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by Luke MacDonald

In January 2010, the United States Supreme Court voted to overturn portions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, commonly known as BCRA (*Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission* 2010). The court's ruling in *Citizens United*, along with the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals' ruling on *SpeechNow.org v. Federal Election Commission* (2010) just two months later, altered campaign finance laws concerning contribution limits. The *Citizens United* decision allowed unlimited corporation expenditures advocating for or against specific candidates (Magleby, Light, and Nemacheck 2011, 295), while the *SpeechNow.org* decision removed limits on individual contributions to advocacy groups (Eggen 2010). Though some dispute that these rulings are responsible for the landscape of today's campaign finance world (Bai 2012), there is no arguing that elections are financed differently than in the post–*Citizens United* world. Independent expenditure and electioneering communication spending by outside groups grew by more than 400 percent from the 2006 midterm elections to the 2010 midterms, where it consisted of over 22 percent of all non-party committee outside spending (MacColl 2011; Center for Responsive Politics 2011).

One key development stemming from the *Citizens United* and *SpeechNow.org* decisions is the Super PACs. PACs, or political action committees, have existed for decades after bursting onto the campaign finance scene when Watergate-inspired restrictions on contributions to congressional campaigns were imposed (Alexander 2001). Super PACs, a name coined by a reporter in July 2010, differ from traditional PACs by allowing unlimited outside contributions (Levinthal 2012). Super PACs spent over $63 million during the 2010 congressional election cycle and over $609 million on the 2012 presidential and congressional elections (Center for Responsive Politics 2012).

Although the 2012 federal elections were unprecedented in terms of money spent, this study investigates Super PAC spending on the 2010 midterms, which were fundamentally different from past elections due to the changes in campaign finance restrictions. The implications from the *Citizens United* and *SpeechNow.org* rulings that opened the door to Super PACs were unknown. Scholars, legal experts, and the media all described the new campaign finance world as uncertain (Tedford 2010; Weiss 2010).

Using roll call votes from the 111th Congress and FEC data on Super PAC donations during the 2010 election cycle, an attempt is made to show that the changes in campaign finance laws in early 2010 led to a change in voting behavior from members of the House of Representatives. A review of past literature investigating election finance and the link between congressional voting behavior and campaign contributions will follow. Then comes the theory, which is essentially that lawmakers altered their voting behavior after the Supreme Court rulings changed campaign finance regulations because of fears related to their upcoming reelection bid. The related assumptions and hypothesis follow. The methodology employed and subsequent findings as well as implications of this work are then presented in detail.

Campaign Finance Theory

Alexander's work provides invaluable historic analysis on Watergate-inspired reforms, publicly funded elections, and PAC contribution limits, though frequent legislative action has rendered his predictions inapplicable to modern federal elections (1989; Alexander and Haggerty 1984). In his 2008 work, Magleby highlights a significant increase in individual donations since BCRA was signed into law in 2002. He identifies numerous possible reasons for the trend, including the Internet, and predicts the upward trend in campaign spending will continue. Bonneau and Cann analyze state elections and find that imposing more stringent limitations on campaign spending disproportionately harms the challenger (2011), findings that imply the *Citizens United* and *SpeechNow.org* decisions should lead to a lower reelection rate for incumbents. Though the 2010 results support this, we should observe more than a few elections before drawing conclusions.

Numerous scholars have investigated the possible relationship between outside campaign contributions and the legislative voting behavior of members of Congress, with mixed results. Research by Brooks, Cameron, and Carter (1998), Lopez (2001), and Silberman and Durden (1976) uses a variety of methods to show evidence that outside monetary contributions to legislators' campaigns significantly influence their voting behavior. However, despite finding evidence that contributions matter in other areas, such as committee participation, Hall and Wayman (1990) find little evidence that campaign contributions directly influence floor votes. Chappell (1981 & 1982) reaches a similar conclusion over the course of multiple studies.

