The Role of Party Identification in a Nonpartisan Election: A Case Study in Provo, Utah

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Introduction

Every November we are urged to go to the polls and vote for a wide range of elected officials. The process in which we make our decision is largely influenced by party identification. This is a low-cost tool voters use as they cast their ballots, but when official party identification is removed, as it is in nonpartisan elections, how do voters make their choice?

Nonpartisan elections originated from the hope that by removing party organizations from elections, voters would make their decisions for the best candidate and not the party affiliation (Schaffner et al., 2001, 9). Gerald C. Wright notes that “more than three-fourths of municipal elections and about half of all U.S. elections use the nonpartisan ballot” (2008, 13). With the large number of nonpartisan elections, political scientists still know little about the process voters go through in deciding who to vote for in these types of elections. We argue that whether or not party identification is removed as a factor in a nonpartisan ballot election is largely dependent upon campaign effects; where candidates use mailers, signs, phone calls, and door-to-door contacts to frame and counter-frame one another in partisan terms.

The 2009 Provo City mayoral race, an area in which both the voters and the candidates heavily lean toward the Republican Party, provides an excellent setting to analyze the effectiveness and use of campaign effects to introduce party identification in nonpartisan elections. The two mayoral candidates were Steve Clark and John Curtis. Our hypothesis was that Clark, through campaign effects, would frame Curtis as a democrat, making the election partisan. As a result, Clark would win the election due to the high concentration of conservative voters. While our assumptions that
Clark would frame Curtis as a democrat held true, Curtis counteracted Clark’s efforts with his own campaign and win the election. These results are aligned with our thesis that in the absence of official party identification, candidates determine the impact of political identification through their campaign strategy.

**Literature Review**

Nonpartisan elections were created to limit party influence in politics. Schaffner et al. describe the progressive movement as the belief that by eliminating the influence of partisanship, elections would result in better outcomes, such as the election of government officials who are more attentive to local needs (2001, 8). Schaffner et al. go on to explain that the progressives’ conclusions rely on an informed electorate interested in obtaining the “common good” (Schaffner et al. 2001, 9).

This ideal of a caring, informed electorate is unrealistic. Research shows that rather than spending hours online, reading the newspaper, or engaging in political dialogue, voters look for low-cost cues to help them make their vote choice (Schaffner et al. 2001, 9; see also Lupia 1994; Popkins 1994). Essentially, this means even among those who actually vote on Election Day, the majority have not invested much time researching and seeking for the “common good.” Campbell et al. in the *American Voter*, explain that party identification is a significant low-cost tool that drives vote choice on Election Day (1960).

In the absence of official party identification, voting behavior may be significantly affected by other factors. In their study, Schaffner et al. conclude that without party identification, voters rely on the most readily available low-cost cue—incumbency. This augments the theory that voters do not take the time to search out the issues in order to make informed decisions. Schaffner et al. also suggest that in nonpartisan elections, “even a modestly effective campaign might have substantial effects where voters have few readily available pointers on who they should support” (2001, 26). Essentially, the theory that whoever wins the campaign contact battle will have a greater chance of winning seems correct. This could be said of any election, but it is more prevalent in nonpartisan elections where voters are more susceptible to campaign influence.

So far, the impact of removing party identification has been examined, and there is research suggesting party affiliation may still be influential in nonpartisan elections. Peverill Squire and Eric R.A.N. Smith explain that voters may not need the party officially identified on the ballot, because they “will pick up on partisan cues in the environment” and it is possible for voters to still “use partisan information to structure their voting decisions” (Peverill and Smith 1988, 177). This complements the theory of Schaffner et al. that campaign effects have greater potential to influence nonpartisan races. As a result, campaigns may turn nonpartisan elections partisan as they frame either or both candidates as being directly affiliated with a certain party.
Squire and Smith are not alone in their assumptions. Charles R. Adrian categorizes nonpartisan elections into one of four types. A type I election is when the candidate's party is easily identified and voters view the election in partisan terms (1959, 452). A type II election is where candidates are supported by a number of groups including parties; this type of election still contains the influence of the party but not as directly as in Type I elections due to the presence of other groups who are not associated with either party but are still politically active in the election (1959, 453). A type III election is characterized by the support of different interest groups for the candidates but very little support from political parties. Lastly, a type IV election is one where political parties are not important in campaigns (1959, 457). Adrian's article explains the party may play a role in nonpartisan elections in varying degrees ranging from very involved in Type I nonpartisan elections to not involved at all in Type IV nonpartisan elections.

