TABLE OF CONTENTS

A Letter From the Editor......................................................................................................1

Diverging Identities:
The Juxtaposition of Palestinians in Israel and the Occupied Territories
Micah Russell ..................................................................................................................3

Populism and Evangelicalism:
A Cross-Country Analysis of Chile and the United States
Adam Roberts ..................................................................................................................33

What Makes a Country Environmentally Friendly?
Sophie Plantamura ........................................................................................................51

US Military Policy in Poland and the Baltics: To Stay or Not to Stay
Owen Bates ..................................................................................................................69

The Effect Of LGBT Film Exposure On Policy Preference
Grant Baldwin ................................................................................................................83

Gender Equality and Democratization:
How Greater Gender Equality Helps Explain Tunisian Success in the Arab Spring
Hannah Miller .................................................................................................................101

Power Brokers:
Three Actors Who Shaped Post-revolutionary Egypt and Tunisia
Dan Harker ....................................................................................................................127

Determining the Constitutionality of Public Aid to Parochial Schools after Espinoza
Anna Bryner ...................................................................................................................157
A Letter From the Editor

Dear Reader,

What a year it has been. The onslaught of the COVID-19 pandemic has presented an array of hardships for individuals all over the world, including debilitating illness, physical separation from loved ones, social injustice, and loss of employment. For the past year, it seems as though life had come to a screeching halt. Yet amidst these difficulties, ideas have flourished—ideas confronting political and social norms, ideas that challenge us to think differently, and ideas that invite us to show more compassion and empathy.

This issue of Sigma consists of just a few of these ideas. In this edition, you will read about the role of religious freedom regarding public aid to parochial schools, the relationship between populism and evangelicalism in the US and Chile, and the various political and social challenges facing Tunisia and Egypt. You will read of the impact of exposure to films depicting LGBT themes on political preferences, the distinct identities of Palestinians in Israel, the US-Russia relationship, and factors shaping environmental policy in countries around the world. We hope these ideas will challenge you to see new perspectives.

We are grateful for the hard work and long nights put into this edition of Sigma. I am thankful for our staff of editors that worked tirelessly with our authors to meet deadlines. I am thankful for our advisor, Scott Cooper, for constantly encouraging the editorial team and offering much-needed advice. This issue is the product of tireless hands from all over the BYU campus community. Thank you for giving a voice to these ideas.

I am proud to present the 2020–21 edition of Sigma.

Sara Lopez
A Social Identity Puzzle

Identity is important. Social identities deal with an individual’s self-perceived placement within a certain group and how that group interacts with a larger community (Tajfel 1974, 65). Identities are often multifaceted and can be influenced by any number of variables, including age, religion, social class, profession, culture, language, disability, education, ethnicity, gender, or sexuality. Because of the diverse nature of social identities, it is quite possible for individuals to self-select themselves into multiple groups. For example, it is not uncommon for people to identify themselves as a Muslim and an Arab or a Christian and a German. This concept of identity begins to get complicated within divided societies.

Arab Israelis in Nazareth demonstrate this complexity. Nazareth is a large majority Arab town in northern Israel where many of the residents identify with the Palestinian Arab community, the Israeli state, and Muslim or Christian faith. Examining members of this community reveals intriguing insights about social identity in a divided society and how it can impose unusual levels of dissonance within an individual. Discussions with the people in Nazareth revealed they were proud of their Arab heritage; a few of them even expressed pride over their Palestinian heritage, yet appeared more hesitant to express this sentiment to a stranger. Moreover, most members of the community had Israeli citizenship and occupations. Arabs in Nazareth were happy to discuss their lives in Israel but refused to acknowledge their dependence on Israeli citizenship for their relative comfort. When interviewed, these Arabs demonstrated that the social and political advantages of being an Israeli citizen caused internal dissonance and threatened the Palestinian Arab identity in Nazareth.
Palestinians from Bethlehem, people from the Arab side of Israel’s security wall, constitute a Palestinian Arab group with contrasting social identity attitudes. Arabs in Bethlehem were asked the same questions as the people in Nazareth: How is life in this town? Is work here good and plentiful? What is your family life like? Do you live near your family? To my surprise, Palestinians from Bethlehem appeared much happier and at peace with their identity than the Arabs from Nazareth. This is true even though the people from Bethlehem experience more hardship and oppression. These Palestinians also expressed higher resentment towards Israel than the Arabs from Nazareth.

This contrast in narratives led me to question the cohesiveness of the Palestinian identity between Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel and Palestinian Arabs in the occupied territories. Although nearly all of the Arabs that were interviewed between Nazareth and Bethlehem self-identified as Arab Palestinian, there appeared to be a noticeable gap between what it meant to be a Palestinian and a citizen of Israel, or a Palestinian without a state in the occupied territories. Numerous publications contrast the Palestinian identity formation with Jewish Israeli identity formation, whereas few works attempt to compare and contrast the different collective identities of various Palestinian groups. Why is there a noticeable difference in the attitudes and behaviors of Israeli Arabs and Palestinians in the occupied territories despite their common self-categorization with the Palestinian-Arab identity? This division is important to understand because it can help us move towards a more comprehensive peace plan. This plan must treat the Palestinians in Israel and the Palestinians elsewhere as two unique groups, each one exhibiting different goals, incentives, and desires.

The primary purpose of this paper is to examine the differing attitudes and behaviors of Palestinians with Israeli citizenship and Palestinians in the occupied territories. Peleg and Waxman introduce the terms “Palestinization” and “Israelization” in their analysis of the multifaceted Israeli-Arab identity (2011, 28). “Palestinization” is the process through which Palestinians re-trench and bolster their Palestinian identity. This process contrasts with “Israelization,” which is the process through which Palestinians are drawn away from their Palestinian identity and integrate themselves within the Jewish state of Israel. I build upon their analysis of the Israeli Arab identity and contrast it with other publications that help explain the identity, attitudes, and behaviors of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. I propose that a distinct social gap exists between the two Palestinian groups. One group is experiencing a "Palestinization" of their social identity, whereas the other group is experiencing an "Israelization" of their social identity.

This distinction is identifiable through three proxy indicators: language (Hebrew proficiency and use), political participation in Israel, and protest participation. Examining how these proxies demonstrate the apparent separation between the two Palestinian groups, I attempt to present and evaluate the factors leading to this separation. After this, I introduce evidence for three independent variables that lead to
the existence of the two Palestinian identities: occupied Palestinians and Palestinian Israelis. These variables are the socio-psychological impact of majority/minority relations, the influence of personal incentives (economic, political, educational), and the Jewish Israeli attitudes and behaviors towards Palestinians in Israel and Palestinians elsewhere. Thus, this is a two-part paper. The first half confirms the existence of two distinct Palestinian identities, and the second half examines the causes of this identity split.

**Historical Context of Palestinian Identity**

In the early 1900s, World War I and the issuance of the Balfour Declaration were the catalysts that made Zionists’ vision of a Jewish nation a reality. The declaration affirmed Britain’s support for the establishment of a “national home for the Jewish people” in the Ottoman region of Palestine. This declaration directly contradicted the British Government’s earlier commitment to the establishment of an Arab state in the same territory as compensation for the Arab’s military alliance with the British during the war. Separate from a formal declaration, this commitment came by way of a series of letters between Husayn ibn ‘Ali of Mecca and a British officer, Sir Henry McMahon. Thus, as World War I came to a close, Arabs and Jews alike sought to lay claim to what the British had promised them, and it became clear that two groups were given conflicting promises. These events preceded the conflicting rise of Zionism and the newfound Palestinian nationalism.

This clash of conflicting nationalisms evolved into the multi-generational Israeli-Palestinian conflict. National collective narratives from both sides laid equal claim to the same land. Zionist narratives depicted the Balfour Declaration and the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine as the fulfillment of a biblical prophecy. Citing ancient claims to the land that traced back to the ancient Jewish diaspora, Zionists came to the land eager to fight for the fulfillment of that prophecy. In contrast, Palestinian national narratives traced their claim to the land back to the biblical Philistines. To further support their claims, Palestinians cited the promises of the Husayn-McMahon correspondence and the generations that Arabs have inhabited and cultivated the land. In contrast, they saw Jewish migrants as an extension of European imperialism and Britain’s mandate. This turned into a political nightmare for Britain. Fed up with violence between Zionists and Palestinians and unable to appease both groups throughout the Mandate period, Britain pulled out of Palestine in 1948. Following Britain’s exit, Zionist leader David Ben-Gurion declared the establishment of the Jewish state of Israel.

Within days of this declaration, the 1948 Arab-Israeli war broke out, and its legacy helped develop Israel and Palestine’s national identities. For Jews, the 1948 conflict became a miraculous victory in their struggle for independence. Conversely, this war came to be known as al-Nakba (The Catastrophe) for the Palestinian people. Israel’s military triumph allowed them to expand their original borders, subsequently expelling hundreds of thousands of Palestinians from their homes. The Jewish people told
a story of a divinely ordained victory; on the other hand, Palestinians told a story of catastrophe and loss. Thus, the 1948 war cemented the Jewish Israeli identity and helped bolster the formation of a strong Palestinian nationalism.

Figure 1: Israel’s 1947 Founding and the 1948 Israeli-Arab War, Vox

Simultaneously, al-Nakba led to the divergence of the collective Palestinian narrative and Palestinian identity that emerged in 1948. Immediately following Israel’s victory, hundreds of thousands of Palestinians were integrated into the Jewish state and granted citizenship. These Arabs in Israel were pressured to assume a more Israeli identity despite the high levels of fear and mistrust between Arabs and Jews (Peleg and Waxman 2011, 10). This pressure started the “Israelization” process and thus the Arab citizens of Israel are trapped in an identity struggle within a viciously divided society. Pulled between the benefits of Israeli citizenship and loyalty to their oppressed Palestinian brothers and sisters in the occupied territories, the Arab citizens of Israel constitute a prime example of how identities can be multifaceted and fluid.

This internal identity conflict presents one of the most intriguing Arab identity shifts of the twenty-first century. A gradual transition has occurred from an Israeli-
Arab identity to a more concrete Palestinian identity (Peleg and Waxman 2011, 27). Peleg and Waxman labeled this shift as “Palestinization.” However, this shift appears to be more an expression of social "Israelization" because it is an effort to achieve equal rights for Palestinians in Israel, rather than bolster the Palestinian cause in the occupied territories. This process is in direct contrast with the “Palestinization” and the identity of Palestinians of the diaspora and occupied territories. The Palestinians of the diaspora possess a collective narrative of forced displacement and life under a hardline occupation. Their “Palestinization” also calls for an independent Palestinian state, rather than an integration with the Jewish state.

There are two conclusions that arise from observing the multifaceted and fluid nature of the Arab Israeli identity. First, “Palestinian nationalism and Israeli citizenship shapes the collective identity of the Arab community in Israel” (Peleg and Waxman 2011, 31). Second, “A new collective identity has emerged among Arab citizens in Israel, distinct from that of Palestinians elsewhere” (Peleg and Waxman 2011, 31). However, these conclusions appear to contradict each other. Peleg and Waxman are suggesting that Arab Israelis are simultaneously bolstering their Palestinian heritage and separating from the post-1948 Palestinian identity and establishing their own category of Palestinian Arab. At the same time, Palestinians appear to be retrenching their individual and social identities into a strong and cohesive Palestinian nationalism. Despite efforts from both groups to maintain their Palestinian identities, both are moving in opposite directions and creating two distinct Palestinian identities. Therefore, the “Palestinization” process that Peleg and Waxman examine in Israel must apply exclusively to their self-prescribed individual identity. Meanwhile, Arabs in the occupied territories experience a "Palestinization" of both individual and social identities.

**Intragroup Conflict and Identity Formation Theories**

This paper pulls from various social identity theories that build the foundation of my argument. First, Laitin presents a theory of identity in divided societies and discusses how to measure the formation of new identities. Laitin introduces the concepts of a “beached diaspora” and a conglomerate identity. In his analysis of Russian speakers in post-Soviet states, he demonstrates how new identities form within minority groups in an ethnocentric nation. These Russian speakers living in the post-Soviet republics face a radical crisis of identity as a "beached diaspora" group: a diaspora category resulting from receding borders, rather than displacement. Laitin asks important questions, including: What will become of these populations? Will they learn the languages of the republics in which they live and prepare their children for assimilation? Will they return to a homeland many have never seen? Or will they become loyal citizens of the new republics while maintaining a Russian identity? He concludes that the Russian-speaking population is a new conglomerate identity in the post-Soviet world. This conglomerate identity of those who share a language is analogous to such designations as "Palestinian" in the Middle East because Palestin-
ians in Israel have become a beached diaspora group and can be expected to form a new conglomerate identity. This identity bolsters their minority status in their new ethnocentric state. Understanding the historical context of the Palestinian identity, it follows that any new conglomerate identity of Palestinians in Israel would depart from the original Palestinian nationalism and identity that formed after 1948.

External forces may also compel Palestinians in Israel to dissociate with their Palestinian group identity and adopt a social identity that favors their Israeli citizenship. Laitin observes that these conglomerate identities can thrive insofar as individual choice is not necessary (Laitin 1998, 31). This means that Palestinians in Israel and elsewhere can include various facets in their identity. Therefore, an Arab citizen of Israel may self-identify as Palestinian for individual purposes but when external influences and incentives pressure them they may favor one element of their identity over others. To measure this, one must look at similar factors to those Laitin observes influencing Russian speakers in post-Soviet states. Examining the different circumstances, attitudes, and behaviors of the two Palestinian groups may demonstrate a noticeable difference in their perceptions of social identity.

The second theory this paper relies on is Nevin T. Aiken's various processes of identity formation in post-conflict divided societies. He develops a model of identity formation that consists of three different social learning processes: instrumental learning, socioemotional learning, and distributive learning. Instrumental learning "[focuses] on rebuilding relationships and interactions that can foster less antagonistic perceptions between formerly divided groups" (Aiken 2015, 44). Instrumental learning is important to the Palestinian case because it allows us to measure some of the processes of "Israelization," "Palestinization," and the widening gap between the Palestinian groups. For example, if there is evidence that constructive dialogue between Jewish Israelis and Arabs in Israel is occurring, then that would fit Aiken's theory of instrumental learning and help explain the "Israelization" of Palestinians' social identity in Israel.

Aiken's second process is socioemotional learning, which "attempts to come to terms with the history of past violence" through mechanisms like truth recovery (Aiken 2015, 49). This learning process allows us to measure differences in the collective narratives between the two Palestinian groups. One way to measure this is to examine the collective narratives of oppression and violence between Palestinians in the occupied territories and Palestinians in Israel. If evidence shows that there are different experiences and circumstances, then there are two identity forming narratives occurring that are not cohesive. This would show one way in which individuals from both groups can claim to be Palestinian but are simultaneously separating at an intergroup level.

Aiken's third process is distributive learning, which solidifies identity formation in post-conflict divided societies by attempting to ameliorate material inequalities that stem from the conflict between two groups (Aiken 2015, 54). In the case of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, this would come in the form of Israel’s attempts to amend the structural inequality and oppression that its Arab citizens face daily. One way this helps expose the identity split between the Palestinian groups is by identifying any inequality in retributive processes between the two groups. For example, by providing some reparations to the Palestinians in Israel but none to the Palestinians in occupied territories, Israel has the ability to widen the identity split by setting Palestinians in Israel in opposition to other Palestinians.

Lastly, Tajfel examines and explains attitudes and behaviors leading to intragroup conflict and demonstrates how intragroup conflict indicates the presence of two distinct group identities. Tajfel prefaces his theory by saying, “In order for the members of an ingroup to be able to hate or dislike an outgroup, or to discriminate against it, they must first have acquired a sense of belonging to a group which is clearly distinct from the one they hate, dislike, or discriminate against” (Tajfel 1974, 66). This paper does not suggest that Palestinians in Israel “hate, dislike, or discriminate against” Palestinians elsewhere, or vice versa. Nevertheless, if there is evidence of mistrust or prejudice between the Palestinians in Israel and Palestinians in the occupied territories, then this is one way in which group identities begin to separate.

**The Two Palestinian Identities**

The previous theories can be applied to the three proxy indicators to illustrate how a new Palestinian identity group has formed in Israel. The first proxy, protest participation, pulls from Tajfel’s theory and demonstrates the idea that intergroup behaviors can only arise from two distinct groups existing. If Palestinians in Israel are a separate identity group, distinct from the Palestinians in the occupied territories, then there should be evidence of significantly lower numbers of Palestinian-Israelis participating in Palestinian protests and the Intifadas. Just like Tajfel suggests, if the Palestinians were one unified social group, then we could expect a relatively equal proportion of Palestinians from Israel and the occupied territories to participate in Palestinian liberation protests and the intifadas.

People are less likely to participate in political protests if they identify more closely with the establishment that is being protested against. According to Lowrance, the “Identity” variable was the most statistically significant variable correlating with protest action (Lowrance 2006, 181). When Arabs identify themselves as more "Israeli," they are less protest-prone than other Palestinian Arabs with more anti-establishment identities (Lowrance 2006, 182). When Lowrance held the social identity variable at “Israeli,” the probability for protest participation was 27%. By contrast, when Lowrance held the social identity variable at “Palestinian,” the probability in protest participation changed to 69%. Thus, the evidence shows that Arabs who identify with Israel behave differently than Arabs who identify more closely with Palestinians. Palestinians from the occupied territories who participated in the protests exclusively consider themselves as "Palestinian" because they have no other identity to choose between. This data is intriguing because it is measuring protest
participation during the Intifada, which was a Palestinian liberation uprising. Essentially, if no identity separation existed between the Israeli Arabs and the Palestinians outside of Israel, then the involvement of Palestinians in Israel during the Second Intifada would not have been so closely tied to their identity.

The second proxy, language, follows Laitin’s theory of identity formation in beached diaspora communities. The Arabic language is an important aspect of identity for Arabs. The language has become an important symbol of the Palestinian struggle in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict because of Israel’s policy of dearabization. If the Palestinians in Israel are categorized as a beached diaspora group, then we can expect to see more Palestinian citizens of Israel integrating Hebrew into their lives.

Evidence suggests that Palestinians in Israel are increasingly using Hebrew and integrating it into their lives. Despite Arabic’s status as a second national language, Israel has implemented a longstanding policy of dearabization within its borders. This policy has been most prevalent in renaming villages, sites, and landmarks with historically Arabic names and giving them Hebrew names. To combat dearabization, Palestinians in the occupied territories speak Arabic exclusively in public and in their homes. Thus, the Arabic language has transcended into an important symbol of identity for Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza.

Furthermore, participation in Israeli politics and business requires proficiency in Hebrew. Recent reports indicate that nearly all Israeli Arabs are proficient in Hebrew (Shakour and Tarabeih 2019, 421). In fact, the native Arabic speakers of Israel frequently adopt colloquial Hebrew terms into their day-to-day vocabulary, including beseder ‘okay,’ arush ‘TV channel,’ mivsha ‘sales discount,’ kanyon ‘shopping mall,’ and mashil ‘lifeguard’ (Shakour and Tarabeih 2019, 421). Obviously, the level of Hebrew proficiency varies between age, gender, and social class. Nevertheless, there is a clear pattern of “Israelization” occurring among Israel’s Arabs measured largely through the use of Hebrew. If we believe Laitin’s argument about titular language learning in beached diaspora groups, then it is clear that the Palestinians in Israel are forming a new conglomerate identity that is separate from the Palestinians outside of Israel.

The final proxy, political participation in Israel, also follows Laitin and Aiken’s theories. Arab participation in Israel's democracy demonstrates a legitimization of the state’s political system and of Arab self-integration into that system. This contrast with the occupied Palestinians who reject the Israeli establishment view it as a symbol of their occupation. Political participation data in Israel reveals that the Arab citizens in Israel are getting more involved in Israeli politics. Over the past decade, and especially this past year, Palestinian voter participation has risen in Israel.
Interestingly, the sudden drop in Arab voter participation in 2019 was for the year's first election, which ended in a tie and prompted a revote. The second election cycle of 2019 saw a new wave of Arab voters, 59%. Moreover, what this graph fails to show is that Arab voter turnout in 2020 was 67%, the highest it has been since 1999. This political participation suggests that Palestinians in Israel are increasingly accepting their Israeli status and citizenship. The 2019 Israel National Election Survey (INES) results support this claim, with a significant majority of Arab respondents (62%) agreeing that civic equality for Arab citizens can be achieved mainly through political struggle in the Knesset. This evidence suggests that the Arabs in Israel are accepting their national identity as Israelis and behaving accordingly. This newfound legitimization of Israeli politics indicates a significant reversal from traditional Palestinian attitudes and behaviors towards Israel. The political legitimacy of Israel has long been an issue in past peace summits because of the occupied Palestinian's reluctance to accept or recognize Israel as a legitimate state. Although this mentality may have been prevalent among Palestinians in Israel, their recent participation in Israel's democracy says otherwise. As a proxy of social identity, it is clear from observing Palestinians’ political participation in Israel that a gap has formed between the two Palestinian groups. On one hand, there are the occupied Palestinians who view Israel as an illegitimate state; on the other hand, there are Palestinians in Israel who have elected to legitimize the state through political participation.
Causes of the Divergent Identities

In the second part of my paper, I examine three independent variables that influence Palestinian-Israelis to move away from their social affiliation with Palestine and move towards Israel. These three variables are the socio-psychological impact of majority/minority relations, the influence of personal incentives (economic, political, and educational), and the Jewish Israeli attitudes and behaviors towards Palestinians in Israel versus Palestinians elsewhere. The evidence shows that these factors have caused the "Israelization" of the Arab Israeli identity and the "Palestinization" of the Arab identity in the occupied territories, despite ongoing efforts from both groups to "Palestinize" their self-prescribed individual identities. Thus, it is possible for Palestinian citizens of Israel to experience a conglomerate identity that assumes contradicting Israeli and Palestinian elements while Palestinians in the occupied territories do not face this identity crisis. In short, I find that all three independent variables help explain how the Palestinian identity has split based on the contrasting attitudes and behaviors of Palestinian citizens of Israel and Palestinians outside of Israel.

To measure these variables, I analyzed primary documents, secondary source publications, survey data from the Israel National Election Survey (INES), and Dr. Khalil Shikaki’s public opinion surveys of Palestinians in the occupied territories. The evidence from surveys presented in this research follows the shift from the Second Intifada (2000–2005) to the most recent INES and Palestinian public opinion polls (2019). These survey results provide invaluable insights into the contrasting attitudes and perceptions of Palestinian Israelis and Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. I also examined peer-reviewed publications that discussed the collective narratives of Palestinians throughout the region. The primary source documents and narratives examined were the 2007 Future Vision documents of Palestinian elites in Israel along with personal narratives from Wendy Pearlman’s Occupied Voices—a conglomerate work of individual narratives from Palestinians throughout the region.

Furthermore, I analyzed various peer-reviewed, secondary source publications, including Rabah Halabi’s School for Peace approach for engaging Palestinian Israelis and Jewish Israelis in dialogue and more observations for Peleg and Waxman’s book. These secondary sources help illustrate the attitudes and behaviors of Israel’s Palestinian citizens, which I contrast with the attitudes and behaviors of occupied Palestinians. The contrasting attitudes and behaviors come from the narratives in Pearlman’s Occupied Voices. This wealth of sources supports the correlation between the three independent variables and the widening social gap between the Palestinian groups.

Socio-Psychological Impact of Majority/Minority Relations

Aiken's socioemotional learning process describes a mechanism of social identity formation that focuses on observing the creation of new collective group narratives. In any post-conflict society, there is bound to be a narrative of victory and a narrative of loss. The Palestinians of Israel and the Palestinians of the occupied territories both share narratives of loss. But their narratives diverge as one side tells a story of loss
and integration into a new ethnocentric state, and the other side tells a story of loss and occupation. These different narratives constitute diverging processes of identity formation and help explain why the two distinct Palestinian groups exist.

Although the Israeli Arabs fit the description of a beached diaspora, categorizing them as such does not exempt them from the social pressure to assimilate into the newly established Jewish state (Laitin 1998, 29). Their status as a social, political, and ethnic minority living in an oppressive ethnocentric state has a socio-psychological impact on Palestinians in Israel. When Arabs became an ethnic minority in the Jewish state of Israel, their communities were dealt new challenges and circumstances, which forced them to either fight against the Jewish establishment or conform to it. These circumstances place substantial pressure on Israel's Palestinian citizens to prioritize the more Israeli aspects of their social identity to survive and thrive in the Jewish state. In the School for Peace discussions, the intergroup dialogue highlights how the Palestinians in Israel feel threatened by their minority status in society and how the Jewish state perceives and treats them. Halabi attempts to reconcile Jewish and Palestinian relations in Israel outside of an official, state-sanctioned, environment. Based on Halabi’s observations, it is apparent that the Palestinians in Israel experience a situation of a dominating group majority (Jewish-Israelis) over a dominated group minority (Arab-Palestinians in Israel) (Halabi 2004, 72). Thus, during the discussions, the Palestinians exhibited attitudes of minority inferiority and how it has affected their personal and community identities.

Halabi makes two conclusions about the majority/minority relationship in Israel: first, the majority has a monopoly over resources and social services, which makes it exceptionally easy for the majority to discriminate against the minority (Halabi 2004, 40). Second, the majority has absolute control over the state institutions and the more prominent sectors of civil society, which leaves the minority politically and socially dependent on the majority (Halabi 2004, 40). These asymmetrical circumstances create an abundance of grievances for Israel’s Palestinian citizens and forces them to depend on their minority communities and noninstitutionalized organizations to fulfill their needs (Halabi 2004, 40).

However, those circumstances do not appear to persuade the Palestinians to abandon their Israeli citizenship and join their fellow Palestinians in the occupied territories. These conclusions were realized early on in Halabi’s experiments when Samir, a Palestinian Israeli girl, voiced her opinion about the situation:

I feel Palestinian, without any connection to the Palestinian state. If a Palestinian state is established in the territories, it will belong to them... How can you come here, the conqueror of another people, and tell them that if only you weren’t here, it would be better? I tell you that I do want you [Jews] to be here. The establishment is not interested in hearing us. Our leadership doesn’t deal with the issues (Halabi 2004, 81).
Samir’s comments present valuable insights into the attitudes of Palestinians in Israel. There is an obvious self-perception of Palestinian identity in her first sentence, but her social identity has started to shift away from Palestinian nationalism. Palestinian nationalism is a call for self-determination and a proactive desire to establish an independent Palestinian state. However, Samir’s expression shows how any new Palestinian state will belong to that group, and she has no desire to become a part of that national project. She shows that Palestinians in Israel desire peaceful cohabitation with the Jews as a valued ethnic minority rather than to leave Israel and join the Palestinian majority. Her insights illustrate how Palestinian citizens of Israel appreciate their citizenship and minority status enough to disassociate themselves with Palestinian nationalism and to become an independent Palestinian Israeli group.

Recent INES survey results further support Samir’s statement that Israeli Arabs would retain Israeli citizenship rather than integrate into any Palestinian state. In the 2019 survey, Arab Israeli participants were asked, “Is the main aspiration of Arab citizens in Israel to have full equality as citizens?” The results show that 78% of Arabs strongly agreed with the statement, and 12% agreed. In other words, 90% of Arab Israeli respondents aspire to be regarded as equal citizens in Israel. Similarly, two-thirds of Arab respondents from the same survey group favor a two-state over a one-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This data is compelling because a two-state solution would guarantee the continuation of Arab Israelis’ minority status in Israel. By contrast, a two-state solution would also guarantee the creation of a sovereign state with a Palestinian majority. The desire of an independent Palestinian state is a powerful motivating factor for the Palestinians. However, Samir’s statement and the INES data appear to be saying that the Palestinians of Israel would elect to remain a minority in Israel rather than joining a new sovereign Palestinian state. Although Samir and other Palestinians in Israel may support the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, their social identity as a minority citizen of Israel is pulling them away from any desire to associate with the Palestinian nationality.

Further evidence of this attitude comes from the Future Vision document. Early in the document, leaders of the Palestinian population in Israel declare various demands that the Palestinian citizens expect from Israel. Two of these demands are reconciliatory and retributive measures. One calls for the state of Israel’s recognition of the Arab Palestinian citizens as an indigenous national group and a legitimate national minority (Khatib 2006, 11). The other demands that Israel attempt to remedy and compensate the many Palestinian citizens who have suffered harsh institutional discrimination “derived from viewing them as enemies and not as citizens that have a right to oppose the state and challenge its rules” (Khatib 2006, 11). While the distributive learning process through retribution is obvious in the second demand, the reconciliatory measures are more obscure. However, demanding Israel’s recognition of the Arab Palestinians as a national minority constitutes a process of truth recovery in building a new national collective narrative in Israel. That process would be a
monumental development in the social and political identities of the Palestinians in Israel and would clearly fit Aiken’s theory of socioemotional learning process. Nevertheless, this declaration is something Israel refuses to make because it would directly contradict the Jewishness of the state. Meanwhile, Israel’s Arab citizens are left out of any national collective narrative.

In the occupied territories, Palestinians constitute the majority demographic of the land they inhabit, which compels them to disassociate from the Palestinians in Israel because they must prioritize their Palestinian Arab identity to survive. When Israel occupied the West Bank and Gaza in 1948, a collective narrative of resentment and hostility towards Israel became a crucial component of the Palestinian national identity. Desires for a sovereign Palestinian state, independent from Israel's violent and oppressive occupation, became a guiding principle for this group. Additionally, the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza are refused the opportunity to become naturalized citizens of Israel. This leaves them stateless and occupied, forced to attain any retribution and reconciliation for their suffering through their own self-determination. By contrast, the Palestinians in Israel seek retribution and reconciliation through their rights as an ethnic minority in the Jewish state of Israel. Although the two Palestinian groups remain connected through their shared suffering and oppression at the hands of Israel, their contrasting narratives and circumstances constitute a serious mechanism that drives them apart.

In the occupied territories, violent oppression and massive displacement occurs as Israel grows its web of settlement throughout the West Bank (UN General Assembly 2014, 9–10). For the Palestinians in the occupied territories, these circumstances are devastating, but they have a much larger community of Palestinians than their Palestinian comrades in Israel. In addition, the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza have no pressure to be connected with Israel because that opportunity is not available to them. For this group, it sees Israel solely as a hostile occupier, rather than an oppressive government. The Palestinians of the territories are forced to create their own institutions and a strong civil society while aggressive occupiers constantly harass, intimidate, and expel them from their own land.

Palestinians in Israel prioritize achieving equality as a minority, but the nature of the Jewish state complicates that aspiration. In 2014, the special rapporteur to the Human Rights Council of the United Nations General Assembly submitted a lengthy report outlining Israel’s illegal treatment of the Palestinians and how their actions constitute allegations of an “apartheid state” (UN General Assembly 2014, 20). Although Israel grants citizenship to Palestinians, there are anti-Palestinian attitudes codified into Israeli law. For the Palestinians in Israel, they experience oppression as an ethnic minority in an ethnocentric government. Compared to the treatment of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, this oppression comes through less violent institutionalized inequality like making freedom of movement difficult for Palestinians, limiting access to water and utilities, and attempting to impose Hebrew upon
the state’s Arab inhabitants through dearabization (Bsoul 2006, 30). This experience for Palestinians in Israel pressures them to dissociate from the passionate drive for Palestinian nationalism and accept their reality as citizens of Israel.

According to Aiken’s theories of identity formation in divided societies, these contrasting circumstances are creating two separate Palestinians identities and pulling them farther apart. Transitioning from generations of stability and peaceful cohabitation with Jews into life as a refugee in their own land placed unbearable sorrow and loss on the Palestinians. In addition to the burdens and horrors of occupation, identity and belonging has been a fundamental crisis for the existing 4.8 million stateless Palestinians throughout the occupied territories. As Israel’s campaign to dearabize the region persists, a formidable counter-campaign of strong Palestinian nationalism exists among the occupied Palestinians. In a way, it has been easier for these Palestinians to hold on to their core identity because of the homogenous Palestinian demographics. Despite being a stateless people, their Palestinian identity has been unchallenged by outside pressures. In other words, as occupied Palestinians retrench into the original Palestinian collective narrative and identity, Israeli Arabs are being pulled in another direction because of the grievances of their minority status.

Influence of Personal Incentives

Identifying specific social and political goals among Arabs in Israel that do not reflect the original Palestinian nationalism and identity helps explain their social departure from that group. Laitin’s argument about conglomerate identities suggests that the Palestinians in Israel can maintain both Israeli and Palestinian facets of their identity insofar as personal choice is not needed. When two aspects of identity begin to conflict, individuals and groups are forced to decide which aspect of their identity they prefer to more closely align with. External influences including Israel’s economic stability, political representation, and higher education opportunities pressure Arabs in Israel to favor their Israeli ties over Palestinian national identities. For Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, their social identity prioritizes an end to the Israeli occupation, achieving a legitimate state, and stabilizing civil society. These social priorities are different for Israeli Arabs, which explains a shift in attitude, behavior, and social identity.

Aiken’s distributive learning process outlines how social identities form in post-conflict societies based on the retributive opportunities that groups have access to. Israel’s position as an internationally recognized state presents many opportunities and benefits to its citizens, a privilege that the Palestinian Authority cannot grant to its people in the occupied territories. Retribution for violence and oppression is a desire among both Palestinian groups. However, the opportunities afforded to the Palestinians in Israel present incentives that may pressure them into conforming to the "Israelization" of their social identity. This imbalance in circumstances disconnects the Palestinian citizens in Israel from the Palestinians elsewhere at both a communal and individual level. Consequentially, these inequalities foster feelings of resentment
and disconnection from occupied Palestinians towards their Palestinian siblings in Israel. I identify three institutional opportunities that incentivize the Palestinian citizens in Israel to adopt a more Israeli identity: increased economic security, political representation, and quality of education.

