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Micah Russell
Brigham Young University

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Recommended Citation
Russell, Micah (2021) "Diverging Identities: The Juxtaposition of Palestinians in Israel and the Occupied Territories," Sigma: Journal of Political and International Studies: Vol. 38 , Article 2. Available at: https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/sigma/vol38/iss1/2

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Diverging Identities:  
The Juxtaposition of Palestinians in Israel and the Occupied Territories

Micah Russell

A SOCIAL IDENTITY PUZZLE

Identity is important. Social identities deal with an individual’s self-perceived placement within a certain group and how that group interacts with a larger community (Tajfel 1974, 65). Identities are often multifaceted and can be influenced by any number of variables including age, religion, social class, profession, culture, language, disability, education, ethnicity, gender, or sexuality. Because of the diverse nature of social identities, it is quite possible for individuals to self-select themselves into multiple groups. For example, it is not uncommon for people to identify themselves as a Muslim and an Arab or a Christian and a German. This concept of identity begins to get complicated within divided societies.

Arab Israelis in Nazareth demonstrate this complexity. Nazareth is a large majority Arab town in northern Israel where many of the residents identify with the Palestinian Arab community, the Israeli state, and Muslim or Christian faith. Examining members of this community reveals intriguing insights about social identity in a divided society and how it can impose unusual levels of dissonance within an individual. The people in Nazareth were proud of their Arab heritage; few of them even expressed pride over their Palestinian heritage yet appeared more hesitant to express this sentiment to a stranger. Moreover, most members of the community had Israeli citizenship and occupations. Arabs in Nazareth were happy to discuss their lives in Israel but refused to acknowledge their dependence on Israeli citizenship for their relative comfort. When interviewed these Arabs demonstrated that the social and political advantages of being an Israeli citizen caused internal dissonance and threatened the Palestinian Arab identity in Nazareth.

Palestinians from Bethlehem, people from the Arab side of Israel’s security wall, constitute a Palestinian Arab group with contrasting social identity attitudes. Arabs in Bethlehem were asked the same questions as the people in Nazareth: How is life in this town? Is work here
good and plentiful? What is your family life like? Do you live near your family? To my surprise, Palestinians from Bethlehem appeared much happier and at peace with their identity than the Arabs from Nazareth. This is true even though the people from Bethlehem experience more hardship and oppression. These Palestinians also expressed higher resentment towards Israel than the Arabs from Nazareth.

This contrast in narratives led me to question the cohesiveness of the Palestinian identity between Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel and Palestinian Arabs in the occupied territories. Although nearly all of the Arabs that were interviewed between Nazareth and Bethlehem self-identified as Arab Palestinian, there appeared to be a noticeable gap between what it meant to be a Palestinian and a citizen of Israel, or a Palestinian without a state in the occupied territories. Numerous publications contrast the Palestinian identity formation with Jewish Israeli identity formation, whereas few works attempt to compare and contrast the different collective identities of various Palestinian groups. Why is there a noticeable difference in the attitudes and behaviors of Israeli Arabs and Palestinians in the occupied territories despite their common self-categorization with the Palestinian-Arab identity? This division is important to understand because it can help us move towards a more comprehensive peace plan. This plan must treat the Palestinians in Israel and the Palestinians elsewhere as two unique groups, each one exhibiting different goals, incentives, and desires.

The primary purpose of this paper is to examine the differing attitudes and behaviors of Palestinians with Israeli citizenship and Palestinians in the occupied territories. Peleg and Waxman introduce the terms “Palestinization” and “Israelization” in their analysis of the multifaceted Israeli-Arab identity (2011, 28). “Palestinization” is the process through which Palestinians re-trench and bolster their Palestinian identity. This process contrasts with “Israelization”, which is the process through which Palestinians are drawn away from their Palestinian identity and integrate themselves within the Jewish state of Israel. I build upon their analysis of the Israeli Arab identity and contrast it with other publications that help explain the identity, attitudes, and behaviors of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. I propose that a
distinct social gap exists between the two Palestinian groups. One group is experiencing a "Palestinization" of their social identity, whereas the other group is experiencing an "Israelization" of their social identity.

This distinction is identifiable through three proxy indicators: language (Hebrew proficiency and use), political participation in Israel, and protest participation. Upon examining how these proxies demonstrate the apparent separation between the two Palestinian groups, I attempt to present and evaluate the factors leading to this separation. After which, I introduce evidence for three independent variables that lead to the existence of the two Palestinian identities: occupied Palestinians and Palestinian Israelis. These variables are the socio-psychological impact of majority/minority relations, the influence of personal incentives (economic, political, educational), and the Jewish Israeli attitudes and behaviors towards Palestinians in Israel and Palestinians elsewhere. Thus, this is a two-part paper. The first half confirms the existence of two distinct Palestinian identities, and the second half examines the causes of this identity split.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF PALESTINIAN IDENTITY

In the early 1900s, World War I and the issuance of the Balfour Declaration were the catalysts that made Zionists’ vision of a Jewish nation a reality. The declaration affirmed Britain’s support for the establishment of a “national home for the Jewish people” in the Ottoman region of Palestine. This declaration directly contradicted the British Government’s earlier commitment to the establishment of an Arab state in the same territory as compensation for the Arab’s military alliance with the British during the war. Separate from a formal declaration, this commitment came by way of a series of letters between Husayn ibn ‘Ali of Mecca and a British officer, Sir Henry McMahon. Thus, as World War I came to a close, Arabs and Jews alike sought to lay claim to what the British had promised them, and it became clear that two groups were given conflicting promises. These events preceded the conflicting rise of Zionism and the newfound Palestinian nationalism.
This clash of conflicting nationalisms evolved into the multi-generational Israeli-Palestinian conflict. National collective narratives from both sides laid equal claim to the same land. Zionist narratives depicted the Balfour Declaration and the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine as the fulfillment of a biblical prophecy. Citing ancient claims to the land that traced back to the ancient Jewish diaspora, Zionists came to the land eager to fight for the fulfillment of that prophecy. In contrast, Palestinian national narratives traced their claim to the land back to the biblical Philistines. To further support their claims, Palestinians cited the promises of the Husayn-McMahon correspondence and the generations that Arabs have inhabited and cultivated the land. In contrast, they saw Jewish migrants as an extension of European imperialism and Britain’s mandate. This turned into a political nightmare for Britain. Fed up with violence between Zionists and Palestinians and unable to appease both groups throughout the Mandate period, Britain pulled out of Palestine in 1948. Following Britain’s exit, Zionist leader David Ben-Gurion declared the establishment of the Jewish state of Israel.

