrease in party contacting towards White voters. Party contacting towards Asian, Black, and Latinx voters increased slightly in 2020 compared to 2016.

From 2016 to 2020, Asian Americans had the highest increase in voter turnout rates. Asian American voter turnout increased from 69.64% in 2016 to 83.33% in 2020, a 13.69 percentage point increase (see Table 1). The average increase in voter turnout for all races surveyed was an 8.32 percentage point increase, jumping from 77.81% in 2016 to 86.13% in 2020. Compared to the average, Asian American voter turnout was substantial in 2020.

Table 1: Demographics of Voters in 2016 and 2020

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>Asian American</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>African American</th>
<th>Latinx</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2016 Voter Turnout</td>
<td>77.81%</td>
<td>69.64%</td>
<td>80.68%</td>
<td>78.92%</td>
<td>62.67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020 Voter Turnout</td>
<td>86.13%</td>
<td>83.33%</td>
<td>88.62%</td>
<td>81.68%</td>
<td>74.06%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016 Contacted by Major Political Party</td>
<td>32.32%</td>
<td>26.31%</td>
<td>33.4%</td>
<td>33.43%</td>
<td>26.81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020 Contacted by Major Political Party</td>
<td>30.67%</td>
<td>27.56%</td>
<td>30.22%</td>
<td>33.64%</td>
<td>29.15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016 Average Racial Group Identity</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>1.97</td>
<td>1.57</td>
<td>3.14</td>
<td>2.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020 Average Racial Group Identity</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>1.47</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>2.67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Party contacting towards Asian Americans in 2020 also increased, as expected, though the increase was slight (see Table 1). The 1.25 percentage point increase in party contacting from 26.31% in 2016 to 27.56% in 2020 was a small increase and likely did not solely contribute to the high turnout rates. Asian Americans still saw the lowest party contacting rates overall. As a result, some other factors likely contributed to the increase in Asian American voter turnout in 2020. As discussed previously, a heightened sense of racial group identity among Asian Americans likely resulted from the racialization of COVID-19.

Racial group identity for Asian Americans also increased in 2020, confirming H2a. Asian American racial identity rose from an average of 1.97 in 2016 to an average of 2.11 in 2020 (see Table 1). The 0.14-point average increase is among the higher increases for racial group identity between the election years. Average African American racial identity increased by 0.19 points, which is a significant increase in group identity. Racial group identity generally does not increase in a short period without cause because group-level identity should be relatively stable (Junn and Masuoka 2008; Fowler and Kam 2007). For comparison, the average Latinx racial identity rose by only 0.03 points from 2016 to 2020. Although Asian Americans saw slight increases in party contacting and racial group identity in 2020, the two factors individually likely did not affect the high voter turnout rate. However, the interaction of party contacting and racial group identity could have increased voter turnout, which is examined below.

**Interaction of Party Contacting and Racial Group Identity**

Overall, Asian American voter turnout increases as people who have a higher sense of group identity are contacted by the major political parties. Table 2 is a probit model that shows that the interaction between the two factors increases turnout for Asian Americans at the 90% statistical significance level. Among Asian Americans who were contacted by a political party, those who have a one unit increase in racial group identity show a 0.463 increase in the z-score for the probability of voting. An increase in the z-score for the predicted probability indicates a higher probability of voting in these regressions. To test whether party contacting and Asian group identity affected 2020 turnout rates, I ran another regression examining the effects of party contacting and racial group identity for Asian, White, Black, and Latinx voters. Latinx voters are also more likely to vote if people with higher racial group identities are contacted by a major party, offering support for Hypothesis 1. Latinx voters who are contacted by a political party and have a one unit increase in racial group identity show a 0.267 increase in the z-score for the probability of voting (see Table 2). The difference between the Asian and Latinx voters suggests differences beyond group identity or migrant effects from political parties. The interaction of party contacting and racial group identity is a slightly stronger indicator of turnout for Asian Americans.

As mentioned earlier, Asian American and Latinx voters are typically ignored by the major political parties in contacting efforts. Voter turnout rates for White and Black voters, however, are not significantly affected by the interaction of party contacting and racial group identity. The interaction between party contacting and racial group
identity, then, appears to be an important factor in voter turnout for minority groups that are traditionally overlooked by the major political parties. The results support H1 as it relates to Asian and Latinx voters but not to Black voters, suggesting that there are different nuances to consider in studying voter turnout based on different racial groups.

Table 2: Effects of Party Contacting and Racial Group Identity in 2016 and 2020 on Voter Turnout

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Combined Effects from 2016 and 2020</th>
<th>Asian American</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>African American</th>
<th>Latinx</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party contact</td>
<td>-0.439</td>
<td>0.414***</td>
<td>0.196</td>
<td>-0.304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.482)</td>
<td>(0.112)</td>
<td>(0.516)</td>
<td>(0.393)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial group identity</td>
<td>-0.0158</td>
<td>-0.104***</td>
<td>0.277***</td>
<td>-0.0184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.110)</td>
<td>(0.0305)</td>
<td>(0.0863)</td>
<td>(0.0767)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party contact and racial group identity</td>
<td>0.463*</td>
<td>-0.0222</td>
<td>0.0695</td>
<td>0.267*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.249)</td>
<td>(0.0627)</td>
<td>(0.160)</td>
<td>(0.146)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.0234</td>
<td>0.200***</td>
<td>0.274***</td>
<td>0.162***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0575)</td>
<td>(0.0138)</td>
<td>(0.0409)</td>
<td>(0.0363)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.0137</td>
<td>0.131***</td>
<td>0.272**</td>
<td>0.0726</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.172)</td>
<td>(0.0455)</td>
<td>(0.124)</td>
<td>(0.111)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity—ever attend</td>
<td>-0.0337</td>
<td>0.144***</td>
<td>0.137</td>
<td>0.0670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.172)</td>
<td>(0.0452)</td>
<td>(0.123)</td>
<td>(0.110)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education level</td>
<td>0.0577</td>
<td>0.200***</td>
<td>0.0726</td>
<td>0.200***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0583)</td>
<td>(0.0157)</td>
<td>(0.0442)</td>
<td>(0.0388)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total family income</td>
<td>0.0501</td>
<td>0.105***</td>
<td>0.174***</td>
<td>0.0843***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0446)</td>
<td>(0.0130)</td>
<td>(0.0397)</td>
<td>(0.0313)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital status</td>
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<td>0.173***</td>
<td>0.0581</td>
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<td>(0.181)</td>
<td>(0.0487)</td>
<td>(0.148)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.246</td>
<td>-0.892***</td>
<td>-2.011***</td>
<td>-0.998***</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.398)</td>
<td>(0.0953)</td>
<td>(0.345)</td>
<td>(0.273)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>5,331</td>
<td>722</td>
<td>637</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Party Contacting and Asian American Group Identity

Once I established that the interaction between party contacting and racial group identity was an important factor in increasing voter turnout rates for Asian Americans, I focused on if and how the relationship changed in 2016 and 2020 (see Table 3). Initial data analysis showed a largely linear relationship between voter turnout and Asian group identity in 2016, as confirmed by the marginal effects plot in Figure 1. Accordingly, I conducted another probit regression with a simple interaction between party contacting and racial group identity for Asian American voters in 2016.
The relationship between turnout and the interaction was linear in 2016, meaning that among those who were contacted by a political party in 2016 and had a higher sense of racial group identity were more likely to vote than those who did not have a strong sense of group identity. However, initial model visualization showed that the relationship in 2020 appeared to shift from a linear relationship to a quadratic relationship, indicating that those who were contacted by a political party and had the highest and lowest senses of racial group identity were most likely to vote. Asian Americans with a moderate sense of racial group identity in 2020 were among the least likely to vote. Because a quadratic term better fits the model in 2020, I ran another probit regression with the interaction between party contacting and a quadratic term for Asian group identity in 2020. The quadratic relationship for Asian group identity in 2020 is confirmed by the marginal effects plot in Figure 2.

Table 3 shows differences in Asian American voter turnout rates in 2016 and 2020 from the effects of party contacting and racial group identity. In 2016, Asian Americans who were contacted by a major political party were less likely to vote. Asians who were contacted by a political party showed a 1.311 decrease in z-score for the probability of voting. This finding is statistically significant at the 90% confidence level. As party contacting has typically been considered an effective method of increasing turnout rates, this finding holds interesting implications. Party contacting alone seems to be an ineffective and detrimental method for increasing turnout among Asian American voters.

Asian Americans who were contacted by a political party and had a higher sense of group identity in 2016, however, were more likely to vote in the presidential election (see Figure 1). Among Asian Americans who were contacted by a political party, a one unit increase in racial group identity was correlated with a 0.915 increase in z-score for the probability of voting. This finding is statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. Therefore, I find support for H3a, showing that Asian American who were contacted by a political party and held higher group attachment were more likely to vote in 2016.

Additionally, Asian identity alone was a stronger indicator of voter turnout in 2020 than it was in 2016. The results for Asian identity on voter turnout are not significant in 2016, whereas the findings are significant in 2020. This finding supports H2b, suggesting that racial identity alone was a stronger determinant of voter turnout in 2020 than it was in 2016. However, the same simple interaction between party contacting and group identity was not a significant indicator of Asian American voter turnout in 2020. Rather, the quadratic term for Asian group identity alone was a significant factor of voter turnout at the 90% confidence level (see Table 3). This finding means that Asian Americans who had the highest and lowest levels of racial group identity were more likely to vote than those who held moderate levels of group identity (see Figure 2). Though the interaction between party contacting and Asian group identity-squared in 2020 is positive, it is not statistically significant. Accordingly, I do not find support for H3b in the regression. The quadratic term for Asian identity was a more reliable indicator of 2020 voter turnout than the interaction of party contacting and Asian group identity.
The quadratic term for Asian group identity was a significant indicator of voter turnout in 2020 (see Figure 2). In 2020, a one unit increase in Asian identity was correlated with a 2.496 unit decrease in the z-score for the probability of voting until a certain point, at which a one unit increase in group identity was associated with a 0.584 unit increase in the z-score for the probability of voting. Asian Americans who had either the lowest sense of group identity or the highest sense of group identity were the most likely to vote in the 2020 election. People who had a moderate sense of group identity, however, were the least likely to vote in the election. Higher turnout rates for people with a greater sense of group identity is expected, as explained above. However, the high turnout rates for people with the lowest sense of group identity is an
unexpected finding. For reference, Table 4 shows the results of the probit regressions in 2016 and 2020 without the interaction between party contacting and group identity and the quadratic variable for racial group identity.

Table 4: Additional Results from 2016 and 2020

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<tr>
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<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>With Interaction</td>
<td>With Interaction</td>
<td>Quadratic</td>
<td>With Quadratic</td>
<td>Quadratic</td>
<td>Quadratic</td>
</tr>
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<td>Party Contact</td>
<td>0.280</td>
<td>0.609**</td>
<td>-1.311*</td>
<td>0.406</td>
<td>0.277</td>
<td>0.701**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.285)</td>
<td>(0.309)</td>
<td>(0.769)</td>
<td>(0.814)</td>
<td>(0.286)</td>
<td>(0.325)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Asian racial group identity</td>
<td>0.204</td>
<td>-0.0532</td>
<td>0.0458</td>
<td>-0.0749</td>
<td>-0.0464</td>
<td>-2.971**</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.139)</td>
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<td>(0.155)</td>
<td>(0.179)</td>
<td>(0.465)</td>
<td>(1.315)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party contact and Asian racial group identity</td>
<td>0.915**</td>
<td>0.101</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.437)</td>
<td>(0.379)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.0399</td>
<td>0.00746</td>
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<td>0.0107</td>
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<td>(0.0798)</td>
<td>(0.0923)</td>
<td>(0.0785)</td>
<td>(0.0961)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.313</td>
<td>0.143</td>
<td>-0.309</td>
<td>0.140</td>
<td>-0.314</td>
<td>0.175</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.247)</td>
<td>(0.258)</td>
<td>(0.251)</td>
<td>(0.258)</td>
<td>(0.247)</td>
<td>(0.270)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity—ever attend</td>
<td>0.00196</td>
<td>0.149</td>
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<td>0.144</td>
<td>0.0136</td>
<td>0.154</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.241)</td>
<td>(0.267)</td>
<td>(0.248)</td>
<td>(0.268)</td>
<td>(0.242)</td>
<td>(0.282)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education level</td>
<td>0.0178</td>
<td>0.0776</td>
<td>0.0113</td>
<td>0.0782</td>
<td>0.0231</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0788)</td>
<td>(0.0940)</td>
<td>(0.0796)</td>
<td>(0.0939)</td>
<td>(0.0794)</td>
<td>(0.0994)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total family income</td>
<td>-0.00202</td>
<td>0.0952</td>
<td>0.00547</td>
<td>0.0961</td>
<td>-0.00219</td>
<td>0.128*</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0669)</td>
<td>(0.0643)</td>
<td>(0.0677)</td>
<td>(0.0644)</td>
<td>(0.0668)</td>
<td>(0.0691)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital status</td>
<td>-0.0588</td>
<td>0.389</td>
<td>-0.0415</td>
<td>0.384</td>
<td>-0.0449</td>
<td>0.313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.265)</td>
<td>(0.281)</td>
<td>(0.270)</td>
<td>(0.281)</td>
<td>(0.266)</td>
<td>(0.294)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian racial group identity$^2$</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0662</td>
<td>0.712**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.118)</td>
<td>(0.306)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.234</td>
<td>-0.0995</td>
<td>0.606</td>
<td>-0.0646</td>
<td>0.395</td>
<td>2.302*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(0.518)</td>
<td>(0.629)</td>
<td>(0.551)</td>
<td>(0.643)</td>
<td>(0.594)</td>
<td>(1.338)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Interestingly, none of the control variables were significant indicators of Asian American voter turnout, except for total family income in 2020. Among the variables studied, racial group identity was the only significant factor in higher Asian American turnout rates in 2020. Given that I controlled for measures traditionally viewed as reliable indicators of voter turnout, the findings suggest that factors of voter turnout vary across racial minorities.
Figure 1

Adjusted Predictions of Asian American Voting in 2016

Figure 2

Adjusted Predictions of Asian American Voting in 2020
Furthermore, I expected to find the interaction between party contacting and group identity to be a significant determinant of voter turnout in both election years. Although this interaction was significant in 2016, it was not significant in determining Asian American voter turnout in 2020. Even with the quadratic term for Asian group identity, the interaction between party contacting and racial group identity was not a significant determinant of voter turnout. Racial group identity for Asian Americans was a more significant indicator of voter turnout in 2020. Asian group identity, then, seems to be a more important factor in voter turnout now than it was previously.

Conclusion and Discussion

The interaction between party contacting and racial group identity appears to affect Asian American voter turnout in some circumstances. Larger social and political context affects Asian American voter turnout. As such, political parties can only do so much in terms of mobilization. In 2016, the interaction effect was significant, meaning that among those contacted by a political party, people with higher racial group attachment were more likely to vote in the election. In 2020, however, the effect of party contacting diminished, and racial group identity became stronger in influencing voter turnout rates. I found no evidence that the interaction between party contacting and group identity increased Asian American voter turnout rates in 2020.

However, Asian Americans who reported the highest and lowest racial group attachment held the highest probability of voting in 2020. Although I expected those with higher group identities to have higher probabilities of voting, the finding that those with the lowest group attachment also have the highest turnout rates is unexpected. I suspect that exogenous circumstances led to the shift for people with the lowest group identity holding the highest probability of voter turnout in 2020. Additional research could corroborate these findings and provide an analysis as to why people with the lowest sense of group identity were more likely to vote in the election.

A limitation to the research is that respondents in the ANES data do not report what specific messages parties use to mobilize voters. Methods of party contacting may not involve racial messages at all. As a result, I must assume that party contacting in any form caused Asian Americans to consider their racial identity, regardless of if the messages themselves were racial. Because racial identity was more salient in 2020 without a significant effect from party contacting, I also assume that political messages in general caused Asian Americans to think about their racial identities.

Because the relationship for Asian racial group identity and party contacting shifted significantly between 2016 and 2020, the data suggests that larger contextual factors played an important role in the sudden increase in voter turnout. An obvious change in the political and social environment in 2020 was COVID-19. The pandemic drastically altered the political and social landscape and brought Asians to the forefront. Because Asians were initially portrayed as the cause of the virus by politicians and groups, the pandemic was highly racialized against Asians. Consequently, Asians experienced a
shocking increase in hate crimes, and COVID-19 likely caused Asians to unite through linked fate and heightened group identity.

Although the findings suggest that party contacting and racial group identity can increase Asian American voter turnout, the results are not conclusive. ANES surveys a limited number of Asian voters, with only 148 Asian respondents in 2016 and 284 respondents in 2020. When adding in control variables, the sample size falls to 127 in 2016 and 157 in 2020. The small sample size could affect the statistical significance of the results for the interaction. Furthermore, self-reported voter turnout and party contacting rates carry a possibility of being skewed due to respondents’ desire to appear more engaged and civic-minded. Additional research that confirms voter turnout rates could corroborate the initial findings for the interaction between party contacting and racial group identity.

The insignificance of the chosen control variables for Asian American voter turnout also reflects the dearth of information on minority turnout. The control variables, which are typically viewed as strong indicators of voter turnout, were all significant indicators of White voter turnout, as shown in Table 2. The number of significant indicators of voter turnout decreased for Black and Latinx voters and fell substantially for Asian voters. The only significant finding in the analysis for Asian American voters was the interaction between party contacting and racial group identity. These findings indicate that factors regarded as typical determinants of voter turnout are largely tailored to reflect White voters. Currently recognized indicators of voter turnout, then, are likely not as widely applicable to all minority groups. Especially because Asian Americans fit into the existing predictions of higher education and income but have lower turnout rates, previously unconsidered factors may influence voter turnout for different racial groups. Further studies on minority voters may need to consider other nontraditional factors besides the typical indicators of high turnout.

Future research should examine how party contacting, Asian group identity, and voter turnout differs for each Asian American ethnicity. Although voter turnout for Asian Americans generally increased in 2020, ANES does not provide data on specific ethnicities. Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders are grouped into one racial category, which causes problems because the groups have diverse backgrounds and face different issues. The common Western idea of Asians being restricted to East Asians rather than all diverse Asian ethnicities also contributes to the difficulty of studying the various ethnic groups. Moreover, studies could examine the specific effects of COVID-19 on Asian political participation. Because ANES did not ask respondents about the pandemic, another survey that focuses on Asian Americans could determine if and how the racialization of the coronavirus affected Asian American voter turnout.

The findings in this study have implications for future Asian American voter turnout. Depending on the larger social and political context, Asian racial group identity could continue to be a salient factor in increasing turnout rates. Additional research could examine the long-lasting effects of COVID-19 on Asian group identity as well as its effects on other social groups. Because Asian American voter turnout is less influenced by factors such as higher education and income levels than are other racial
groups, research on Asian voters may require a different perspective. In the 2024 presidential election, Asian voter turnout could shift based on the larger social context and the role of the political parties in bringing Asians closer to the center of the political atmosphere. Asian American voter turnout can change depending on the broader social and political context as well as contacting from political parties. Parties can maximize their roles in Asian American voter mobilization by increasing contacting efforts and paying attention to the general atmosphere around racial group identity.
References


Introduction

The German Green Party seemed to be forever a secondary party in German politics. That is, until the German General Election in 2021 when they gained more seats in the Bundestag than any other party. Many wondered how such a small party could perform such a feat. Scholars, particularly Ronald Inglehart, have theorized on and studied the concept of postmaterialism. In a basic sense, postmaterialism is a set of values that turns away from safety and security concerns (materialism), and more toward what Inglehart called intellectual and aesthetic concerns (Inglehart 1971, 991–993). These concerns range from topics like freedom of speech, greater protections and rights for minority groups, and environmentalism (Inglehart and Abramson 1999, 670). It has been postulated that postmaterialism is mostly driven by middle and upper-class young people who did not experience war or financial instability during their upbringing. These young people would then begin to bring postmaterialist values to the political environment (Inglehart 1971, 991–993). Building off of the scholarly literature, I theorize that a younger generation of Germans holding postmaterialist values was an important factor to the German Green Party’s electoral success in the 2021 German Bundestag Elections, where the Green Party gained over fifty seats. The party then held 118 seats in the 736-seat Bundestag (“Distribution,” 2021).

The electoral success of the German Green Party presents an opportunity to study how postmaterialism affects vote choice in elections. It has been theorized that younger voters holding postmaterialist values are driven to vote for Green Parties. Additionally, we can focus on the success the party had on younger voters, who were the core of the Green Party’s electorate.
In order to study the effects that postmaterialism had on young voters’ party choice, I use the GLES (German Longitudinal Election Study) to connect postmaterialist values and young voters choosing the Green Party over other alternatives. The GLES is an exit poll conducted over the Internet targeting German voters in the 2021 Federal election. The GLES asks who they voted for in 2021 and 2017, as well as other thermometer questions that study voter’s attitudes on specific issues like immigration, populism, inequality, and more. Using the exit polling data and the questions asked to the participants in the GLES, the study shows holding postmaterialist values affected vote choice. A major limitation of the GLES is its lack of a specific postmaterialist measurement, which will be outlined in subsequent sections. Without these specific measurements, I identified nine questions given to participants which I will use to study postmaterialism within the sample.

The findings would not exactly be what Inglehart would have expected. After running multivariate and multinomial regression, I find that younger voters were more likely to vote for the Green Party than other age groups. Furthermore, I found that younger voters were more likely to hold postmaterialist values than older voters. Finally, those that held more postmaterialist values were more likely to vote for the Green Party over other party alternatives. These results may indicate that the Green Party is solidifying its base around those who hold postmaterialist values.

From these findings, I theorize that young postmaterialists were a significant factor in the German Green Party’s success, unifying around a strong party that prioritizes postmaterialist concerns against a backdrop of record flooding and climate activism in Germany. There are limitations to this conclusion, the primary being that the GLES survey did not include a postmaterialist measurement. Furthermore, some of the criteria for postmaterialist values are more correlated with populism and right-wing parties in Germany. Finally, the limited number of younger voters in the survey could lead to bias in the results.

This main paper will first go through relevant scholarship that has been done on the topic of green parties and postmaterialism. Then I will discuss the theoretical argument and move into the methods of this paper. Finally, I will discuss the results and conclude with final remarks, making note of topics for further research on this question.