Other scholarly work focuses on the target and pattern of the campaign contributions. Brunell finds that although many groups donate funds to both democrats and republicans, PACs clearly favor one party over another by strategically giving funds to their favored party in competitive races and to the other party in mostly noncompetitive races (2005). Such research is significant in dealing with the theory that money follows money in elections. Esterling examines the relationship between contributions and committee members' attention to policy analysis and shows that outside groups are more likely to contribute to legislators with high capacity to develop policy. Esterling finds that these groups, rather than engage in vote-buying, try to gain influence with members of Congress who are more likely to introduce legislation (2007). Patterns from recent elections reinforce this observation as parties favored to win elections see a sharp increase in outside contributions at the very end of a campaign, evidence of interest groups trying to gain favor from influential legislators rather than influence the election's outcome (Zeleny and Pilhofer 2006).

While groups trying to acquire clout through financial contributions can seem unethical or unfair, it may not be a bad thing when considering the voters themselves. Much of the money Super PACs spend on elections goes toward advertising (Mathews 2012), and studies have shown show that political commercials actually increase public awareness on candidates and their issue stances (Patterson and McClure 1976; West 2001). Herbert Alexander, one of the first and most influential figures in campaign finance research, maintained throughout his career that American elections were under-financed rather than over-financed. Despite the high costs of elections, Alexander argued that money in elections would promote democratic principles (Alexander 1976, 15). However, a recent study indicates the benefit to the electorate may come at an expense, as Cotton concludes that contribution limits can encourage better policy (2012). Whichever side of the campaign contribution limit debate one personally falls on, the academic research indicates there are pros and cons that come with either option.

Theory

The voting behavior of members of Congress changed after the U.S. Supreme Court handed down their decision on *Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (2010)*. Changes brought on by this case and other significant decisions (like *SpeechNow.org v. Federal Election Commission, 2010*) fundamentally altered the campaign finance landscape in the U.S. as it applies to federal elections. Specifically, I looked only at the House of Representatives, as the low number of senators makes statistical comparisons difficult. The introduction of Super PACs into the federal election landscape had an immediate and profound influence on the actions of Congress. House members saw the changes as potential threats to their reelection chances, as corporations, unions, or even individuals with agendas could provide a large amount of money either in opposition to their campaign or in support of a challenger. The theory dictates that representatives facing challenges in the upcoming elections reacted to the rulings by significantly altering their voting behavior, due to one or both of these reasons: They feared significant financial contributions to their opponents and wanted to placate potentially hostile opposition groups, or they were more likely to try to please friendly groups they saw as wielding significantly more influence after the *Citizens United* and *SpeechNow.org* rulings. Therefore, representatives should show statistically significant differences in their voting behavior after the *Citizens United* decision (21 January 2010) when compared to their voting behavior before *Citizens United*. In coming to this conclusion, there are a number of relevant assumptions made. These assumptions, along with the basis and rationale on which they are made, are discussed below.

Assumptions

1) Members of Congress Are Single-Minded Seekers of Reelection

As Mayhew theorizes in his seminal work the *Electoral Connection*, the actions of members of Congress are always with one goal in mind: winning reelection (Mayhew 2004). Mayhew's theory states that we can predict members of Congress will make whatever choice increases their odds of winning reelection.

2) Money Matters in Congressional Elections

Incumbents win congressional elections at a much greater rate and raise considerably more money than challengers. Although there is disagreement over whether or not a causal relationship exists and in which direction it would move, there is a strong correlation between high campaign spending and electoral success. The Center for Responsive Politics concludes that even during competitive cycles and close, contested elections, the candidate who raises the most amount of money usually wins (Biersack 2012). This comes as no surprise to casual observers, who see the media paying plenty of attention to fund-raising and spending during every federal election cycle. As such, a prevalent belief that money and success are inseparably connected in congressional elections has developed among the general population. For example, a 2011 poll revealed that two-thirds of Americans feel elections are generally for sale to the candidate who raises the most money, with only 30 percent believing that elections are usually won on the basis of who is the best candidate (CNN 2011).

Despite the public's consensus that spending has great importance in federal elections, scholars often test the theory. Gerber uses Senate elections to show the significant influence campaign spending has on election outcomes (1998) and recent research by Hall shows that money significantly influences the outcomes of state legislative elections (2013). Stratmann utilizes region-adjusted advertising prices to show that campaign spending is effective for both incumbents and challengers in congressional elections (1995).