Within days of this declaration, the 1948 Arab-Israeli war broke out, and its legacy helped develop Israel and Palestine's national identities. For Jews, the 1948 conflict became a miraculous victory in their struggle for independence. Conversely, this war came to be known as al-Nakba (The Catastrophe) for the Palestinian people. Israel’s military triumph allowed them to expand their original borders, subsequently expelling hundreds of thousands of Palestinians from their homes. The Jewish people told a story of a divinely ordained victory; on the other hand, Palestinians told a story of catastrophe and loss. Thus, the 1948 war cemented the Jewish Israeli identity and helped bolster the formation of a strong Palestinian nationalism.
Simultaneously, *al-Nakba* led to the divergence of the collective Palestinian narrative and Palestinian identity that emerged in 1948. Immediately following Israel’s victory, hundreds of thousands of Palestinians were integrated into the Jewish state and granted citizenship. These Arabs in Israel were pressured to assume a more Israeli identity despite the high levels of fear and mistrust between Arabs and Jews (Peleg and Waxman 2011, 10). This pressure started the “Israelization” process and thus the Arab citizens of Israel are trapped in an identity struggle within a viciously divided society. Pulled between the benefits of Israeli citizenship and loyalty to their oppressed Palestinian brothers and sisters in the occupied territories, the Arab citizens of Israel constitute a prime example of how identities can be multifaceted and fluid.

This internal identity conflict presents one of the most intriguing Arab identity shifts of the twenty-first century. A gradual transition has occurred from an Israeli-Arab identity to a more concrete Palestinian identity (Peleg and Waxman 2011, 27). Peleg and Waxman labeled this shift as “Palestinization.” However, this shift appears to be more an expression of social "Israelization" because it is an effort to achieve equal rights for Palestinians in Israel, rather than bolster the Palestinian cause in the occupied territories. This process is in direct contrast with the “Palestinization” and the identity of Palestinians of the diaspora and occupied territories. The Palestinians of the diaspora possess a collective narrative of forced displacement and life under a
hardline occupation. Their “Palestinization” also calls for an independent Palestinian state, rather than an integration with the Jewish state.

There are two conclusions that arise from observing the multifaceted and fluid nature of the Arab Israeli identity. First, “Palestinian nationalism and Israeli citizenship shapes the collective identity of the Arab community in Israel” (Peleg and Waxman 2011, 31). Second, “A new collective identity has emerged among Arab citizens in Israel, distinct from that of Palestinians elsewhere” (Peleg and Waxman 2011, 31). However, these conclusions appear to contradict each other. Peleg and Waxman are suggesting that Arab Israelis are simultaneously bolstering their Palestinian heritage and separating from the post-1948 Palestinian identity and establishing their own category of Palestinian Arab. At the same time, Palestinians appear to be retrenching their individual and social identities into a strong and cohesive Palestinian nationalism. Despite efforts from both groups to maintain their Palestinian identities, both are moving in opposite directions and creating two distinct Palestinian identities. Therefore, the “Palestinization” process that Peleg and Waxman examine in Israel must apply exclusively to their self-prescribed individual identity. Meanwhile, Arabs in the occupied territories experience a "Palestinization" of both individual and social identities.

INTRAGROUP CONFLICT AND IDENTITY FORMATION THEORIES

This paper pulls from various social identity theories that build the foundation of my argument. First, Laitin presents a theory of identity in divided societies and discusses how to measure the formation of new identities. Laitin introduces the concepts of a “beached diaspora” and a conglomerate identity. In his analysis of Russian speakers in post-Soviet states, he demonstrates how new identities form within minority groups in an ethnocentric nation. These Russian speakers living in the post-Soviet republics face a radical crisis of identity as a "beached diaspora" group – a diaspora category resulting from receding borders, rather than displacement. Laitin asks important questions including: What will become of these populations? Will they learn the languages of the republics in which they live and prepare their children for assimilation? Will they return to a homeland many have never seen? Or will they
become loyal citizens of the new republics while maintaining a Russian identity? He concludes that the Russian-speaking population is a new conglomerate identity in the post-Soviet world. This conglomerate identity of those who share a language is analogous to such designations as "Palestinian" in the Middle East because Palestinians in Israel have become a beached diaspora group and can be expected to form a new conglomerate identity. This identity bolsters their minority status in their new ethnocentric state. Understanding the historical context of the Palestinian identity, it follows that any new conglomerate identity of Palestinians in Israel would depart from the original Palestinian nationalism and identity that formed after 1948.

External forces may also compel Palestinians in Israel to dissociate with their Palestinian group identity and adopt a social identity that favors their Israeli citizenship. Laitin observes that these conglomerate identities can thrive insofar as individual choice is not necessary (Laitin 1998, 31). This means that Palestinians in Israel and elsewhere can include various facets in their identity. Therefore, an Arab citizen of Israel may self-identify as Palestinian for individual purposes but when external influences and incentives pressure them they may favor one element of their identity over others. To measure this, one must look at similar factors to those Laitin observes influencing Russian speakers in post-Soviet states. Examining the different circumstances, attitudes, and behaviors of the two Palestinian groups may demonstrate a noticeable difference in their perceptions of social identity.

The second theory this paper relies on is Nevin T. Aiken's various processes of identity formation in post-conflict divided societies. He develops a model of identity formation that consists of three different social learning processes: instrumental learning, socioemotional learning, and distributive learning. Instrumental learning "[focuses] on rebuilding relationships and interactions that can foster less antagonistic perceptions between formerly divided groups" (Aiken 2015, 44). Instrumental learning is important to the Palestinian case because it allows us to measure some of the processes of "Israelization," "Palestinization," and the widening gap between the Palestinian groups. For example, if there is evidence that constructive dialogue between Jewish Israelis and Arabs in Israel is occurring, then that would fit Aiken's theory of
instrumental learning and help explain the "Israelization" of Palestinians’ social identity in Israel.

Aiken's second process is socioemotional learning, which “attempts to come to terms with the history of past violence” through mechanisms like truth recovery (Aiken 2015, 49). This learning process allows us to measure differences in the collective narratives between the two Palestinian groups. One way to measure this is to examine the collective narratives of oppression and violence between Palestinians in the occupied territories and Palestinians in Israel. If evidence shows that there are different experiences and circumstances, then there are two identity forming narratives occurring that are not cohesive. This would show one way in which individuals from both groups can claim to be Palestinian but are simultaneously separating at an intergroup level.

Aiken's third process is distributive learning, which solidifies identity formation in post conflict divided societies by attempting to ameliorate material inequalities that stem from the conflict between two groups (Aiken 2015, 54). In the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, this would come in the form of Israel’s attempts to amend the structural inequality and oppression that its Arab citizens face daily. One way this helps expose the identity split between the Palestinian groups is by identifying any inequality in retributive processes between the two groups. For example, by providing some reparations to the Palestinians in Israel but none to the Palestinians in occupied territories, Israel has the ability to widen the identity split by setting Palestinians in Israel in opposition to other Palestinians.

Lastly, Tajfel examines and explains attitudes and behaviors leading to intragroup conflict and demonstrates how intragroup conflict indicates the presence of two distinct group identities. Tajfel prefaces his theory by saying, “In order for the members of an ingroup to be able to hate or dislike an outgroup, or to discriminate against it, they must first have acquired a sense of belonging to a group which is clearly distinct from the one they hate, dislike, or discriminate against” (Tajfel 1974, 66). This paper does not suggest that Palestinians in Israel “hate, dislike, or discriminate against” Palestinians elsewhere, or vice versa. Nevertheless, if there is evidence of mistrust or prejudice between the
Palestinians in Israel and Palestinians in the occupied territories, then this is one way in which group identities begin to separate.