**Literature Review**

In 1971, Ronald Inglehart proposed a theory which is the basis of this paper. Inglehart theorized that the relative economic peace and prosperity after the second world war brought political realignment in Western Europe, as those who grew up in times of peace and prosperity would have shifting political values. Those in the upper-middle classes who experienced economic stability and security would no longer look for these values in their political leaders, taking these conditions for granted. Instead, they would look toward more intellectual and aesthetic needs. Those in the working class, meanwhile, would have had opportunities to gain property and general economic growth, and would then be more interested in the security and stability of their economic assets,
instead of in gaining these assets. Thus, those in the middle class would turn from the parties on the right and center, parties of stability and security, to parties more on the left, which advocate for larger societal changes. Working class people, meanwhile, would shift their voting patterns from the left to the right, as they would be more interested in the economic prosperity that the right offers over the economic stability that the left campaigns from (Inglehart 1971, 991–993). For this paper, I am interested in the value shifts of those from the middle class—shifts which Inglehart would later define as “postmaterialism.”

Postmaterialism was measured originally through a test assessing four values. People were asked to pick two values that were most important to them out of the following four: “maintaining order in the nation, giving the people more of a say in important political decisions, fighting rising prices, and freedom of speech,” (Inglehart 1971, 994). Responding with “giving people more of a say” and “freedom of speech” indicates more postmaterialist values, while “order” and “fighting rising prices” are indicative of more materialist values. Inglehart later created a twelve-value test that asked survey takers an additional eight questions that gauged what they preferred in the long term. These values ranged from intellectual and belonging (postmaterialist) to safety and sustenance needs (materialist—the opposite of postmaterialist values, which includes having strong defense capabilities and maintaining order to economic growth and a stable economy) (Inglehart 1977, 39–48). This test showed that citizens of developing countries placed greater emphasis on materialist values, while developed nations had higher rates of postmaterialism. For example, only 7% of respondents in Ireland (which was identified as developing at the time) were identified as postmaterialist while 14% of Belgians identified as postmaterialist (Inglehart 1971, 38).

Postmaterialism significantly impacts political ideology, and as a result, it impacts public policy outcomes as well. Inglehart found that those who were identified as postmaterialist were also likely to identify themselves as leaning left politically. The opposite is true for materialists (Inglehart 1977, 60–62). This is an interesting consideration, especially when taking into account that part of Inglehart’s theory is that postmaterialist and materialist values will transcend classical left-right ideologies in the future (Inglehart and Abramson 1999, 669). In the same article, Inglehart and Abramson identify issues that postmaterialists would be likely to support. These issues include the acceptance of abortion, LGBTQ+ rights, prostitution, and more. Further, they define taking part in strikes, boycotts, and demonstrations as postmaterialist actions (Inglehart and Abramson 1999, 670). Interestingly, many of these viewpoints and actions are associated with leftists and other left-leaning political ideologies. They comment on this point, stating that “postmaterialism has been reshaping the meaning of left and right, shifting the original emphasis on class conflict issues, such as government ownership of industry and the redistribution of income, toward an increasing focus on the quality of life, such as environmental protection, women’s rights, and the status of gays and lesbians,” (Inglehart and Abramson 1999, 669). What Inglehart appears to be arguing is not the disappearance of the left-right labels, but rather a shift in what parties value and is important to them.
Inglehart attributed the rise of postmaterialism to the younger generations of the middle-class. These youths, who have grown up in times of economic prosperity and physical safety, turn their attention to social, environmental, intellectual, and belonging values (Inglehart 1971, 1977, 1999). In 1977, Inglehart noted that postmaterialist values were increasingly found in younger populations (Inglehart 1977, 54 and 69).

In the context of political and economic conflict, the stability of postmaterialist values in today's youth comes under question. Economic crises like the Great Recession and the effects of COVID-19 put the younger generation in a precarious situation in terms of their loyalties to postmaterialist values. According to Inglehart, a socialization process takes place when individuals have had a stable economic and physical upbringing. These values, which are developed in their teen years, become solidified and stabilized over time (Inglehart 1981, 881). This Socialization Theory was tested some years later, and it was shown that young postmaterialists in the United States and the Netherlands held onto postmaterialist values into their adult years (De Graaf, Hagenaars, and Luijkx 1989, 183–201). Interestingly, postmaterialist values were seen to be less stable in Germany. This instability was attributed to the economic hardships endured after WWII and the subsequent introduction of American economic and cultural values. These explanations, however, were not empirically tested (De Graaf, Hagenaars, and Luijkx 1989, 192–193). More recently, studies have shown that postmaterialist values have persisted in the face of the Great Recession among younger people. This stability through a devastating economic crisis may mean that younger people will continue to hold onto their postmaterialist values beyond the COVID-19 pandemic (Henn, Sloam, and Nunes 2021, 16).

Effects of postmaterialism on voting patterns have been studied by multiple scholars. In the United States, noneconomic interests were beginning to play a large role in politics for both materialists and postmaterialists during the presidential races of the 1990’s. In those races, noneconomic concerns proved to shift postmaterialists to Democratic candidates (Brown and Carmines 1995, 490). During the Australian parliamentary elections of 1990 and 1998, it was found that postmaterialists were beginning to change their vote share to Labor instead of smaller parties (like the Australian Green Party), which points to larger parties beginning to encompass postmaterialist ideals in their platforms in Australia (Western and Western 2001, 457). After German Reunification, materialist concerns became more salient, even after postmaterialist concerns became integrated into the Social Democratic Party’s (SPD) platform. This reversion to materialism was caused by the integration of East Germans into the political sphere, which caused greater electoral success for the CDU/CSU (Christian Democratic Union of Germany and Christian Social Union in Bavaria) and created a challenge for the SPD to create a mixture of a materialist and postmaterialist platform (Fuchs and Rohrsneider 1998, 112–3). From these different results, we can see that the country and the economic and/or political situation of that country affects how postmaterialists vote.

In the present day, young postmaterialists have been influential in a multitude of political activities. For example, postmaterialism has been linked to higher rates of institutionalized and non-institutionalized forms of political participation by younger
people. It has been found that while British postmaterialists tend to favor activities like boycotting and demonstrating, they are also more likely than their materialist counterparts to vote. It is also interesting to note that the same group favored more party competition within the United Kingdom, throwing their support towards smaller parties and electoral reform (Henn, Oldfield, and Hart 2018, 712–37).

Furthermore, young postmaterialists have been increasingly linked to environmental and political activism. A study conducted by Henn et al. shows that postmaterialism among Europe’s youth is connected to environmental protest and politics. The same group was also connected to greater political engagement, with a tendency toward higher levels of female and educated populations (Henn, Sloam, and Nunes 2021, 1–21). Similar results were found in Chile, during the environmental protests of 2011. It was found that youth who held postmaterialist values were more likely to have participated in the protests (Scherman, Arriagada, and Valenzuela 2015, 151–71). Both of these studies make an interesting conclusion: postmaterialist, environmentally minded youth were more likely to be found in urban or cosmopolitan centers. Additionally, many of these studies about postmaterialist youth produced similar findings across countries. As noted above, postmaterialist youth are likely to participate in elections, which translates to the vote choice of environmental or green parties.

These green parties exist globally, and some play important roles in governance or opposition. According to the Global Greens, an international network of green parties, green parties are those that center “ecological wisdom, social justice, equality, freedom, participatory democracy, non-violence, sustainability, and respect for diversity,” in their party platforms (“Charter” 2021). These parties center on environmental concerns. It is important to note that most, if not all, of their core values are intrinsically postmaterialist and noneconomic in nature. The presence of these parties may thus draw the votes of postmaterialists. The German Green Party is no exception, but must distinguish and prove itself in order to compete with other left-leaning German parties.

There are three main left-leaning parties in Germany: The Social Democrats (SPD), Die Linke (The Left), and the Green Party. Die Linke is the successor of the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), the party that ruled East Germany under the Iron Curtain. Since reunification, Die Linke has been solidly materialistic, prioritizing issues such as taxes, the minimum wage, and working conditions. However, they have also evolved to be more postmaterialist, emphasizing environmentalism, equality, and other noneconomic concerns. The SPD is a center-left party that existed in West Germany before unification. The SPD strategically emphasized postmaterialist values when these values became more salient for West German voters, and minimized them after unification when economic concerns were at the front of mind for East Germans. Contrary to the rest of the German left, the Green Party is the only party that has been reliably postmaterialist. Even after reunification, they continued to emphasize values of environmentalism, equality, and justice until today.

The environmental activism of young postmaterialists translates into their voting habits. Countries with multiparty systems have seen an increase in support for green parties amongst young people. Two explanations for this trend have been put forward.
One, which is in line with my own theory, observes the success of the Green Party in Germany and hypothesizes that it is linked to the rise of postmaterialist values in constituents and the Green Party’s ability to present itself as a viable, further left alternative to the Social Democrats (Kaelberer 1998, 299–315). The other theory suggests that young people are influenced by the postmaterialist rhetoric of green parties. For younger voters, the social and environmental issues of the Green Party resonated with them, causing them to turn out to vote for the Green Party at a higher rate. In this case, political socialization is an important factor in developing postmaterialist attitudes (Tranter and Western 2009, 145–67). This theory suggests reverse causality between voting for the German Green Party and holding postmaterialist values. Regardless of when or how German voters came to hold postmaterialist values, this paper explores whether postmaterialists were an important factor in voting for the German Green Party in the 2021 election.

**Theory**

With past literature and theories in mind, we now move to the causal logic of the increase of Green Party voters from 2017 to 2021. While there may be many reasons for the general shift from other parties to the Green Party, there are three that were either widely discussed during this election cycle or were relevant to prior scholarship. These three key factors are devastating floods and accompanying environmental youth protests, the rising number of individuals who hold postmaterialist values, and the fragmented and weak state of left-leaning alternatives.

On September 24, 2021, thousands of young people and students gathered in front of the German Bundestag (“Fridays for Future: Climate Protests Kick off with Greta Thunberg in Berlin” 2021). Greta Thunberg, the then eighteen-year-old climate activist, spoke to the crowd of masked students: “Voting is essential, but alone it is not enough. If we want to ensure a safe presence and a future on planet Earth, we need to be active democratic citizens and go out on the streets, like what we are doing today,” (Abnett 2021). Just two months earlier, Rhineland-Palatinate and North Rhine-Westphalia were hit with a series of catastrophic floods (“Floods in Germany” 2022). 184 Germans were thought to have lost their lives. Soon, much of the media was reporting on an article published by multiple academics who claimed that the large amount of rainfall was 1.2 to 9 times more likely because of climate change (Kreienkamp et al. 2021). Climate action was a salient issue among German voters but was especially salient among young voters. This was a perfect occasion for the German Greens to solicit votes from anxious youths and Germans affected by the floods.

Political mobilization by institutional and noninstitutional means, is often displayed by those holding postmaterialist values (Henn, Oldfield, and Hart 2018, 712–37). If Inglehart’s theory of postmaterialism is accurate, then we should expect a higher number of young people to hold more postmaterialist values every year. This effect should be especially visible at a time when the Green Party is visible and climate rhetoric may be influencing the values of younger people (Tranter and Western 2009,
According to the World Values Survey, in 2013, 20.5% of German people under the age of 29 were indicated to be postmaterialist by Inglehart's four item survey (“World Values Survey 2013 Germany,” n.d.). In 2017, that number nearly doubled to 39.9%. This growing number of young postmaterialists may have had a big impact on the number of young constituents the Greens were able to carry.

Finally, the other left-leaning alternatives were either weak or emphasized materialist goals more. The German Green Party emphasized the environment and other postmaterialist concerns in the party’s manifesto, and while they addressed economic concerns, it was not centered like the SPD’s platform was. The SPD did campaign on some postmaterialist values, but they did not center them like the Green Party did. Die Linke, on the other hand, campaigned heavily on environmentalism, but still emphasized classic leftist economic concerns (wages, working conditions, taxing the wealthy, etc). While they were able to create a platform that emphasized both materialistic and postmaterialist concerns, they had major party in-fighting. In her book entitled The Self-Righteous, Sahra Wagenknecht, a popular Die Linke politician, raved about the “lifestyle leftists,” for whom being left-wing has become a question of culture and taste rather than material or class interests,” according to Jacobin (Balhorn 2021). Inter-party bickering within Die Linke made the party appear weak and caused it to underperform in the 2021 election. It failed to win the votes of East Germans and urbanites (Hasselbach 2021). While a significant portion of youth voters did vote for Die Linke, it did not experience the electoral success of the Green Party, which was much more unified.

Research Design and Methods

To create a causal link between younger voters and the German Green Party’s success, I used survey data from the German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES). The GLES collected exit polling data from those that participated in the 2021 federal election. Furthermore, it asked a variety of questions ranging from who participants voted for in 2017 to opinion questions and general data (education level, location, sex, age, etc.).

This survey does have a few limitations. First, in some cases, the survey was completed a few months after the election. Many different factors could have contributed to why a person voted for the party that they did. Furthermore, this gap in time may increase the probability of retroactive opinions about different survey questions. Additionally, the survey had a fairly small number of younger respondents. While this may distort the findings, it is also reflective of the small number of youth voters (~7% of the electorate). Lastly, the survey was conducted over the Internet. While this may not be to the detriment of the survey, it is not clear how the creators of the survey selected those that took their survey. Despite these limitations, I believe that the GLES survey data will stand to be a good determinate of how Germany voted in the 2021 Federal Election.

The causal logic of this paper rests on three separate hypotheses: (1) younger voters tend to vote for the Green Party, (2), younger people tend to hold postmaterialist values, and (3) those with more postmaterialist values tend to vote for the Green Party.
Most of the hypotheses outlined above were tested by using regressions. These regressions employed a number of variables that control for the traditional Green Party base. This includes those with higher college degrees, urbanites, those who live in historical West Germany, women, and the financially well-off.

For the first hypothesis, I used multivariate logit regression to illustrate that the younger one is, the more likely they will vote for the Green Party. I will then use multinomial regression to identify the party preferences that young voters had during this past election. The multinomial regression has a base party in order to avoid issues with perfect multicollinearity. The CDU/CSU (Christian Democratic Union of Germany and the Christian Social Union in Bavaria) will serve as the base party.

The second hypothesis is that holding postmaterialist views is a significant predictor in voting for the Green Party. Part of the GLES included a questionnaire. While participants were not asked Inglehart's four or twelve item survey, they were asked questions that we can use to determine whether they hold postmaterialist values. Some of these include warmth towards immigrant groups, concern about the environment, and views of democracy, among other factors. First, I ran regressions for each measure of postmaterialism with relevant controls and party choice. Then, I combined the relevant postmaterialist variables into an index and regressed the index with party choice.

My third and final hypothesis is that a higher postmaterialist score will have a higher likelihood of voting for the German Green Party. For this, I will use the postmaterialist index score and run a regression with the different parties to visualize the likelihood of voting for each party while holding postmaterialist values.

Findings

For the first hypothesis, there was statistically significant evidence that those who voted for the Green Party tended to be younger than thirty years old. The German Green’s main base (other than youth) are with women, western Germans, urbanites, the well-educated, and the financially well-off. I controlled for these variables in order to ensure that there are no omitted variable biases present in the results of the regression. I ran a multivariable regression into ascertain the linkage between age and voting for the Green Party. While the results are significant, the date of birth accounts for only a tiny increase of voting for the Greens (a coefficient of 0.002). Furthermore, all other controls, except for economically stable, were more significant. However, age still predicts a higher probability of voting for the Greens as the voter becomes younger (as seen in the graph below).
I then ran a multinomial regression testing for whether age was a significant factor in voting for each party while controlling for relevant control variables. Compared to other political parties, the Green Party (denoted by GRUENE in the regression table below) was statistically significant in younger voters voting for them. Other parties and the Free Democratic Party (FDP) are the only other parties where age was a significant indicator of vote choice. These results are unsurprising. The FDP, Greens, and other smaller parties are known to attract younger voters (Bundesamt 2021). These results may cast doubt on the validity of the first hypothesis, as many younger voters in the GLES preferred the FDP over the Green Party. These results from the regression do not align with the actual voter turnout of the election. 24% of voters between the ages of 18 and 24 voted for the Green Party, while 20% voted for the FDP (Bundesamt 2022, 17). While these values are similar, they show that there was a larger turnout for Green Voters than the multinominal regression is predicting. This indicates that there may be sampling issues with the dataset. While we have established that the dataset has significantly fewer younger voters than older voters, we see that there seems to be a slight FDP bias with the GLES, which we will keep in mind for the rest of the paper.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>(I) Green Party Vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.00224***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000584)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>0.115***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0209)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.0680***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0173)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educated</td>
<td>0.167***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0195)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>0.169***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0188)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financially Stable</td>
<td>0.0497***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0191)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-4.396***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.151)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>2,275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.089</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
To test the second hypothesis, I made an index for all the postmaterialist measures. The index scored each respondent between 0 (most materialist) to 25 (most postmaterialist). This index is based on questions that the respondents were asked during their survey. These questions covered a range of topics including environmental concern, acceptance of immigrants, and attending political demonstrations.\(^1\) I regressed the postmaterialist index score and age, while controlling for other relevant factors. The results shown below indicate that young voters are considerably more postmaterialist than older voters. With this in mind, we can then tentatively conclude that younger people are more likely to hold postmaterialist values.

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\(^{1}\) These survey questions: the importance of combating climate change; immigrants shouldn’t be obligated to adapt to German culture; participated in a boycott; participated in a demonstration; the government should take action to reduce income disparities; and, there should be a mandatory quota on large companies for women sitting on supervisory boards. In these questions, respondents were asked how much they agreed with each prompt (except for participating in a boycott or demonstration, which was a simple yes or no). From there, each participant was assigned a score based off of how postmaterialist they were.
Finally, I ran a regression with this index and party choice, controlling for relevant factors. I found that higher postmaterialist scores are more related to the German Green Party than other party alternatives. However, Die Linke scores are just below the German Green Party’s coefficient. This means that postmaterialist voters may not have been as loyal to the Green Party during this election than other scholars would argue.

### Conclusion

Postmaterialism proved to be the key to explaining much of the German Green Party’s electorate. While environmental concern and to a lesser extent, age, were still significant variables in higher probabilities of voting for the Greens, having higher postmaterialist values seemed to be the best predictor, even with constants. It is important to note that more young people held postmaterialist values than older populations. While there is shaky evidence at best with climate change as a motivator, younger people still preferred the German Green Party over others, especially other left-leaning parties.

Future research should explore this topic more by taking a sample and asking specific postmaterialist measures as outlined in the World Values Survey. As outlined above, future scholarship could also investigate the relationship between right-wing populist views and postmaterialist values. This could help scholars identify patterns in voting and explain vote choices for races in Germany in the future.
References


Introduction

A classic dilemma facing governments and citizens alike is the trade-off between privacy and security. This concept is found in the Constitution’s Fourth Amendment, which implies that citizens have a right to be protected against “unreasonable searches and seizures by the government” (FindLaw 2019). The technological revolution, and its implications for privacy, has complicated the nature of this right. Different types of data require different approaches to the privacy versus security tradeoff. A 2003 panel by Wright et. al asks how “sensor data,” data that is collected through technology that tracks a user’s online or real-world movements, should be approached, and characterize its existence as a “real and growing privacy threat” (Wright et. al 2003). Surveillance technology falls into this category.

Certain demographics value privacy more than others. In the context of Privacy Enhancing Technologies (systems that can protect the identity of application users), people of color and women appear to value privacy more than Whites in the context of online forums and in personal data collection (Joshghani, Ekstrand et. al 2018). Therefore, it is reasonable to believe that this difference in preference of privacy over security, or visa-versa, may exist along gendered lines—specifically women. In a small sample survey, van Heek, Arning, and Ziefle found that in the face of higher levels of threat, participants were more likely to prefer security over privacy, with more women tending to value security over privacy in comparison to men. These theoretical differences beg the question if there are real-world implications for the differences in how men and women feel about security measures in their daily lives. This gives significance to my research question: How does gender affect the acceptance of surveillance technology?
It is generally accepted that men and women navigate the world differently. Many (if not most) women plan their days to avoid a walk home alone at night, avoid spending too long in a public space by themselves, and generally will go out of their way to decrease the perceived danger that they feel (Farah and Farah n.d.). Even if the actual risk of being harassed, robbed, or otherwise victimized is small, this fear often alters the use of public spaces such as streets, parks, and public transportation for women in comparison to men.

Public surveillance technology seems like an obvious solution. New York City has installed approximately 15,280 surveillance cameras that are connected to facial recognition technology (Amnesty International 2021). But programs like these have received significant pushback. Amnesty International has joined the “Ban the Scan” campaign against New York City’s surveillance technology network, fearing the use of this technology has enabled the local government to violate certain human rights, particularly for participants in the Black Lives Matter protests (Amnesty International 2021).

At the same time, there has been a push to make public spaces more gender equal in accessibility. Local authorities in Mexico City, Mexico, have created a “Pink Transportation” system, a system designed for the exclusive use of females in the city (Dunkel-Graglia 2013). The rape and murder of Sarah Everard by a London police officer as she walked home in March of 2021 was an event that drew international outrage and became a call for action to prevent violent acts against women in public spaces. Millions of women shared personal stories of their experiences of victimization and their daily fear of victimization (Legrand 2021). The global outrage and media attention that followed Everard’s murder morphed into demands that public spaces should be made safe and accessible for women (Legrand 2021).

Given the apparent high demand for public safety and to equalize the use of public spaces, it is essential to understand how controversial high-tech solutions, such as security cameras and facial recognition, differentiate in their popularity along gendered lines. Thus, I investigate the link between gender and the acceptance of surveillance technology in public spaces.

To do this, I utilize survey data that asks respondents how they feel about the use of surveillance technology in public places. I hypothesize that there are significant differences in the likelihood of accepting surveillance technology between men and women. I also hypothesize that female responses will be positively correlated with state-level crime statistics because female acceptance of surveillance technology varies with threat perception, and threat perception reflects actual rates of crime. Therefore, as crime rates increase, female acceptance of surveillance technology also increases. I also hypothesize that because crime victimization is more related to gender than terrorism victimization, the gendered difference in surveillance technology acceptance will be greater in the context of crime than when framed as a method to prevent terrorism.

I find that women are indeed more likely to accept surveillance technology in comparison to men, and that female acceptance is positively correlated with state-level crime statistics. However, the gendered difference in surveillance technology acceptance is found to be significantly greater in the context of terrorism than in the context of
crime. This is contrary to my stated hypothesis that there will be a greater gendered difference in surveillance technology acceptance in the context of crime than in the context of terrorism.

