Sigma: Journal of Political and International Studies

Volume 38 Article 8

5-2021

Power Brokers: Three Revolutionaries Who Shaped Post-revolutionary Egypt and Tunisia

Dan Harker
Brigham Young University

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/sigma

Part of the Military and Veterans Studies Commons, Near and Middle Eastern Studies Commons, Other International and Area Studies Commons, Other Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration Commons, Peace and Conflict Studies Commons, Political Science Commons, and the Social Welfare Commons

Recommended Citation

Harker, Dan (2021) "Power Brokers: Three Revolutionaries Who Shaped Post-revolutionary Egypt and Tunisia," *Sigma: Journal of Political and International Studies*: Vol. 38 , Article 8.
Available at: https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/sigma/vol38/iss1/8

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at BYU ScholarsArchive. It has been accepted for inclusion in Sigma: Journal of Political and International Studies by an authorized editor of BYU ScholarsArchive. For more information, please contact scholarsarchive@byu.edu, ellen_amatangelo@byu.edu.

Power Brokers: Three Actors Who Shaped Post-revolutionary Egypt and Tunisia

Dan Harker

Professor Mecham

Political Science 450

April 13, 2020

Introduction

On June 17, 2019, Egypt's first and only civilian president, Muhammad Morsi, collapsed from a heart attack while standing trial in a military court. The 67-year-old Morsi was facing nearly half a century in prison six years after he was removed from power in a military coup. Morsi was pronounced dead upon arriving at a Cairo hospital, prompting the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamist movement he had once led, to accuse the Egyptian regime of committing "full-fledged murder."[1]

Less than four months later, Tunisian voters flocked to the polls to choose a new president and parliament for the second time in their country's history.[2] Despite continuing to face severe economic challenges and repeated security threats, Tunisia remains the Arab world's lone true democracy. That success has, in large part, unfolded under the supervision of Tunisia's most prominent Islamist group—the Ennahda Movement. Rached Ghannouchi, Ennahda's founder, has played a central role in crafting the policies which have guided the Tunisian democratic transition and currently serves as the speaker of parliament.[3]

Nine years after the events of the Arab Spring, it would seem that the political climates of these two countries could not be more different. In Egypt, an exceptionally authoritarian military regime has quashed any meaningful political opposition and tightly restricts civil liberties.[4] Tunisia, by contrast, has developed a vigorous multi-party democracy and regularly holds free and fair elections. Freedom House, a research institute that evaluates the robustness of political

rights and civil liberties around the world, has rigorously documented the widening disparity between Egyptian and Tunisian democratization (figure 1).[5]



Note: Higher scores indicate worse conditions for political rights and civil liberties.

When popular uprisings toppled veteran autocrats in both countries, however, Egypt and Tunisia seemed to be embarking on very similar trajectories. Both promptly conducted elections that the international community deemed "competitive and credible,"[6] and both voted in governments led by Islamist political movements. What happened in the intervening decade? Why did these two comparable Arab states experience such divergent outcomes in the wake of their democratic revolutions?

In this paper, I analyze both structural and agent-based factors in the Egyptian and Tunisian cases to develop a theory explaining their contrasting transitional outcomes. Structurally, I scrutinize state institutions, émigré communities, and voter perceptions of Islamism in both countries. Regarding agent-related variables, or variables concerning individual actors, I focus on post-revolutionary actors including civil society organizations, Islamist

political parties, and the military. Based on my analysis of these factors, I conclude that these two cases were fundamentally similar in most structural respects, but subtle structural differences shaped key groups of actors, which ultimately differed drastically. I identify three actors whom I contend were most relevant to this study: the Islamists, the military, and civil society. It was these agents which were most directly responsible for determining Egypt and Tunisia's political destinies after the Arab uprisings. I specifically argue that a conciliatory Ennahda Movement bolstered Tunisians' trust in their new democratic government, while professionalized armed forces and a strong, independent civic sector protected the integrity of the country's transition. Conversely, I contend that the Muslim Brotherhood won too much power too quickly, priming the group for a confrontation with the Egyptian military which felt compelled to protect its economic interests. I further argue that Egypt's weak civil society which had largely been co-opted by the state accelerated the country's backslide into despotism.

I support this theory with consideration of the two states' contextual similarities in addition to quantitative and qualitative analysis of their most relevant structural and agent-based variables. I specifically devote the following section of this paper to briefly exploring the origins of the Egyptian and Tunisian states in addition to the beginnings of their most influential Islamist groups. I then draw from opinion polling data gathered between 2011 and 2014 to test my hypotheses on how the contrasting behavior of Islamist parties affected those groups' levels of public support. By doing so, I seek to understand why demonstrators protested the Brotherhood government in Egypt, triggering the group's removal, but did not protest against Ennahda in Tunisia. By contrast, I use detailed historical process tracing to test my hypotheses regarding the role of the military in early Egyptian and Tunisian state-building, as well as the relationship between the countries' regimes and civil society groups. I exploit a similar blend of

quantitative and qualitative analysis to test my hypotheses relating to the structural variables of this study, including state bureaucracies, returned émigré populations, and the perceptions and preferences of the two states' electorates.

Background

The existing literature on this subject largely fits into two general areas: the effect of structural or external variables on state outcomes and the effect of domestic actors on state outcomes. While I acknowledge structure-oriented arguments in this paper, the majority of my analysis draws from the work of scholars who primarily examined agent-related variables. I distill their arguments in order to focus on the impact of the Islamists, military, and civil society on Egypt and Tunisia's divergent transitional outcomes.

In explaining the two countries' contrasting post-revolutionary experiences, a small but credible number of scholars contend that structural or external factors were most salient. For instance, Masri postulates that Tunisia's unique cultural identity made it inevitable that democracy would eventually take root there.[7] He identifies the country's long non-Arab and non-Muslim history, its partiality to Malikist Islam, and the modernizing reforms of Habib Bourguiba as key factors which distinguished Tunisia from the rest of the Arab World and primed it to be fertile ground for democratization. Masri essentially argues that Tunisia's status as the region's lone true democracy is simply a realization of its destiny and it would be near impossible for other Arab states to replicate Tunisia's success. Moreover, Bishara contends that Egypt's authoritarian reversal as compared to Tunisia's democratic consolidation was a function of the former's geopolitical importance and the Gulf states' willingness to smother Egyptian democratization in its infancy. He argues that the fall of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt was

only the latest illustration of international actors' impact on democratization, following decades of American interference in the developing world during the Cold War.

Perhaps a more widespread school of thought contends that domestic actors—rather than structural factors—were most responsible for the two Arab states' different experiences. Szmolka asserts that an inclusive political climate and participation from all influential political actors at all stages of a transition are crucial to successful democratization. Furthermore, he stipulates that electoral pluralism alone is not sufficient to guarantee a successful transition and that all major political actors must be included in government even after elections have concluded. Szmolka concludes that the hegemony of the Islamists in Egypt's transition and the multilateral coalition in Tunisia's contributed to the former's authoritarian reversal and the latter's democratic consolidation. Moreover, Bellin describes how Ennahda's role in government encouraged or at least failed to stifle democratic consolidation in Tunisia. She identifies Ennahda's commitment to a civil rather than an Islamic state, its tenuous plurality in parliament and cooperation with secular parties, and its concessions to Tunisian labor unions as key variables on the success of the transition. Finally, Brown argues that the SCAF's seizure of the Egyptian transition process early on doomed any chances of success for a civilian government. He further emphasizes that political actors like the Muslim Brotherhood behaved illiberally not because they weren't committed to the democratic process, but rather they mistrusted their rivals and the system's capacity to protect them. Actors like the Brotherhood tried to accommodate the military in order to stymie their civilian rivals, giving the generals ultimate power during the transition.

In order to construct my own theory, I synthesize several of these arguments and focus on the three actors previously mentioned. While I acknowledge the credibility of more structural

theories, I maintain that structural variables were most influential in how they shaped state actors. In turn, it was those actors who had the most direct effect on Egypt and Tunisia's political destinies after the Arab uprisings.

Similar Structures, Dissimilar Actors

Given Arend Lijphart's analysis of the comparative method, Egypt and Tunisia seem to be close to ideal cases for understanding the factors that influence post-revolutionary transitional outcomes. Both countries are North African Arab states, so while the number of potentially relevant explanatory variables for this study is "still very large, [it] is at least reduced in the… happy choice of area."[8] The two countries also resemble each other in important structural respects, including their experiences with colonialization, republican authoritarianism, the Arab uprisings of 2011, and state institutions. However, key agent-related differences in Egypt and Tunisia's revolutionary mechanisms, their militaries, and the political backgrounds of their respective Islamist groups hint at why they experienced such contrasting post-revolutionary trajectories. In this section, I contend that the Egyptian and Tunisian cases have enough structural similarities to make a compelling comparative argument, but also important agent-based differences which give crucial context for the divergent outcomes of their democratic transitions.