3) Super PACs Have Significant Amounts of Money to Spend on Congressional Elections

While this assumption is fairly self-explanatory, it is important to note that it forms an integral link between Assumption 1 and Assumption 4. Money is an important asset to a campaign and acts as not only as a significant indicator in predicting election outcomes but also as a deterrent to potential challengers. Super PACs spent over $60 million in the short time between the Supreme Court decision and the 2010 elections (Center for Responsive Politics 2010). Both the 2012 primaries and general election only serve to underscore Super PACs' willingness to spend large amounts of cash on elections (Center for Responsive Politics 2012).

4) Variance Exists both for Recipients of Super PAC Funds and for the Amounts They Receive

This is likely the most debatable of the assumptions. Many believe that money follows money when it comes to elections in Congress. If a democrat is challenging a moderate republican for a Senate seat in Pennsylvania and receives a sizable contribution, it follows that someone (the RNC, corporate interest groups, loyal donors in the area, etc.) will cancel out the initial donation with a similar donation of their own to keep the incumbent in office. The same logic says that similar events will occur regardless of who receives the first contribution or how much money it is, as long as the race is perceived close enough that such a donation could plausibly be the determining factor. However, this assumption contradicts that logic. Super PAC money is different from other types of donations. The lack of restraints on large sums of cash and the general newness and uncertainty of what patterns Super PAC financing (especially leading up to the 2010 election) would follow means that Super PACs do not necessarily resemble other forms of campaign financing or at least not yet (Tedford 2010; Weiss 2010). While in the future Super PACs may settle in to the same traditional practices and norms we see in traditional campaign financing, the uncertainty due to the novelty of Super PACs, combined with other important features of Super PACs, forms the basis for this assumption.

A related concern is that Super PACs simply inflate the costs of elections. This concern states that, for example, rather than $25,000 proving to be a significant sum in a House election, the influence of Super PACs will simply drive up costs, and the same advantage that $25,000 purchased will soon cost $250,000. This argument is satisfied with the same logic discussed above. In future elections, the existence of Super PACs may demonstrate no discernible difference in election results or voting behavior other than elevating total expenditures and inflating the cost of an election. However, because 2010 was the first election cycle involving Super PACs, and because the decision had been handed down so close to Election Day (less than ten months prior), Super PACs had not yet inflated campaign spending.

Additionally, legislators see Super PACs differently than observers do. Legislators are unlikely to look long-term and predict inflation. Instead, as Assumption 1 states, they are focused on the next election. Though Super PACs may eventually inflate costs, House representatives in 2010 are likely to treat them as threats to reelection.

5) Members of Congress Are Acting in Anticipation

The nature of the hypothesis testing means that one of two lines of reasoning must be followed: members of Congress are acting in anticipation of Super PACs or that they are reacting to Super PACs. The first would entail comparing roll call votes within the 111th Congress (during which the Supreme Court decided *Citizens United*) while the second would entail comparing roll call votes between the 111th Congress and the 112th Congress. This is a difficult choice to make, but applying Mayhew's theory (see Assumption 1) helps the decision. Mayhew's theory states that members of Congress will act in a way that gives them the best chance for reelection (Mayhew 2004). Thus, members of Congress learn to react to changes in the electoral and political environment in a way that will not harm their reelection chances. Legislators who are more likely to wait and observe the effects that Super PACs have on the next campaign and election before changing their behavior are less skilled politically and are less likely to exist in Congress, lacking the skills important to win an election in the first place.

Hypothesis

Legislators will vote differently on the same issue if he or she received a significant amount of Super PAC money. While all legislators do not vote perfectly consistent, these legislators will essentially vote different *differently* than others do. Their voting patterns will not be consistent with other legislators.

Why 2010?

The first federal elections held since the *Citizens United* decision saw $63 million in Super PAC spending (Center for Responsive Politics 2010). Although the $609 million Super PACs spent during the 2012 election dwarfs the 2010 total, much of the 2012 money went to the presidential race between Barack Obama and Mitt Romney (Center for Responsive Politics 2012). Until the 2014 midterms it is unknown just how much money Super PACs with years to organize and raise money will spend on federal elections lacking the excitement and publicity of a presidential race.