**Literature Review**

In the choice between privacy versus security, America has come to favor privacy. Gumpert and Drucker argue in their 2009 paper that Americans have come to value their privacy more as individuals' public information has become more accessible to other private individuals. They posit that privacy has become a greater area of concern for Americans more broadly, citing trends from 1970–1992 Harris-Westin polling data (Westin 1991). This is especially true of surveillance conducted by the United States' National Security Agency (NSA). The NSA has been strongly opposed by many Americans since the Edward Snowden data leaks, which exposed the NSA's program of mass civilian surveillance in the name of terrorism prevention (Reddick, Chatfield, and Jaramillo 2015). Some opponents of surveillance technology in public spaces urge the courts to stifle its use, citing the potential abuse of power by the state enabled by mass surveillance (Slobogin 2002). Other opponents make the argument that such technology will warp the dynamics of life in public spaces and subsequently decrease the quality of life in these spaces (Patton 2000).

The literature surrounding the actual effectiveness of surveillance technology in deterring crime is controversial. In a randomized field experiment conducted in New Jersey by Caplan, Kennedy, and Petrossian, the implementation of security cameras in businesses had mostly no significant impact on crime levels in the area (the cameras were installed so the viewing field included public spaces). Analyzing the results across three outcome measures showed that only auto thefts were significantly impacted by the treatment (Caplan, Kennedy, and Petrossian 2011). Giovanni and McGarrell conducted similar research in 2020 on the implementation of “Project Green Light,” a program that required businesses to install cameras and signs to prevent crimes in Detroit, Michigan. Its results were also mixed; Project Green Light had a significant negative impact on disorder and property related crimes, but no statistically significant impact on violent crime rates.

The actual effectiveness of surveillance technology is relevant to the implications of my research question. If surveillance technology can deter crime, then it can be a plausible solution to the gender inequality of public spaces. But it does not necessarily affect potential gender differences in the acceptance of surveillance technology in public spaces. Instead, the perception of the surveillance technology itself has more implications for this question. Koskela argues that women may be more hesitant to approve of surveillance technology precisely because of gender-related issues. The operators and monitors of surveillance equipment are more likely to be male, which for some women, merely extends perceived male dominance in the public spaces from the physical sphere to the digital sphere. Women may also fear subjectivation to the male gaze through the guise of surveillance, especially if cameras are hidden. In addition, verbal harassment
and other threats made toward women may not be readily apparent in videos. For this reason, cameras that are hidden may have a detrimental effect on female acceptance of surveillance technology. Koskela also finds that women are concerned with the politics behind public surveillance, which may impact their willingness to accept it as a policy (Koskela 2002).

However, there is literature to support a gendered difference in surveillance technology acceptance. In a survey of 99 participants in Germany, van Heek, Arning, and Zeifle find that women are more likely to prefer security to privacy than men and that this tradeoff varied with how public the area under question was. This demonstrates how perceived threat level could be a mechanism for this difference (Van Heek, Arning, and Zeifle 2014). While insightful, the scope of the survey data used in this study is extremely limited. It is also based on the responses of German citizens, and the value of privacy versus security may differ between German and US citizens. Therefore, a US-based national-level analysis is needed to strengthen the correlation between gender and a preference for privacy or security.

In discussing gender perception in public spaces, it is helpful to address how men interact with public spaces. Day, Stump, and Carreon provide qualitative insights into how males perceive public spaces. They find that safety for men can be viewed through the lens of how spaces confirm or confront their masculine identities. Spaces that challenge qualities that are traditionally associated with masculinity, such as control, may subsequently negatively impact their perception of safety in that space (Day, Stump, and Carreon 2003). The possibility that the perception of safety is gendered gives context to potential gendered differences in the acceptance of surveillance technology.

Existing literature implies that there may be a gendered difference in the acceptance of surveillance technology, but the direct relationship between gender and surveillance technology acceptance has yet to be explored. This research will shed light on this relationship and investigate why a gendered relationship does exist. The results have implications for how the security versus privacy dilemma is viewed, and how public safety should be discussed and approached in the United States.

**Hypotheses**

I hypothesize that women are more accepting of surveillance than men because they view threats differently. Women perceive a higher risk of becoming victim to crimes, a perception that is contributed to by a different combination of threats in comparison to men (May, Rader, and Goodrum 2010). More specifically, sexual crimes are correlated with heightened risk perception for women, but not for men (May, Rader, and Goodrum 2010). This seems to translate to a greater willingness to sacrifice privacy for security, a concept that is supported by the literature (Van Heek, Arning, and Zeifle 2014). To directly test the causal mechanism of a heightened perception of threat experienced by women, I will also analyze how state-level crime rates interact with the acceptance of public surveillance.
H1: In the context of crime, women will be more accepting of the implementation of surveillance technology in public spaces in comparison to men.

If it is true that the perceived threat of crime victimization drives higher acceptance of surveillance technology among women, then it should also be true that women in areas of high violent crime will be more willing to accept surveillance technology precisely because they perceive higher levels of threat than women in lower violent crime rate areas. This hinges on the assumption that women can accurately gauge the prevalence of crime in their community, an assumption that is supported by existing literature. A study that analyzed survey data across New Delhi, India found that respondents were generally able to accurately perceive the odds of sexual harassment experienced by women in public transportation (Madan and Nalla 2016). The same study found that men were more likely than women to underestimate the “seriousness of sexual harassment behaviors” given a specific scenario (Madan and Nalla 2016, 94). This suggests a difference in the perception of sexual harassment threats in public spaces between men and women. These findings support the assumption that women perceive a threat of victimization that reflects the crime rates of their environment and that women perceive an increased threat of victimization in comparison to men. This is the mechanism that contributes to higher acceptance of public surveillance technology among women. To test this mechanism, I look at the relationship between crime rates and women’s acceptance of surveillance technology in public spaces.

H2: Acceptance of surveillance technology by women will be positively correlated with the respondents’ state crime rates; as the violent crime rates increase, the acceptance of surveillance technology by women will also increase.

This second hypothesis builds on and supports the logic of the first. However, there may be other factors that impact the outcomes of these hypotheses. For example, there is evidence to suggest that men may mask or hide their fear of crime due to social desirability bias (Sutton and Farrall 2005). This poses a problem for my theory because it suggests that men may perceive similar threat levels as women. This may interfere with the logic that differences in threat perception is the driving force behind any gender differences in the acceptance of surveillance technology, and consequently the logic that crime rates should be similarly correlated with acceptance. This may be an explanation for insignificant or mixed results of the data.

Finally, I will also investigate the impact of framing the survey question in the context of terrorism on surveillance technology acceptance. Framing is a commonly observed phenomenon in survey research, and I expect that framing a survey question about the acceptance of surveillance technology will be impacted by whether it is framed as a question related to terrorism threats or to crime. Shortly after the September 11 attacks, a nationwide survey found that Americans are largely willing to give up civil liberties in the face of serious terrorism threats, but with a caveat impacting this phenomenon: trust in government (Davis and Silver 2003). After Edward Snowden revealed the massive extent of NSA surveillance on the American people, public opinion
on technological surveillance was mostly negative, as previously mentioned (Reddick, Chatfield, and Jaramillo 2015). The literature suggests that the precise wording of a survey question about terrorism has a significant impact on the perceived threat of terrorism. For example, “radical Islamic groups” triggers a higher level of threat perception than “homegrown terrorists,” whereas “terrorism” by its own right does not seem to impact threat perception (Woods 2011). This shows that the framing of a survey question, especially regarding terrorism, has substantial implications on survey outcomes. Therefore, I anticipate that a question on surveillance technology in the context of crime will be interpreted differently than a survey question in the context of the deterrence of terrorism.

Based on the literature available, I hypothesize that among women, terrorism survey questions will have less impact on the acceptance of surveillance technology than crime survey questions. I propose that the gender-specific, more immediate threat women perceive related to crime will outweigh the more distant threat of terrorism for women. This will lead to a higher acceptance of technology surveillance for the “crime framing” in comparison to “terrorism framing” question stems among women. In addition, terrorism is not generally considered a gender specific threat; well-known terrorist attacks in the United States, such as 9/11, are plotted and claim victims irrespective of gender. Therefore, the gap in gendered acceptance of surveillance technology in the context of terrorism will be less than the acceptance of surveillance technology in the context of crime. This leads to my third hypothesis:

H3: “Terrorism” question stems will yield lower acceptance rates than “crime” question stems for the implementation of surveillance technology in public spaces among women.

Research Design

This is a quantitative study that will utilize two national-level surveys from the United States. The first survey is a July 2007 ABC/Washington Post poll conducted to measure surveillance technology acceptance in the context of crime. It asked respondents the following question:

“Some people support the use of surveillance cameras in public places to help solve crimes. Others say these cameras go too far as a government intrusion on personal privacy. What’s your opinion—do you support or oppose the increased use of surveillance cameras in public places?”

Participants had the option of selecting the following answers:

“Support,” “Oppose,” or “Depends.”

To analyze the degree of support of surveillance technology acceptance over its opposition, “Depends” answers are not included in the analysis but are included in the appendix.
I will analyze survey results to this question and compare the acceptance of surveillance technology of public spaces between women and men. I chose data from the year prior to the year the ABC/Washington Post survey was conducted to most accurately reflect the threat level respondents possibly perceived. I will also isolate female responses and compare it to crime rate statistics to answer H2. I will compare survey responses to 2006 state-level crime statistics provided by the United States Census Bureau to measure the potential impact of these factors on the acceptance rate. These crime rates are aggregated at the state level and only include violent crimes of robbery, rape, assault, and murder. These types of crime, as opposed to white-collar crime, are threats compatible with the reasoning I propose for why women are more accepting of surveillance technology in public spaces.

The second survey data in my analysis specifically gauges public opinion on the acceptance of surveillance technology that is aimed at deterring acts of terrorism. To avoid the impact of the general distrust felt by Americans towards the NSA (and subsequently surveillance) after the Edward Snowden data leaks, I use data collected prior to the leak. To limit the impact of time-variant unobservable effects on the data, I selected a survey that was conducted closest in time to the ABC/Washington Post survey. A July 2005 CBS News Poll asked American adults the following survey question on the acceptance of surveillance technology, framed in the context of terrorism:

“Some people think installing video surveillance cameras in public places is a good idea because they may help to reduce the threat of terrorism. Other people think this is a bad idea because surveillance cameras may infringe on people’s privacy rights. What do you think? Would you say that it is a good idea or a bad idea to install surveillance cameras in public places?”

Participants had the option of selecting the following answers:

“Good idea,” “Bad idea,” “Both,” or “Don’t know/No answer.”

To analyze real support of the employment of surveillance technology in public spaces in comparison to its opposition, answers “Both” or “Don’t know/No answer” are not included in the analysis but are included in the appendix.

The strength of using national-level survey data is that there is a natural divide of survey responses along state lines, which makes it convenient to compare responses to crime rates at the state level. The major drawback of this type of data is that the comparison of crime rates and responses would be more illuminating at the local or municipality level. This would be a more accurate reflection of an individual’s day-to-day interaction with their environment, and thus their perceived threat level in public spaces. However, there are limits to the specificity of locational indicators in the survey data on surveillance technology acceptance. Therefore, given this limitation, only state-level crime statistics could be used to find a correlation between crime and surveillance technology acceptance.
Methods

To analyze the effect of gender on the survey responses, I employ a logit regression. The logit regression is used to demonstrate the impact of “x” on binary F(x) values. In this case, the dependent binary variable is the acceptance or rejection of surveillance technology (acceptance coded as 1 and rejection as 0). Gender is also a binary variable, where women are represented by 1 and men 0. Therefore, positive gender coefficients indicate a positive correlation between women and acceptance of surveillance technology. A negative coefficient indicates that if the respondent is a woman, this characteristic negatively impacts surveillance technology acceptance. The logit regression is represented mathematically in the following equation (Sinnott, Duan, and Sun 2016):

\[
F(x) = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-\beta_0 - \beta_1 x}}
\]

To analyze the effect of crime statistics on survey responses, I employ the use of a multilevel mixed-effects logistic regression. Multilevel regressions are helpful when using factors that are clustered on or measured at a different level than the outcome level. I analyze how gender, state-level crimes, and the acceptance of surveillance cameras interact. Because gender and the outcome variable, acceptance of surveillance, are characteristics of the individual whereas the state-level crime rate is a measurement of a group (the whole state), multilevel modeling is necessary (Robson and Pevalin 2016, 6). In a simpler model, such as a logit regression model, all data points are fitted onto one intercept. Applying this simple regression to state-level statistics would be ineffective as each state would be averaged into that one intercept. A multilevel mixed-effects regression, however, means each state can “have its own intercept” and be accounted for individually (Robson and Pevalin 2016). Using this model will help distinguish characteristics that impact the outcome due to an individual’s characteristics versus characteristics that impact the outcome because of state-level variation (Sommet and Morselli 2017). This mixed-effects model is represented mathematically in the following equation, where i is the individual and j is the state-level of analysis (West n.d.):

\[
\text{logit}[P(y_{ij}=1)] = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x_{ij} + u_{0j} + u_{1j} x_{ij}
\]

Results

Table 1 provides a side-by-side comparison of the results of four models that all look at the effect of gender on surveillance technology acceptance. I included control variables that may influence privacy versus security tradeoff preferences, such as partisanship, race, and ethnicity, as well as other factors that may impact threat perception such as age, education, and income.

Models 1–3 are based on survey responses about surveillance technology acceptance in the context of crime. Model 1 uses a basic logit regression that looks at the effect of gender on the outcome variable, acceptance of surveillance technology in the context of crime, with controls included. Model 2 uses a multilevel mixed-effects logistic regression that analyzes how gender and crime rates change the acceptance of surveillance technology. Model 3 analyzes the effect of crime on the acceptance of surveillance
technology among female respondents (male responses are dropped). Model 4 is similar to Model 1 in that it looks at the effect of gender on surveillance technology acceptance using a logit regression. However, it is based on survey responses on acceptance of surveillance technology in the context of terrorism prevention.

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>0.430** (0.200)</td>
<td>0.435* (0.229)</td>
<td>0.0119* (0.00688)</td>
<td>0.739*** (0.252)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.0164*** (0.00545)</td>
<td>0.0164*** (0.00502)</td>
<td>0.0119* (0.00688)</td>
<td>0.494*** (0.163)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.179* (0.0960)</td>
<td>0.189* (0.110)</td>
<td>0.459*** (0.166)</td>
<td>-0.132 (0.118)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>0.0322 (0.0577)</td>
<td>0.0134 (0.0658)</td>
<td>0.00644 (0.0849)</td>
<td>0.215** (0.103)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>0.501** (0.230)</td>
<td>0.510* (0.272)</td>
<td>1.126*** (0.386)</td>
<td>-0.541 (0.338)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>-1.110* (0.579)</td>
<td>-1.110** (0.583)</td>
<td>0.131 (0.693)</td>
<td>-0.0755 (0.339)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>1.534*** (0.529)</td>
<td>1.591*** (0.583)</td>
<td>1.441** (0.693)</td>
<td>-0.572* (0.339)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Party/Don’t Know/No Answer</td>
<td>-0.230 (0.261)</td>
<td>-0.794*** (0.278)</td>
<td>-0.282 (0.499)</td>
<td>0.0561 (0.449)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>0.426 (0.551)</td>
<td>0.363 (0.458)</td>
<td>0.914 (1.002)</td>
<td>-1.170 (1.216)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Hispanic</td>
<td>-0.268 (0.827)</td>
<td>0.161 (1.382)</td>
<td>0.0729 (1.216)</td>
<td>-0.129 (0.534)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Hispanic</td>
<td>0.469 (1.053)</td>
<td>0.435 (0.631)</td>
<td>-0.317 (0.818)</td>
<td>0.0605 (0.578)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic (no race given)</td>
<td>-0.477 (0.352)</td>
<td>-0.536 (0.331)</td>
<td>0.0377 (0.644)</td>
<td>0.0777 (0.587)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Hispanic</td>
<td>-0.940 (1.105)</td>
<td>-1.099** (0.485)</td>
<td>0.0605 (1.465)</td>
<td>-1.170 (1.105)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime Stats (ln)</td>
<td>0.439 (0.291)</td>
<td>0.888** (0.365)</td>
<td>-0.778*** (0.234)</td>
<td>0.899 (0.899)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime Stats Constant</td>
<td>0.439 (0.291)</td>
<td>0.888** (0.365)</td>
<td>-0.778*** (0.234)</td>
<td>0.899 (0.899)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.308** (0.602)</td>
<td>-3.648* (1.863)</td>
<td>-6.778*** (2.334)</td>
<td>-0.963 (0.899)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>991 885</td>
<td>481 586</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of groups</td>
<td>49 48</td>
<td>49 48</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Model 1 is a logit regression that looks at the effect of gender on the outcome variable and the acceptance of surveillance technology with controls included. The gender coefficient indicates that gender has a statistically significant impact on the outcome variable (at the 95% confidence level), with females being more likely to accept public surveillance. To interpret the gender coefficient as an odds ratio (Choueiry n.d.):

\[ e^\beta = e^{0.430} = 1.537 \]

This indicates that women have a 53.7% (1.537 – 1 = 0.537) increase in the odds of accepting surveillance technology in comparison to men (Choueiry n.d.). This supports H1, as the coefficient shows that women are significantly more likely to accept the implementation of surveillance technology in public places in the context of crime in comparison to men.

Models 2 and 3 employ a multilevel mixed-effects logistic regression model to account for individual and state-level variations. Model 2 looks at the impact of gender on the outcome variable, acceptance of surveillance technology in the context of crime, with logged state-level crime rates and controls included. With the “crime stats” variable included, the gender coefficient remains a statistically significant predictor of surveillance technology acceptance (at the 90% confidence level). This indicates that even when controlling for state-level crime statistics, women have a 54.5% (1.545 – 1 = 0.545) increase in the odds of accepting surveillance technology in comparison to men. However, the crime statistics coefficient is not statistically significant, indicating that crime rate does not predict overall acceptance of surveillance technology (Choueiry n.d.).

Model 3 is a multilevel mixed-effects logistic regression aimed at measuring the impact of state-level crime rates on the outcome variable among female respondents alone. Model 3 shows that state-level crime rates are a statistically significant predictor of surveillance technology acceptance in female responses (at the 99% confidence level). This means if crime rates increase by 1%, the probability of accepting surveillance technology increases by 0.88%. This finding supports H2, as the coefficient shows that female acceptance of surveillance technology is positively correlated with state-level crime rates. As crime rates increase, the acceptance of surveillance technology by women also increases.

Model 4 is a logit regression to assess the effect of gender on the acceptance of surveillance technology in the context of terrorism. Model 4 shows that gender is a statistically significant predictor of the acceptance of surveillance technology (at the 99% level confidence rate). This indicates that women have 109.4% (2.094 – 1 = 109.4) increase in the odds of accepting surveillance technology in comparison to men in the context of terrorism. This finding is aimed at investigating H3; the difference in gendered acceptance of surveillance technology is higher in the context of crime than in the context of terrorism. However, this finding suggests H3 may be incorrect because this coefficient and odd are higher than that of Model 2.

Graph 1 compares the gender differences of accepting surveillance technology in the context of terrorism and in the context of crime. In contrast with H3, this indicates
that the difference between female and male acceptance of public surveillance is higher in the context of terrorism than of crime. This gendered difference in the context of crime versus terrorism is significantly different, with an F statistic of 0.338 at the 99 percent confidence level.

Graph 1

To further analyze the differences in the gendered acceptance of surveillance technology in the context of crime and terrorism as shown in Graph 1, I compare gender coefficients found in Model 1 and Model 4 in Table 2 to find the F-statistic (MedCalc Software n.d.).

Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample</th>
<th>Coefficients</th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism Context</td>
<td>0.739***</td>
<td>632</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime Context</td>
<td>0.430 **</td>
<td>1125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Test Statistic F</td>
<td>0.338***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The F statistic indicates that there is a statistically significant difference between the coefficients from the two samples. Contrary to H3, the results indicate that the difference in gendered acceptance of surveillance technology in the context of terrorism is greater than the difference in gendered acceptance of surveillance technology in the context of crime as shown in Graph 1. This is directly contrary to H3, where I posit that the difference in the acceptance of surveillance technology between men and women will be significantly greater in the context of crime.
Limitations

This analysis is limited in its external validity, as the technological advancements of surveillance technology have changed substantially since the collection of the survey data in 2005 and 2007. A similarly worded survey question today may imply the use of artificial intelligence and big data analysis that would further reduce privacy in public spaces, which may potentially impact my results. However, the key implication of the findings suggests that women generally value security over privacy in public. If this is true, it is possible that the advancements in technology will have an inconsequential impact on the impact of gender on surveillance technology acceptance.

The sample size of respondents to the survey question on terrorism was relatively small. Some control variables, such as Black Hispanics, were forced to be dropped from the logistic regression analysis because it is perfectly correlated with the outcome. While this has some negative implications for the internal validity of my analysis, the benefits of controlling for time-variant unobservable effects in selecting this survey outweigh these implications. However, a larger and more representative sample would be preferred in any future analysis of the impact of gender on surveillance technology acceptance.

As previously mentioned, my analysis includes state-level crime rates. To more accurately reflect the perceived threat level experienced by survey respondents, a comparison of survey responses to crime rates data on the municipal level crime rates would increase the internal validity of my findings.

Conclusion and Implications

An analysis of national-level survey data shows that women are more accepting of the implementation of surveillance technology in public places than men in the contexts of both terrorism and crime. Survey data shows that women perceive a higher level of threat of crime victimization in public spaces in comparison to men (Farah and Farah n.d.), despite the fact that women are less likely to be a victim of violent crime (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2009). This indicates that perception, and not necessarily real risk, is the primary reason why women are more likely to accept surveillance technology in the context of crime in comparison to men. This is supported by the finding of a correlation between crime rates and the acceptance of surveillance technology by women.

I also hypothesized that there will be a greater difference in the gendered acceptance of surveillance technology in the context of crime than in the context of terrorism. However, upon analysis of the data, the opposite appears to be true; the difference in the acceptance of surveillance technology between me and women is greater in the context of terrorism than in the context of crime. Further research will be needed to explain this phenomenon. This finding does not contradict the hypothesis that threat perception is the link between gender and technology surveillance acceptance. While the literature documents that women perceive higher levels of threat in comparison to men in the context of crime, the gendered threat perception of terrorism has yet to be explored. It is possible that women tend to perceive terrorism as a larger threat than men, which
would be consistent with my findings on the gendered difference in surveillance technology acceptance and threat perception. It is also possible that another factor that is unique to terrorism drives this larger gap, or that the state-level crime statistics used in the data was not specific enough to actually predict the perceived threat experienced by women.