The three opportunities that may influence the attitude, behaviors, and social identity of Arab Israelis are a major cause of the Palestinian split because they are three institutional problems that Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip face. Unemployment in the occupied territories is high—52% in the Gaza strip and 20% in the West Bank (State of Palestine 2018). In addition, the Palestinian Authority has not held legitimate elections since 2006, further adding to the narrative of the PA’s corruption and inefficiency. And although literacy rates in Palestine are high, funding for schools in the region is low and families worry about sending their children to school because of the violent Israeli occupation forces. Since the economic, political, and educational opportunities of being an Israeli citizen are important to the Arabs of Israel, it is no wonder they have begun to associate more with Israel rather than Palestine to receive these benefits. This also helps explain why Palestinians in the occupied territories elect to dissociate themselves from the Arabs in Israel. Israeli Arabs are experiencing benefits from the state that is depriving occupied Arabs of those same benefits.

The benefits of being a part of a strong and stable economy incentivize many Palestinians in Israel to dissociate from Palestine and conform to their Israeli identity. In fact, economic incentives are so important to the Palestinians in Israel that they regard economic issues on par with issues of peace and territories in the INES surveys. In 2001, around the beginning of the Second Intifada, the majority of Palestinian-Israeli respondents regarded the economy as the main problem the Knesset had to handle. Two years later, the economy and issues of peace and the occupied territories were the strongest influencers of the Arab vote in the 2003 election survey. 95% of Arab respondents said the economy would greatly influence their vote; moreover, 94% of Arab voters in Israel said that peace and the territories would also have a strong influence on their vote. It is apparent through the election surveys from the early 2000s to today that economic prosperity significantly motivates the attitudes of Israel’s Arab citizens. This data also shows how personal incentives like economic success drive a wedge between the two Palestinian groups. For Palestinians in the territories, economic prosperity and security is not a realizable reality until they are free from Israel's occupation. The year 2003 was in the middle of the Second Intifada, a widespread Palestinian liberation uprising. Nevertheless, the economy had a stronger influence on the votes of Arab Israelis in 2003 than any other factor.

Almost as important as economic personal incentives, the status as a citizen of Israel—regardless of ethno-religious class—presents immeasurable advantages to Israel’s Arab citizens than being a stateless Palestinian refugee in the territories. As a citizen of Israel, the Palestinians enjoy privileges including voting rights, access to
state institutions, social services, and health care. More importantly, these institutions, rights, and services are considered to be more efficient and of higher quality than the services that the Palestinian Authority, Hamas, and non-governmental organizations provide to the occupied Palestinians. Thus, there is an acute incentive for individual Palestinians in Israel to disconnect from Palestinian institutions and move towards Israel’s.

This is clear from voting patterns of Palestinians in Israel. Arab voters have often boycotted Israeli elections as a tactic to protest the Jewish state’s institutionalized discrimination. Jewish Israelis also attempt to suppress Arab voter turnout. Surprisingly, in 2015, a relatively sizable number of Israeli Arabs (64%) went to the voting booths, yet that number suddenly plunged until the most recent election in 2020 (Rahman 2019). During this period of diminished Arab voter turnout, a coalition of Jewish political parties raised the electoral threshold in an attempt to undercut the fragmented Arab parties (Rahman 2019). However, the Arab parties’ response involved coming together in political unity and forming the Arab Joint List which became the third-largest party in the Knesset. In fact, the recent Israeli election deadlock suggests that Israel’s Arabs are beginning to embrace their ability to participate politically, capitalize on Israel’s fragmented political system, and engage in Israeli politics.

Political involvement in Israel is significant to the formation of a new Palestinian identity because it means that the Arabs in Israel accept and intend to capitalize on their citizenship. In fact, the 2019 INES results show that 62% of Palestinians in Israel both support Israel’s political institutions and believe that they can achieve political and social equality through Israeli elections. In addition, 80% of Palestinians agreed that participating in Knesset elections would benefit their national rights in Israel. However, this acceptance to and involvement with Israel’s political system constitutes a direct contradiction to the entire Palestinian narrative. The occupied Palestinians view Israel as an illegitimate state and any involvement with Israel’s government implies its legitimacy. Thus, accepting and admitting the legitimacy of the state of Israel has been a controversial topic for the occupied Palestinians in peace talks and day-to-day life. These contrasting attitudes and behaviors drive a considerable wedge between the Palestinians of Israel and the occupied Palestinians.

Along with economic and political incentives, the Palestinian minority in Israel has access to a better funded and more sophisticated educational system. What is more, Arab Israelis are increasingly placing their children in Hebrew schools because they receive higher funding and provide more opportunities for success in the Jewish state (Kazis-Taylor 2018). This becomes a powerful incentive for Palestinian citizens of Israel to embrace the “Israelization” of their social identity in order to provide their children with a more promising future. Although education levels between the Palestinian groups are similar, Palestinian citizens of Israel also have more opportunities for higher education. In the past eight years the number of Arab Israelis enrolled in Israeli universities increased nearly 60% (Dattel 2018). The opportunities for success
that higher education provides in Israel further incentivizes the Arab Israelis to assimilate into Israel’s educational system.

In the West Bank and Gaza Strip, education is valued and supported but does not enjoy the same level of infrastructure and state funding that Israeli schools do. Many of the narratives of Palestinians from Pearlman’s *Occupied Voices* explain how the occupation makes access to education and freedom of education challenging. Stories from Palestinian mothers in the book discussed Israeli Defense Force soldiers shooting children going to school and returning home, often for just throwing a rock, wearing a suspicious looking backpack, or getting too close to the soldiers. Israel also has a history of targeting Palestinian schools in the West Bank and Gaza Strips in routine airstrikes because they believe that they are shelters for Palestinian terrorists. Occupied Palestinians understand that education is, perhaps, their best weapon against the occupation which is evident through their impressively high literacy rates. In fact, literacy rates in the West Bank and Gaza Strip are the highest in the region: 96% (UNDP 2014, 2). Arabs in Israel share similar literacy rates. Nevertheless, there are severe challenges and limitations to the Palestinian education system which the Palestinian citizens of Israel do not have to deal with.

In addition, the threat of population transfers or the annexation of Arab land to a newfound Palestinian state is another concern that influences the majority of Israeli Arabs. According to Sammy Smooha’s index of Arab-Jewish relations, the average proportion of Israeli Arabs who experienced “Fear of annexation of the [Arab] Triangle to a Palestinian state against the will of the Arab-Israeli citizens” was 52% (Smooha 2010). Moreover, the same proportion on average were afraid “of population transfer [mass expulsion] of some Arab citizens” (Smooha 2010). Peleg and Waxman also observed that most Israeli citizens—Jews and Palestinians alike—are supportive of harmonious coexistence of all Israeli citizens and reconciling the relationship between Jewish and Palestinian citizens (Peleg and Waxman 2011, 13). Considering the past evidence of individual incentives in addition to the data, this shows how Israel’s Palestinian citizens not only enjoy the benefits of embracing Israeli citizenship but are also fearful of being displaced into the less stable Palestinian territory.

This attitude is the antithesis of the Palestinian attitude in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Residents there desire an autonomous and contiguous Palestinian state. For the occupied Palestinians, the opportunities afforded to their comrades in Israel are not as widely available to them, not even the benefits of statehood. Meanwhile, as Israel establishes more settlements throughout the West Bank, the Palestinians lose more of their territory and their land becomes less contiguous. For the Palestinians seeking an independent state, contiguity of their territory is a major issue. For Arab Israelis to exhibit both loyalty to the Jewish State and to fear that Arab majority areas of Israel, like Nazareth, will be transferred to the Palestinian territories, this presents a substantial dividing element between the them and their fellow Palestinians in the
occupied territories. It is a divide that compels the occupied Palestinians to resent the Arabs in Israel.

**Jewish Israeli Attitudes and Behaviors Towards Palestinians**

*In our state there will be non-Jews as well – and all of them will be equal citizens; equal in everything without exception; that is: the state will be their state as well.*

(David Ben Gurion, December 1947)

INES data demonstrates how widespread Jewish Israelis exhibit hostility, mistrust, and intolerance towards Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. When asked what they believe the final aspiration of the Palestinians to be, 40% of Jewish Israeli respondents said, “To conquer the country and destroy a significant part of the Jewish population.” The next largest proportion of respondents, roughly 18% of Jewish Israelis, believed that the final aspiration of the Palestinians was, “To get back all of the territories that were conquered in the Six Day War.” Based on these public opinion results, it is clear that the widespread Jewish Israeli population perceives Palestinians as an existential threat to Israel and its Jews. This creates a situation where Israel has an incentive to divide the Palestinians to ensure national security. Treating them as separate and distinct groups makes it easier for the Jewish state to achieve this goal.

With regard to Tajfel’s theory of intergroup behavior, Jewish Israelis would be expected to treat Palestinians in Israel differently than Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza if two distinct social identities exist. Thus, any variation in treatment from Jewish Israelis towards Palestinians in Israel further indicates how outgroups perceive Israeli Arabs as an independent group, separated from the original Palestinian identity. This drives the groups apart because it fosters attitudes of resentment from the occupied Palestinians directed against the Palestinian Israelis since the Israeli group is treated more fairly than the occupied group.

Occupied Palestinians (with good reason) tell a narrative of violence, inequality, occupation, and resentment in their interactions with Jewish Israelis. For example, one common narrative to arise from the Second Intifada describes Israel’s indiscriminate repression through home demolitions. According to the Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions, ten thousand Palestinian homes were demolished since 1967, and more than two thousand homes were demolished during the Second Intifada (Pearlman 2003, 136). These demolitions are often unjustified, without judicial consent, and done only to dissuade entire families and communities from participating in protests. These abhorrent behaviors, among others, illustrate Israel’s institutional discrimination and hostility towards the occupied Palestinians.

What is more, the Palestinian Authority outlawed any collaboration with the State of Israel. In the West Bank and Gaza, collaborating with Israel may lead to execution. The State of Israel understands this and knows that if the occupied Pales-
tinians believe that other Palestinian Arabs are cooperating with and conceding to Israel, this will spur mistrust, resentment, and dissociation. Fostering a hostile relationship between Palestinians makes it easier for the Israelis to manage Palestinian unrest in their state and manage the Palestinian threat in the occupied territories. On one hand, Jewish Israelis see a minority group that can be coerced and pressured into submitting to the Jewish Israeli agenda. On the other hand, Jewish Israelis see a substantially large group of Palestinian Arabs that resent the Jewish state and pose an existential threat to the state. Although some Jews view the Palestinians in Israel as an existential threat, they are perceived as a more manageable threat than the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. For the Jewish state, this management of Palestinians groups is a major element of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and leads to significant divides between the two Palestinian groups. More importantly, this evidence shows that Israel possesses the capability to persuade, manipulate, and coerce the Palestinians in Israel to "Israelize" their social identity, thereby compelling them to dissociate from the Palestinians of the occupied territories.

In contrast, during the School for Peace discussions, Halabi observes a more tolerant relationship between the Jewish people and Palestinians in Israel. In these discussions, the Palestinian Israelis viewed the Jewish participants as representative of the Jewish population in whole; whereas the Jewish participants chose to view the Arab participants as mere exceptions to the larger, more threatening, Palestinian community (Halabi 2004, 36). This attitude suggests that the Jewish group is willing and able to connect with individual Palestinian Israelis but struggles to relate with them at an intergroup level because of Israel's institutional bias against Palestinians. Following weeks of intergroup discussions, most of the Jewish Israelis began to express dissonance in their perceptions and behaviors they exhibited towards the Palestinian community in Israel. However, the Jewish participants refused to extend this change of opinion to the occupied Palestinians. Thus, it is apparent that the Jewish Israeli perception of the Palestinian citizens of Israel is much more sympathetic than their perception of Palestinians in the occupied territories.

Furthermore, the INES results support broad Jewish Israeli tolerance of Palestinian Israelis and relative hostility towards other Palestinians. In 2003, during the middle of the violent Second Intifada, Jewish Israelis were asked whether they supported the transfer of Israel’s Arab citizens. 69% of Jewish respondents opposed transferring the Arab Israeli citizens out of Israel. This data is important because it shows that the majority of Jewish Israelis favor keeping the Arab Israeli population within Israel, even when intergroup hostilities are high. Contrast that data to corresponding 2019 INES results and an interesting picture of heightened Jewish Israeli tolerance and acceptance of Palestinian citizens surfaces. When Jewish Israeli participants were asked what they believe the most important value for the development of the State of Israel to be, 70% of Jewish Israeli respondents valued a democratic state with equal rights for all and a state of peace. On top of that information, 60% of Jewish Israelis believe
that it is impossible to achieve a peace agreement with the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. These survey results show that an overwhelming majority of Jewish Israelis support peaceful cohabitation and equal rights with Palestinian Israelis; meanwhile they maintain the illusion that a peace agreement with Palestinians outside of Israel is unattainable. This attitude coincides with Israel’s security priorities. Maintaining Palestinians as a minority rather than transferring them to the Palestinian territories keeps the Palestinian identity divided. These attitudes also re trench the widespread attitude and resentment in the occupied territories that Palestinian-Israelis are perceived as collaborators with the Israeli occupation.

Because Palestinian citizens of Israel receive fairer treatment from Jewish Israelis, Palestinians elsewhere, and Arabs across the region, perceive and treat the Arab Israelis with mistrust and resentment (Suleiman 2011, 54). Similarly, Palestinians and Arabs treat Jews with Arab and North African heritage similarly (Suleiman 2011, 54). These attitudes and behaviors are in line with Tajfel’s theory of intergroup behavior. In order for Palestinians to mistrust and scorn Palestinians in Israel there must be a distinct sense of belonging to an independent social group. That independent social group is the original Palestinian identity that arose from the 1948 catastrophe. Understanding how Jewish Israelis treat Palestinians in Israel differently, it follows that Palestinians would also treat Palestinians in Israel as an outgroup whose new social identity has diverged from the pre-1948 Palestinian identity.

Conclusion

This two-part paper explored one of the crucial, yet often ignored, aspects of the Israeli Palestinian conflict: identity. The first part adds upon contemporary theories of identity formation and intergroup behavior and demonstrates how two independent social identities exist between Palestinians in Israel and Palestinians in the occupied territories. The second part explains why the Palestinian identity split occurred. This is of the utmost importance because other scholars like Peleg and Waxman have helped to uncover the existence of diverging identities but have lacked a comprehensive explanation for the factors driving that split. The three variables I examine come from a diversity of theoretical frameworks and present three of the major causes to this identity split.

Measuring the socio-psychological impacts of majority/minority relations correlates with the separation of Palestinian identities because Palestinian citizens of Israel must adapt to different institutional challenges than the occupied Palestinians. For Palestinians in Israel, becoming an ethnic minority in an ethnocentric state forces them to adapt to a new social and political order. Meanwhile, although there are political differences throughout the occupied territories, there is little evidence that majority/minority relations influence Palestinian civil society. This forces the Palestinian Israelis to change their attitudes and behaviors to survive in an institutionally discriminatory civil society.
Measuring the influence of personal incentives correlates with the separation of Palestinian identities because it becomes apparent that being an Israeli citizen is more preferable than being a stateless Palestinian. The benefits of being a part of a strong and stable economy incentivizes many Palestinians in Israel to dissociate from Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. As a citizen of Israel, the Palestinians enjoy privileges including voting rights, access to state institutions, social services, higher education, and better health care. Thus, there are clear and obvious external forces coercing Israel’s Palestinians to “Israelize” their social identity.

Lastly, measuring the more humane treatment that Jewish Israelis give to Arab Israelis demonstrates why the two separate Palestinian identities exist. Occupied Palestinians tell a narrative of violence, inequality, occupation, and resentment in their interactions with Jewish Israelis. In contrast, a more tolerant relationship between Jewish and Palestinian Israelis exists, despite continual discrimination in Israeli civil society. Nevertheless, the difference in treatment correlates with a separation of occupied Palestinians from Israeli Palestinians. Palestinians outside of Israel view the Palestinian Israelis as traitors, and this attitude leads to two distinct Palestinian identities existing in the region.

All of the evidence I provide in this paper could be interpreted in another way as well. It may be that the Palestinians in Israel are conforming to their Israeli identity to bring an end to the conflict from within the state. The Arab population in Israel is rather large and poses a threat to many Jewish political parties. Arab-Palestinian participation in Israel’s election could be interpreted as the oppressed minority rising up to bring an end to their own grievances and the grievances of Palestinians everywhere. However, this paper suggests the contrary. If Palestinians in Israel were trying to bring an end to the conflict from within Israel’s political system, there would be more widespread protest participation and cohesive attitudes and behaviors amongst Palestinians everywhere. The INES data and qualitative evidence do not support this.

This research may apply to other cases as well because there are divided societies and populations caught in identity crises all around the world such as Native Americans and their assimilation into American culture. The Kurdish question is another example of a contemporary beached diaspora. Should the Kurds continue to fight for a state of their own? Or, should they start to assimilate into already established nations? Assimilation would entail doing something similar to what the Palestinians in Israel have done: transforming their social identity to survive in their state while attempting to hold on to their heritage through individual identity. It will be interesting to watch these cases unfold as time goes on and trace how identities transition in divided societies.

Recognizing the existence of two distinct Palestinian identities has significant implications for future peace plans, the future of the Palestinian cause, and the future of Israel’s democracy. Because Palestinian citizens of Israel are not the same as Palestinians elsewhere, their needs and goals are different despite their common Palestin-
ian heritage. Thus, to successfully attain comprehensive reconciliation and transition to harmonious cohabitation, future peace processes must account for the needs of both Palestinians in the occupied territories and the needs of Palestinians in Israel. These findings also suggest that Palestinians in Israel are not as passionate about ending the occupation as other Palestinians are. Furthermore, Palestinians in Israel have some capacity to influence change democratically through the Knesset. However, this does not appear to be happening. The evidence suggests that Palestinians in Israel are seeking to bolster their social status in Israel and favor a new social identity over the pre-1948 Palestinian collective identity. Moreover, if Palestinians in Israel are, in fact, “Israelizing” their social identity, then Israel can expect to see higher Arab voter turnout and increasing participation in Israeli civil society. Hopefully, this involvement will pressure Israel to bring an end to the occupation, reconcile appropriately with all Palestinian-Arabs, remove its discriminatory nation state laws and become a state for Jews and Arab citizens alike.
References


Appendix A

Figure 1: Israel’s 1947 Founding and the 1948 Israeli-Arab War, Vox

1947: United Nations Partition Plan

June 1948: Arab armies invade

July 1948: Israeli army counterattacks
Appendix B

INES 2019 Survey – N=1,614 respondents (1,347 Jews, 267 Arabs)

V26: There are those who argue that a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel is the best way to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Others argue that one state between the sea and the Jordan river is the best way to solve the conflict. With which of the two arguments do you tend to agree?

1. A Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel is the best solution: 63%
2. One state between the sea and the Jordan river is the best solution: 26%

V27: The main aspiration of Arab citizens in Israel is to have full equality as citizens?

4 – Strongly Agree: 78%
3 – Agree: 12%
2 – Disagree
1 – Strongly Disagree
V28: Civic equality for Arab citizens can be achieved mainly through a political struggle in the Knesset (parliament)?
   4 – Strongly Agree: 33%
   3 – Agree: 29%
   2 – Disagree: 10%
   1 – Strongly Disagree: 26%

V30: Participating in Knesset elections harms the struggle for Palestinian national rights?
   4 – Strongly Agree: 11%
   3 – Agree: 9%
   2 – Disagree: 14%
   1 – Strongly Disagree: 60%

V14: To what extent are you worried or not worried that you or one of your family members are likely to be harmed by terrorists in your everyday life?
   1. Very worried: 18%
   2. Worried: 35%
   3. Not worried: 30%
   4. Not at all worried: 17%

V12: In your opinion, is it possible to reach a peace agreement with the Palestinians?
   1. Definitely possible: 10%
   2. Believe it is: 29%
   3. Believe it is not: 24%
   4. Definitely not possible: 33%

V117: How important to you is your identity as an Israeli? (Muslim respondents)
   4. Very important: 39%
   3. Quite important: 36%
   2. Not so important: 4%
   1. Not at all important: 19%

V118: And how important to you is your identity as a Jew? (For Arabs: “as a Palestinian”) (Muslim respondents only)
   4. Very important: 46%
   3. Quite important: 22%
   2. Not so important: 10%
   1. Not at all important: 16%
2015 Survey – N=1,595 respondents (1,330 Jews, 265 Arabs)

V12. In your opinion, what are the final aspirations of the Arabs? (Only Jewish Israelis)

1. To get back some of the territories that were conquered in the Six Day War: 15%
2. To get back all of the territories that were conquered in the Six Day War: 18%
3. To conquer the state of Israel: 15%
4. To conquer the country and destroy a significant part of its Jewish population: 40%

2001 Survey – N=1,417 (1,249 Jews and 168 Arabs)

B29-32: Which term best defines your identity?

B29: Most defines identity
1. Israeli: 9.56%
2. Palestinian: 19.85% (No Druze)
3. Arab: 53.37%
4. Religion: 22.09%

B30: Second
1. Israeli: 19.35%
2. Palestinian: 41.29%
3. Arab: 27.1%
4. Religion: 12.3%

B31: Third
1. Israeli: 36.4%
2. Palestinian: 18.2%
3. Arab: 11.57%
4. Religion: 34%

B32: Fourth
1. Israeli: 48.25%
2. Palestinian: 20.18%
3. Arab: 2.63%
4. Religion: 29%
A24: Are you worried about being injured by Arabs?
1. Not at all: 7% (No Druze)
2. Not worried: 16% (1 Druze)
3. Worried: 40% (38% of Druze said this)
4. Very worried: 37% (56% of Druze said this)

A8: Main problem the government has to handle?

A16: Eventually, do you oppose or support a peace agreement that includes establishment of Palestinian state on 95% of the territories and keeping settlement blocks; Giving Palestinians Jerusalem’s Arab neighborhoods; concession of sovereignty in Temple Mount, not including the Western Wall; a return of a limited number of refugees and a mutual declaration of end of further demands?
1. Strongly oppose: 10%
2. Oppose: 14%
3. Support: 59%
4. Strongly support: 17%

2003 Survey – N=1,234 (1,083 Jews and 151 Arabs)

A11: Territories should be exchanged for peace?
1. Definitely agree: 61%
2. Agree: 31%
3/4. Only 8% disagree or strongly disagree.

A12: The establishment of a Palestinian state in the territories as part of a permanent settlement?
1. Definitely agree: 51%
2. Agree: 33%
3/4. Only 26% disagree or strongly disagree.

A13: A fence of separation should be built?
1. Definitely agree: 28%
2. Agree: 30%

A18: QUESTION ONLY FOR JEWS – Arabs who are citizens should be transferred?
1. Definitely agree: 9.62%
2. Agree: 21.89%
3. Disagree: 48.87%
4. Strongly disagree: 19.62%
A22: Are you worried about being injured by Arabs?
   1. Very worried: 48%
   2. Worried: 32%
   3. Not worried: 20%

A58 & A61: To what extent will ECONOMICS (A58) and PEACE AND TERRITORIES (A61) have on your vote?

A58: Economics
   1. Very great extent: 71%
   2. Great extent: 24%
   3. Certain extent: 4%
   4. Not at all: 1%

A61: Peace and Territories
   1. Very great extent: 71%
   2. Great extent: 23%
   3. Certain extent: 4%
   4. Not at all: 3%
Introduction

The relationship between populism and religion is complicated. Some aspects of populism seem to be at odds with religion, such as the claim of absolute authority coming from the people’s will rather than from a divine deity or clerical leader. However, other aspects of populism are similar to religious principles, such as the importance of morality in decision-making and strong beliefs of a dichotomy between Good and Evil. While the connection between religion and populism is interestingly complex and potentially illuminating, there has been relatively little work done to examine this relationship (Mudde 2015).

In this study, I focus on one specific example of the relationship between populism and religion: evangelical Christianity’s populist tendencies. I focus on evangelicals because they seem to have a unique connection to populist movements in the US (Zuquete 2017, Smith & Woodhead 2018). Do evangelical Christians have higher populist attitudes than other Christians, and is this true in all parts of the world?

This research memo aims to answer this question using comparative survey data from Chile and the United States. I find that evangelicals are significantly more populist than other religious groups in the US, but in Chile evangelicals are not more populist than other groups. This connection in the US has to do with the evangelical identity in a broader national context much more than with evangelical religious beliefs. This finding opens the door for future research on the relationship between evangelicalism and populist attitudes.

This memo proceeds as follows. First, I summarize existing scholarship on the relationship between evangelical Christianity (and Christianity in general) and populism and identify gaps in this work. I then describe results I found from my analysis...
of populist attitudes and religion in Chile and the US, followed by a discussion of this analysis and its place in the existing literature.

**Defining Populism**

Populism has been defined in many different ways in social science scholarship, but scholars agree that populist rhetoric represents politics as two main blocs: the elite versus “the people.” This division is political and vertical; the people are the power-seekers, while the elite or establishment are the power holders (Stavrakakis and Katsambakis 2014). The people populists claim to represent are typically ordinary citizens who are purportedly being neglected by special interests such as big business or political leaders. Populists are champions of the rights of these “people,” who are understood to be more virtuous than the malicious and selfish elites. The people are also understood as having a unanimous will; the populist leader’s job is to discern this will and enact it into policy when elected to office (Mudde 2004; Canovan 1999). While all definitions of populism recognize the importance of the “the people” vs. the elite dichotomy in populism, they disagree on where these ideas come from. Some believe that populism is simply a political style (Laclau 2005) or a political strategy (Roberts 2006) used by politicians to unite and mobilize their constituents. Others claim populism is a Manichaean or dualistic discourse “that identifies Good with a unified will of the people and Evil with a conspiring elite” (Hawkins 2009). This definition is called the “ideational approach” because of its assumption that populism is a set of independent ideas of left-right dimensions of political ideology.

I use the ideational definition of populism for this memo because I think it is the best at distinguishing populism from other political attitudes. An ideational definition of populism does this because it describes the people and the elite in general terms, which can be applied to individual cases and circumstances. Defining who fits into either of these two categories depends on the country’s demography, political context, and even the “style” of populism. So, the ideational approach to populism allows voters and political leaders to have “populist attitudes” that can either be activated or remain dormant. Considering populism in this way allows for a more comparative measurement of populism. For example, Hawkins, Kaltwasser, and Andrédias (2018) find that while levels of populist attitudes are similar in Chile and Greece, populist attitudes are more predictive of voting behavior in Greece than they are in Chile. Thus, this definition will be best when comparing levels of populism in the US and Chile.

**Populism and Evangelicalism**

Evangelicalism is a Christian movement that is gaining popularity throughout the globe (Stanley 2013). Evangelicalism is trans-denominational, meaning that evangelicals can be found in almost every Protestant denomination and tradition, including Baptist and Pentecostal churches (Mohler 2011). In 2016, about two-thirds of all Protestants and one in four Christians were evangelicals (De Senneville 2016). The
largest proportion of evangelicals in the world live in the United States, where they are the single largest religious group and comprise one-quarter of the nation’s population (FitzGerald 2017). Evangelicals’ core beliefs include the centrality of conversion (or the "born again" experience) in receiving salvation, the absolute authority of the Bible, and in evangelism, or spreading the Christian message (Price 1993).

The literature on populism and evangelicalism is relatively new and, therefore, not all-encompassing. Much of the current work on this topic looks specifically at which populist parties and leaders evangelicals have historically voted for and supported. The Oxford Handbook of Populism chapter on populism and religion identifies the first religious populist party as the US-based People’s Party in the 1890s, which was primarily supported by Protestant evangelicals (Zuquete 2017). This movement framed elites as any holder of power they saw as immoral or oppressive. They believed that these elites would change the US from a free and God-fearing society into a Satanic tyranny unless stopped. The chapter also acknowledges the “Teavangelical” movement that emerged from the secular Tea Party movement in the early 2010s. The Teavangelicals called for small government and fiscal conservatism based on their interpretation of the Bible.

The relationship between evangelicalism and populism gained renewed interest in 2016, with the populist Brexit referendum in the UK and the election of populist President Donald Trump in the US. Both phenomena were influenced heavily by Protestant Christians (Smith and Woodhead 2018). However, in the US, Trump’s election was supported by highly religious evangelicals, while in the UK, the Brexit vote was supported by many Anglicans who didn’t attend church regularly. In fact, most evangelicals in the UK voted to remain in the European Union. This finding indicates that the evangelicals’ political behavior isn’t monolithic across countries. Thus the connection between evangelicalism and populism isn’t as clear-cut as it may initially appear.

What does evangelicalism look like in Latin America, where Catholicism has historically dominated the religious sphere? Evangelicalism is proliferating in the region while Catholic membership is declining (Pew 2014). This decline of Catholicism in Latin America could be indicative of growing distrust in traditional institutions. Many populist politicians in Latin America, like Jair Bolsonaro of Brazil or Fabricio Alvarado of Costa Rica, have attained support from evangelicals for their socially conservative policy proposals (Raderstorf & Reif 2018). While there may be growing support for populists from evangelicals in Latin America, this support is much less consistent than from evangelicals in the US.

While studies on populism and evangelical Christianity are few, there has been interest in the relationship between populism and Christianity as a whole. Much of the current literature on populism and Christianity has focused on populist movements in Europe. Additionally, much of this work addresses Christianity’s use by right-wing populist parties simply as an anti-Muslim identity. In Saving the People:
How Populists Hijack Religion (Morzouki et al, 2016), the authors consider many right-wing populist parties in Europe that use Christian identities to justify xenophobic policy changes. For example, they indicate that the French populist party, Front National (now called the National Rally), justifies anti-immigration measures in the name of Christian identity, ironically putting itself at odds with the Catholic church. Sociologist Roger Brubaker uses the term “Christianism” rather than Christianity to differentiate between Christian identity and Christian beliefs. Brubaker argues that Christianism, which he defines as a method of promoting liberal Christian values in contrast to the undesirability of undemocratic Muslim cultural values (Brubaker 2017), is how populists incorporate religion into their movements. These studies of Christianity and populism examine religion as a very broad identity without looking at specific religious affiliations, like evangelical Christianity.

Although the empirical work that has been done is useful to understand more about the evangelicals that support populist movements in the US, almost none of the literature looks at countries outside the West. This is the hole I attempt to fill with this research memo.

Research Design

To evaluate the relationship between evangelicalism and populism, I examine the cases of Chile and the US. Chile isn’t a perfect representative of Latin America, but it is useful for my analysis in unique ways. First, while the US has a history of religious populism and a current resurgence of populism on both the right and left, Chile has experienced lower numbers of populist movements or leaders that gain national recognition. Populist attitudes can exist whether or not they are activated (Hawkins and Kaltwasser 2017), so this does not present a problem for comparison. In fact, the differences in populist movements may provide information about how and why evangelicalism has been correlated with populism in certain contexts.

Second, Chile’s religious demography is an outlier in Latin America’s religious landscape. Most Latin American countries have seen Catholics—especially low-income Catholics—leaving the church and becoming evangelical. It’s estimated that more than 30% of the population in Central American countries is evangelical Christian (Rodríguez 2018). However, in Chile, the number of evangelicals has remained at about 18% for the past seven years, while the number of people with no religious affiliation has continued to grow to 32% in 2019 (Universidad Católica 2019). Since Chile is an outlier for Latin American countries, this limits the external validity of the analysis. However, if evangelicalism inherently has a connection to populism, we would expect to see it in evangelicals in Chile as much as in other Latin American countries. If we don’t see this connection, it suggests that something else related to evangelicalism is causing populist sentiments among evangelicals in the US.

Populism in the US

To understand the historic connection between evangelicalism and populism, I look at two historical populist movements, the People’s Party and the Tea Party
movement and their relationship to evangelicalism. These cases show us that the evangelical movement in the US has been connected to populism for centuries.

*People’s Party (1880s)*

To understand the historic connection between evangelicalism and populism,

One of the first populist movements in the US, the People’s Party, was started partially because of anti-Catholic sentiment among protestant farmers. These farmers believed that elites (sometimes categorizing them as Catholic elites) were not looking out for farmers and other working-class people enough. However, populist leaders who emerged from this movement deliberately denounced these anti-Catholic sentiments, seeing them as going against the American principle of religious liberty (Zuquete 2017).

The movement was anti-monopoly and anti-Wall Street (Betz 2017), essentially a leftist populist movement that called for economic protections for farmers and redistribution of wealth accumulated by crony capitalists. Thus, while it may seem that evangelicals are more populist because they are extremely conservative, in the 1880s they were supportive of this leftist populist movement. This supports the idea that there is something about evangelical identity, apart from conservative ideology, associated with populism. To contrast this historical example, we will now look at a more recent right-wing populist movement in the US, the Tea Party movement.

*Tea Party Movement and Teavangelicalism (2010s)*

The Tea Party movement initially started as a libertarian political movement that focused on reducing government size and scope in the US, especially in fiscal matters (Somasekhar 2010). The movement has never had a formal leader or hierarchy, but many organizations define themselves as Tea Party groups. Many of these Tea Party organizations have emphasized avoiding social issues as part of their platforms, restricting the focus of the movement to fiscal matters like government spending and national debt.

However, while the roots of the movement were based on libertarian ideas, in practice, over 50% of self-identified Tea Party members are evangelical Christians (Good 2010), which is why many pundits label this large sub-group of the movement the Teavangelicals (Boorstein 2010). Many of these Teavangelical organizations engage with social policies like abortion or gun control, which looks more like classic US conservativism than libertarianism. However, there is nothing about the Teavangelical movement that is inherently connected to evangelical religious beliefs. The social views that the movement promotes, like anti-abortion and anti-immigration stances, or pro-gun policies, are significant parts of the Republican party platform and have little to do with the evangelicals’ religious views about Christianity (where does it say that we shouldn’t allow immigrants into the US in the Bible?). This supports my finding that evangelicalism is a significant cause of populism when controlling for religiosity (shown in the Empirical Results section, Table 1).
Thus, it seems that populist movements in the US have a strong connection with evangelical Christianity. While some of this may be due to evangelicals being more conservative than other groups in recent years, the evidence shows that the relationship between evangelicalism and populism is more consistent than the connection between ideology and populism.