Although the 2010 midterms saw a comparatively low amount of Super PAC money, they are a valuable resource for a number of reasons. First, the newness of Super PACs and the uncertainty surrounding their viability and influence means their spending will vary across candidates. This directly addresses Assumption 4 (variance exists in Super PAC distribution of funds). A popular theory arguing against the significance of Super PACs states that in elections money follows money. Simply put, if an outside group contributes or spends $50,000 backing Representative A then opposing organizations will either notice or be pressed into action by the campaign, and a similar amount will be spent *opposing* Representative A. In terms of campaigning, these sums will effectively cancel each other out. Super PAC data from 2010, at least in terms of incumbents, shows this is not the case. Among the seventy-two members of the House in the 111th Congress, with Super PAC money spent either for or against them, only nineteen saw money spent both for and against them (Center for Responsive Politics 2010). Of these nineteen, one category often dominated the other. For every Bruce Braley ($59,032 spent in favor, $58,107 against), there are three or four Heath Shulers ($260 for, $252,378 against). More than half of the nineteen saw more than ten times the amount of money in either the "for" or "against" category as they did in the other.

Another reason the 2010 midterms are particularly valuable for studying Super PAC money is the variance seen in the individual amounts spent, an observation which also directly addresses Assumption 4 (variance exists in Super PAC distribution of funds). Among the sixty-nine representatives with Super PAC money spent in their favor, expenditures range from $260 in Super PAC spending on an individual candidate to over $400,000, with an average of $42,151 (Center for Responsive Politics 2010). Similarly, among the forty-one representatives with Super PAC money spent against them, expenditures range from $100 to over $500,000, with an average of $119,340. It is entirely possible that when Super PACs are more established money will indeed follow money and Super PAC spending will be offset. However, this was not the case in 2012. The data on Super PAC spending in the 2010 election on members of the House of Representatives follows Assumption 4. Future elections will show whether the cause happened to be the newness of and uncertainty surrounding Super PACs or whether it was simply the nature of the unlimited donations themselves.

One trend emerging from the 2010 Super PAC expenditures on representatives is the difference in spending on parties. There are ninety-one representatives with money spent either in support or against them. Of the ninety-one, only four are republicans (Center for Responsive Politics 2010). This disparity makes statistical comparisons by party difficult. Although the average total (Super PAC dollars for, minus Super PAC dollars against) among the ninety-one representatives with money spent in favor or against them is $24,382 opposing democrats and $34,190 supporting republicans, a comparison of means tests returns statistically insignificant results due to the low number of republican observations. The contrast in party spending is not shocking (conservative Super PAC spending more than doubled that of liberal Super PACs in 2010), especially considering the data only includes money spent on house incumbents, and the success of republican challengers in 2010. A large portion of the conservative Super PAC money went to GOP challengers. Simple statistical comparisons are also used to reinforce Assumption 4 (variance exists in Super PAC distribution of funds).

Methodology

In an attempt to highlight changes in legislator voting after the 21 January 2010 Supreme Court ruling on *Citizens United,* this study compares roll call votes before and after 21 January by House members from the 111th Congress. However, comparing the frequency of "yay" votes before 21 January, to the frequency of "yay" votes after, does not control for the overall ideology of the subjects of roll call votes. Bills and amendments proposed after 21 January could be more conservative in nature than those proposed before, and legislators would be expected to vote differently regardless of other factors. In order to compensate for this, I utilize anchor legislators to accurately assess the differences between voting behavior before and after 21 January. Anchor legislators should not be expected to change their voting patterns after changes in campaign finance law. Therefore, their roll call votes can serve as reliable baselines with which to compare other legislators. I selected four representatives whose votes can be reasonably expected to be unaffected by *Citizens United*: Todd Akin (R-MO), Jim McDermott (D-WA), Eric Cantor (R-VA), and Steny Hoyer (D-MA). Representatives Akin and McDermott have been among the most reliably conservative and liberal voters, respectively, within the House. Representatives Cantor and Hoyer were among their party leadership during the 111th Congress. With Cantor serving as the minority whip and Hoyer as the majority leader, both were essentially the second-ranked members of the House for their respective parties (as the speaker traditionally does not cast a vote, using the top-ranking representatives was not an option). All four representatives were comfortably reelected in 2010 and will serve as reliably steady baselines in comparisons of votes from before and after *Citizens United*.