THE TWO PALESTINIAN IDENTITIES

The previous theories can be applied to the three proxy indicators to illustrate how a new Palestinian identity group has formed in Israel. The first proxy, protest participation, pulls from Tajfel’s theory and demonstrates the idea that intergroup behaviors can only arise from two distinct groups existing. If Palestinians in Israel are a separate identity group, distinct from the Palestinians in the occupied territories, then there should be evidence of significantly lower numbers of Palestinian-Israelis participating in Palestinian protests and the Intifadas. Just like Tajfel suggests, if the Palestinians were one unified social group, then we could expect a relatively equal proportion of Palestinians from Israel and the occupied territories to participate in Palestinian liberation protests and the intifadas.

People are less likely to participate in political protests if they identify more closely with the establishment that is being protested against. According to Lowrance, the “Identity” variable was the most statistically significant variable correlating with protest action (Lowrance 2006, 181). When Arabs identify themselves as more "Israeli," they are less protest-prone than other Palestinian Arabs with more anti-establishment identities (Lowrance 2006, 182). When Lowrance held the social identity variable at “Israeli,” the probability for protest participation was 27%. By contrast, when Lowrance held the social identity variable at “Palestinian,” the probability in protest participation changed to 69%. Thus, the evidence shows that Arabs who identify with Israel behave differently than Arabs who identify more closely with Palestinians. Palestinians from the occupied territories who participated in the protests exclusively consider themselves as "Palestinian" because they have no other identity to choose between. This data is intriguing because it is measuring protest participation during the Intifada, which was a Palestinian liberation uprising. Essentially, if no identity separation existed between the Israeli Arabs and the Palestinians outside of Israel, then the involvement of Palestinians in Israel during the Second
Intifada would not have been so closely tied to their identity.

The second proxy, language, follows Laitin’s theory of identity formation in beached diaspora communities. The Arabic language is an important aspect of identity for Arabs. The language has become an important symbol of the Palestinian struggle in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict because of Israel’s policy of dearabization. If the Palestinians in Israel are categorized as a beached diaspora group, then we can expect to see more Palestinian citizens of Israel integrating Hebrew into their lives.

Evidence suggests that Palestinians in Israel are increasingly using Hebrew and integrating it into their lives. Despite Arabic’s status as a second national language, Israel has implemented a longstanding policy of dearabization within its borders. This policy has been most prevalent in renaming villages, sites, and landmarks with historically Arabic names and giving them Hebrew names. To combat dearabization, Palestinians in the occupied territories speak Arabic exclusively in public and in their homes. Thus, the Arabic language has transcended into an important symbol of identity for Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza.

Furthermore, participation in Israeli politics and business requires proficiency in Hebrew. Recent reports indicate that nearly all Israeli Arabs are proficient in Hebrew (Shakour and Tarabeih 2019, 421). In fact, the native Arabic speakers of Israel frequently adopt colloquial Hebrew terms into their day-to-day vocabulary, including: beseder ‘okay,’ arush ‘TV channel,’ mivsha ‘sales discount,’ kanyon ‘shopping mall,’ and mashil ‘lifeguard’ (Shakour and Tarabeih 2019, 421). Obviously, the level of Hebrew proficiency varies between age, gender, and social class. Nevertheless, there is a clear pattern of ‘Israelization’ occurring among Israel’s Arabs measured largely through the use of Hebrew. If we believe Laitin’s argument about titular language learning in beached diaspora groups, then it is clear that the Palestinians in Israel are forming a new conglomerate identity that is separate from the Palestinians outside of Israel.

The final proxy, political participation in Israel, also follows Laitin and Aiken’s theories. Arab participation in Israel's democracy demonstrates a legitimization of the state’s political system and of Arab self-integration into that system. This contrast with the occupied Palestinians
who reject the Israeli establishment view it as a symbol of their occupation.

Political participation data in Israel reveals that the Arab citizens in Israel are getting more involved in Israeli politics. Over the past decade, and especially this past year, Palestinian voter participation has risen in Israel.

![Graph of voter turnout in recent Israeli Elections](image)

(Nationwide and Arab-Israeli voter turnout in recent Israeli Elections, Israel Democracy Institute)

Interestingly, the sudden drop in Arab voter participation in 2019 was for the year's first election, which ended in a tie and prompted a revote. The second election cycle of 2019 saw a new wave of Arab voters, 59%. Moreover, what this graph fails to show is that Arab voter turnout in 2020 was 67%, the highest it has been since 1999. This political participation suggests that Palestinians in Israel are increasingly accepting their Israeli status and citizenship. The 2019 Israel National Election Survey (INES) results support this claim, with a significant majority of Arab respondents (62%) agreeing that civic equality for Arab citizens can be achieved mainly through political struggle in the Knesset. This evidence suggests that the Arabs in Israel are accepting their national identity as Israelis and behaving accordingly. This newfound legitimization of Israeli politics indicates a significant reversal from traditional Palestinian attitudes and behaviors towards Israel. The political legitimacy of Israel has long been an issue in past peace summits because of the occupied Palestinian's reluctance to accept or recognize Israel as a legitimate state. Although this mentality may have been prevalent among Palestinians in Israel, their recent participation in Israel's democracy says otherwise. As a proxy of social
identity, it is clear from observing Palestinians’ political participation in Israel that a gap has formed between the two Palestinian groups. On one hand, there are the occupied Palestinians who view Israel as an illegitimate state; on the other hand, there are Palestinians in Israel who have elected to legitimize the state through political participation.

CAUSES OF THE DIVERGENT IDENTITIES

In the second part of my paper, I examine three independent variables that influence Palestinian-Israelis to move away from their social affiliation with Palestine and move towards Israel. These three variables are the socio-psychological impact of majority/minority relations, the influence of personal incentives (economic, political, and educational), and the Jewish Israeli attitudes and behaviors towards Palestinians in Israel versus Palestinians elsewhere. The evidence shows that these factors have caused the "Israelization" of the Arab Israeli identity and the "Palestinization" of the Arab identity in the occupied territories, despite ongoing efforts from both groups to "Palestinize" their self-prescribed individual identities. Thus, it is possible for Palestinian citizens of Israel to experience a conglomerate identity that assumes contradicting Israeli and Palestinian elements while Palestinians in the occupied territories do not face this identity crisis. In short, I find that all three independent variables help explain how the Palestinian identity has split based on the contrasting attitudes and behaviors of Palestinian citizens of Israel and Palestinians outside of Israel.

To measure these variables, I analyzed primary documents, secondary source publications, survey data from the Israel National Election Survey (INES), and Dr. Khalil Shikaki’s public opinion surveys of Palestinians in the occupied territories. The evidence from surveys presented in this research follows the shift from the Second Intifada (2000-2005) to the most recent INES and Palestinian public opinion polls (2019). These survey results provide invaluable insights into the contrasting attitudes and perceptions of Palestinian Israelis and Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. I also examined peer-reviewed publications that discussed the collective narratives of Palestinians throughout the region. The primary source documents and narratives examined were
the 2007 Future Vision documents of Palestinian elites in Israel along with personal narratives from Wendy Pearlman’s, *Occupied Voices* – a conglomerate work of individual narratives from Palestinians throughout the region.