**Populism in Chile**

Currently, Chile has not experienced populist movements that have been effective on the national scale. However, a historical study of populism in Latin America reveals important examples of populist leaders in Chile, going back as far as 1921.

For this memo, the example of Salvador Allende (1971–1974) is perhaps the most useful. Allende was a Marxist and a lifelong committed member of the Socialist Party of Chile (Mabry 2006). He unsuccessfully ran for president many times before finally being elected in 1971. While scholars have not categorized Allende as populist in the past, more recent analysis has found strong evidence of populism in his rhetoric (Drake 1978). Thus, Allende’s form of socialist populism can be viewed as similar to current examples in Latin America, like Hugo Chavez in Venezuela.

Initially, Allende received support from Chile’s Christian Democrats party, a left-wing Catholic party (Mabry 2006). The Citizen Left Party (formerly the Christian Left Party) was also supportive of Allende and formed partly in response to the Allende movement. There were few evangelicals in Chile at the time: the first evangelical denomination had only been created about 40 years earlier and faced fierce opposition from the Catholic church (Hudson 1994). So, it is hard to exactly measure who evangelicals supported at this time. Furthermore, while Allende received support from some Catholic groups, his government was not associated with religion very much. Thus, the most recent movement of populism in Chile was associated loosely with Catholicism but certainly didn’t have any connection to evangelical Christianity. This explains why the relationship between populism and evangelicalism (and religion in general) in Chile is much weaker than it is in the US.

**Empirical Analysis**

To measure the correlation between the religious preference and populist attitudes in these two countries, I use data from two surveys. For Chile, I use data from the United Nations World Development Indicators. This survey has approximately 1,805 respondents, 294 of which self-identify as evangelical Christians. For the US, I use data from a survey conducted by the Cooperative Congressional Elections Study (CCES), which has 1,000 responses, and 314 identified as born again Christian (synonymous with evangelical Christian).

In each survey, to measure populist attitudes, an inventory developed by Agnes Akkerman and others (Akkerman et al. 2014; Hawkins et al. 2012) is used. While the
Chilean survey includes all of the questions listed below, the US survey only includes half (bolded in the list below).

1. The politicians in Congress need to follow the will of the people.
2. The people, not the politicians, should make our most important policy decisions.
3. The political differences between the people and the elite are bigger than the political differences among the people.
4. I’d rather be represented by an ordinary citizen than by an experienced politician.
5. Politicians talk a lot without accomplishing much.
6. What people call “compromise” in politics is really just selling out on one’s principles.
7. Ordinary people can’t be trusted to make the right choices about our nation’s problems.
8. Our country would function better if the important decisions were made by independent experts.
9. Politicians should guide the people rather than follow them.
10. Democracy is about achieving compromise among differing viewpoints.
11. In a democracy it’s important to listen to the opinion of all groups
12. Politics is ultimately a struggle between good and evil.
13. The power of a few special interests prevents our country from making progress.

To determine the effect of evangelicalism on populist attitudes, I use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression with robust standard errors. I use factor analysis to create a single variable for populist attitudes in both surveys (see Appendix A). The factors used in each dataset have eigenvalues of over 2. Chile’s factor accounts for approximately 25% of the variation in the populism index, while the US factor accounts for about 30%. These factors are the dependent variables used in the models. To test the effect of evangelicalism on populist attitudes, I create a dummy variable in both surveys. I then use three different models to test this effect.

Model 1 tests the effect of evangelicalism with selected control variables. I include education and income because rich and highly educated people are often framed as elites. These variables are collected by asking respondents to place themselves in categories (for income, they are given upper and lower bounds of dollar amounts for each type). Many evangelicals have lower levels of education and income, so I would like to see if the effect of evangelicalism is independent of these factors. I also include a control variable for ideology (low values are leftist responses; high values are rightist) because others have found that ideology can moderate the effect of populist attitudes (Hawkins et al., 2018). These ideology variables are self-reported, so they are based on the respondent’s ideological identification and not on the actual ideology of their positions. Since evangelicals tend to be conservative, adding this variable
will show the effect of evangelicalism if ideology is held constant. Finally, I add race, age, and gender to the model to ensure that these demographic characteristics don’t affect the coefficients. A second model uses the same independent variables, plus control for religiosity, measured by church attendance. Model 3 interacts religiosity (coded from low to high) with evangelicalism to test if more religious evangelicals are more populist than non-religious evangelicals. For more descriptive information about these variables, see Appendix B.

**Empirical Results**

I find that simple t-tests in both samples revealed that evangelicals are significantly more populist than non-evangelicals in the US. Still in Chile, evangelicals are not statistically different from other religious groups in their support for populism. Figure 1 and Figure 2 show these differences graphically.

**Figure 1: Difference in Populism of Evangelicals from Other Groups in Chile**

![Chile: Populism Among Evangelicals](image)

0 = not evangelical, 1 = evangelical
Figure 2: Difference in Populism of Evangelicals from Other Groups in the U.S.

US: Populism Among Evangelicals

0 = not evangelical, 1 = evangelical
Now, to identify what this difference can be attributed to, we turn to OLS regression models of populism and religion below.

Table 1: Evangelicalism on General Populism.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Chile</th>
<th>United States</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 1</td>
<td>Model 2</td>
<td>Model 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evangelical</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>-0.037</td>
<td>-0.323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.131</td>
<td>-0.138</td>
<td>-0.308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>-0.026</td>
<td>-0.068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-0.068</td>
<td>-0.068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evangelical X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>0.145</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.144</td>
<td>-0.043</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.027</td>
<td>-0.031</td>
<td>-0.031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.023</td>
<td>-0.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>0.118***</td>
<td>0.117***</td>
<td>0.115***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.029</td>
<td>-0.031</td>
<td>-0.031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.500***</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.153</td>
<td>-0.223</td>
<td>-0.23</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 1 shows the results from the OLS regression models. In Chile, evangelicalism does not have a significant effect on populism. Evangelicalism has a significant (and substantial) effect on populism in the US, although the R-squared is not particularly high. Education has a significant negative effect on populism in the US but has no effect in Chile. The fact that education, a characteristic commonly related to elitism, does not affect populist attitudes may be due to the small sample size (and thus low statistical power) in the Chilean survey. Income does not have a significant effect in either country. This observation is consistent with views that populist views have become more common among middle and even upper-class individuals worldwide (Rodríguez 2018).

The most puzzling result is that ideology has a significant effect in both countries, in which conservativism causes higher levels of populist attitudes. Hawkins and Kaltwasser (2018) find that populist attitudes are not determined by ideology.
However, it is essential to note that the classification of ideology is very simple in both surveys; respondents simply self-select where they stand on the left-right scale. This method is much simpler than the process to identify respondents’ ideology used by Hawkins and Kaltwasser, so it may be that populists are more likely to call themselves right-leaning, even if they are not. Additionally, Tables 2 and 3 show that conservative ideology does not predict every question in the populism index, so the result could simply be due to the factor that was selected and not about actual populist attitudes.

Tables 2 and 3 show Model 2 on specific questions about populism (questions 1, 2, 6, and 10 above). These tables show four of the questions from the populist index. Evangelicalism in the US has the most substantial effect on perceptions of who should make the most critical decisions in government (in this case, evangelicals believe the people should make the most important decisions). In Chile, evangelicalism’s lack of an effect can be seen in Table 2.

### Table 2: Evangelicalism on Specific Populism Questions, Chile

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Democracy Compromise</th>
<th>Will of People</th>
<th>Compromise - Sell Out</th>
<th>People Decisions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Evangelical</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>-0.041</td>
<td>0.031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.099</td>
<td>-0.118</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>-0.121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.032</td>
<td>-0.032</td>
<td>0.058**</td>
<td>-0.019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.021</td>
<td>-0.024</td>
<td>-0.025</td>
<td>-0.024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>0.066***</td>
<td>-0.035*</td>
<td>0.055***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.018</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.021</td>
<td>-0.019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>0.051</td>
<td>0.072***</td>
<td>0.036</td>
<td>0.114***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.024</td>
<td>-0.026</td>
<td>-0.028</td>
<td>-0.029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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<td>1.544***</td>
<td>2.057***</td>
<td>1.614***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.181</td>
<td>-0.113</td>
<td>-0.114</td>
<td>-0.109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>425</td>
<td>539</td>
<td>515</td>
<td>538</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.047</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.057</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3: Evangelicalism on Specific Populism Questions, United States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Democracy Compromise</th>
<th>Will of People</th>
<th>Compromise - Sell Out</th>
<th>People Decisions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Evangelical</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.190**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-0.086</td>
<td>-0.118</td>
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<td>Education</td>
<td>0.064***</td>
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<td>-0.178***</td>
<td>-0.063**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.023</td>
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<td>-0.027</td>
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<tr>
<td>Income</td>
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<td>-0.026</td>
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<td>-0.038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.023</td>
<td>-0.022</td>
<td>-0.029</td>
<td>-0.027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>-0.163***</td>
<td>0.053***</td>
<td>0.232***</td>
<td>0.087***</td>
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<td>-0.019</td>
<td>-0.024</td>
<td>-0.023</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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<td>3.664***</td>
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<td>938</td>
<td>938</td>
<td>939</td>
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<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
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<td>0.059</td>
<td>0.174</td>
<td>0.068</td>
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</table>

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

These results give an interesting insight into the political behavior of evangelicals in the US. Evangelicals are more conservative than other religious groups (Lipka 2016), and these results show that conservatives are more populist than liberals. Yet when controlling for ideology, the effect of evangelicalism is still significant. Additionally, when controlling for religiosity, the coefficient on evangelicalism is statistically significant, and the magnitude increases. This finding supports the idea that the connection between populism and evangelicalism has more to do with evangelical identity than it does with their religious beliefs and values. We see this because when holding church attendance constant, evangelicalism has an even stronger correlation with populism.

In Chile, evangelicalism does not have a connection to populism. Thus, perhaps the reason why evangelicals are slightly more populist than non-evangelicals in Chile (although not statistically so) has to do with the fact that evangelicals in Latin America are more conservative than other religious groups (Pew 2014).

Conclusion

Using quantitative and qualitative methods in Chile and the US, I find evidence that evangelical identity is associated with populist attitudes in the US. Still, this association does not hold for Chile. This is shown in OLS regression results from survey
data that measures populist attitudes, as well as analysis of historical examples of populist movements in both countries.

The reasons that evangelicals in some places are more populist than other religious groups are not immediately apparent. It does not seem to be the result of evangelical teachings or beliefs. However, when controlling for this, evangelical self-identification is still significant; therefore, it must have something to do with evangelical identity. I do not attempt to identify the nature of this identity or why it is associated with populism. While this idea was not explored in this memo, it could be the topic of future research on populism and religion.

The findings presented here have interesting implications for future study of populism in comparative politics. Future studies could examine other Christian denominations (like Orthodox Christianity) or look more closely at religiosity’s effect on populist attitudes. Furthermore, this memo focused exclusively on Christianity and populism, but the findings could help understand connections between other religious faiths (like Islam, Buddhism) and populism.

Analysis of non-Christian religious faiths lack the literature on religion and populism, so further studies to identify the connection between populism, ideology, and religion would be a welcome addition.

Additionally, to better understand the connection between evangelicalism and populism, additional countries with similar regional environments could be compared to eliminate idiosyncratic differences that may impact results. Comparing US survey data on populism to other Western countries may allow us to be more precise about the differences between evangelicals and other Christians in the global West. Likewise, comparing the Chilean data to that in other Latin American neighbors would showcase the broader impact of Latin American evangelicalism.
References


### Appendix A

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chile</th>
<th>Observations</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev</th>
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<th>Max</th>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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Appendix B

Questions from a US Survey

Income: “Thinking back over the last year, what was your family’s annual income?”
Possible responses:
1. $0 - $29,999
2. $30,000 - $59,999
3. $60,000 - $79,999
4. $80,000 - $119,999
5. $120,000 - $250,000 or more

Education: “What is the highest level of education you have completed?”
Possible responses:
1. High school graduate
2. Some college
3. 2-year
4. 4-year
5. Post-grad

Evangelical: “Would you describe yourself as a ‘born-again’ or evangelical Christian, or not?”
Possible responses:
1. Yes
2. No

Religiosity: “Aside from weddings and funerals, how often do you attend religious services?”
Possible responses:
1. Never
2. Seldom
3. A few times a year
4. Once or twice a month
5. Once a week
6. More than once a week
Ideology: “How would you rate yourself?”
Possible responses:
   1. Very Liberal
   2. Liberal
   3. Somewhat Liberal
   4. Middle of the Road
   5. Somewhat Conservative
   6. Conservative
   7. Very Conservative

Race: “What racial or ethnic group best describes you?”
Possible responses:
   1. White
   2. Black
   3. Hispanic
   4. Asian
   5. Native American
   6. Mixed
   7. Other
   8. Middle Eastern

Age: “In what year were you born?” [I subtracted this variable from 2012, the year this survey was given, to create an age variable.]

Gender: “Are you male or female?”
Possible responses:
   1. Male
   2. Female
What Makes a Country Environmentally Friendly?

Sophie Plantamura

Introduction

Carbon emissions, climate change, plastic pollution—environmental issues have been a problem for decades, but in recent years controversies concerning environmental practices have come to a head. As shifting weather patterns negatively impact global food production and rising sea levels increase the risks of catastrophic flooding for nations around the world, immediate environmental action is necessary (United Nations 2019). The international public has taken to making its voice heard on the subject; as awareness has increased, so have popular protests and pressure on domestic governments and international organizations alike to take action and alleviate global environmental issues. Although individuals have the ability to impact the environment through their own actions, whether particular countries decide to adopt environmentally friendly policies or maintain their current environmental practices will determine the future of the planet. It seems as though every state has its own ideas about how to best legislate environmental policy, and some states even deny that these issues require immediate action. International environmental treaties are often viewed as toothless and unenforceable while protests often draw large crowds but result in little governmental action. In light of these challenges, it is vital to ask: what makes a state environmentally friendly? Is a state’s environmental friendliness determined by its form of government? Wealth? Identity and culture? Education levels? Or another, more important factor?

In this paper, I seek to explain which factors are most effective in determining a country’s environmental policy—specifically how form of government, wealth, public opinion, and educational attainment make a country more or less environmentally friendly. I will begin by outlining my theoretical approach. The current literature
largely focuses on how single factors—such as form of government alone—impact environmental friendliness (Clulow 2019, 244). My paper broadens current scholarship to include a multivariate analysis that not only identifies the effects of individual factors, but how these factors interact with one another, revealing policies countries should focus on to improve environmental performance.

Next, I will outline my methodology, including my hypothesis, variables, and data. I hypothesize that domestic factors are the most telling indicators of a country’s environmental friendliness, specifically that form of government is the critical determinant of whether a country’s wealth, culture, and education levels are able to influence environmental policy. My hypothesis is rooted in the reasoning that while autocratic states are not obligated to listen to their citizenry in order to maintain power, democratic regimes must satisfy their constituents in order to win reelection and retain political control. Therefore, democratic states with significant wealth, publics that are highly interested in environmental friendliness, and high education levels should be the most environmentally friendly.

Finally, I will present the quantitative results of my research and data, revealing which variables are the biggest indicators of a state’s environmental friendliness. I conclude that wealth and educational attainment are the most significant indicators of a state’s environmental performance, while a state’s form of government is not a significant indicator of environmental friendliness.

Theory

In order to answer the question of which factors most influence environmental friendliness, I will approach the relationship between a state’s environmental policy and state-specific characteristics through the lens of liberal international relations theory. Liberalism posits that both domestic and international civic cultures—rather than power politics, as realism theorizes—are the most important indicators of a state’s behavior. According to traditional liberal views, cooperation and conflict on the international scale depend on the representativeness of a domestic government, the level of social cohesion and equity in a society, and the level of a state’s international economic interdependence. Liberalism is often characterized as the most effective theory of international relations to explain a country’s environmental politics as it accounts for both domestic policy and international interdependence, both of which are vital indicators of a state’s environmental friendliness. From these assumptions, I identified four main variables to test how much of a state’s environmental friendliness is explained by liberal principles: form of government, wealth, public environmental engagement, and education levels.

According to Keohane and Nye, my chosen variables should indicate international policy since they are “capabilities that are affected by the norms, networks, and institutions associated with international organization” at the time (Keohane and Nye 2012, 47). Because each of these variables is connected to norms and international organizations, I will include controls accounting for that state’s international presence;
I do not expect to predict a state’s environmental performance without acknowledge-
ment of their status on the international stage. Yet, Keohane and Nye also hold that,
in consideration with issues like environmental policy, “foreign policy leaders . . .
will have to pay even more attention than usual to domestic politics,” emphasizing
the importance of state-specific indicators in environmental policy (Keohane and Nye
2012, 202).

Additionally, in liberalism, a state’s regime type is a significant factor in deter-
mining environmental policy. Studies have found that democracies tend to perform
better in terms of emission levels than non-democracies (Clulow 2019, 244). There-
fore, it can be theorized that democracies will have more overall environmentally
friendly policies than autocracies for the following reasons.

First, democracies, by definition, allow their citizens to participate in govern-
ment policymaking, something that autocracies fail to do. In democracies, there are
more opportunities for environmental factors to influence policy making and hold
elected politicians accountable, implying that a democratic state’s environmental
policies and subsequent behavior should be more environmentally friendly. Interest
groups are a major part of the political decision-making process within democracies,
and environmental activists are able to lobby the government and encourage leaders
to pass environmentally friendly legislation. The voice of the public is much louder in
democracies than autocracies, so if a democracy has a substantially engaged and en-
vironmentally concerned public, “the stringency of environmental policies” should
be raised (Fredriksson 2005, 363).

Secondly, because of political competition for re-election, policymakers will be
more inclined to listen to public opinion than autocratic dictators who do not need
popular support to maintain their sovereignty. Democracies are characterized by reg-
ular and fair elections; unpopular leaders who do not listen to the voice of the public
will be ousted by popular vote. Therefore, in a democracy with an environmentally
engaged public, leaders are incentivized to pass environmentally friendly legislation.
In autocracies, even if the public is very focused on environmental friendliness, lead-
ers have no incentive to pass legislation that reflects public opinion.

On the other hand, the very characteristics that encourage environmental friend-
liness in democracies could also lead to less environmentally friendly policies. Demo-
cratic regimes take into consideration opinions of all the people, including those that
may be against environmental regulations. Autocratic regimes, alternatively, do not
have to consider the wants of the people at all; if a dictator favors environmental
regulation, it will be much easier for that dictator to implement stringent policies and
enforce obedience than it is in a democratic society. Whether the public’s opinion on
environmental policies actually makes an impact on a state’s environmental policies
will be analyzed below.

Various studies have found that GDP per capita has a positive effect on environ-
mental concern up to a certain point, and analyses of the International Social Survey
Program (ISSP) have emphasized this (Franzen and Vogl, 2013, Franzen and Diekmann, 1999). A state’s wealth would be expected to impact its environmental friendliness positively, especially because wealthier countries have the freedom to pursue greener industries. A wealthier country has the ability to focus on implementing environmentally friendly policies rather than on pursuing development and building the economy through industry. Additionally, as liberalism predicts, wealthier countries are more economically interdependent on the global stage, which should lead to increased international cooperation with environmental policies.

At the same time, wealthier states may be confined to what is sometimes called the carbon curse: resource-rich countries produce more carbon emissions and weaker incentives to invest in improvements of energy efficiency (Friedrichs and Inderwildi 2013, 1356–1365). Fuel rich countries tend to be wealthier, and it is difficult for them to evade carbon-intensive developmental pathways (Friedrichs and Inderwildi 2013, 1356–1365). Once a wealthy, developed state has a successful, but environmentally harmful, industry, it could be more difficult for that state to abandon that industry for a greener one.

The value placed on environmental friendliness by a state’s civic culture should also be telling of how environmentally friendly a state’s policies are. In recent years, the status of public opinion on environmental issues has increased as the public becomes more passionate about these problems, and one would expect that governments would reflect the public’s growing interest in pro-environmental policy. Yet, previous studies have found a “value-action gap” when it comes to environmental policy, raising the question of whether or not public value of environmental issues actually makes an impact on environmental policies (Blake 1999, 257).

For environmental issues, especially, taking consideration of a state’s public interest in environmental friendliness is vital: “These issues directly affect particular groups, and touch the lives of nearly all citizens. If domestic interest groups are powerful enough to block policies favored by the president . . . top officials may no longer be able to determine policy” (Keohane and Nye 2012, 203). In democracies particularly, a state’s public environmental engagement should be expected to have a significant impact on that state’s environmental policy, as clean air and protection from climate change are issues that play a major role in the lives of everyone.

In terms of education, many studies have found a correlation between higher education levels and an individual’s environmental friendliness (Brecard et al. 2009, 115). The causal logic surrounding this correlation ranges from the rational economic benefits of green behavior to the increased concern over social welfare that comes with education (Meyer 2015, 108–121). As citizens become more educated, recognition of the long-term economic benefits of environmentally friendly policies begins to outweigh the short-term negatives. Additionally, education brings an increased concern over social welfare—a concern that should be directly affected by environmental policies.
A highly educated citizenry translates to a highly educated government, so leaders in highly educated countries may be more sympathetic to environmentally friendly policies. I theorize that having higher education levels will lead to having more environmentally friendly policies, especially in democracies, since the educated citizens will vote for leaders and policies that agree with their friendlier opinions on environmental behavior. Having a highly educated citizenry in an autocracy should be less effective, since the policymakers are not elected.

Methodology and data

Hypothesis: I predict that domestic factors will be significant indicators of a state’s environmental policy. Specifically, I hypothesize that a state’s form of government will be the most significant predictor of environmental friendliness. Form of government exists at the center of my predictions for environmental friendliness since I expect democracy to be required for wealth, public opinion, and education to have significant effects on environmental policy. Even if the public of an autocratic state places a high cultural value on environmental friendliness, the state is under no obligation to satisfy the public’s wants. Additionally, wealthy autocracies may be less likely to spend their money on environmentally friendly policies because they do not have to be reelected by a satisfied citizenry. Finally, the significance of a highly educated citizenry should hinge upon whether or not the state’s government takes the citizenry’s opinions into account. Therefore, I predict that wealthy democracies with a highly educated population that values environmental friendliness should be the most environmentally friendly.

Dependent Variable

Environmental Friendliness: Conceptually, a country’s environmental friendliness can be measured by its willingness to sign international environmental treaties and whether it meets “the resource . . . needs of current and future generations without compromising the health of the ecosystems that provide them” (Morelli 2011, 6). Yet, treaties do not always make a tangible difference in a country’s environmental policy, and this conceptual definition therefore does not translate to actual environmental performance. Operationally, this study will instead measure a country’s environmental friendliness by its ranking on the 2018 Environmental Performance Index (EPI), a ranking indicated by scores across “ten issue categories covering environmental health and ecosystem vitality” (Yale University 2018, 3). This index does not include treaties, but focuses on actual indicators of a country’s emissions, such as air quality, biodiversity, climate and energy, and agriculture. Each country included in the EPI is given a score on a common scale from 0 to 100, with 0 indicating worst performance and 100 indicating best performance (see Appendix A).

Independent Variables

Form of Government: In order to measure how democratic a country is, I utilized The Economist Intelligence Unit’s 2018 Democracy Index. The Economist Intelligence
Unit’s Democracy Index goes further than other prominent freedom indices in that they include more indicators than political freedom and civil liberties. The Democracy Index is based on five categories, including electoral process and pluralism, the functioning of government, political participation, political culture, and civil liberties. After a comprehensive analysis of key indicators within these categories, a country is classified as one of four types of regime: “full democracy,” “flawed democracy,” “hybrid regime,” or “authoritarian regime.” Countries are then assigned a score on a scale from 0–10, with 0 being least democratic and 10 being most democratic (See Appendix B).

**Wealth:** While measuring the wealth and development of each country in my study, I utilized The World Bank’s data for a country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). I chose to use GDP per capita to measure states’ wealth because it provides a simple estimation of a country’s output in a standardized way across all countries. GDP per capita is also used to estimate the size of a country’s economy, an important factor to consider when measuring a country’s overall wealth.

**Public Environmental Engagement:** In order to get an idea of how much value a state’s public places on environmental friendliness, I decided to create a variable called public environmental engagement. Public environmental engagement includes how invested a state’s citizens are in protecting the environment: whether they participate in protests, donate to environmental groups, or place environmental issues over economic ones. In order to measure a country’s public environmental engagement, I accessed data compiled by the World Values Survey (WVS), the “largest non-commercial, cross-national, time series investigation of human beliefs and values ever executed” (Inglehart R. et al. 2014). The WVS conducts nationally representative surveys in almost 100 countries which cover the full range of global variations, from very poor to very rich. In order to develop their comprehensive questionnaire, social scientists from all over the world create questions measuring “cultural values; attitudes and beliefs toward gender, family, and religion; attitudes and experience of poverty, education, health, and security; social tolerance and trust; attitudes toward multilateral institutions; cultural differences; and similarities between regions and societies” (Inglehart R. et al. 2014). A handful of these questions concern environmental involvement, and these are the questions I utilized for my study. My sample is limited to the countries that were given these environmental-related questions, comprising a total of 51 countries from different regions around the world (See Appendix C).

I operationalized this data by creating a ‘culture’ variable in my compiled data that gave a score from 0–100, measuring the percentage of respondents who had answered survey questions in an environmentally engaged way. For example, in Argentina, 46.41% of respondents said that believing that looking after the environment is important is either very much like them or like them. I then averaged the percent-
age of respondents answering environmental questions in the affirmative, creating a comprehensive score for each country in the study (see Appendix D).

**Education:** A state’s education levels may be measured in many different ways, but for this study I chose to measure educational attainment by a state’s mean years of schooling, the average number of completed years of education of a country’s population (Roser 2018). I acquired data for each state in my study’s mean years of schooling through the United Nations Human Development Data for 2018.

**Control Variables**

**Population:** I included population as one of the control variables within my study. A country with a much higher population density should have greater carbon emissions, pollution, and waste simply because more people live in that country. I measured population through data from the World Bank for each of the countries in my study.

**International Involvement:** Although I am hypothesizing about the domestic factors determining environmental policy, it is important to account for a state’s presence on the global scale in order to estimate its international involvement. I did this by creating a variable that accounts for how many international treaties each of the states in my study has signed since 1900 by using data from the International Red Cross. Most of these treaties originated in the United Nations. I thought that treaties would provide a straightforward way to estimate a country’s international presence because more internationally involved states should be willing to sign more treaties.

**Miles of Coastline:** My final control variable is the miles of coastline a country possesses. Because rising sea levels are a major consequence of climate change, I thought that states with more coastline may be more sensitive to environmental issues, and therefore would enact more environmentally friendly policies. I used data compiled by the CIA World Factbook to estimate the miles of coastline, defined as the total length of boundary between the land area and the sea, and included this variable in my analysis.

**Results**

**Methodology:** In order to test the significance of my hypotheses, I collected data for all of my variables and performed three multivariate regressions. I decided on this quantitative method because it allows a researcher to see how much of the dependent variable—in my case, environmental performance—is explained by the independent variables—form of government, GDP, public environmental engagement, and educational attainment. A multivariate regression also shows whether the relationship between independent variables and dependent variables is significant. My results were as follows:
In my first regression, I simply calculated the relationship between a state’s EPI score and my independent variables while holding constant for all of the other variables. According to the regression analysis, the only independent variables that have a significant relationship with EPI scores are a state’s GDP per capita and educational attainment. Form of government and public environmental engagement, on the other hand, did not have a significant relationship with EPI score in this regression.

The data show that when a state’s GDP per capita increases by one dollar, its EPI score is expected to increase by 0.000253, an amount that, though small, is statistically significant at the 99% level. Therefore, it can be concluded that how wealthy a country is does, in fact, significantly impact its environmental policies. Form of government, on the other hand, was not a significant variable: with a 1-point increase in a country’s democracy score, EPI score is expected to increase by a small and insignificant
amount, signifying that the probability that the relationship is attributed to chance cannot be ruled out. Similarly, a one unit increase in a state’s public environmental engagement score is associated with a .0648 unit increase in the EPI score—another statistically insignificant amount. Educational attainment and EPI score, though, appear to have an extremely meaningful relationship. When a state’s mean years of educational attainment increase by one year, its EPI score is expected to increase by 1.265, a relationship significant at the 95% level.

Of my control variables, only one was statistically significant: population. Interestingly, population and EPI score have a negative correlation that is significant at the 99% level. Therefore, as population increases, a country’s EPI score is expected to decrease quite significantly.

The estimated constant of the regression is 35.86. This means that when the other independent variables are 0, a state’s environmental performance score is expected to be 35.86. The R-squared in this regression is 0.659, meaning that 65.9% of the variance in EPI score is explained by my variables. This is a moderately high R-squared value, but there may be other, more important indicators of a country’s environmental friendliness.

For my next regressions, I decided to make form of government a binary variable called Democracy, in which a state was coded as 1 if it had a democracy score of over 6. I then interacted, or multiplied, democracy with both public environmental engagement, GDP per capita, and educational attainment, and the results were as follows:
Table 2. Model 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>(1) EPI Score</th>
<th>(2) EPI Score</th>
<th>(3) EPI Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>1.863</td>
<td>-0.895</td>
<td>6.746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.332)</td>
<td>(10.22)</td>
<td>(11.16)</td>
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<td>Public Environmental Engagement</td>
<td>0.0480</td>
<td>0.0409</td>
<td>0.0338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.196)</td>
<td>(0.299)</td>
<td>0.204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy#Public Environmental</td>
<td>0.0487</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engagement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.413)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>0.000413*</td>
<td>0.000257**</td>
<td>0.000295***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000211)</td>
<td>(7.61e-05)</td>
<td>(9.98e-05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy#GDP per capita</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000227)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Attainment</td>
<td>1.339***</td>
<td>1.288**</td>
<td>1.424**</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.489)</td>
<td>(0.508)</td>
<td>(0.547)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy#Educational Attainment</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.157)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>-1.09e-05***</td>
<td>-1.07e-05***</td>
<td>-1.11e-05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.81e-06)</td>
<td>(3.85e-06)</td>
<td>(3.87e-06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Treaties Signed</td>
<td>0.163</td>
<td>0.176*</td>
<td>0.179*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0972)</td>
<td>(0.0965)</td>
<td>(0.0963)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miles of Coastline</td>
<td>8.11e-05</td>
<td>8.13e-05</td>
<td>8.46e-05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000118)</td>
<td>(0.000121)</td>
<td>(0.000119)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>35.34***</td>
<td>36.56***</td>
<td>35.23***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(6.238)</td>
<td>(7.109)</td>
<td>(6.364)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.664</td>
<td>0.659</td>
<td>0.662</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

When I interacted democracy with public environmental engagement, the regression considered public environmental engagement for democracies separately from non-democracies. Yet, public environmental engagement was still not a significant variable, implying that public opinion about environmental policy is not signifi-
significant, no matter the regime type. When I interacted democracy and GDP per capita, the relationship was also not significant, and whether a country is democratic does not reveal how its wealth affects environmental performance. Finally, I interacted democracy with a country’s educational attainment, and again, the relationship was not significant. Therefore, a state’s form of government does not seem to signify the implications of wealth, a highly engaged public, or high education levels.

**Conclusion**

According to my analysis, GDP per capita, educational attainment, and population are the most significant indicators of a state’s environmental friendliness. When democracies are interacted with GDP per capita, public environmental engagement, and educational attainment, none of the relationships were significant. Therefore, my hypothesis was partially correct: wealthier and more educated countries do have more environmentally friendly policies, but the effects of these variables do not hinge upon whether or not a country is a democracy. Instead, wealth and education increase a country’s environmental friendliness regardless of whether that country is a democracy. Public environmental engagement, too, is never a significant indicator of environmental friendliness.

These results are consistent with much of the existing theory surrounding environmental policy. Current scholarship emphasizes the ability of wealthy countries to focus more on environmentally friendly policy than developing countries. My results conflict with the carbon curse theory, which posits that wealthier, resource-rich countries do not pursue energy efficient policies as the more resource-rich countries in my sample do have more environmentally friendly policies. Additionally, education has long been linked to environmental friendliness, and my results affirm the established theory that increased education leads a country to have more environmentally friendly policies.

An unexpected feature of my results is the insignificance of a country’s form of government on its environmental policies. Although past scholarship indicates that more democratic countries do tend to have lower emissions levels, for example, my results depart from this view. When considering a country’s wealth and education levels, the form of government is no longer a significant predictor of environmental friendliness.

Another unexpected result from my analysis is the significance of population on environmental friendliness. Although it is widely accepted that larger populations lead to more environmental degradation, how population affects environmental policy decisions has not been extensively studied. In the future, scholars should analyze the relationship between population levels and a government’s decisions about environmental policy.

Implications of my quantitative conclusions are threefold: first, the international public should be aware that wealthier countries are more likely to have environmentally friendly policies. Foreign aid should be focused on increasing the long-term
wealth of poorer countries, as wealth leads to significant increases in environmental friendliness under any form of government. Second, education should become a major focus of environmental advocacy groups and state governments hoping to improve environmental policy. Increasing a country’s average educational attainment has a clear and significant positive correlation with environmental friendliness, so efforts to increase mean years of schooling within states could lead to environmental payoffs. Third, although population cannot be ethically controlled, global leaders should be aware that higher populations are associated with less environmentally friendly policies within states.

My analysis is not without limitations, though; there are many more specific variables that could be important indicators of a state’s environmental performance, especially considering my relatively low R-squared. These include, but are not limited to, a state’s geographical region, employment trends, average temperature, and reliance on fossil fuels. Because these variables could be very significant in deciding a state’s environmental policies, their roles cannot be ruled out in any sound analysis.