The statistical significance of the differences between two samples was determined using paired-differences tests. Specifically, it showed the difference between legislators' frequency of voting with an anchor before 21 January and their frequency of voting with an anchor legislator after 21 January. The frequencies are numbers between 0 and 1, with 1 representing a voting record perfectly parallel to the anchor. For example, if the roll call votes of a particular legislator match those of Eric Cantor for 70 percent of roll call votes before 21 January and 50 percent after, the difference between Cantor and that legislator's votes would be .2 (.7 - .5 = .2). Paired-difference tests with four different groups of legislators were run using each anchor: the entire House, members of the anchor's party, those involved in 2010 elections where more than $25,000 of Super PAC money was spent, and those who failed in their 2010 reelection bid are each examined separately against each anchor. If the entire body of representatives shows significant differences in voting behavior when comparing pre- and post-21 January votes, that would be a notable finding. However, if significant differences were found only for those legislators who had a significant amount of Super PAC money spent in their election or only for those who lost their reelection bid, then evidence in support of the hypothesis would be even stronger.

Multiple regression is used to test the validity of paired-differences findings by controlling for other potential causes of a change in voting behavior. Four regression models are used, one for each anchor voter. The dependent variable in the multiple regression analysis is the difference between legislators' frequency of voting with an anchor before 21 January and their frequency of voting with an anchor legislator after 21 January. This is the same number tested for statistical significance in the paired-differences tests. If the number is large (meaning, if the legislator voted with the anchor significantly more or less after 21 January than before 21 January) then the hypothesis is supported. What if factors other than the Supreme Court rulings are driving the change in voting? If the change can be attributed to other variables, the ability to attribute findings showing a significant change in voting behavior to campaign finance reform is significantly decreased. The absolute value of this number is taken to measure the magnitude of change in voting ideology compared to the anchor rather than whether the legislator voted with more liberal or conservative tendencies after 21 January.

The four regressions (one for each anchor legislator) incorporate ideology and other control variables, such as ideological intensity and party. Controlling for ideology is vital when evaluating which factors best predict voting behavior. In Poole and Daniels' study on past congressional voting patterns, more than 80 percent of the variance in votes may be explained by the simple one-dimensional liberal-conservative spectrum (Poole and Daniels 1985). Ideology is measured by DW-NOMINATE scores. NOMINATE scores were developed by political scientists Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal and are commonly used within the discipline by political scientists to measure ideology. The scores are on a -1 to 1 (liberal to conservative) scale based on all roll call votes taken within a particular Congress. DW-NOMINATE (dynamic, weighted NOMINATE) scores allow for direct comparison between members of Congresses across time. Poole and Rosenthal's online database provided roll call votes and DW-NOMINATE scores for members of the 111th House of Representatives (Voteview 2013). Ideological intensity is measured by simply taking the absolute value of a legislator's DW-NOMINATE score.

The Super PAC variable, measuring total dollars spent by Super PACs for or against that individual member of Congress in the 2010 general election, is the variable of interest in the regressions. A statistically significant coefficient would support the hypothesis that changes in campaign finance regulations resulted in members of Congress changing their voting behavior is supported. Other variables in the regression showing significance do not necessarily prove the hypothesis wrong. However, combining statistically significant factors like legislator ideology and party with a non-significant Super PAC money variable would attribute the change in legislator voting behavior after 21 January to non-*Citizens United* factors.

Findings

Numerous paired-differences tests were used for each anchor, results of which may be found in Table 1 of the Appendix. Statistically significant differences exist with virtually every specification, showing that when using "safe" representatives as anchors, members of the House of Representatives in the 111th Congress voted significantly different after 21 January 2010 compared to before. However, comparisons show the differences are found not only among legislators who eventually had significant amounts of Super PAC money spent in their race or only among legislators who failed to win reelection in November 2010. For example, among House members who saw significant amounts of Super PAC money spent in their 2010 election, 52 percent voted with Todd Akin before 21 January and 64 percent after. This 12 percent difference is statistically significant at the 1 percent significance level and shows a clear difference in voting behavior after *Citizens United*. However, there is a 9 percent difference in voting among all members of the House, regardless of Super PAC money spent in the 2010 elections. This difference is also significant at the 1 percent level, showing the 21 January *Citizens United* ruling may not be entirely responsible for the change in voting patterns. Similar significant differences in voting behavior exist when using any of the four anchor legislators. Though promising, these findings are not validated by the regression results.

