Populism and the 2005 Iranian Presidential Election

John Gibbons
Populism and the 2005 Iranian Presidential Election

by John Gibbons

“We shall put the fruits of oil wealth on the ordinary person’s dinner table” (Ehsani 2006; Tait 2006).

Causes of Populist Electoral Victory

In 2005, former mayor of Tehran and political lightweight Mahmoud Ahmadinejad shocked the world with an unexpected victory in the Iranian presidential elections. Perhaps even more bizarre than his surprising second-place finish in the first round of voting was his complete domination of the second, run-off round against Akbar Rafsanjani, a former president of Iran. The news media was quick to label Ahmadinejad as a populist, and indeed his discourse did have comparatively strong populist elements (Hawkins 2010). Assuming Ahmadinejad is a populist, how did he come to power? Specifically, does his meteoric ascent to Iranian political glory fit the standard “recipe” for populist electoral victories?

Hawkins (2010) researched and empirically tested various causal theories of populism, and he found that aggregate country-level data disproved mass society and structuralist causal theories of populism but confirmed economic and corruption theories. Specifically, the “economic voting” causal theory posits that “populist movements are driven by repeatedly bad economic performance, especially when this performance is repeated across governments from prominent parties” (Hawkins 2010, 134). Hawkins found that this theory was partially supported by empirical data (2010, 136). The “corruption and democratic norms” causal theory, on the other hand conceives of populism as a normative response to crises of legitimacy resulting from widespread systematic violation of the rule that citizens can construe as corruption; it requires not only some policy failure, but also a backdrop of
political institutional failure that populist discourse can sensibly interpret as a violation of democratic norms (Hawkins 2010, 148). The correlation, Hawkins found, between both perceived corruption and actual corruption and the election of a populist executive was strong (2010, 151).

This, therefore, is the causal mechanism for populism: economic disappointment, combined with widespread corruption, can produce electoral victory for populists. I say *can produce* because Hawkins makes clear these are only necessary but not sufficient conditions for populism, and more research needs to be done on what exactly “ignites” these conditions with populism (2010, 160–65). Can we see these causal mechanisms in the case of the 2005 Iranian presidential elections? Did these causal mechanisms operate in one round of the election voting but not the other? If the election does fit the “recipe,” what was the additional factor that ignited the political kindling? I believe Ahmadinejad’s victory in the 2005 presidential election does, indeed, fit this pattern, and corruption and economic disappointment played a major role in the electoral results.

**Widespread Corruption as a Causal Factor**

There is little question that corruption infests Iranian government and society, both before the 2005 election and now. Iran is always represented poorly in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index: 2003–2005, Iran received (out of 10) 3.0, 2.9, and 2.9, placing it 78th, 87th, and 88th, respectively, out of the world’s countries (Transparency International). Similarly, the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators assigned Iran an average “Control of corruption” score of -0.48 (on a scale of -2.5, worst, to 2.5, best) for 1996–2005 (World Bank 2013). In a case study of Iran, Mashali (2012) found there is a statistically significant correlation between perceived corruption at the highest levels of government and actual corruption at lower levels. Corruption, then, has a pernicious tendency to spread from top to bottom. As a well-known Iranian has written, “If a king takes and carries away an apple of someone, his soldiers will root out the apple trees” (Saadi, quoted in Mashali 2012, 775).

It is also clear that Iranian voters were both aware and critical of the corruption plaguing their country. Indeed, corruption had become an integral part of the Iranian way of politics. The 2005 World Values Survey found that 45.6% of Iranians said they had “not very much” confidence in the government overall (Medrano, “V138”), 66.0% of Iranians said that they had “not very much” confidence in the press (Medrano, “V133”), 38.7% had “not very much” confidence in the police (Medrano, “V136”), and 50.1% had “not very much” confidence in the justice system (Medrano, “V137”).

It seems this is such a deeply entrenched part of Iranian politics that it has affected the Iranian citizenry’s perception of the world around them. The same survey found that, in response to the question, *Can most people be trusted or do you need...*
to be very careful in dealing with people? only 10.5% of Iranian believed most people could be trusted. The remainder—an enormous 89.4%—believed one must be very careful in dealing with people (Question V23). Additionally, a majority of Iranians believe most people would take advantage of them (Question V47). Indeed, a popular Iranian television series, viewed by “90 percent of people with access to a television,” portrays a small Iranian town riddled with corruption (Author unknown 2005). Why is the series so popular? “This comic soap opera may be set about 70 years ago in the little village of Barareh, but Iranian viewers see its corrupt councilors [and] rigged elections . . . as a microcosm of Iran today” (Author unknown 2005).