Yet, I am confident that my results—considering the relationship between environmental friendliness and form of government, GDP, public environmental engagement, and educational attainment—provide an accurate prediction of environmental friendliness when it comes to these variables. As time goes on and environmental issues become increasingly problematic, I expect that a country’s GDP per capita and education levels will be sound and important indicators of that country’s environmental friendliness.
References


Appendix A

Environmental Performance

The ten issue categories included in my environmental performance variable are Air Quality, Water & Sanitation, Heavy Metals, Biodiversity & Habitat, Forests, Fisheries, Climate & Energy, Air Pollution, Water Resources, and Agriculture. All of these categories effectively reflect a country’s environmental friendliness and sustainability, and each includes numerous indicators that measure the issue category. Air quality considers how indoor and outdoor air pollution, caused by natural or man-made contaminants released into the atmosphere, are leading threats to human health. Water and sanitation includes indicators measuring sanitation and access to drinking water. Heavy metals can cause extreme health challenges, and the EPI measures them through lead exposure. The biodiversity and habitat indicator is measured by terrestrial biome protection, marine protected areas, species protection index, protected area representatives index, and species habitat index. A country’s forest score is measured by tree cover loss. Fish stock status and Regional Marine Trophic Index indicate a country’s fishery score. A country’s response to climate change and energy are measured by carbon dioxide emission intensity, methane emission intensity, nitrous oxide emission intensity, and black carbon emission entity. Sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide emissions indicate a country’s levels of air pollution. Water resources are measured by a country’s wastewater treatment, which minimizes the negative impacts of sewage. Agricultural productivity is indicated by the Sustainable Nitrogen Management Index.

Appendix B

Democracy Score

The index values are used to place countries within one of four regime types:
1. Full democracies: scores greater than 8
2. Flawed democracies: scores greater than 6, and less than or equal to 8
3. Hybrid regimes: scores greater than 4, and less than or equal to 6
4. Authoritarian regimes: scores less than or equal to 4

Full democracies are classified as countries that not only respect basic political freedoms and civil liberties, but also tend to be underpinned by a political culture that emphasizes and places great value on democracy: the government functions satisfactorily, the media is independent, checks and balances exist, and the judiciary is independent.

Flawed democracies, like full democracies, are required to maintain free and fair elections and respect basic civil liberties. Unlike full democracies, though, flawed democracies contain significant weaknesses in their forms of governance.
Hybrid regimes tend to have substantially irregular elections that prevent them from being free and fair in addition to serious weakness in political culture, functioning of government, and political participation. Corruption is common, and the press and the judiciary are not independent.

Authoritarian regimes are states where political pluralism is either absent or extremely limited, and many of these states have outright dictatorships. Elections are neither free nor fair, civil liberties are violated, media are state-owned, and there is no independent judiciary.

**Wealth:** In order to measure the wealth and development of each country in my study, I utilized The World Bank’s data for income and GDP per capita. I chose GDP per capita rather than other forms of measuring a country’s wealth because it divides the country’s gross domestic product by its total population, making it a good example of a country’s standard of living. GDP per capita is also an effective way of making cross-country comparisons.

**Appendix C**

**Public Environmental Engagement**

Countries included in my sample include the following:

1. Algeria
2. Azerbaijan
3. Argentina
4. Australia
5. Armenia
6. Brazil
7. Belarus
8. Chile
9. China
10. Colombia
11. Cyprus
12. Ecuador
13. Estonia
14. Georgia
15. Germany
16. Ghana
17. Haiti
18. India
19. Iraq
20. Japan
21. Kazakhstan
22. Jordan
Appendix D

Public Environmental Engagement

The minimum sample size used by the WVS is 1200 and must represent all people of age 18 or older within private households in each country. The survey is translated into all languages which serve as the first language for 15% or more of the population in each country where the survey is conducted. Interviews are conducted face-to-face with respondents, and non-response issues are minimized by investigators.

The questions that I focused on from the WVS were as follows:
**SIGMA**

**Q1:** Active/Inactive membership: Environmental organization
   0. Not a member
   1. Inactive member
   2. Active member

**Q2:** Looking after the environment is important to this person; to care for nature and save life resources
   1. Very much like me
   2. Like me
   3. Somewhat like me
   4. A little like me
   5. Not like me
   6. Not at all like me

**Q3:** Most serious problem of the world
   1. People living in poverty and need
   2. Discrimination against girls and women
   3. Poor sanitation and infectious diseases
   4. Inadequate education
   5. Environmental pollution

**Q4:** Protecting environment vs. Economic Growth
   1. Protecting the environment should be given priority, even if it causes slower economic growth and some loss of jobs
   2. Economic growth and creating jobs should be the top priority, even if the environment suffers to some extent
   3. Other answer

**Q5:** Past two years: given money to ecological organization
   1. Yes
   2. No

**Q6:** Past two years: participated in demonstration for environment
   1. Yes
   2. No

These questions were most relevant to my topic of public engagement in environmental friendliness. I measured the percentage of environmentally friendly answers for each question in each country that the survey was performed, creating a comprehensive variable of environmental friendliness by averaging the percentage for each country.
In the decades following the end of the Cold War, relations between the United States and Russia have been anything but warm. While the two countries have found ways to collaborate in areas of mutual interest, leaders have debated over a variety of topics in which the countries have competing interests. These include nuclear proliferation, NATO alliance expansion, involvement in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet sphere, and more recently, obstruction of democratic liberal processes.

One of the main battlegrounds between US and Russian competing interests is the region of Poland and the Baltic States. The tug-of-war for influence in this region dates back to the mid-twentieth century during the Cold War. Poland was under heavy control of the Soviet bloc until 1989 when it was able to break away and create a more independent government. Similarly, the three Baltic States that were occupied by Soviet troops throughout the Cold War gained recognition of independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, and Soviet troops withdrew from the three countries in the following years. Since then, both Russia and the United States have taken an interest in fostering support from these four countries to assist in their competing interests.

The United States has a vested interest in the success of democracy in Poland and the Baltic States for several reasons. First, the United States has an interest in the success of democracy abroad, which includes Eastern Europe, where democracy is young and not firmly established. Also, since these countries are full NATO members, the United States is obligated to defend them in the event of an invasion from Russia. Finally, the presence of the United States in Poland and the Baltic States is a deterring force against Russian aggression.

Based on these key interests, the United States should increase the number of military troops in the region by 50 percent contingent on the increase of support from
Western European countries and an increase of 50 percent in defense spending in Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. This new policy will deter Russian aggression, strengthen democratic ties in the region, and reassure allies of the importance of their security from the perspective of the United States. It also has the best chance of limiting Russian counteractions and bolstering Western European support of the current proposed policies.

This paper will proceed as follows. First, I will give a brief background of the history of Poland and the Baltic States as it relates to US and Russian involvement. Then, I will describe the interests the United States has in Poland and the Baltic States and analyze why they are important to US national security. Next, I will outline three potential policies scholars and diplomats have proposed to achieve US interests in the region and describe the potential efficacy of each one. Finally, I will propose the policy that will be in the best interest of the United States and the four regional countries.

**Background**

The United States has supported Poland and the three Baltic states since their earliest days of independence in 1918. Throughout the Cold War, the United States voiced its disapproval of the unjust control the Soviet Union held over these countries. US leaders refused to recognize Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania as part of the Soviet Union. Instead, they repeatedly referred to these countries as independent countries occupied by Soviet troops. The United States provided significant support in the 1990s as each of these countries worked to establish liberal democratic governments.

Part of the US plan to integrate these young democratic countries into the Western world was to provide a clear path for them to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to provide further security protection. In 1999, only ten years after freeing itself from the Soviet bloc, Poland joined NATO. Five years later, in 2004, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania joined as well. This greatly upset Russian leaders, who were under the impression US leaders had promised that NATO would not expand to include former Warsaw Pact countries. Russia viewed these events as a threat to its regional control. However, Russian troops refused to respond with military action, fearing to spark conflict with NATO member states.

More recently, Russian aggression has grown in the countries bordering Russia. In 2008, Russia invaded Georgia to have a deciding hand in the war over Abkhazia

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2 Ibid.
and South Ossetia. This caused NATO to respond by increasing navy presence in the Black Sea. In 2014, Russia annexed the Ukrainian peninsula of Crimea and the Donbas region of Eastern Ukraine. This followed years of political tension over pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian leadership. In November 2020, Russian peacekeeping troops returned to the Caucasus region to help settle the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. While the two sides were able to reach a peace agreement, Russian troops have remained in the region and are expected to remain there for at least the next five years. These events show Russia is ready and willing to deploy troops to foreign countries in order to control its interests in the near abroad.

In response to increased Russian aggression, NATO members agreed in 2016 to send military troops to Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania called the Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP). These troops were to reassure the countries of NATO’s willingness to provide protection and deter Russia from further aggression in the region. By the summer of 2017, 1,100 UK-led troops were deployed to Estonia, 1,138 Canadian-led troops were deployed to Latvia, 1,022 German-led troops were sent to Lithuania, and 1,270 US-led troops were sent to Poland. While the number of EFP troops has increased dramatically in recent years, US military presence in the region is still small compared to the tens of thousands of US troops spread throughout Western Europe. Since the deployment of EFP troops, a debate has arisen among scholars and policymakers over whether more should be done to ensure security in the region.

US Interest in Poland and the Baltic States

Three Key Interests

US involvement in this region stems from three key interests as well as historic precedence. These key interests include supporting democracy abroad, strengthening relationships with allies, and deterring Russian aggression beyond its borders. First, since Poland and the Baltic States have made clear attempts to establish themselves as strong democratic countries, the United States should help them in their efforts in the interest of supporting democracy. Since the early 20th century and the Wilson administration, the United States has adopted a policy of “mak[ing] the world safe

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6 Ibid.
for democracy.”11 This long-standing tradition continues in Eastern Europe where democracy is young. By helping these countries establish a democratic foundation, the United States will be able to hold them up as examples of how democracy is the most prosperous ideology to adopt. This will help promote democracy in other Eastern European countries where democracy is either weak or weakening. For example, many of the Balkan countries such as Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Bulgaria have had a complicated relationship with democratic institutions over the past thirty years. If these countries witness a clear success of democracy in Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, they may be open to adopting stronger liberal democratic reforms. In addition, strengthened US military defense in the region will allow Poland and the Baltic States to focus on strengthening their own democratic institutions rather than building up their defense forces.

Second, and perhaps more importantly, the United States has a key interest in maintaining good relations with its allies in Europe. One of the key security alliances the United States is a part of is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Since Poland and the Baltic States are all full members of this alliance, the United States is obligated to assist them in minimizing security threats from abroad—most importantly, from Russia.12 Leaders of the Baltic States and Poland have consistently asked for increased assistance from the United States in fighting off a Russian threat. For example, Lithuanian Defense Minister Raimundas Karoblis said the following: “Let me be very clear: The US is the most powerful ally, and its deterrent effect is not comparable to other allies. I am convinced that Russia would not dare to test NATO if US military units are deployed on a persistent basis in the three Baltic states.”13 The United States must take interest in the requests of these foreign leaders and assess whether or not to honor those requests. Failing to be sufficiently involved in these countries has potential ramifications of losing the trust of other allies in the West, hurting the world image of US-led international institutions, and threatening transatlantic economic relations. These negative effects are clearly not in the interests of the United States.

Third, the United States has an interest in deterring Russian aggression in the former-Soviet sphere. In the past two decades, President Putin has involved Russia in the domestic issues of several neighboring countries, including Georgia and Ukraine. It has been the strategic policy of the last three US presidential administrations to deter Russian aggression with the goal of limiting the rise of Russia’s geopolitical influence in Eurasia. This can be achieved with significant US involvement in Poland

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and the Baltic States. As the Lithuanian defense minister noted, and as expressed by Russian scholars, the US military is a strong deterrent force from the Russian perspective. If there is a sufficient number of troops in the region, it is highly unlikely Russia would be willing to invade or attack those countries because it does not want to spark a conflict with the United States. Therefore, increased US military presence in the region will deter Russian aggression not only in Poland and the Baltics, but also in nearby countries such as Ukraine and Georgia. This will help the United States achieve its interests on several fronts.

**Presidential Administrations and Involvement**

A final reason the United States should take interest in Poland and the Baltic States is due to the long tradition of presidential support for these countries. Since the end of the Cold War, every presidential administration has emphasized US involvement in this region with the goal of deterring Russian aggression and limiting the rise of Russia’s geopolitical influence in Eurasia. This has set a strong precedence for the United States to continue to take part in security issues for these countries. Since the relationship with these countries has not fundamentally changed, there is no reason the United States should lose interest in their success and security.

Under the Obama administration, President Obama faced the bold task of responding to Russia after the annexation of Crimea and invasion of eastern Ukraine. In September 2014, President Obama traveled to Estonia and met with leaders of the Baltic States to reassure them of the continued support of the United States against potential Russian threats. While many have criticized Obama’s response to Russia as being weak and not doing enough for the Ukrainian people, his reassurance to the Baltic States as NATO allies was sufficient for Baltic leaders to trust in the support of the NATO alliance. This highlights a key difference between NATO allies and non-NATO allies. Since the Baltics and Poland are NATO members, the United States holds a greater responsibility in supporting them than it does in supporting other countries such as Ukraine that fall victim to the aggression of great powers such as Russia.

Under the Trump administration, support for Poland and the Baltics continued. Despite the president’s strong isolationist rhetoric and policy of “America First,” Trump continued to take interest in bolstering up the security of these foreign coun-

18 Ibid.
tries. For example, in July 2019, President Trump committed an additional 1,000 troops to Poland in addition to the 1,100 US-led troops from NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence.\textsuperscript{19} This move clearly emphasized the Trump administration’s intent to support Poland against Russian threats. While President Trump refused the offer from Polish leaders to establish a permanent military base in Poland, his commitment of additional troops was a strong move to support allies in a time when the president alienated the United States from many other traditional allies.\textsuperscript{20}

In 2018, President Trump upset NATO allies by threatening to withdraw the United States from NATO if each country did not increase their defense spending to at least 2 percent.\textsuperscript{21} While the demand for increased spending and the threshold of 2 percent were not unique to the Trump administration, the threat of withdrawal angered and scared NATO allies. Later that year, he demanded the benchmark be raised to 4 percent.\textsuperscript{22} By 2019, the three Baltic states and Poland led in European defense spending as a percentage of GDP with Estonia at 2.1 percent and Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland at 2 percent each. Only four other countries had also met the goal of spending at least 2 percent GDP on defense spending. While Trump recognized these countries for reaching the benchmark, he pushed them to do more.\textsuperscript{23} In response to that request, these countries adopted plans to continue to increase spending to 3 percent by 2030. These moves demonstrate that Poland and the Baltic States are deeply committed to having a strong relationship with the United States and are willing to meet demands to please US leaders. In return, the United States should be willing to protect these allies.

While the cost of upsetting Western allies may prove to be severe, increased defense spending from NATO allies will surely alleviate some of the financial burden the United States holds. As NATO members continue to take an increased share of the financial burden of defense spending, it is in the interest of the United States to continue to support its allies with manpower and supplies. Since one of the key security threats to NATO is Russia, it continues to be in the interests of the United States to provide military support in the region of Poland and the Baltics.

President Biden has expressed his desire to strengthen relationships with allies and reassure them of US support for NATO.\textsuperscript{24} This likely means that the United States will become more involved in Europe than it has been in the past four years.


\textsuperscript{20} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{23} Ibid.

Biden has also emphasized his plan to assist countries who face challenges from great power aggression. Thus, we can expect to see an increase of support for Poland and the Baltic States that fits squarely under both of these categories during the Biden administration.

**Potential Policy Solutions**

There are three main policy solutions in the current debate of what the correct US involvement is in Poland and the Baltic States. The first is to maintain the status quo, the second is to withdraw military support from the region altogether, and the third is to increase military support.

**Maintain the Status Quo**

A large portion of scholars and policymakers advocate that the United States should maintain the status quo with its involvement in Poland and the Baltics. Those who support this policy argue that any increased involvement in the region—especially military involvement—will provoke Russia to respond militarily. They believe regional dominance is so vital to Russian national interests that Russia will do anything to preserve it. In fact, bouts of Russian aggression in the past have been in direct response to perceived outside threats. For example, they argue Russia annexed Crimea and invaded eastern Ukraine only after the Euromaidan revolution that was sparked by public interest in joining Western European institutions such as the European Union and NATO. Thus, to prevent further Ukrainian alignment with the West, Russia chose to intervene. However, this argument overlooks the fact that Russian aggression abroad has been on the rise long before the events of 2014, and Russia has intervened militarily in places that are much less aligned with the West, including Georgia and Azerbaijan.

Other supporters of this policy claim the United States should focus on alleviating tensions between Russia through direct diplomatic routes rather than through involvement in Poland and the Baltics. While it is true much more could be done to strengthen diplomatic ties with Russia, it is unfair to leave Poland and the Baltics vulnerable to Russian threats while the diplomatic process, which is likely to take a long time, is under way. Thus, while the United States should pursue stronger diplomatic relations, it must also fulfill its obligation to protect its allies during the process.

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25 Ibid.
Still others in this group claim the title of NATO membership is enough to keep these countries safe.\textsuperscript{29} They argue since Russia has never before invaded a NATO country, it will not begin to do so now. They believe the current EFP troops in the Baltics and Poland are sufficient to deter Russia and do not need to be increased. Although it is true Russia has not invaded a NATO country in the past, this is no assurance it will not elect to do so if it is in Russia’s best interest in the future. It would be careless to wait to protect against a potential Russian invasion until after the invasion has occurred.

\textit{Withdraw Military Completely}

A smaller group of researchers and policymakers propose a complete withdrawal of US troops from the region of Poland and the Baltics. Some who support this policy are isolationists who believe the United States is far too overstretched in its interests abroad.\textsuperscript{30} They claim it would be best to retrench from frivolous security alliances that bleed the United States dry of resources, military, and money. In their view, the countries of Europe have benefitted from security and protection at little or no cost to them.\textsuperscript{31} This is indicated by the low percentage of defense spending in many European countries. For them, European countries should be able to take care of themselves without US involvement. This argument is concerning because it underplays the threat Russia may pose to US national security in the future. If the United States can mitigate Russian aggression and expansion, it is in its interest to do so to limit Russian influence before it ever threatens the United States.

On the opposite side of this group, non-isolationists believe the United States has more important threats to national security elsewhere in the world. They argue that sending excessive troops and resources to Eastern Europe where there is only an indirect threat to US national security is unwise, and the United States should re-allocate its manpower and resources to regions in the world where it will provide direct protection to the US homeland.\textsuperscript{32} These regions include the Middle East and East Asia. This group similarly underestimates the threat Russia poses to US national security. They also fail to consider that the more that NATO member states increase their defense spending, the less the United States will pay in terms of resources and money. Troops will still be deployed in the region, but the cost of these troops’ presence will be much lower to the American people.


Increase Military Support

The final group of scholars and policymakers, many of whom are native to the region, support a policy where the United States increases military troops and support in Poland and the Baltic States. Members of this group believe the success of NATO is so important to US interests that it is worth any effort to protect against existential threats such as Russian aggression.\(^{33}\) Many claim the number of troops should be at least double the current amount.\(^{34}\) While not all of these troops must come from the United States, these scholars believe that the United States is the most capable country of sparing additional troops because its military apparatus and defense budget is already much stronger than most of its European allies. Additionally, they advocate for the establishment of a permanent US military presence in Poland.\(^{35}\) Doing so will signal to Russia the severity that a response to a security threat in the region will hold.

In addition to the increase of military troops in the region, scholars and policymakers who promote this policy push for all NATO member states to continue to increase defense spending. Some even support an effort to double defense spending from 2 percent to 4 percent GDP.\(^{36}\) They believe if all NATO members—including Poland and the Baltic States—are willing to robustly enhance their military forces, this, in addition to increased US military troops, will be sufficient to deter any perceived Russian threats in the future. Anything less than these policy changes will leave border countries of NATO such as Poland and the Baltic States susceptible to Russian security threats.

The arguments in support of this policy are not without merit. Doubling both troops and defense spending in the region would certainly make the region safer against potential Russian threats. However, the potential cost of the deterioration of US-Russian diplomatic relations as a result of this robust military increase in the region may be too high to justify the means.\(^{37}\) This course of action could potentially spark a new arms race as Russia tries to counteract and build up its own military capabilities. Also, such a robust buildup of military in the region would leave little

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\(^{34}\) Ibid.


room for the United States to gain leverage over Russia if future tensions were to escalate.

**Proposed Policy Solution**

Due to the factors discussed earlier, the best course of action for the United States to take in Poland and the Baltic States is a moderate increase of military troops and support. This policy is built on three parts: increase of US military troops, increase of NATO defense spending, and creation of a security committee. NATO should increase military troops in each of these four countries by 50 percent over the next five years. In Poland, where there are currently just over 2,000 US-led troops, the United States should commit an additional 1,000 troops by the year 2026. These troops should continue to be sent on a rotational basis rather than establishing a permanent US military presence in Poland. In Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, where there are currently about 1,000 NATO troops each, NATO should commit at least 500 troops to each country by 2026. Of these 500, at least 200 should be US troops to show the Baltic States the United States is committed to help protect them. While the increase of troops in the region may concern Russia, the gradual nature of the increase will not spark a direct counteraction from Russia.

The United States should also push for an increase of defense spending from each NATO member state to 3 percent by 2030. This is a 50 percent increase from the current benchmark. Poland and the Baltic States are already on track to reach this goal. The inclusion of other Western European countries in this goal will greatly increase Europe’s ability to fund military and security efforts against Russian threats and decrease the cost of US military involvement. In conjunction with this effort, the United States should encourage the European Union to take a more direct interest in the security of Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, who have all been EU members for 16 years. This will better balance the burden of defending the region between the two organizations who have the strongest interests in protecting its outer borders from Russian security threats.

Finally, the United States should advocate the creation of the Poland-Baltic Security Committee as a branch of the larger NATO Security Committee. This committee will be made up of defense experts from Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania as well as the four countries who lead EFP troops (the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Germany). These experts will meet every five years to review and assess the security of Poland and the Baltic States. If they determine security threats have grown over the past five years, they may suggest to the NATO Security Committee an additional increase in troops and support. Similarly, if they find security threats have weakened, they may request a decrease of military presence in the region. Such a committee is an important aspect of the policy because it recognizes security threats are always changing, and it can adjust resources accordingly to optimize the use of military troops and spending in the areas that are the most urgent.
Conclusion

US-Russian relations have always been complicated. In recent years, Russia has tried to show its great power dominance in the countries along its borders. This has negatively impacted efforts to strengthen democracy abroad, a vital US interest. The United States made clear its commitment to Poland and the Baltic States in its 2018 US National Defense Strategy: “Russia has violated the borders of nearby nations and pursues veto power over the economic, diplomatic, and security decisions of its neighbors . . . A robust constellation of allies and partners will sustain American influence and ensure favorable balances of power that safeguard the free and open international order.”38

The best way to respond to Russian aggression and preserve US interests in the region is by increasing support for Poland and the Baltics. Anders Fogh Rasmussen, former Secretary General of NATO stated, “The U.S. and Europe need to take a firm stance because the only language Putin understands is the language of power.”39 The proposed policy of a gradual increase of military support and the creation of a security committee is the best option for defending US interests in the region and preserving the security of US allies. This policy, while strong-handed, will not incite Russia to respond militarily. It is also adaptable, allowing countries to change the military presence in the region as the security environment changes in future years.

While the future of US-Russia relations promises to be complex and difficult, the strengthening of the security in the region of Poland and the Baltics will be an important step in keeping Russian aggression at bay and strengthening other important security allies.

References


In recent years, Hollywood has produced a greater number of films that portray humanized homosexual characters in either leading or supporting roles. Notable and successful films of this type include *Love Simon* (2018), *Green Book* (2018), and *Bohemian Rhapsody* (2018). The critical and financial success of these films is most likely a result of increasing levels of social acceptance of the LGBT community in the last decade. But perhaps the exposition of a humanized homosexual character in a film could motivate an individual who originally did not support pro-LGBT legislation to amend their opinions. This research seeks to answer the question: does increased exposure to films containing a humanized homosexual character affect viewers’ support for pro-LGBT policies? Specifically, it seeks to discover whether these films have any sway on policy support among those living in the predominantly religious and conservative state of Utah. I claim that increased exposure to films containing sympathetic LGBT characters will correlate with increased support for pro-LGBT policies. This paper provides a short description of the history of homosexuality in cinema as well as American society, explains basic assumptions based on prior research on the political implications of film, outlines the methods whereby its claim was tested, analyzes observational data, and deliberates the implications of its analysis.

Specific terms of importance are used in this paper as follows. Homosexuality relates to the romantic and sexual behavior and attraction between individuals of the same sex or gender. A homosexual is an individual who attaches a sense of their identity to these behaviors and attractions. The terms “gay” and “lesbian” are also used in this paper to refer to homosexual individuals. LGBT is an acronym that encompasses people who identify themselves as either lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender. A pro-LGBT policy is defined as legislation that attempts to satisfy the de-
mands of LGBT interest groups by providing equal rights to individuals regardless of gender identity or sexual orientation. Lastly, a humanizing film is defined as a motion picture that uses messages that do not portray homosexuality as strictly comedic or deplorable, but rather characterizes them as people with similar emotions, motivations, and ambitions as the straight characters portrayed. A humanizing message in the context of homosexuals can portray a homosexual lifestyle as favorable, as well as focus on the humanity of a specific homosexual individual.

Attitudes toward Homosexuals in Film and Society

The depiction of homosexuality in film has an interesting history. Early Hollywood made a mockery of cross-dressing males and females in its silent comedies (Benshoff & Griffin 2006, 25). In response to public outcry against immoral and violent films, Hollywood instituted its Production Code in 1933, which restricted “sex perversion,” including the depiction of homosexuality (Benshoff & Griffin 2006, 30). Under the influence of the Production Code, Hollywood depicted queer-coded characters—or characters that were only subtextually implied to be queer—as predators and villains in horror films (Benshoff 1997, 12). Homosexuality continued to be either censored or viewed in a negative light in films until the counter-culture movement of the late 1960s and 1970s grew in popularity. Hollywood adjusted to the countercultural climate and began to release more films targeted at younger audiences that reflected the views of the sexual revolution (Mennel 2012, 50). Mainstream films began streamlining gay side characters—characterized as such either explicitly through direct references to their homosexuality or implicitly through subtle nods to gay behavior or stereotypes—into supporting and minor roles. In the decades following the sexual revolution, queer films have dominated the independent film scene and have even received Academy Award consideration (Benshoff & Griffin 2006, 262). From the late 1990s into the twenty-first century, evolving social norms allowed humanized homosexuality to become more prevalent in blockbuster Hollywood films. What had originated in film as a point of mockery evolved into a commonplace occurrence. Film scholar Richard Maltby said, “Hollywood is a ‘social institution,’ and therefore it is understandable that it should reflect society’s hopes, fears and beliefs” (Maltby 1995, 361). Society’s hopes, fears, and beliefs about homosexuals in particular over time can be seen very clearly throughout cinema history.

Attitudes toward homosexuality and the LGBT community have also evolved over time. In 1970, more than 70% of Americans viewed homosexual behavior as always wrong and believed that homosexuals should not be allowed to work in government positions or as court officials (Levitt & Klassen 1976, 31). Although homosexuality as a whole was looked down upon, those who had prior familiarity with a homosexual, such as a family member or coworker, had less prejudice toward homosexuals (Herek 1984). As the twentieth century came to a close, American attitudes toward homosexuality and LGBT civil liberties grew more positive. This cultural shift spawned from significant demographic shifts in America. Notably, the increased
number of college graduates and the decreased amount of religious affiliation contributed to higher levels of support for the protection of civil liberties of homosexual Americans by the year 1998 (Loftus 2001, 767). Public opinion polling from 1981 to 2000 suggests that acceptance of homosexuality is negatively correlated with age (Anderson & Fetner 2008). Further, attitudes among young adults in the 21st century suggest that they are less likely to demonstrate sexual prejudice to their gay and lesbian peers (Horn 2006). These demographic and social norm shifts spawned a new push for LGBT rights, recognition, and non-discriminatory policy.

The first two decades of the twenty-first century saw massive changes in legislation and policy pertaining to the equal treatment of homosexuals, culminating with the legalization of same-sex marriage. Since then, a variety of anti-discrimination bills and resolutions for equality regardless of gender identity or sexual orientation have been debated in Congress and state legislatures. Although some states have enacted LGBT employment anti-discrimination laws, homosexuals still regularly report incidents of discrimination to their state employment agencies (Sears & Mallory 2011). Despite numerous cases of discrimination, national trends suggest much wider acceptance of pro-LGBT policies in recent years. By 2014, a majority of Americans (56 percent) and growing numbers of Republicans (41 percent) and young adults (about 75 percent) supported same-sex couples’ right to marry (NORC 2014). By 2017, in the state of Utah, where this study took place, 54% favored the legalization of same-sex marriages, while 80% favored LGBT employment and housing nondiscrimination laws (Public Religion Research Institute 2017). Americans that oppose anti-discrimination policy link their opposition to their personal views of morality or privacy, rather than to a lack of desire for equality (Mucciaroni 2008).

Today, mainstream films tend to reflect more favorable attitudes toward homosexuality and pro-LGBT policies by including gay and lesbian main or supporting characters and portraying them in a sympathetic, humanizing manner. For example, *The Imitation Game* (2014) is a historical drama that tells the story of the World War II British cryptanalyst, Alan Turing, that ends with social commentary about the chemical castration Turing and thousands of other homosexuals endured by the order of the British government. *Green Book* (2018) also paints a picture of the history of discrimination against homosexuals in the mid-twentieth century, although its messages are not as glaring as *The Imitation Game*’s. Additionally, recent biopics *Bohemian Rhapsody* (2018) and *Rocketman* (2019) explore the homosexuality of beloved musicians Freddie Mercury and Elton John. Homosexuality has even made its way into fantasy and science fiction. *Fantastic Beasts: The Crimes of Grindelwald* (2018) depicts the protagonist’s mentor, Albus Dumbledore, gazing into a mirror that will reveal what an individual desires most and seeing a romantic relationship with another man. Other films have attempted to slip suggestions of homosexuality into the background rather than at the forefront, such as *Star Wars: The Rise of Skywalker* (2019), which featured a lesbian kiss between two minor characters in the back corner of the frame at the film’s con-
clusion. These aforementioned films are only a selection of a vast number of films in recent years that have humanized their homosexual characters.

**Theory & Hypothesis**

Alongside the influx of Hollywood’s humanized homosexual characters, perhaps there has also been a shift in policy preference as a result of these films’ popularity. Previous research conducted by Butler et al. (1995) concluded that a politically charged film has significant impacts on the audience’s intentions to engage in various political actions such as voting and donating money to campaigns (248). Additionally, films also have the power to significantly change an audience’s opinions on specific government entities (Pautz 2015). Riggle et al. (1996) conducted specific research that observed the impact of viewing a documentary about a gay politician on the audience’s level of prejudice toward homosexuals. The study found that the documentary film had a “significant impact on viewers’ attitudes toward gay men, and regardless of [pre-viewing] level of prejudice, the impact was in the less-prejudiced direction” (Riggle et al. 1996, 64).

These previous studies’ confirmations that film has the power to shift an audience’s opinion on politics as well as level of prejudice toward homosexuals influence this research’s assumptions. Film scholar Douglas Kellner suggests that “images and figures constitute part of the ideological representations of sex, race, and class in film and culture” (Kellner 1991, 3). Thus, even though a film featuring an LGBT character may have low levels of political content, the viewer can surely still unearth ideological meaning from the film’s figures (Haas, Christensen, & Haas 2015, 6). When an individual finds what they are consuming entertaining, they will passively digest messages about how society functions for a minority (Garretson 2009, 74). If exposure to a film can impact an audience member’s political and social opinions, it should naturally follow that increased exposure to a number of films containing references to homosexuality and homosexual characters will increase the level of impact in a viewer’s opinions.

This research aims to discover how much of a sway increased exposure to these films has on the policy positions of those residing in the state of Utah, which is somewhat unique because of its dominant conservative and religious attitudes. As I mentioned earlier, I hypothesize that increased exposure to humanized homosexual characters in film would translate to greater support of pro-LGBT policies. Although conservatism is often negatively correlated with support for pro-LGBT policies, I expect to find that the more someone is exposed to films with a humanized LGBT character, the more their policy preferences would change to support pro-LGBT policy regardless of political persuasion. This assumption is supported by Riggle et al.’s (1996) findings surrounding exposure to a pro-LGBT film and subsequent levels of social prejudice toward homosexuals (64). Further, I hypothesize that exposure to films with higher levels of LGBT content will also predict stronger support for pro-LGBT policies.
Methods

A field survey was designed to test the effect on increased exposure to films containing a LGBT character on attitudes toward pro-LGBT policies among residents of the state of Utah. The survey was administered from March 16-20, 2020. Due to the encouraged social distancing of the COVID-19 global pandemic, the survey respondents responded electronically through the Internet. The survey was posted through Google Forms on Facebook groups such as “Salt Lake/Utah County Yard Sales, Job Listings, Business Advertisement,” “Utah Classifieds,” “Utah Community Forum,” and “Salt Lake Area News.” Members of these groups were informed they would be taking part in an undergraduate research survey, but no information regarding the content of the survey was provided prior to its administration. Because these Internet groups were not entirely political in nature, it was hard to predict whether there was any likely bias in the sample collected. However, social media users tend to be younger on average than the general population, so the sample could be skewed to include a larger proportion of younger respondents than within the target population.