Egypt and Tunisia's analogous demographics and political histories generated state conditions that were strikingly—if superficially—similar leading up to the Arab Spring. Both countries had recently experienced prodigious youth bulges, both had grappled with stubbornly high levels of unemployment, and both had overwhelmingly Sunni Muslim populations (though Egypt has a sizeable Coptic Christian minority).[9][10] Both states also trace their origins to periods

of Ottoman and European subjugation. Egypt transitioned to Britain's sphere of influence following centuries of Ottoman rule in order to pay off massive debts incurred while building infrastructure projects like the Suez Canal.[11] Though the persistent efforts of nationalist movements would win nominal Egyptian independence in 1925, a military coup two decades later would give rise to a string of autocrats—Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar Sadat, and Hosni Mubarak—who would shape Egypt into a modern, single-party police state.[12] Tunisia's colonial and post-independence experience was remarkably similar. Much like Egypt, 19th century Tunisia—long an Ottoman province—rapidly bankrupted itself trying to implement modernizing reforms and subsequently became a vassal state of France, its primary foreign creditor.[13] While nationalists would overthrow France's puppet monarchy in 1956, the Tunisian government which followed—led by strongmen Habib Bourguiba and Zine El Abidine Ben Ali—would be brutally authoritarian.[14] The 2011 revolution which toppled Ben Ali inspired Egyptian protesters to clamor for Hosni Mubarak's removal less than a month later.[15]

The Mubarak and Ben Ali administrations prior to these uprisings were comparably repressive, and the core institutions of their regimes were only marginally different. Tunisian state corruption and patronage were concentrated at the highest levels of government, close to Ben Ali and his inner circle. Nonetheless, the bulk of his administration "did not depend on the kind of accumulation of small bribes that subverted bureaucracy elsewhere."[16] The organization of the Mubarak regime was somewhat more integrated, creating relatively more compromised institutions which were less prepared to sustain "a clean, efficient, and technocratic government" than those of Tunisia.[17] Both sets of bureaucracies, however, were considerably more professionalized than those of other Arab states such as Libya, and their ultimate impact on their countries' democratic transitions would be minimal.

In spite of these demographic, historical, and institutional similarities, the Egyptian and Tunisian states differed crucially both in the dynamics of their democratic revolutions and in their militaries. In Tunisia, the 2011 uprising began in rural areas and "spiraled toward the capital,"[18] driven by a robust organized labor force which the Ben Ali regime had long repressed. Egypt's revolution, by contrast, was concentrated primarily in major cities like Cairo and relied on "urbane and cosmopolitan young people" for its energy and sustainability.[19] Meanwhile, Tunisia's military was highly professionalized and largely removed from economic activity. The Egyptian military, however, was much more proximate to the levers of state power and was deeply involved in profiteering. I will discuss these critical military differences and their impact on transitional outcomes in greater detail later in this paper.

Egypt and Tunisia's most important non-state actors—the Muslim Brotherhood and the Ennahda Movement—were notably similar in their ideological origins. In fact, by some accounts, Ennahda was conceived as a Tunisian offshoot of the Brotherhood. Sayida Ounissi, a Tunisian member of parliament and an Ennahda spokeswoman, acknowledged that Brotherhood founder Hassan al-Bana heavily influenced the ideology of Tunisia's nascent Islamist movement, while more recent "Brotherhood publications were the main philosophical 'food for thought'" for the group's Tunisian counterpart.[20] Furthermore, both movements renounced violence in the mid-1980s and sought to become legitimate players in their countries' political arenas by embracing democracy and pluralism. The Brotherhood specifically "[called] for an 'Islamic civil state'…that operates largely on democratic principles," while Ennahda "explicitly accepted the principles of democratic pluralism" even earlier.[21]

Like the states in which they operated, however, the Brotherhood and Ennahda differed in fundamental ways, particularly in terms of their early political experience. The Brotherhood,

for one, had extensive experience competing and succeeding in national elections prior to the 2011 uprisings. The group entered electoral politics in 1984 when it formed an alliance with the Wafd Party and won 59 out of 454 available seats in parliament.[22] Mubarak's ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) quickly annulled the elections' results, claiming they unfairly excluded independent candidates, but the Brotherhood would go on to do even better in the next round of elections in 1987.[23] By the 2000s, the regime had become acutely aware of the Brotherhood's potency as an opposition movement and was actively seeking to block its ascension. The NDP officially banned parties from participating in elections and barred candidates from running on overtly religious platforms, while the regime arrested scores of Brotherhood members who seemed likely to launch independent bids for parliamentary seats.[24] In spite of these measures, Brotherhood candidates won 88 seats in the 2005 elections, marking "their most successful electoral performance to date."[25]

Ennahda, by contrast, "was almost entirely excluded from Tunisia's political process," after the Ben Ali regime drove the party underground in the wake of its 1989 parliamentary victories.[26] Party founder Rached Ghannouchi spent the better part of the subsequent two decades in exile in London and his movement had virtually no preexisting infrastructure when it sought to stage a resurgence after Ben Ali fled the country. As a relatively unknown political entity, Ennahda elicited suspicion from many members of the Tunisian public and press, with some commentators worrying that the group would indulge in radical inclinations if it attained power.[27]

This disparity in political experience between the Brotherhood and Ennahda likely influenced the dissimilar results of their countries' first post-revolution elections. While the Brotherhood won both the Egyptian presidency and a majority in parliament, allowing it to

govern unilaterally, Ennahda chose not to present a candidate in Tunisia's presidential elections and won few enough seats that it was required to join a coalition with two other secular parties in order to govern.[28] These contrasting outcomes would have significant implications for Egypt and Tunisia's democratic transitions.

In this section, I have sought to demonstrate that the Egyptian and Tunisian cases are similar enough to form the basis of an effective comparative study while different enough to enable me to build a convincing theory explaining their transitional outcomes. While many of their similarities correspond to structural characteristics, most of their differences accentuate the role of post-revolutionary agents such as the military and Islamist groups. These structural similarities partially serve as controls in this study, while Egypt and Tunisians' distinct agents prove to be critical to my theoretical argument. In the following section, I examine the roles of both structural and agent-based variables in effecting transitional outcomes for these two cases.

Structures Molded, Actors Mattered

To build my theory and supporting hypotheses, I draw from a body of research that explains Egypt and Tunisia's dissimilar transitions by examining both state characteristics and the decision-making of post-revolutionary power brokers. Contributors to this research specifically argue that the hegemony of the military in Egyptian society, the robust civic sector in Tunisia, and the significant community of Tunisian émigrés who returned from Europe after the Arab uprisings were important structural variables that influenced the countries' divergent transitional outcomes (In contrast to these scholars, I classify the military and civil society groups as agents rather than state institutions).[29] Furthermore, these authors contend that the Muslim Brotherhood's inseverable connection to its political wing—the Freedom and Justice

Party (FJP), Egyptian Islamists' appeal to economically leftist voters, and the Ennahda movement's commitment to political inclusiveness were the transitions' most salient actor-related variables.[30] While I do not unreservedly agree with all these arguments, their structural and agent-based orientations laid the groundwork for my own theory which contends that state structures shaped influential actors, and those actors, in turn, shaped Egypt and Tunisia's transitions.

The structural set of arguments largely depict a post-revolutionary Egypt defined by political exclusion and ossified institutions in contrast to a post-revolutionary Tunisia characterized by relative political inclusiveness and a vibrant civil sector. Inmaculada Szmolka posits that the Egyptian case demonstrated that an "elected government is not a sufficient condition" for democratic consolidation and that a "legitimate authority [must govern]…according to policies which have not been determined by actors such as the military."[31] Tunisia, by contrast, showed what was possible when the military deferred to civilian authority. Eva Bellin argues that a strong civil society that was absent in Egypt shepherded Tunisia's civilian government towards success by pressing for the popular accountability of the new regime and for fostering constructive dialogue when political actors became bogged down in petty disputes.[32] Finally, Phillipe Fargues observes that for recently returned Tunisian émigrés who had cultivated protest-centric attitudes in European states like France and Italy, "voting for Ennahda was a natural form of protest."[33] Egypt, on the other hand, did not produce nearly as many Europe-destined émigrés, depriving former opposition groups like the Brotherhood of a potential base of support.