Nevertheless, although the Iranian people may accept that corruption infests the government, they overwhelmingly oppose it. 72.9% of Iranians believe it is never “justifiable for someone to accept a bribe in the course of their duties” (World Values Survey 2005, Question V201). Behzad Mashali (2012) describes the situation this way:

With respect to Iran, it can be said that corruption is a malady without a cure in this country because neither statesmen nor citizens are interested in fighting the menace. In other words, statesmen are interested (with big interest) in corruption and citizens lack the motivation or hope to battle against it (785). Ahmadinejad, then, becomes the glorious solution to Iran’s corruption problem. As a political “outsider,” Ahmadinejad could (and did) credibly run on a platform to fight corruption, “ascribing Iran’s economic malaise to corruption and bureaucratic incompetence” (Ehsani 2006). He drew attention to his middle-class income, his sparsely furnished house, and the lack of a swimming pool in his backyard (Vick 2005). In fact, virtually all descriptions of Ahmadinejad’s 2005 campaign activities mention his distinctive opposition to governmental corruption: “[his] campaign concentrated on lambasting those who had frittered away the country’s oil wealth” (Ganji 2005, 1). Ahmadinejad himself said the first-round results of the 2005 election were “the nation’s cry against a cross-section of the country’s managers” (Ganji 2005, 1).

This was especially true in the run-off round of voting, which pitted Ahmadinejad, alone, against Rafsanjani, who “is widely considered to be one of the most corrupt politicians in Iran” (Ganji 2005, 1). Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Mahjoob Zweiri write

Rafsanjani, an ally of the father of the Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini, is also a billionaire and a highly influential senior politician, and is apparently identified by the poorer classes in Iran with the current corruption plaguing Iranian society.

Ironically, his campaign seemed to make matters worse, for he virtually refused to go out and conduct a public campaign, calculating that people would choose him over the uncertainty represented by others.

His elitism only appeared to validate what had turned Iranians off from the start, reminding them of the dishonesty and cronyism that had been associated with
his presidency. In 2005 there was no real connection between Rafsanjani and the Iranian electorate; his lifestyle had no resemblance to that of an average Iranian (2007, 60).

The second round of the election thus became a cosmic struggle between good and evil: Ahmadinejad, who “presented himself to the public as ‘a conservative with clean hands’,” versus Rafsanjani, the literal embodiment of corruption (Ehteshami and Zweiri 2007, 60). With Ahmadinejad placing such an emphasis on corruption in campaign activities before both rounds of the election (and Rafsanjani making virtually no public appearances), surely corruption must have been at the forefront of Iranian voters’ minds when casting their ballots. “‘We will win the runoff,’ close aide [to Ahmadinejad] Nasser Qomian said. ‘Iranians have felt Ahmadinejad in their hearts. Iranians are fed up with Rafsanjani, who did little to improve the life of the poor,’ he added” (Naji 2008, 85).

Economic Disappointment as a Causal Factor

There was obviously much corruption throughout Iran at the time of the 2005 presidential election but was economic frustration as universally prevalent? The answer to the economic question is not as readily apparent as to the corruption question, since Iran’s economy does not seem to have struggled before the elections. In fact, Iran’s GDP per capita had been dramatically increasing since about 2000 (World Bank 2013). Hawkins (2008) notes that while most of the countries seem to fit the “economic decline” causal theory of populism, that “two of our strongest instances of populist discourse, Bolivia under Morales and Iran under Ahmadinejad, are not well explained by this indicator, and have relatively strong trends of [economic] growth in comparative context. . . . Iran’s long-term growth average is actually fairly strong” (135–36).

Economic aid for the poor was a central plank of Ahmadinejad’s campaign. One of his best-known campaign slogans was “We shall put the fruits of oil wealth on the ordinary person’s dinner table” (Ehsani 2006; Tait 2006). Samii (2006) observed that “Ahmadinejad’s campaign promise that Iran’s oil revenues would end up on Iranians’ tables . . . contributed greatly to his winning the 2005 presidential election.” Rieffer-Flanagan (2013) wrote that “Offering a populist message to improve the economic situation of the poor and the middle class was one of the key aspects of his victory” (93–94). Indeed, the Iranian people “voted for him [Ahmadinejad] because he promised to improve their economic situation, and he was one of the few politicians who were [sic] not perceived to be corrupt” (Rieffer-Flanagan 2013, 94). Yet the question remains, what needed to be improved economically?