Respondents were asked a collection of demographic questions that could be predictive of their levels of support for pro-LGBT policies. Among these were their age, sexual orientation, whether or not they have a familial or personal relationship with any lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender individuals, and if so, how many. Additionally, they were asked to identify their level of political conservatism on a scale of 1–5 (1 being not conservative at all and 5 being very conservative). These demographic questions were chosen because they could help identify possible factors that predict an individual’s level of support for pro-LGBT policies. They were specifically selected based on conclusions drawn by prior research in which younger ages, less conservatism, and personal contact with an LGBT individual were correlated with warmer feelings about homosexuality (Anderson & Fetner 2008; Horn 2006; Valelly 2012).

To measure an individual’s exposure to films containing an LGBT character, respondents were asked how many films of this type they had viewed in the last five years. A list of twenty-two films ranging in release dates from 2015 to 2019 was provided and the respondents indicated which films they had viewed. This was done to help respondents that may have had trouble remembering or recognizing which films they had viewed that contained LGBT representation. The selected films were all major releases that had at least some name recognition and received relative critical and financial success. The twenty-two films on the list were:

*Dope* (2015)
*Moonlight* (2016)
*Deadpool* (2016)
*Star Trek Beyond* (2016)
*It* (2017)
Respondents then answered questions pertaining to their opinions on five separate pro-LGBT policies. Support for a particular policy was measured on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 indicating strong opposition and 5 indicating strong support. The questions were worded as follows:

Table 1: Survey Question Wording

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy</th>
<th>Question</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employment Anti-Discrimination</td>
<td>All in all, how likely would you support legislation that protects individuals in the workplace regardless of sexual orientation or gender identity?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing Anti-Discrimination</td>
<td>All in all, how likely would you support legislation that protects housing rights of individuals regardless of their sexual orientation or gender identity?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adoption Rights</td>
<td>How likely would you support legislation that gives same-sex parents the same child adoption rights as heterosexual couples?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transgender Bathrooms</td>
<td>How likely would you support legislation that allows children to use the bathroom in public schools that suits their preferred gender identity?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conversion Therapy</td>
<td>All in all, how likely would you support legislation that bans child conversion therapy?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When the demographics of the sample collected are compared to the demographics of the population as a whole, there are some obvious discrepancies. Most notably, the survey oversampled individuals that were young and identified as lean-
ing liberal and liberal. This most likely occurred because the survey was conducted over the internet within like-minded groups. To accommodate for this oversampling, I apply post-stratification weights to the sample as follows:

Table 2: Post-stratification Weights

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population Parameters</th>
<th>Sample Parameters</th>
<th>Applied Weight (W)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conservative/Lean Conservative</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>18.48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Lean/Independent</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>18.18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal/Lean Liberal</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>63.34%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Within the analysis, the twenty-two films were divided into three categories based on the amount of LGBT content within each film. This was done in order to differentiate the effects of films with subtle nods to homosexuality from films in which homosexuality is a prominent theme on an individual’s policy preference. Films with low LGBT content were categorized as films in which homosexuality is either only implied or limited to a single, isolated moment during the film. Films were categorized with medium LGBT content if homosexuality plays a minor role in the film’s plot. In these films, a main or prominent supporting character was either openly homosexual or involved in some homosexual actions, whether those actions were shown or merely implied. High LGBT content films were those in which the plot centered around the homosexuality of either the main character or a prominent supporting character. Within these films, there was clear depiction of romance between characters of the same sex. The breakdown of the twenty-two films into the three respective categories are shown in Table 3.

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Table 3: LGBT Film Content Categories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Low LGBT Content</th>
<th>Medium LGBT Content</th>
<th>High LGBT Content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Solo: A Star Wars Story</em> (2018)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Jojo Rabbit</em> (2019)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For the main analysis, I simplified support for each policy to a 3-point scale, from -1 (opposition to the policy) to 1 (support for the policy). To test my hypothesis, I conducted an ordinal logit regression with the collected data in which an average level of support for all five pro-LGBT policies is the dependent variable. The independent variables included the number of films viewed by category as well as each respondents’ age, conservatism, sexual orientation, presence of an LGBT friend or family member, and the number of LGBT friends and family members. In order to avoid problems associated with multicollinearity with the three LGBT variables, I presented separate models with these variables together and separately. Further, each category of film is given its own models as well. An ordinal logit regression ensures that the effect of increased exposure to films with LGBT characters on policy preference can be measured while holding all other predictor variables constant. Because the other variables are held constant, I was able to examine a specific relationship between the number of films viewed and support for pro-LGBT policies.

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2 Respondents that indicated an opposition to the given policy (1 or 2 on the 5-point scale) were coded with a support value of -1. Likewise, respondents that indicated support (4 or 5 on the 5-point scale) were coded with a support value of 1. Respondents that indicated they neither oppose nor support the given policy (3 on the 5-point scale) were coded with a support score of zero (0).
Analysis

Table 4: Support for Pro-LGBT Policies.  
Ordered Logit Regression Selected Results.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Films Viewed:</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(8)</th>
<th>(9)</th>
<th>(13)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low LGBT</td>
<td>-0.018</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.077)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.092)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium LGBT</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.295**</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.246*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.121)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.14  )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High LGBT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.399**</td>
<td>0.332**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.157)</td>
<td>(0.167)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.127</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservatism</td>
<td>-1.110***</td>
<td>-1.045***</td>
<td>-1.049***</td>
<td>-0.994***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.137)</td>
<td>(0.139)</td>
<td>(0.137)</td>
<td>(0.148)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LGBT</td>
<td>1.590***</td>
<td>1.664***</td>
<td>1.440**</td>
<td>1.397**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.553)</td>
<td>(0.61)</td>
<td>(0.629)</td>
<td>(0.664)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LGBT Contact (Binary Variable)</td>
<td>0.423</td>
<td>0.381</td>
<td>0.471</td>
<td>0.397</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.569)</td>
<td>(0.581)</td>
<td>(0.569)</td>
<td>(0.588)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of LGBT Contacts</td>
<td>0.088*</td>
<td>0.057</td>
<td>0.066</td>
<td>-0.065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.051)</td>
<td>(0.048)</td>
<td>(0.053)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psuedo R-squared</td>
<td>0.163</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.171</td>
<td>0.177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations (N):</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>329</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, two-tailed

Robust standard errors shown in parentheses. The dependent variable is the average level of support for pro-LGBT policies.

Table 4 displays the results of selected models of the ordered logit regression. The models predict that when all other variables are held constant, increased exposure to films with medium and high levels of LGBT content have a statistically significant (p < 0.05) positive relationship with respondents’ levels of support for pro-LGBT policies. I’ve attributed this to the nature of LGBT representation within the films categorized as medium and high. In these film categories, the films’ LGBT representation is either central to the plot or emphasizes the social and/or political difficulties of

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3 Results for all thirteen models are presented in Table 5.
navigating society as a homosexual. While the films do not explicitly push an agenda about a specific pro-LGBT policy, they each feature a main or prominent supporting character that must endure the societal challenges associated with being a sexual minority. Viewing lovable, humanized characters being harassed, bullied, and discriminated against could push one to support anti-discrimination policies. Perhaps the films that portrayed the difficulty of a homosexual character’s youth or childhood gave sympathy to their viewers toward LGBT children and children confused about their sexual preferences, and in turn the viewers show greater support for preferred gender bathroom use and banning conversion therapy. Likewise, portrayals of homosexuals in romantic relationships could foster support for homosexual couples’ ability to begin families and adopt children.
### Table 5: Support for Pro-LGBT Policies. Ordered Logit Regression Results.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Films Viewed:</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
<th>(7)</th>
<th>(8)</th>
<th>(9)</th>
<th>(10)</th>
<th>(11)</th>
<th>(12)</th>
<th>(13)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Low LGBT</strong></td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>-0.012</td>
<td>-0.048</td>
<td>-0.018</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>-0.012</td>
<td>-0.048</td>
<td>-0.018</td>
<td>-0.101</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.072)</td>
<td>(0.074)</td>
<td>(0.075)</td>
<td>(0.077)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.072)</td>
<td>(0.074)</td>
<td>(0.075)</td>
<td>(0.077)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Medium LGBT</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.355***</td>
<td>0.326***</td>
<td>0.299***</td>
<td>0.295***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.119)</td>
<td>(0.116)</td>
<td>(0.123)</td>
<td>(0.121)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.119)</td>
<td>(0.116)</td>
<td>(0.123)</td>
<td>(0.121)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>High LGBT</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.440***</td>
<td>0.483***</td>
<td>0.441***</td>
<td>0.399**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.152)</td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td>(0.154)</td>
<td>(0.157)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.152)</td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td>(0.154)</td>
<td>(0.157)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.127</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.015)</td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conservatism</strong></td>
<td>-1.156***</td>
<td>-1.16***</td>
<td>-1.138***</td>
<td>-1.110***</td>
<td>-1.064***</td>
<td>-1.085***</td>
<td>-1.082***</td>
<td>-1.045***</td>
<td>-1.084***</td>
<td>-1.092***</td>
<td>-1.084***</td>
<td>-1.049***</td>
<td>-0.994***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.133)</td>
<td>(0.127)</td>
<td>(0.131)</td>
<td>(0.137)</td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>(0.131)</td>
<td>(0.137)</td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>(0.137)</td>
<td>(0.137)</td>
<td>(0.137)</td>
<td>(0.137)</td>
<td>(0.137)</td>
<td>(0.148)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LGBT</strong></td>
<td>1.730***</td>
<td>1.590***</td>
<td>1.737***</td>
<td>1.664***</td>
<td>1.487**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.534)</td>
<td>(0.553)</td>
<td>(0.594)</td>
<td>(0.610)</td>
<td>(0.614)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LGBT Contact</strong></td>
<td>0.823</td>
<td>0.423</td>
<td>0.651</td>
<td>0.381</td>
<td>0.756</td>
<td>0.471</td>
<td>0.397</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.522)</td>
<td>(0.569)</td>
<td>(0.538)</td>
<td>(0.581)</td>
<td>(0.529)</td>
<td>(0.569)</td>
<td>(0.569)</td>
<td>(0.588)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of LGBT Contacts</strong></td>
<td>0.123***</td>
<td>0.088*</td>
<td>0.087*</td>
<td>0.057</td>
<td>0.094</td>
<td>0.066</td>
<td>-0.065</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.047)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.047)</td>
<td>(0.051)</td>
<td>(0.045)</td>
<td>(0.048)</td>
<td>(0.053)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Psuedo R-squared</strong></td>
<td>0.154</td>
<td>0.146</td>
<td>0.151</td>
<td>0.163</td>
<td>0.166</td>
<td>0.156</td>
<td>0.158</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.165</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.162</td>
<td>0.171</td>
<td>0.177</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, two-tailed

Robust standard errors shown in parentheses. The dependent variable is the average level of support for pro-LGBT policies.
Note: Coefficients displayed above are from Model 13. Dependent Variable is the Average Level of Support for Pro-LGBT Policies
Interestingly, increased exposure to films with low levels of LGBT representation predicts opposition to pro-LGBT policies—although this relationship is not statistically significant. I attribute this finding to two possibilities. First, the references to homosexuality in the low categorized films are so isolated or obscure that the films do little to leave a significant message or impact on the audience about homosexuality. It is hard to imagine a same-sex kiss in the background or subtle nod to a minor character’s homosexuality substantially impacting one’s political preferences. It could be the case that because these films are not explicitly about homosexuality, they appeal to conservative viewers as well. Figure 2 displays trends in film exposure by respondent level of conservatism. Within this sample, very conservative respondents viewed more films with low LGBT content than medium or high LGBT content films. These conservative viewers’ pre-disposed political attachments overpowered any brief mentions or depictions of homosexuality. Second, unexpected isolated and subtle nods to homosexuality in blockbuster movie franchises have also led to negative reactions from certain groups of viewers about the films themselves and LGBT representation broadly (O’Connor 2019; Futrelle 2019).
In each of the thirteen models, age has a positive—albeit statistically insignificant—predictive power on support for pro-LGBT policies. This finding is curious considering previous literature that finds a negative relationship between age and attitudes about homosexuality (Anderson & Fetner 2008; Horn 2006). Figure 3 presents the average level of support for pro-LGBT policy by each respondent’s age. The scatter plot indicates that the sample contains a sizable number of younger individuals that are opposed to pro-LGBT policies. At the same time, there are a few outliers among older respondents that strongly support pro-LGBT policies. Whether this can be attributed to error or bias in the collection of the sample or to errors made by individual respondents while indicating their level of support for the policy, these outliers help explain why the regression predicts a small, insignificant positive relationship between age and policy support.

The variables with the strongest predictive power on an individual’s level of support for pro-LGBT policies are an individual’s identification as LGBT and an individual’s level of conservatism. Unsurprisingly, the models predict that individuals who identify as LGBT are more likely to support pro-LGBT policy. Throughout each model where this variable is present, LGBT identification is the strongest positive predictor of policy support. On the contrary, an individual’s level of conservatism is the strongest predictor of opposition to pro-LGBT policy. This finding goes against my original hypothesis, which predicted increased exposure to these films would
outweigh any pre-existing political attitudes. It seems that while increased exposure to humanized homosexual characters is related to higher levels of support for pro-LGBT policies, increased exposure alone is not enough to overpower any previously held political beliefs.

**Limitations, Implications, and Conclusion**

This observation concludes that when all other variables are held constant, increased exposure to films with a humanized LGBT character—with medium to high amounts of LGBT content—is correlated with higher levels of average support for five pro-LGBT policies. While increased exposure to these films did have a significant impact on the level of support for the policies, an individual’s level of conservatism and sexual orientation are much more predictive factors. An individual’s identification as LGBT is the strongest predictor for policy support in every model. Further, it seems that although increased exposure to films with humanized LGBT characters may have some effect on the support for particular pro-LGBT policies, these effects are not large enough to outweigh the existing effects associated with one’s political identification.

It is important to recognize that this observation focuses purely on the films’ impact on viewers’ support of pro-LGBT policies rather than their sympathy toward LGBT people as a whole. It is possible that the exposure to these films had a significant effect on the viewers’ levels of sympathy toward gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender individuals. While one’s political opinions about pro-LGBT policies may have remained nearly unchanged, their desire to be more kind toward LGBT people or attitude regarding LGBT people as a whole could have changed instead. This observation concentrates on the effects of these films on politics and legislation, but further research pertaining to sociological attitudes could contribute to the ongoing LGBT media representation conversation.

An element that may weaken this observation’s conclusion is its inability to address possible self-selection bias of the respondents’ film viewing history. There is a reasonable chance that the respondents that reported higher levels of support for pro-LGBT policies held those policy preferences before they had viewed any of the listed films. Additionally, those that have unfavorable views of pro-LGBT policies or LGBT people as a whole may have decided to abstain from seeing the films in the first place because they are not in alignment with their political view. An experimental approach such as the one performed by Riggle et al. (1996) would be a more effective method to determine the effects of a particular film on policy support without any selection bias. Instead, this observation is only able to claim a correlation between exposure to humanized homosexual characters in film and policy support rather than assert that this exposure causes a change in policy preferences.

This observation’s findings may have interesting implications for politically motivated filmmakers and LGBT advocacy and interest groups. The scattered demographics of lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and transgendered individuals in America
leaves these sexual minorities politically with “structural powerlessness” (Sherrill 1996). This powerlessness implies that in order for these sexual minorities to thrive politically, they must receive the support of heterosexuals (Valelly 2012). The question then remains for these sexual minority advocates: what influences individuals’ levels of support for pro-LGBT policies? Politically motivated filmmakers who support pro-LGBT policies may feel inclined to produce more films that contain humanized LGBT characters and expect rising levels of support to coincide with increased exposure. LGBT advocacy groups could use this information to foster support for films of this type. On a similar note, traditional family advocacy groups and anti-LGBT interest groups may use these findings to organize campaigns to deter individuals from consuming films of this nature.

To conclude, motion pictures have a greater effect on their viewers’ policy preferences than the viewers themselves often realize. When it comes to pro-LGBT policy, increased exposure to films with a humanized LGBT character significantly increases an individual’s willingness to support legislation advocated by LGBT and sexual equality interest groups. It is worth noting, however, that political persuasion and sexual orientation will often have stronger effects on pro-LGBT policy support than increased exposure to films of this type. Although the relationship may be small in comparison, increased exposure to humanized LGBT characters does correlate with an individual’s level of support for pro-LGBT policies. To repeat the film scholar Richard Maltby, “Hollywood is a ‘social institution’ and therefore it is understandable that it should reflect society’s hopes, fears and beliefs” (Maltby 1995, 361). If current Hollywood trends are any indication of America’s current hopes, fears, and beliefs, then it can be expected that support for pro-LGBT policies will increase alongside an increase in LGBT film representation.
Works Cited


On March 8, 2017, millions of men and women filled the streets of dozens of the world’s major cities to commemorate International Women’s Day. Many speculated that the election of Donald Trump, with his misogynist statements and obscene behavior towards women, contributed to the unprecedented numbers of these marches. It was the event’s fortieth anniversary, the United Nations having designated March 8 as International Women’s Day in 1977 to celebrate progress and invite all nations to continue to increase gender equality.

Tunisia celebrates two women’s days. The second, August 13, is also a public holiday celebrating the landmark Code of Personal Status, which gave unrivaled rights to women in the Middle East/North African (MENA) region. The law outlawed polygamy and declared that women were neither “secondary nor complementary” to men (Coleman, 2018).

Tunisia is unique in the region for other reasons. First, Tunisian women have historically enjoyed higher relative levels of equality than their regional neighbors. Also, besides Israel, Tunisia is the only democracy in the MENA region. Could these two anomalies be linked?

This paper explores the status of Tunisian women before, during, and after its 2011 revolution that launched a wave of regional revolutions and mass protests known as the Arab Spring. Only in Tunisia’s case (the so-called Jasmine Revolution) did the Arab Spring result in a lasting democracy (a regime where all legislative and executive positions are filled by representatives who win in free and fair and regular elections), a result that has puzzled social scientists. I argue that an obvious but often forgotten variable—gender equality—could be a significant factor in explaining Tunisia’s success in achieving democracy compared to the failure of its neighbors.
Tunisia’s case demonstrates that a certain level of gender equality, before a revolutionary process, may be a significant variable in creating positive results for democracy and post-revolutionary stability. In this paper, Egypt will serve as a counterexample to show how low gender equality can generate negative results. Egypt’s existing culture of low gender equality, rampant sexual violence, and the exclusion of women from political processes may have been a factor that doomed the aspirations of their pro-democracy revolutionaries, both male and female, and contributed to the failure of the revolution.

Delayed Democratization in the Middle East and North Africa

For contextual clarity, before discussing why gender equality mattered in Tunisia’s democratic transition process and why it matters for democratic transitions in general, we must first review the attempts of Middle Eastern and North African states to democratize, especially their most recent attempts during the Arab Spring. Democracy has had multiple global waves, but the Middle East has failed to catch any of them. In the Arab Spring, it seemed as though the region’s time had finally come. However, almost all efforts for democratization ultimately failed. This raised the question of why Middle Eastern states are so resistant to transition to democratic systems, especially since statistics show that 86% of citizens of Arab states support democracy (Jamal et al. 2008, 98).

Not only desire for, but action towards change and revolution blossomed in many countries during the Arab Spring. The uprisings began soon after December 17, 2010, when Tunisian street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi publicly self-immolated in a shocking demonstration of his frustration with the limited economic opportunity in Tunisia. Grievances about the low standard of living and the lack of political freedoms led thousands of Tunisians to protest against President Ben Ali’s 23-year repressive regime.

Tunisia succeeded in toppling its government in 29 days. The quick and impressive toppling of the regime in Tunisia ignited hope in many other Arab peoples with similar economic and political grievances towards their authoritarian governments. A few weeks after Ben Ali’s demise, Egyptians flooded Cairo’s main square to protest the Mubarak regime. Mubarak was similarly ousted after only a few weeks of protests, but Egypt’s political woes were far from over. By this time, news of the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt reached many other Arab peoples via news media and social media outlets. Libya, Syria, Yemen, and Bahrain also saw major uprisings and violence. Additionally, sustained uprisings reached most other states in the region, including Iraq, Morocco, Algeria, Lebanon, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, and Sudan.

Unfortunately, the rate of success of the Arab Spring was low. Nine years after the uprising, solely Tunisia succeeded in establishing a lasting democratic regime with substantial political liberalization and expanded rights. Other authoritarian states succeeded in squandering the hopes of the revolutionaries through regime repression or economic incentives. The anomaly of Tunisian success has been de-
bated by many social scientists. One explanation could be the importance of adopting secularism by Tunisia’s Ennahda party. Secularism is not necessary for democracy; however, Alfred Stepan claims that “twin tolerance” between religious citizens and the state is necessary. The first toleration is that of religious citizens toward the state. It requires that “they accord democratically elected officials the freedom to legislate and govern without having to confront denials of their authority based on religious claims—such as the claim that ‘Only God, not man, can make laws.’” The second toleration is that of the state toward religious citizens. This type of toleration “requires that laws and officials must permit religious citizens, as a matter of right, to freely express their views and values within civil society, and to freely take part in politics, as long as religious activists and organizations respect other citizens’ constitutional rights and the law” (Stepan, 2000).

After winning Tunisia’s post-revolution elections, the Ennahda, although an Islamist party, accepted secularism and separated the powers of the state from the power of religious figures and texts. Consequently, the new 2014 Tunisian constitution did not include Islamic Shari’a law. Contrastingly, the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood (MB) rejected secularism after winning the post-revolution elections in Egypt. It opted to include Shari’a jurisprudence in the new constitution and gave Muslim clerics power to interpret religious, and subsequently, civil law, which rules not only the Muslim citizens, but forces Islamic interpretations of the civil law on all Egyptians (Al Tuba, 2016). Further differences between these two Islamic parties will be addressed later in this paper.

**Why Gender Equality is an Essential Factor for Democratization (Theory)**

Existing theories as to why Middle Eastern states have been unable to realize democracy are inconclusive and contradictory. Some arguments are economically based. Samuel Huntington argues that modernization is an important prerequisite to democratization (Huntington, 1996). However, multiple Middle Eastern states, especially the oil states, are blatant exceptions to this theory. Some cite oil wealth and the rentier effect as primary obstacles to democratization. Melanie Cammett claims that what she calls the “governance gap,” where resource-rich countries can pay their citizens in exchange for political acquiescence, inhibits the potential for democratic transitions (Cammett, 2015).

The pervasiveness of the public sector in Middle Eastern economies could also stunt democratic transitional potential. Modernization theory emphasizes the role of the middle class in pushing for expanded political rights. However, the middle class in much of the Middle East is unique in the sense that it is mostly employed by the state and therefore risks much more by rebelling against the state (Waterbury, 1994). Authoritarian statecraft, clan governance, ethnic and religious sectarianism, and the effects of colonialism and imperialism are also among contributing factors.

Steven Fish published a unique argument. He says that, generally, Islamic countries have lower female literacy, less representation in government, and male-domi-
nated sex-ratios; he argues that this gender gap is the main obstacle to democratization. Fish’s argument would have been stronger if he said Middle Eastern countries have this problem instead of Muslim majority countries. Multiple Muslim majority states, including Indonesia, Turkey, Pakistan, Kyrgyzstan, are either full or partial democracies and have even had female heads of state. Additionally, many non-Muslim states suffer from greater gender inequality than some Muslim majority countries. What is more broadly valid is that any country with a large gender gap is very unlikely either to be a democracy or to democratize. Overlooking the status of women as a significant variable for contemporary democratization has been a lamentable omission by political scientists and other theorists alike.

It is often assumed that gender equality is typically an effect of democratization instead of a prerequisite. What if the opposite is true? Well-established democratization theories state that the process of political liberalization, meaning the extension of civil liberties and the reduction of state repression, tends to precede a democratic transition (Wang, et al., 2017). This process suggests that in order to gain democracy, a country must first give civil liberties to both men and women because “the granting of rights—specifically the freedom of domestic movement and discussion, participation in labor markets and property rights—is especially necessary for women to generate civic skills that are crucial for the development of opposition movements” (Wang, et al., 2017, 737). Without these rights, half of the population would remain in the private sphere, uninvolved in political activities and not contributing to any potential opposition movement. The expansion of women’s civil liberties can enhance civil society’s pressure and demands on authoritarian governments for political change by increasing the number of stakeholders actively able to participate in society.

Female participation in the democratization process is important for other reasons as well. As Wang and his co-authors argue, the process of political liberalization that leads to democratization includes not only the extension of civil liberties but also the reduction of state repression. The possibility of a democratic transition is often conditional on a state’s ability or willingness to repress the opposition pushing for democracy. States calculate and weigh the cost of repression compared to the costs of concessions and democratic reform. Political scientist Robert Dahl argued that if the political costs of suppression exceed the costs of toleration, regimes will appease opposition groups by making democratic reforms (Dahl, 1971).

The involvement of women in opposition movements increases the cost of repression. Wang explains the logic behind the heightened cost that female participation brings; “when half of the population—that is, women—increasingly gain the rights to move, voice demands, discuss, and hold material and immaterial assets, the calculation of repression cost is significantly changed. Conversely, countries where women are denied their basic rights—that is, highly gender unequal societies—are less likely to democratize as fewer people have the ability to express opposition to
the system, and thus the relative cost of repressing revolts is lower” (Wang, et al., 2017, 737).

Additionally, female participation in opposition has a unique effect in raising the cost of repressing opposition movements. Various “mother’s movements” have had substantial effects and significant success in opposing authoritarian regimes and injustice. Mothers in Chile continuously protested publicly against the military regimes and military dictator Pinochet in the 1970s and 80s to know where their disappeared children and husbands were. These mothers gained international recognition when the band U2 ended their 1998 nationally televised concert in Santiago by inviting many of these protesting mothers onto the stage to show pictures of their disappeared loved ones and say their names into the microphone. This display sparked international sympathy for these mothers, and an international arrest warrant led to Pinochet’s arrest in London several months after the concert for his connection with many human rights violations (Greene, 2013).

Mothers in Turkey have similarly challenged various repressive governments, with groups like the Saturday Mothers who have held over 700 demonstrations demanding answers from the government about their disappeared family members. Women, especially mothers, have a unique effect on opposition movements because there is often a sacred status accorded to them. (Karaman, 2016). Therefore, using violence against them is much more costly since it casts increasing shame on the regime.

The link between gender equality and democracy is inescapable. Since women generally account for half of a population, such a large social category without full political rights would be inherently undemocratic. Traditional cultural attitudes tend to present major barriers to women’s participation in government offices, and countries with Islamic backgrounds fall towards the bottom of global rankings for the percentage of women in Parliament (Inglehart et al., 2002). Inglehart and his co-authors find that a cultural shift of attitudes towards women’s roles and freedom of self-expression drive the process of democratization. Their study concludes that “cultural changes seem to bring rising female representation in parliament regardless of whether or not democratization occurs” (Inglehart, et al., 2002, 328). However, rising gender equality improves the chances of democratic institutions to emerge and thrive. Countries with more liberal views towards women’s roles and their freedom in self-expression are more stable democracies (Inglehart et al., 2002, 329). Gender equality then works in a positive feedback loop: a certain level of gender equality is necessary for democracy to begin, the democracy begets more gender parity, strengthening the democracy, and so on.

In the book The First Political Order, Hudson and her co-authors point out that a society’s oppression of and violence towards women are a microcosm for a regime’s use of oppression and violence against their people. They state that societies built by male kin groups that monopolize resources by subordinating women “will not be predisposed to evolve as democracies, but rather as male dominance hierarchies
in the form of autocracy” and that “political autocracies not only seem natural when women are subordinated, but men actually may feel a vested interest in the acceptance of autocracy at the group level to justify the use of autocracy at the household level” (Hudson, 2020, 119).

Hudson et al. identify a “syndrome” that exists in many societies where men subordinate women by monopolizing decision-making power, monopolizing the control of resources, and using force and violence to coerce the women into submission. According to their data, the syndrome dominates the society in nearly all of the Middle East and North Africa. Tunisia is the only country in the region where they find the syndrome is “present, but somewhat mitigated”. All other MENA states are either dominated by it completely, or the syndrome is “hardly mitigated” (Hudson, 53).

In The First Political Order, Pamela Shifman says, “until families are safe and democratic, society will not be. You have to address one before you can address the other” (Hudson, 167). Looking at measurable variables like female economic participation, female literacy and school enrollment rates, physical security of women, rights for women in divorce, inheritance, custody cases, and more could point to higher levels of democratic attitudes and practices in families. The existence or lack of these variables reflect familial democratic attitudes because they demonstrate an equal distribution of rights and resources between the men and women of families. Families that hold more gender-equal attitudes will produce democratic societies. Therefore, the mechanism for democratic transition may be a democratic family structure.

The previously stated arguments and theories in this section indicate that the pre-existence of gender equality in non-democratic states will only aid the process of a democratic transition and may help instigate it. This paper specifically argues that the relatively high level of gender equality in Tunisia was a contributing factor to the success of the 2011 democratic transition.

**Gender Equality in the Middle East and North Africa**

Looking at democratization in the Middle East through gender equality theories’ frameworks may offer an enlightening explanation for the issue at hand. The Middle East generally suffers from not only long-lasting authoritarianism but also low levels of gender equality and female liberation. Middle Eastern and North African countries consistently rank in the lowest quartile of the Gender Gap Index (World Economic Forum, 2020). The 2010 Global Gender Gap Index shows that in the year prior to the Arab Spring uprisings, the Middle East ranked the lowest of all global regions in both overall rank and gender equality progress on the Global Gender Gap Index (World Economic Forum, 2011).

Using data from the World Bank, I compared the five major participants in the Arab Spring: Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, Yemen, and Bahrain (Libya, another major participant, does not have sufficient data). All these countries ranked below the global medium. However, comparatively, Tunisia scored the highest.
Adding the other regional countries that saw sustained protests, again we see each of them lagging behind the world median. And again, we see Tunisia coming out tied at the top with Kuwait (TCdata360, Overall Global Gender Gap Index). Does the above evidence suggest that a threshold of gender equality was indeed a factor in the success of Tunisia’s revolution? A second country that the world had high expectations for during the Arab Spring was Egypt.
However, Egypt failed in sustaining a democratic transition. Egyptians, like Tunisians, revolted against a long-time authoritarian dictator. Both states succeeded in overthrowing their old regimes and instigating democratic elections. Both states saw Islamist parties win these elections. However, while the Tunisian democratic government is now relatively stable, Egypt quickly reverted to authoritarianism after a military coup in 2013.

Democracy is not only an institution but also a culture. Thus, democratization cannot succeed if the regime is the only aspect to change. Rather, culture must also transform until societies are more democratic-like, with guaranteed liberties, rights, security, and equality for all. In this paper, I assume a comparative analysis using Tunisia and Egypt as two cases to show that the chance of a democratic outcome increases when the culture of the transitioning country is more egalitarian. As stated previously, one of the most rampant and obvious inequalities in the Arab world is inequality between men and women. Therefore, successful democratization is more likely when gender equality prior to and during the transitional phase is higher.

**Methodology**

I use process tracing to measure gender equality levels in Tunisia and Egypt prior to their 2010/2011 revolutions. I measure the status of women by measuring multiple variables under five different factors: political factors, economic factors, social factors, civil/legal factors, and lastly, educational factors. I measure each factor by measuring one or more specific variables to show gender equality levels prior to the start of the respective revolutions. To measure civil/legal factors, I look at existing laws that either discriminate against or expand the rights of women. I specifically look at laws surrounding marriage, abortion, property, divorce and custody rights, and the personal status or family code laws. To measure political factors, I look at the percent of female participation in the Tunisian and Egyptian state governments. I measure economic factors by recording the percentage of female participation in the labor force and the unemployment gap between men and women. I measure social factors by (a) ranking the levels of sexual violence as very prevalent, prevalent, or less prevalent, (b) ranking female physical security as high, medium, or low, and (c) sex ratio demographics of each nation-state. Lastly, to measure education, I use data on (a) female literacy rates and (b) gender gaps in school enrollment, specifically at the gender demographics of university enrollment. These variables should indicate a level of gender equality with reasonable accuracy.

After comparing the pre-revolution conditions of Tunisia and Egypt, I focus on female participation and mobilization during the protests themselves. Based on academic accounts and journalistic data, I rank the level of participation of women in each revolution as high, medium, or low. Secondly, I inspect how welcome and/or safe female participants were in each revolution by looking at the prevalence of gender-based or sexual violence in the protests.
Lastly, I compare the political outcomes and effects of the Tunisian and Egyptian Revolutions. I re-measure the same variables for the political, social, and civil measures prior to the revolution to see if democracy has expanded by looking to see if women’s rights have expanded. I look specifically at how involved women are in the post-revolution phase measured by the number of women serving on constitutional councils and serving in the new governments. I also look at the new constitutions and laws that either expand or narrow gender equality.

**The Higher Status of Tunisian Women in Pre-Revolution Society**

Pre-existing political rights for women in Tunisia reflected a society that already had many democratic ideals—a society ripe for democratization. At the Independence of Tunisia in 1956, the government adopted the Personal Status Code (PSC) that instituted a series of laws increasing gender equality in several areas. The PSC was revolutionary in many ways, giving Tunisians unprecedented rights compared to the rest of the region. Under the PSC, Tunisian women had greater guaranteed rights than any other Arab women. The PSC abolished polygamy (making Tunisia the first Muslim country to do so), guaranteed protection for women against abuse from their husbands, and established women’s equality in divorce, property rights, marriage, and child custody (Megahed, 2011, 405). The PSC also abolished the right of a father to force his daughter into marriage.