In addition, crime does not seem to predict survey responses for both men and women; crime rates are not significantly correlated with the overall acceptance of surveillance technology, but it was significantly correlated when looking only at women. This suggests that male acceptance of surveillance technology is not as affected by the level of perceived threat reflected by real life crime statistics, supporting conclusions drawn in previous literature that men are less willing to exchange privacy for security (Van Heek, Arning, and Zeifile 2014) and that men may downplay the seriousness of some forms of harassment (Madan and Nalla 2016).

Generally, this research contributes to the study of gender and its impact on the security versus privacy tradeoff. The conclusion that women are more likely to be more willing to be surveilled by cameras in public places suggests that women are more willing to choose security over privacy. This has implications for how policymakers and law enforcement institutions view public safety. The trade-off between privacy versus security is a gendered issue. It is an issue that women may feel that they have more of a stake in, and consequently have a different opinion about surveillance than men. Because this is a gendered issue, seeking out female opinions and female representation on the issue of surveillance technology in relevant institutions and policy-making processes is essential. Women deserve to use public spaces in the same way that men do.

The willingness to increase security at the cost of privacy may imply that women think the threat of victimization outweighs the risk of abuses of power by the state. Making public spaces safe for women could mean changing how half of the United States population moves daily through subway stations, bus stops, public parks, business centers, and sidewalks. The implication of change is massive on the personal and national level, not just for women, but for all citizens who choose to prioritize equal gender access to public spaces.

Appendix

To investigate the impact of responses “Both” or “Don’t know/No answer” or “Depends” to the survey questions posed above, I assigned differing values to responses and ran the same regressions described above.

Because this paper deals specifically with the strict acceptance of surveillance technology, “Both” or “Don’t know/No answer” or “Depends” can be considered as the unacceptance of surveillance technology. Therefore, I ran the same regressions but with these neutral/both answers included as a rejection of surveillance technology (coded as 0), and acceptance was coded as 1. This yielded the following results:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>0.437***</td>
<td>0.444*</td>
<td>0.599***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.189)</td>
<td>(0.231)</td>
<td>(0.222)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.0168***</td>
<td>0.0165***</td>
<td>0.00970</td>
<td>0.300**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00511)</td>
<td>(0.00472)</td>
<td>(0.00624)</td>
<td>(0.134)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.200**</td>
<td>0.205*</td>
<td>0.416***</td>
<td>-0.127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0887)</td>
<td>(0.111)</td>
<td>(0.147)</td>
<td>(0.100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>0.0507</td>
<td>0.0336</td>
<td>0.00589</td>
<td>0.199**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0547)</td>
<td>(0.0637)</td>
<td>(0.0817)</td>
<td>(0.0859)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>0.577***</td>
<td>0.585**</td>
<td>1.104***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.217)</td>
<td>(0.253)</td>
<td>(0.373)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.641**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.295)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither/Independent</td>
<td>1.403***</td>
<td>1.439***</td>
<td>1.035*</td>
<td>-0.472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.468)</td>
<td>(0.482)</td>
<td>(0.533)</td>
<td>(0.302)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Party/Don’t Know/No Answer</td>
<td>-1.085**</td>
<td>-1.142**</td>
<td>0.0203</td>
<td>0.135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.534)</td>
<td>(0.472)</td>
<td>(1.016)</td>
<td>(0.545)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>-0.132</td>
<td>-0.696**</td>
<td>-0.286</td>
<td>0.188</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.248)</td>
<td>(0.302)</td>
<td>(0.501)</td>
<td>(0.415)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Hispanic</td>
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<td>0.324</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.497)</td>
<td>(0.441)</td>
<td>(0.848)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Hispanic</td>
<td>1.347</td>
<td>1.091</td>
<td>0.568</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.122)</td>
<td>(2.052)</td>
<td>(2.202)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic (No Race Given)</td>
<td>0.499</td>
<td>0.351</td>
<td>0.153</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.841)</td>
<td>(1.454)</td>
<td>(1.204)</td>
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<td>-0.137</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.488)</td>
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<td>(0.488)</td>
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<td>Asian</td>
<td>0.693</td>
<td>0.653</td>
<td>-0.655</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.055)</td>
<td>(0.614)</td>
<td>(0.671)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Race</td>
<td>-0.393</td>
<td>-0.445</td>
<td>-0.0512</td>
<td>0.0216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.339)</td>
<td>(0.319)</td>
<td>(0.593)</td>
<td>(0.529)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t Know/No Opinion/Refused</td>
<td>-1.545</td>
<td>-1.725</td>
<td>-0.916</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.131)</td>
<td>(1.218)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime Statistics (ln)</td>
<td>0.239</td>
<td>0.688*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.289)</td>
<td>(0.356)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.699***</td>
<td>-3.073*</td>
<td>-5.465**</td>
<td>-0.520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.578)</td>
<td>(1.851)</td>
<td>(2.238)</td>
<td>(0.787)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>1,035</td>
<td>924</td>
<td>502</td>
<td>631</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of groups</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>48</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

When neutral responses were included as the counterpart to surveillance acceptance, similar trends were found as in the original models.

Alternatively, one could view these neutral answers as entirely separate but still important to include as a middle ground between acceptance and rejection. For Table
4, “Yes” answers were assigned the number 1, “No” answers were assigned the number “-1” and all other answers (“Both,” “Don’t know/No answer,” or “Depends”) were assigned a 0. The results can be found below in Table 4:

**Table 4**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>0.458 (0.416)</td>
<td>0.477 (0.461)</td>
<td>0.0102 (0.364)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.0161 (0.0106)</td>
<td>0.0161* (0.00876)</td>
<td>-0.000699 (0.00989)</td>
<td>-0.309* (0.162)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.272 (0.175)</td>
<td>0.267 (0.202)</td>
<td>0.0979 (0.262)</td>
<td>-0.131 (0.151)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>0.171 (0.132)</td>
<td>0.162 (0.165)</td>
<td>0.0452 (0.250)</td>
<td>0.130 (0.125)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>0.966* (0.505)</td>
<td>0.958** (0.380)</td>
<td>0.492 (0.669)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.946** (0.467)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>0.828 (0.819)</td>
<td>0.603 (0.888)</td>
<td>-0.664 (0.974)</td>
<td>-0.129 (0.507)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Party/Don’t Know/No Answer</td>
<td>-0.644 (1.053)</td>
<td>-1.042 (1.077)</td>
<td>-0.830 (1.639)</td>
<td>1.642 (1.111)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>0.611 (0.577)</td>
<td>0.594 (0.865)</td>
<td>-0.446 (1.093)</td>
<td>1.397* (0.849)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Hispanic</td>
<td>0.207 (0.850)</td>
<td>0.264 (0.934)</td>
<td>-0.571 (1.393)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Hispanic</td>
<td>-0.683 (2.385)</td>
<td>-1.087 (2.201)</td>
<td>-2.095 (2.012)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Hispanic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.631 (1.154)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.786** (0.904)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Race</td>
<td>0.658 (0.734)</td>
<td>0.726 (0.765)</td>
<td>-0.274 (0.919)</td>
<td>-0.0432 (1.161)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK/No Opinion/Refused to Answer Race</td>
<td>-2.278 (1.831)</td>
<td>-2.248 (2.408)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime Statistics (ln)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.645 (0.506)</td>
<td>-0.463 (0.875)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.419 (1.434)</td>
<td>3.754 (3.373)</td>
<td>5.889 (4.861)</td>
<td>4.492*** (1.204)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>1,015</td>
<td>904</td>
<td>495</td>
<td>627</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of groups</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Although the direction and substance of the coefficients remain similar, the difference in gendered response is no longer significant for any models. This indicates that the difference between men and women are not statistically significant when non-affirmative responses are included and could be due to chance.
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Slobogin, Christopher. 2002. "Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public Places and the


Explaining Guatemalan Vigilantism

Bryant McConkie

Introduction

Ripped from his home in Concepción, Guatemala, the evening of October 13, 2015, Mayor Bacilio Juracán was brutally beaten, doused with gasoline, and burned to death by attackers convinced he had orchestrated the murder of a political rival they supported. In just this one isolated incident, the town hall, various cars, and at least six additional buildings were burned along with the mayor (“Linchan y Queman” 2015). A growing number of similar lynchings—vigilante attacks in which victims of the mob are severely injured or killed—across Guatemala have thrust Guatemalan vigilantism into the public consciousness, perplexing governments and political theorists alike for almost twenty-five years.

Relatively unheard of before the 1990s, the rise of Latin American vigilantism—the extralegal prevention, investigation, or punishment of offenses (Bateson 2021, 1)—has since drawn significant attention. Though exact statistics quantifying this phenomenon are hard to come by due to vigilantism’s unofficial nature, governments and human rights organizations are increasingly documenting the attacks. The Guatemalan Office of Human Rights, for example, reported 2,135 cases of vigilantism—including both lynchings and illegal citizen arrests—from 2005–2020, averaging 2.6 acts of vigilantism a week nationwide (Guatemalan Office of Human Rights, 2021). Lynchings have been of particular focus, and despite their increasingly common occurrence, they are by nature sensational, capable of sending shockwaves throughout both the local population and the world. This viral nature has been exacerbated by the rapid technological modernization of Latin America, which allows accounts of the violence to be propagated to a much wider audience through social media and video sharing sites. A simple search
of the term on YouTube yields thousands of depictions of the gruesome events, and corresponding news coverage further increases the lynchings’ exposure.

On a reputational level, vigilantism poses a great threat to both the credibility and legitimacy of Latin American governments. At one point or another in the last two hundred years, every republic in Latin America has fought for independence, sovereignty, and statehood—including the ability to govern the proper use of force within its borders. With independence came the desire to establish a respectable society in which order prevailed and citizens’ rights were protected, at least in theory. Essential to this fairness was a judicial system designed to interpret the law without bias and resolve disputes with even-handed fairness. Yet, in a matter of moments, vigilantism circumvents any notion of due process by subjecting its victims to the mercy of a mob. Lynchings often feature public trials in which furious vigilantes carry out the investigation, prosecution, and sentencing of their victims without any semblance of due process or legal representation (Godoy 2022). News of modern vigilantism spreads the idea that, despite living in a civilized, advanced world, some countries cling to lawless remnants of the past or lack sufficient penal systems to adequately punish criminals. Vigilantism is particularly repugnant in the eyes of western, “more-developed” countries, which view such acts as an utter rejection as two of their tightest-held core values: democracy and the protection of human rights. As developing countries seek to assert themselves as competitors and equal peers on the world stage, public acts of vigilantism such as Lynchings discourage partnership and potential investment, suggesting that the nation still has work to do domestically before becoming a viable partner.

These destabilizing effects of vigilantism—in no way inclusive—necessitate investigation into the phenomenon’s root cause. Using Guatemala as a case study, I seek to do just that—first by exploring the theoretical underpinnings of the prevailing explanations for the violence and then by empirically testing the validity of each.

Theories

As one of the lynching capitals of Latin America, Guatemala presents an interesting case study for government agencies, human rights organizations, and political analysts alike (Tegel 2014). This is partly due to the frequency of the act in the country; in 2014, for example, the Guatemalan Office of Human Rights reported an incredible rate of 0.95 lynchings and illegal citizen arrests per day (2021). How the phenomenon relates to the country’s racially divided past and present makes the topic even more intriguing, as many of the most publicized of these violent acts occurred in the country’s indigenous, mountainous regions—the same areas subjected to brutal terror and persecution at the hands of US-backed, right-wing military squads during Guatemala’s thirty-six-year civil war. Fighting in the name of anticommunism and seeking insurgents, the army tore through the indigenous countryside, leaving 625 villages decimated and 186,000 Mayans dead in its wake (Commission 1999). In 1996, a signing of peace accords between the army and the leftist insurgents marked the end of the guerilla warfare, but rather than drying up, the violence merely changed forms. Instead of burned villages
and mass killings, more traditional crimes—such as robbery, extortion, and homicide—surged nationwide (Godoy 2002). Vigilante lynchings emerged as well, though not always highly correlated with traditional crime rates—a puzzling pattern that suggests an independent root cause for the phenomenon.

To gain insight into what the mysterious origin of Guatemalan vigilantism may be, I gathered research on the phenomenon and grouped the explanations into three prevailing theories, each pointing to a different root cause. To determine each theory’s validity, I examine the causal logic of each and calculate the correlation between its explanatory variable and provincial variation in vigilantism across Guatemala.

Operating under the assumption that the majority of vigilantism takes place in the country’s indigenous communities, the first two theories emerged with a focus on Guatemala’s largest ethnic minority, the Maya. The first, the “Mayan Theory,” views vigilantism as an institutionalized, inherent characteristic of Mayan culture both historically and today (“El Castigo Maya” 2018; Morales 2015; Arifin-Cabo 2011). The second prevailing theory, the “Scars of War Theory,” differs from the Mayan Theory in that it sees vigilantism as a response to years of unspeakable massacres and repression during the Civil War, shifting the explanatory variable from culture to historical trauma (Garcia 2004; Godoy 2002; Colussi 2014). The third and final prevailing theory, the “Government Incompetence Theory,” distances itself entirely from a Mayan focus, arguing that vigilantism is a direct result of the Guatemalan government’s institutional weakness, negligence, and history of unassumed responsibility and corruption, which have altogether left citizens feeling abandoned and left to fend for themselves in the face of suspected criminal activity (“Al menos 1.757”; “Linchan y Queman” 2015; Rodas, 2019; United Nations Secretary General, 2004; Colussia 2014).

**Ethnic Explanations**

Large parts of the academic community and the general Guatemalan populace seem to have settled on the belief that there is something inherently indigenous about Guatemalan vigilantism. Most articles on the topic—whether in academic journals or local newspapers—include either an anecdote or a study of collective mob violence in the provinces of Quiché, Alta Verapaz, San Marcos, Huehuetenango, or Sololá—all of which feature relatively high levels of lynchings and illegal detentions and are home to vast indigenous populations. This coverage, once disseminated to the general population, helps shape popular perception. Two general theories are derived from this perceived correlation. The first, the Mayan Theory, posits that Guatemalan indigenous communities’ cultural norms and governance structures enable and embrace vigilantism by providing an alternative method for resolving grievances outside of the Guatemalan judicial system. The second explanation, the Scars of War Theory, holds that for the historically oppressed indigenous Guatemalan community, vigilantism is a natural response to years of enduring government violence. While this causal logic does not apply exclusively to Guatemala’s Maya, it is often associated with them, as they bore the brunt of the violence during the country’s civil war.
**The Mayan Theory**

The idea that vigilantism is an inherent cultural and political feature of Mayan civilizations is a popular belief propagated by Guatemalan media. In one example of this argument, a local newspaper article, whose title translates to “The Mayan Punishment—A Method for Keeping the Homicide Rate Under Control,” highlights Quiché, a province of 89% indigenous population, and posits that its embracing of collective-action lynchings is the tool that has helped it lower its homicide rate to one of the lowest in the country. This willingness to engage in extrajudicial policing, the article asserts, is thanks to “the ancestral cohesion” that exists in the local ethnicity that “goes back to its origins” (“El Castigo Maya” 2018).

Despite its popularity in Guatemalan press, this proposed Mayan connection with the practice of vigilantism has received heavy pushback from both the academic community and local indigenous leaders, who deem the notion an ignorant misunderstanding of an ancient Mayan system of government that long predates the emergence of lynchings. Arifín-Cabo outlines this cultural misconception as follows:

> The system upon which traditional Mayan conflict resolution rests is defined as a repair system: the aim is to repair what has been damaged, starting from the necessity and responsibility one has with nature, the cosmos, and being human. . . [it] implies resolving conflicts with these three elements, and not causing harm to any—when that happens, the balance is lost. Agreements made in this process are not a form of punishment; they do not seek to harm others. In this case, and contrary to popular perception, lynchings are not part of the Mayan tradition of conflict resolutions, nor what is called “the system of Mayan justice.” Mayan customs and traditions oppose the use of violence to resolve a conflict or a problem since they pursue a type of restoring justice. (2011, 3)

Cabo clarifies the nature of Mayan governance by emphasizing its peaceful, non-violent focus, standing in stark contradiction to those who assume the system to be a merely retributive, inherent part of Guatemalan indigenous culture. To shed some more light on this hotly debated issue, my study will test whether or not the core belief of the Mayan Theory explanation holds empirically with the following hypothesis:

**H1:** Provinces that have higher percentages of indigenous populations will exhibit higher levels of vigilantism than those with lower proportions of indigenous populations.

**The Scars of War Theory**

Departing from a strictly Mayan cultural explanation, the Scars of War Theory sees Guatemalan vigilantism as a natural response to years of abuse at the hands of the Guatemalan government, and it finds more general acceptance among the academic community. For many analysts, the nation’s Civil War and ethnic cleansing “was the seed that has given fruit to these lynchings,” as such a violent form of collective action
was unheard of before the waning years of the conflict (Garcia 2004, 2). Godoy emphasizes this point, asserting that “contemporary lynchings are only comprehensible against the backdrop of war’s incredible violence” (2002, 645). The collective violence and psychological torture endured by the Mayan people includes everything from being raped and murdered, to stumbling upon strewn plates, covered with remnants of the brains of neighbors cannibalized by army forces. In addition to being victimized by such atrocities and driven from burning villages, many indigenous people with no military experience, including women, were forcibly enlisted in army death squadrons where they were converted into killing machines trained to wield sharpened sticks with lethal precision (Garcia, 2004).

All of these atrocities undoubtedly left survivors disrupted—not only economically and socially, but also mentally and emotionally. Speaking on the devastating psychological effects of being forcefully conscripted into a militant self-defense patrol, one citizen of the indigenous San Mateo Ixtatan commented:

The patrols changed the people’s mentality—they brought us many problems and much pain—it wasn’t true that they were there to save life, but rather to kill our own brothers. . . a lot of violence remains inside us and sometimes it comes out. . . we are all sick because of what they made us do. (Garcia 2004, 11)

Though just a couple of thoughts, this man’s account speaks volumes to the psychological effects of Guatemala’s wartime violence. The Guatemalan military fed village people propaganda to convince them of imminent, existential danger to such an extent that they were willing to turn on their own friends and family for being sympathizers with the leftist rebel regime (Colussi 2014). Such indoctrination and violence, he explains, has not totally coursed its way through the Guatemalan system, and occasionally this infirmity manifests itself externally. Proponents of the Scars of War Theory posit that this effect is what drives vigilantism today and assert that Guatemalans exposed to violence during the Civil War have been desensitized to both severe violence and lack of regard for due process—two preconditions for spontaneous mob violence.

Though related to the Mayan Theory in its focus on Guatemala’s indigenous population, the Scars of War Theory does not point to ethnicity itself as the root cause of vigilantism, but instead to historic victimization. Thus, Guatemalans who experienced wartime violence should be equally likely to engage in vigilantism regardless of their race. To test the validity of this explanation, I propose the following hypothesis:

H2: Provinces that experienced higher levels of massacres during the Guatemalan Civil war will exhibit higher levels of vigilantism than those that experienced fewer or no massacres.

Governmental Incompetence Theory

“In politics, perception is reality.” These words, spoken by former United States Republican Party consultant Lee Attwater, perfectly capture the political conundrum of Guatemala (Willis 2013, 1). The general population, historically abused and neglected
by corrupt and incompetent ruling elites, has ceased giving the government the benefit
of the doubt. Instead, the people’s default mindset toward their ruling authorities is one
of indifference—or even skeptical cynicism. Thus, the country’s struggling government
is not only weakened by its poor performance, but also by negative public perception.
As a testament to this unpopularity, a nationwide survey conducted in 2018 revealed
that 47.8% of the Guatemalan public disapproved of the police, 38% disapproved of
the nation’s judicial system, and 76% disapproved of its prison system (ENPEVI 2018).

Proponents of the Government Incompetence Theory see the Guatemalan govern-
ment’s unpopularity as a natural byproduct of the country’s checkered political past and
present, which includes unsuccessful prosecution of civil war generals accused of war
crimes, presidential corruption, and bribery of constitutional court members (United
Nations Secretary General 2004). The people’s negative experiences breed mistrust,
especially toward Guatemala’s law enforcement and justice systems, and hamstrings
the potential efficacy of any top-down attempts to rectify past mistakes or abuses. Ac-
cording to the Government Incompetence Theory, such a lack of confidence makes
Guatemalans feel obligated to take matters into their own hands to ensure justice is
served: “justicia a la mano propia.” On the scene of a 2009 lynching that left behind
the charred corpses of three alleged rapists, village elder Thomas Saquic commented:

This matter is now closed; there’s nothing more to say. Justice was done and it’s
our business. The only thing I can tell you is that here we take a tough line [ten-
emos mano dura] and we know that the police, human rights, and the judges are
all corrupt. (Sieder 2011, 3)

Sieder uses this elder’s justification of a lynching on the basis of the incompetence
of his nation’s law enforcement to support her assertion that vigilantism has been imple-
mented as a replacement for government intervention. This claim is further illustrated
by the village peoples’ refusal to allow the police and ambulance to attend to the scene,
a common theme of such events which is generally ascribed to the fear that suspected
criminals will never be prosecuted (Sieder 2011, 4).

Though elements of governmental distrust are markedly high in indigenous com-
unities that have historically been subjected to governmental abuses, it is important
to note that this theory is more general than the previous two because of its inclusion of
an even broader segment of the population. Not all Guatemalans are Mayan, nor have
they all been the subjects of discriminatory wartime violence, yet all can harbor feelings
of distrust or disbelief towards the government and be spurred toward vigilantism. This
theory is important because it helps to explain the rampant vigilantism that has been
observed in even Guatemala’s least-Mayan provinces.