Furthermore, I analyzed various peer-reviewed, secondary source publications, including Rabah Halabi’s School for Peace approach for engaging Palestinian Israelis and Jewish Israelis in dialogue and more observations for Peleg and Waxman’s book. These secondary sources help illustrate the attitudes and behaviors of Israel’s Palestinian citizens, which I contrast with the attitudes and behaviors of occupied Palestinians. The contrasting attitudes and behaviors come from the narratives in Pearlman’s *Occupied Voices*. This wealth of sources supports the correlation between the three independent variables and the widening social gap between the Palestinian groups.

**Socio-Psychological Impact of Majority/Minority Relations**

Aiken's socioemotional learning process describes a mechanism of social identity formation that focuses on observing the creation of new collective group narratives. In any post conflict society, there is bound to be a narrative of victory and a narrative of loss. The Palestinians of Israel and the Palestinians of the occupied territories both share narratives of loss. But their narratives diverge as one side tells a story of loss and integration into a new ethnocentric state, and the other side tells a story of loss and occupation. These different narratives constitute diverging processes of identity formation and help explain why the two distinct Palestinian groups exist.

Although the Israeli Arabs fit the description of a beached diaspora, categorizing them as such does not exempt them from the social pressure to assimilate into the newly established Jewish state (Laitin 1998, 29). Their status as a social, political, and ethnic minority living in an oppressive ethnocentric state has a socio-psychological impact on Palestinians in Israel. When Arabs became an ethnic minority in the Jewish state of Israel, their communities were dealt new challenges and circumstances, which forced them to either fight against the Jewish establishment or conform to it. These circumstances place substantial pressure on Israel's Palestinian citizens to
prioritize the more Israeli aspects of their social identity to survive and thrive in the Jewish state.

In the School for Peace discussions, the intergroup dialogue highlights how the Palestinians in Israel feel threatened by their minority status in society and how the Jewish state perceives and treats them. Halabi attempts to reconcile Jewish and Palestinian relations in Israel outside of an official, state-sanctioned, environment. Based on Halabi’s observations, it is apparent that the Palestinians in Israel experience a situation of a dominating group majority (Jewish-Israelis) over a dominated group minority (Arab-Palestinians in Israel) (Halabi 2004, 72). Thus, during the discussions, the Palestinians exhibited attitudes of minority inferiority and how it has affected their personal and community identities.

Halabi makes two conclusions about the majority/minority relationship in Israel: First, the majority has a monopoly over resources and social services, which makes it exceptionally easy for the majority to discriminate against the minority (Halabi 2004, 40). Second, the majority has absolute control over the state institutions and the more prominent sectors of civil society, which leaves the minority politically and socially dependent on the majority (Halabi 2004, 40). These asymmetrical circumstances create an abundance of grievances for Israel’s Palestinian citizens and forces them to depend on their minority communities and noninstitutionalized organizations to fulfill their needs (Halabi 2004, 40).

However, those circumstances do not appear to persuade the Palestinians to abandon their Israeli citizenship and join their fellow Palestinians in the occupied territories. These conclusions were realized early on in Halabi’s experiments when Samir, a Palestinian Israeli girl, voiced her opinion about the situation:

“I feel Palestinian, without any connection to the Palestinian state. If a Palestinian state is established in the territories, it will belong to them… How can you come here, the conqueror of another people, and tell them that if only you weren’t here, it would be better? I tell you that I do want you [Jews] to be here. The establishment is not interested in hearing us. Our leadership doesn’t deal with the issues" (Halabi 2004, 81).
Samir’s comments present valuable insights into the attitudes of Palestinians in Israel. There is an obvious self-perception of Palestinian identity in her first sentence, but her social identity has started to shift away from Palestinian nationalism. Palestinian nationalism is a call for self-determination and a proactive desire to establish an independent Palestinian state. However, Samir’s expression shows how any new Palestinian state will belong to that group, and she has no desire to become a part of that national project. She shows that Palestinians in Israel desire peaceful cohabitation with the Jews as a valued ethnic minority rather than to leave Israel and join the Palestinian majority. Her insights illustrate how Palestinian citizens of Israel appreciate their citizenship and minority status enough to disassociate themselves with Palestinian nationalism and to become an independent Palestinian Israeli group.

Recent INES survey results further support Samir’s statement that Israeli Arabs would retain Israeli citizenship rather than integrate into any Palestinian state. In the 2019 survey, Arab Israeli participants were asked, “Is the main aspiration of Arab citizens in Israel to have full equality as citizens?” The results show that 78% of Arabs strongly agreed with the statement, and 12% agreed. In other words, 90% of Arab Israeli respondents aspire to be regarded as equal citizens in Israel. Similarly, two-thirds of Arab respondents from the same survey group favor a two-state over a one-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This data is compelling because a two-state solution would guarantee the continuation of Arab Israelis’ minority status in Israel. By contrast, a two-state solution would also guarantee the creation of a sovereign state with a Palestinian majority. The desire of an independent Palestinian state is a powerful motivating factor for the Palestinians. However, Samir’s statement and the INES data appear to be saying that the Palestinians of Israel would elect to remain a minority in Israel rather than joining a new sovereign Palestinian state. Although Samir and other Palestinians in Israel may support the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, their social identity as a minority citizen of Israel is pulling them away from any desire to associate with the Palestinian nationality.

Further evidence of this attitude comes from the Future Vision document. Early in the document, leaders of the Palestinian population in Israel declare various demands that the
Palestinian citizens expect from Israel. Two of these demands are reconciliatory and retributive measures. One calls for the state of Israel’s recognition of the Arab Palestinian citizens as an indigenous national group and a legitimate national minority (Khatib 2006, 11). The other demands that Israel attempt to remedy and compensate the many Palestinian citizens who have suffered harsh institutional discrimination “derived from viewing them as enemies and not as citizens that have a right to oppose the state and challenge its rules” (Khatib 2006, 11). While the distributive learning process through retribution is obvious in the second demand, the reconciliatory measures are more obscure. However, demanding Israel’s recognition of the Arab Palestinians as a national minority constitutes a process of truth recovery in building a new national collective narrative in Israel. That process would be a monumental development in the social and political identities of the Palestinians in Israel and would clearly fit Aiken’s theory of socioemotional learning process. Nevertheless, this declaration is something Israel refuses to make because it would directly contradict the Jewishness of the state. Meanwhile, Israel’s Arab citizens are left out of any national collective narrative.