Since its adoption, many more liberal reforms and amendments have been added to the PSC. In 1962, the state allowed access to birth control, and in 1965, Tunisia legalized abortion. It was the first Muslim state to do so and granted this right to women eight years before the United States did (Saifuzzaman, 2017, 230). As of 1973, it is legal for women to have an abortion during the first three months of pregnancy. In 1985, a new law stipulated death as a possible penalty for perpetrators of rape. In 1993, the Code was modified to give wives/mothers the right to give their patrimony and citizenship to their children in the same capacity as husbands/fathers. Women in other Arab countries, including Jordan, still do not have the right to pass on their citizenship to their children. Women in Tunisia also acquired the rights to represent their children in judicial procedures and manage their own bank accounts.

As Inglehart and his co-authors pointed out, a cultural shift in the perception of family and gender roles is what creates social changes strong enough to create political changes. Among the 1993 reforms to the PSC, maternal grandparents became equally entitled as paternal grandparents to receive support payments for children. This legal change reflected social trends that were working to eliminate the concept of the patriarchal family.

The Personal Status Code alone shows that Tunisian women had more political liberties than many of their regional counterparts. The 1957 PSC guaranteed many rights to Tunisian women that other Arab women still do not have today. Therefore, I conclude that Tunisian society enjoyed greater gender equality in its civil and legal frameworks before the Arab Spring than any other MENA country.
While Tunisia aggressively reformed the status of women in the family law, Egypt has expanded civil liberties to women more slowly and conservatively. In 1979, President Anwar Al-Sadat’s wife Jehan initiated a Personal Status Law granting women more legal rights in marriage, divorce, and custody, which was opposed by Islamist parties. President Sadat implemented the law anyway, perhaps, to undermine the legitimacy of Islamist groups (Megahed 2017, 405).

However, under Mubarak’s regime, the gains towards gender equality included in this law went away, as the law was repealed in 1985. The new law still gave women expanded divorce rights and the right to give their Egyptian nationality to their children, but it did not change the law to allow women to travel without the permission of a male relative (Megahed, 2017, 408). This 1985 law also stipulates that “if the wife refuses to show obedience (ta’ā) to the husband, without lawful justification, her maintenance (nafaqā) shall be suspended from the date of refusal.” Another article of this law states that a woman’s right of custody ends when a minor boy turns ten and when a girl turns twelve. After this age, a judge may allow the mother to keep custody of her children, but without custody payments from the father (El Alami, 1994).

While Egyptian women enjoyed greater liberties than women in some other MENA nations, significant institutionalized gender discrimination was still present prior to 2011. Therefore, Egyptian society prior to 2011 did not reflect a democratic society tolerant of female’s civil liberties.

The extent of female political participation in government is another important factor indicating the level of gender equality in Tunisia before the Jasmine Revolution. Tunisian women gained the right to vote and run in elections in 1957. In 2010, Tunisia topped other MENA states and even outranked many Western countries with women constituting almost 28% of Tunisia’s parliamentary deputies in President Ben Ali’s government. This 28% was 3% above the quota that Ben Ali implemented in 2004. Additionally, in 2005, women constituted 28% of the nation’s judges, 30% of its lawyers, 23% of regional governments, and 25% of municipal governments even under the dictatorial regime (Chambers, 2014).

Historically, female political participation in Egypt has been low, only surpassing 5% with the help of gender quotas. In 1956, Egyptian women were granted the right to vote and run for elections. In 1964, 2.3% of parliamentary seats were held by women. The rate reached 9% in 1979 after President Sadat issued a law allocating thirty seats for women. After the removal of the quota in 1984, women’s representation declined and remained stagnant at about 2% (OECD, 2018, 12). Among local councils and governments, in 2008, only 5% of the appointed officials were women. From 1979 until after the Arab Spring, women have never represented more than 10% of local Egyptian governments (OECD, 2018, 14).

According to the Global Gender Gap Report of 2009, MENA countries are behind global averages in many factors of education. Quantitative studies considering the past 25 years recognize that greater equality distribution of education between
women and men contributes to democratization (Wang, et al., 2017, 736). Tunisia has historically made education a priority, universalizing it in 1958 and making it compulsory for all children in 1991. Women and girls benefited greatly from these educational reforms, as reflected in Tunisia’s educational statistics prior to its democratic transition in 2011. According to the Tunisian National Institute of Statistics, by the 2009–2010 academic year, female enrolment in pre-university education reached 98.5% (Megahed, 2017, 407). In 2008–2009, 59.5% of all university students were women (Megahed, 2017, 412). Additionally, Tunisia implemented a literacy program early on that raised female literacy from approximately 4% in 1956 to 71% in 2010 for all adult women and 96% for girls age 15–24 (Index Mundi).

Egypt’s education statistics lag behind Tunisia. The Global Gender Gap Index lists Tunisia as 109th on the global education gender gap ranking while ranking Egypt 126th. This table compares pre-university and tertiary education in Egypt and Tunisia and shows disparities in female education rates in both countries. Tunisia does significantly better in both pre-university and tertiary enrollment rates. Additionally, Egyptian adult female literacy rates in 2010 were 64.9%, over six percent less than their Tunisian counterparts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total enrolment rate</td>
<td>97.7%</td>
<td>90.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male enrolment rate</td>
<td>97.4%</td>
<td>90.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female enrolment rate</td>
<td>98.5%</td>
<td>90.3%</td>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of female students</td>
<td>59.5%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Another way to measure female empowerment and a society’s inclusivity of women is by looking at the rate of participation of women in the economy. Measuring both the percentage of female participation and the unemployment gap between men and women can help rank the status of women in Tunisian and Egyptian society prior to the revolutions. Tunisia rapidly increased its percentage of women in the labor force over the last half-decade. The female labor force was a mere 5.5% in 1966. By 1990, the ratio was 29.6%, and by 2010, women represented 34.8% of the labor force (Data World Bank, 2020d).

Female participation in Egypt took a different trajectory. While Egypt was nearly on par with Tunisia in 1990, with women making up 29.4%, it steadily declined until it hit 23.6% in 2002. By 2010, it had risen back up to 29%. Unemployment rates among women were higher than men in both countries, but the unemployment gap was significantly larger in Egypt, where, in 2008, 19.2% of females versus 5.9% of males were
unemployed. In Tunisia in 2005, female and male unemployment rates reached 17.3% and 13.1%, respectively (Wang, 2017).

On the eve of the revolutions, Tunisia’s female labor force participation was 34.8% juxtaposed to Egypt’s at 29%. Egypt’s ratio was on par with the regional average, while Tunisia was above it (Data World Bank 2020f).

**Ratio of Female to Male Labor Force Participation Rate**

When measuring female empowerment, Valerie Hudson, a political scientist at the Bush School of Government, says that society often overlooks the factors and variables that more truly reflect female empowerment. Looking at literacy rates or the percentage of seats in parliament held by women can be misleading. Afghani women hold 28% of national parliament seats, more than the corresponding 23.5% in the United States. However, most people would not argue that Afghani women are more empowered than American women. Women claiming higher government involvement does not always translate to greater gender equality and empowerment. According to Hudson, some of the more telling variables of gender empowerment and equality are the physical security of women, divorce and custody laws, and the prevalence of female infanticide, to name a few (Hudson, 2012).

Looking at the physical security of women both before and during the revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia should be a significant indicator of their status. Data from the Womanstats Project categorized Egypt in 2009 as a place where “women lack physical security.” In that same year, Womanstats categorized all other MENA countries in this same category except for Tunisia and Israel, who were ranked among nations with “low levels of physical security.” Tunisia and Israel were not free of
physical attacks on women, but the rule of law offered relatively more protection than other regional states (Womanstats, 2009).

Looking at the rates of sexual violence in Egypt reflects a very unequal society, where nearly 50% of the population was physically insecure and highly prone to physical and psychological attacks. In 2010, women’s rights activist Abul Komsan surveyed 1,010 women in Egypt and found that 98 percent of foreign women and about 80 percent of Egyptian women said they had been sexually harassed in some way. Additionally, two-thirds of men said that they had harassed women. This type of gendered violence on the basic societal level creates a broader culture of violence and exploitation at the political and state level. While it would be inaccurate to say that Tunisian women experience no or even low levels of harassment, they did fare marginally better. Additionally, Womanstats ranked Tunisia as a regional leader in lower rates of child marriage, marital rape, and female genital cutting.

Regarding sex demographics, unbalanced sex-ratios can show how women are unequal in several factors, from female selective abortion and female infanticide, higher rates of murder of women, and the greater ease of men in migration. A natural sex ratio would have more women since women tend to live longer. However, in 2010, about 50.5% of the Egyptian population was male. That may seem insignificant, but with a population of about 83 million people in 2010, there were approximately 1 million more men than women in Egypt (Plecher, 2020a). In 2010 49% of the Tunisian population was male—a more natural balance (Plecher, 2020b).

At the end of this section, I summarize the most important data in a simple visual. This graph recaps the relatively greater gender equality that existed in Tunisia before the Jasmine Revolution. This narrower gender gap shows that at least a partial democratic cultural transition in Tunisia had already taken place—thereby facilitating the intuitional transition.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Tunisia</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% of parliamentarians who are female</td>
<td>28.0%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of labor force that is female</td>
<td>34.8%</td>
<td>29.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of male/female unemployment gap</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic rights guaranteed in PSC or Family Code</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of female literacy</td>
<td>71.0%</td>
<td>64.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of university students who are female</td>
<td>59.5%</td>
<td>46.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical security of women</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
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**Female Participation in the Jasmine Revolution Facilitated the Democratic Transition**

On the eve of the Arab Uprisings, women in Tunisia were poised to be significant stakeholders in political change. They had accumulated substantial legal, social,
and economic rights and had a greater capacity to express opposition to the system. They also had more to lose if the revolutionary movement posed a threat to their thus far acquired rights. Parallelly, Egyptian women were still very much marginalized. However, despite the apparent political and social marginalization of women in Egypt, both Tunisian and Egyptian women showed up in large numbers to participate in demonstrations against their autocratic governments.

To portray the extent to which women participated and were welcome in the demonstrations, I measure the presence and participation of women in the protest, ranked low, medium, or high, and secondly, how welcomed/safe women were in protests by looking at the prevalence of sexual violence in demonstration activities.

While historically political protests are often male-dominated, both Tunisian men and women filled the streets, demanding the end of Ben Ali’s 24-year autocratic reign in December of 2010. Female voices in the protests created a conundrum for the state. Ben Ali’s government had been the biggest champion of women’s rights in the region over the past few decades. But instead of cooperating with or defending their alleged protector, women joined the men in demanding the fall of the regime. One Tunisian woman described the solidarity between all Tunisians, male and female, saying, “there was not the smallest difference between the men and the women . . . we were in the squares, facing bullets with the men and even on their shoulders chanting for freedom, we were with the young men in the front lines, us protecting them and they protecting us. It brought us together for one goal—the fall of the regime” (Al fara’ai, 2017).

Multiple news accounts and international non-governmental organizations repeatedly emphasized the strength and numbers of the women in Tunisian protests. Women of all kinds participated—students, grandmothers, professionals, etc.; wearing veils, jeans, and everything in between (Morgan, 2011). Therefore, I comfortably rank female participation in the Jasmine Revolution as high.

Egyptian women likewise showed up in huge numbers to the first protest in Tahrir Square on January 25, 2011. One Egyptian man described the first days of the protests as an “incredible time in Egypt.” He said, “Women and men were comrades in the protests . . . women were not afraid . . . There was a sense of [male demonstrators’] complete respect, complete support, and complete solidarity towards the women” (Johansson-Nogues, 2013, 398). In the initial days of the protests, female participation was high and female mobilization was pivotal, adding to the weight and seriousness of the anti-Mubarak protests. However, the initial welcoming of women’s participation in demonstrations began to diminish as women became victims of sexual harassment from both state actors and other protestors.

The relative safety and acceptance of women in anti-regime demonstrations also point to the level of social inclusiveness of women. As Tunisian women’s roles became more visible via social media and famous Tunisian blogger, Lina Ben Mhenni, the state launched gender-specific deterrents. In some final efforts to disperse pro-
HANNAH MILLER

testors, the regime security forces used sexual harassment or rape against female demonstrators. However, the quick fall of the regime prevented the continuation of attacks. The Tunisian people quickly realized that women were an essential part of their transition and included and protected them in the transitional period.

After the fall of Ben Ali’s regime, women actively participated and were welcomed in the transitional period and the building of a new Tunisia. Right after the ousting of Ben Ali, Tunisian Prime Minister Mohamed Ghannouchi formed the Higher Political Reform Commission (in Arabic "نجللا ايلعلا حلاصلإل يسايسلا") in charge of overseeing legal and constitutional reform, hailed as one of the most effective consensus-building bodies in democratic transition history (Johansson-Nogués, 2013, 93). The commission, which included various males and females from varying civil society groups, discussed the things they considered the most important in moving forward with democracy. One of those things was the preservation and even development of civil liberties and protected status for women. The commission wanted to aim for male-female parity in politics and therefore suggested that every other name on party candidate lists must be a female. The religious Ennahda party was the first party to accept this gender parity provision (Johansson-Nogués, 2013, 93).

Soon after the beginning demonstration in Tahrir Square, the state started targeting women, seeing gendered violence as a highly effective tool for repression. Allegedly, the policy of Egyptian security forces was to harass and sexualize female protestors and to impugn the women’s respectability (Johansson-Nogués, 2013, 3019). Government-paid thugs would enter protest crowds and assault women. It was impossible to tell these thugs from other protestors. Despite these challenges, the Egyptian masses succeeded in pressuring Mubarak to step down only a few weeks after Tunisians ousted Ben Ali. However, the fall of Mubarak did not signal the end of the revolution, nor the end of violence towards women.

Mubarak was not replaced by an open civilian body like Tunisia, but rather by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF)—composed entirely of male military officers. Protests and violence towards women, including sexual harassment and assault and threats of rape, continued under the SCAF interim government that lasted from February 11, 2011 to June 30, 2012. On March 9, 2011, several women’s organizations marching in Cairo, demanding the protection and expansion of rights for women, were attacked by state-paid thugs. The thugs arrested 19 women who were then tortured and sexually degraded in state dependencies, forced to submit to virginity tests. Egyptians today are still worried about the existence of such groups, referred to as magmua’at baltagia (in Arabic، "تاعومجم ةيجطلب") who undertake thug-like activity such as theft, sexual harassment, mugging, etc. and consistently avoid legal consequences.

Egyptian protestors and international media recorded multiple instances of especially harsh treatment of female demonstrators. U.S. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton responded to horrid scenes of women being beaten and stripped to their under-
women in the streets by police forces saying, “women are being beaten and humiliated in the same streets where they risked their lives for the revolution only a few months ago . . .” (Koppelman, 2011).

Women were essentially marginalized and terrorized out of reaching their full potential for participation in Egypt’s 2011 revolution. Both Mubarak and the interim government after his fall used sexual violence to terrorize and wipe out the respectability of female demonstrators by sexually assaulting them in public, arresting them as prostitutes, raping, and sexually torturing them in jail (Johansson-Nogues, 2013). Many male protestors refused to let their female family members participate in demonstrations for fear their women would be sexually assaulted. Two years after the start of the revolution, 99.3 percent of Egyptian women said they had experienced some form of harassment (UN Women, 2013).

**Inclusion/Exclusion of Women in the Transitional Period**

So far, we have looked at the status and inclusivity of Egyptian and Tunisian women before and during the revolution in each respective state. The political, civil, social, educational, and economic factors measured in the first section of this paper show that Tunisia was more egalitarian than both Egypt and all other MENA states. Alternatively, Egypt reflected a more conservative society that undermined women’s rights in many ways. Egyptian society largely ignored developing the status of women and likewise permitted the exploitation of women in many ways. Just as a culture of hierarchical male dominance controlled the social, economic, political, and civil spheres of society, the Egyptian interim government (SCAF) and later elected government (The Muslim Brotherhood and Mohamed Morsi) continued a vertical structure of ruler and ruled. The more vertical a society is in its hierarchical power structure, the harder it will be to flatten into a horizontal, egalitarian, and democratic structure. Tunisia already reflected a less severe hierarchy, with women participating more equally with men than most MENA societies.

Eventually, both Tunisia and Egypt saw democratic elections after the fall of their authoritarian regimes. In both elections, Islamist parties won the largest percentage of votes. However, each respective Islamist party took different stances on women’s rights.

When the moderate Islamist party Ennahda party won the Tunisian elections of 2011, many in the international community worried that the party would try to reverse Tunisia’s progressive family code. But instead, the party assured continued protection of women’s rights, and Ennahda party leader, Rachid Ghannouchi, called himself an “advocate of absolute equality of men and women” (Johansson-Nogués, 2013, 95). The Ennahda party is considered center-right in its ideologies and supports social conservatism and economic liberalism. Ennahda was one of the first parties that voted in favor of an election law requiring electoral lists of each party to include 50 percent women and 50 percent men, placed alternately on the list to ensure a high
percentage of women in the legislative assembly. In 2014, the Ennahda party had the highest number of female lawmakers—41 out of 90 (Kottor, 2014).

The outcomes of the post-revolution elections did not produce total parity. Nearly all running parties failed to put females at the top of their zippered candidate lists (except for Ennahda); therefore, women only won about 27% of the Tunisian Constituent Assembly (Johansson-Nogués, 2013, 102). Despite these less-than-ideal outcomes, this percentage is still noticeably higher than the global average.

The election results did not fully reflect gender parity, but to hope for such an outcome would be quite unrealistic, even in the parliaments of the most liberal democracies. It is apparent, however, that women were politically and socially involved in Tunisia’s democratic transition. Women participated in protests, founded rights-based organizations, and mobilized around the writing of the constitution. On August 13, 2012 (Tunisia’s Women’s Day), both men and women filled the streets to protest controversial wording in the first draft of the new constitution. Article 28 referred to women as “complementary” to men. Protestors chanted, “Women are complete, not complements!” (Charrad, 2014). This clause was removed in the next draft. Today, the Tunisian Constitution states that men and women are equal under the law, and Ennahda continues to support laws that promote gender equality and protection for women against violence, although it recently faced criticism for voting against a law that would guarantee equal inheritance for males and females.

In Egypt, the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood won the first democratic elections in January 2012 but ensuring women’s rights was not on their agenda. The MB supports social and religious conservatism and has long advocated for the traditional roles for women. Women and women’s organizations had to fight to keep the Muslim Brotherhood from reversing the civil liberties they had before the revolution, like the right of women to travel alone without the consent of a male relative. The Muslim Brotherhood also attempted to cancel the family law providing women with the right to custody, amend the article granting children born to an Egyptian mother and a foreign father the right to Egyptian nationality, legalize female genital cutting, and abolish 18 as the legal age of marriage (Hafez, 2019).

Official female participation in the Muslim Brotherhood is nearly non-existent. The party did have a few lawmakers in the first parliament formed after the revolution, but men completely monopolized both leadership positions and decision-making bodies of the party. The party additionally claims that it would not support a woman or Christian president in Egypt (Fick, 2012).

Ennahda and the Muslim Brotherhood championing or attacking women’s rights is not only a reflection of the parties’ attitudes towards gender equality but rather also reflects the permissiveness of the respective societies to tolerate discriminatory policy. In Tunisia’s case, we see how civil society mobilized to reject proposed discriminatory language in the draft of Article 28. Contrastingly, Egyptians, except for a few women’s rights organizations, did not mobilize to limit the deterioration of
women’s rights under the Muslim Brotherhood. The fact that the MB and President Morsi won a democratic election shows that much of Egyptian society was tolerant of the party’s gender discriminatory ideologies. Morsi’s government called for Egypt to re-evaluate its support for the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and “re-consider whether the terms of the convention were suitable ‘to our [Egyptian] culture, traditions and […] established values’” (Dyer, 2013). Many of the MB’s policies reflected the “culture, traditions and established values” of Egyptians.

Turnout for the Egyptian parliamentary election was unprecedented, but only 2% (12 of 498) of the seats in both upper and lower houses of parliament were occupied by women, even despite electoral law stipulating that all political parties must have women on their ballots. The first Constituent Assembly in 2012 only had six women out of a 100-member panel. The second Assembly initially included more women, “but all walked out before the draft was finished on the grounds that they were either reportedly being intimidated by their male homologs or found their views being ignored in the drafting of the text” (Johansson-Nogués, 2013, 402). The nearly all-male committee drafted a constitution that did not protect nor prevent gender discrimination nor guarantee women’s rights inherent in the Personal Status Law. This constitution was adopted in December 2012.

Popular demonstrations continued in 2013 due to grievances with the results of the 2012 elections. The Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies and Egyptian women’s rights group, Nazra, said that during 2013, dozens of gage rape cases were reported, and testimonies indicate that the rapes were organized isolated attacks against female protestors designed to scare and shame women into abandoning demonstrations. This prevented women from practicing their democratic right to participate in Egypt’s transitional democratic process (Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, 2019). The Muslim Brotherhood’s government took no measures to prevent, punish, or investigate such brutal violations.

Reflecting on female participation in the revolutions and in the transitional period, the men and women of Tunisian society, along with the new political power holders, proved to be more democratic-like by including women in these political processes. While certainly not all Egyptians support or promulgate sexist views, the Egyptian revolution and transitional process, in general, excluded women.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Comparison</th>
<th>Tunisia</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participation of Women in Demonstrations</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustained Sexual Violence Towards Female Protestors</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation of Women in Writing New Constitution</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Females Elected to New Government</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guaranteed Gender Equality in New Constitution</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Conclusion

The status of women in these two countries today is starkly different. Tunisian women enjoy more legal protection, civil liberties, and social inclusivity than women in all other MENA countries. Political power in Tunisia has peacefully alternated between different parties more than twice—a good sign of a stable democracy. Egyptian women experience even harsher political marginalization than before. A military coup in 2013 overturned Egyptian democracy, and women still live under a government that disregards adequate measures to protect their physical security, leading to Thompson Reuters ranking Cairo as the world’s most dangerous megacity for women in 2017 with rampant sexual harassment and limited access to good healthcare, finance and education (Reuters, 2017).

To say that gender equality is the only variable that mattered for the success of the Tunisian revolution would be an oversimplification. A puzzle as complicated as a democratic transition will surely have many other important pieces. Some scholars say that Tunisia’s commitment to greater secularism compared to its regional counterparts both before and after the revolution greatly aided the success of democratization. Tunisia had several religiously neutral state structures and laws giving rights to women since its independence. However, these religiously neutral structures and laws were not created nor promoted by secularists, but by many Islamic thinkers who argued for the expansion of women’s rights from within Islam. Tahar Haddad, an early Tunisian Islamic thinker, wrote *Notre femme dans la Législation Musulmane et dans la Société* in which he argued that a correct reading of the Quran would lead to women’s equality. Many of his ideas were adopted into Tunisia’s first Family Code.

Alfred Stepan argues that secularism itself is not what is necessary for democracy, but rather what he called “twin tolerance” where religious citizens tolerate the state and its authority in making laws while states also tolerate religious citizens and their right to express their views and values within society and politics (Stepan, 2012). He points out that the success of both Islamic and secular organizations is contingent upon not enforcing their views on others. However, the real important twin tolerance that existed in Tunisia was civil and religious society’s tolerance of women’s rights.

Another potentially important variable in the success of Tunisia was the lack of international intervention. International intervention played a significant role in thwarting political change in the other Arab Spring states. Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, Syria, and Egypt all saw significant attempts by other states to affect the results of their popular uprising movements. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates vehemently opposed the fall of their Sunni monarch ally in Bahrain and sent military troops to disperse protestors. Intervention from numerous countries resulted in devastating and bloody proxy and civil wars in Libya, Yemen, and Syria. Contrastingly, Tunisia avoided international intervention in all its forms. Certainly, this variable should also be considered in Tunisia’s successful democratization.
We return now to the initial question raised in this essay—why have the Middle Eastern states in general struggled to democratize, and why was Tunisia the only successful Arab state to successfully realize a democratic transition during the Arab Spring? I conclude that this is largely because Middle Eastern societies and regimes oppress their women. And as they suppress their women, they suppress their possibility and probability for democracy. When societies oppress women, it invalidates those societies’ calls for better treatment and equality from their governments.

Lakshmi Puri, Deputy Executive Director of United Nations Women, said, “Women’s full participation in national and local politics, in the economy, in academia and the media is fundamental to democracy.” She continues, “Indeed, true democracy is based on the realization of human rights and gender equality . . . Women's rights must be part of the foundation of these new beginnings” (Puri, 2011). Gloria Steinem once said, “the family is a microcosm of the state… only democratic families can produce and sustain a real democracy” (Hudson, 2019, 119).

Democratization cannot just be an institutional change but must be a social/cultural change first. This cultural change cannot be implemented from a top-down approach, but rather must be the result of a long-time cultural shift in perceptions of gender roles and women’s freedom that later mobilizes to create political change. This type of cultural shift had gained significant momentum in Tunisia before its democratic transition. Since its independence in 1956, to before the revolution in 2011, Tunisians reflected this cultural change as they adopted more liberal laws and practices for women in custody, marriage, property-owning, divorce, etc. Tunisia also achieved significant gains for women in education, health, and economic sectors. This resulted in greater equality and the sharing of resources on all levels of Tunisian society.

We can think of democratic transition as making a jump from an authoritarian culture to a more egalitarian culture. Tunisia was able to make the jump because it had worked since its foundation to narrow the inequality gap, while the gap in Egypt was still too wide to cross. The Tunisian case demonstrates the importance of the link between gender equality and democratization. Female status in Egypt suggests a society unready for democracy.

Egypt, on the other hand, much like the rest of its regional counterparts, had a deep gender inequality gap at the onset of the Arab Uprisings. Egyptian women’s rights campaigners ascribe centuries of tradition and culture as the reason for rife discrimination and inequality (Reuters, 2017). The other major states where democratization did not ensue after mass protests in 2011 also exhibit significant gender inequality in both law and practice, and therefore, the realization of democracy, a political system based on equality of all citizens, was an unrealistic expectation.

This conclusion presents a few important implications for MENA countries, revolution/democracy theorists, and U.S. foreign policymakers. First, Middle Eastern societies that hope for democracy might best start with tenacious efforts to en-
able women and treat them fairly. Egypt specifically should have a truth and justice commission for crimes and violations suffered by women during the conflict and transitional periods if it wants to create more stability, equality, and the rule of law under its current regime. Middle Eastern societies should not wait for governments to change laws surrounding women’s rights but should initiate cultural changes in families, communities, workplaces, media, and literature. Certain societies have already begun to do so. A small group of women called Sadaqa in Amman, Jordan, have unrelentingly campaigned and lobbied for both the government and civil society stakeholders to increase female participation in the labor force by providing workplace daycares, improving public transportation, and eliminating sexual harassment. Men and women in other countries can undertake similar efforts.

When social scientists study revolutions and democratization in a country, they should consider and measure the social and political status of women in the country, along with the prevalence of female participation in the protests and transitional period. To ignore the level of contribution and/or marginalization of a country’s largest identity group—women—makes no sense. Additionally, this variable should strongly indicate the likeliness of a country to democratize. Saudi Arabia, for example, likely has many years until it democratizes, despite any political challenges the monarchy may experience. The fall of Saudi’s monarchy would not likely result in a democratic transition at the present time. If Saudi Arabians want democracy, they should start by empowering their women.

This argument also has considerable implications for U.S. foreign policy. If the U.S. is interested in increasing and strengthening democracy in the world, it should support political groups and movements that promise to champion women’s rights. The U.S. should also invest in projects that empower women globally. It is also an issue of national and world security. More democratic and liberal states are much less likely to go to war with each other. The chain reaction that women’s empowerment would initiate could increase world peace.

Lastly, gender in politics should be included in broader political dialogue with other democratization theory arguments instead of circulating in gender studies circles only. This paper is about democratization, not gender issues. But it points out the importance of gender in politics. If political scientists and politicians start to pay attention to the factor of gender, it could have significant positive implications for the world.
Bibliography


HANNAH MILLER


Introduction

On June 17, 2019, Egypt’s first and only civilian president, Muhammad Morsi, collapsed from a heart attack while standing trial in a military court. The 67-year-old Morsi was facing nearly half a century in prison six years after he was removed from power in a military coup. Morsi was pronounced dead upon arriving at a Cairo hospital, prompting the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamist movement he had once led, to accuse the Egyptian regime of committing “full-fledged murder.”

Less than four months later, Tunisian voters flocked to the polls to choose a new president and parliament for the second time in their country’s history. Despite continuing to face severe economic challenges and repeated security threats, Tunisia remains the Arab world’s lone true democracy. That success has, in large part, unfolded under the supervision of Tunisia’s most prominent Islamist group—the Ennahda Movement. Rached Ghannouchi, Ennahda’s founder, has played a central role in crafting the policies which have guided the Tunisian democratic transition and currently serves as the speaker of parliament.

Nine years after the events of the Arab Spring, it would seem that the political climates of these two countries could not be more different. In Egypt, an exceptionally authoritarian military regime has quashed any meaningful political opposition and tightly restricts civil liberties. Tunisia, by contrast, has developed a vigorous multi-party democracy and regularly holds free and fair elections. Freedom House, a research institute that evaluates the robustness of political rights and civil liberties around the world, has rigorously documented the widening disparity between Egyptian and Tunisian democratization (figure 1).
Figure 1: Egypt and Tunisia Freedom House Scores

Note: Higher scores indicate worse conditions for political rights and civil liberties.

When popular uprisings toppled veteran autocrats in both countries, however, Egypt and Tunisia seemed to be embarking on very similar trajectories. Both promptly conducted elections that the international community deemed “competitive and credible,” and both voted in governments led by Islamist political movements. What happened in the intervening decade? Why did these two comparable Arab states experience such divergent outcomes in the wake of their democratic revolutions?

In this paper, I analyze both structural and agent-based factors in the Egyptian and Tunisian cases to develop a theory explaining their contrasting transitional outcomes. Structurally, I scrutinize state institutions, émigré communities, and voter perceptions of Islamism in both countries. Regarding agent-related variables, or variables concerning individual actors, I focus on post-revolutionary actors including civil society organizations, Islamist political parties, and the military. Based on my analysis of these factors, I conclude that these two cases were fundamentally similar in most structural respects, but subtle structural differences shaped key groups of actors, which ultimately differed drastically. I identify three actors whom I contend were most relevant to this study: the Islamists, the military, and civil society. It was these agents which were most directly responsible for determining Egypt and Tunisia’s political destinies after the Arab uprisings. I specifically argue that a conciliatory Ennahda Movement bolstered Tunisians’ trust in their new democratic government, while professionalized armed forces and a strong, independent civic sector protected the integrity of the country’s transition. Conversely, I contend that the Muslim Broth-
erhood won too much power too quickly, priming the group for a confrontation with the Egyptian military which felt compelled to protect its economic interests. I further argue that Egypt’s weak civil society which had largely been co-opted by the state accelerated the country’s backslide into despotism.

I support this theory with consideration of the two states’ contextual similarities in addition to quantitative and qualitative analysis of their most relevant structural and agent-based variables. I specifically devote the following section of this paper to briefly exploring the origins of the Egyptian and Tunisian states in addition to the beginnings of their most influential Islamist groups. I then draw from opinion polling data gathered between 2011 and 2014 to test my hypotheses on how the contrasting behavior of Islamist parties affected those groups’ levels of public support. By doing so, I seek to understand why demonstrators protested the Brotherhood government in Egypt, triggering the group’s removal, but did not protest against Ennahda in Tunisia. By contrast, I use detailed historical process tracing to test my hypotheses regarding the role of the military in early Egyptian and Tunisian state-building, as well as the relationship between the countries’ regimes and civil society groups. I exploit a similar blend of quantitative and qualitative analysis to test my hypotheses relating to the structural variables of this study, including state bureaucracies, returned émigré populations, and the perceptions and preferences of the two states’ electorates.

Background

The existing literature on this subject largely fits into two general areas: the effect of structural or external variables on state outcomes and the effect of domestic actors on state outcomes. While I acknowledge structure-oriented arguments in this paper, the majority of my analysis draws from the work of scholars who primarily examined agent-related variables. I distill their arguments in order to focus on the impact of the Islamists, military, and civil society on Egypt and Tunisia’s divergent transitional outcomes.

In explaining the two countries’ contrasting post-revolutionary experiences, a small but credible number of scholars contend that structural or external factors were most salient. For instance, Masri postulates that Tunisia’s unique cultural identity made it inevitable that democracy would eventually take root there. He identifies the country’s long non-Arab and non-Muslim history, its partiality to Malikist Islam, and the modernizing reforms of Habib Bourguiba as key factors which distinguished Tunisia from the rest of the Arab World and primed it to be fertile ground for democratization. Masri essentially argues that Tunisia’s status as the region’s lone true democracy is simply a realization of its destiny and it would be near impossible for other Arab states to replicate Tunisia’s success. Moreover, Bishara contends that Egypt’s authoritarian reversal as compared to Tunisia’s democratic consolidation was a function of the former’s geopolitical importance and the Gulf states’ willingness to smother Egyptian democratization in its infancy. He argues that the fall of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt was only the latest illustration of international actors’
impact on democratization, following decades of American interference in the developing world during the Cold War.

Perhaps a more widespread school of thought contends that domestic actors—rather than structural factors—were most responsible for the two Arab states’ different experiences. Szmolka asserts that an inclusive political climate and participation from all influential political actors at all stages of a transition are crucial to successful democratization. Furthermore, he stipulates that electoral pluralism alone is not sufficient to guarantee a successful transition and that all major political actors must be included in government even after elections have concluded. Szmolka concludes that the hegemony of the Islamists in Egypt’s transition and the multilateral coalition in Tunisia’s contributed to the former’s authoritarian reversal and the latter’s democratic consolidation. Moreover, Bellin describes how Ennahda’s role in government encouraged or at least failed to stifle democratic consolidation in Tunisia. She identifies Ennahda’s commitment to a civil rather than an Islamic state, its tenuous plurality in parliament and cooperation with secular parties, and its concessions to Tunisian labor unions as key variables on the success of the transition. Finally, Brown argues that the SCAF’s seizure of the Egyptian transition process early on doomed any chances of success for a civilian government. He further emphasizes that political actors like the Muslim Brotherhood behaved illiberally not because they weren’t committed to the democratic process, but rather they mistrusted their rivals and the system’s capacity to protect them. Actors like the Brotherhood tried to accommodate the military in order to stymie their civilian rivals, giving the generals ultimate power during the transition.