Meanwhile, the actor-related arguments contrast the FJP, which was attached at the hip to the Muslim Brotherhood and relied heavily on appeals to left-wing populist tropes, with

Ennahda, a party that largely operated independently of the religious organizations that birthed it. Barbara Zollner specifically asserts that this disparity in organizational independence was a critical factor in Egypt and Tunisia's eventual transitional outcomes as it ran "parallel to the formation of…new political system[s]" in those countries.[34] According to Zollner, social movements' capacity to formalize participation in elections reliably predicted their ability to function as good democratic actors.[35] Tarek Masoud additionally submits that the FJP may have been particularly inclined to drift towards illiberalism as it actively exploited the electorate's economic anxieties with populist rhetoric. In the 2012 elections, FJP candidates railed against economic injustices such as high prices, unemployment, and income inequality.[36] The FJP's campaign strategy seems to have convinced Egyptian voters that the "Islamists [were] more redistributive and more welfare-statist than" their secular leftist rivals.[37] While the FJP would pull off stunning victories in those elections, its experimentation with economic demagoguery may have encouraged its authoritarian instincts which would land it in trouble with Egypt's activists and military down the road. Furthermore, the group may have set unrealistic expectations which intensified voters' dissatisfaction as abysmal economic conditions persisted.

Drawing from these and other arguments, I develop my own theory explaining Egypt and Tunisia's transitional outcomes using a series of structural and agent-based hypotheses. I first acknowledge the potential role of structural variables in molding influential actors and thus indirectly affecting the transitions. I then pay close attention to the role of three categories of agents: the military, civil society groups, and the Islamists. By doing so, I hope to create a comprehensive theoretical framework that can begin to elucidate the factors affecting democratization in Egypt and Tunisia specifically, as well as in the Arab World more broadly.

Structural Hypotheses

I first seek to test the argument that fundamental differences in the Egyptian and Tunisian electorates—specifically in émigré communities and voter perceptions of the economy—gave Ennahda enduring political relevance in the context of a successful Tunisian democratic transition. Conversely, these differences supposedly led the Muslim Brotherhood and its political arm, the FJP, to rapidly lose public support, priming Egypt to revert to authoritarianism. To test these assertions, I employ the following hypotheses:

H1: Tunisia had a higher rate of émigrés who returned from exile in Europe after the Arab uprisings than Egypt. These émigrés brought with them more pluralistic worldviews, greater trust in democracy, and more intense anti-regime attitudes that ultimately benefited Ennahda electorally.

H2.a: Tunisian voters had lower economic expectations for Ennahda than Egyptian voters did for the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP). These restrained expectations kept public levels of trust in Ennahda from dropping too precipitously.

H2.b: Alternatively, Tunisian voters believed that Ennahda achieved its economic goals in a way that distinguished it in positive ways from its secular competitors. By contrast, the FJP's inability to address economic issues in Egypt cut down its levels of public support, making it vulnerable to an opportunistic military.

Agent-Based Hypotheses

I then seek to test the argument that pronounced military professionalism and independent civil society in Tunisia ensured the integrity of the country's transition, while the absence of these variables proved detrimental to the Egyptian transition. I also test the assertion that Ennahda's

conciliatory and inclusive governing style in addition to its religious moderation allowed it to remain a force in Tunisian politics, while the FJP's authoritarian instincts and ideological commitments played a central role in precipitating its loss of public support and the 2013 coup that removed it from power. To test these arguments, I use the following hypotheses:

H3: The Egyptian military's experience in conflicts with Israel in 1967 and 1973 and its deep involvement in the economy made it the country's ultimate power broker after democratic elections. Tunisia's military, by contrast, was inexperienced, removed from economic decisions, and ultimately did not participate in a meaningful way in Tunisia's democratic transition, making room for civilian control.

H4: Since corruption within the Tunisian regime was concentrated at the highest levels of power, Tunisia's bureaucracies and civil society were less compromised and co-opted and played a central role in ensuring a successful democratic transition. Egyptian institutions and civil society, on the other hand, experienced broader corruption, fragmentation, and regime cooptation, making them less prepared to guide the country's transition.

H5: Tunisian voters responded positively to Ennahda's participation in a governing coalition with secular parties, while Egyptian voters viewed the FJP's near unilateral seizure of the legislature and executive branch as an authoritarian power grab.

H6.a: Ennahda moderated its religious platform more quickly and effectively than the FJP, endearing it to Tunisia's relatively secular electorate.

H6.b: Alternatively, Ennahda's religious identity propelled the party to power and helped it maintain support in the face of its secular competitors.

Results

Émigré Communities

To examine émigré respondents' attitudes towards Egypt and Tunisia's Islamist parties, I conduct multivariate regression analysis on survey data gathered by the Arab Barometer Project Waves II and III. Wave II, which measures attitudes of Tunisian and Egyptian nationals between 2010 and 2011, surveyed 1,219 respondents in Egypt and 1,196 respondents in Tunisia. Wave III, which measures attitudes of a comparable group of participants between 2012 and 2014, surveyed 1,196 respondents in Egypt and 1,199 respondents in Tunisia.[38] Based on my analysis of these datasets, I find that émigré communities were neither significantly sympathetic nor hostile towards the FJP or Ennahda during either of the two states' democratic transitions.

For my regressions, I use respondent trust in Ennahda and the FJP as my dependent variables and the time each respondent had spent in a European or North American country over the last five years as my primary independent variable.[39] I also include controls for respondent age, gender, education, employment, marital status, religiosity, and income among my explanatory variables. I then generate four regression models, one with controls and one without controls for both Ennahda and the FJP. I pull from Arab Barometer Waves II and III in order to gauge respondent levels of trust in Islamists both directly following the two states' democratic revolutions and around the time that the Egyptian military overthrew the Brotherhood government. Given the ability of multivariate regressions to determine how significantly two variables correlate to one another, I believe that this method is most appropriate for assessing whether Egyptian and Tunisian émigrés were more or less likely to support Islamists than the general population.

Based on the results of these regressions (appendix 1, table 4), I deduce that any political attitudes Tunisian and Egyptian respondents developed while visiting western countries played a

negligible role in determining their level of support for Islamist parties. When examining the 2010-2011 regression output, I observe no statistically significant relationship between time spent in Europe and trust for Islamists across any of my models, except for the coefficient for respondent trust in the FJP when not accounting for control variables, which indicates a strong negative correlation. Furthermore, the 2012-2014 regression output (appendix 1, table 6) indicates that respondent time spent in Europe did not have a statistically significant impact on trust in Islamists except for in the case of the Ennahda, and even that significance disappears when accounting for control variables.

Moreover, it seems unlikely that any single corresponding, significant regressor which corresponds to time spent in Europe (such as education) is responsible for diluting that variable's significance. For both the Wave II and Wave III regression output, time spent abroad negatively correlates with trust in Islamists, while respondent education positively correlates with trust in those groups, indicating that these variables had competing rather than complementary effects. Overall, these results indicate that time spent in the West was not a salient factor in predicting support for Ennahda and the FJP, either prior to Egypt and Tunisia's revolutions or in the years thereafter. I accordingly conclude that there is no evidence to support H1.

Voter Perceptions of Islamist Parties

In this section, I seek to understand how Egyptian and Tunisian voters' attitudes toward Islamist political movements both shaped those movements and potentially determined whether they stayed in power. By doing so, I hope to discern what factors may have molded the actors central to my study and ascertain which structural variables were relevant to the two states'

contrasting transitions. I ultimately find that while economically dissatisfied Tunisian voters actually blamed Ennahda more than comparable Egyptian voters blamed the FJP, these economic considerations did not significantly affect transitional outcomes.

To determine the effect of voters' high economic expectations on support for the Ennahda Movement and the FJP during the 2011-2012 election season, I again run multivariate regressions on Arab Barometer Wave II survey data. Based on this analysis, I find that Egyptian and Tunisian respondents who had high expectations for their countries' economic future during this period were more likely to trust both the FJP and Tunisia respectively.

While I use the same outcome and control variables for these regressions as used in previous models, this time I employ expectations for the economic situations in Egypt and Tunisia as my explanatory variables. I focus on Arab Barometer Wave II data for these models in order to accurately understand how Egyptian and Tunisian respondents perceived their economic futures before their countries' Islamist groups had a chance to govern. As with previous models, I believe that multivariate regressions are better suited to describing the correlation between these variables than any other research method.

From my regression output (see page 16, table 1), I observe that high economic expectations had a statistically significant positive correlation to both Tunisian respondent trust in Ennahda and Egyptian respondent trust in the FJP, with and without accounting for control

Table 1.