In the occupied territories, Palestinians constitute the majority demographic of the land they inhabit, which compels them to disassociate from the Palestinians in Israel because they must prioritize their Palestinian Arab identity to survive. When Israel occupied the West Bank and Gaza in 1948, a collective narrative of resentment and hostility towards Israel became a crucial component of the Palestinian national identity. Desires for a sovereign Palestinian state, independent from Israel's violent and oppressive occupation, became a guiding principle for this group. Additionally, the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza are refused the opportunity to become naturalized citizens of Israel. This leaves them stateless and occupied, forced to attain any retribution and reconciliation for their suffering through their own self-determination. By contrast, the Palestinians in Israel seek retribution and reconciliation through their rights as an ethnic minority in the Jewish state of Israel. Although the two Palestinian groups remain connected through their shared suffering and oppression at the hands of Israel, their contrasting narratives and circumstances constitute a serious mechanism that drives them apart.
In the occupied territories, violent oppression and massive displacement occurs as Israel grows its web of settlement throughout the West Bank (UN General Assembly 2014, 9-10). For the Palestinians in the occupied territories, these circumstances are devastating, but they have a much larger community of Palestinians than their Palestinian comrades in Israel. In addition, the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza have no pressure to be connected with Israel because that opportunity is not available to them. For this group, it sees Israel solely as a hostile occupier, rather than an oppressive government. The Palestinians of the territories are forced to create their own institutions and a strong civil society while aggressive occupiers constantly harass, intimidate, and expel them from their own land.

Palestinians in Israel prioritize achieving equality as a minority, but the nature of the Jewish state complicates that aspiration. In 2014, the special rapporteur to the Human Rights Council of the United Nations General Assembly submitted a lengthy report outlining Israel’s illegal treatment of the Palestinians and how their actions constitute allegations of an “apartheid state” (UN General Assembly 2014, 20). Although Israel grants citizenship to Palestinians, there are anti-Palestinian attitudes codified into Israeli law. For the Palestinians in Israel, they experience oppression as an ethnic minority in an ethnocentric government. Compared to the treatment of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, this oppression comes through less violent institutionalized inequality like making freedom of movement difficult for Palestinians, limiting access to water and utilities, and attempting to impose Hebrew upon the state’s Arab inhabitants through dearabization (Bsoul 2006, 30). This experience for Palestinians in Israel pressures them to dissociate from the passionate drive for Palestinian nationalism and accept their reality as citizens of Israel.

According to Aiken’s theories of identity formation in divided societies, these contrasting circumstances are creating two separate Palestinians identities and pulling them farther apart. Transitioning from generations of stability and peaceful cohabitation with Jews into life as a refugee in their own land placed unbearable sorrow and loss on the Palestinians. In addition to the burdens and horrors of occupation, identity and belonging has been a
fundamental crisis for the existing 4.8 million stateless Palestinians throughout the occupied
territories. As Israel’s campaign to dearabize the region persists, a formidable
counter-campaign of strong Palestinian nationalism exists among the occupied Palestinians. In
a way, it has been easier for these Palestinians to hold on to their core identity because of the
homogenous Palestinian demographics. Despite being a stateless people, their Palestinian
identity has been unchallenged by outside pressures. In other words, as occupied Palestinians
retrench into the original Palestinian collective narrative and identity, Israeli Arabs are being
pulled in another direction because of the grievances of their minority status.

Influence of Personal Incentives

Identifying specific social and political goals among Arabs in Israel that do not reflect the
original Palestinian nationalism and identity helps explain their social departure from that group.
Laitin’s argument about conglomerate identities suggests that the Palestinians in Israel can
maintain both Israeli and Palestinian facets of their identity insofar as personal choice is not
needed. When two aspects of identity begin to conflict, individuals and groups are forced to decide
which aspect of their identity they prefer to more closely align with. External influences including
Israel’s economic stability, political representation, and higher education opportunities pressure
Arabs in Israel to favor their Israeli ties over Palestinian national identities. For Palestinians in the
West Bank and Gaza, their social identity prioritizes an end to the Israeli occupation, achieving a
legitimate state, and stabilizing civil society. These social priorities are different for Israeli Arabs,
which explains a shift in attitude, behavior, and social identity.

Aiken's distributive learning process outlines how social identities form in post-conflict
societies based on the retributive opportunities that groups have access to. Israel’s position as an
internationally recognized state presents many opportunities and benefits to its citizens, a privilege
that the Palestinian Authority cannot grant to its people in the occupied territories. Retribution for
violence and oppression is a desire among both Palestinian groups. However, the opportunities
afforded to the Palestinians in Israel present incentives that may pressure them into conforming to
the "Israelization" of their social identity. This imbalance in circumstances disconnects the
Palestinian citizens in Israel from the Palestinians elsewhere at both a communal and individual level. Consequentially, these inequalities foster feelings of resentment and disconnection from occupied Palestinians towards their Palestinian siblings in Israel. I identify three institutional opportunities that incentivize the Palestinian citizens in Israel to adopt a more Israeli identity: increased economic security, political representation, and quality of education.

The three opportunities that may influence the attitude, behaviors, and social identity of Arab Israelis are a major cause of the Palestinian split because they are three institutional problems that Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip face. Unemployment in the occupied territories is high – 52% in the Gaza strip and 20% in the West Bank (State of Palestine 2018). In addition, the Palestinian Authority has not held legitimate elections since 2006, further adding to the narrative of the PA’s corruption and inefficiency. And although literacy rates in Palestine are high, funding for schools in the region is low and families worry about sending their children to school because of the violent Israeli occupation forces. Since the economic, political, and educational opportunities of being an Israeli citizen are important to the Arabs of Israel, it is no wonder they have begun to associate more with Israel rather than Palestine to receive these benefits. This also helps explain why Palestinians in the occupied territories elect to dissociate themselves from the Arabs in Israel. Israeli Arabs are experiencing benefits from the state that is depriving occupied Arabs of those same benefits.

The benefits of being a part of a strong and stable economy incentivizes many Palestinians in Israel to dissociate from Palestine and conform to their Israeli identity. In fact, economic incentives are so important to the Palestinians in Israel that they regard economic issues on par with issues of peace and territories in the INES surveys. In 2001, around the beginning of the Second Intifada, the majority of Palestinian-Israeli respondents regarded the economy as the main problem the Knesset had to handle. Two years later, the economy and issues of peace and the occupied territories were the strongest influencers of the Arab vote in the 2003 election survey. 95% of Arab respondents said the economy would greatly influence their vote; moreover, 94% of Arab voters in Israel said that peace and the territories would also have a
strong influence on their vote. It is apparent through the election surveys from the early 2000s to today that economic prosperity significantly motivates the attitudes of Israel’s Arab citizens. This data also shows how personal incentives like economic success drive a wedge between the two Palestinian groups. For Palestinians in the territories, economic prosperity and security is not a realizable reality until they are free from Israel's occupation. The year 2003 was in the middle of the Second Intifada, a widespread Palestinian liberation uprising. Nevertheless, the economy had a stronger influence on the votes of Arab Israelis in 2003 than any other factor.

Almost as important as economic personal incentives, the status as a citizen of Israel – regardless of ethno-religious class – presents immeasurable advantages to Israel’s Arab citizens than being a stateless Palestinian refugee in the territories. As a citizen of Israel, the Palestinians enjoy privileges including voting rights, access to state institutions, social services, and health care. More importantly these institutions, rights, and services are considered to be more efficient and of higher quality than the services that the Palestinian Authority, Hamas, and non-governmental organizations provide to the occupied Palestinians. Thus, there is an acute incentive for individual Palestinians in Israel to disconnect from Palestinian institutions and move towards Israel’s.