As noted before, Iran’s GDP per capita had been improving significantly for several years by the 2005 presidential elections (World Bank, 2013). Shown below in Figure 1, Iranian incomes had, in fact, become modestly more equitable in the years before the elections (World Bank 2013). Salehi-Isfahani (2006) writes that
poverty [in Iran], having substantially declined in recent years, is quite low by international standards and in comparison to pre-revolution years. . . . Significantly, poverty sharply declined and inequality decreased somewhat in the five years leading up to the election. Increased welfare of the poor over the period is also evident in access to basic services, such as electricity and safe water, as well as in ownership of household appliances (“Abstract”).

The Iranian economy does, however, suffer from consistently high unemployment rates. According to the Statistical Centre of Iran (2013), in the years leading up to the election, the Iranian workforce consistently posted double-digit unemployment rates—14.2 percent in the worst year. To test the effect of unemployment on support for Ahmadinejad, I performed a regression on province-level unemployment rates (Statistical Centre of Iran 2013) against percentage of total votes by province cast for Ahmadinejad in both rounds of the presidential election (Princeton University 2013). If voters truly responded to Ahmadinejad’s economic populism, then Ahmadinejad’s percentage of the vote in each province should be positively correlated with unemployment rates. I found no correlation between votes for Ahmadinejad and unemployment rates in the first round of the elections, and actually found a statistically significant negative correlation between votes for Ahmadinejad and unemployment rates in the run-off round (see Figure 2). In other words, as unemployment increased, voters in the second round were less likely to vote for Ahmadinejad—the opposite of what was expected. Of course, in both round two regressions, even though the coefficients are statistically significant, the $R^2$ values are fairly low (0.108835 and 0.349819), which means there are other variables that explain the variance in the votes received by Ahmadinejad, which may reverse the direction of the relationship once accounted for in the regression models.

**FIGURE 1: Iranian Income Inequality**

![Income share held by groups](chart.png)

Based on this data (positive GDP growth and no positive statistical relationship between unemployment and support for Ahmadinejad), I reached the same puzzling question Hawkins (2008, 135–36) encountered in his research: Why is the Iranian populism case such an economic outlier? Why did the Iranian people “[vote] for him [Ahmadinejad] because he promised to improve their economic situation” (Reiffler-Flanagan 2013, 94) if there was so little to improve? If the results in this election fit Hawkin’s model, economic disappointment should be prevalent and an important factor in the outcome of the election. It is clear unemployment was a serious problem, but the data in my regressions suggest Ahmadinejad did not have higher support in provinces with higher unemployment. Where are the economic troubles that drove voters to populism in all but two of the countries examined by Hawkins (2010)? Djavad Salehi-Salehi-Isfahani posits a possible explanation to this paradox in his 2006 research entitled “Revolution and redistribution in Iran: poverty and inequality 25 years later”:

**FIGURE 2: Effect of 2005 Unemployment on Votes for Ahmadinejad**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Round 1 ($R^2 = 0.005627$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Variable</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005 unemployment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Round 2 ($R^2 = 0.108835$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Variable</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005 unemployment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FIGURE 3: Effect of Five-Year Average Unemployment on Votes for Ahmadinejad**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Round 1 ($R^2 = 0.035135$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Variable</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005 unemployment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Round 2 ($R^2 = 0.108835$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Variable</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005 unemployment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For Figures 2 and 3: * = significance at the $p \leq 0.10$ level, ** = significance at the $p \leq 0.05$ level, *** = significance at the $p \leq 0.01$ level.
The wide gap between the evidence presented . . . which shows improvement in the welfare of the poor, and popular sentiments in Iran, which indicate worsening poverty and inequality, raises important questions about the political economy of redistribution in Iran. I suggest that in the context of a distributive economy such as Iran’s in which wealth accumulation is seen to depend more on political access than individual productivity, more subjective feelings of envy and fairness may matter more than objective indicators of poverty and inequality (2006, “Abstract”).

In other words, Iranian voters supported Ahmadinejad not because of actual economic trouble, but because they felt impoverished, taken advantage of, and left out of the country’s economic gains. As far as vote choice, economic perceptions may certainly be potentially just as powerful as economic realities; if voters feel impoverished, that can influence their decision-making even if it is not necessarily based on the true condition of the economy.