While significant differences exist between voting behavior before and after *Citizens United*, even when using the votes of anchor legislators as baselines, regression analysis attempts to validate these findings by controlling for ideology. The results of the regression models show the significant differences found in paired mean-comparison tests may be attributed to ideology. The variable of interest, Super PAC dollars spent in that legislator's 2010 election, is statistically insignificant in all four models. Super PAC dollars spent in 2010 is not a valid indicator of the magnitude of the change in voting patterns after 21 January. These results bode poorly for the hypothesis that the court rulings are to be held responsible for changes in voting behavior within the 111th Congress. The results of the ideology control variables also indicate that the paired-differences tests results may be attributed to other factors.

While Super PAC dollars were shown to be an insignificant factor in all four regression models, ideology-related controls were not. The coefficient on ideology shows statistical significance in three of the four models, meaning that it can be said with 95 percent confidence that ideology is a relevant predictor of the dependent variable, the difference in the frequency with which a legislator votes with an anchor legislator before and after the 21 January Supreme Court ruling. The only model that does show statistical significance on the ideology variable, which is the model with Jim McDermott as the anchor, shows political party as significant at the 1 percent level. Ideological intensity (measured by the absolute value of the ideological score) shows statistical significance in multiple models. A quadratic variable is used to control for a nonlinear relationship between the difference in voting after 21 January and ideological intensity, but only shows significance in one model. Legislators with extreme ideology scores see a larger change in voting behavior after 21 January when using a democrat as an anchor than when using a republican. Full details on all regression models may be found in Table 2 of the Appendix.

Limitations

Though the statistical findings are inconclusive, the theory that Super PACs influenced congressional voting behavior is not dead yet. Fundamental limitations in the analysis exist, potentially obstructing the observation of a significant relationship.

The Timeframe

Examining legislators' votes within just the 111th Congress is a good way to isolate factors such as party share, outside influences, and public opinion. In fact, examining votes within only the 111th Congress is necessary to test the portion of the theory that attributes uneven variance in Super PAC spending to the uncertainty and novelty of changes brought on by campaign finance reforms such as the *Citizens United* and *SpeechNow.org* rulings. However, the existence of a relationship between legislator voting and Super PAC money may show up if 2012 and, in the future, 2014 elections are included. Although the uncertainty of Super PACs would not exist in later elections at the same levels it did in 2010, Super PACs spent substantially more money in 2012 than in 2010 (Center for Responsive Politics 2012). More money could translate to more attention paid by legislators.

The Legislators

This research was limited to the House because of its higher number of legislators vying for reelection when compared to the Senate. However, the effects of Super PACs on legislators' voting behavior may be more substantial in the Senate than in the House, as Senate elections usually cost significantly more money than House elections (Center for Responsive Politics 2013). One senator among a hundred carries more weight than one representative among 435, so corporations, unions, and other Super PAC donors with big money often choose to focus on Senate races. Even though the problems concerning the low number of senators running for reelection since *Citizens United* still exist today, future data on the Senate may prove more fruitful in identifying links between Super PAC spending on congressional voting.

The Election

The timing of the *Citizens United* and *SpeechNow.org* decisions necessitates that 2010 is the election cycle examined for any campaign fallout. However, 2010 may not be considered a typical election year. Effects of the financial crisis and high unemployment rates were still in full-swing. One of the most controversial health care reforms in decades, the Affordable Care Act, was signed into law. The BP oil spill put new emphasis on environmental regulation. These domestic influences and the growing concern of the state of European banking and financial operations make it difficult to identify campaign finance reform as the top outside influence over Congress. Every election has pressing issues, but the lasting influence of these, especially the financial crisis, paints 2010 as an exceptional election and an especially difficult year to inspect analytically. This is also shown in the results of the 2010 midterms, when the republicans gained a whopping sixty-three seats to take control of the House.

What Does the Future hold?

While the hypothesis that 2010 campaign finance reform significantly changed congressional voting behavior in the House of Representatives is left unaccepted, the discussion is still valuable in today's considerations on the subject of campaign finance. Debate continues on whether or not the huge sums of money being contributed to political campaigns is necessarily a bad thing. Opponents believe large contributions are likely to lead to preferential treatment by lawmakers toward those who make the contributions and unfairly restrict access for those who do not. Supporters of rulings like *Citizens United* and *SpeechNow.org* will cite the principle of free speech and the belief that more money in elections leads to an increasingly informed and engaged public.