In order to construct my own theory, I synthesize several of these arguments and focus on the three actors previously mentioned. While I acknowledge the credibility of more structural theories, I maintain that structural variables were most influential in how they shaped state actors. In turn, it was those actors who had the most direct effect on Egypt and Tunisia’s political destinies after the Arab uprisings.

**Similar Structures, Dissimilar Actors**

Given Arend Lijphart’s analysis of the comparative method, Egypt and Tunisia seem to be close to ideal cases for understanding the factors that influence post-revolutionary transitional outcomes. Both countries are North African Arab states, so while the number of potentially relevant explanatory variables for this study is “still very large, [it] is at least reduced in the . . . happy choice of area.” The two countries also resemble each other in important structural respects, including their experiences with colonization, republican authoritarianism, the Arab uprisings of 2011, and state institutions. However, key agent-related differences in Egypt and Tunisia’s revolutionary mechanisms, their militaries, and the political backgrounds of their respective Islamist groups hint at why they experienced such contrasting post-revolutionary trajectories. In this section, I contend that the Egyptian and Tunisian cases have enough structural similarities to make a compelling comparative argu-
ment, but also important agent-based differences which give crucial context for the divergent outcomes of their democratic transitions.

Egypt and Tunisia’s analogous demographics and political histories generated state conditions that were strikingly—if superficially—similar leading up to the Arab Spring. Both countries had recently experienced prodigious youth bulges, both had grappled with stubbornly high levels of unemployment, and both had overwhelmingly Sunni Muslim populations (though Egypt has a sizeable Coptic Christian minority). Both states also trace their origins to periods of Ottoman and European subjugation. Egypt transitioned to Britain’s sphere of influence following centuries of Ottoman rule in order to pay off massive debts incurred while building infrastructure projects like the Suez Canal. Though the persistent efforts of nationalist movements would win nominal Egyptian independence in 1925, a military coup two decades later would give rise to a string of autocrats—Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar Sadat, and Hosni Mubarak—who would shape Egypt into a modern, single-party police state. Tunisia’s colonial and post-independence experience was remarkably similar. Much like Egypt, 19th-century Tunisia—long an Ottoman province—rapidly bankrupted itself trying to implement modernizing reforms and subsequently became a vassal state of France, its primary foreign creditor. While nationalists would overthrow France’s puppet monarchy in 1956, the Tunisian government which followed—led by strongmen Habib Bourguiba and Zine El Abidine Ben Ali—would be brutally authoritarian. The 2011 revolution which toppled Ben Ali inspired Egyptian protesters to clamor for Hosni Mubarak’s removal less than a month later.

The Mubarak and Ben Ali administrations prior to these uprisings were comparably repressive, and the core institutions of their regimes were only marginally different. Tunisian state corruption and patronage were concentrated at the highest levels of government, close to Ben Ali and his inner circle. Nonetheless, the bulk of his administration “did not depend on the kind of accumulation of small bribes that subverted bureaucracy elsewhere.” The organization of the Mubarak regime was somewhat more integrated, creating relatively more compromised institutions which were less prepared to sustain “a clean, efficient, and technocratic government” than those of Tunisia. Both sets of bureaucracies, however, were considerably more professionalized than those of other Arab states such as Libya, and their ultimate impact on their countries’ democratic transitions would be minimal.

In spite of these demographic, historical, and institutional similarities, the Egyptian and Tunisian states differed crucially both in the dynamics of their democratic revolutions and in their militaries. In Tunisia, the 2011 uprising began in rural areas and “spiraled toward the capital,” driven by a robust organized labor force which the Ben Ali regime had long repressed. Egypt’s revolution, by contrast, was concentrated primarily in major cities like Cairo and relied on “urbane and cosmopolitan young people” for its energy and sustainability. Meanwhile, Tunisia’s military was highly professionalized and largely removed from economic activity. The Egyptian
military, however, was much more proximate to the levers of state power and was deeply involved in profiteering. I will discuss these critical military differences and their impact on transitional outcomes in greater detail later in this paper.

Egypt and Tunisia’s most important non-state actors—the Muslim Brotherhood and the Ennahda Movement—were notably similar in their ideological origins. In fact, by some accounts, Ennahda was conceived as a Tunisian offshoot of the Brotherhood. Sayida Ounissi, a Tunisian member of parliament and an Ennahda spokeswoman, acknowledged that Brotherhood founder Hassan al-Bana heavily influenced the ideology of Tunisia’s nascent Islamist movement, while more recent “Brotherhood publications were the main philosophical ‘food for thought’” for the group’s Tunisian counterpart.20 Furthermore, both movements renounced violence in the mid-1980s and sought to become legitimate players in their countries’ political arenas by embracing democracy and pluralism. The Brotherhood specifically “[called] for an ‘Islamic civil state’ . . . that operates largely on democratic principles,” while Ennahda “explicitly accepted the principles of democratic pluralism” even earlier.21

Like the states in which they operated, however, the Brotherhood and Ennahda differed in fundamental ways, particularly in terms of their early political experience. The Brotherhood, for one, had extensive experience competing and succeeding in national elections prior to the 2011 uprisings. The group entered electoral politics in 1984 when it formed an alliance with the Wafd Party and won 59 out of 454 available seats in parliament.22 Mubarak’s ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) quickly annulled the elections’ results, claiming they unfairly excluded independent candidates, but the Brotherhood would go on to do even better in the next round of elections in 1987.23 By the 2000s, the regime had become acutely aware of the Brotherhood’s potency as an opposition movement and was actively seeking to block its ascension. The NDP officially banned parties from participating in elections and barred candidates from running on overtly religious platforms, while the regime arrested scores of Brotherhood members who seemed likely to launch independent bids for parliamentary seats.24 In spite of these measures, Brotherhood candidates won 88 seats in the 2005 elections, marking “their most successful electoral performance to date.”25

Ennahda, by contrast, “was almost entirely excluded from Tunisia’s political process,” after the Ben Ali regime drove the party underground in the wake of its 1989 parliamentary victories.26 Party founder Rached Ghannouchi spent the better part of the subsequent two decades in exile in London and his movement had virtually no preexisting infrastructure when it sought to stage a resurgence after Ben Ali fled the country. As a relatively unknown political entity, Ennahda elicited suspicion from many members of the Tunisian public and press, with some commentators worrying that the group would indulge in radical inclinations if it attained power.27

This disparity in political experience between the Brotherhood and Ennahda likely influenced the dissimilar results of their countries’ first post-revolution elec-
tions. While the Brotherhood won both the Egyptian presidency and a majority in parliament, allowing it to govern unilaterally, Ennahda chose not to present a candidate in Tunisia’s presidential elections and won few enough seats that it was required to join a coalition with two other secular parties in order to govern. These contrasting outcomes would have significant implications for Egypt and Tunisia’s democratic transitions.

In this section, I have sought to demonstrate that the Egyptian and Tunisian cases are similar enough to form the basis of an effective comparative study while different enough to enable me to build a convincing theory explaining their transitional outcomes. While many of their similarities correspond to structural characteristics, most of their differences accentuate the role of post-revolutionary agents such as the military and Islamist groups. These structural similarities partially serve as controls in this study, while Egypt and Tunisians’ distinct agents prove to be critical to my theoretical argument. In the following section, I examine the roles of both structural and agent-based variables in effecting transitional outcomes for these two cases.

**Structures Molded, Actors Mattered**

To build my theory and supporting hypotheses, I draw from a body of research that explains Egypt and Tunisia’s dissimilar transitions by examining both state characteristics and the decision-making of post-revolutionary power brokers. Contributors to this research specifically argue that the hegemony of the military in Egyptian society, the robust civic sector in Tunisia, and the significant community of Tunisian émigrés who returned from Europe after the Arab uprisings were important structural variables that influenced the countries’ divergent transitional outcomes (in contrast to these scholars, I classify the military and civil society groups as agents rather than state institutions). Furthermore, these authors contend that the Muslim Brotherhood’s inseverable connection to its political wing—the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), Egyptian Islamists’ appeal to economically leftist voters, and the Ennahda movement’s commitment to political inclusiveness were the transitions’ most salient actor related variables. While I do not unreservedly agree with all these arguments, their structural and agent-based orientations laid the groundwork for my own theory which contends that state structures shaped influential actors, and those actors, in turn, shaped Egypt and Tunisia’s transitions.

The structural set of arguments largely depict a post-revolutionary Egypt defined by political exclusion and ossified institutions in contrast to a post-revolutionary Tunisia characterized by relative political inclusiveness and a vibrant civil sector. Inmaculada Szmolka posits that the Egyptian case demonstrated that an “elected government is not a sufficient condition” for democratic consolidation and that a “legitimate authority [must govern] . . . according to policies which have not been determined by actors such as the military.” Tunisia, by contrast, showed what was possible when the military deferred to civilian authority. Eva Bellin argues that a strong civil society that was absent in Egypt shepherded Tunisia’s civilian govern-
ment towards success by pressing for the popular accountability of the new regime and for fostering constructive dialogue when political actors became bogged down in petty disputes. Finally, Phillipe Fargues observes that for recently returned Tunisian émigrés who had cultivated protest-centric attitudes in European states like France and Italy, “voting for Ennahda was a natural form of protest.” Egypt, on the other hand, did not produce nearly as many Europe-destined émigrés, depriving former opposition groups like the Brotherhood of a potential base of support.

Meanwhile, the actor-related arguments contrast the FJP, which was attached at the hip to the Muslim Brotherhood and relied heavily on appeals to left-wing populist tropes, with Ennahda, a party that largely operated independently of the religious organizations that birthed it. Barbara Zollner specifically asserts that this disparity in organizational independence was a critical factor in Egypt and Tunisia’s eventual transitional outcomes as it ran “parallel to the formation of . . . new political system[s]” in those countries. According to Zollner, social movements’ capacity to formalize participation in elections reliably predicted their ability to function as good democratic actors. Tarek Masoud additionally submits that the FJP may have been particularly inclined to drift towards illiberalism as it actively exploited the electorate’s economic anxieties with populist rhetoric. In the 2012 elections, FJP candidates railed against economic injustices such as high prices, unemployment, and income inequality. The FJP’s campaign strategy seems to have convinced Egyptian voters that the “Islamists [were] more redistributive and more welfare-statist than” their secular leftist rivals. While the FJP would pull off stunning victories in those elections, its experimentation with economic demagoguery may have encouraged its authoritarian instincts which would land it in trouble with Egypt’s activists and military down the road. Furthermore, the group may have set unrealistic expectations which intensified voters’ dissatisfaction as abysmal economic conditions persisted.

Drawing from these and other arguments, I develop my own theory explaining Egypt and Tunisia’s transitional outcomes using a series of structural and agent-based hypotheses. I first acknowledge the potential role of structural variables in molding influential actors and thus indirectly affecting the transitions. I then pay close attention to the role of three categories of agents: the military, civil society groups, and the Islamists. By doing so, I hope to create a comprehensive theoretical framework that can begin to elucidate the factors affecting democratization in Egypt and Tunisia specifically, as well as in the Arab World more broadly.

Structural Hypotheses

I first seek to test the argument that fundamental differences in the Egyptian and Tunisian electorates—specifically in émigré communities and voter perceptions of the economy—gave Ennahda enduring political relevance in the context of a successful Tunisian democratic transition. Conversely, these differences supposedly led the Muslim Brotherhood and its political arm, the FJP, to rapidly lose public support,
priming Egypt to revert to authoritarianism. To test these assertions, I employ the following hypotheses:

**H1:** Tunisia had a higher rate of émigrés who returned from exile in Europe after the Arab uprisings than Egypt. These émigrés brought with them more pluralistic worldviews, greater trust in democracy, and more intense anti-regime attitudes that ultimately benefited Ennahda electorally.

**H2.a:** Tunisian voters had lower economic expectations for Ennahda than Egyptian voters did for the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP). These restrained expectations kept public levels of trust in Ennahda from dropping too precipitously.

**H2.b:** Alternatively, Tunisian voters believed that Ennahda achieved its economic goals in a way that distinguished it in positive ways from its secular competitors. By contrast, the FJP’s inability to address economic issues in Egypt cut down its levels of public support, making it vulnerable to an opportunistic military.

**Agent-Based Hypotheses**

I then seek to test the argument that pronounced military professionalism and independent civil society in Tunisia ensured the integrity of the country’s transition, while the absence of these variables proved detrimental to the Egyptian transition. I also test the assertion that Ennahda’s conciliatory and inclusive governing style in addition to its religious moderation allowed it to remain a force in Tunisian politics, while the FJP’s authoritarian instincts and ideological commitments played a central role in precipitating its loss of public support and the 2013 coup that removed it from power. To test these arguments, I use the following hypotheses:

**H3:** The Egyptian military’s experience in conflicts with Israel in 1967 and 1973 and its deep involvement in the economy made it the country’s ultimate power broker after democratic elections. Tunisia’s military, by contrast, was inexperienced, removed from economic decisions, and ultimately did not participate in a meaningful way in Tunisia’s democratic transition, making room for civilian control.

**H4:** Since corruption within the Tunisian regime was concentrated at the highest levels of power, Tunisia’s bureaucracies and civil society were less compromised and co-opted and played a central role in ensuring a successful democratic transition. Egyptian institutions and civil society, on the other hand, experienced broader corruption, fragmentation, and regime cooptation, making them less prepared to guide the country’s transition.

**H5:** Tunisian voters responded positively to Ennahda’s participation in a governing coalition with secular parties, while Egyptian voters viewed the FJP’s near unilateral seizure of the legislature and executive branch as an authoritarian power grab.

**H6.a:** Ennahda moderated its religious platform more quickly and effectively than the FJP, endearing it to Tunisia’s relatively secular electorate.

**H6.b:** Alternatively, Ennahda’s religious identity propelled the party to power and helped it maintain support in the face of its secular competitors.
Results

Émigré Communities

To examine émigré respondents’ attitudes towards Egypt and Tunisia’s Islamist parties, I conduct multivariate regression analysis on survey data gathered by the Arab Barometer Project Waves II and III. Wave II, which measures attitudes of Tunisian and Egyptian nationals between 2010 and 2011, surveyed 1,219 respondents in Egypt and 1,196 respondents in Tunisia. Wave III, which measures attitudes of a comparable group of participants between 2012 and 2014, surveyed 1,196 respondents in Egypt and 1,199 respondents in Tunisia. Based on my analysis of these datasets, I find that émigré communities were neither significantly sympathetic nor hostile towards the FJP or Ennahda during either of the two states’ democratic transitions.

For my regressions, I use respondent trust in Ennahda and the FJP as my dependent variables and the time each respondent had spent in a European or North American country over the last five years as my primary independent variable. I also include controls for respondent age, gender, education, employment, marital status, religiosity, and income among my explanatory variables. I then generate four regression models, one with controls and one without controls for both Ennahda and the FJP. I pull from Arab Barometer Waves II and III in order to gauge respondent levels of trust in Islamists both directly following the two states’ democratic revolutions and around the time that the Egyptian military overthrew the Brotherhood government. Given the ability of multivariate regressions to determine how significantly two variables correlate to one another, I believe that this method is most appropriate for assessing whether Egyptian and Tunisian émigrés were more or less likely to support Islamists than the general population.

Based on the results of these regressions (appendix 1, table 4), I deduce that any political attitudes Tunisian and Egyptian respondents developed while visiting western countries played a negligible role in determining their level of support for Islamist parties. When examining the 2010–2011 regression output, I observe no statistically significant relationship between time spent in Europe and trust for Islamists across any of my models, except for the coefficient for respondent trust in the FJP when not accounting for control variables, which indicates a strong negative correlation. Furthermore, the 2012–2014 regression output (appendix 1, table 6) indicates that respondent time spent in Europe did not have a statistically significant impact on trust in Islamists except for in the case of the Ennahda, and even that significance disappears when accounting for control variables.

Moreover, it seems unlikely that any single corresponding, significant regressor which corresponds to time spent in Europe (such as education) is responsible for diluting that variable’s significance. For both the Wave II and Wave III regression output, time spent abroad negatively correlates with trust in Islamists, while respondent education positively correlates with trust in those groups, indicating that these variables had competing rather than complementary effects. Overall, these results
indicate that time spent in the West was not a salient factor in predicting support for Ennahda and the FJP, either prior to Egypt and Tunisia’s revolutions or in the years thereafter. I accordingly conclude that there is no evidence to support H1.

**Voter Perceptions of Islamist Parties**

In this section, I seek to understand how Egyptian and Tunisian voters’ attitudes toward Islamist political movements both shaped those movements and potentially determined whether they stayed in power. By doing so, I hope to discern what factors may have molded the actors central to my study and ascertain which structural variables were relevant to the two states’ contrasting transitions. I ultimately find that while economically dissatisfied Tunisian voters actually blamed Ennahda more than comparable Egyptian voters blamed the FJP, these economic considerations did not significantly affect transitional outcomes.

To determine the effect of voters’ high economic expectations on support for the Ennahda Movement and the FJP during the 2011–2012 election season, I again run multivariate regressions on Arab Barometer Wave II survey data. Based on this analysis, I find that Egyptian and Tunisian respondents who had high expectations for their countries’ economic future during this period were more likely to trust both the FJP and Tunisia respectively.

While I use the same outcome and control variables for these regressions as used in previous models, this time I employ expectations for the economic situations in Egypt and Tunisia as my explanatory variables. I focus on Arab Barometer Wave II data for these models in order to accurately understand how Egyptian and Tunisian respondents perceived their economic futures before their countries’ Islamist groups had a chance to govern. As with previous models, I believe that multivariate regressions are better suited to describing the correlation between these variables than any other research method.

From my regression output (see table 1), I observe that high economic expectations had a statistically significant positive correlation to both Tunisian respondent trust in Ennahda and Egyptian respondent trust in the FJP, with and without accounting for control variables. Furthermore, the coefficients for these regressors indicate that when accounting for other regressors, Egyptian respondents with high economic expectations were 9.66 percent more likely to support the FJP than Tunisian respondents with similar expectations were to support Ennahda. However, since the 95 percent confidence intervals for these two coefficients overlap, I cannot conclude that the difference between them is statistically significant. Though it is difficult to determine the directionality of the relationship between these two variables, these coefficients seem to indicate that Egyptian and Tunisian voters who were optimistic about their countries’ economic prospects after toppling Mubarak and Ben Ali tended to attach their high hopes to ascendant Islamist groups. This finding potentially validates part of H2.a, in that Egyptian voters may have had higher economic expectations for the FJP than Tunisian voters had for Ennahda.
## Table 1

**Dependent Variable:**
Levels of Trust in Islamist Groups (2010-2011)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regressors</th>
<th>Ennahda</th>
<th>Ennahda</th>
<th>MB/FJP</th>
<th>MB/FJP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic Expectations</td>
<td>0.142***</td>
<td>0.0944**</td>
<td>0.0926**</td>
<td>0.191***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0432)</td>
<td>(0.0451)</td>
<td>(0.0383)</td>
<td>(0.0504)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
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<td></td>
<td>0.00352</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00417)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00389)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (Male)</td>
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<td>0.00859</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0941)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.146)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.146***</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0707***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0287)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0256)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>-0.345***</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.0525</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.125)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.118)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>0.0896</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0970</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.115)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.164)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion (Muslim)</td>
<td>-0.294</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.382*</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.499)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.204)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mosque Attendance</td>
<td>0.158***</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.0246</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0278)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0581)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-1.65e-08</td>
<td></td>
<td>-3.12e-05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.27e-08)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(6.41e-05)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.369***</td>
<td>1.826***</td>
<td>2.484***</td>
<td>2.208***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0943)</td>
<td>(0.574)</td>
<td>(0.0799)</td>
<td>(0.344)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Observations**: 919, 811, 1,084, 624

**R-squared**: 0.011, 0.078, 0.006, 0.039
Table 2

Dependent Variable:
Levels of Trust in Islamist Groups (2012-2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regressors</th>
<th>Con. Council</th>
<th>Con. Council</th>
<th>MB/FJP</th>
<th>MB/FJP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic Dissatisfaction</td>
<td>-0.461***</td>
<td>-0.432***</td>
<td>-0.324***</td>
<td>-0.287***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00879)</td>
<td>(0.00449)</td>
<td>(0.00997)</td>
<td>(0.0145)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.00273</td>
<td>0.000257</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00304)</td>
<td>(0.00107)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (Male)</td>
<td>0.0601</td>
<td>0.0247</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0759)</td>
<td>(0.0277)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.0598**</td>
<td>-0.493***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0249)</td>
<td>(0.00282)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>0.0441</td>
<td>0.0869***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0915)</td>
<td>(0.0291)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>-0.111</td>
<td>-0.0440</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0928)</td>
<td>(0.0301)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion (Muslim)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-0.493***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0427)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mosque Attendance</td>
<td>0.0433*</td>
<td>0.0546***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0256)</td>
<td>(0.00953)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>2.67e-10</td>
<td>-3.46e-08***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(9.30e-09)</td>
<td>(4.43e-09)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>3.967***</td>
<td>3.652***</td>
<td>3.622***</td>
<td>3.809***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0196)</td>
<td>(0.227)</td>
<td>(0.0226)</td>
<td>(0.0699)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Observations  14,093 | 961 | 13,771 | 7,030
R-squared     0.163 | 0.116 | 0.072 | 0.102

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

In order to understand how the economic attitudes of these respondents evolved as Islamist parties won elections and as Egypt and Tunisia continued to face harsh economic realities, I run further regression analysis on the same variables from previous models using data from Arab Barometer Wave III. For these regressions, however, I use respondent perceptions of then-economic conditions as my principle explanatory variable, rather than examining respondent economic expectations. In this way, I hope to gauge whether respondents had linked their dashed economic hopes with the Islamist parties which had prevailed in recent elections. I hope that by focusing on these variables, I can gain insight into how Tunisian and Egyptian voters perceived Islamist parties in an economic context after those parties had established themselves as part of the government rather than the opposition.

The p-values produced by these regressions indicate that high levels of dissatisfaction with the economy had a statistically significant negative correlation with both Tunisian respondent trust in Ennahda and Egyptian respondent trust in the FJP, with and without accounting for control variables (see table 2). While supporters of Islamists had high expectations for their countries’ economic prospects in 2010 and 2011, those respondents who expressed dissatisfaction with their countries’ economic
stagnation two years later tended to blame the Islamists. This is to be expected, as Egyptian and Tunisian voters who believed in the mission of Islamists would have a high degree of faith in those actors’ potential for economic achievement, and those same voters would understandably become disillusioned with their Islamist standard-bearers as economic conditions failed to improve.

These results undermine H2.a, however, as Tunisian voters dissatisfied with the economy were less likely to trust the Tunisian Constitutional Council, which Ennahda led, than economically dissatisfied Egyptians were to trust the Muslim Brotherhood. Specifically, respondents in Tunisia who were unhappy with the economy were 46.1 percent less likely to trust the Constitutional Council than respondents who were happy with the economy, while Egyptian respondents who were dissatisfied with the economy were only 28.7 percent less likely to trust the Muslim Brotherhood than more content Egyptian respondents. Since the regression output for these two coefficients indicates that their respective 95 percent confidence intervals do not overlap, I conclude that the divergent levels of trust in Tunisian and Egyptian Islamists differ to a statistically significant degree and that economically disillusioned Tunisians are indeed less likely to trust their country’s Islamists than their Egyptian counterparts. This finding contradicts my hypothesis that Tunisian voters’ lower economic expectations kept their support for Ennahda dropping more precipitously than Egyptian voters’ support for the Brotherhood, at least during this period.

Finally, to gain a sense of how high levels of economic satisfaction influenced support for Islamist groups, I again draw from Arab Barometer Wave III and find that while the Brotherhood enjoyed increased trust from economically satisfied voters, Ennahda did not. I conduct multivariate regression analysis using the same control and outcome variables that I used to test H2.a, but this time I include an explanatory variable for economic satisfaction, rather than dissatisfaction. According to the p-values given in my regression output, when accounting for control variables, economic satisfaction was only a reliable predictor of trust in Islamists with regard to the FJP, and then only at a 90 percent confidence level (appendix 1, table 5). Furthermore, the coefficient for the effect of economic satisfaction on trust in the FJP indicates a weak positive correlation. These results tentatively contradict the postulation of H2.b that Tunisian voters supported Ennahda by greater margins than Egyptian voters supported the FJP thanks to perceived success in the former’s economic agenda.

How could this be? If disaffected voters in Tunisia blamed Ennahda for the country’s economic woes to a greater extent than Egyptian voters blamed the FJP, and if Ennahda did not benefit from any perceived economic achievements, why did Egyptian voters turn out en masse to protest the Brotherhood in 2013, while Ennahda’s detractors largely stayed home? I suggest that economic conditions had a more negligible impact on shaping the outcomes of Egypt and Tunisia’s transitions than might be intuitive and that other variables—such as the FJP’s authoritarian governing style—were ultimately more influential. This conclusion supports my broader theory
that structural variables, such as voter perceptions and attitudes, were less relevant to Egypt and Tunisia’s transitional outcomes.

The Military

Through extensive historical process tracing, I conclude that Tunisia owes a great deal of the success of its democratic transition to a unified, professional military that was cut out of the channels of power for decades. By contrast, Egypt’s less professional, extractive military played a central role in the country’s return to authoritarianism. Drawing from these conclusions, I argue that the disparity in the professionalization—or detachment from economic and political interests—of the Tunisian and Egyptian militaries was one of the three most relevant agent-based variables affecting the two states’ divergent transitions.

Though the regime of former Tunisian President Zine el Abidine Ben Ali was exceptionally repressive, it did not rely on the military to maintain power to nearly the same extent as did many of its authoritarian Arab neighbors. Ben Ali’s predecessor, Habib Bourguiba, “deliberately kept the military small,” and Ben Ali—himself a former internal security officer—further eclipsed the military upon assuming office by elevating the police to a position of supreme national power. In large part thanks to their close relationship with the new ruling family, senior police officials cultivated profitable connections with Tunisia’s business elites, while lower-level officers exploited opportunities for bribery and other corrupt practices. The police’s hegemony in the world of Tunisian cronyism and their critical role in the survival of the regime meant that the military was excluded from the bulk of state profiteering. Furthermore, unlike many of the Arab World’s other militaries, the Tunisian armed forces never participated in combat and existed on the periphery of Tunisia’s national identity.

This marginalization gave the military very little incentive to back Ben Ali when protests engulfed the country at the end of 2010 and ultimately boded well for the country’s democratic transition. Indeed, Marc Lynch argues that “the endgame in Tunisia rested on the decision of the independent military, which ultimately decided not to use excessive force against protestors and then moved to push Ben Ali out of power.” After Ben Ali’s flight to Saudi Arabia, the armed forces remarkably refrained from replacing him with the high-ranking general who had deposed him, Rachid Ammar. In continued deference to civilian authority, the military then stepped back from the transition process altogether and allowed the Ben Achour Commission, a “consensus-building body” comprised of civil society groups, to take charge. Alfred Stepan attributes the military’s unique restraint during this critical period to Tunisians’ relatively low susceptibility to “Brumairian temptations.” According to Stepan, in comparison with other Arab states such as Egypt which were skittish of ascendant Islamist groups, Tunisian voters were ultimately less inclined to “[abdi- cate] their right to rule to soldiers—in . . . exchange for military protection against perceived threats from . . . rivals newly empowered by democracy.” This, com-
combined with the military’s independence from the vestiges of the Ben Ali regime and its detachment from the Tunisian economy, paved the way for a successful civilian democratic transition.

A quasi-professional military also played a central role in removing Egypt’s veteran autocrat, Hosni Mubarak, from office. In contrast to Tunisia’s armed forces, however, the Egyptian military enjoyed proximity to the seat of national power and was deeply involved in the economy. In fact, the military’s economic interests were a critical factor in its decision to force Mubarak out to begin with. Unlike Ben Ali, Mubarak—who had commanded Egypt’s air force in the 1973 war against Israel—was a military fixture. And during a tenure which lasted longer than that of any Egyptian leader since Muhammad Ali Pasha, he helped his military colleagues build “commercial and industrial empires” which depended on the political stability his regime had carefully engineered. However, Mubarak’s eldest son and likely successor, Gamal, threatened to disrupt that stability. It was an open secret that the military’s top brass despised Gamal for shirking service in the armed forces and for promising to implement neo-liberal reforms which might fracture their crony networks. Furthermore, in spite of its profound participation in the Egyptian economy, the military had been “thoroughly depoliticized so as to avoid coups,” and “could not be deployed for naked regime-survival purposes,” severely limiting its ultimate loyalty to the Mubarak family. These factors, combined with reports of intense lobbying of military leadership on part of the Obama administration, made the army’s decision not to use violence against protestors and eventually depose Mubarak an unsurprising one.

Unlike the Tunisian military, however, the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) meddled extensively in Egypt’s early democratic transition and later exploited Egyptian voters’ receptivity to a Brumairian solution. While Tunisia had created an independent electoral commission, which opened itself to international observers, the SCAF—which was unilaterally responsible for orchestrating Egypt’s elections—initially prohibited international scrutiny of electoral processes, ostensibly to prevent any violation of Egypt’s sovereignty. In response to mounting international pressure, the SCAF eventually allowed a limited number of “electoral followers” into the country, but their prerogative was severely restricted. After the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafist al-Nour Party claimed victory in those elections, the military began working behind the scenes to undermine the new government. Finally, as Egyptians returned to the streets to protest the Islamists’ increasingly illiberal policies and inability to address an ailing economy, the military removed Brotherhood President Muhammad Morsi from power and replaced him with Defense Minister Abdel Fattah el-Sisi.

Since taking office, Sisi has largely acted as an unabashed autocrat of the same mold as Hosni Mubarak. The Egyptian regime has banned the Muslim Brotherhood and essentially coopted any remaining Islamists in parliament, while freedom of expression and political mobilization have sunken to abysmal levels. These measures
have ensured that Egypt’s post revolutionary destiny has been starkly different from Tunisia’s.

Civil Society and Corresponding Bureaucracies

Through similar process tracing, I now seek to understand the role that civil society organizations and state institutions played in shaping Egypt and Tunisia’s transitions. From my analysis, I conclude that strong civil society groups—particularly labor unions—were instrumental in the survival of Tunisian democracy, whereas weak civil society groups conversely facilitated Egypt’s authoritarian reversal. I do not find evidence, however, that Egypt and Tunisia’s political institutions differed significantly enough to have explanatory power for this study’s research question.

After the Islamists, civic organizations were arguably the most influential non-state actors of the Tunisian democratic transition. As Bellin observes, Tunisia had long been fertile ground for a robust civil sector. Even in light of the intense repression they weathered from the Ben Ali regime, civil society groups benefited from Tunisia’s unique “structural assets: a large middle class, a relatively well-educated population, and the country’s proximity to . . . Europe—along with [a] high level of Internet connectivity.” These favorable conditions laid the groundwork for Tunisia’s most powerful labor union: the “Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail” (UGTT). Though the Bourguiba regime would coopt the UGTT soon after seizing power, the union retained a remarkable degree of independence, especially among its rank and file members. The UGTT’s experience negotiating with the regime through a series of strikes in the 70s and 80s gave it the organizational savvy necessary to mobilize Tunisians across the country during the 2011 uprising and eventually force Ben Ali to abdicate. It also proved to be exceptionally influential in shaping the country’s fledgling liberal government, and ultimately “played a decisive role in setting Tunisia on the road to democratic transition.”

By contrast, Egyptian organized labor constituted a minority of the workforce and most unions were state-controlled. Admittedly, workers’ groups staged multiple strikes leading up to Mubarak’s departure and sought to affect the country’s transition by joining protestors. However, their ultimate inability to wrest power from the Islamists or military meant that they “did not become . . . indispensable central actor[s]” in Egypt’s democratic transition.

Unlike civil society groups, Egyptian and Tunisian state institutions did not differ significantly from one another and had a negligible impact on Egypt and Tunisia’s divergent transitional outcomes. While Egypt’s bureaucracies were marginally more compromised than Tunisia’s, they continued to “allow the state to function under severe political and security conditions.” In fact, Abdulmonem Almashat and Salwa Thabet argue that the Egyptian bureaucracy “did its best” to protect the state from players with illiberal instincts such as the FJP and the military. It seems that the Egyptian authoritarian backslide had less to do with the corruption of its institutions
and more to do with the strength of other actors whose agendas proved to be at odds with democratic growth.

I accordingly find only partial support for H4. While the differences in Egypt and Tunisia’s civil societies were predictive of the countries’ transitional outcomes, the differences in the integrity of their bureaucracies had an inconsequential impact on those outcomes. This finding supports my theory that actors such as civic groups ultimately had a more substantial impact on the transitions than structural institutions such as bureaucracies.

Islamist Political Movements

Finally, I assess how the decisions and behavior of the FJP and Ennahda affected their trustworthiness with voters. This question is of particular interest to this study since the massive public outcry against the Muslim Brotherhood likely gave the military the credibility it needed to topple the elected Brotherhood government. In this section, I find that Ennahda’s participation in a parliamentary coalition and its concessions to rival parties were critical to its political survival, while the FJP’s seizure of the legislature and the presidency set the party on a fatal collision course with Egyptian activists and armed forces. Conversely, I find no evidence that Ennahda’s religious moderation played a significant role in enabling it to succeed where the Brotherhood failed.