The extent to which government mistrust correlates with vigilantism, the Govern-
ment Incompetence Theory will be tested using the following hypothesis:

H3: Provinces that exhibit higher levels of distrust in the government will exhibit
higher levels of vigilantism than those that have lower levels of distrust.
Research Design

Upon review of the three prevailing theories in the available literature, I find that the systematic empirical evidence supporting them is generally sparse. From my analysis, most articles on Guatemalan vigilantism depend on anecdotal evidence such as on-the-spot interviews which, though valuable in certain circumstances, are subjective and can fail to reflect true motives for action due to social desirability bias (Sieder 2011; Ariñón-Cabo 2011; Garcia 2004). Additionally, most of the cases of vigilantism and lynchings cited in the literature are seemingly cherry-picked from provinces with high indigenous populations such as Quiché, Huehuetenango, and Sololá—suggesting possible confirmation bias in the research (Sieder 2011; “El Castigo Maya” 2018; “Linchan y Queman” 2015). Studies that do delve into the numbers do so delicately, including tables that indicate the general prevalence or rise and fall of vigilantism instead of quantitatively searching for root causes on a provincial basis. Though this shallow level of findings is understandable due to the newness of vigilantism statistics and the difficult and limited nature of Guatemalan government databases, such ambitious theories necessitate statistical substantiation and careful analysis before they reach wholesale acceptance.

To analyze the validity of each of the explanations, I performed correlation analyses between each of the proposed independent variables and all twenty-two Guatemalan provinces’ frequency of vigilantism. I measure the dependent variable, vigilantism, based on data from the Guatemalan Office of Human Rights Annual 2021 Report which provides provincial breakdowns of “vigilante acts” from 2005–2021. As part of this measure, I will not only include lynchings—illegal citizen detentions in which injury or death occurs—but also incidents in which the victim(s) were arrested but escaped unscathed. Though it could plausibly be argued that citizen detentions resulting in no injury to those apprehended have different root motivations than violent lynchings, the agency’s grouping of the two outcomes into one indicator suggests that, despite their differing outcomes, both types of detention should be considered as variants of the same vigilante phenomenon.

Admittedly, a municipality-by-municipality breakdown of vigilante acts would provide a more precise statistical analysis; however, after extensive research, it seems no such record exists. Additionally, the range of the data studied is somewhat limited—it seems that, despite the emergence of widespread vigilantism around the conclusion of the Civil War in 1996, the phenomenon was not reliably documented on a national scale until 2005 (Guatemalan Office of Human Rights 2021).

To control for the wide variation in provincial population, I divided each province’s total of acts of vigilantism for a given time period by its population as reported in the 2018 Guatemalan Census. In this way, instead of tilting the analysis heavily towards Guatemala’s most populous regions, this new indicator, “Acts of Vigilantism per Capita,” or AVPC, as I will hereafter refer to it, reflects an average citizen’s likelihood to be involved in an act of vigilantism in their province.
To test the Mayan Theory, I accessed data from the 2018 Guatemalan Census and calculated each province’s percentage of population that self-identifies as Maya to serve as the independent variable. Then, I performed a simple correlation analysis by plotting each province’s proportion of indigenous population with its respective AVPC for the years 2005–2020 (as the Office of Human Rights published its report in March, vigilante acts in 2021 were excluded).

To test the Scars of War Theory, I used a chart from Oglesby and Ross’s article, “Guatemala’s Genocide Determination and Spatial Politics of Justice,” which details the number of massacres documented by Guatemala’s Commission for Historical Clarification by province (2009). Just as with AVPC, I controlled each province’s number of documented massacres by dividing by population, thus hoping to capture the prevalence of the killings on an individual basis. Next, I calculated and plotted the correlation between massacres per capita and AVPC.

To test the Government Incompetence Theory, I first had to find appropriate proxies to represent the Guatemalan Government’s effectiveness or lack thereof. The Guatemalan Government has a historic lack of transparency and introspection, so records of corruption and bribery are not widely available in a central location. In addition, public opinion surveys, which can be costly endeavors, are not consistently realized on a national level. Despite this relative lack of documentation, however, I was able to locate a standalone government-sponsored survey from 2018 called ENPEVI—the National Survey of Public Security Perception and Victimization. Though the survey’s main focus was the extent to which Guatemala’s public felt safe in certain situations, it included a question used to gauge citizens’ overall confidence in specific government institutions on both a local and national level.

This analysis assumes public confidence to be a valid proxy for government competence because a government is only as competent as it is perceived to be by its constituents. As such, I decided to focus on the provincial perception of three judicial institutions whose proposed “weakness” is often blamed in the wake of vigilante intervention: the police, the judges, and the prison system. This data allowed me to calculate the strength of the correlation between provincial AVPC and confidence levels in each institution, providing a direct insight into the political thought process of everyday citizens—a thought process that, under the right conditions, can drive them to engage in extrajudicial violence. Since the survey was conducted in 2017–2018 only, I limited the analysis of AVPC to those years and the years that followed: 2017–2020.

Results

H1: The Mayan Theory
My test of the Mayan Theory suggests only a weak relationship between the percentage of a province’s population of Mayan ethnicity and vigilantism, with a correlation of 0.28. The less-Mayan provinces exhibit a fair amount of spread in AVPC, ranging from the only 2 percent Mayan Jutiapa with a country-low rate of vigilantism, to the 14.95 percent Mayan Retalhuleu that registers a national high. Though the three most Mayan provinces, Totonicapán, Alta Verapaz, and Sololá all exhibit above average rates of vigilantism, it must be noted that the far less Mayan provinces of Huehuetenango (64.99%), Quetzaltenango (51.13%), Suchitepéquez (38.06%), and Retalhuleu (14.95%) exhibit even higher levels of vigilantism, despite their varying ethnic compositions. Additionally, though Jutiapa, Jalapa, Zacapa, Santa Rosa, and El Progreso—all of which are below 5% Mayan and have the 1st, 2nd, 5th, 7th, and 9th lowest levels of vigilantism, respectively—present an interesting cluster, my analysis reveals far too many outliers throughout the rest of the country to produce definitive conclusions in favor of the Mayan Theory. Given the relatively high levels of vigilantism in the nation’s most Mayan provinces, it is easy to see how potentially biased media coverage could give the impression that vigilantism is most frequent in those regions; however, my per-capita analysis reveals generally disparately distributed levels of extrajudicial violence throughout the country, independent of Mayan heritage.
I also find very little support for the Scars of War Theory, which registers a meager correlation of 0.21. Worth noting is a slightly linear positive trend manifest in the provinces of Chiquimula, Sololá, Alta Verapaz, and Huehuetenango, implying that historic massacres might have a stronger impact on vigilantism in these specific provinces; however, a broader analysis reveals this pattern is not generalizable. Additionally apparent is the fact that Guatemala’s most ethnically Mayan provinces bore the brunt of the violence, and the vast majority of the country was relatively untouched. According to the Scars of War explanation, the relatively unscathed provinces should exhibit correspondingly low levels of vigilantism. This causal logic, however, does not manifest in my results, as provinces with low levels of massacres per capita exhibit an incredible range of variation of AVPC. In fact, just between provinces having experienced zero massacres, the number of acts of vigilantism per 100,000 people ranges from 2.46 to 11.5—a 367 percent difference. This general bunching of the data points along the y-axis suggests that the Scars of War Theory’s independent variable, historical government brutality in the form of massacres, does not effectively explain Guatemalan vigilantism on a nationwide scale. Furthermore, the correlation is significantly skewed by Quiché, which experienced 15 times more massacres than the average Guatemalan
province. Removing Quiché from the calculation results in a much lower correlation coefficient of only 0.14. From this analysis, I conclude that despite the link between the Mayan and the Scars of War Theories, the notion of vigilantism as a natural outgrowth of violent victimization from Guatemala’s Civil War finds even less backing than the cultural explanation.

**H3: The Government Incompetence Theory**

Government incompetence, despite being a conclusion reached by analysts and Guatemalans alike, similarly struggles to explain vigilantism. With correlations of 0.22, 0.14, and -0.03, respectively, the three selected proxies for efficacy—lack of confidence in the Guatemalan police, judges, and prison system—appear to explain little to no variation in AVPC. This evidence—or lack thereof—is illustrated in the loosely distributed spread of the scatterplots below.

**Figure 3: Percentage of province of with little to no trust in police exhibits a weak relationship with AVPC**
Figure 4: Percentage of province with little to no trust in Guatemalan judges and AVPC exhibits a very weak relationship.
These findings cast significant doubt on the main premise of the Government Incompetence Theory, which predicts that as a province’s lack of confidence in a judicial institution increases, so does its likelihood to participate in vigilantism. Ultimately, these weak correlations suggest that, even if a slight causal relationship between governmental weakness and vigilantism does exist, academia and the public’s simplistic explanations that wholly blame institutional decay are likely misplaced.

Of contextual interest, additional tests revealed much stronger correlations between Mayan ethnicity and the negative perception of specific governmental institutions, including the army (0.57) and the Office of Human Rights Ombudsman (0.48). This level of tension, understandable considering the war’s victimization of the Guatemalan Maya, is assuredly well-known publicly; thus, exposure to reports of lynchings and vigilantism taking place in indigenous communities could reinforce the public’s convictions about both the Mayan Theory and the Governmental Incompetence Theory at once.
Implications

In light of the virtually nonexistent correlation between theorized causes of Guatemalan vigilantism and its actual occurrence, this study has two major takeaways, both of which call into question commonly held perceptions of the phenomenon.

First, given their relatively low correlations of 0.27 and 0.21, it seems both the Mayan and Scars of War Theories are largely unfounded—the general conclusion that Guatemalan vigilantism is uniquely a product of either Mayan culture or historical trauma is overly simplistic. The largely unvalidated Mayan Theory’s persistence to the modern day, despite academic pushback, may be a testament to residual racist stereotypes that have plagued Guatemala since colonial times, whereas the lack of evidence for the Scars of War Theory questions the prevailing assertion that the nation’s bloody history is directly responsible for its vigilantism—and by extension, high levels of other violence—today. Additionally problematic is these ethnic explanations’ hyperfocus on vigilantism in highly-Mayan provinces—whether pointing to their cultural qualities or their high levels of historic victimization—while seemingly ignoring the phenomenon in non-indigenous areas.

Furthermore, it seems these two theories are interconnected. As the Mayan Theory’s assertion that Guatemala’s Maya are inherently more violent than the rest of the population falls under increasing criticism in academia, it is possible that some analysts are shifting to the Scars of War Theory because it fits with their still unchanged view that Mayans have a higher propensity toward vigilantism by nature. Despite this shift, however, the findings of my study suggest that the latter explanation is even less supported than the former. Consequently, I call for a reframing of the general discourse on the topic at large and urge the elimination of preconceived prejudices and a more open-minded, careful consideration and coverage of vigilantism in all twenty-two of Guatemala’s provinces—not just the indigenous ones. Additional research regarding the role Guatemalan media has played in the promulgation of these seemingly misguided theories could contribute insight into their historical origins and current popularity among the Guatemalan population today.

Second, the Government Incompetence Theory’s proposition that institutional weakness drives Guatemalans towards vigilantism to compensate for the lack of justice, while logically sound and receiving wide acceptance in the literature, does not seem to reflect reality. The relationship between Guatemala’s judicial institutions—the police, the judges, and the prison systems—and vigilantism was found to be very weak in my tests. Though a government-conducted survey on the efficacy of government may admittedly elicit a certain degree of social desirability bias from certain respondents, the survey’s immense sample size helps negate this effect. These findings call into question the notion that Guatemalans spring into action because they mistrust the institutions tasked with administering justice—one of the most common tropes of media write-ups and international government reports alike. Additionally, they cast doubt on the academic use of anecdotal, on-the-spot interviews which traditionally blame a weak
or corrupt state, suggesting that the violent phenomenon is likely a consequence of an unmentioned factor.

**Conclusion**

Though admittedly my study of the causes of Guatemalan vigilantism could be refined with a more rigorous test, such as a regression that considers yearly, sub-provincial data for my variables of vigilantism, ethnic composition, and government perception, such data sources do not seem to exist. Despite this limitation, my simple correlations reveal that none of the prevailing theories successfully bears the weight of explaining Guatemalan vigilantism by itself. Simple, reductive explanations such as the Mayan and Scars of War theories find very little empirical support and may be evidence of a continued racist anti-Mayan sentiment today. The Government Incompetence Theory, while oft referenced and logical, finds even less backing. In a modern era in which simplified headlines and catchy clickbait reign supreme, the root of Guatemalan vigilantism stands out as a nuanced topic that calls for nuanced investigation.
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The Sino-Soviet Split: A Domestic Ideology Analysis

Caleb Ringger

Introduction

In December 1960, the Peking Review, China’s only English national news magazine, celebrated the “Eternal, Unbreakable Sino-Soviet Friendship” on its front page (Peking Review 1960). The alliance between the world’s largest communist nations certainly seemed ironclad, at least from an outside perspective. But over the next decade, relations between the two allies completely deteriorated, ultimately resulting in bloody confrontation on the Sino-Soviet border, where dozens were killed in violent clashes in March 1969. What accounts for the rapid deterioration in relations between China and the Soviet Union? How could two seemingly close allies turn into enemies so quickly?

Answering this question has important implications for understanding the foreign relations of revolutionary states and the wider study of why interstate conflict occurs. Mao’s China and the USSR were the two most prominent revolutionary states of the twentieth century, products of two of the few true social revolutions. Many theorists of revolutionary foreign policy predict that revolutionary states will come into conflict with non-revolutionary or reactionary powers (Kissinger 1999; Halliday 1999; Terhalle 2009; Colgan 2013), but few predict how or if revolutionary states will come into conflict with one another, as happened between the Soviet Union and China. Therefore, the Sino-Soviet conflict is particularly interesting.

Numerous theorists and historians have noted a range of reasons why relations between China and the USSR deteriorated in the late 1950s and 1960s. However, I propose an explanation for the Sino-Soviet split that is primarily ideological in nature. Simply put, relations between the Soviet Union and China deteriorated because of growing ideological differences between their leaders, which created animosity that manifested in personal attacks, refusal to coordinate policy, and eventually violence.
More specifically, I place the blame for the split primarily on Mao Zedong, who intentionally adopted more extreme ideological positions and demonized moderates to gain power over his domestic rivals. Examples of these extreme ideological moves include conducting political purges of his ideological enemies, such as the Anti-Rightist Campaign, provoking international crises, such as the Second Taiwan Straits Crisis, and forcibly implementing extreme and ultimately disastrous socialist economic policies during the Great Leap Forward.

I will argue that these extreme positions, which were the direct result of Mao’s doctrine of “continuous revolution,” demanded perpetual ideological radicalization and rejection of moderates and conservatives. As I will demonstrate, this radical ideology led Mao to associate his domestic enemies with the more ideologically conservative Soviet Union. Mao then explicitly associated the Soviets with his domestic ideological enemies and viewed them as essentially the same threat. He then began treating the Soviets like he treated his domestic enemies, which provoked conflict and eventually led to the total breakdown in Sino-Soviet relations.

My dependent variable, i.e. the Sino-Soviet split, takes a variety of forms. In its early stages, starting around 1956, the split manifested mostly as private disagreement between Soviet and Chinese leaders. However, starting around 1960, the conflict manifested more publicly with openly hostile public statements at international conferences and the withdrawal of all Soviet specialists from China. The conflict escalated through the rest of the 1960s decade, ultimately culminating in deadly military clashes at the Sino-Soviet border in 1969 and Sino-American rapprochement in the early 1970s.

Literature Review

Scholarly literature on the Sino-Soviet split falls into two broad categories: ideological explanations and realist explanations. Ideological explanations are not all identical, but agree on the assertion that the difference in ideology between China and the Soviet Union created tension that caused the split. Realist explanations argue that geopolitical factors, such as balance of power, territorial disputes, and ethnic or nationalist tensions, led to the split. Realists do not argue that China and the Soviet Union were not ideologically different, but they do argue that ideology was not the primary reason for the split.

Ideological Explanations

Ideological distance explanations predict that interstate conflict is likely to occur when two states grow more ideologically distant. Haas (2005, 6–14), for example, argues that ideological distance leads to a breakdown in communication, fear of demonstration effects, and a tribalistic in-group–out-group worldview, thus leading to conflict. With respect to the Sino-Soviet split, Haas argues that Mao Zedong’s ideological radicalization, best demonstrated by the Great Leap Forward, brought him into conflict with the more conservative Khrushchev (146–175). As Mao and Khrushchev grew apart ideologically, they clashed on issues of both domestic and foreign policy.
As I will explain, my argument agrees with Haas’s ideological distance theory insofar as it argues that ideological concerns played a primary role in the Sino-Soviet split. However, I disagree that simple ideological distance was the primary reason for the split. China and the USSR did not engage in armed conflict with every state they had ideological differences with, and both states softened relations with the United States, which they were obviously more ideologically distant from, in the years before and after the Sino-Soviet split. Additionally, this theory fails to apply to many states outside of the Sino-Soviet context. Alliances between ideologically distant states are not uncommon, particularly when common strategic interests align, as Haas himself has noted (2021).

Lorenz Lüthi (2008), one of the leading voices in the ideological camp, argues that disagreements over how to implement socialism at home and direct the international socialist bloc caused the split. He identifies Mao’s radical economic policies, Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization process, and Soviet policies of peaceful coexistence with the West as the three main points of tension that contributed to the breakdown of the alliance (2). He also argues that Mao actively encouraged the Sino-Soviet split as a way to legitimize his domestic policies and demonize his moderate domestic opponents. Lüthi, like most ideological authors, acknowledges non-ideological factors that contributed to the collapse of the alliance, but argues that they were results, not causes, of the split.

I generally find Lüthi’s argument to be the most convincing explanation for the split. His theory explains the available evidence, including recently declassified archival evidence from both China and the Soviet Union (1). It also accounts for the timing of the split better than realist explanations, which sometimes ignore early signs of the split and focus on its manifestations (Radchenko 2009; Shen and Xia 2017). Lüthi’s actor-driven explanation demonstrates how specific decisions by individuals like Mao and Khrushchev led to an unexpected outcome that surprised most outside observers.

Mingjiang Li is another important voice in the ideological camp. In his 2012 book *Mao’s China and the Sino-Soviet Split: Ideological Dilemma*, Li applies the concept of an ideological dilemma to Sino-Soviet relations. The ideological dilemma is similar to the security dilemma: any regime’s attempt to strengthen ideological legitimacy in their country is interpreted as a threat to the ideological legitimacy of a neighboring country with a distant ideology. Li argues that Mao’s foreign and domestic ideological struggles were intimately linked, and that he provoked the split to gain domestic power (5). This in turn created an ideological dilemma that led to conflict with the Soviet regime.

Li’s argument is strong, and it is similar to Lüthi’s in its conclusions. The main difference is that Li goes into more depth with the exact mechanism of the split, applying the concept of two-level game theory to Sino-Soviet relations. While I agree with Li’s assertion that Chinese domestic and foreign policy were intimately linked, I find Li’s framework to be overly rigid at times, leading him to ignore elements of human agency, such as the personalities of Mao and Khrushchev, in favor of his structural theoretical framework.

Robert Snyder’s (1999) theory of externalization, though it deals primarily with the United States, is applicable to the Sino-Soviet split. Snyder argues that Third World
revolutionary states grow hostile to the United States as the radical faction of the revolutionary party tries to assert dominance over moderate domestic rivals by associating them with the United States, a non-revolutionary enemy. In the Sino-Soviet case, Snyder’s theory would predict that China came into conflict with the USSR as Mao Zedong asserted his dominance over moderates within China by associating them with the Soviet Union, a more moderate foreign power.

Snyder’s theory is valuable to understand the basic concept of how Mao externalized his conflict with moderate domestic rivals to conflict with the Soviet Union. However, the exact details of Snyder’s mechanism are not applicable to the Sino-Soviet case. For example, Snyder’s theory predicts that the breakdown in relations will occur while the revolutionary state is still in the process of revolution, as revolutionaries fight against the bourgeois elites who have links with the status quo power (270–71). In the Sino-Soviet case, conflict did not occur until after the revolutionary movement had long since succeeded, and it occurred as a newly moderate faction emerged, not in response to traditional bourgeois elites.

**Realist Explanations**

Realist explanations fall into three broad categories: national interest theories, structural theories, and strategic triangle theories. National interest theories emphasize how China and the Soviet Union had fundamentally different national interests that made cooperation on foreign policy impossible. Robinson (1967, 135–147), for example, identifies a number of conflicting national interests between the two nations that he claims inevitably led to conflict, including economic influence in Xinjiang and Korea, and political influence in Korea and Vietnam.

The national interest explanation has three main problems. First, many of the conflicting interests Robinson identifies could easily be considered ideological conflicts. For example, Robinson lists “keeping Stalin’s ideological authority high,” “imposition of Chinese ideological primacy,” and “war or peace as alternative environments for transition to socialism” as primary issues of Chinese national interest (153–56). Each of these interests are largely ideological in nature.

Secondly, many national interest concerns did not become relevant in the conflict until after the conflict had already begun over ideological concerns. Robinson identifies conflict over intervention in Vietnam and recovery of lost territory as key Chinese national interests, though China did not begin to actively pursue either of these policies until after conflict over ideology had begun (Goldstein 2001, 985). Border clashes, like those over Zhenbao Island and Xinjiang, did not occur until 1969—nearly a decade after earlier ideological disagreements had caused diplomatic relations to deteriorate (985). Though these clashes were undoubtedly part of the split, they are more properly seen as results of the split rather than causes of it.

Finally, even the basic idea that Mao Zedong was acting in the Chinese national interest by breaking with the Soviet Union is doubtful. Mao’s China was mired in abject poverty and isolated from the rest of the world with no powerful consistent allies.
outside of the Soviet Union. Breaking with its most powerful ally, especially during the early Cold War when the United States was at its most militantly anti-communist, cannot be considered as acting in the country’s geopolitical national interest. A national interest-prioritizing leader would have stayed as close to the Soviet Union as possible, accepting all its economic, technological, and military aid in order to protect its survival in a hostile geopolitical environment.

Strategic triangle explanations emphasize the supposed tripolar nature of Cold War-era international relations. Rather than a bipolar rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, strategic triangle theory sees the Cold War as a shifting balance of power between the United States, the Soviet Union, and China. The Sino-Soviet split, and the subsequent softening in relations between the United States and China, was thus a strategic choice to counterbalance the rising power of the Soviet Union in the late 1960s (Thornton 1987, 48–49).

