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The Russian Coordinating Conjunctions *u* and *a*: Their Meaning, Function, and Pedagogy

MARK J. ELSON

1. Introduction

This paper is concerned with the systemic status of the coordinating conjunctions *u* and *a* in Contemporary Standard Russian. Most previous treatments of *u* and *a* have, without comment, viewed them as minimal syntactic units (i.e., words) defined, for systemic purposes, functionally—as equating or likening in the case of *u* but contrasting or opposing in that of *a*. However, these treatments, whether intentionally or unwittingly, have left unattended the possibility that *u* and *a*, although syntactic units, are more properly defined grammatically (i.e., are systemically characterized by an invariant grammatical meaning of which their functions are derivative).¹ At least one previous treatment, by Rudnitskaya and Uryson (2008), does treat meaning, but it is limited in scope with questionable conclusions and therefore leaves the issue of the systemic basis of *u* and *a*—function or grammatical meaning—unresolved.

My focus herein is the relevance to this question of, to the best of my knowledge, a heretofore unmentioned peculiarity of the following frame with respect to the occurrence of *u* and *a*:²

Иван поёт ... Мария смотрит телевизор_s

‘Ivan is singing and/but Maria is watching television.’

I will henceforth designate this frame I-M abbreviating Ivan x Maria y and define it as a compound sentence comprising two simple sentences differing in both subject (i.e., here Ivan versus Maria) and predicate (i.e., here x versus y). For analytic purposes, I will oppose this

¹ For a concise statement and illustration of the difference between GRAMMATICAL MEANING and FUNCTION OR SYNTACTIC MEANING, see Jakobson (1984a, 65, 69–71), which clarifies the difference with reference to the treatment of case in Russian.

² To avoid a potentially confusing proliferation of punctuation marks, I have refrained from using the period and question mark in the citation of data, although not in glosses. I have replaced the period in citations with subscript s and the question mark with subscript q, abbreviating STATEMENT and QUESTION respectively.

frame to *Иван поёт ... Мария поёт*, 'Ivan is singing and Maria is singing,' which I will designate I+M abbreviating Ivan x Maria x and define as a compound sentence comprising two simple sentences differing in either subject or predicate but not both (i.e., sharing either subject or predicate, here the latter as x). It had been my understanding that, with regard to the occurrence of *u* and *a* characterized functionally, I+M requires *u* because it can be understood only as an equation and is therefore compatible only with *u*, which functions to equate. I understood I-M, however, to permit both *u* and *a* with the expected difference—that is, *u* functioning to equate (i.e., signal that the speaker wishes to communicate that both I and M are engaged in activity) and *a* functioning to contrast (i.e., signal that the speaker wishes to communicate that I and M are engaged in different activities). This understanding was challenged when my use of *u* in I-M was corrected to *a* by a native speaker colleague informing me that *u* is not possible in such sentences—that *a* is the only possibility in I-M even in the absence of contrast (i.e., even if the speaker's communicative goal is to equate rather than contrast) and that *a* can also be used to communicate neutrally, without equating or contrasting. Upon inquiry of other native speakers, however, I encountered disagreement, with most confirming the unacceptability of *u* in I-M (i.e., requiring *a* regardless of the speaker's communicative goal) but some accepting it, for example, as one speaker noted, in answer to the question *Что делают дети* 'What are the children doing?'. An instance of *u* in I-M does in fact appear in Launer (1974, 65), although not with reference to I-M, which is unmentioned elsewhere in the literature on coordinating conjunctions.³

The disagreement among native speakers relating to the occurrence of *u* and *a* in I-M, I wish to argue, is not merely one of idiosyncratic preference but evidence for grammatical meaning as their systemic basis, thus rendering their functions a result of that meaning. It is specifically the incompatibility of *u* with I-M and consequent necessity of *a* that are the focal points of my argument and therefore the data from which I will proceed. First, however, I will turn to a preliminary matter regarding the domain of my treatment, then to a brief survey and critical summary of representative previous treatments of this topic (i.e., to a

³ It is important to note that there is no structural or other injunction against the appearance of both *u* and *a* in a given frame. There are frames in which both can occur with a concomitant difference in communicative result; see Rudnitskaya and Uryson (2008, 6) for an example.

review of the nature—largely if not exclusively functional—and extent of their coverage, thereby demonstrating that I–M is not only unmentioned in them but unaccommodated by the treatment they offer). In this regard, with the exception of Rudnitskaya and Uryson (2008), scholars have assumed that *u* and *a* both have fixed values, whether meaning or function, *u* being associated in some sense with equation or likeness and *a* with contrast or difference, although some previous treatments observe in passing and without recognizing its implications a property of *a* relevant to the resolution of I–M that I will offer. Nevertheless, if *a* is consistently associated, either directly or through meaning, with contrast as its function, we cannot systemically accommodate the absence of contrast that speakers may wish to signal with I–M or the inability of *u* to occur in it signaling the equation they may intend. I will conclude with attention to the consequences of my findings for the teaching of *u* and *a* in the Russian language classroom.

1.1 A preliminary matter: The domain of the corpus

The analysis of *u* and *a* is complicated by the occurrence of both in contexts that are not compatible with conjunction as the instantiated part of speech. In these contexts, the usual response is to recognize them as instantiations in the contemporary language of particle, and in that capacity not a part of their synchronic treatment as conjunctions. Nevertheless, the occurrence of *u* and *a* as particles does relate to their occurrence as conjunctions because, diachronically, the former emerged from the latter. As a result, it is a potential source of evidence for the systemic organization that characterized the latter and may still characterize it.⁴ An overview of their occurrence as particles, especially the differences between them in this regard, is therefore useful.

Particles are defined, according to Vasilyeva (n.d., 8) citing Vinogradov (1947, 663), as:

classes of those words which, as a rule, have no completely independent real, or material, meaning, but for the most part introduce additional shades into the meanings of other words, phrases or sentences, or are used to express all kinds of grammatical (and, consequently, logical and expressive) relation.

⁴ For the relevance of historical information in synchronic analysis, here the emergence of *u* and *a* as particles in Russian to their status as conjunctions, see Kiparsky (1968).