This is clear from voting patterns of Palestinians in Israel. Arab voters have often boycotted Israeli elections as a tactic to protest the Jewish state’s institutionalized discrimination. Jewish Israelis also attempt to suppress Arab voter turnout. Surprisingly, in 2015, a relatively sizable number of Israeli Arabs (64%) went to the voting booths, yet that number suddenly plunged until the most recent election in 2020 (Rahman 2019). During this period of diminished Arab voter turnout, a coalition of Jewish political parties raised the electoral threshold in an attempt to undercut the fragmented Arab parties (Rahman 2019). However, the Arab parties’ response involved coming together in political unity and forming the Arab Joint List which became the third-largest party in the Knesset. In fact, the recent Israeli election deadlock suggests that Israel’s Arabs are beginning to embrace their ability to participate politically, capitalize on Israel’s fragmented political system, and engage in Israeli politics.
Political involvement in Israel is significant to the formation of a new Palestinian identity because it means that the Arabs in Israel accept and intend to capitalize on their citizenship. In fact, the 2019 INES results show that 62% of Palestinians in Israel both support Israel’s political institutions and believe that they can achieve political and social equality through Israeli elections. In addition, 80% of Palestinians agreed that participating in Knesset elections would benefit their national rights in Israel. However, this acceptance to and involvement with Israel's political system constitutes a direct contradiction to the entire Palestinian narrative. The occupied Palestinians view Israel as an illegitimate state and any involvement with Israel's government implies its legitimacy. Thus, accepting and admitting the legitimacy of the state of Israel has been a controversial topic for the occupied Palestinians in peace talks and day-to-day life. These contrasting attitudes and behaviors drive a considerable wedge between the Palestinians of Israel and the occupied Palestinians.

Along with economic and political incentives, the Palestinian minority in Israel has access to a better funded and more sophisticated educational system. What is more, Arab Israelis are increasingly placing their children in Hebrew schools because they receive higher funding and provide more opportunities for success in the Jewish state (Kazis-Taylor 2018). This becomes a powerful incentive for Palestinian citizens of Israel to embrace the ‘Israelization’ of their social identity in order to provide their children with a more promising future. Although education levels between the Palestinian groups are similar, Palestinian citizens of Israel also have more opportunities for higher education. In the past eight years the number of Arab Israelis enrolled in Israeli universities increased nearly 60% (Dattel 2018). The opportunities for success that higher education provides in Israel further incentivizes the Arab Israelis to assimilate into Israel’s educational system.

In the West Bank and Gaza Strip, education is valued and supported but does not enjoy the same level of infrastructure and state funding that Israeli schools do. Many of the narratives of Palestinians from Pearlman’s Occupied Voices explain how the occupation makes access to education and freedom of education challenging. Stories from Palestinian mothers in the book
discussed Israeli Defense Force soldiers shooting children going to school and returning home, often for just throwing a rock, wearing a suspicious looking backpack, or getting too close to the soldiers. Israel also has a history of targeting Palestinian schools in the West Bank and Gaza Strips in routine airstrikes because they believe that they are shelters for Palestinian terrorists. Occupied Palestinians understand that education is, perhaps, their best weapon against the occupation which is evident through their impressively high literacy rates. In fact, literacy rates in the West Bank and Gaza Strip are the highest in the region – 96% (UNDP 2014, 2). Arabs in Israel share similar literacy rates. Nevertheless, there are severe challenges and limitations to the Palestinian education system which the Palestinian citizens of Israel do not have to deal with.

In addition, the threat of population transfers or the annexation of Arab land to a newfound Palestinian state is another concern that influences the majority of Israeli Arabs. According to Sammy Smooha’s index of Arab-Jewish relations, the average proportion of Israeli Arabs who experienced “Fear of annexation of the [Arab] Triangle to a Palestinian state against the will of the Arab-Israeli citizens” was 52% (Smooha 2010). Moreover, the same proportion on average were afraid “of population transfer [mass expulsion] of some Arab citizens” (Smooha 2010). Peleg and Waxman also observed that most Israeli citizens – Jews and Palestinians alike – are supportive of harmonious coexistence of all Israeli citizens and reconciling the relationship between Jewish and Palestinian citizens (Peleg and Waxman 2011, 13). Considering the past evidence of individual incentives in addition to the data, this shows how Israel’s Palestinian citizens not only enjoy the benefits of embracing Israeli citizenship but are also fearful of being displaced into the less stable Palestinian territory.

This attitude is the antithesis of the Palestinian attitude in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Residents there desire an autonomous and contiguous Palestinian state. For the occupied Palestinians, the opportunities afforded to their comrades in Israel are not as widely available to them, not even the benefits of statehood. Meanwhile, as Israel establishes more settlements throughout the West Bank, the Palestinians lose more of their territory and their land becomes less contiguous. For the Palestinians seeking an independent state, contiguity of their territory is a
major issue. For Arab Israelis to exhibit both loyalty to the Jewish State and to fear that Arab
majority areas of Israel, like Nazareth, will be transferred to the Palestinian territories, this
presents a substantial dividing element between the them and their fellow Palestinians in the
occupied territories. It is a divide that compels the occupied Palestinians to resent the Arabs in
Israel.

**Jewish Israeli Attitudes and Behaviors Towards Palestinians**

*In our state there will be non-Jews as well – and all of them will be equal citizens; equal in
everything without exception; that is: the state will be their state as well*  
(David Ben Gurion, December 1947).

INES data demonstrates how widespread Jewish Israelis exhibit hostility, mistrust,
and intolerance towards Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. When asked what
they believe the final aspiration of the Palestinians to be, 40% of Jewish Israeli respondents
said, “To conquer the country and destroy a significant part of the Jewish population.” The
next largest proportion of respondents, roughly 18% of Jewish Israelis, believed that the
final aspiration of the Palestinians was, “To get back all of the territories that were
conquered in the Six Day War.” Based on these public opinion results, it is clear that the
widespread Jewish Israeli population perceives Palestinians as an existential threat to Israel
and its Jews. This creates a situation where Israel has an incentive to divide the Palestinians
to ensure national security. Treating them as separate and distinct groups makes it easier for
the Jewish state to achieve this goal.

With regard to Tajfel’s theory of intergroup behavior, Jewish Israelis would be expected to
treat Palestinians in Israel differently than Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza if two distinct
social identities exist. Thus, any variation in treatment from Jewish Israelis towards Palestinians
in Israel further indicates how outgroups perceive Israeli Arabs as an independent group,
separated from the original Palestinian identity. This drives the groups apart because it fosters
attitudes of resentment from the occupied Palestinians directed against the Palestinian Israelis
since the Israeli group is treated more fairly than the occupied group.

Occupied Palestinians (with good reason) tell a narrative of violence, inequality, occupation, and resentment in their interactions with Jewish Israelis. For example, one common narrative to arise from the Second Intifada describes Israel’s indiscriminate repression through home demolitions. According to the Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions, ten thousand Palestinian homes were demolished since 1967, and more than two thousand homes were demolished during the Second Intifada (Pearlman 2003, 136). These demolitions are often unjustified, without judicial consent, and done only to dissuade entire families and communities from participating in protests. These abhorrent behaviors, among others, illustrate Israel’s institutional discrimination and hostility towards the occupied Palestinians.