While the Supreme Court's rulings on recent cases involving campaign contributions means strict regulations and limitations are unlikely to take effect anytime soon in the U.S., citizens must still decide whether or not that is a good thing. Weighing the potential for entities to essentially purchase influence with elected officials versus the benefits of more accessible information to educate the public with is not an easy balance to strike. Without the aid of definitive research results, the deliberating will go on.

The repercussions of *Citizens United* and *SpeechNow.org* and their role in bringing Super PACs to the forefront of campaign spending will continue to play an important part in political science academics. Whether further work that tests the relationship between voting behavior before and after these landmark decisions will show significant relationships or not, the landscape of campaign finance has certainly changed.

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APPENDIX

TABLE 1: (Paired-Differences)

Todd Akin (R)	Obs.	Freq. matching Aiken before *Citizens United*	Freq. matching Aiken after *Citizens United*		99% Confidence Interval of Difference
Entire House	434	.64	.73	.09	.08, .1
Republicans	178	.89	.93	.04	.04, .05
Sig. Super PAC $	49	.52	.64	.12	.11, .13
2010 Losers	50	.52	.64	.12	.11, .13
Jim McDermott (D)	Obs.	Freq. matching McDermot before *Citizens United*	Freq. matching McDermot after *Citizens United*		99% Confidence Interval of Difference
Entire House	434	.76	.8	.04	.03, .04
Democrats	256	.94	.95	.004	.002, .007
Sig. Super PAC $	49	.89	.90	.01	-.002, .02
2010 Losers	50	.89	.89	.005	-.004, .01
Eric Cantor (R)	Obs.	Freq. matching Cantor before *Citizens United*	Freq. matching Cantor after *Citizens United*		99% Confidence Interval of Difference
Entire House	434	.66	.74	.08	.08, .09
Republicans	178	.9	.94	.04	.03, .04
Sig. Super PAC $	49	.54	.65	.13	.09, .13
2010 Losers	50	.54	.65	.11	.1, .12
Steny Hoyer (D)	Obs.	Freq. matching Hoyer before *Citizens United*	Freq. matching Hoyer after *Citizens United*		99% Confidence Interval of Difference
Entire House	434	.77	.81	.05	.04, .05
Democrats	256	.96	.96	.004	.001, .006
Sig. Super PAC $	49	.9	.92	.01	-.0002, .03

Of the three confidence intervals that include zero and do not show results at the 1 percent significance level, two show results at the 5 percent significance level. The only one that does not show a significant difference in voting before and after Citizens United with at least 95 percent confidence is the test looking at 2010 election losers with Jim McDermott as the anchor.

TABLE 2: (Multiple Regression)

	Regression 1	Regression 2	Regression 3	Regression 4
VARIABLES	Cantor	Akin	Hoyer	McDermott
Total Super PAC dollars (logged)	0.0004	0.0002	0.0004	0.0003
	(0.0006)	(0.0004)	(0.0003)	(0.0002)
Ideology	-0.406**	-0.300*	0.315*	0.212
	(0.149)	(0.125)	(0.143)	(0.137)
Party (1=R, 0=D)	0.008	0.022	-0.055**	-0.07**
	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Party x Ideology	0.679*	0.421	-0.360	-0.163
	(0.297)	(0.249)	(0.279)	(0.267)
Ideological Intensity	-0.469**	-0.364**	0.389*	0.277
	(0.158)	(0.134)	(0.168)	(0.165)
Ideological Intensity squared	0.0635	0.087*	-0.135	-0.125
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.075)	(0.077)
Constant	0.126**	0.135**	0.005	0.006
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Observations	434	434	434	434
R-squared	.75	.84	.87	.82

Heteroskedastic-robust standard errors in parentheses. ** indicates statistical significance at the 1 percent level, $p<0.01$, while * indicates statistical significance at the 5 percent level, $p<0.05$. The *Total Super PAC dollars* variable is the natural log of the total amount of Super PAC dollars spent in that candidate's general election, both for and against. *Ideology* is measured using DW-NOMINATE scores, while *Ideological Intensity* is the absolute value of this score.