Relevant to the dual status of *u* and *a*, she comments:

It is very difficult to distinguish between particles and the conjunctions they have evolved from, since the conjunctive particles generally retain, to a greater or lesser degree, their *copulative* function. (n.d., 12; emphasis added)

With regard to the retention of copulative function by *a*, she observes:

In dialogue, the particle *a* is placed at the beginning of the sentence, especially in questions, which is a sign of ellipsis, of a hidden logical *link* with the omitted parts, and which emphasizes the spontaneity of a live conversation. (n.d., 151; emphasis added)

Vasilyeva's use of *link* may be understood as an implicit recognition of the retention by *a* of copulative function (i.e., function as a conjunction although undoubtedly diminished in force and with no element of contrast, in at least some instances of its occurrence as a particle, specifically those instances which are sentence-initial). Wade (2011, 510) gives examples of such instances accompanied by functionally oriented descriptive labels:

- (1) stating the apparently obvious; e.g., *Что же мне теперь делать*_q *А очень просто*_s 'What should I do now? It's very simple.'
- (2) instantiating a conversational exchange; e.g., *Митю можно*_q *А он на работе*_s *А когда он будет*_q 'Can I speak to Mitja? He's at work. When will he be home?'

To these we can add INSTANTIATING SPECIFICATION OR DEFINITION — e.g., (3) *Нас было трое, а именно: Панов, Белова и я*_s 'There were three of us: Panov, Belova and me.' In other instances of *a* as a particle, we must assume the absence not only of contrastive function but also copulative function. By contrast, although *u* may, according to Vasilyeva (n.d., 134) retain an element of its copulative function, it is also typically characterized by other functions—e.g., imparting and emphasizing REGULARITY, CORRESPONDENCE, and the NATURALNESS OF CONNECTIONS, all of which can, perhaps, be seen, although Vasilyeva makes no mention of it, as an outgrowth of its equating function as a conjunction (e.g., regularity as equating to an established norm). This is unlike *a*, which, in its occurrence as a particle, seems not to retain contrastive or other

function beyond copulative. We may speculate that *u* in its systemic essence as a conjunction, whether grammatical or functional, was and is, in some semiotic sense, more substantial than *a*, and thus *u* was generally not reduced, in particle usage, merely to a diminished variant of linkage as, apparently, *a* was or could be. This observation is significant because it is compatible with, and even suggestive of, the argument I will make for the systemic relevance of meaning rather than function in the synchronic status of *u* and *a* as conjunctions. Thus, at the very least, we can be reasonably certain that the diachrony of *u* and *a* cannot be seen as problematic for the view that meaning rather than function is synchronically their systemic basis.

2. Previous treatments: Introductory remarks

Previous treatments of Russian conjunctions, like those of other parts of speech and the linguistic system generally, differ considerably in depth and detail, as a reflection, we may assume, of their purpose and, in that connection, intended audience. With these differences in mind, we can, for organizational purposes, typologize the treatments as FORMAL or INFORMAL, with formal treatments invoking the principles and structures of theoretical linguistics and informal treatments relying primarily on translation sometimes accompanied by limited commentary referring to function, usually under one of its aliases: USE and OCCURRENCE. Informal treatments are further divisible into INSTRUCTIONAL and CONSULTATIVE, with instructional treatments characteristic of textbooks and consultative treatments characteristic of reference grammars. In relying on translation and commentary, instructional and consultative treatments are similar in content and cannot be called analyses in the strict sense but only descriptions because there is no reference to SYSTEM. Formal treatments, by contrast, do refer to system and therefore do qualify as analyses. In this regard, I note that the status and role of MEANING and FUNCTION in all sources, but especially informal, are often difficult to determine and may well be moot because, with the single exception of Rudnitskaya and Uryson (2008), on which I will comment in a following section, there is no evidence in any of the sources that the distinction played a role in the analysis or was recognized as relevant by the investigator in the evaluation of data. Phraseology suggestive of function is usual regardless of the level of formality, but we also

find references to meaning, although there is nothing to suggest that meaning, as opposed to function, was the object of investigation or that the investigator recognized the difference for purposes of analysis. Dengub and Rojavin (2010, 148–153), a consultative treatment, provides a case in point in the section designated MEANINGS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE COORDINATING CONJUNCTIONS *u*, *a*, *no*. This designation notwithstanding, the phraseology is indisputably suggestive of, or refers explicitly to, function (e.g., “the core function of the conjunction *u* is to unite ...” with an explicit reference to function, although in a preceding sentence the authors refer to “semantic meanings” with regard to *u* and other coordinating conjunctions). Nor, with the exception of Rudnitskaya and Uryson (2008), a formal treatment, do we find any component of the apparatus we typically associate with grammatical as opposed to syntactic and/or pragmatic treatment (e.g., the designation of a relevant grammatical meaning or category). Excluding Rudnitskaya and Uryson (2008), I will therefore assume the general absence of attention to meaning in previous treatments to be indicative of a failure to recognize it as relevant, and in my summary of them I will, for consistence, use phraseology compatible with function.

2.1 Previous informal treatments

Informal treatments of *u* and *a*, especially if we include those online, are numerous, and consistently, whether instructional or consultative, they fail to distinguish explicitly between meaning and function, although the terminology and phraseology they use more often than not suggests function. Among instructional sources—i.e., textbooks—I consulted beginning-level *Nachalo* (Lubensky et al. 2001, *Live from Russia* (Lekić, Davidson, and Gor 2008), *Golosa* (Robin, Evans-Romaine, and Shatalina 2012), *Troika* (Nummikoski 2012), and *Mezhdu nami* (deBenedette et al. 2016). The upper-level textbooks I consulted—i.e., *V puti* (Kagan, Miller, and Kudyma 2006) and *Panorama* (Rifkin, Dengub, and Nazarova 2017)—do not review conjunctions. I have summarized the beginning-level textbooks in appendix 1, which includes three older exemplars (i.e., Lunt 1968; Stilman and Harkins 1972; and Clark 1983) for comparison with more recent ones and in support of my view that contemporary (i.e., communicatively oriented) textbooks are no more enlightening than their predecessors were in the presentation of *u* and *a*. Appendix 1 also includes

Launer (1974), which, although not a conventional language textbook, is introductory in level. All of the exemplars—either directly via descriptive language or indirectly via translation (i.e., English equivalents)—associate *и* with equation or likeness in some capacity and *а* with contrast or difference. Thus, these exemplars provide no insight into the potential relevance of meaning or the peculiarity of I–M (i.e., its failure to permit *и*, thereby preventing the speaker from equating I and M as both engaged in activity, which results in the requirement of *а* regardless of the speaker’s communicative goal). These instructional sources, therefore, require no further attention.