Strategic triangle theories have three main problems. First, the theory predicts that the United States and China would form a new alliance, or at least soften relations, to counterbalance Soviet power. While the US and China did in fact soften relations, at least partially in order to counterbalance the Soviets, this rapprochement did not happen until the late 1960s and early 1970s, around a decade after the Sino-Soviet split had begun (Panda 1997, 46). Second, the theory takes for granted that China was a great power at the time, which the evidence does not support. China could hardly be considered an economic or military power even in the region, much less the world (Morrison 2019, 2–3). Third, it is unclear why a developing nation like China in the 1960s would provoke a conflict with its most powerful neighbor and seek an alliance with a faraway ideological enemy rather than simply stay on good terms with its neighbor and avoid conflict.

Structural realist explanations emphasize the fundamentally imbalanced nature of the Sino-Soviet alliance of 1950. Sergey Radchenko’s Two Suns in the Heavens (2009) is perhaps the most important modern work to use the structural realist framework. Radchenko (2009) argues that the Sino-Soviet alliance was structurally favorable to the Soviets over the Chinese, thus creating an imbalance of power that was intolerable to Mao, who demanded Chinese superiority. He sees China as bidding for superiority within the communist movement, but frames it more as a power struggle than an ideological one (36).

The structural realist hypothesis is the most convincing alternative hypothesis, though, as I will show, it still does not explain the bulk of the evidence. The hypothesis is attractive because, as theorists like Radchenko point out, the Sino-Soviet split included more than just ideological bickering. In my view, three major points raised by realists do not stand up to scrutiny.

First, realists claim that the split could not have been ideologically motivated, because shortly after the split occurred, China softened relations with the United States (Khoo 2005, 529–531). Realists argue that if Mao split with the Soviets over Soviet ideological softening, he would not then proceed to meet with Nixon and Kissinger. This accusation is weakened by the fact that this rapprochement with the US did not
happen until almost fifteen years after the split began and in a completely new geopolitical context. By the early 1970s, Sino-Soviet relations had already deteriorated so thoroughly that China seriously feared an all-out war with the USSR (Lüthi 2012, 394). Faced with such a prospect, Mao was understandably unable to fully commit to constantly antagonizing the United States. Rapprochement with the United States was part of a strategic calculation by the Chinese in an effort to avoid a two-front war with the world’s two largest superpowers (Segal 1980, 500). Certainly, it did not represent a sudden ideological about-face, as evidenced by the quick stagnation of the Sino-American rapprochement (Yang and Xia 2010).

Second, realists claim that the roots of the conflict lay in the fundamentally imbalanced nature of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1950, which put China in a position of inferiority that it refused to tolerate. While the treaty was certainly imbalanced, the evidence does not suggest that this dynamic was the main reason for the split. Mao’s complaints about Khrushchev and the Soviet Union were consistently ideological in nature. Mao constantly called the Soviets “revisionists,” accused them of forsaking Marxism, and defended Stalinism, Khrushchev’s main ideological enemy (Nottingham Communist Group 1980; People’s Daily 1964). This suggests that ideology took precedence over realist concerns. Stalin was, after all, one of the authors of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1950 (Heinzig 1998; 328). If Mao’s principal concern was with the structure of the treaty, it seems unlikely that he would routinely defend the man who authored it and, in some ways, strong-armed China into accepting its unequal terms.

Third, realists point to border clashes over disputed territories between the two nations as evidence that the split was more about material concerns than ideology. However, I, along with other ideological scholars like Lüthi, argue that these border clashes were manifestations of the ideological split, not causes of it. The timing bears this out. China and the USSR had unresolved border questions for their entire existence, but the first active border disputes did not occur until 1960, after relations between the two countries had already deteriorated significantly (Radchenko 2009, 110). The most famous border clash, the battle at Zhenbao Island, did not occur until 1969, over a decade after relations had already broken down. Prior to the ideological rift between Khrushchev and Mao that emerged around 1958, the disputed border regions were relatively peaceful, suggesting that border clashes happened as a result of the split, not as a cause of it.

For these reasons, and more that I will detail below, I argue that the primary reason for the Sino-Soviet split was the ideological divide between Mao Zedong and the post-Stalin Soviet Union. My paper will proceed in two parts. First, I will demonstrate how and when the ideological split occurred from 1956 to 1960. This will show that the independent variable, ideological divide, did in fact occur immediately prior to the split. Second, I will detail how exactly this ideological divide translated into a breakdown in relations between the two nations after 1960.
The Ideological Split: Roots of the Conflict

The Sino-Soviet split was a long and relatively gradual process. Therefore, I will not focus on the entire decade-and-a-half long process of the breakdown. I will focus primarily on the early stages, which allows me to determine what events caused the split rather than simply resulted from it or worsened it. Specifically, I will focus on the period between 1956 and 1962. I chose 1956 because I see Khrushchev’s Secret Speech, which inaugurated the Soviet Union’s process of de-Stalinization, as laying the foundation of the ideological divide. I chose 1962 as an end date because the evidence suggests that the split was complete by that point, though there is no scholarly consensus on an exact date.

Historical Context

The Sino-Soviet Treaty of Alliance, Friendship, and Mutual Cooperation was signed in February 1950 by Mao Zedong and Joseph Stalin. It came shortly after Mao and his Chinese Communist Party (CCP) emerged victorious from the Chinese Civil War in 1949. The alliance proceeded relatively smoothly for the next several years as the Soviet Union gave significant economic aid and sent hundreds of specialists to develop the Chinese economy (Zhang 1998, 197–198). China, which had endured a decade of devastation at the hands of the Japanese and the civil war, relied heavily on this Soviet aid for reconstruction efforts (197–198). While Mao and Stalin butted heads on a few issues, notably over Soviet involvement in the Korean War, these disagreements never translated into open conflict.

Immediately after Stalin’s death in 1953, the alliance continued to progress positively. Li (2012, 22) notes that when Stalin’s successor Nikita Khrushchev first visited Beijing in 1954, there was “a possibly unprecedented friendly atmosphere between the two sides.” As Li (2012) reports, the number of Soviet advisors in China reached a peak of five thousand, and the Soviets collaborated with Beijing on a number of Chinese development projects.

Secret Speech and its Repercussions

This cooperation began to change in 1956, when Khrushchev made a monumental speech entitled “On the Cult of Personality and Its Consequences,” also known popularly as the “Secret Speech.” This speech, given at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, railed against the policies and personality of Stalin and shocked the communist world. While the speech did not immediately lead to a breakdown in relations between China and the Soviet Union, it clearly laid the foundation for future conflict and signaled the first point of serious ideological distance between Mao and Khrushchev (Lüthi 2008, 48; Chen 2001, 67; Sheng, Zhai, and Kaple 2012, 106).

Khrushchev’s (1956) speech focused its criticism on the cult of personality Stalin had built around himself and the violent purges he enacted against his political enemies. Khrushchev harshly criticized Stalin’s “absolutely insufferable character,” “brutal
violence,” and “abuse of power.” While Mao had not yet developed what would later become his own fanatical personality cult, the similarities between Khrushchev’s criticisms of Stalin and his later criticisms of Mao are striking.

More than simply criticizing ideas that Mao would later adopt, the speech also threatened to undermine Mao’s ideological legitimacy by shaking confidence in communist leaders worldwide. The speech sparked heated protests, both from Stalinists furious at the Soviet government’s criticisms of their ideological leader and from anti-Stalinists furious that the Soviet government had concealed and enabled his abuses for so long (Jones 2013, 43). Riots in Georgia and North Korea threatened to undermine the support of communist leaders that ruled similarly to Stalin. Mao, who called the speech a “surprise attack” (Luthi 2008, 50) that “made a mess,” (Chen 2001, 64) was understandably disturbed by the international reaction to the speech and took measures to shore up domestic support in response.

Mao commissioned a lengthy article to be written in the People’s Daily, the official newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party, defending Stalin as the official position of the CCP (MacFarquhar 1973; 618). The article acknowledged Stalin’s “serious mistakes,” but identified these mistakes mostly as Stalin’s policies towards China rather than the domestic terror Khrushchev had criticized. The article also praised Stalin and defended him as a “great Marxist-Leninist.” Mao developed what he called the “seventy-thirty principle” with regards to Stalin: that Stalin’s actions had been 70% correct and 30% mistaken (Chen 2001, 65).

It is relatively remarkable that Mao would go out of his way to defend Stalin, considering that Mao and Stalin’s relationship had frequently been strained. Stalin had insulted and embarrassed Mao on multiple occasions, and, as previously mentioned, they had disagreed over how to handle the Korean War (Radchenko 2009, 3–4). But Mao still chose to defend Stalin, primarily for his own ideological protection. Mao’s economic and political model, some of which he had already implemented and some of which was still in planning stages, greatly resembled Stalin’s early revolutionary model. As Khrushchev and the Soviets were moving away from a highly centralized planned economy and repressive political regime centered in the personality of an all-powerful leader, Mao felt that his own model of governance was being directly challenged by his closest ally (Radchenko 2009, 10). This is in line with Li’s (2012) model of an ideological dilemma: Mao perceived Khrushchev’s attempt to gain ideological dominance within the Soviet Union as a threat to his own divergent model.

To be clear, there is no evidence that Mao reacted with fury or unapologetic condemnation to Khrushchev’s speech (2012, 21). Public and private statements were nuanced. On one hand, Mao concurred with Khrushchev’s criticisms of Stalin and even voiced explicit criticism of the cult of the individual (MacFarquhar 1973; 618). On the other hand, Mao also noted sharply the damage the speech had done to the communist movement and ultimately argued that Stalin should still be seen as an example of a Marxist hero (Chen 2001, 65). This is to say that the Secret Speech did not immediately seriously damage the Sino-Soviet alliance. It did, however, lay the foundations
for ideological conflict in the future by illustrating how the Soviet Union’s rightward-shifting ideology created tension with Mao’s revolutionary ideology.

Mao’s Leftward Turn

On its own, the Chinese response to the Secret Speech was certainly not enough to destroy the alliance. Following the speech, China and the Soviet Union continued to cooperate on important issues and diplomatic relations continued smoothly.

However, the Secret Speech occurred just months before Mao Zedong’s domestic policy took a sharp leftward turn. This leftward turn was caused by perceived challenges to Mao’s domestic legitimacy and had three manifestations in the years between 1957 and 1960, each of which I will discuss in detail. First, Mao launched the Anti-Rightist Campaign, a persecution campaign aimed at political enemies. Second, he orchestrated a military strike on Taiwanese-owned islands in an attempt to mobilize support for his radical reforms. Third, he launched the Great Leap Forward, a dramatic and ultimately disastrous attempt to forcibly establish communism instead of implementing the more moderate Soviet development model. Each of these pivotal events will be discussed in detail below.

As I will demonstrate below, Mao’s leftward turn brought him into conflict with domestic moderates, who challenged his legitimacy, and the Soviet Union, which had previously overseen China’s economic development. In response, Mao doubled down on his radicalism and portrayed the moderates and the Soviets as part of a wider conspiracy of “revisionists” who were trying to influence China’s revolution for their own gain. In short, Mao and the Soviets disagreed fundamentally about how to implement revolution both at home and in foreign policy, leading to outright conflict by 1961.

Anti-Rightist Campaign

The Anti-Rightist Campaign was a political purge of moderates and conservatives in Chinese society. The campaign was started in response to challenges of legitimacy Mao perceived both at home and abroad. It demonstrates two important parts of the theory: first, that Mao’s ideological radicalization came as a response to ideological challenges both within China and abroad, and second, that Mao’s radicalization brought him into conflict with the Soviets over the proper method of implementing socialism.

By 1957, two major events had occurred that challenged Mao Zedong’s legitimacy and influenced him to adopt more radical policies. First, anti-communist protests in Hungary appeared to seriously threaten the stability of communist regimes worldwide (Békés, Byrne, and Rainer 2002; xiii–xiv). To the Chinese, these were not anti-Soviet protests, but anti-communist protests, and thus a serious threat to worldwide communism (Chen 2001, 157). The Chinese urged Moscow not to withdraw troops from Budapest and advocated strongly to put down the protests, which they characterized as “reactionary” (Chen 2001, 155).

The second major event that pushed Mao leftward was the failure of the Hundred Flowers Campaign. The campaign had started in 1956 as an attempt to cultivate diversity of thought in China, ostensibly reasoning that as more ideas were proposed,
more good ideas would be proposed. The campaign was sanctioned and encouraged by Mao himself, but it quickly backfired on him (Rádványi 1970, 127–128). Political dissent spread among the now emboldened intellectual elite, and Mao quickly responded with violence and censorship. This poses a puzzle for historians, as it seems obvious in retrospect that this would happen. Some have proposed that the Hundred Flowers Campaign was an intentionally laid trap, intended to lure out intellectual dissenters into the open so Mao could easily identify and silence them (Chung 2011, 397; Chen 2001, 161). In light of his many seemingly earnest statements about encouraging intellectual innovation, I find it likely that Mao misperceived his own popularity and did not anticipate the level of dissent that would arise during the campaign (Tsai 1999, 31; Chen 2001; 161). Regardless of his motivations, the campaign ultimately resulted in increased political repression and forced revolutionary policies.

The Anti-Rightist Campaign was initiated in response to both of these events (Chen 2001, 339). Critics of Mao’s regime were labeled “rightists” and persecuted in order to silence dissent and consolidate state power (Tsai 1999, 32). Low estimates claim that three hundred thousand people were persecuted, ranging from censorship to arrest to execution (Chung 2011, 410). This campaign consolidated state power, intimidated the population, and enshrined Mao’s position as the ultimate authority on acceptable political views (391).

During the Anti-Rightist Campaign, Mao’s attitude towards Khrushchev became noticeably more hostile. He ordered a new article to be written in the People’s Daily, titled “Another Discussion of the Historical Lessons of the Proletarian Dictatorship,” which took a more hostile tone towards de-Stalinization by pointing out how it had led to the uprising in Hungary (Chen 2001, 159). The article reiterated China’s position towards Stalin—that he had made some mistakes, but was nonetheless a great leader. When giving instructions to the article’s authors, Mao reportedly stated, “Khrushchev abandoned Stalin, and the others used it to attack him, causing him to be besieged from all directions” (160). This demonstrates how Mao saw Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization as a challenge to his authority and pushed back in order to maintain legitimacy.

Two lessons can be learned from the Anti-Rightist Campaign. First, Mao was becoming increasingly radical and hostile to moderate Soviet political ideology in response to challenges to domestic authority. Second, Mao was becoming more like Stalin, giving further reason why he would see Soviet de-Stalinization as a threat. These two lessons make it clear that the process of ideological divide was well underway by 1957, when the Anti-Rightist Campaign was ongoing.

Second Taiwan Strait Crisis

The Second Taiwan Strait Crisis was a period of several weeks of tension between China and the United States over the island of Taiwan that nearly resulted in nuclear war. It seriously damaged Sino-Soviet relations by dragging the Soviet Union to the brink of nuclear war over an issue they considered relatively unimportant. While the geopolitical implications of the crisis are obvious, I argue based on evidence below that the crisis was primarily the product of Mao’s ideological radicalization. Therefore, it
illustrates another important example of how the ideological rift between the two nations created conflict.

The Taiwan Straits Crisis occurred when China began heavy artillery shelling of the Taiwanese-owned Kinmen Island in August 1958. China did so without informing Khrushchev, which was in direct violation of Article IV of the 1950 treaty, which stipulated that both nations would consult with each other over all important international issues. Following the shelling, the White House released a threatening press release hinting at the possibility of using nuclear weapons against the Chinese (Lüthi 2008, 101). The cavalier way Mao treated the American nuclear threat disturbed and alienated the Soviets, who felt they were being dragged into a potential nuclear conflict by their non-nuclear ally over a relatively unimportant issue (Chen 2001, 190; Li 1996, 262).

While many analyses of the event emphasize China’s desire to test American resolve to defend Taiwan (Brands 1988; George and Smoke 1974), evidence suggests that Mao used the event primarily as a way to mobilize his population and shore up domestic support for his planned economic reforms. Mao explicitly stated as much on multiple occasions. A week before the shelling began, Mao stated that “tension [is] to our competitive advantage” and “tension can help gain membership for Communist parties” (Chen 2001, 180). During the crisis, he stated that “Crisis situations allow us to mobilize forces, mobilize backward people, and mobilize people in the middle, and can therefore promote the Great Leap Forward in economic construction” (Chen 2001, 175; Lüthi 2008, 105). These quotations give strong evidence that Mao intentionally provoked the crisis in order to shore up his domestic ideological legitimacy and prepare his population for the Great Leap Forward.

The immediate geopolitical implications of the Taiwan Strait Crisis are less important than what the situation demonstrates about Mao’s ideological evolution and changing attitude towards the Soviet Union. Mao’s radicalism had prompted him to start an international crisis and bring the world to the brink of nuclear war in order to mobilize his population for communist economic reform. Relations with the Soviet Union had been deeply strained as their ally had nearly drawn them into nuclear war with an act of aggression they had not been informed of (Lüthi 2008, 103). Visible cracks had started to form in the alliance, cracks that would only be worsened by the Great Leap Forward in the coming years.

**Great Leap Forward**

If the Anti-Rightist Campaign was the political manifestation of Mao’s leftward turn, the Great Leap Forward was the economic manifestation. Mao intended to jump-start the Chinese economy by forcibly implementing communism and pushing agricultural and industrial production past their limits. The Great Leap Forward resulted in unimaginable catastrophe, with estimates ranging from twenty to thirty million people dying in the resulting famine (Joseph 1986, 420). The Great Leap Forward was primarily ideologically motivated, and it led to radicalization that seriously damaged Sino-Soviet relations.
Mao’s decision to launch the Great Leap Forward appears to have been mostly ideological (Lüthi 2008, 112). While the particulars of the program obviously concerned themselves with material capabilities, there is no evidence that Mao intended to use the Great Leap Forward to gain a material advantage over the Soviets. He did, however, announce plans to economically compete with Great Britain by the end of the Great Leap Forward (Chen 2001, 73). To me, this reads as an ideological motivation rather than a realist one. It seems unlikely that China would specifically single out the United Kingdom, a country across the world and largely irrelevant in southeast Asia, to achieve some geopolitical relative power gain. Rather, I speculate that China targeted the United Kingdom because of the UK’s status as the second most powerful capitalist nation after the United States, and a desire to demonstrate communism’s superiority over capitalism.

A diversity of thought existed within communist circles about how best to transition to socialism. The Soviet model, which focused on the urban working class, had proven ineffective in China, which was dominated by an enormous rural peasant class. The Great Leap Forward, which created rural communes and focused on the peasant class, represented a major break with the Soviet-inspired policies which had influenced early CCP economic practices. Mao admitted that one of the purposes of the Great Leap Forward was to achieve full transition to communism before the Soviet Union did. He distinguished between what he called “Bureaucratic Stalinism,” or the more moderate policies the Soviet Union was pursuing, with “Revolutionary Stalinism,” the preferred Chinese path. In 1958, Mao announced that “we take a road opposite to that of the Soviet Union” with regards to economic development (Lüthi 2008, 88).

The response to the disaster of the Great Leap Forward was confused and sporadic, since the Chinese government did so much to repress the facts. However, as information about the catastrophe spread, domestic criticism of Mao reached unprecedented levels. Mao was forced to eventually come to terms with the abject disaster that the Great Leap Forward had been among his population. This reckoning came to a head at the Lushan work conference in August 1959. At this conference, Mao’s policies were explicitly criticized, especially by Peng Dehuai, who wrote a famous letter to Mao detailing explicitly the failures of the Great Leap Forward’s planning and execution (Lüthi 2008, 127).

This conference was a critical point in Mao’s ideological evolution. Mao could have chosen to carefully analyze his actions, implement reforms, and listen to experts. Instead, he decided to double down. Mao heavily leaned into his supposed ideological superiority, banished Peng from politics for life, and ramped up his cult of personality (Leese 2011, 73–74). This is evidence of how Mao was growing more like Stalin, and that he responded to domestic political threats with ideological extremism. Additionally, Mao was beginning to explicitly identify his domestic ideological enemies with the Soviet Union. He called Peng Dehuai a “Soviet agent,” insinuating that the Soviets were somehow to blame for the Great Leap Forward’s failure (Chen 2001, 79).

The ideological radicalization of China, propelled by the Great Leap Forward and the suppression of political dissent, was the foundational and necessary precondition to the Sino-Soviet split. In 1959, Mao made a comment that succinctly summarized
exactly how far his opinion of the Soviets had fallen over the preceding half-decade: “Khrushchev has already betrayed the Marxist, proletarian undertakings; he has changed into a revisionist” (Lüthi 2008, 151). In response, Khrushchev gave an equally telling statement about Mao: “This reminds us of the atmosphere that existed in our country during I.V. Stalin’s last years of life” (154). The ideological foundation of the conflict had been fully laid.

Manifestations of Conflict

The preceding evidence demonstrates convincingly that the Soviet Union and China became ideologically distant during the five years between 1956 and 1960. Minor conflicts between the two countries ensued, though they were limited to insulting comments and a failure to coordinate on international crises. The following evidence will demonstrate how exactly that ideological rift led to outright conflict, ultimately ending in armed confrontation. In short, deep disagreements about how to implement socialism within China and oppose capitalism abroad led to the breakdown of the alliance from 1960 onward. This breakdown manifested in polemics on the international stage, the withdrawal of Soviet economic aid, and the first Sino-Soviet border clash since before the Chinese Civil War.

Visible Conflict in 1960

After the events of 1959 demonstrated just how far the two countries had drifted in their domestic ideologies, the 1960 Warsaw Pact summit, which met in Moscow, offered the first opportunity for the two sides to clash on the international stage. The atmosphere of the Warsaw Pact meeting was defined by Khrushchev’s recent decision to attend the upcoming Paris summit with leaders of the US, Great Britain, and France. The Chinese delegation in Moscow opposed Khrushchev’s peaceful coexistence policy and publicly reprimanded Khrushchev for cooperating with the capitalist enemy, sparking an ugly fight that defined the conference. After the conference ended, Mao ordered the publication of “Long Live Leninism,” a newspaper article that ostensibly celebrated Lenin’s ninetieth birthday but in reality railed against the USSR’s peaceful coexistence policy and defended the Great Leap Forward. The Soviets replied by re-publishing an article, written by Lenin, entitled “Leftism in Communism—An Infantile Disorder,” which sharply criticized those who refused peaceful coexistence (Li and Xia 2008; 563).

The planned Paris Summit never happened after the Soviets shot down a US U-2 spy plane that had been illegally surveying Soviet land. Mao responded gleefully, feeling vindicated in his position that the US could not be trusted and was a fundamental enemy of all Marxist regimes (Lüthi 2008, 165). The CCP churned out propaganda against the United States and Khrushchev alike, stoking anti-Khrushchev sentiment in the Chinese public (166).