What is more, the Palestinian Authority outlawed any collaboration with the State of Israel. In the West Bank and Gaza, collaborating with Israel may lead to execution. The State of Israel understands this and knows that if the occupied Palestinians believe that other Palestinian Arabs are cooperating with and conceding to Israel, this will spur mistrust, resentment, and dissociation. Fostering a hostile relationship between Palestinians makes it easier for the Israelis to manage Palestinian unrest in their state and manage the Palestinian threat in the occupied territories. On one hand, Jewish Israelis see a minority group that can be coerced and pressured into submitting to the Jewish Israeli agenda. On the other hand, Jewish Israelis see a substantially large group of Palestinian Arabs that resent the Jewish state and pose an existential threat to the state. Although some Jews view the Palestinians in Israel as an existential threat, they are perceived as a more manageable threat than the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. For the Jewish state, this management of Palestinians groups is a major element of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and leads to significant divides between the two Palestinian groups. More importantly, this evidence shows that Israel possesses the capability to persuade, manipulate, and coerce the Palestinians in Israel to "Israelize" their social identity, thereby compelling them to dissociate from the Palestinians of the occupied territories.
In contrast, during the School for Peace discussions, Halabi observes a more tolerant relationship between the Jewish people and Palestinians in Israel. In these discussions, the Palestinian Israelis viewed the Jewish participants as representative of the Jewish population in whole; whereas the Jewish participants chose to view the Arab participants as mere exceptions to the larger, more threatening, Palestinian community (Halabi 2004, 36). This attitude suggests that the Jewish group is willing and able to connect with individual Palestinian Israelis but struggles to relate with them at an intergroup level because of Israel's institutional bias against Palestinians. Following weeks of intergroup discussions, most of the Jewish Israelis began to express dissonance in their perceptions and behaviors they exhibited towards the Palestinian community in Israel. However, the Jewish participants refused to extend this change of opinion to the occupied Palestinians. Thus, it is apparent that the Jewish Israeli perception of the Palestinian citizens of Israel is much more sympathetic than their perception of Palestinians in the occupied territories.

Furthermore, the INES results support broad Jewish Israeli tolerance of Palestinian Israelis and relative hostility towards other Palestinians. In 2003, during the middle of the violent Second Intifada, Jewish Israelis were asked whether they supported the transfer of Israel’s Arab citizens. 69% of Jewish respondents opposed transferring the Arab Israeli citizens out of Israel. This data is important because it shows that the majority of Jewish Israelis favor keeping the Arab Israeli population within Israel, even when intergroup hostilities are high. Contrast that data to corresponding 2019 INES results and an interesting picture of heightened Jewish Israeli tolerance and acceptance of Palestinian citizens surfaces. When Jewish Israeli participants were asked what they believe the most important value for the development of the State of Israel to be, 70% of Jewish Israeli respondents valued a democratic state with equal rights for all and a state of peace. On top of that information, 60% of Jewish Israelis believe that it is impossible to achieve a peace agreement with the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. These survey results show that an overwhelming majority of Jewish Israelis support peaceful cohabitation and equal rights with
Palestinian Israelis; meanwhile they maintain the illusion that a peace agreement with Palestinians outside of Israel is unattainable. This attitude coincides with Israel’s security priorities. Maintaining Palestinians as a minority rather than transferring them to the Palestinian territories keeps the Palestinian identity divided. These attitudes also retrench the widespread attitude and resentment in the occupied territories that Palestinian-Israelis are perceived as collaborators with the Israeli occupation.

Because Palestinian citizens of Israel receive fairer treatment from Jewish Israelis, Palestinians elsewhere, and Arabs across the region, perceive and treat the Arab Israelis with mistrust and resentment (Suleiman 2011, 54). Similarly, Palestinians and Arabs treat Jews with Arab and North African heritage similarly (Suleiman 2011, 54). These attitudes and behaviors are in line with Tajfel’s theory of intergroup behavior. In order for Palestinians to mistrust and scorn Palestinians in Israel there must be a distinct sense of belonging to an independent social group. That independent social group is the original Palestinian identity that arose from the 1948 catastrophe. Understanding how Jewish Israelis treat Palestinians in Israel differently, it follows that Palestinians would also treat Palestinians in Israel as an outgroup whose new social identity has diverged from the pre-1948 Palestinian identity.

CONCLUSION

This two-part paper explored one of the crucial, yet often ignored, aspects of the Israeli Palestinian conflict: Identity. The first part adds upon contemporary theories of identity formation and intergroup behavior and demonstrates how two independent social identities exist between Palestinians in Israel and Palestinians in the occupied territories. The second part explains why the Palestinian identity split occurred. This is of the utmost importance because other scholars like Peleg and Waxman have helped to uncover the existence of diverging identities but have lacked a
comprehensive explanation for the factors driving that split. The three variables I examine come from a diversity of theoretical frameworks and present three of the major causes to this identity split.

Measuring the socio-psychological impacts of majority/minority relations correlates with the separation of Palestinian identities because Palestinian citizens of Israel must adapt to different institutional challenges than the occupied Palestinians. For Palestinians in Israel, becoming an ethnic minority in an ethnocentric state forces them to adapt to a new social and political order. Meanwhile, although there are political differences throughout the occupied territories, there is little evidence that majority/minority relations influence Palestinian civil society. This forces the Palestinian Israelis to change their attitudes and behaviors to survive in an institutionally discriminatory civil society.

Measuring the influence of personal incentives correlates with the separation of Palestinian identities because it becomes apparent that being an Israeli citizen is more preferable than being a stateless Palestinian. The benefits of being a part of a strong and stable economy incentivizes many Palestinians in Israel to dissociate from Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. As a citizen of Israel, the Palestinians enjoy privileges including voting rights, access to state institutions, social services, higher education, and better health care. Thus, there are clear and obvious external forces coercing Israel’s Palestinians to “Israelize” their social identity.

Lastly, measuring the more humane treatment that Jewish Israelis give to Arab Israelis demonstrates why the two separate Palestinian identities exist. Occupied Palestinians tell a narrative of violence, inequality, occupation, and resentment in their interactions with Jewish Israelis. In contrast, a more tolerant relationship between Jewish and Palestinian Israelis exists, despite continual discrimination in Israeli civil society. Nevertheless, the difference in treatment correlates with a separation of occupied Palestinians from Israeli Palestinians. Palestinians outside
of Israel view the Palestinian Israelis as traitors, and this attitude leads to two distinct Palestinian identities existing in the region.

All of the evidence I provide in this paper could be interpreted in another way as well. It may be that the Palestinians in Israel are conforming to their Israeli identity to bring an end to the conflict from within the state. The Arab population in Israel is rather large and poses a threat to many Jewish political parties. Arab-Palestinian participation in Israel’s election could be interpreted as the oppressed minority rising up to bring an end to their own grievances and the grievances of Palestinians everywhere. However, this paper suggests the contrary. If Palestinians in Israel were trying to bring an end to the conflict from within Israel’s political system, there would be more widespread protest participation and cohesive attitudes and behaviors amongst Palestinians everywhere. The INES data and qualitative evidence do not support this.