Among consultative sources, I included Borrás and Christian (1971); Offord (1996); Rozental’, Golub, and Telenkova (2016); and Wade (2011), all of which may be considered representative. Of the four, Rozental’, Golub, and Telenkova (2016, 274–275) is the most detailed with respect to both the description and exemplification of *и* and *а*. The description is suggestive of function rather than meaning and begins with a simple division of conjunctions (i.e., *союзы*) into *сочинительные* (i.e., COORDINATING) and *подчинительные* (i.e., SUBORDINATING), with the former subcategorized into, among others, *соединительные* (i.e., UNITING [= EQUATING]) and *противительные* (i.e., CONTRASTING). Uniting (i.e., equating) conjunctions like *и* are characterized as expressing *отношения перечисления* ‘relationships of enumeration,’ and contrasting coordinators like *а* as expressing *отношения противопоставления, несоответствия, различия ...* ‘relationships of opposition, (of) the absence of correspondence, (of) difference.’ The illustrations of *а* require no comment because, functionally, they all involve contrast in some obvious sense. The illustrations of *и* are more varied. In general, they, too, involve function, in particular ENUMERATION in various manifestations (e.g., sequences, unordered lists, etc.). They do not, however, include obvious examples of equation like I+M, which is the function of *и* commonly illustrated in other sources, and it is possible that the authors view the equating function of *и* as inherent in enumeration, which is normally, like equation, a concatenation of similar items. They do include examples in which *и* introduces a clause of RESULT (e.g., [4] *Он уже уехал, и [поэтому] невозможно было с ним поговорить*_s ‘He had already left, so it was not possible to chat with him.’). This function of *и* often goes unmentioned but is noteworthy in demonstrating that *и* is

more than enumerative and equative in its function as a conjunction. It may be significant that Rozental', Golub, and Telenkova provide these characterizations in their discussion of morphology (2016, 176–282) but illustrate them in their discussion of syntax (2016, 284–339), implying, perhaps, that they recognize, or at least assume, the systemic relevance of meaning as well as function. Nevertheless, they often use *служить* 'serve (as)' for descriptive purposes seemingly without attention to its implicit reference to function. In any case, despite their relatively comprehensive presentation of *u* and *a*, they leave unexplained the ability of *a* to occur when contrast is NOT the intent of the speaker, as may be true in I–M. On the contrary, in mentioning *но* and *однако* in connection with *a*,⁵ they imply identity among the three with regard to the impartation of contrast although allowing for “additional shades of meaning.”

Borras and Christian (1971), Wade (2011), and Offord (1996) are less detailed in their comment on, and illustration of, *u* and *a*. Offord (1996, 374–375) relies heavily on translation but offers snippets of commentary suggestive of function (e.g., “*a* may also translate English *and*, when that conjunction has contrastive meaning [= functions to contrast]”). There is, however, nothing relevant to the peculiarity of I–M. Borras and Christian (1971, 270–272) and Wade (2011, 486), although very much the same in content as Offord (1996), are nevertheless significantly different in one detail: they both recognize the ability of *a* to occur when there is *no* contrast (i.e., when the speaker's communicative goal is *not* contrast)—in contexts that should be incompatible with *a* if we follow previous treatments, which consistently associate *a* with contrast. This is the situation presented by I–M for those speakers whose internalized grammars do not permit *u*: they can use *a* in it *without* intending to signal contrast. Wade makes this observation in the following statement labeling *a* as an ADVERSATIVE conjunction, but adding that it

links ideas which CONTRAST WITHOUT CONFLICTING ... [in this regard, it] introduces a positive statement via a preceding negative ... [and it] introduces parenthetical statements. (2011, 486; emphasis added)

⁵ A full treatment of coordinating conjunctions in Russian must include attention to contrastive *но* and *однако* in addition to *u* and *a* but cannot be profitably undertaken until the relationship between *u* and *a* has been clarified; see Wade (2011, 487) for informal comment on *но* and *однако*.

This observation, reminiscent of the comment made to me by the speaker who challenged my use of *u* in I–M, is important, but it still leaves unexplained the inability of *u* to conjoin simple sentences differing in both subject and predicate that the speaker wishes to equate (i.e., sentences expressing “compatible ideas,” to use Wade’s phraseology [2011, 485]) in response—for example, to *Что делают дети*_q). Borrás and Christian (1971, 270–275), too, although going no further than a list of functions in the section designated THE CONJUNCTIONS ‘*a*,’ ‘*u*,’ AND ‘*же*,’ nevertheless include an implicit recognition that the characterization of *a* as functionally contrastive or adversative is inadequate when they state:

[The conjunction] *a* in Russian is often merely an alternative for *u* (*and*) or *но* (*but*).

Although this statement, which may appear on its face to be self-contradictory in likening *a* to *u*, is not elaborated, it, like Wade’s statement regarding the use of *a* to signal contrast without conflict, is relevant to the analysis I will propose. The meaning of both statements, to which I will later return, is clear, and it is compatible with Vasilyeva’s view referenced previously that although *u* as a particle often, like *a* as a particle, retains weakened copulative function, it may, unlike *a*, take on additional function (e.g., emphasis) arguably derivative in origin of its function as a conjunction.

2.2 Previous formal treatments

Formal treatments often assume that *u* and *a*, although syntactic units (i.e., words), are essentially PRAGMATIC in nature and that they must therefore be defined functionally—i.e., be seen to have pragmatic function. Meaning is, accordingly, ignored even if it is mentioned; see, for example, Jasinskaja and Zeevat (2008, 65), who write in their abstract:

The functional space covered by the conjunctions *and* and *but* in English is divided between three conjunctions in Russian: *i*, *a*, and *но*. We analyze these markers as *topic management devices*, i.e., they impose different kinds of constraints on the discourse topics (questions under discussion) addressed by their conjuncts.

In their introduction, however, Jasinskaja and Zeevat refer to MEANINGS, albeit in quotes, leaving us uncertain as to the relevance and

role of meaning, which plays no obvious role in their treatment. We must therefore conclude that they assume there is no meaning as such (i.e., in the conventional sense) associated systemically with conjunctions, or, alternatively, that they fail to recognize the difference between such meaning and pragmatic function. Other formal treatments are similar in this regard.⁶ The pragmatic, i.e., “supra-syntactic” or discourse, concern of treatments like Jasinskaja and Zeevat (2008) virtually excludes attention to meaning, and therefore to the problem posed by I–M, which is a syntactic construction thus raising no discourse issues. Hence it is not surprising that we find no reference to I–M in these treatments and, as a result, no treatment of the ability of *a* to occur in noncontrastive contexts at the sentential level.