The breakdown in relations continued rapidly throughout 1960 as the two sides clashed on domestic and foreign policy for ideological reasons. The Romanian Party Congress in Bucharest was attended by Soviet and Chinese delegates, and quickly
devolved into a public ideological boxing match. Khrushchev personally berated the Chinese delegation, criticizing both Chinese domestic policy, such as the Hundred Flowers campaign and the Great Leap Forward, and Chinese aggression internationally, such as the Sino-Indian border conflict of 1958. This conference was remarkably hostile, even by Sino-Soviet standards—the Soviet delegation distributed a sixty-eight page condemnation of Chinese domestic and foreign policy to all delegations except the Chinese party (170). At the end of the conference, China was one of just two dissenting votes (along with Albania) on a proposed set of policies favoring the Soviet point of view. After the conference, Mao and Zhou Enlai delivered a speech accusing the USSR of working against China since the very beginning—the USSR, according to them, had tried to derail the Chinese Revolution and work against the development of true socialism (173).

This speech appears to have been the final straw for Khrushchev. Following Mao and Zhou’s speech, the Soviet Union suddenly and dramatically severed a number of ties with China. First, nuclear research collaboration between the two nations ceased immediately (Shen and Xia 2012, 114). Second, the Soviets stopped publishing their Friendship journal which they had published jointly with the Chinese (Lüthi 2008, 173). Third, and much more consequentially, the Soviet Union immediately and without warning recalled all 1,400 Soviet experts which had been living in China and assisting with its economic development (McWilliams and Piotrowski 2014, 2000). It is telling that this severance did not occur during a border conflict, over trade disputes, or even over relations with the United States. It directly followed hostile verbal and written statements attacking Soviet ideology.

The withdrawal of the Soviet specialists in summer 1960 was probably the point of no return for Sino-Soviet relations. From this point forward, Mao had a convenient scapegoat to pin his domestic failings on. He immediately painted the withdrawal of specialists as a betrayal of not only China as a nation, but his personal Marxist ideology. Because many of these specialists had been assisting with the Great Leap Forward, Mao was able to blame the Soviets for whatever failures he was forced to publicly acknowledge.

Sino-Soviet relations collapsed following the withdrawal of the specialists. Trade between the two nations shrank by about twenty percent in 1960, and Mao suspended existing deliveries of Chinese goods (Lüthi 2008, 179). It was at this point, in November 1960, that the first border conflict began, over cattle-grazing rights in the region of Buz Aigyr. The Chinese border official accused the Soviets of staging border incidents to incite conflict as part of a “general plan” to undermine the Chinese state (181). Despite attempts in late 1960 to find common ground, Sino-Soviet relations had suffered a blow from which they would not recover for decades (183–191).

Mao’s Withdrawal and Return, 1961–62

The next phase of Sino-Soviet relations, starting in early 1961, was defined by a critical change: Mao’s temporary withdrawal from political life after extensive criticism of his Great Leap Forward policies (Chen 2001, 82). This period provides a strong test
of my theory, since the independent variable, Mao Zedong and his radical ideology, is not present. Thus, if Sino-Soviet relations significantly improved during this period, my theory would be supported. Accordingly, my theory also predicts that Sino-Soviet relations would begin to decline again in late 1962 after Mao returned to political life.

Indeed, that is exactly what the evidence shows. Lüthi calls this period from 1961–1962 an “ambiguous truce” in which Sino-Soviet relations proceed “on a relaxed note” (Lüthi 2008, 197). As China reeled from economic devastation, it turned to the Soviet Union for both advice and aid. Dealing primarily with Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping rather than Mao, Khrushchev demonstrated increased generosity, offering over one million tons of sugar and grain as a loan in February 1961 (200). The CCP explicitly called for a stop in anti-Soviet rhetoric and to relax tensions in early 1961 (Li 2012, 81). The two nations cooperated on negotiating Chinese debt repayment, defense cooperation, and radio communication (83). Some Soviet specialists even returned to China for a time, demonstrating a relaxation in previous tensions. When tensions did arise, this time over Mao’s growing relationship with Albania, a Soviet enemy, Zhou Enlai and Foreign Minister Chen Yi did their best to calm the Soviets’ fears. Chen released a detailed report to the Foreign Ministry that explicitly advocated for better relations with the Soviets and international communist unity (85).

This truce corresponded with a brief period of liberalization within China under the leadership of Zhou, Deng, and other moderate leaders. Private farming was allowed, communes were dissolved, and the Chinese ambassador to the USSR advocated for reconciliation (Radchenko 2009, 28). Mao’s domestic power weakened as prominent party members openly criticized his Great Leap Forward policies and encouraged liberalization.

This period of liberalization did not last long, however. While Mao had been willing to take a step back temporarily following the failure of the Great Leap Forward, he returned to political life in late 1962. Once Mao saw private farming and dissolving communes, he aggressively took back power at the Beidaihe Conference in August 1962 (Li 2012, 88). He railed against the liberalization policies and presented the conference with two choices: move forward with socialism or regress back to the capitalist past. By framing the issue as an existential conflict between true communists and revisionists, Mao associated his domestic moderate enemies with the Soviet revisionists. Shortly after this conference, Mao introduced a new slogan: fanxiu fangxiu, which translates roughly to “oppose revisionism abroad, prevent revisionism at home” (Lüthi 2008, 223). This concept explicitly linked domestic and foreign policy, demonstrating how Mao saw his domestic ideological enemies and the Soviets as essentially the same enemy.

The return of Mao and his radical ideology, the independent variable, had the predicted effect on the dependent variable: Sino-Soviet relations quickly deteriorated from late 1962 onward and would not improve until after Mao’s death. This renewal in tension manifested most immediately in October, following the Soviet handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis. After Khrushchev ultimately gave in to US demands to remove missiles from Cuba, Mao mercilessly attacked Khrushchev’s “capitulationism.”
The Chinese propaganda machine blamed Soviet revisionism for the humiliation and doubled down on accusations that Khrushchev was too peaceful with the West and not supportive enough of Third World revolutions like Cuba (Radchenko 2009, 25). A *Renmin Ribao* article even compared Khrushchev’s capitulation to Great Britain’s appeasement policies towards Hitler (34).

Over the next few years, relations deteriorated further. Mao launched the Cultural Revolution in 1966, which took demonization of moderates and revisionists to an unprecedented level. Border clashes began in November 1967 and continued for the next two years before reaching the nadir of Sino-Soviet relations, the Battle of Zhenbao Island. At this clash, dozens of deaths occurred on both sides. Following this incident, the USSR threatened a nuclear attack on China, though it is unclear to what extent they seriously considered it as an option (Lüthi 2008, 342). In 1972, Mao Zedong hosted Richard Nixon in a momentous act of rapprochement. While many realist scholars argue that this is an example of national security interests trumping ideology, there is actually ample evidence that rapprochement fit into Mao’s early 1970s radical communist ideology. The Chinese regime had stated that, because of its “social-imperialism,” the Soviet Union had overtaken the United States as the most dangerous threat to worldwide socialist revolution (Chen 2001, 243).

The period between 1961 and 1962 provides a strong test of my theory. The evidence shows exactly what the theory predicts—that relations were poor before Mao stepped away from power, that they improved when he was away, and that they rapidly deteriorated when he returned. That return in 1962 ultimately resulted in the climax of Sino-Soviet tensions in the late 1960s. Therefore, it can be reasonably concluded that Mao, and the radical ideology he brought to politics, were the major driving forces behind the Sino-Soviet split.

**Conclusion**

The Sino-Soviet split was a gradual but total disintegration of the Sino-Soviet alliance between the years 1956 and 1962. The preceding evidence has demonstrated convincingly that the split was primarily caused by Mao Zedong, who opposed revisionist Soviet policies and imposed his ideological vision of communist revolution at home and abroad.

The evidence in the Sino-Soviet case suggests that ideology plays an important role in revolutionary foreign policy. Not only should ideology be considered a driving force behind revolutionary states’ conflicts with status quo powers, but ideology should also be considered an important factor in relations between revolutionary states. Further research should explore how ideological differences can cause revolutionary states to come into conflict with one another just as much as with status quo powers. In doing so, the international community can better prepare itself to predict and address ideological conflicts between ideologically motivated revolutionary world leaders in the coming decades.
Works Cited


Qatar, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Arab Uprisings

When the wave of revolutions commonly referred to as the Arab Spring engulfed the Arab world in the early 2010s, regional powers were suddenly presented with a potentially complete restructuring of the Arab world’s political and social structure. In the years leading up to the uprisings, rising food prices, soaring unemployment, and widespread political corruption had converged to make the Middle East and North Africa a fertile ground for revolution. The mounting pressure came to a head in December of 2010 when demonstrations broke out across Tunisia following the self-immolation of a street vendor protesting police corruption. The following months saw mass protests demanding political reform in most Arab states, the overthrow of the Tunisian and Egyptian governments, and the start of ongoing civil wars in Syria, Libya, and Yemen. This upheaval presented global and regional powers with worrying instability in one of the world’s most volatile regions, but also with the opportunity to intervene on behalf of the factions—governmental or revolutionary—most likely to protect their interests in a re-ordered Arab world.

While the region’s revolutionaries united around their disapproval of their current governments, various factions proposed vastly different replacements for the existing regimes. As countries held elections, penned constitutions, and fought civil wars, some demanded secular democracies while Salafists called for a return to a form of Islamic government more similar to theocracy. Other groups espoused a democracy rooted in and justified by Islamic principles and language. The most well-known of these groups, the Muslim Brotherhood, had been providing social services, including schools, hospitals, and religious education, across the Arab world since its foundation in Egypt in 1928. While its early attempts to move into the political arena had been
staunchly opposed by many of the region's governments, the Brotherhood maintained social and fringe political influence by providing reputable charity work and presenting Islam as the solution to regional issues. During the Arab uprisings and their immediate aftermath, building on its mass popularity, the Brotherhood not only gained control of the Egyptian government but also served as an inspiration and an affiliate for Islamic democratic factions around the region. The Brotherhood and these affiliated factions were aided in their rapid, albeit short-lived, rise to relevance by a somewhat ironic ally: the State of Qatar.

This paper seeks to explain Qatar’s seemingly counter-intuitive response to the Arab uprisings and their aftermath—actively sponsoring Islamic democratic revolution across the region. The Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani regime of Qatar, a small, wealthy petro-monarchy that justifies its own autocratic rule in the language of Islam, puzzlingly chose to throw its support behind these groups. In Tunisia, Qatar provided funding to the Brotherhood-inspired Al Nahda party, while the state-owned media giant Al Jazeera gave the Al Nahda positive news coverage during the demonstrations, elections, and early days of its regime in the politically reconfigured Tunisia. Qatar similarly provided round-the-clock coverage of the protests in Egypt and provided billions of dollars in aid to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood before and after its victory in Egypt’s first post-uprising elections. In Libya, Qatar provided training and funding for Islamist militias and parties more loosely affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood. In Syria, it gave similar support to a collection of Islamic revolutionary factions and used its experience in diplomatic mediation to gather them into a somewhat unified council.

At first glance, these foreign policy decisions seem to run counter to the Al Thani regime’s interests at home and abroad, and an explanation of those decisions must thus answer two questions. First, why would an autocratic state like Qatar, which clearly restricted options for democratization at home, sponsor democratic transitions abroad? Fears of revolutionary spread typically discourage authoritarian regimes from supporting revolution in their neighbors. Autocratics fear that the success of democracy abroad, especially in a state with a similar ethnic or religious identity, will provide a model for domestic demands for democracy. In particular, the monarchies of the Persian Gulf, which legitimize their autocratic rule in Islamic terms, have historically oppressed groups like the Muslim Brotherhood that invoke the same Islamic language to call for democracy. In fact, during the uprisings and their aftermath, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) vigorously opposed the revolution in Egypt, supported secular factions in Tunisia and Libya, and backed Salafist groups in Syria (although it should be noted that the ideological difference between Qatar’s clients and those of the other Gulf states here was far murkier than in the other revolutions). What, then, explains Qatar’s divergence from this trend? Second, in the years leading up to the Arab uprisings, Qatar had risen to a prominent, arguably out-sized, role in regional politics by pursuing a careful policy of diplomatic hedging and mediation. Why would Qatar abandon this successful pragmatic policy, risk its remarkable regional influence, and throw its support behind a controversial movement that would ultimately fail to hold long-term power in any state?
I argue that the unique way the Arab uprisings threatened the security of the Al Thani regime’s domestic rule was the primary reason for Qatar’s divergence from both trends. Qatar’s relative social cohesion was the permissive factor, allowing the regime to support revolution abroad without triggering a mass revolution at home. However, the regional instability inevitably created by uprisings heightened the regime’s perceived risk of an elite coup. Supporting Islamic democratic groups was largely an attempt to secure against that risk, despite potentially adverse consequences on Qatar’s regional influence. Regional experts have maintained that the international relations of the Persian Gulf “are best explained by leaders’ concerns about their own hold on power domestically” (Gause 2009, 1). While much of the literature on Qatar’s response to the Arab uprisings has emphasized the Al Thani regime’s freedom from such concerns, I argue that Qatar’s response to the uprisings does indeed fit the trend of domestic regime security driving foreign policy. Through comparative analysis with the UAE, I will demonstrate that Qatar’s relative social cohesion allowed it to support the Brotherhood without fear of inspiring a similar revolution at home in a way its neighbors could not, despite marked similarities in other areas. However, a look at the history of succession in the Al Thani dynasty demonstrates that Qatari monarchs who failed to appease elites were often removed from power, and that regional upheaval had been a catalyst for palace coups in the past. By examining what political scientists, historians, and the regime itself have outlined as the pillars of its domestic power and comparing it to the rhetoric of the Muslim Brotherhood, I will illustrate how deepening its support of the Brothers and affiliated groups would strengthen those pillars during a time of heightened insecurity. An analysis of the Al Thani regime’s public rhetoric on its support of Islamic democratic groups further supports this assertion. Finally, I will explain why existing arguments fail to explain the logic of Qatar’s reaction to the Arab uprisings, and the implications of my conclusion on the general study of international relations.

Social Cohesion and Foreign Policy in the Persian Gulf

Before identifying Qatar’s motivation for supporting Islamic democratic revolution, we must first explain what permissive factors gave Qatar greater leeway to provide that support vis-à-vis its neighbors in the gulf. While the literature has identified several attributes that give Qatar unique latitude in setting foreign policy, it appears that Qatar’s relative social cohesion was the primary cause of that relative leeway. Culturally, Qatari society is quite similar to its Gulf neighbors. Structured around deep-cutting clan ties, it places an emphasis on religion as a basis for social and political order. Qatari society tends towards conservatism in dress, relations between the sexes, and religious observance. While Saudi Arabia is perhaps more conservative than Qatar in this regard, and the UAE more liberal, there is a clear shared Gulf culture emphasizing tradition, family ties, and Islam. Politically, Qatar embodies the autocracy that defines the Persian Gulf. In a semi-constitutional hereditary monarchy, the emir of Qatar has complete control of the state’s executive branch and its courts, having total authority to appoint and dismiss ministers. While a consultative assembly has a limited ability to reject the
legislation of those ministers, general elections for that assembly were not held until 2021. Like neighboring monarchies, Qatar cites the preservation of Islamic law as the basis for this autocratic form of government (Qatar Constitution, Article I). Despite these similarities, Qatar is relatively free of the social fissures that restrain its neighbors’ foreign policy. Qatar lacks the intense religious sectarian frictions of Bahrain and, as a small unitarian state, lacks the geographical disparities that plague Saudi Arabia and the UAE, where economically disadvantaged regions are often disgruntled at the uneven distribution of petro-wealth (Roberts 2017). While some class divisions in Qatar certainly emerged as oil revenues increased, the state’s size allowed for a much more even distribution of wealth among citizens precluding the emergence of entire communities dissatisfied with the established political and socio-economic order (Crystal 1995, 22–36). As such, while the other Gulf monarchies must carefully avoid exacerbating domestic social divisions in their foreign policy, Qatar has a free hand in making alliances and choosing regional clients (Ulrichsen 2014).

Qatar and the UAE: A Case Study

David Roberts’s comparative analysis of the history of the Muslim Brotherhood in the UAE and Qatar, and subsequently the states’ responses to the Arab uprisings, illustrates the impact of Qatar’s social cohesion on its ability to sponsor Islamic democratic clients (Roberts 2017). Lying just southeast of Qatar, the UAE was formed after the withdrawal of British colonial forces as a federation of seven constituent absolute monarchies, each with its own monarch, led by the monarch of the wealthiest emirate, Abu Dhabi. Similar to Qatar, the UAE cites Islamic law as the basis of its form of government. The shared Gulf culture described above is certainly present in the UAE, and the shared emphasis on the traditional, family ties, and Islam has been highlighted by UAE leaders (Rugh 2002, 17). The historical similarities between Qatari and Emirati culture are further evidenced by the fact that both Qatar and Bahrain were set to join the union of emirates in the aftermath of the British withdrawal from the Gulf. The two ultimately withdrew from the union due, not to an inherent societal difference between them and the other emirates, but due to border disputes between each other (Roberts 2017). Despite these fundamental political and social similarities, the federative system of UAE has allowed for regional social disparities not present in unitary Qatar. For example, from 2004–2014 the northern emirates each contributed between 0.2 and 5% of GDP (Roberts 2017) compared to the 56 and 29% that Abu Dhabi and Dubai respectively contributed. These poorer regions experienced unemployment and power outages over the same period, while Abu Dhabi and Dubai flourished (Roberts 2017).

The history of the Muslim Brotherhood in Qatar and the UAE demonstrates how these disparities ultimately restrained the UAE from supporting Islamic democracy abroad. The Gulf chapter of the Brotherhood was founded in UAE in 1974, where it quickly exploited economic disparities to garner popular following and elite patronage in the poorer emirates of Ras al-Khaimah and Fujairah. In the following decades, Islah would use this patronage to avoid Abu Dhabi’s attempts to co-opt the group and limit
its domestic activities. Thus, when the Arab uprisings broke out, and Brotherhood-related groups mobilized across the region, the UAE’s efforts to repress them at home and abroad reflected its concern that the groups’ newfound power would be used to incite the dissatisfied Emiratis. Even if it had found supporting these groups strategically valuable, doing so would threaten the monarchs’ rules at home.

On the other hand, similar concerns were largely absent in Qatar because the threat of a Brotherhood-inspired mass uprising had long since been neutralized. While Islah set up a chapter in Qatar shortly after its establishment in the UAE, it found no dissatisfied factions, mass or elite, that resonated with the calls for a comprehensive political overhaul. As Roberts points out, Qatar is a unitary state with marked social cohesion and a relative lack of economic disparities among its citizens. With no regional patronage to shield them from the Emir’s attempts to co-opt the actors, Islah and other Brotherhood-affiliated individuals entered into a tacit agreement with Qatar whereby they could reside in the state if they refrained from calling for reform within Qatar. This agreement was successful and, with no discontent audience for democratic aspirations, the Brothers abolished their Qatari chapter in 1999. In fact, as Roberts points out, the small, rapidly developing state used these skilled, charismatic individuals to lead ministries and fill other leading roles in a rapidly expanding bureaucracy. And yet, despite becoming an increasingly important part of the Qatari political elite, they were met with a lack of mass democratic demands that held true through the Arab uprisings. While the percentage of Emiratis who listed democracy as important rose from 58% in 2008 to 75% in 2011, the percentage of Qataris that considered democracy important dropped from 68% to 33% over the same period (“Democracy Top of Youth Agenda” 2011). While Qatar was still cautious during the uprisings, stepping up cash payments to keep its citizens content, there was no large, dissatisfied group that would view the success of Islamic democracy abroad as a convincing model for needed change at home. With little threat of mass revolution spreading to Qatar, the Al Thani regime had a free hand to support their Islamist democratic patrons in revolutions throughout the uprisings and their aftermath.

While Roberts does not explicitly dismiss them, this comparison suggests that several elements commonly identified as essential in Qatar’s unrestrained foreign policy were not the defining factor in its freedom to support Islamic democracy vis-a-vis its neighbors. First, some emphasize the ability of the Al Thani regime to react agilely to international developments because of its institutional autonomy. Qatari leadership is unrestrained, for example, by the more complex factional politics of the Saudi royal family or the proactive parliament of Kuwait (Kamrava 2015, 42). In fact, it has been said that Qatari foreign policy decisions are made by, at the most, four individuals (Khatib 2013, 429). There is a general consensus that this centralization allows Qatar to react to systematic changes in ways other states cannot (Kamrava 2015, 43; Khatib 2013; Ulrichsen 2014). However, it does not appear that the UAE’s response was in any way limited by a lack of institutional autonomy. Leaked US diplomatic cables suggest that crown prince Muhammad bin Zaid had essentially monopolized security policy in the UAE (US Embassy Abu Dhabi 2009), and he was able to mobilize support for his
clients in Tunisia and Libya just as quickly as his Qatari counterparts mobilized support for theirs (Roberts 2017).

Second, some argue that the growth of Qatar as a key US ally and the "primary locus of US forces" in the region has allowed Qatar to feel secure from regional backlash to its more radical foreign policies (Kamrava 2015, 41). However, the UAE, which houses three US bases and has been described as the US's best counter-terrorism ally in the Gulf (Kean and Hamilton 2004), appears to have enjoyed a similar status. Finally, it is argued that the financial resources at the disposal of the state allow the regime to further smooth any domestic discontent (Bank, Ritcher, and Sunik 2014), finance regional clients, and embark on ambitious "subtle power" projects such as Al Jazeera and the Qatar Foundation (Kamrava 2015, 43–44). However, the UAE clearly did not lack the financial resources to attempt to assuage domestic strife or sponsor regional clients at the outbreak of the uprisings. While the central government sent a $1.5 billion package to the poorer emirates, according to Roberts, that package failed to stave off Islah’s ability to exploit the country’s long-standing regional grievances (Roberts 2017). The lack of financial restraints on the UAE's foreign policy was evident, for example, in its ability to, along with Saudi Arabia, more than replace Qatari aid to Egypt after the military retook power in 2013 (Kepel 2020, 137–138). With other factors apparently equal between the UAE and Qatar, it appears that the primary factor permitting Qatari support of democratic Islamist groups relative to the rest of the Gulf was indeed its social cohesion. The question, then, is what motivated Qatar to use this foreign policy freedom to launch a campaign of active intervention in the region’s uprisings.