Dependent Variable: Levels of Trust in Islamist Groups (2010-2011)				
Regressors	Ennahda	Ennahda	MB/FJP	MB/FJP
Economic Expectations	0.142***	0.0944**	0.0926**	0.191***
	(0.0432)	(0.0451)	(0.0383)	(0.0504)
Age		0.00149		0.00352
		(0.00417)		(0.00389)
Gender (Male)		0.142		0.00859
		(0.0941)		(0.146)
Education		0.146***		0.0707***
		(0.0287)		(0.0256)
Employment		-0.345***		-0.0525
		(0.125)		(0.118)
Married		0.0896		0.0970
		(0.115)		(0.164)
Religion (Muslim)		-0.294		-0.382*
		(0.499)		(0.204)
Mosque Attendance		0.158***		-0.0246
		(0.0278)		(0.0581)
Income		-1.65e-08		-3.12e-05
		(1.27e-08)		(6.41e-05)
Constant	2.369***	1.826***	2.484***	2.208***
	(0.0943)	(0.574)	(0.0799)	(0.344)
Observations	919	811	1,084	624
R-squared	0.011	0.078	0.006	0.039

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 2.

Dependent Variable: Levels of Trust in Islamist Groups (2012-2014)

Regressors	Con. Council	Con. Council	MB/FJP	MB/FJP
Economic Dissatisfaction	-0.461***	-0.432***	-0.324***	-0.287***
	(0.00879)	(0.0449)	(0.00997)	(0.0145)
Age		-0.00273		0.000257
		(0.00304)		(0.00107)
Gender (Male)		0.0601		0.0247
		(0.0759)		(0.0277)
Education		0.0598**		-0.493***
		(0.0249)		(0.00282)
Employment		0.0441		0.0869***
		(0.0915)		(0.0291)
Married		-0.111		-0.0440
		(0.0928)		(0.0301)
Religion (Muslim)		-		-0.493***
				(0.0427)
Mosque Attendance		0.0433*		0.0546***
		(0.0256)		(0.00953)
Income		2.67e-10		-3.46e-08***
		(9.30e-09)		(4.43e-09)
Constant	3.967***	3.652***	3.622***	3.809***
	(0.0196)	(0.227)	(0.0226)	(0.0699)
Observations	14,093	961	13,771	7,030
R-squared	0.163	0.116	0.072	0.102

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

variables.[40] Furthermore, the coefficients for these regressors indicate that when accounting for other regressors, Egyptian respondents with high economic expectations were 9.66 percent more likely to support the FJP than Tunisian respondents with similar expectations were to support Ennahda. However, since the 95 percent confidence intervals for these two coefficients overlap, I cannot conclude that the difference between them is statistically significant. Though it is difficult to determine the directionality of the relationship between these two variables, these coefficients seem to indicate that Egyptian and Tunisian voters who were optimistic about their countries' economic prospects after toppling Mubarak and Ben Ali tended to attach their high hopes to ascendant Islamist groups. This finding potentially validates part of H2.a, in that Egyptian voters may have had higher economic expectations for the FJP than Tunisian voters had for Ennahda.

In order to understand how the economic attitudes of these respondents evolved as Islamist parties won elections and as Egypt and Tunisia continued to face harsh economic realities, I run further regression analysis on the same variables from previous models using data from Arab Barometer Wave III. For these regressions, however, I use respondent perceptions of then-economic conditions as my principle explanatory variable, rather than examining respondent economic expectations. In this way, I hope to gauge whether respondents had linked their dashed economic hopes with the Islamist parties which had prevailed in recent elections. I hope that by focusing on these variables, I can gain insight into how Tunisian and Egyptian voters perceived Islamist parties in an economic context after those parties had established themselves as part of the government rather than the opposition.

The p-values produced by these regressions indicate that high levels of dissatisfaction with the economy had a statistically significant negative correlation with both Tunisian respondent trust in Ennahda and Egyptian respondent trust in the FJP, with and without

accounting for control variables (page 17, table 2).[41] While supporters of Islamists had high expectations for their countries' economic prospects in 2010 and 2011, those respondents who expressed dissatisfaction with their countries' economic stagnation two years later tended to blame the Islamists. This is to be expected, as Egyptian and Tunisian voters who believed in the mission of Islamists would have a high degree of faith in those actors' potential for economic achievement, and those same voters would understandably become disillusioned with their Islamist standard-bearers as economic conditions failed to improve.

These results undermine H2.a, however, as Tunisian voters dissatisfied with the economy were less likely to trust the Tunisian Constitutional Council, which Ennahda led, than economically dissatisfied Egyptians were to trust the Muslim Brotherhood. Specifically, respondents in Tunisia who were unhappy with the economy were 46.1 percent less likely to trust the Constitutional Council than respondents who were happy with the economy, while Egyptian respondents who were dissatisfied with the economy were only 28.7 percent less likely to trust the Muslim Brotherhood than more content Egyptian respondents. Since the regression output for these two coefficients indicates that their respective 95 percent confidence intervals do not overlap, I conclude that the divergent levels of trust in Tunisian and Egyptian Islamists differ to a statistically significant degree and that economically disillusioned Tunisians are indeed less likely to trust their country's Islamists than their Egyptian counterparts. This finding contradicts my hypothesis that Tunisian voters' lower economic expectations kept their support for Ennahda dropping more precipitously than Egyptian voters' support for the Brotherhood, at least during this period.

Finally, to gain a sense of how high levels of economic *satisfaction* influenced support for Islamist groups, I again draw from Arab Barometer Wave III and find that while the Brotherhood

enjoyed increased trust from economically satisfied voters, Ennahda did not. I conduct multivariate regression analysis using the same control and outcome variables that I used to test H2.a, but this time I include an explanatory variable for economic satisfaction, rather than dissatisfaction. According to the p-values given in my regression output, when accounting for control variables, economic satisfaction was only a reliable predictor of trust in Islamists with regard to the FJP, and then only at a 90 percent confidence level (appendix 1, table 5). Furthermore, the coefficient for the effect of economic satisfaction on trust in the FJP indicates a weak positive correlation. These results tentatively contradict the postulation of H2.b that Tunisian voters supported Ennahda by greater margins than Egyptian voters supported the FJP thanks to perceived success in the former's economic agenda.

How could this be? If disaffected voters in Tunisia blamed Ennahda for the country's economic woes to a greater extent than Egyptian voters blamed the FJP, and if Ennahda did not benefit from any perceived economic achievements, why did *Egyptian* voters turn out en masse to protest the Brotherhood in 2013, while Ennahda's detractors largely stayed home? I suggest that economic conditions had a more negligible impact on shaping the outcomes of Egypt and Tunisia's transitions than might be intuitive and that other variables—such as the FJP's authoritarian governing style—were ultimately more influential. This conclusion supports my broader theory that structural variables, such as voter perceptions and attitudes, were less relevant to Egypt and Tunisia's transitional outcomes.

The Military

Through extensive historical process tracing, I conclude that Tunisia owes a great deal of the success of its democratic transition to a unified, professional military that was cut out of the

channels of power for decades. By contrast, Egypt's less professional, extractive military played a central role in the country's return to authoritarianism. Drawing from these conclusions, I argue that the disparity in the professionalization—or detachment from economic and political interests—of the Tunisian and Egyptian militaries was one of the three most relevant agent-based variables affecting the two states' divergent transitions.

Though the regime of former Tunisian President Zine el Abidine Ben Ali was exceptionally repressive, it did not rely on the military to maintain power to nearly the same extent as did many of its authoritarian Arab neighbors. Ben Ali's predecessor, Habib Bourguiba, "deliberately kept the military small,"[42] and Ben Ali—himself a former internal security officer—further eclipsed the military upon assuming office by elevating the police to a position of supreme national power[43]. In large part thanks to their close relationship with the new ruling family, senior police officials cultivated profitable connections with Tunisia's business elites, while lower-level officers exploited opportunities for bribery and other corrupt practices.[44] The police's hegemony in the world of Tunisian cronyism and their critical role in the survival of the regime meant that the military was excluded from the bulk of state profiteering. Furthermore, unlike many of the Arab World's other militaries, the Tunisian armed forces never participated in combat and existed on the periphery of Tunisia's national identity.[45]

This marginalization gave the military very little incentive to back Ben Ali when protests engulfed the country at the end of 2010 and ultimately boded well for the country's democratic transition. Indeed, Marc Lynch argues that "the endgame in Tunisia rested on the decision of the independent military, which ultimately decided not to use excessive force against protestors and then moved to push Ben Ali out of power."[46] After Ben Ali's flight to Saudi Arabia, the armed forces remarkably refrained from replacing him with the high-ranking general who had deposed

him, Rachid Ammar.[47] In continued deference to civilian authority, the military then stepped back from the transition process altogether and allowed the Ben Achour Commission, a "consensus-building body" comprised of civil society groups, to take charge.[48] Alfred Stepan attributes the military's unique restraint during this critical period to Tunisians' relatively low susceptibility to "Brumairian temptations." According to Stepan, in comparison with other Arab states such as Egypt which were skittish of ascendant Islamist groups, Tunisian voters were ultimately less inclined to "[abdicate] their right to rule to soldiers—in…exchange for military protection against perceived threats from…rivals newly empowered by democracy."[49] This, combined with the military's independence from the vestiges of the Ben Ali regime and its detachment from the Tunisian economy, paved the way for a successful civilian democratic transition.