The formal treatment in Rudnitskaya and Uryson (2008), by contrast, is indisputably meaning based, although not avoiding references to function. The authors adopt a Praguian approach to grammatical meaning. This approach conceptualizes each systemically justified grammatical meaning as a CATEGORY C instantiated by a FEATURE F (e.g., NUMBER instantiated by [SINGULAR]).⁷ Features are BINARY, occurring as [+] or [–] and yielding OPPOSITIONS of the form F VERSUS NON-F (e.g., [+/-SINGULAR] yielding the opposition SINGULAR VERSUS NONSINGULAR). If a feature is [+], the forms it characterizes, termed MARKED, obligatorily signal F in ALL instances of their occurrence and can therefore occur ONLY in contexts compatible with that meaning. If, however, a feature is [–], the forms it characterizes, termed UNMARKED, although ordinarily signaling the polar opposite meaning, designated the HAUPTBEDEUTUNG (i.e., USUAL MEANING) of the [–] value, are not limited in their occurrence (e.g., [–SINGULAR] ordinarily signaling PLURAL, its Hauptbedeutung, but nevertheless compatible with singular contexts, thus in Russian verbs forms of the second person plural used to express politeness with reference to a singular addressee). The authors apply this approach to their corpus, which they describe as Russian frames with the structure P–Q, in which P and Q are conjoinable clauses and, in principle, compatible with *u* or *a*, depending on the relationship between them. The focus of their discussion is the relationship they

⁶ See Jasinskaja and Zeevat (2008), Rudnitskaya and Uryson (2008), and Uryson (2013) for representative bibliographies of formal treatments to date.

⁷ For the Praguian view of grammatical meaning, see Jakobson (1984b, 47). For a more extensive statement, see Vachek (1966, 84–85).

describe as EXPECTED OUTCOME—for example, (5) [P] *It started raining in the morning*, and [Q] *the children were not taken to the beach*, with Q here expressing the expected outcome that the children had to remain home due to inclement weather and requiring *u* in the Russian translation. The feature they propose to accommodate the occurrence of *u* and *a* in Russian frames of this type is [CONTRAEXPECTATION].⁸ In this analysis, the positive (i.e., marked) value signals UNEXPECTED OUTCOME and is instantiated by *a*, while the negative (i.e., unmarked) value usually signals—as its Hauptbedeutung, although the authors do not identify it as such—EXPECTED OUTCOME and is instantiated by *u*. This analysis correctly predicts *u* in the Russian version of (5) as a reflection of the expected outcome. However, it brings with it a significant difficulty: the claim that *a* is marked while *u* is unmarked, a position that is at odds with the statements of Wade (2011) as well as Borrás and Christian (1971) that *a* is, in some instances, virtually the equivalent of *u*, suggesting, in a meaning-based approach, that *a* has unmarked status. In addition, the authors do not accommodate in any obvious way the occurrence of *u* and *a* in other constructions, thus leaving I–M unaccommodated, although, unlike others, they do recognize it, if unwittingly, in their consideration of a second P–Q frame, which they correctly claim requires *a*:

(6) *Коля богатый а Ваня бедный*_s
 ‘Kolja is rich and/but Vanja is poor.’

Their recognition must be seen as unwitting because they identify sentences like (6), following the Russian tradition, as COMPARISONS, and they seem to view comparison as a phenomenon that, in its connotation of contrast, tolerates only *a*, thereby providing an explanation for the exclusion of *u* in this instance. Nevertheless, (6) and sentences like it meet the requirements of I–M—a compound sentence differing in both the subject and the predicate of its constituent simple sentences. They may therefore be considered a subtype of I–M in which the components express the opposite and, as a result, IRRECONCILABLE ends of a gradation and for that reason require *a*. In the instances of I–M that concern me,

⁸ This is my formulation of the feature, which I prefer to Rudnitskaya and Uryson’s (2008) somewhat unwieldy formulation: [CONTRARIETY-TO-EXPECTATION]. For justification of this negatively oriented feature, see Rudnitskaya and Uryson (2008, 2–3).

gradation, and therefore reconcilability, is not an issue; it is possible, in principle, to view Ivan and Maria as compatible with equation (i.e., as both involved in activity).

3. The argument for meaning-based treatment

We may assume that informal treatment of Russian coordinating conjunctions via translation and/or commentary referencing function, use, or occurrence, and ignoring the possibility of meaning, is not an acceptable approach if the goal is knowledge of them on their own terms (i.e., without filtering them through the distorting lens of another language, here English). With regard to formal treatment, the facts relating to I-M, heretofore uninvolved in treatments of *u* and *a*, argue strongly in favor of the systemic centrality of meaning rather than function, especially if we consider that both Borrás and Christian (1971) and Wade (2011) treat *a* as contrastive in function, although it may be used in contexts that are not contrastive if the speaker deems the contrast irrelevant or, in Wade's words, the contrast does not give rise to a conflict.

Vasilyeva's observation that *u*, even when instantiated as a particle, frequently retains an element of copulative function and, beyond that, adds function while *a* need not do either is compatible with Wade's (2011) statement. We must conclude that the function of *a* as a conjunction, however we understand it, is fundamentally different from that of *u* in both the literal sense (i.e., *u* and *a* do not have the same function) and in another less obvious one: *a*, unlike *u*, can be used even if the function normally associated with it is absent or mitigated (i.e., there is contrast, but not conflict, according to Wade [2011], or merely, according to Borrás and Christian [1971], as an alternative for *u*). This observation cannot be formally accommodated by the assumption that FUNCTION is the defining characteristic of *u* and *a*, but it is readily accommodated by the Praguian theory of grammatical meaning, adopted by Rudnitskaya and Uryson (2008) although without full consideration of the relevant data, resulting in an incorrect conclusion regarding markedness, and without attention to CATEGORY but only to FEATURE. If we accept the status of *u* and *a* as entities defined grammatically by a feature F instantiating a category C with their functions a derivative of that meaning, the analytic task becomes the identification of a category and an instantiating feature

resulting in *u* as marked (i.e., [+F]) and *a* as unmarked (i.e., [-F]). In the resulting system, it is the unmarked status of *a*, which we infer from the comments of Borrás and Christian (1971) and Wade (2011), that permits it to occur in I–M even if the speaker’s intent is not contrast but equation, because, for reasons I will discuss, marked *u*, although functioning to equate, is nevertheless incompatible with I–M.