I return to Arab Barometer Wave III and conclude that Ennahda benefited from governing as part of a coalition while the FJP was hurt by its unilateral control of the Egyptian parliament and presidential palace. For my two explanatory variables in this analysis, I use 1) respondents’ preference that a wide array of both secular and religious parties competes in national elections and 2) respondents’ opposition to their government consistently passing legislation in accordance with Islamic law. I substitute these regressors for my ideal variable (respondent preference that a coalition, rather than a single party, form a government in parliament) as this data was not available in Wave III. I proceed to use the same dependent and control variables used in earlier models.

From the output of these regressions (table 3), I observe that when accounting for control variables, respondents who favored pluralistic elections were 8.68 percent more likely to trust Ennahda than those who did not, while similar respondents did not exhibit a corresponding increase of trust in the FJP. Predictably, both parties fared poorly at a significant level among respondents who opposed their government enacting laws in accordance with Islamic law. Based on these results, I infer that Ennahda earned the trust of Tunisia’s electorate by participating in a parliamentary coalition, while Egyptian voters viewed the unconstrained FJP with suspicion.
I draw from Arab Barometer Wave III for a final time to find that while Ennahda benefited from its coalition participation, it did not experience a significant increase in support for moderating the Islamist platform. I run several multivariate regressions using the same control and outcome variables from previous hypotheses, but this time I use respondents’ preferences for secular parties as my primary explanatory variable. Wave III, unfortunately, does not provide any data reflecting respondents’ views on the religious platforms of Ennahda or the FJP, but I consider a comparison of the levels of trust in the two groups among voters who tend to support secular parties an acceptable substitute.

My results indicate a strong negative correlation between respondents’ preference for secular parties and their support for Ennahda or the FJP, with and without control variables (appendix 1, table 7). While the coefficient for the relationship between secular party preference and trust in the FJP is more extreme than the same coefficient for trust in Ennahda, the confidence intervals for the two coefficients overlap, indicating that the difference between them is not statistically significant. I thus
conclude that while there is tentative support for H6.a, I would need to analyze additional data to confirm that Ennahda’s ideological moderation gave it the political sustainability to outlast the FJP. Conducting further analysis on the effect of Ennahda’s moderation might well verify arguments from prominent Arab authors such as Ghazi al Tuba, who contend that the group’s drift towards the political center was crucial to its relative success.\textsuperscript{64} At this juncture, however, I am unable to definitively prove or disprove H6.a, and accordingly can neither rule on the validity of H6.b.

This analysis demonstrates that the two Islamist groups’ contrasting degrees of control over their governments were predictive of their ultimate levels of support. H6 was correct. Tunisian voters responded well to Ennahda’s participation in a coalition while Egyptian voters perceived the FJP’s control of the presidency and the legislature to be dangerously authoritarian. These voters seemed less concerned, however, with their parties’ commitment to Islamic values. It seems that Egyptian and Tunisian Islamists literally lived or died by their ability to convince the public that they were team players.

**Conclusion**

The results of this study demonstrate that while state conditions certainly shaped Egypt and Tunisia’s most influential post-revolutionary actors, the agents themselves, not the structures that molded them, ultimately had the most definitive impact on transitional outcomes. As discussed earlier in this paper, the military, Islamists, and civil society groups proved to be the most important of these actors. I specifically contend that in Tunisia, a professional military that played a minimal role in economic affairs paved the way for a civilian democratic transition, while strong and independent civic organizations guided that transition during subsequent political turbulence. Furthermore, the most successful party in Tunisia’s first elections—Ennahda—governed as part of a coalition with two secular parties, assuaging the public’s fears that it aimed to stage a complete Islamist takeover and discouraging widespread protests. In Egypt, on the other hand, the military had a long history of using state industry to turn a profit, meaning that it had a strong incentive to meddle in civilian politics well after deposing Mubarak in order to secure its interests. After the Muslim Brotherhood won the presidency and dominated the country’s parliamentary elections in 2012, the Islamists and armed forces were the only real power brokers left in Egypt, especially with such an underdeveloped and disorganized civil society. The authoritarian instincts of both groups made the country’s return to despotism inevitable.

The variables which were not influential in shaping the two states’ transitional outcomes have significant implications as well. Economic grievances surprisingly did not determine which Islamist-led government survived. In fact, Tunisians felt economic pain and blamed their leaders to a greater degree than Egyptians did. Nor is there compelling evidence that Ennahda’s moderation or the Brotherhood’s commitment to Islamic values were deciding factors in the two parties’ fates. Rather it seems
that Ennahda prevailed and the Brotherhood fell because Tunisians believed the former was willing to work with one-time rivals in good faith while Egyptians saw the latter as an uncompromising juggernaut barreling towards remaking the country to its liking.

In short, Egyptians and Tunisians cared more about pluralism and the rule of law than they did about the economy or ideological purity. What is more, those liberal attitudes were just as prevalent among voters who had lived in the Middle East their entire lives as they were among voters who had been exposed to the political innovations of Europe and North America. These popular attitudes collided with key actors to produce starkly different outcomes. In the end, these countries’ actors—not structures—determined their political destinies. Democracy, it seems, is not exclusively a Western import. It just needs the right agents who are willing and capable enough to make it flourish.

14 Ibid., 668.
16 Ibid., 322.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid., 321.
Ibid.


23 Ibid.

24 Ibid., 193.

25 Ibid.

26 Ibid.


28 Khalil Al Anani, “A New Test for Democracy in Tunisia,” Aljazeera (Arabic), August 21, 2019. https://www.aljazeera.net/knowledge/opinions/2019/8/21/%d8%a7%d8%a8%d8%a8%d8%a7%d8%b1-%d8%ac%d8%af%d9%8a%d9%84%d9%84%d8%af%d9%8a%d9%85%d9%82%d8%b1%d8%a7%d8%b7%d9%8a%d8%a9-%d9%81%d9%8a-%d8%aa%d9%88%d9%86%d8%b3


31 Ibid.

32 Eva Bellin, “Drivers of Democracy”


34 Zollner, “Metamorphosis of Social Movements,” 11.

35 Ibid.

36 Masoud, Counting Islam, 147.

37 Ibid., 140.


39 One limitation of this study is that Arab Barometer Wave III did not assess levels of respondent trust in Ennahda, so I instead used trust in the Tunisian Constitutional Council—of which Ennahda was a part—as my Tunisian outcome variable.

40 Among the controls which had a statistically significant effect on the outcome variable, respondent education positively correlated with trust in Islamist groups in both countries. While employment had a negative correlation with trust in Ennahda, statistical significance disappeared when examining the correlation between employment and trust in the FJP. And while mosque attendance positively correlated with trust in Ennahda, that variable’s effect also lost its significance when applied to trust in the FJP.
While many of the coefficients for the control variables resemble those from control variables of table 1, educated respondents seem to have turned on the FJP, while more religiously pious respondents seem to have flocked to it.


Anderson, “Demystifying the Arab Spring,” 323.


Anderson, “Demystifying the Arab Spring,” 323.


Anderson, “Demystifying the Arab Spring,” 95.

Ibid., 92.

Ibid., 94, 95.

Slackman, “Hosni Mubarak Dies.”

Ibid.


Ibid.

Ibid., 92.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Stepan, “Tunisia’s Transition,” 93.


Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.


Ibid., 116.

Ghazi Al Tuba, “Why did the revolution succeed in Tunisia but not in Egypt?” *Aljazeera* (Arabic), February 4, 2016. https://www.aljazeera.net/knowledgelate/opinions/2016/2/4/%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B0%D8%A7-%D9%86%D8%AC%D8%AD%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AA%D9%88%D9%86%D8%B3-%D9%88%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%AC%D8%AD-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B1
Annotated Bibliography

Al Anani, Khalil. 2019. “A New Test for Democracy in Tunisia.” Aljazeera (Arabic), 21 August. Accessed March 5, 2020. https://www.aljazeera.net/knowledgegate/opinions/2019/8/21/%d8%a7%d8%ae%d8%aa%d8%88%d8%a7%d8%b1-%d8%ac%d8%af%d9%8a%d8%af-%d9%84%d9%84%d8%af%d9%8a%d9%85%d9%82%d8%b1%d8%a7%d8%b7%d9%8a%d8%a9-%d9%81%d9%8a-%d8%aa%d9%88%d9%86%d8%b3.


Al Tuba, Ghazi. 2016. “Why did the revolution succeed in Tunisia but not in Egypt?” Aljazeera (Arabic), 4 February. Accessed March 6. https://www.aljazeera.net/knowledgegate/opinions/2016/2/4/%D9%84%D9%85%D8%D9%86%D8%A7-%D9%84%D8%AB-%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AA-%D9%88%D9%86%D8%B3-%D9%88%D9%84%D9%85-%D8%AA-%D9%86%D8%AC-%D8%AD-%D9%81-%D9%8A-%D9%85-%D8%AA-%D9%86%D8%AC-%D8%AD-%D9%81-%D9%8A-%D9%85-%D8%B5-%D8%B1.


Appendix 1

Table 4

Dependent Variable:
Levels of Trust in Islamist Groups (2010-2011)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regressors</th>
<th>Ennahda</th>
<th>Ennahda</th>
<th>MB/FJP</th>
<th>MB/FJP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Time Spent in Europe</td>
<td>0.0118</td>
<td>0.0283</td>
<td>0.167***</td>
<td>0.0600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0435)</td>
<td>(0.0479)</td>
<td>(0.0320)</td>
<td>(0.0720)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.00105</td>
<td>0.00225</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00400)</td>
<td>(0.00387)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (Male)</td>
<td>0.161*</td>
<td>0.0774</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0918)</td>
<td>(0.144)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.148***</td>
<td>0.0668***</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0280)</td>
<td>(0.0255)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>-0.367***</td>
<td>-0.0583</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.120)</td>
<td>(0.118)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marriage</td>
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<td>0.0905</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.111)</td>
<td>(0.156)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion (Muslim)</td>
<td>-0.262</td>
<td>-0.356*</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.520)</td>
<td>(0.210)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mosque Attendance</td>
<td>0.157***</td>
<td>0.00804</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0270)</td>
<td>(0.0566)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-1.57e-08</td>
<td>-2.13e-05</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.21e-08)</td>
<td>(6.61e-05)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.596***</td>
<td>1.851***</td>
<td>3.453***</td>
<td>2.205***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.214)</td>
<td>(0.644)</td>
<td>(0.155)</td>
<td>(0.542)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Observations | 969 | 861 | 1,117 | 638
R-squared | 0.000 | 0.073 | 0.018 | 0.018

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.01
Table 5

Dependent Variable:
Levels of Trust in Islamist Groups (2012-2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regressors</th>
<th>Con. Council</th>
<th>Con. Council</th>
<th>MB/FJP</th>
<th>MB/FJP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic Satisfaction</td>
<td>5.92e-06**</td>
<td>-0.127</td>
<td>2.14e-06</td>
<td>0.0711*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.75e-06)</td>
<td>(0.0965)</td>
<td>(4.25e-06)</td>
<td>(0.0379)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.00258</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00314)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (Male)</td>
<td>0.0813</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0479*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0775)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0289)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.0499*</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0123***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0263)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00306)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.104***</td>
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<td>(0.0972)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0300)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Mosque Attendance</td>
<td>0.0620**</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0490***</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0268)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00986)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
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<td>-3.61e-08***</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(9.65e-09)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(4.49e-09)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marriage</td>
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<td></td>
<td>-0.134***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0423)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion (Muslim)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>-0.699***</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0422)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.979***</td>
<td>3.047***</td>
<td>2.929***</td>
<td>3.297***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00871)</td>
<td>(0.250)</td>
<td>(0.00931)</td>
<td>(0.0803)</td>
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</table>

Observations 14,093 961 13,771 7,030
R-squared 0.000 0.027 0.000 0.050

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
### Table 6

**Dependent Variable:** Levels of Trust in Islamist Groups (2012-2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regressors</th>
<th>Con. Council</th>
<th>Con. Council</th>
<th>MB/FJP</th>
<th>MP/FJP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Time Spent in Europe</td>
<td>-0.111***</td>
<td>0.00806</td>
<td>0.00652</td>
<td>-0.00725</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00978)</td>
<td>(0.0478)</td>
<td>(0.00989)</td>
<td>(0.0135)</td>
</tr>
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<td>0.00131</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00317)</td>
<td>(0.00112)</td>
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</tr>
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<td>0.0384</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0777)</td>
<td>(0.0288)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Education</td>
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<td>0.0121***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0267)</td>
<td>(0.00306)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.0981)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Married</td>
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<td>-0.0766**</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0973)</td>
<td>(0.0311)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Religion (Muslim)</td>
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<td>-0.711***</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0421)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mosque Attendance</td>
<td>0.0545**</td>
<td>0.0492***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0269)</td>
<td>(0.00991)</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Income</td>
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<td>(9.76e-09)</td>
<td>(4.50e-09)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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<td>2.917***</td>
<td>2.927***</td>
<td>3.381***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(0.00919)</td>
<td>(0.227)</td>
<td>(0.00999)</td>
<td>(0.0686)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Observations**: 14,025 | 948 | 13,714 | 6,974
**R-squared**: 0.010 | 0.027 | 0.000 | 0.049

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 7
Dependent Variable: Levels of Trust in Islamist Groups (2012-2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regressors</th>
<th>Con. Council</th>
<th>Con. Council</th>
<th>MB/FJP</th>
<th>MB/FJP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secular Party Preference</td>
<td>-0.137***</td>
<td>-0.237***</td>
<td>-0.324***</td>
<td>-0.303***</td>
</tr>
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<td>(0.00957)</td>
<td>(0.0328)</td>
<td>(0.00962)</td>
<td>(0.0145)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Age</td>
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<td>0.000184</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00332)</td>
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<td>(0.00127)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gender (Male)</td>
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<td>0.0148</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.0850)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0326)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.0369</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.00778**</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0284)</td>
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Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The Supreme Court provided a new consideration to the longstanding debate about public aid to parochial schools in its June 2020 decision of *Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue*. In *Espinoza*, the Supreme Court injected demands of the Free Exercise Clause into a debate historically governed by Establishment Clause concerns. The Court did this by relying on precedent in *Trinity Lutheran v. Comer* (2017), which says that the Free Exercise Clause protects against laws that impose religious status discrimination unless those laws pass strict scrutiny. Applying this precedent to *Espinoza*, the Court held that the application of Montana’s constitutional provision preventing public aid from arriving at parochial schools was a form of religious status discrimination that did not pass strict scrutiny; therefore, it was unconstitutional. But while that finding may affect the future of state constitutional no-aid provisions known as Blaine Amendments, it is by itself insufficient to determine in what situations public aid is constitutional.

When governments or courts determine whether it is constitutional for religious schools to receive public funding, they must consider together the demands of both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, recognizing “‘there is room for play in the joints’ between them.”¹ Analysis must not be limited to free exercise protection against religious status discrimination, as it was in *Espinoza*; it must also include Establishment Clause considerations, specifically the doctrines of neutrality and private choice. When applied to questions about public aid to parochial schools, these doctrines yield different answers for programs of direct and indirect funding.

Background on Espinoza and Blaine Amendments

Some brief background on Espinoza may be helpful for understanding its implications. The case is about a program established by the Montana Legislature that provided tax credits to those who donated to private school scholarship organizations. Families of students awarded scholarships from such organizations could decide to which private schools they would apply the funds. In implementing the program, the Montana Department of Revenue promulgated a rule prohibiting families from applying scholarships to religious schools. It did so in an attempt to comply with the Montana Constitution’s provision prohibiting either indirect or direct aid to religious schools.

The Montana Constitution’s no-aid provision is known as a Blaine Amendment, and Montana is one of thirty-seven states to have such a provision in its constitution. Blaine Amendments are so named for a failed federal constitutional amendment barring aid to sectarian schools that was introduced in 1875 by House Speaker James Blaine. When the federal amendment failed, many states adopted their own versions—sometimes as a coerced condition of admission to the Union. Despite their prevalence in state constitutions, Blaine Amendments are highly controversial for two main reasons: Anti-Catholic animus fueled the original Blaine Amendment, and Blaine Amendments demand a very strict separation of church and state that some deem unnecessary or even unconstitutional.

The question the Court ruled on in Espinoza was the application of Montana’s Blaine Amendment. The Court has never ruled directly on the constitutionality of a Blaine Amendment itself, but in Espinoza, it came close. The majority took several occasions in its opinion to attack Montana’s no-aid provision, writing that it “bars religious schools from public benefits solely because of the religious character of the schools. . . . This is apparent from the plain text,” and also, matter-of-factly, that “The Montana Constitution discriminates based on religious status.” Further, the Court’s holding that Montana should not have applied its no-aid provision to the very circumstance in which it seemed to be relevant suggests no-aid provisions themselves are constitutionally questionable, and at a minimum out of favor with the Court.

As a result, Blaine Amendments stand on tenuous ground. Even if it is constitutional to retain Blaine Amendments in state constitutions, could it ever be constitutional to apply them? It seems unlikely given that the textual construction of Blaine Amendments usually consists of a distinction made solely on whether or not an entity is religious—a distinction the Court would call status-based discrimination. Thus, when states with Blaine Amendments attempt to comply with Espinoza, they will recognize they cannot deny religious schools or those who attend them the opportunity to apply for public aid simply because they are religious. But they will still be left with the question of whether or not it is permissible to actually grant aid. Here they must turn to the Establishment Clause for guidance.

Judicial Interpretation of the Establishment Clause

The Establishment Clause is the companion to the Free Exercise Clause in establishing constitutional protection of religious freedom. The Establishment Clause stipulates that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.” This prohibition also applies to state legislatures through the Fourteenth Amendment.

Unfortunately, interpretation of the Establishment Clause is notoriously complicated, making its application sometimes difficult to discern. Although the Establishment Clause is vital in maintaining a proper relationship between church and state, neither its historical, scholarly, or judicial interpretations are entirely consistent in articulating what constitutes establishment. Despite differences in interpretation, most justices past and present have focused to some extent on questions of a policy’s intent, neutrality in implementation, and resulting relationship between church and state.

These concerns underlie the landmark decision of Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971), which said providing public salary supplements to parochial school teachers was unconstitutional. In Lemon, the Court built upon tests in Walz v. Tax Commission (1971) and Everson v. Board of Education (1947) to create a three-prong test to determine if an Establishment Clause violation has occurred.

The test asks whether a governmental action or policy:
1. Has a clear secular purpose
2. Has a primary effect of promoting or inhibiting religion
3. Results in excessive government entanglement with religion

To pass all three prongs, a governmental action or policy must have a clear secular purpose, must not have a primary effect of promoting or inhibiting religion, and must not result in excessive government entanglement with religion. For the first two decades of its application, the Lemon test resulted in a strict separation of church and state in parochial aid cases, but conservative justices later shifted the ambiguous test’s analysis to be more accommodating of religious options.

The Lemon test has been widely criticized for its prongs’ ambiguity, which has resulted in inconsistent applications and outcomes. In many cases where it could have been applied, Lemon has been ignored. When the Court applied Lemon again in 1993 after evading it in other cases, Justice Antonin Scalia famously wrote that “Like some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause jurisprudence once again.” It has continued to “stalk” on and off since.

5 Pacelle, “Lemon Test.”
The Court modified the Lemon test in Agostini v. Felton (1997) by integrating prong three, the excessive entanglement prong, into prong two, the primary effect prong. The modification of the test helped to shift the Court’s hardline policy of strict separation of church and state, which was typically invoked by prong three, to focus more on whether the primary effect of the policy was neutral toward religion.7

But even with modification, the Lemon test has still been widely criticized. The criticism stems more likely from the difficulty of applying the Lemon test than a total error in the test’s considerations. Even when Lemon is not used, the notions underlying its prongs, such as policy purpose and neutrality of policy, tend to resurface in arguments about Establishment Clause violations.

While Lemon remains on the books, it is unclear exactly if or how it might be applied in future cases as a controlling precedent. The Court sharply criticized the test in its 2019 decision of American Legion v. American Humanist Association, but it proposed no new test.8

If Lemon is out, as some justices have indicated, then it is necessary to turn to the Court’s principle-based antiestablishment approaches. Interestingly, the principles of these approaches often underlie many of the same concerns of the Lemon test. This is evident in Justice Stephen Breyer’s dissent in Espinoza in which he raised the establishment concerns of the government’s purpose—the first prong of the Lemon test—and effect of its policy—the second prong. However, instead of mentioning Lemon, he mentioned the Court’s neutrality doctrine.9 Neutrality and its related principles of avoiding coercion and endorsement are among some of the principle-based approaches the Court has used in antiestablishment jurisprudence instead of the Lemon test.

As this limited recitation of jurisprudence has shown, it is unclear exactly what the Establishment Clause demands. But out of the complexity of Establishment Clause jurisprudence some guiding principles have emerged, including the importance of neutrality in intent, effect, and sometimes implementation of governmental policies. Because Lemon is out of favor with the Court, I will discuss how two Establishment Clause doctrines—neutrality and private choice—can effectively guide determinations about public aid to religious schools.

The Establishment Clause Doctrine of Neutrality

The doctrine of neutrality has a long-established history in Establishment Clause jurisprudence. It first emerged in Everson v. Board of Education (1947) in which the Supreme Court upheld a New Jersey law that allowed public reimbursement of the

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cost of transportation to schools, including private religious schools. In so holding, the Everson Court said that the Establishment Clause precludes the government from “prefer[ring] one religion over another” and also that it “requires the state to be neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and nonbelievers.” The Everson Court also made clear that neutrality prohibits the government from being an “adversary” of religion, meaning that “State power is no more to be used so as to handicap religions than it is to favor them.” The New Jersey program was neutral toward religion, the Court held, because it included both nonreligious and religious private schools. The Everson Court’s characterization of neutrality supports the notion that government policies must have a secular purpose. This prevents the government from implementing policies that would favor religion in a general sense or certain religions in particular—policies tantamount to endorsing religion. In addition, the doctrine of neutrality articulated in Everson would preclude public aid from being used to coerce or endorse religious belief or behavior, or from being used to skew the marketplace of choice toward or away from religious options.

Private Choice Doctrine

The Court’s private choice doctrine was born out of its neutrality doctrine. Private choice doctrine maintains that the government has remained neutral when it directs aid or benefits to a broad class of individual recipients who, by their private choices, then direct the aid to religious schools.

The private choice doctrine was first emphasized in Mueller v. Allen (1983). In that case, the Court dismissed an Establishment Clause challenge to an educational expense tax deduction program that included parochial schools. The Court held that the program was constitutional because the program did “not have the primary effect of advancing the sectarian aims of nonpublic schools;” rather, the program “provide[d] aid to parochial schools only as a result of decisions of individual parents.” Private choice doctrine gained traction in several decisions after Mueller, and it took on significant power in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris (2002). Unlike previous cases of private choice, which typically involved minimal government aid of inherently secular materials or activities, Zelman upheld a private choice tuition voucher program that allowed individuals to apply their vouchers directly to religiously affiliated schools for religiously integrated education. The Zelman Court held that this was constitutional because the program was enacted for a secular purpose—providing education; the program provided assistance “to a broad class of citizen;” “true private choice” existed; and the state did not create incentives that would skew choices toward religious schools.

11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
The private choice doctrine represents a shift from stricter no-aid holdings of the Court before *Mueller*. However, it is now well entrenched in jurisprudence and appears here to stay. Even though the Court declined to address any Establishment Clause concerns in *Espinoza*, it took the time to hint its support for the private choice doctrine articulated in *Zelman*, writing that “Any Establishment Clause objection… here is particularly unavailing because the government support makes its way to religious schools only as a result of Montanans independently choosing to spend their scholarships at such schools.” As a result, private choice doctrine, along with its parent doctrine of neutrality, should be considered in determining the Establishment Clause’s implications regarding the constitutionality of public aid reaching religious schools.

The Permissibility of Direct Aid

Because the Supreme Court has made distinctions between direct and indirect aid, as have many no-aid constitutional provisions, I will consider direct and indirect aid separately, beginning with direct aid. Here, direct aid means the transferring of public aid from a governmental body directly to a religiously affiliated school. Determining how neutrality affects direct aid requires consideration of the purpose of the aid, whether the aid or its implemented purposes may result in coercion or endorsement, and whether the marketplace of choice resulting from the direct aid is neutral toward religion.

I. The purpose of the aid must be secular

The government’s intention in providing direct aid is a first consideration. The aid’s purpose should be secular to prevent concerns of government endorsement of one religion or religion generally. For example, suppose a state legislature allocates funds for which private and public secondary schools can apply to purchase math textbooks containing the state’s newly updated curriculum standards. The purpose here is secular, and the standard of neutrality is met because the purpose of the funding is neither to advance or inhibit religion. The state, of course, can set forth requirements to apply, such as requiring schools to demonstrate financial need or meet accreditation standards. However, as long as parochial schools meet the requirements set forth by the state, which cannot be based on religious status, they should be eligible to apply and ostensibly receive the benefits from the state to fulfill the state’s secular purpose.

Some may be concerned that math textbooks awarded to religious schools could be used in religiously integrated curriculums and thus have the effect of advancing religion. It is true that parochial schools may incorporate religious elements into

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16 Ibid.
their teaching of math. However, as long as the state’s secular purpose in providing textbooks—to help students learn the state’s curriculum standards—will still be accomplished, the state’s purpose in providing textbooks has been fulfilled. Ancillary curriculum or pedagogical techniques that incorporate religion need not concern the state.

II. The direct aid cannot result in coercion or endorsement

A second neutrality concern that must be considered is whether the aid or implementation of the aid would coerce individuals to perform or pretend religious beliefs or acts in order to obtain a benefit, or if providing the aid would result in endorsement of one religion or religion generally. Whether or not coercion or endorsement may exist determines whether or not neutrality in implementation of public aid is required. Two examples may help to illustrate.

First, suppose the government decides to create a law that allows selected schools to establish after-school remedial math programs that serve their local communities. The remedial math programs would be open to any students in the community, not just students who attend the schools in which the programs are held. Suppose also that the government only has funds to award two schools in a large and religiously diverse community this privilege, and it decides to fund the two schools that seem to be most geographically convenient for students in the community. In choosing the two schools, the government’s assumption is that students will attend the after-school program nearest to them.

If one of the schools chosen is a religious school, then the religious school would probably need to be religiously neutral in implementing the after-school program to avoid the possibility of coercion. This is because students would likely be deciding which school’s program to attend based on geographic proximity, not based on the religious nature of the school holding the program. The lack of convenient alternatives to a religious option inhibits a fair choice about which program to attend. As a result, incorporating religious elements to the administration of the math program could result in participants being coerced to hold, assume, or pretend religious beliefs or acts simply to participate in the program nearest to them.

Even if, somehow, no student attending the remedial math program at a religious school would be coerced into religious beliefs or behavior if the curriculum was religiously integrated, the funding of one particular religious school—and the authorization for the school to implement religious elements—could raise an establishment concern. Some might consider the state to be showing a preference for a particular religion by choosing to aid that religion’s school and not others. Therefore, it would probably be best for the school to be religiously neutral in implementing the program.

Consider a second example where the state establishes the same program, but this time the state can fund all accredited schools to hold their own after-school remedial math programs for their own students. In this case, integration of religion by
religious schools to their after-school math programs would not be likely to result in coercion. Students at religious schools have already opted in to religiously integrated instruction by choosing to attend a religious school; therefore, a religiously integrated curriculum would not likely result in coercion of religious beliefs or behavior.

In addition, this scenario, where all schools receive direct aid, prevents the government from preferring one religion to another in its distribution of benefits, thereby alleviating concerns of government endorsement of religion. Thus, when coercion and endorsement concerns are mitigated through the structuring of government policy, a religious school need not be religiously neutral in implementing direct aid from the government.

III. Neutrality concerns the choices the direct aid creates or incentivizes

A third point of consideration, closely tied to avoiding coercion and endorsement, is the extent to which a government policy affects the availability of choices or the incentives toward religious and nonreligious choices.

In the previously mentioned example where one religious and one nonreligious school both receive direct aid, the government not only controls but limits the marketplace of choice for students hoping to participate in a remedial math program. The more the government limits the marketplace of choice, the less freedom religious schools have to incorporate religious elements when implementing the direct aid’s purpose. This is because the government must be careful to avoid the real concern of coercing religious behavior or acts due to limited educational alternatives. On the other hand, leaving out religious schools, or requiring them to be neutral in implementing religious programs, can effectively coerce the choosing of nonreligious options. In navigating these difficult decisions, the government should presume it imposes a greater conscience violation by coercing religious choice than simply not providing a religiously integrated option. Still, such zero-sum policy structures, where schools compete against each other to receive direct aid, are naturally suspect as policies that may seem to favor either religion or nonreligion; likely, they will not strike a perfect balance, nor should they be expected to.

A better—though financially more challenging—way of maintaining neutrality can be accomplished by attempting to include all schools, or as many as possible, in direct aid programs. When the government does this, it does not limit or bear responsibility for the variety of choices. For instance, in the example of the government funding remedial math programs for all schools, the government does not create the school options that exist. Instead, the government seeks to be neutral in the incentives it creates by including all schools so that no school is receiving a benefit incentivizing its attendance that another school is not.

Such policy structuring is ideal because it prevents a zero-sum situation; the government does not have to choose a nonreligious school over a religious school or vice versa but rather allows all schools to participate. Therefore, the government is less likely to be accused of favoring one type of school. When all schools are eligible for
the same benefits, and when secular and religious schools are evaluated on the same
grounds in determinations about aid, then the government is not skewing the mar-
ketplace of choices. Certain incentives may already exist between different schools,
and the government need not attempt to correct these differences to maintain neutral-
ity. Rather, it must avoid creating new incentives that may seem to favor or disfavor
religious or nonreligious schools.

As previously mentioned, the availability of alternatives to religious options—or
vice versa—may determine the likelihood of coercion and establishment. The more
options the government funds with direct funding, the less likely coercion or es-
tablishment are likely to be concerns. Of course, government funds are limited and
funding all options may be difficult practically. But to the best of its ability, the gov-
ernment should seek neither to intentionally disincentivize or incentivize religious
schools by its policies, and where possible, it should seek to maximize, not minimize,
the available options.

The Permissibility of Indirect Aid

The doctrine of neutrality also has implications for indirect aid, which is defined
as governmental aid that is directed to an intermediary or series of intermediaries
who decide to which school to apply the aid. Because there is an intermediary—usu-
ally a citizen—making a choice about where the aid goes, the private choice doctrine
of the Establishment Clause applies in tandem with neutrality doctrine. Neutrality’s
implications for indirect aid are similar to those of direct aid in that the purpose of
the aid must be secular and the government must be neutral toward religion in the
marketplace of choice. However, neutrality demands little of indirect aid in terms of
whether the aid is used in a religiously integrated manner. This is because the Court
has recognized as important the fact that indirect aid programs do not allow the gov-
ernment to choose which schools ultimately receive aid; thus, indirect aid programs
alleviate most endorsement and coercion concerns.

I. The purpose of the aid must be secular

For the same reasons emphasized in relation to direct aid, the government’s pur-
pose with any indirect aid program should be secular. Secular purposes avoid poli-
cies that would constitute government endorsement of religion.

II. The private choice doctrine makes indirect aid presumptively constitutional

The Court’s assertion in cases of private choice is that when public aid for secular
purposes reaches religious institutions through “deliberate choices of numerous indi-
vidual recipients,” the government is not establishing religion.\textsuperscript{17} The Court explicitly
absolved governmental responsibility for the aid’s final destination when it explained
in Zelman that the government’s role “ends with the disbursement of benefits.” \textsuperscript{18}

case.pdf.

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid.
This is why indirect aid programs, as long as they are secular in purpose, do not raise coercion or establishment concerns. Coercion is mitigated by allowing individuals to make their own choices about which schools to apply aid. Endorsement is also mitigated because the government does not decide which institutions will receive aid. Even if private citizens choose to apply the aid mostly to religious schools, the government does not bear responsibility for this end result and thus cannot be said to endorse or establish religion.

III. The government must be neutral toward religion in the marketplace of choice

Although neutrality does not demand an examination of the sum effect of private choices in cases of indirect aid, it does demand an examination of whether the government is neutral toward religion in the choices it provides or incentivizes. The value of private choice is hindered when choices are constricted.

For example, if a government creates a program to provide scholarships to students that attend private universities, students attending private religious universities should be as eligible to receive a scholarship as students attending private non-religious universities. Perhaps the government may restrict the eligibility criteria to certain programs of study. Or it may exclude pastoral training as an eligible program of study so as to avoid establishment of religion—an exclusion the Supreme Court upheld in Locke v. Davey (2004). The government has the right to determine its criteria for scholarship eligibility. But once it does, students at religious universities who meet that criteria must be eligible for the publicly available benefit. If the government excludes religious universities, it fails to meet the demands of neutrality because it expresses disfavor toward religious options. Neutrality doctrine demands—and the private choice doctrine supports—the inclusion of religious school options when nonreligious private schools are also included in governmental policies.

Conclusion

Determining what forms of aid are constitutionally permissible is particularly challenging after Espinoza. Though the Espinoza Court did not officially declare Blaine Amendments unconstitutional in its holding, it spared no opportunity to insult their constitutionality. As state officials and courts grapple with decisions about direct and indirect aid, they will need workable Establishment Clause doctrines to accompany the Free Exercise Clause protection against religious status discrimination.

Because Lemon appears to be on its way out, the Court should return to its interrelated Establishment Clause doctrines of neutrality and private choice. Specifically, when neutrality is considered in cases of direct aid, it is important to consider the government’s intent in providing the aid, the possibility of coercion or endorsement imposed by providing the aid, and the resulting marketplace of choice, including adequate existence of religious or nonreligious alternatives, that the government creates or affects by its policy.
In cases of indirect aid, the policies should be presumed constitutional so long as the government does not incentivize or disincentivize religious choice or constrict choices to nonreligious options. When the Establishment Clause doctrines of neutrality and private choice are considered in tandem with those of the Free Exercise Clause, policies that better appreciate the “play in the joints” between the Religion Clauses will be possible.\(^\text{19}\)

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