A quasi-professional military also played a central role in removing Egypt's veteran autocrat, Hosni Mubarak, from office. In contrast to Tunisia's armed forces, however, the Egyptian military enjoyed proximity to the seat of national power and was deeply involved in the economy. In fact, the military's economic interests were a critical factor in its decision to force Mubarak out to begin with. Unlike Ben Ali, Mubarak—who had commanded Egypt's air force in the 1973 war against Israel—was a military fixture.[50] And during a tenure which lasted longer than that of any Egyptian leader since Muhammad Ali Pasha,[51] he helped his military colleagues build "commercial and industrial empires"[52] which depended on the political stability his regime had carefully engineered. However, Mubarak's eldest son and likely successor, Gamal, threatened to disrupt that stability. It was an open secret that the military's top brass despised Gamal for shirking service in the armed forces and for promising to implement neo-liberal reforms which might fracture their crony networks.[53] Furthermore, in spite of its profound

participation in the Egyptian economy, the military had been "thoroughly depoliticized so as to avoid coups," and "could not be deployed for naked regime-survival purposes," severely limiting its ultimate loyalty to the Mubarak family.[54] These factors, combined with reports of intense lobbying of military leadership on part of the Obama administration, made the army's decision not to use violence against protestors and eventually depose Mubarak an unsurprising one.[55]

Unlike the Tunisian military, however, the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) meddled extensively in Egypt's early democratic transition and later exploited Egyptian voters' receptivity to a Brumairian solution. While Tunisia had created an independent electoral commission, which opened itself to international observers, the SCAF—which was unilaterally responsible for orchestrating Egypt's elections—initially prohibited international scrutiny of electoral processes, ostensibly to prevent any violation of Egypt's sovereignty. In response to mounting international pressure, the SCAF eventually allowed a limited number of "electoral followers" into the country, but their prerogative was severely restricted.[56] After the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafist al-Nour Party claimed victory in those elections, the military began working behind the scenes to undermine the new government. Finally, as Egyptians returned to the streets to protest the Islamists' increasingly illiberal policies and inability to address an ailing economy, the military removed Brotherhood President Muhammad Morsi from power and replaced him with Defense Minister Abdel Fattah el-Sisi.

Since taking office, Sisi has largely acted as an unabashed autocrat of the same mold as Hosni Mubarak. The Egyptian regime has banned the Muslim Brotherhood and essentially coopted any remaining Islamists in parliament, while freedom of expression and political mobilization have sunken to abysmal levels. These measures have ensured that Egypt's post-revolutionary destiny has been starkly different from Tunisia's.

Civil Society and Corresponding Bureaucracies

Through similar process tracing, I now seek to understand the role that civil society organizations and state institutions played in shaping Egypt and Tunisia's transitions. From my analysis, I conclude that strong civil society groups—particularly labor unions—were instrumental in the survival of Tunisian democracy, whereas weak civil society groups conversely facilitated Egypt's authoritarian reversal. I do not find evidence, however, that Egypt and Tunisia's political institutions differed significantly enough to have explanatory power for this study's research question.

After the Islamists, civic organizations were arguably the most influential non-state actors of the Tunisian democratic transition. As Bellin, observes, Tunisia had long been fertile ground for a robust civil sector. Even in light of the intense repression they weathered from the Ben Ali regime, civil society groups benefited from Tunisia's unique "structural assets: a large middle class, a relatively well-educated population, and the country's proximity to…Europe—along with [a] high level of Internet connectivity."[57] These favorable conditions laid the groundwork for Tunisia's most powerful labor union: the "*Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail*" (UGTT). Though the Bourguiba regime would coopt the UGTT soon after seizing power, the union retained a remarkable degree of independence, especially among its rank and file members.[58] The UGTT's experience negotiating with the regime through a series of strikes in the 70s and 80s gave it the organizational savvy necessary to mobilize Tunisians across the country during the 2011 uprising and eventually force Ben Ali to abdicate.[59] It also proved to be exceptionally influential in shaping the country's fledgling liberal government, and ultimately "played a decisive role in setting Tunisia on the road to democratic transition."[60]

By contrast, Egyptian organized labor constituted a minority of the workforce and most unions were state-controlled. Admittedly, workers' groups staged multiple strikes leading up to Mubarak's departure and sought to affect the country's transition by joining protestors. However, their ultimate inability to wrest power from the Islamists or military meant that they "did not become…indispensable central actor[s]" in Egypt's democratic transition.[61]

Unlike civil society groups, Egyptian and Tunisian state institutions did not differ significantly from one another and had a negligible impact on Egypt and Tunisia's divergent transitional outcomes. While Egypt's bureaucracies were marginally more compromised than Tunisia's, they continued to "allow the state to function under severe political and security conditions."[62] In fact, Abdulmonem Almashat and Salwa Thabet argue that the Egyptian bureaucracy "did its best" to protect the state from players with illiberal instincts such as the FJP and the military.[63] It seems that the Egyptian authoritarian backslide had less to do with the corruption of its institutions and more to do with the strength of other actors whose agendas proved to be at odds with democratic growth.

I accordingly find only partial support for H4. While the differences in Egypt and Tunisia's civil societies were predictive of the countries' transitional outcomes, the differences in the integrity of their bureaucracies had an inconsequential impact on those outcomes. This finding supports my theory that actors such as civic groups ultimately had a more substantial impact on the transitions than structural institutions such as bureaucracies.

Islamist Political Movements

Finally, I assess how the decisions and behavior of the FJP and Ennahda affected their trustworthiness with voters. This question is of particular interest to this study since the massive

public outcry against the Muslim Brotherhood likely gave the military the credibility it needed to topple the elected Brotherhood government. In this section, I find that Ennahda's participation in a parliamentary coalition and its concessions to rival parties were critical to its political survival, while the FJP's seizure of the legislature and the presidency set the party on a fatal collision course with Egyptian activists and armed forces. Conversely, I find no evidence that Ennahda's religious moderation played a significant role in enabling it to succeed where the Brotherhood failed.

I return to Arab Barometer Wave III and conclude that Ennahda benefited from governing as part of a coalition while the FJP was hurt by its unilateral control of the Egyptian parliament and presidential palace. For my two explanatory variables in this analysis, I use 1) respondents' preference that a wide array of both secular and religious parties competes in national elections and 2) respondents' opposition to their government consistently passing legislation in accordance with Islamic law. I substitute these regressors for my ideal variable (respondent preference that a coalition, rather than a single party, form a government in parliament) as this data was not available in Wave III. I proceed to use the same dependent and control variables used in earlier models.

From the output of these regressions (page 27, table 3), I observe that when accounting for control variables, respondents who favored pluralistic elections were 8.68 percent more likely to trust Ennahda than those who did not, while similar respondents did not exhibit a corresponding increase of trust in the FJP. Predictably, both parties fared poorly at a significant level among respondents who opposed their government enacting laws in accordance with Islamic law. Based on these results, I infer that Ennahda earned the trust of Tunisia's electorate by participating in a parliamentary coalition, while Egyptian voters viewed the unconstrained FJP with suspicion.

Table 3.