With regard to the details of category, feature, and markedness, I believe that we already have a satisfactory answer in Jakobson’s (1984b) category of TAXIS, which, in serving as the grammatical basis for syntactic concatenation, accommodates CONJUNCTION as a part of speech, and which is instantiated, following Jakobson (1984b), by the feature [DEPENDENT] with marked [+DEPENDENT] realized, in the case of Russian coordinating conjunctions, by *u* and unmarked [-DEPENDENT] by *a*. Jakobson (1984b, 51) defined the positive value of [DEPENDENT] as “signaling a narrated event concomitant with another, principal narrated event” and thus coordinated with it, because his discussion focused on taxis in nonfinite verb forms—i.e., the PARTICIPLE and GERUND of Russian verbs, in which we have, in effect, the equivalent of a subordinate clause with relative tense, and therefore a dependency. However, there is no reason to think that this category and its instantiating feature as identified by Jakobson cannot be extended to other syntactic dependencies or to constructions that can be understood as such, whether or not there is a narrated event. This extension is possible if we assume that *u* as a reflection of its marked status with respect to dependency functions TO UNITE, OR COORDINATE, ONE SYNTACTIC ENTITY (i.e., a word or clause) WITH ANOTHER, USUALLY PRECEDING, SYNTACTIC ENTITY THAT IT IN SOME WELL-DEFINED WAY CONSUMMATES OR COMPLETES (e.g., by expressing a result, an expectation, or the final element of an enumeration) AND ON THE EXISTENCE OF WHICH IT IS THEREFORE DEPENDENT. Within this framework, *u*—as a reflection of its meaning [+DEPENDENT]—must therefore be compatible with at least three unifying functions associated with its occurrence: EQUATION, ENUMERATION, and RESULT. We can add a fourth function if we extend dependency to Rudnitskaya and Uryson’s (2008) frame P–Q as it relates to expectation, and we (1) view expectation as a function rather than a meaning, which is a defensible adjustment because expectation can be seen as a type of result, and (2) we replace [CONTRAEXPECTATION], which proceeds from *a* as marked, with [CONFIRMATION (of expectation)], which

proceeds from *и* as marked to accommodate the indisputable evidence in support of that relationship in markedness.

With this revision of Rudnitskaya and Uryson's treatment, there are four unifying functions—EQUATION, ENUMERATION, RESULT, and CONFIRMATION—that must be compatible with *и* as [+DEPENDENT]. The nature of the dependency is obvious for the functions of result and confirmation. In each, the syntactic unit that *и* precedes is a consequence or outcome of the syntactic unit preceding it, and in that sense is inextricably linked to, or dependent on, it. These dependencies can be designated CONTINGENCIES. As an example, we may take (7) *Я опаздываю на встречу, и (поэтому) я должен уйти*_s 'I'm late, and I (therefore—i.e., as a result) have to leave.' The dependency of contingency instantiated as a result and marked by *и* in this sentence is made clear by sentences like (8) *Я не опаздываю на встречу, а должен всё-таки уйти*_s 'I'm not late for the meeting, but I must nevertheless leave.' In which there is no dependency of contingency and *и* is therefore not possible, making *а* necessary although there is no contrast. The absence of contrast (i.e., of the usual function associated with the Hauptbedeutung of *а*) is unproblematic because *а* is unmarked, and although it normally occurs in its Hauptbedeutung of INDEPENDENT, thus signaling contrast or opposition, it need not occur in that capacity.

Enumeration and equation, by contrast, are not dependencies of contingency but rather may be designated dependencies of PARITY, in which the syntactic unit that *и* precedes AND the syntactic unit preceding it can be viewed as MUTUALLY OR RECIPROCALLY dependent. Thus, in a dependency of contingency between syntactic entity A and syntactic entity B with *и* preceding the latter, B is contingent on A, but A is not contingent on B. In a dependency of parity, by contrast, syntactic entities A and B with *и* preceding the latter are in a MUTUAL OR RECIPROCAL relationship of dependence (e.g., ENUMERATION), in which each element has the same status, and it is their parity that functions to bind them and produce an enumeration, or list. This interpretation also accommodates the function of EQUATION, and thus I+M as a representative of sentences with a shared constituent (e.g., *Иван поёт и Мария поёт*_s), in which *и* is marking a dependency of parity, in this case an equation, in the unshared constituent (i.e., Ivan and Maria are both singing). It should be noted that *и*, in effect, acts as a type of inflectional morpheme because it is normally

proclitic and therefore, like inflectional morphemes, not characterized by primary stress. Thus, *u* preceding a noun or other syntactic entity acts to inflect it for taxis as [+DEPENDENT] just as, for example, the bound morpheme *-e* in the past gerund of Russian inflects the verb in question for dependence on the main verb with regard to tense and subject.

Returning now to I-M, how are we to reconcile its peculiarity with [DEPENDENT] as the feature instantiating taxis? Why can I+M be understood as a dependency of parity while I-M cannot be understood as such (i.e., as signaling the speaker's desire to communicate that Ivan and Maria are the same in both being engaged in an activity), thus permitting *u* as does I+M, in which there is a shared predicate and *u* is the only possibility? We must infer that *u* has a proviso in addition to [+DEPENDENT], its feature content, rendering it incompatible with I-M although, in principle, it can be construed as a mutual dependency. Nevertheless, I-M cannot be seen as a dependency within the context of the grammar of Russian. That proviso can be formalized succinctly using the framework of Blühdorn (2008, citing Lang [1984, 66]), as follows:

The semantic *relata* of coordinative constructions must be tied up by a *common integrator*. This term refers to a superordinate conceptual category, under which both *relata* can be subsumed.

However, in the instance of Russian *u*, the integrator appears NOT to be a “superordinate conceptual category” but a syntactic constraint: A DEPENDENCY INSTANTIATED BY *u* IS POSSIBLE ONLY WITHIN THE CONFINES OF S_n (e.g., *Иван и Мария поют* ‘Ivan and Maria are singing.’; *Иван поёт и смотрит телевизор* ‘Ivan is singing and watching television.’). It may therefore transgress S_n —thus uniting S_n with S_{n+1} —IF AND ONLY IF S_n and S_{n+1} are syntactically combinable in a relationship of dependency, either of contingency (e.g., result; i.e., S_{n+1} is the result of S_n) or parity (e.g., equation; i.e., a constituent of S_n is identical to a constituent of S_{n+1} that can serve as the basis of a relationship of equation).