Salehi-Isfahani’s theory explains empirical data on Iranian attitudes about the role of government in economics and economic conditions. The 2005 World Values Survey found that 59.7 percent of Iranians believe the country’s top priority should be ensuring “a high level of economic growth.” The same survey found that 68.9 percent of Iranian favor a greater degree of income equality, and 73.38 percent are favorable to the government “tak[ing] more responsibility to make sure people are provided for” (World Values Survey 2013). As far as current economic conditions, 58.9 percent of Iranians are dissatisfied to some degree with their household’s financial situation, 61.2 percent believe they are in the lower-middle or lower class, and 62.2 percent believe they are in the bottom 50 percent of the income distribution (World Values Survey 2013). It is clear Iranians in general feel economic frustration, and they believe the government is responsible to provide the answer.

Why does there exist such disconnect between economic perceptions and economic reality among Iranian voters? Salehi-Isfahani (2006) writes:

Most Iranians who express dissatisfaction with their economic system seem to have exaggerated ideas about the size of oil income and are suspicious of how it is distributed. Wild speculations about accumulations of wealth by Iranians inside and outside Iran is indicative of how little information exists about the size and the distribution of the oil rent in Iran. Not surprisingly, corruption rather than reliance on markets is the main reason why Iranians suspect the oil money has not found its way to their dinner table, to paraphrase Ahmadinejad’s effective election slogan. . . . Lack of transparency in the Iranian economy in general, and about how the oil rent is distributed in particular thus fuels envy and complicates politics precisely at times when the economy is posed for rapid growth (41).
Salehi-Isfahani’s explanation is supported by research on the Iranian economy and government. Popular overestimation of the size of a nation’s oil income is common in countries whose economies largely depend on oil rents (Hawkins 2013). It is not surprising that so “little information exists about the size and . . . distribution” of oil profits, since Freedom House has given Iran consistently poor scores in both “political rights” and “civil liberties” every year since 1998, the first year for which scores were available (Freedom House 2013). Even if media freedoms were more liberal in Iran, it would change public opinion little, because 71.1 percent of Iranians have little or no confidence in the press, and only 10.5 percent believe people can be trusted (World Values Survey 2013, Questions V23, V133). Additionally, as has already been discussed, corruption is rampant in Iranian government and society.

Because of the nature of the Iranian economy and the “[l]ack of transparency” in government, Iranians are prone to perceive economic trouble when there exists none in reality (Salehi-Isfahani 2006, 41). It seems, therefore, that Iran satisfies Hawkins’ (2010) “economic disappointment” criterion for a populist electoral victory. Even though there exists no actual serious economic troubles (in relative perspective), Iranians exhibit a great deal of economic frustration. Like corruption, economic disappointment is likely to have been at the forefront of voters’ minds, since Ahmadinejad made both the centerpieces of his presidential campaign.

“The Spark” to Ignite the Political Situation

Hawkins (2010) is clear that corruption and economic troubles are likely necessary but not sufficient causes of populist electoral victories (160–65). Essentially, corruption and economic woe create the circumstances in which the spark of populism may ignite a successful political movement. More research is needed in the “supply side” of populist movements (Hawkins 2010, 163–65), which Hawkins says could be linked to the availability of a charismatic leader (163–65). Is Ahmadinejad a personalistic leader of the caliber necessary to ignite the conditions for a populist victory? Obviously, Ahmadinejad connected with voters in a way that Rafsanjani could not. Samii (2006) writes that

Western journalists noted Ahmadinejad’s popularity with average Iranians when they assessed his standing a year after his election. The Wall Street Journal, for example, reported on June 22 [2006]: “The president’s popularity is soaring thanks to . . . his embrace of economic populism.” “Ordinary people marvel at how their president comes across as someone in touch, as populist candidate turned caring incumbent,” The Washington Post reported on June 3 [2006], adding that Ahmadinejad shows “a relentless preoccupation with health, housing, and, most of all, money problems.”

Ahmadinejad’s appeal was based on the way in which he portrayed himself as an average Iranian during the campaign (Vick 2005; Persian Mirror 2005; Rieffer-
Indeed, “[w]hile Rafsanjani courted the reform vote, the mayor of Tehran was selling himself as the people’s champion” (Naji 2008, 82). Vick (2005) further elaborated on the contrast between the presidential candidates:

In an election season that brought slick, Western-flavored campaigning to Iran, Ahmadinejad’s pitch stood out for its austerity. His campaign posters were printed in black and white. A half-hour television special dwelled on the modesty of his home, a traditional Iranian house furnished with only a chair at the desk he shared with his father. “Where’s the swimming pool?” the narrator asked. Several voters had described him as refreshingly authentic.