Dependent Variable: Levels of Trust in Islamist Groups (2012-2014)				
Regressors	Con. Council	Con. Council	MB/FJP	MB/FJP
Pluralist Attitudes	0.0545***	0.0868***	0.0226**	0.00617
	(0.00834)	(0.0293)	(0.00916)	(0.0124)
Opposition to Islamic State	-0.0969***	-0.155***	-0.0363***	-0.0292**
	(0.00986)	(0.0394)	(0.0106)	(0.0149)
Age		-0.00237		0.000770
		(0.00317)		(0.00115)
Gender (Male)		0.0305		0.0398
		(0.0796)		(0.0297)
Education		0.0240		0.0108***
		(0.0263)		(0.00330)
Employment		0.0247		-0.678***
		(0.0992)		(0.0310)
Married		-0.143		-0.0654**
		(0.0984)		(0.0320)
Mosque Attendance		0.0590**		0.0494***
		(0.0272)		(0.0102)
Income		4.38e-09		-3.82e-08***
		(1.01e-08)		(4.62e-09)
Religion (Muslim)				-0.678***
				(0.0452)
Constant	3.062***	3.183***	2.955***	3.426***
	(0.0287)	(0.260)	(0.0311)	(0.0775)
Observations	12,846	896	12,611	6,560
R-squared	0.011	0.049	0.001	0.051

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

I draw from Arab Barometer Wave III for a final time to find that while Ennahda benefited from its coalition participation, it did not experience a significant increase in support for moderating the Islamist platform. I run several multivariate regressions using the same control and outcome variables from previous hypotheses, but this time I use respondents' preferences for secular parties as my primary explanatory variable. Wave III, unfortunately, does not provide any data reflecting respondents' views on the religious platforms of Ennahda or the FJP, but I consider a comparison of the levels of trust in the two groups among voters who tend to support secular parties an acceptable substitute.

My results indicate a strong negative correlation between respondents' preference for secular parties and their support for Ennahda or the FJP, with and without control variables (appendix 1, table 7). While the coefficient for the relationship between secular party preference and trust in the FJP is more extreme than the same coefficient for trust in Ennahda, the confidence intervals for the two coefficients overlap, indicating that the difference between them is not statistically significant. I thus conclude that while there is tentative support for H6.a, I would need to analyze additional data to confirm that Ennahda's ideological moderation gave it the political sustainability to outlast the FJP. Conducting further analysis on the effect of Ennahda's moderation might well verify arguments from prominent Arab authors such as Ghazi al Tuba, who contend that the group's drift towards the political center was crucial to its relative success.[64] At this juncture, however, I am unable to definitively prove or disprove H6.a, and accordingly can neither rule on the validity of H6.b.

This analysis demonstrates that the two Islamist groups' contrasting degrees of control over their governments were predictive of their ultimate levels of support. H6 was correct. Tunisian voters responded well to Ennahda's participation in a coalition while Egyptian voters perceived

the FJP's control of the presidency and the legislature to be dangerously authoritarian. These voters seemed less concerned, however, with their parties' commitment to Islamic values. It seems that Egyptian and Tunisian Islamists literally lived or died by their ability to convince the public that they were team players.

Conclusion

The results of this study demonstrate that while state conditions certainly shaped Egypt and Tunisia's most influential post-revolutionary actors, the agents themselves, not the structures that molded them, ultimately had the most definitive impact on transitional outcomes. As discussed earlier in this paper, the military, Islamists, and civil society groups proved to be the most important of these actors. I specifically contend that in Tunisia, a professional military that played a minimal role in economic affairs paved the way for a civilian democratic transition, while strong and independent civic organizations guided that transition during subsequent political turbulence. Furthermore, the most successful party in Tunisia's first elections—Ennahda—governed as part of a coalition with two secular parties, assuaging the public's fears that it aimed to stage a complete Islamist takeover and discouraging widespread protests. In Egypt, on the other hand, the military had a long history of using state industry to turn a profit, meaning that it had a strong incentive to meddle in civilian politics well after deposing Mubarak in order to secure its interests. After the Muslim Brotherhood won the presidency and dominated the country's parliamentary elections in 2012, the Islamists and armed forces were the only real power brokers left in Egypt, especially with such an underdeveloped and disorganized civil society. The authoritarian instincts of both groups made the country's return to despotism inevitable.

The variables which were *not* influential in shaping the two states' transitional outcomes have significant implications as well. Economic grievances surprisingly did not determine which Islamist-led government survived. In fact, Tunisians felt economic pain and blamed their leaders to a greater degree than Egyptians did. Nor is there compelling evidence that Ennahda's moderation or the Brotherhood's commitment to Islamic values were deciding factors in the two parties' fates. Rather it seems that Ennahda prevailed and the Brotherhood fell because Tunisians believed the former was willing to work with one-time rivals in good faith while Egyptians saw the latter as an uncompromising juggernaut barreling towards remaking the country to its liking.

In short, Egyptians and Tunisians cared more about pluralism and the rule of law than they did about the economy or ideological purity. What is more, those liberal attitudes were just as prevalent among voters who had lived in the Middle East their entire lives as they were among voters who had been exposed to the political innovations of Europe and North America. These popular attitudes collided with key actors to produce starkly different outcomes. In the end, these countries' actors—not structures—determined their political destinies. Democracy, it seems, is not exclusively a Western import. It just needs the right agents who are willing and capable enough to make it flourish.

Annotated Bibliography

Al Anani, Khalil. 2019. "A New Test for Democracy in Tunisia." *Aljazeera (Arabic)*, 21 August. Accessed March 5, 2020. https://www.aljazeera.net/knowledgegate/opinions/2019/8/21/%d8%a7%d8%ae%d8%aa%d8%a8%d8%a7%d8%b1-%d8%ac%d8%af%d9%8a%d8%af-%d9%84%d9%84%d8%af%d9%8a%d9%85%d9%82%d8%b1%d8%a7%d8%b7%d9%8a%d8%a9-%d9%81%d9%8a-%d8%aa%d9%88%d9%86%d8%b3.

Al Anani, Khalil. 2015. "The Rise and Fall of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood" *The Middle East Journal* 69, no. 4: 527-543. https://www.jstor.org/stable/43698286 .

Aljazeera. 2019. "Tunisia's Parliamentary Elections at a Glance." October 5. Accessed March 29, 2020. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/10/tunisia-parliamentary-election-glance-191005074153980.html.

Allinson, Jaime. 2015. "Class forces, transition and the Arab uprisings: a comparison of Tunisia, Egypt and Syria." *Democratization* 22, no.2. https://www-tandfonline-com.erl.lib.byu.edu/doi/full/10.1080/13510347.2015.1010812.

Almashat, Abdulmonem and Salwa Thabet. 2019. "State survival bureaucracy (SSB): state sustainability after Arab revolutions." 115. https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/REPS-09-2018-0001/full/pdf?title=state-survival-bureaucracy-ssb-state-sustainability-after-arab-revolutions.

Al Tuba, Ghazi. 2016. "Why did the revolution succeed in Tunisia but not in Egypt?" *Aljazeera (Arabic),* 4 February. Accessed March 6. https://www.aljazeera.net/knowledgegate/opinions/2016/2/4/%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B0%D8%A7-%D9%86%D8%AC%D8%AD%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AA%D9%88%D9%86%D8%B3-%D9%88%D9%84%D9%85-%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%AC%D8%AD-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B1.

Amara, Tarek, 2020 "Tunisia's Next Government Must be Broad-Based, says Leader of Biggest Party." *US News,* February 5. Accessed April 1.https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2020-02-05/tunisias-next-government-must-be-broad-based-says-leader-of-biggest-party.

Anderson, Lisa. 2011. "Demystifying the Arab Spring: Parsing the Differences Between Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya." *Foreign Affairs*, May/June. Accessed March 5. https://learningsuite.byu.edu/plugins/Upload/fileDownload.php?fileId=d2a5e52b-qJVj-51GP-ZaH5-S63e566e3e43.

Bellin, Eva. 2013. "Drivers of Democracy: Lessons from Tunisia." 4.

https://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/middle-east-briefs/pdfs/1-100/meb75.pdf.

Brooke, Steven. 2019. *Winning Hearts and Votes: Social Services and the Islamist Political Advantage*. Cornell: Cornell University Press.

Doucet, Lyse. 2019. "Egypt's Ousted President Mohammed Morsi Dies During Trial," *BBC News*, June 17. Accessed March 23, 2020. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-48668941.

Duverger, Maurice. 1954. *Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State.* New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

Fargues, Phillippe. 2017. *Combining Economic and Political Development: The Experience of MENA.* Boston, Massachusetts: Brill. Accessed December 23, 2019. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1163/j.ctt1w8h356.16.

"Freedom in the World," Freedom House, accessed March 14, 2020. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world.

"Freedom in the World 2020—The Arab Uprisings and their Global Repercussions: Selected Data from Freedom House's Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties." *Freedom House*, accessed March 14, 2020, 1. https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2020-02/FIW_2012_Booklet.pdf.

"Freedom in the World 2020: Egypt," Freedom House, accessed March 14, 2020. https://freedomhouse.org/country/egypt/freedom-world/2020.

Harnisch, Chris and Quinn Mecham. 2009. "Democratic Ideology in Islamist Opposition? The Muslim Brotherhood's 'Civil State'." *Middle Eastern Studies* 45, No. 2 (March): 190.