My hypothesis of a syntactic constraint on the occurrence of marked *u* and the concomitant implicit hypothesis that semantic considerations do not play a role in the ability of *u* to occur were supported by the results of a short, informal questionnaire, which I include as appendix 2, completed by seven native speakers (raised and educated in St. Petersburg) and one heritage speaker. The respondents were presented with six situations,

each comprising sentences meeting the requirements of I–M (i.e., absence of a shared constituent, as a subtype of which I included partially shared constituents—e.g., *читать книгу/читать газету* ‘read a book/read a newspaper’) and each including a prompt suggesting, either directly or indirectly, SAMENESS as a semantic concept available to serve as a basis for combining S_n and S_{n+1} via *и* in the absence of a shared constituent. A, B, C, and D were prompted externally with respect to S_n and S_{n+1} by a question suggesting sameness (i.e., a plural subject in A and B, *и ... и* in C, *оба* in D), while E and F were prompted internally by a matrix clause uniting S_n and S_{n+1} and therefore suggesting sameness with regard to the lexical content of the matrix (e.g., *я не знал* in E). For each item, respondents were asked to conjoin S_n and S_{n+1} either with *и* or *а*. The prompts did not, generally, result in the use of *и*, and the responses were therefore consistent with a formal rather than a semantic integrator.⁹

It follows that I+M (i.e., *Иван поёт ... Мария поёт_s*) is compatible with *и* because, although it comprises two sentences, there is a shared constituent (i.e., *поёт*) that can serve as the basis of a dependency of parity functioning to equate *Иван* and *Мария*, thus permitting reduction to S_n (i.e., *Иван и Мария поют_s*) at the discretion of the speaker, but it also follows that I–M (i.e., *Иван поёт ... Мария смотрит телевизор_s*) in the absence of a shared constituent is not compatible with *и*, at least for some if not most speakers, nor is reduction possible. The same constraint, it should be noted, regulates participles and gerunds in Russian. They *must* occur within the sentence of the syntactic entity on which they are dependent—i.e., no dependency is possible between a participle or gerund in one sentence and a syntactic entity in another unless the sentences share a constituent in terms of which they can be united. However, unmarked *а*, unlike marked *и* and nonfinite verb forms, is *not* constrained by S_n ,

⁹ The support for the relevance of syntax is direct in A, B, C, and D, all with a prompt suggesting semantic sameness but having no effect on the ability of *и* to occur in its equating function in the absence of a shared constituent. E and F, each with a matrix clause suggesting, or at least compatible, with sameness, seem at first to support a role for semantics (e.g., E1 and F1, for which *и* occurs in the absence of a shared constituent) but in fact are easily accommodated by the additional stipulation that a subordinating conjunction, in this instance *что*, can itself serve as the shared constituent required for the occurrence of *и* and I+M—i.e., subordinate clauses as instantiations of S_n and S_{n+1} can be united with *и* even in the absence of a shared constituent provided the relevant subordinating conjunction precedes BOTH of them, in effect serving as a substitute for a shared constituent internal to S_n and S_{n+1} (cf. in this regard F4, which includes a shared constituent and elicited *и* in the absence of *что* preceding S_{n+1}).

because it does not mark a dependency. This means that *a* is compatible with I–M and is in fact required by it in the inability of marked *u* to occur. Although the occurrence of *a* usually signals, functionally, contrast, which is reflective of its Hauptbedeutung, it can also, by virtue of its unmarked status, occur when the speaker’s communicative goal is not contrast but either a neutral statement or the equation of activities as such (i.e., Ivan and Maria are both engaged in an activity).

Those speakers who accept *u* in I–M presumably proceed from an internalized grammar in which the syntactic constraint on the occurrence of *u* apparently does *not* exist or is only weakly operative—i.e., the occurrence of *u* is governed exclusively by its marked meaning and the intent of the speaker to equate regardless of syntax. In this connection, we may speculate that if the answer to *Что делают дети*_q, for which we observed that *a* is at least normal if not obligatory, goes beyond two (e.g., [8] *Иван поёт, Мария смотрит телевизор ... Пётр убирает комнату*_s ‘Ivan is singing, Maria is watching television, and/but Peter is cleaning his room.’), then the preference for *u* as the conjunction between the penultimate and final items rises because the longer chain is more likely to be understood as an enumeration (i.e., a mutual dependency), at least in the view of the speaker, and *a* is therefore no longer required. If this is true, the acceptability to some speakers of *u* even with only a two-place answer may be the intrusion of the notion of enumeration. A two-member construction is not normally construed as such, but for some speakers, as an alternative in casual speech, it may have made the transition to a type of list (i.e., a MINIMAL enumeration).

4. Conclusion

To conclude, I will summarize my claims, following which I will offer brief comments on their relevance to pedagogy—i.e., the Russian language classroom.

4.1 Summary

Unlike those who have previously treated Russian *u* and *a* and who have not discussed their systemic basis but rather assumed it to be function, I have argued that they are defined systemically by grammatical meaning, with their respective functions a reflection of that meaning. This argument is based on a peculiarity of *a*—the requirement that it occur in I–M REGARDLESS

of the speaker's intent, whether equation or contrast—and further on the comments of Borrás and Christian (1971) and Wade (2011) that *a* can be used more neutrally and perhaps even as a virtual replacement for *u*. This peculiarity and the comments of Borrás and Christian and Wade find a straightforward explanation in the Praguian conception of grammatical meaning, which accommodates the facts without difficulty in terms of its primes of CATEGORY, (binary) FEATURE, MARKEDNESS, and HAUPTBEDEUTUNG. Rudnitskaya and Uryson (2008) had already invoked this framework but without attention to its details, specifically the relevant category, and had decided to assign unmarked value to *u* despite the indisputable evidence in favor of unmarked status for *a*.