Additionally, Iranian society was already particularly susceptible to populist rhetoric because of the lingering legacy of the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Ayatollah Khomeini’s rhetoric leading up to the 1979 Revolution contained both populist and Islamist overtones (Curtis 2013; Salehi-Isfahani 2006, 2–3), and Ahmadinejad’s rhetoric likely brought brief glimpses of Khomeini’s inspiring revolutionary messages to a perhaps-nostalgic Iranian public. The lingering populist influence of the 1979 Revolution created a political environment even more favorable to a populist candidate than a country with just corruption and economic trouble would be, allowing an extraordinarily likeable populist candidate to capitalize on the convergence of corruption and economic frustration.

Election Fraud?

It may be, however, that Ahmadinejad was not elected legitimately. “It’s one thing for Tehranis to have an affinity for him,” noted an Iranian researcher. “But in Isfahan? Shiraz? Yazd? He was close to second before even the Tehran votes were counted” (Vick 2005). Accusations of election fraud regarding the first round of the election are common—even Rafsanjani and Karroubi protested Ahmadinejad’s surprising second-place finish (Ehsani 2006; Vick 2005; Ganji 2005; Naji 2008). Of course, given the particularly closed system of government in Iran, including low levels of political and civil liberties (Freedom House 2013), it is unlikely such allegations would be investigated fairly. It appears there will always be speculation about whether Ahmadinejad won the election unfairly, but (absent any conclusive evidence of electoral fraud) the populism-based explanation is the best explanation available to researchers.

Of course, the allegations, if true, would throw an interesting twist into any populist explanation of Ahmadinejad’s electoral victory. Ganji (2005), already skeptical of the legitimacy of the election, observes that “[d]espite President Ahadinezhad’s [sic] rhetoric and his populist platform, he is an embodiment of ‘the system’” (“Key points”). It would be ironic, indeed, if a candidate who campaigned so strongly against corruption, won the presidential contest through election fraud. It would be equally ironic for a populist candidate to win because “a conspiring elite
subverted the will of the people” in Ahmadinejad’s favor (Hawkins 2009, 1044). Nevertheless, because the evidence for election fraud is unlikely to ever be more than circumstantial, any examination of this election must inevitably leave open the possibility of fraudulent results.

Conclusions and Questions

Ahmadinejad’s surprise victory in the 2005 Iranian presidential elections offers a unique case study into the causes of populist electoral victory. I find the conditions that led to the populist win in Iran do follow the populist recipe described by Hawkins (2010). Corruption was widespread and common in Iran for years before the election, and although there was healthy economic growth at a national level, there still existed among the Iranian electorate a pervasive misconception of economic difficulty. Of course, the most important factor in voting decisions is not necessarily reality but rather voters’ perceptions of reality. Therefore, voters merely believing they are impoverished led to the same election results as if they were actually impoverished. The populist rhetoric of the 1979 Revolution made the Iranian electorate even more susceptible to populism than it otherwise would have been, which allowed the likeable populist candidate, Ahmadinejad, to seize the opportunity and win the presidential election.

Of course, more research is needed into the economic conditions of the Iranian people on the eve of the 2005 presidential election. Based on populism theory, we would expect more Iranians in provinces with higher unemployment would have voted for Ahmadinejad, but statistical analysis seems to show this is not true. Perhaps there are other variables not accounted for in the regressions—for example, are populist candidates more or less popular with young voters than with the average voter? It could be, for instance, that Ahmadinejad had little support among young Iranians, which would explain the regression results, since “[y]oung people ages 15–29 make up 35 percent of the population but account for 70 percent of the unemployed” (Salehi-Isfahani 2009). More research must also be done into the feelings of perceived economic troubles described in this research. What social class do these feelings affect most, and how intense are these feelings? Additionally, any leaks of hard evidence about 2005 election fraud would help to confirm or dispel speculations that make it difficult for this research to be as definitive as one would like.

Nine years later, the causes of Ahmadinejad’s victory are still immensely important for Iranian politics and society. Since 2005, Ahmadinejad won the 2009 election as an incumbent before a more moderate candidate won the presidency in 2013. Will similar economic and corruption troubles in the future allow conservatives to regain the reins of the Islamic Republic, or will the ripples of the Arab Spring lead to a more open and democratic Iranian society? Would a future conservative candidate have to employ Ahmadinejad-style populism to win, or would other campaign strategies work equally well or better? Only time will tell.
NOTE
1. For further discussion of these allegations, see Ganji (2005), Naji (2008), and Vick (2005).

REFERENCES