Kirdis, Esen. 2019. *The Rise of Islamic Political Movements and Parties: Morocco, Turkey, and Jordan.* Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Penner, Michele. 2011. "Morning in Tunisia: The Frustrations of the Arab World Boil Over." *Foreign Affairs*, January 16. Accessed March 6. https://learningsuite.byu.edu/plugins/Upload/fileDownload.php?fileId=ee5af170-reRo-AcCM-oo9a-tgbc94ab85f2.

Porat, Liad, and Alonit Berenson. "Institutional Journalism in a Revolutionary Crisis: The Press as an Aide to the Muslim Brotherhood 2011–2012." *Middle Eastern Studies* 54, no. 2 (2018): 304–321. http://web.a.ebscohost.com.erl.lib.byu.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=4&sid=3319ae57-c1bf-492a-a46c-41825fea4915%40sdc-v-sessmgr01.

Lijphart, Arend. "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method." *American Political Science Review* 65, no. 3 (1971): 688.

Lust, Ellen. 2020. *The Middle East*. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 17.

Makdisi, Samir. *Combining Economic and Political Development: The Experience of MENA.* Boston, Massachusetts: Brill, 2017. Accessed December 23, 2019. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1163/j.ctt1w8h356.9.

Masoud, Tarek. *Counting Islam: Religion, Class, and Elections in Egypt.* New York, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014. Accessed January 2, 2020.

McCarthy, Rory. "When Islamists Lose: The Politicization of Tunisia's Ennahda Movement." *The Middle East Journal* 72, no. 3 (2018): 365-384. https://www.muse.jhu.edu/article/702192.

Sayah, Habib M. 2012. "A Win for Islamists in Tunisia, or the Road to Slavery?" Institut Kheireddine (Arabic), May 18. Accessed March 6, 2020. http://ar.institut-kheireddine.org/?s=ثورة&searchblogs=4%2C6.

Slackman, Michael. 2020. "Hosni Mubarak, Egyptian Leader Ousted in Arab Spring, Dies at 91." *New York Times*, February 25.https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/25/world/africa/hosni-mubarak-dead.html.

Scarrow, Susan E., Paul D. Webb, and Thomas Poguntke. 2017. *Organizing Political Parties: Representation, Participation, and Power.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Shehata, Dina. 2011. "The Fall of the Pharaoh: How Hosni Mubarak's Reign Came to an End."*Foreign Affairs,* May/June. Accessed March 5. https://learningsuite.byu.edu/plugins/Upload/fileDownload.php?fileId=bfdd40f3-pwP7-FSmv-Spkl-BA2ccef38261.

Slackman, Michael. 2020. "Hosni Mubarak, Egyptian Leader Ousted in Arab Spring, Dies at 91." *New York Times*, February 25.https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/25/world/africa/hosni-mubarak-dead.html.

Szmolka, Inmaculada. 2015. "Exclusionary and Non-Consensual Transitions Versus Inclusive and Consensual Democratizations: The Cases of Egypt and Tunisia." *Arab Studies Quarterly* 37, no. 1 (Winter): 91. http://content.ebscohost.com/ContentServer.asp?EbscoContent=dGJyMNHX8kSeprI4 v%2BbwOLCmsEiep69Ssa%2B4SLeWxWXS&ContentCustomer=dGJyMPGuskyurK5I uePfgeyx43zx1%2B6B&T=P&P=AN&S=R&D=aph&K=101983380.

"The World Factbook – Egypt." *Central Intelligence Agency*, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/eg.html. (2019)

"The World Factbook – Tunisia." *Central Intelligence Agency*, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ts.html. (2019)

Appendix 1

Table 4.

Dependent Variable: Levels of Trust in Islamist Groups (2010-2011)				
Regressors	Ennahda	Ennahda	MB/FJP	MB/FJP
Time Spent in Europe	0.0118	0.0283	-0.167***	0.0600
	(0.0435)	(0.0479)	(0.0320)	(0.0720)
Age		0.00105		0.00225
		(0.00400)		(0.00387)
Gender (Male)		0.161*		0.0774
		(0.0918)		(0.144)
Education		0.148***		0.0668***
		(0.0280)		(0.0255)
Employment		-0.367***		-0.0583
		(0.120)		(0.118)
Marriage		0.111		0.0905
		(0.111)		(0.156)
Religion (Muslim)		-0.262		-0.356*
		(0.520)		(0.210)
Mosque Attendance		0.157***		0.00804
		(0.0270)		(0.0566)
Income		-1.57e-08		-2.13e-05
		(1.21e-08)		(6.61e-05)
Constant	2.596***	1.851***	3.453***	2.205***
	(0.214)	(0.644)	(0.155)	(0.542)
Observations	969	861	1,117	638
R-squared	0.000	0.073	0.018	0.018

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.01

Table 5.

Dependent Variable: Levels of Trust in Islamist Groups (2012-2014)				
Regressors	Con. Council	Con. Council	MB/FJP	MB/FJP
Economic Satisfaction	5.92e-06**	-0.127	2.14e-06	0.0711*
	(2.75e-06)	(0.0965)	(4.25e-06)	(0.0379)
Age		-0.00258		0.000851
		(0.00314)		(0.00115)
Gender (Male)		0.0813		0.0479*
		(0.0775)		(0.0289)
Education		0.0499*		0.0123***
		(0.0263)		(0.00306)
Employment		0.0350		0.104***
		(0.0972)		(0.0300)
Mosque Attendance		0.0620**		0.0490***
		(0.0268)		(0.00986)
Income		3.20e-09		-3.61e-08***
		(9.65e-09)		(4.49e-09)
Marriage				-0.134***
				(0.0423)
Religion (Muslim)				-0.699***
				(0.0422)
Constant	2.979***	3.047***	2.929***	3.297***
	(0.00871)	(0.250)	(0.00931)	(0.0803)
Observations	14,093	961	13,771	7,030
R-squared	0.000	0.027	0.000	0.050

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 6.

Dependent Variable: Levels of Trust in Islamist Groups (2012-2014)

Regressors	Con. Council	Con. Council	MB/FJP	MP/FJP
Time Spent in Europe	-0.111***	0.00806	0.00652	-0.00725
	(0.00978)	(0.0478)	(0.00989)	(0.0135)
Age		-0.00266		0.00131
		(0.00317)		(0.00112)
Gender (Male)		0.107		0.0384
		(0.0777)		(0.0288)
Education		0.0527**		0.0121***
		(0.0267)		(0.00306)
Employment		0.0153		0.107***
		(0.0981)		(0.0301)
Married		-0.132		-0.0766**
		(0.0973)		(0.0311)
Religion (Muslim)		-		-0.711***
				(0.0421)
Mosque Attendance		0.0545**		0.0492***
		(0.0269)		(0.00991)
Income		5.04e-09		-3.59e-08***
		(9.76e-09)		(4.50e-09)
Constant	3.018***	2.917***	2.927***	3.381***
	(0.00919)	(0.227)	(0.00999)	(0.0686)
Observations	14,025	948	13,714	6,974
R-squared	0.010	0.027	0.000	0.049

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 7.

Dependent Variable: Levels of Trust in Islamist Groups (2012-2014)

Regressors	Con. Council	Con. Council	MB/FJP	MB/FJP
Secular Party Preference	-0.137***	-0.237***	-0.324***	-0.303***
	(0.00957)	(0.0328)	(0.00962)	(0.0145)
Age		-0.00286		0.000184
		(0.00332)		(0.00127)
Gender (Male)		0.00727		0.0148
		(0.0850)		(0.0326)
Education		0.0369		0.00778**
		(0.0284)		(0.00371)
Employment		0.105		0.0420
		(0.102)		(0.0347)
Married		-0.0446		-0.0376
		(0.106)		(0.0351)
Mosque Attendance		0.0178		0.0105
		(0.0287)		(0.0116)
Income		1.35e-08		-3.29e-08***
		(1.01e-08)		(4.95e-09)
Religion (Muslim)				-0.380***
				(0.0500)
Constant	3.350***	3.716***	3.819***	4.057***
	(0.0289)	(0.274)	(0.0278)	(0.0834)
Observations	10,552	809	10,368	5,308
R-squared	0.019	0.080	0.094	0.128

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

---

[1] Lyse Doucet, "Egypt's Ousted President Mohammed Morsi Dies During Trial," *BBC News*, June 17, 2019. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-48668941

[2] "Tunisia's Parliamentary Elections at a Glance," *Aljazeera*, October 5, 2019. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/10/tunisia-parliamentary-election-glance-191005074153980.html

[3] Tarek Amara, "Tunisia's Next Government Must be Broad-Based, says Leader of Biggest Party," *US News*, February 5, 2020. https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2020-02-05/tunisias-next-government-must-be-broad-based-says-leader-of-biggest-party

[4] "Freedom in the World 2020: Egypt," Freedom House, accessed March 14, 2020. https://freedomhouse.org/country/egypt/freedom-world/2020.