With regard to category and feature, I argued that Jakobson's (1984b) category TAXIS instantiated by [DEPENDENT] accommodates the functions of *u* illustrated by Rozentál', Golub, and Telenkova (2016) and can be extended to Rudnitskaya and Uryson's treatment of P–Q with appropriate modification (i.e., analysis of confirmation as a result). It is relevant in this regard to note that [DEPENDENT] also accommodates conjunctions traditionally designated SUBORDINATING, thus providing the basis for an integrated understanding of CONJUNCTION as a part of speech and rendering it parallel to other parts of speech in having grammatical meaning as the systemic source of its functional properties. The compatibility of [DEPENDENT] with subordinating conjunctions as well as coordinating is not problematic. It means only that we must establish the additional oppositions that instantiate the difference (e.g., TEMPORAL VERSUS NONTEMPORAL to accommodate subordinating conjunctions with a reference to time). In this regard, I note that Jakobson (1984b, 198, 51–52) acknowledges the necessity of additional oppositions in hypothesizing SEQUENTIAL VERSUS NONSEQUENTIAL within [+DEPENDENT], and CONSEQUENTIAL VERSUS NONCONSEQUENTIAL in [+SEQUENTIAL].¹⁰

¹⁰ The additional oppositions suggested by Jakobson might accommodate contingency and parity (e.g., contingency as [+SEQUENTIAL]), which, in any case, do require formal accommodation in the analysis I am suggesting. More generally, there is the necessity, if my analysis proves to be justified with further investigation, of transition in the formal treatment of conjunctions from the familiar functionally based descriptive terminology as primary to terminology that is grammatically based, thus incorporating [DEPENDENT] instantiating taxis. The commonly occurring labels COORDINATING and SUBORDINATING with respect to conjunctions are themselves functionally based and may not bear a direct relationship to the feature designation(s) justified in a meaning-based treatment. While it is true that functions and associated descriptive terminology must be compatible with meaning and its terminology, there is no requirement that the relationship be direct.

4.2 Pedagogy

Two pedagogical issues emerge regarding the teaching of Russian *u* and *a*: the use of translation as opposed to explanation in matters of grammar, and the incorporation of grammatical explanation in situations like this one, in which everyday grammatical jargon will not suffice if more detailed coverage is the goal. With regard to the use of translation, the difficulty is obvious: the correlation between Russian and English coordinating conjunctions is inexact (i.e., *u* and *and* are not identical either in meaning or function, nor are *a* and *but*). However, the difficulty goes beyond the inadequacy of translation, requiring attention to the second issue, grammatical explanation, because the markedness relationship between English *and* and *but* is the reverse of that between Russian *u* and *a*. Regarding *and* and *but*, there can be no doubt that *but* is marked and thus unlike Russian *a*, to which it is normally, and mistakenly, likened. In terms of function, the available evidence suggests that *but* consistently signals contrast (i.e., it signals CONTRAST in all instances of its occurrence). If there is an unmarked member in the English opposition *and* versus *but*, it must therefore be *and*, and the data support this view. Without doubt, *and* can be used when there is contrast; e.g., *I expected to see him, and didn't*, in which *and* is unambiguously contrastive in the sense that the speaker's expectation was not met. Thus, English, structurally, appears to oppose *but*, which is functionally specified for CONTRAST,¹¹ to unspecified *and* usually signaling NONCONTRAST although it is compatible with contrast. It follows, if this is true, that the conjoining function of unmarked Russian *a* should be paralleled, if at all, by unspecified English *and*, and this appears to be so. In answering the English equivalent of *Что делают дети*_q (i.e., 'What are the children doing?'), therefore, speakers of English can impart contrast via specified *but* (e.g., *John is reading but Mary is not.*), but if the question is answered neutrally, it must be done with *and* (e.g., *John is reading and Mary is not.*), signaling non-contrast although contrast may be understood because *and* is unmarked, leaving open the connotation of contrast from context. The question of dependence does not arise in English as it does for the conjunction *u* in Russian because, unlike *u*, with which it is normally compared, English *and* is unspecified. Further, unspecified English *and*,

¹¹ To maintain the distinction between meaning and function, I use SPECIFIED and UNSPECIFIED instead of MARKED and UNMARKED in referring to function and therefore in referring to the coordinating conjunctions of English, which have yet to be examined for meaning, although I assume the category TAXIS with the feature [DEPENDENT] is justifiable for them.

like unmarked Russian *а*, can, by virtue of its unspecified status, function merely to conjoin, as a particle; e.g., *And what, pray tell, will you do today?* (cf. *А что вы будете делать сегодня* 'And what will you do today?'), in which Russian *а* is performing its copulative function as a particle with no hint of contrast.

With regard to the second issue, the question is *how* do we incorporate the relevant information, and *when*? I begin with two observations that I believe relevant, both of which I make anticipating the objection by some that the information in question is, in its complexity, not suitable for the language classroom:

- a. there is precedent for more sophisticated classroom presentation in morphology and grammar—i.e., in the presentation of both form and meaning; e.g., for form, Lekić, Davidson, and Gor (2008) and Rifkin, Dengub, and Nazarova (2017) in the presentation of conjugation; for meaning, Janda and Korba (2008) in the presentation of aspect;
- b. there is precedent for a tacit reference to markedness; e.g., in the presentation of verbs of motion, in which PEDAL verbs are unmarked and, although normally used for motion on foot, are also used in situations that are not walkable, such as when destinations within city limits are not realistically reachable without vehicular transportation.

There is no reason in principle, therefore, to avoid a more sophisticated, and thus more accurate, presentation of *и* and *а* in the classroom. With regard to specific suggestions for such a presentation, I offer the following for introduction *no earlier than the second year of instruction*:

- a. introduction and clarification of the difference between LEXICAL meaning and GRAMMATICAL meaning, the former being the type of meaning students encounter in glossaries and dictionaries, the latter being the type they more typically encounter in explanations of the usage of forms and which is often presented as informal OPPOSITIONS, with the structure A versus B relating to familiar grammatical concepts (e.g., FEMININE versus MASCULINE relating to GENDER, PERFECTIVE versus IMPERFECTIVE relating to ASPECT, VEHICULAR versus PEDAL relating to MOTION);

- b. reconceptualization of oppositions to incorporate MARKEDNESS and thus transition from the format A versus B (e.g., PERFECTIVE versus IMPERFECTIVE), with which students are already generally acquainted, to F versus NON-F (e.g., PERFECTIVE versus NONPERFECTIVE), accompanied by explanation of the significance of the reconceptualization (i.e., the status of NON-F as unmarked and as such, although normally signaling the polar opposite of F, not being required to do so);
- c. a reminder to students that they already encountered this reconceptualization, but only informally, when they studied such topics as the occurrence of pedal verbs of motion in contexts normally associated with vehicular transportation;
- d. reconceptualization of *u* versus *a* as conjunctions from A versus B to F versus NON-F, using the terminology of FUNCTION (i.e., transition from EQUATION/RESULT versus CONTRAST to EQUATION/RESULT versus NONEQUATION/RESULT) rather than that of MEANING because the concept of FUNCTION is more concrete and will therefore be more readily accessible to students than direct reference, at least initially, to meaning as [DEPENDENT];
- e. discussion of English coordinating conjunctions *and* and *but* to demonstrate that simple association with Russian *u* and *a* is insufficient if the goal of communicative competence is accorded due attention;
- f. introduction of the concept of CONSTRAINT relating to the marked member of an opposition and specifically to the view that the marked member of an opposition may be understood as a set of conditions that must be present for its use. If any part of the set is absent or violated (e.g., the integrator required by Russian *u* is absent), the unmarked member, which may be designated the DEFAULT for instructional purposes, will occur.