From Pragmatism to Intervention

Before the Arab uprisings, Qatar primarily used its free hand to engage in careful diplomatic hedging and carve out a reputation as a mediator. Qatari policy under Hamad bin Khalifa emphasized maintaining open communication with as many regional actors as possible (Khatib 2013) and engaging in diplomatic hedging. Qatar would take big bets in one direction, such as its close ties to the US, and smaller bets in the other direction, such as maintaining cordial relations with Iran (Kamrava 2015). Additionally, in the years leading up to the Arab uprisings, Qatar had raised its regional influence by carving out a reputation as an adept, impartial mediator in local and regional conflicts (Khatib 2013). The success of these policies in augmenting Qatar’s ability to stabilize regional politics was great enough to call into question academic assumptions about the power of small states (Kamrava 2015, 8–10). According to then crown prince Tamim bin Hamad, the success of Qatar’s pragmatism had been vital to the survival of Qatar as a small state stuck between two much larger, antagonistic states in a region marked by instability (Kamrava 2015, 75). Why would Qatar abandon this successful policy in favor of throwing its full support behind a controversial movement with an unclear movement?

I argue that the Al Thani regime abandoned pragmatism and mediation in favor of intervention on behalf of its democratic Islamic clients in order to reinforce its
legitimacy among domestic elites during a time of regional social turmoil. While the literature largely agrees that Qatar was relatively secure from a mass revolution, it has under-emphasized the underlying threat of a palace coup in bin Khalifa’s foreign policy calculus toward the Arab uprisings. The literature acknowledges the general salience of that threat, and it acknowledges that bin Khalifa had secured himself against that threat by co-opting key players in domestic politics and by demonstrating his ability to actively balance countervailing social forces—in other words, by moderating the pace of social change and keeping that change tethered to the region’s Islamic foundations. However, there has been little discussion of the threat of a palace coup as a motivation for the specific actions taken by the Al Thani regime during the uprisings, despite marked similarities between the regional instability they produced and the conditions that had paved the way for the cousins or sons of previous emirs to gain the support of political elites and depose the apparently unfit head of state. By supporting the Brotherhood and its affiliates during the spring, the regime attempted to strengthen the traditional pillars of its domestic power in order to shield itself against the threat of deposition. By escalating its support for groups who couched their democratic aspirations in Islamic language, the Al Thani regime could demonstrate to domestic elites that, while it acknowledged that regional change was inevitable, it was actively moderating the pace of that change by promoting a popular regional movement that—although vastly different from Qatar’s Wahabi interpretation of Islam—would honor the region’s Islamic roots and lead to long-term stability.

Bases of Domestic Power in Qatar

The turbulent history of regime succession in Qatar led Hamad bin Khalifa to make securing the domestic legitimacy of his regime a priority of both domestic and foreign policy. Both historians and political scientists agree that the threat to Qatari Emirs has come from elites, not the masses (Kamrava 2015, 113; Fromherz 2017, 77–85). Before the uncontested transition of power from bin Khalifa to his son Tamim bin Hamad in 2013, the last five emirs had come to power through palace coups or contested successions. Historically, the emir of Qatar was more likely to be deposed by a brother, cousin, or son who had convinced other royal family members that the emir was unfit to rule than he was to pass the authority off to his chosen heir after abdication or death. The lessons bin Khalifa took from his ability to overthrow his father, Emir Khalifa bin Hamad, in the bloodless coup of 1995 guided his efforts to solidify authority for himself and his eventual successor. While bin Hamad oversaw rapid modernization and economic development in Qatar, he alienated broad sectors of the Qatari elite who felt the rate of social change threatened the Wahabi identity of the state. This dissatisfaction was exacerbated when bin Hamad grew increasingly passive in regional politics at a time when decreasing oil prices created uncertainty about the region’s future and the Gulf War brought conflict to Qatar’s front door (Fromherz 2017, 77–88). This paved the way for bin Khalifa to secure the loyalty of stakeholders in Qatari politics and depose his father in 1995 (Kamrava 2015, 77–85). While the countercoup mounted by
bin Hamad in 1996 was a dramatic failure, a recent hour-long Al Jazeera special about the attempt testifies to the durability of Qatar’s turbulent history in Qatari discourse (“A Last Second Withdrawal. . . Uncovering a Conspiracy against Qatar ” 2018) and avoiding his father’s fate appears to have informed bin Khalifa’s efforts to solidify domestic power, as demonstrated in the literature and Qatar state documents.

The pillars of bin Khalifa’s domestic politics outlined in the literature, and those outlined by the regime itself in their own developmental plan, express the emir’s continued emphasis on avoiding his father’s fate by checking rapid social change, co-opting domestic actors, and playing an active role in regional politics. According to Kamrava, balancing countervailing social forces and co-opting domestic actors were key pillars of bin Khalifa’s domestic political power (Kamrava 2015, 130–35). While bin Khalifa continued his predecessor’s policy of aggressive political, economic, and social modernization, he emphasized balancing that progress by honoring tradition. Further, informed by his father’s inactivity in regional affairs, bin Khalifa stressed his commitment to actively balancing social change in the region. Additionally, by offering patronage to various domestic social, political, and religious actors, bin Khalifa minimized the possibility of someone repeating his 1995 takeover.

The importance of balancing progress and tradition to the Al Thani regime is evident in Qatar National Vision 2030, the development plan it released in 2008. The document emphasizes that “Qatar’s very rapid economic and population growth have created intense strains between the old and new in almost every aspect of life” (General Secretariat of Development Planning 2008, 4) and names balancing “modernization and tradition” (General Secretariat of Development Planning 2008, 3) as a key pillar of development. Furthermore, the document specifically highlights that modernization must happen in the context of Qatar’s Islamic identity (General Secretariat of Development Planning 2008, 22). The initiative is also clear that this balancing is not limited to domestic society. It lists international cooperation as one of three pillars of social development and asserts that Qatar will take on an increased regional role politically and socially (General Secretariat of Development Planning 2008, 23). This testifies to both the regime’s concern toward unchecked, rapid social change and its commitment to facilitating the balancing of the change both domestically and abroad.

While the Arab uprisings threatened to drastically change regional society, they also provided bin Khalifa with an opportunity to solidify his domestic security by playing an active role in moderating that change. With unprecedented mass uprisings threatening to establish new regimes in states across the Arab world, bin Khalifa had reached the exact type of crossroads that paved his father’s overthrow. While the threat of revolution spreading to Qatar was low, the discussion above indicates that such a situation would heighten bin Khalifa’s perceived risk of a palace coup. The two primary factors leading to the elites’ dissatisfaction with bin Hammad, unchecked social change and regional instability on Qatar’s doorstep, were both clearly present in the uprisings. Governments were falling across the region, and the future of the region’s socio-political order was far from clear. While the civil wars breaking out across the region were not identical to the Gulf War, which brought scud missiles to Qatar’s doorstep, such wars
certainly did not make Qatars feel more secure. As bin Khalifa was ultimately successful in preventing the emergence of such a coup, there are no clear indications of what specific members of the royal family would potentially have been vying for power at the time. However, given the history of palace coups during similar regional conditions, it is reasonable to believe that bin Khalifa would have been on higher alert and taken extra precautions during the uprisings. Intensifying his policy of actively balancing social change with honoring tradition, an established pillar of his securing domestic power would thus be vital for maintaining power—while emerging from the Spring with increased regional power would be ideal, the one thing Khalifa could not risk was appearing passive during a time of immense regional change. The regime’s relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood not only offered connections to actors in multiple uprisings, but it also provided the perfect partner to demonstrate its commitment to promoting social progress balanced by honoring tradition.

The Brothers: Framing Democracy in Islamic Language

The Muslim Brotherhood and its affiliates’ combination of Islamic and democratic rhetoric made them ideal clients through which bin Khalifa could reaffirm his ability to balance modernization and tradition. While the Muslim Brotherhood was certainly a force for change and not conservatism, establishing democracy and interpreting Islam in a vastly different way than Qatar, the way it used Islam as the language of democracy allowed the Al Thani regime to present it as a force that honored tradition while promoting modernization. For example, the rhetoric of Yusuf al-Qaradawi, a prominent intellectual leader of the Brothers based in Qatar from 1961 until his death in 2022, clearly complemented the balancing mission outlined in Qatar National Vision 2030. While Qaradawi emphasized the need for Muslims to adopt certain Western practices, he expressed that need in Islamic terms. For example, he described democracy as an extension of the Islamic concepts of Ummah (community) and Shuruh (the obligation of a ruler to consult the governed) (Salazar 2014). He explicitly stated that Muslims must “wrap [democracy] in [their] spirit” and adapt democratic mechanisms “as they suit [them], retaining the right to make alterations and modifications’” (Salazar 2014). By deepening their support for a movement that expressed sentiments so similar to the balancing act on which bin Khalifa based his domestic legitimacy, he could demonstrate to Qatari elites that, unlike his predecessor, he would take an active role in moderating this regional revolution in a way that honored the Islamic foundations of Arab society. Again, while there is an ideological chasm between Qatari Wahabism and the Brotherhood, the fact that al-Qaradawi and individuals of his ilk had long served in the ministry of education speaks to Qatar’s view that their ideology could certainly play a role in a stable future for the region. And, as stated previously, there was little reason for him to fear that their revolutionary-democratic rhetoric would find a receptive mass audience within the state.

Further, supporting the Brotherhood allowed the Al Thani regime to secure the support of a critical domestic actor by deepening their dependence on it. As indicated
by Roberts, individuals affiliated with the Brotherhood had for decades filled government positions, and securing their support, along with that of other domestic elites, had been critical to each Emir’s solidification of power (Roberts 2017). Al-Qaradawi’s rhetoric in the aftermath of the uprisings suggests that the regime’s increased support for the Brotherhood helped secure their support and shielded them from potential criticism. Throughout the uprisings, al-Qaradawi became increasingly hostile toward the other Gulf monarchies. For example, in a 2014 sermon, al-Qaradawi cited the UAE’s alignment with the reinstated military government in Egypt as evidence of the Emirates as “standing against all Islamic rule” (France 24 Arabic 2014). Similar statements towards Qatar could have been devastating to a Qatari regime already facing the type of regional chaos that had paved the way for the deposition of previous emirs. While there would be little threat that those statements would lead to mass uprisings, Brotherhood-affiliated elites losing confidence in the regime could pave the way for an aspiring member of the royal family to begin to amass elite support for a potential coup as others had done before him. However, as Al Thani continued providing him with a platform, al-Qaradawi’s rhetoric at the time not only extolled Qatar as “standing with the truth, with justice, and with God,” but it also classified the revolutionary groups they supported as a “moderate current” and supported that claim with references to the Quran (al-Qaradawi 2014). Ensuring this type of characterization from influential domestic elites provides a plausible explanation for why Qatar continued to provide a platform for al-Qaradawi’s inflammatory rhetoric against al-Sisi’s Egypt and the other GCC members, despite its contribution to Qatar’s regional isolation and declining influence in Egypt (Kepel 2020, 298–300).

Framing Intervention in Public Discourse: Facilitating Social Change

A look at the public rhetoric of Qatari leaders on the Arab Spring supports the assertion that the state’s support of democratic groups was motivated by the need to present itself as actively managing the pace of regional social and political change. In striking similarity to the language of Qatar National Vision 2030, both Hamad bin Khalifa and the then foreign minister Hamad bin Jassim warned against a rushed solution to the upheaval in Syria and Libya. In a 2011 interview with Al Jazeera Arabic, bin Khalifa was asked if Qatar’s continued support of Islamist militias in Libya was merely prolonging the bloodshed, and if a quick resolution to the civil war should be prioritized. Hamad’s response stressed the dangers of forcing rapid, unchecked social change: “We cannot expect a revolution to achieve rapid breakthroughs. Revolutions usually go through growing pains” (Al Thani 2011). In a 2013 interview, bin Jassim was similarly asked about the need to prioritize a swift diplomatic solution to end the bloodshed in Syria. He responded by saying that “a solution requires our persistent support, but it also needs to come at a time where it can truly be endorsed. Will it lead to something or is it a dead end?” (Al Thani 2013). He further clarified that the issue with a political solution at the time was not the specific personnel involved in the negotiations, but “an
issue of moving forward a quarter step just to take ten steps back” (Al Thani 2013). Both leaders’ statements indicate concern that the revolutions could end in a rushed, unsustainable outcome. However, their public statements suggest that they saw supporting democratic factions as a way to push a more stable outcome that balanced that change with tradition.

Both bin Khalifa and bin Jassim frame their support for democracy as a way to temper the extremism and regional crisis that might emerge from the uprisings if they went unchecked. In the same 2013 interview, bin Khalifa addressed concerns about extremism taking hold of the revolution in Syria, framing Qatar’s support of democratic groups as a means of curbing that extremism: “You can find extremist tones in any revolution in the Arab World. The issue of extremists, Al Qaeda, Salafism, Jihadists... call it what you want, exists. But if the revolution is subjected to democracy... I believe you will see this extremism transform into civil society” (Al Thani 2011). In a similar fashion, bin Jassim indicated that the failure of Syria to contain that extremism required specifically external intervention: “The Syrian people were once without terrorists, if you can even call them that. If there are terrorists, who allowed that? Who caused destruction, imprisonment, and terror to the point that the far (foreign actors) had to intervene before the near (domestic actors)” (Al Thani 2013). Bin Jassim also frames Qatar’s economic support for newly democratized countries as a way of preventing regional economic turmoil that could threaten Qatar, saying that economic problems after a revolution are natural but that Qatar has offered its resources to ease the transition. In the specific case of Egypt, he states, “Our goal in Egypt was to help them overcome the economic hurdles... the strength of Egypt is the strength of the Arab world” (Al Thani 2013). The above statements all align with a Qatari foreign policy aimed at leveraging its ties to Islamist, democratic factions to avoid regional turmoil that could spell the end of bin Khalifa’s regime as it had his father’s.

Addressing Alternate Explanations

The theory presented in this paper for Qatar’s action during the Arab uprisings explains the rationality of Qatar’s policy shift in a way existing explanations have been unable to do. The literature has essentially presented two explanations of Qatar’s seemingly irrational shift to support Islamic democratic revolution. Some characterize it as simply another piece of Qatar’s hedging policy. Kamrava, for example, suggests that Qatar had calculated that the days of the regimes contested by the uprisings were numbered, and its increased support for Brotherhood-related groups secured its position in regional politics in that event (Kamrava 2015, 78–79). Others characterize Qatari support for revolution during the Arab uprisings as a radical break demonstrating the regime’s lack of a cohesive foreign policy. They argue that the outsized success of Qatari foreign policy had inflated the regime’s confidence in Qatar’s abilities (Nuruzzaman 2015), leading to a wild miscalculation of the Arab uprisings as an opportunity to flex its foreign policy muscles and cement its position as a regional power (Ulrichsen 2014; Khatib 2013).
Neither characterization provides a satisfactory explanation of Qatar’s abandonment of its pragmatic policy. While Qatar would certainly not be alone in overestimating the durability of regional democracy in the early days of the uprisings, it seems difficult to classify active support for a fundamental restructuring of the regional political landscape as another small bet focused on ensuring regional stability. Further, while it is not unreasonable to assume that Qatar miscalculated the intensity of the regional response to its support of the Brothers, culminating in a blockade of Qatar, it is difficult to imagine that it was not aware that such support would threaten its “open-door” policy with states like Saudi Arabia or Egypt, states it had recently made a point of reconciling with (Khatib 2013). It is equally unlikely that the Al Thani regime failed to predict at least some of the impact its intervention would have on its reputation for impartial mediation or its subtle power tools, such as Al Jazeera and the Qatar Foundation.

On the other hand, characterizing Qatar’s intervention in the Arab uprisings as solely a miscalculated power grab fails to explain Qatar’s continued support of Brotherhood affiliates well after the limits of those groups’ regional power became apparent. It is reasonable to assume that Qatar initially miscalculated the uprising’s outcome, and it would seem logical for a state to lend greater support to a client poised to take regional power. However, a motivation to establish itself as a regional power fails to explain why Qatar continued doubling down on its support for Brotherhood groups well after it was clear that this support was diminishing, not strengthening, Qatar’s regional influence. Well after the fall of Qaddafi, Qatar continued supporting and supplying the Islamist homeland party in Libya, despite its declining influence there (Jacinto 2012) and the adverse effect of the support on Libyan public opinion of both Qatar and its client (Khatib 2013). Qatar failed to restrain Al Jazeera’s aggressive rhetoric against the Egyptian military regime well after it was clear that the Brotherhood would not be returning to power anytime soon. Not only did this coverage play a key role in its isolation from the rest of the Gulf over the next decade, but it also damaged the reputation of Al Jazeera and Egyptian public opinion of Qatar (Kepel 2020, 298–300). Without taking into account the domestic pressures the regime was likely facing, these policies which clearly decreased Qatar’s regional power seem irrational.

Further, returning to the regime’s public rhetoric demonstrates that it was well aware that its intervention in the uprisings would come at the cost of its successful diplomatic policy. In the same 2011 interview cited above, bin Khalifa explains why Qatar ultimately abandoned amicable relations with Syria in favor of the opposition: “In light of the exceptional relationship between Syria and Qatar, there were calls between Assad and us about how we could contain this issue [the uprisings]. And in our view, containment required considering the requests of the protestors who were asking for, in our view, basic things. It became clear that if things continued the way they were heading, it would be necessary to quickly find a solution” (Al Thani 2011). Similarly, in a 2012 interview with Al Jazeera’s Bila Hadood, bin Jassim stressed that Qatar “preferred a top-down solution over a bottom-up solution, for it to be orderly. It doesn’t benefit Qatar for Syria to be in chaos. . . we pleaded with the Syrian government to preserve the country” (Al Thani 2012).
These statements seem to contradict the idea that Qatar was simply emboldened by its previous foreign policy success and overextended its capabilities, or that supporting Brotherhood-related groups was simply another piece of the state’s careful hedging. It appears that the Al Thani regime preferred to continue with its pragmatic policy and was well aware that throwing its full support behind rebel groups would limit its ability to continue its “open-door” diplomacy. However, when supporting these groups became, in their minds, the only way to manage and contain regional social upheaval, Qatar was willing to abandon its careful hedging. While public statements do not always reflect a regime’s internal decision-making, they tell us how it wants specific audiences to view its decisions. The similarity of the regime’s statements to their developmental plans suggests that they were, at least in part, a component of bin Khalifa’s efforts to assure Qatari elites that he was actively facilitating and moderating social change in a way that balanced tradition, modernization, and stability.

While other explanations of Qatari foreign policy could provide interpretations of Qatar’s rhetoric, an explanation that ignores the domestic pressures on the Al Thani regime fails to fully explain Qatar’s support of the Brothers. On the one hand, those who view Qatar’s actions during the uprisings as a misguided power grab could argue that the above statements were simply public posturing to justify their actions and not a reflection of real motivations. However, as mentioned, a motivation based on increasing regional power fails to address why Qatar continued supporting its clients well after it was clear that this support was decreasing Qatar’s influence abroad. On the other hand, those like Kamrava, who see Qatar’s support for Islamist democrats as a continuation of a Qatari policy primarily aimed at maintaining regional stability, have an easier time explaining Qatar’s framing of the uprisings—Qatar was supporting these groups because they thought it would lead to that stability, regardless of any need to appease domestic elites. Again, knowing the exact calculus of a closed regime like Qatar is impossible, and there is no doubt that regional stability remains a foreign policy goal. However, the general salience of a palace coup threat (which Kamrava himself lays out), the similarity between the Arab uprisings and the regional situation surrounding previous successful coups, and the similarity between the pillars of domestic power outlined in the literature and Qatar’s framing of its support for democratic factions make it reasonable to assume that a heightened risk of coup was a crucial factor in Qatar resorting to a policy of active intervention.

Conclusion: Regime Security and the International Relations of Autocracy

In 2018, the unmitigated foreign policy failure of Qatar’s support for democratic Islamic revolution abroad could not have been clearer. Qatar’s clients in Libya had only marginal political import, the Brotherhood in Egypt had been replaced by a Saudi-backed military government for nearly five years, and the two had joined their Gulf allies in a years-long diplomatic and economic isolation campaign against Qatar. However, perhaps even more worrisome was the complete deterioration of regional public
opinion towards Qatar and its soft power tools. As Egypt played Uruguay in that year’s world cup, Egyptians flocked to the Israeli public broadcast of the match, rather than paying for the BeIn SPORT (A Qatari state-owned service) broadcast, with one Egyptian telling The Economist (2018), “I’d watch the broadcast in Hebrew before I gave money to Qatar” and another telling LA Times, “There is no big difference, really—Qatar is as bad as Israel when it comes to their political views of Egypt” (Hassan 2018). That Qatar was held in similar esteem to perhaps the most consistently disdained entity in the region speaks volumes to just how far Qatar’s carefully built reputation had fallen in the Arab world.

However, the success of this strategy at securing the domestic rule of the Al Thani regime was just apparent as its failure to increase the state’s regional power. In 2013, Hammad bin Khalifa did what his predecessors had failed to do for decades: abdicating to his heir, Tamim bin Hammad, in an uncontested power transfer. It appears that local elites had indeed bought bin Khalifa’s strategic reasons for supporting the Brotherhood and its affiliates, and he was largely able to place the blame for the failure of the strategy’s execution on his foreign minister (Kepel 2020, 234). Five years later, bin Hammad was still enjoying a stable hold on domestic power, leading a period of economic prosperity and diversification despite Qatar’s rival’s attempts to isolate it (Ramani 2021). While caution is needed when interpreting intent from results, explaining those results through Qatar’s domestic, rather than merely foreign policy goals, returns rationality to a regime known for its savvy in the decade leading up to the uprisings.

These findings not only affirm the lengths to which the autocrats of the Middle East will go to maintain their domestic hold on power but could also enhance the general framework for studying the international relations of autocracy. While the regime-security lens of international relations has typically theorized that authoritarian regimes will likely intervene abroad and form alliances with the goal of preventing the emergence of a successful ideology likely to provide a model antithetical to their own rule, the case of Qatar demonstrates that this does not hold true when the threat comes from elites who feel comfortable with the political status quo, but may still have specific foreign policy expectations of the autocrat. While there are likely few states that find themselves in Qatar’s specific situation, lending a greater focus on how autocrats justify their rule to elites, not just their populace, could greatly enhance our ability to predict their actions abroad.
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