This research may apply to other cases as well because there are divided societies and populations caught in identity crises all around the world such as Native Americans and their assimilation into American culture. The Kurdish question is another example of a contemporary beached diaspora. Should the Kurds continue to fight for a state of their own? Or, should they start to assimilate into already established nations? Assimilation would entail doing something similar to what the Palestinians in Israel have done: transforming their social identity to survive in their state while attempting to hold on to their heritage through individual identity. It will be interesting to watch these cases unfold as time goes on and trace how identities transition in divided societies.

Recognizing the existence of two distinct Palestinian identities has significant implications for future peace plans, the future of the Palestinian cause, and the future of Israel’s democracy. Because Palestinian citizens of Israel are not the same as Palestinians elsewhere, their needs and goals are different despite their common Palestinian heritage. Thus, to successfully attain comprehensive reconciliation and transition to harmonious cohabitation, future peace processes must account for the needs of both Palestinians in the occupied territories and the needs of
Palestinians in Israel. These findings also suggest that Palestinians in Israel are not as passionate about ending the occupation as other Palestinians are. Furthermore, Palestinians in Israel have some capacity to influence change democratically through the Knesset. However, this does not appear to be happening. The evidence suggests that Palestinians in Israel are seeking to bolster their social status in Israel and favor a new social identity over the pre-1948 Palestinian collective identity. Moreover, if Palestinians in Israel are, in fact, “Israelizing” their social identity, then Israel can expect to see higher Arab voter turnout and increasing participation in Israeli civil society. Hopefully, this involvement will pressure Israel to bring an end to the occupation, reconcile appropriately with all Palestinian-Arabs, remove its discriminatory nation state laws and become a state for Jews and Arab citizens alike.
References


HEBREW OF EMILE HABIBI.” Hebrew Studies 60, pp. 419-434.


APPENDIX A

Image 1 – Israel’s 1947 Founding and the 1948 Israeli-Arab War, Vox

Image 2 - Overall and Arab sector turnout in recent Israeli Elections, Israel Democracy Institute
APPENDIX B

--INES 2019 Survey – N=1,614 respondents (1,347 Jews, 267 Arabs)--

V26: There are those who argue that a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel is the best way to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Others argue that one state between the sea and the Jordan river is the best way to solve the conflict. With which of the two arguments do you tend to agree?
1. A Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel is the best solution: 63%
2. One state between the sea and the Jordan river is the best solution: 26%

V27: The main aspiration of Arab citizens in Israel is to have full equality as citizens?
4 – Strongly Agree: 78%
3 – Agree: 12%
2 – Disagree
1 – Strongly Disagree

V28: Civic equality for Arab citizens can be achieved mainly through a political struggle in the Knesset (parliament)?
4 – Strongly Agree: 33%
3 – Agree: 29%
2 – Disagree: 10%
1 – Strongly Disagree: 26%

V30: Participating in Knesset elections harms the struggle for Palestinian national rights?
4 – Strongly Agree: 11%
3 – Agree: 9%
2 – Disagree: 14%
1 – Strongly Disagree: 60%

V14: To what extent are you worried or not worried that you or one of your family members are likely to be harmed by terrorists in your everyday life?
1. Very worried: 18%
2. Worried: 35%
3. Not worried: 30%
4. Not at all worried: 17%

V12: In your opinion, is it possible to reach a peace agreement with the Palestinians?
1. Definitely possible: 10%
2. Believe it is: 29%
3. Believe it is not: 24%
4. Definitely not possible: 33%

V117: How important to you is your identity as an Israeli? (Muslim respondents)
4. Very important: 39%
3. Quite important: 36%
2. Not so important: 4%
1. Not at all important: 19%

V118: And how important to you is your identity as a Jew? (For Arabs: “as a Palestinian”) (Muslim respondents only)
4. Very important: 46%
3. Quite important: 22%
2. Not so important: 10%
1. Not at all important: 16%

--2015 Survey – N=1,595 respondents (1,330 Jews, 265 Arabs)--

V12. In your opinion, what are the final aspirations of the Arabs? (Only Jewish Israelis)
1. To get back some of the territories that were conquered in the Six Day War: 15%
2. To get back all of the territories that were conquered in the Six Day War: 18%
3. To conquer the state of Israel: 15%
4. To conquer the country and destroy a significant part of its Jewish population: 40%

--2001 Survey – N=1,417 (1,249 Jews and 168 Arabs)--

B29-32: Which term best defines your identity?
B29: Most defines identity
1. Israeli: 9.56%
2. Palestinian: 19.85% (No Druze)
3. Arab: 53.37%
4. Religion: 22.09%

B30: Second
1. Israeli: 19.35%
2. Palestinian: 41.29%
3. Arab: 27.1%
4. Religion: 12.3%

B31: Third
1. Israeli: 36.4%
2. Palestinian: 18.2%
3. Arab: 11.57%
4. Religion: 34%

B32: Fourth
1. Israeli: 48.25%
2. Palestinian: 20.18%
3. Arab: 2.63%
4. Religion: 29%

A24: Are you worried about being injured by Arabs?
1. Not at all: 7% (No Druze)
2. Not worried: 16% (1 Druze)
3. Worried: 40% (38% of Druze said this)
4. Very worried: 37% (56% of Druze said this)

A8: Main problem the government has to handle?

A16: Eventually, do you oppose or support a peace agreement that includes establishment of Palestinian state on 95% of the territories and keeping settlement blocks; Giving Palestinians Jerusalem’s Arab neighborhoods; concession of sovereignty in Temple Mount, not including the Western Wall; a return of a limited number of refugees and a mutual declaration of end of further demands?
1. Strongly oppose: 10%
2. Oppose: 14%
3. Support: 59%
4. Strongly support: 17%

--2003 Survey – N=1,234 (1,083 Jews and 151 Arabs)--

A11: Territories should be exchanged for peace?
1. Definitely agree: 61%
2. Agree: 31%
3/4. Only 8% disagree or strongly disagree.

A12: The establishment of a Palestinian state in the territories as part of a permanent settlement?
1. Definitely agree: 51%
2. Agree: 33%
3/4. Only 26% disagree or strongly disagree.

A13: A fence of separation should be built?
1. Definitely agree: 28%
2. Agree: 30%

A18: QUESTION ONLY FOR JEWS – Arabs who are citizens should be transferred?
1. Definitely agree: 9.62%
2. Agree: 21.89%
3. Disagree: 48.87%
4. Strongly disagree: 19.62%

A22: Are you worried about being injured by Arabs?
1. Very worried: 48%
2. Worried: 32%
3. Not worried: 20%

_A58 & A61: To what extent will ECONOMICS (A58) and PEACE AND TERRITORIES (A61) have on your vote?_

_A58 Economics_
1. Very great extent: 71%
2. Great extent: 24%
3. Certain extent: 4%
4. Not at all: 1%

_A61 Peace and Territories_
1. Very great extent: 71%
2. Great extent: 23%
3. Certain extent: 4%
4. Not at all: 3%