Following these preliminaries, and with prior review of topics such as verbs of motion as a point of reference to remind students that they have already encountered grammatical meaning as oppositions and the concept of markedness, a SPIRALED approach in the general sense of building on that which has preceded serves well, making the transition gradually from a conceptually less complicated situation to a conceptually more

complicated one. The final step for the instructor is EXERCISE PREPARATION in which at least some of the frames included permit EITHER *u* or *a* as a reflection of the communicative intent of the speaker. The Rozental', Golub, and Telenkova (2016) exemplars of *u* and *a* provide models for the creation of more contemporary—and nonliterary—exemplars by the instructor. Other types of exercises, with FUNCTION replacing MEANING to enhance student accessibility, may also be of value; e.g.,

- a. exercises distinguishing *and* from *but* in English to reinforce the concept of opposition in which one term is specified but the other is not and is therefore characterized by a USUAL function (i.e., the polar opposite of its partner) but not confined to it;
- b. exercises focusing on the function(s) of *u* and emphasizing its marked value but including a reference to the restriction on its occurrence—the syntactic constraint;
- c. exercises introducing *a* not as the polar opposite of *u*, although that function is usual, but as the default capable of occurring in conjunction with constraints on the marked member of the opposition;
- d. support via reading and the examination of attestations in authentic texts.

There is little doubt that the more sophisticated grammatical presentation required for a deeper understanding of Russian *u* and *a* demands special effort and dedication on the part of both instructors and students. The additional exertion, however, is not difficult to justify, especially in upper-level courses, in view of the stated goal of contemporary language instruction: COMMUNICATIVE COMPETENCE. Construed broadly, communicative competence is not restricted to oral communication on everyday topics with the additional communicative ability provided by specialized lexicon to discuss less-common topics. In principle, communicative competence should be extended as well, especially at the advanced levels of instruction, to scholarly and professional endeavors—i.e., endeavors that involve translation as well as oral communication and in which there is, as a result, a need for the grammatical precision required by close reading and accurate comprehension that more sophisticated grammatical presentation of topics—generally those topics in which Russian differs in its detail from that of the native language of the learner—provides.

Appendix A: Representative Treatments of Russian *u* and *a* in Beginning-Level Russian Language Textbooks

Table 1. Older exemplars

	<i>u</i>	<i>a</i>
LUNT 1968, 31–32	<i>and</i> ; joins words that are on the same level; represents equality or addition	no exact equivalent in English; sometimes translated as <i>and</i> and sometimes as <i>but</i> ; denotes a contrast
STILMAN AND HARKINS 1972, 47–48	connects several members of a sentence to which the statement made is equally applicable	separative; two different statements are made about two members of a sentence; merely different although not contrastive
CLARK 1983, 62	<i>and</i>	<i>but (rather)</i>
LAUNER 1974, 66–67	combines two elements into a unit; its mathematical analogue is a plus sign	exclusivity

Table 2. More recent exemplars

	<i>u</i>	<i>a</i>
LUBENSKY ET AL. 2001, 32	joining	joining and contrasting
LEKIĆ ET AL. 2008, 54	signals similarities	signals differences
ROBIN ET AL. 2012, 102–103	<i>and</i> ; two things are the same; there is no contrast	two contrasts; two different comments are made about two different topics
NUMMIKOSKI 2012, 59	<i>and</i> ; parallel	<i>and/but</i> ; slight contrast; often starts a question
DEBENEDETTE ET AL. 2016, 2.2	connects items; a + sign; connects nouns and phrases and clauses into a chain	no single English equivalent; introduces a phrase that contrasts with a previous one

Appendix B: The Russian Conjunctions *и* and *а* with a Semantic Integrator in Native Speaker Responses (8 respondents)

Table 3. External semantic integrator

SEMANTIC INTEGRATOR	SIMPLE SENTENCE 1	SIMPLE SENTENCE 2	<i>и</i>	<i>а</i>	<i>и/а</i>
(A) <i>Что делают дети?</i>	(1) <i>Иван читает книгу</i>	<i>Мария смотрит телевизор.</i>		7	1
	(2) <i>Иван читает книгу</i>	<i>Мария читает газету.</i>		7	1
(B) <i>Что они делают?</i>	(1) <i>Иван читает книгу</i>	<i>Мария смотрит телевизор.</i>		7	1
	(2) <i>Иван читает книгу</i>	<i>Мария читает газету.</i>		7	1
(C) <i>И он и она заняты?</i>	(1) <i>Да, Иван пишет письмо</i>	<i>Мария смотрит телевизор.</i>	1	7	
	(2) <i>Да, Иван пишет письмо</i>	<i>Мария пишет сочинение.</i>	2	6	
(D) <i>Они оба заняты?</i>	(1) <i>Да, Иван пишет письмо</i>	<i>Мария смотрит телевизор.</i>	1	6	1
	(2) <i>Да, Иван пишет письмо</i>	<i>Мария пишет сочинение</i>	2	6	

Table 4. Internal Semantic Integrator

SEMANTIC INTEGRATOR	SIMPLE SENTENCE 1	SIMPLE SENTENCE 2	<i>и</i>	<i>а</i>	<i>и/а</i>
(E) <i>Я не знал,</i>	(1) <i>что Иван пишет письмо</i>	<i>что Мария смотрит телевизор.</i>	8		
	(2) <i>что Иван пишет письмо</i>	<i>Мария смотрит телевизор.</i>		7	1
	(3) <i>что Иван читает газету</i>	<i>что Мария читает книгу.</i>	8		
	(4) <i>что Иван читает газету</i>	<i>Мария читает книгу.</i>	1	7	
(F) <i>Вы уверены,</i>	(1) <i>что Иван пишет письмо</i>	<i>что Мария смотрит телевизор?</i>	8		
	(2) <i>что Иван пишет письмо</i>	<i>Мария смотрит телевизор?</i>	1	6	1
	(3) <i>что Иван читает газету</i>	<i>что Мария читает книгу?</i>	8		
	(4) <i>что Иван читает книгу</i>	<i>Мария читает книгу?</i>	8		

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