[5] "Freedom in the World," Freedom House, accessed March 14, 2020. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world. (Higher scores indicate fewer political rights and civil liberties)

[6] "Freedom in the World 2020—The Arab Uprisings and their Global Repercussions: Selected Data from Freedom House's Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties," *Freedom House*, accessed March 14, 2020, 1. https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2020-02/FIW_2012_Booklet.pdf

[7] Safwan Masri, *Tunisia: An Arab Anomaly*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017).

[8] Arend Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method," *American Political Science Review* 65, no. 3 (1971): 688.

[9] "The World Factbook – Egypt." *Central Intelligence Agency*, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/eg.html. (2019)

[10] "The World Factbook – Tunisia." *Central Intelligence Agency*, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ts.html. (2019)

[11] "Egypt Profile – Timeline," BBC News, January 7, 2019. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13315719

[12] Michael Slackman, "Hosni Mubarak, Egyptian Leader Ousted in Arab Spring, Dies at 91," *New York Times,* February 25, 2020. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/25/world/africa/hosni-mubarak-dead.html.

[13] Ellen Lust, *The Middle East*, (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2020), 17.

[14] Ibid., 668.

[15] Lisa Anderson, "Demystifying the Arab Spring: Parsing the Differences Between Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya," *Foreign Affairs*, May-Jun. 2011, 321.

[16] Ibid., 322.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Ibid., 321.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Monica Marks and Sayid Ounissi, "Ennahda from Within: Islamists or 'Muslim Democrats'? A Conversation," *Brookings*, March 23, 2016. https://www.brookings.edu/research/ennahda-from-within-islamists-or-muslim-democrats-a-conversation/

[21] Chris Harnisch and Quinn Mecham, "Democratic Ideology in Islamist Opposition? The Muslim Brotherhood's 'Civil State'," *Middle Eastern Studies* 45, No. 2 (March 2009): 190. https://learningsuite.byu.edu/plugins/Upload/fileDownload.php?fileId=ff2ac666-eATw-MN0b-KhUA-CT8348122e36 (190): Rory McCarthy, "When Islamists Lose: The Politicization of Tunisia's Ennahda Movement," The Middle East Journal 72, No. 3 (Summer 2018). https://muse-jhu-edu.erl.lib.byu.edu/article/702192

[22] Chris Harnisch and Quinn Mecham, "Democratic Ideology in Islamist Opposition? The Muslim Brotherhood's 'Civil State'," *Middle Eastern Studies* 45, 2 (March 2009): 190. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00263200802611408.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Ibid., 193.

[25] Ibid.

[26] McCarthy, "When Islamists Lose."

[27] Habib M. Sayah, "A Win for Islamists in Tunisia, or the Road to Slavery?" *Institut Kheireddine (Arabic),* May 18, 2012. http://ar.institut-kheireddine.org/?s=ثورة&searchblogs=4%2C6

[28] Khalil Al Anani, "A New Test for Democracy in Tunisia," *Aljazeera (Arabic),* August 21, 2019. https://www.aljazeera.net/knowledgegate/opinions/2019/8/21/%d8%a7%d8%ae%d8%aa%d8%a8%d8%a7%d8%b1-%d8%ac%d8%af%d9%8a%d8%af-%d9%84%d9%84%d8%af%d9%8a%d9%85%d9%82%d8%b1%d8%a7%d8%b7%d9%8a%d8%a9-%d9%81%d9%8a-%d8%aa%d9%88%d9%86%d8%b3

[29] Inmaculada Szmolka, "Exclusionary and Non-Consensual Transitions Versus Inclusive and Consensual Democratizations: The Cases of Egypt and Tunisia," *Arab Studies Quarterly* 37, no. 1 (Winter 2015): 91. http://content.ebscohost.com/ContentServer.asp?EbscoContent=dGJyMNHX8kSeprI4v%2BbwOLCmsEiep69Ssa%2B4SLeWxWXS&ContentCustomer=dGJyMPGuskyurK5IuePfgeyx43zx1%2B6B&T=P&P=AN&S=R&D=aph&K=101983380; Eva Bellin, "Drivers of Democracy: Lessons from Tunisia," last modified August 2013, 4. https://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/middle-east-briefs/pdfs/1-100/meb75.pdf; Phillippe Fargues, "Mass Migration and Uprisings in Arab Countries: An Analytical Framework," in *Combining Economic and Political Development: The Experience of MENA*, Giacomo Luciani, (Leiden: Brill, 2017), 180-181. https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/10.1163/j.ctt1w8h356.16.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A6c51b399d7a09134fa80213c0d836a0f.

[30] Barbara Zollner, "The Metamorphosis of Social Movements into Political Parties during Democratic Transition Processes. A Comparison of Egyptian and Tunisian Movements and Parties," last modified March 19, 2016. https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/15014/1/Zollner%20Metamorphosis%20ISA%20submission.pdf; Tarek Masoud, *Counting Islam: Religion, Class, and Elections in Egypt,* (New York, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

[31] Ibid.

[32] Eva Bellin, "Drivers of Democracy"

[33] Phillippe Fargues, "Mass Migration" 180-181.

[34] Zollner, "Metamorphosis of Social Movements," 11.

[35] Ibid.

[36] Masoud, *Counting Islam*, 147.

[37] Ibid., 140.

[38] "Data Downloads," Arab Barometer, accessed March 14, 2020. https://www.arabbarometer.org/survey-data/data-downloads/.

[39] One limitation of this study is that Arab Barometer Wave III did not assess levels of respondent trust in Ennahda, so I instead used trust in the Tunisian Constitutional Council—of which Ennahda was a part—as my Tunisian outcome variable.

[40] Among the controls which had a statistically significant effect on the outcome variable, respondent education positively correlated with trust in Islamist groups in both countries. While employment had a negative correlation with trust in Ennahda, statistical significance disappeared when examining the correlation between employment and trust in the FJP. And while mosque attendance positively correlated with trust in Ennahda, that variable's effect also lost its significance when applied to trust in the FJP.

[41] While many of the coefficients for the control variables resemble those from control variables of table 1, educated respondents seem to have turned on the FJP, while more religiously pious respondents seem to have flocked to it.

[42] Alfred Stepan, "Tunisia's Transition and the Twin Tolerations," *Journal of Democracy* 23, no. 2 (2012): 96. https://learningsuite.byu.edu/plugins/Upload/fileDownload.php?fileId=0fd500a0-hRip-V1N1-rzLt-Xpb413427e64

[43] Anderson, "Demystifying the Arab Spring,"323.

[44] Derek Lutterbeck, "Tool of rule: the Tunisian police under Ben Ali," *Journal of North African Studies* 25, no. 5 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1080/13629387.2015.1059324.

[45] Anderson, "Demystifying the Arab Spring," 323.

[46] Marc Lynch, *The Arab Uprising: The Unfinished Revolutions of the New Middle East,* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2012). 79.

[47] Stepan, "Tunisia's Transition," 95.

[48] Ibid., 92.

[49] Ibid., 94, 95.

[50] Slackman, "Hosni Mubarak Dies."

---

[51] Ibid.
[52] Lynch, *The Arab Uprising,* 88.
[53] Ibid.
[54] Ibid., 92.
[55] Ibid.
[56] Stepan, "Tunisia's Transition," 93.
[57] Bellin, "Drivers of Democracy," 9.
[58] Jaime Allinson, "Class forces, transition and the Arab uprisings: a comparison of Tunisia, Egypt and Syria," *Democratization* 22, no.2 (2015). https://www-tandfonline-com.erl.lib.byu.edu/doi/full/10.1080/13510347.2015.1010812.
[59] Ibid.
[60] Ibid.
[61] Ibid.
[62] Abdulmonem Almashat and Salwa Thabet, "State survival bureaucracy (SSB): state sustainability after Arab revolutions," last modified January 12, 2019, 115. https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/REPS-09-2018-0001/full/pdf?title=state-survival-bureaucracy-ssb-state-sustainability-after-arab-revolutions.
[63] Ibid., 116.
[64] Ghazi Al Tuba, "Why did the revolution succeed in Tunisia but not in Egypt?" *Aljazeera (Arabic),* February 4, 2016. https://www.aljazeera.net/knowledgegate/opinions/2016/2/4/%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B0%D8%A7-%D9%86%D8%AC%D8%AD%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AA%D9%88%D9%86%D8%B3-%D9%88%D9%84%D9%85-%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%AC%D8%AD-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B1