In summary, the campaign is the largest determinant of election type. David A. Niven uses psychological research to explain how voters can be influenced. Voters are influenced depending on "the accessibility of the message" and "[thinking] themselves personally affected by the message" (Niven 2004, 871). Campaigns seek to influence vote choice; if they are successful in making their message "accessible" and salient, they can determine the level of partisanship in an election. This will depend on whether or not a candidate believes he or she has an advantage by attaching party identification to the nonpartisan election.

A Case Study: Provo, Utah

The 2009 Provo City mayoral race offered an ideal opportunity to understand how campaigns determine the effects of creating the illusion of partisanship in a nonpartisan election. Provo, Utah, is a distinctive place. The population is homogenous—especially among voters. The majority of residents are religiously active, politically conservative, and family oriented. In fact, more than 70 percent of the population identify themselves as republican (Appendix A, Table 1). While these demographics make it difficult to apply our findings to other populations, it allows us to isolate and analyze the role of partisan framing through campaign effects.

Both mayoral candidates, Steve Clark and John Curtis, have similar characteristics that reflect the population: they are both white, middle-aged males and members of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. While neither one of them was technically an incumbent, Steve Clark was serving as a State Representative. Therefore, we assumed any incumbent advantage would transfer to him. Previous to the mayoral election, John Curtis had unsuccessfully run for a State House and Senate seat. As a result of their backgrounds, both candidates had significant campaign experiences. Clark and Curtis were raised in the Provo area, have large families, and were executives of successful local companies.
The two main issues facing Provo voters were iProvo and zoning law issues. When we looked at the candidates' web sites, we could not find a clear distinction between their views on these issues. Therefore, we assumed the issues would play little role in the outcome of the election.

**Hypotheses**

The literature suggests that even in a nonpartisan election, party identification can play a significant role. Due to the Republican Party dominance in Provo, we believed that if a candidate had any history with the Democratic Party, it would be a disadvantage to them at the polls.

While prominent members of the Republican Party endorsed both candidates, Curtis previously had been both the vice-president and president of the Utah County Democratic Party. As a result, we predicted Clark's campaign would frame Curtis as a democrat to turn the election partisan. We hypothesized that Clark would win the race with the clear republican advantage in Provo.

**Data/Methodology**

We collected campaign literature from both campaigns. This was necessary to determine whether or not Clark used Curtis' political history against him. It was also important to see how Curtis' campaign would respond to any suggestion that he was not "republican enough" to be the Provo mayor. Because we were interested in partisan framing, the only mailers we analyzed in this study were those that identified Curtis as a democrat and his response to those attacks.

We used data from the Utah Colleges Exit Poll to evaluate the effectiveness of both campaigns. The exit poll has been in operation since 1982 and has consistently been the most accurate poll in Utah. On Election Day, there were pollsters at all nineteen voting locations. They selected voters at a random interval based on the projected turnout for their given location. On Election Day, 10,750 people voted, and over 2,500 participated in the exit poll. We used three questions from the survey: the first measured the party identification of each voter, the second measured the perceived party identification of the candidates, and the third, a count of the campaign contacts the voters received during the campaign (Appendix 3).

Perceived candidate party identification, which will be referred to as candidate party identification, was measured on a seven-point scale (Campbell et al., 1960). The lower a voter ranked the candidate on the scale, the stronger their perception that candidate is a democrat. The "other" and "don't know" categories were also included in the question. We dropped these responses from our data and only considered options one through seven. We subtracted the party identification of Clark from Curtis to use as the dependent variable in our regression model. This produced a scale ranging from negative six to positive six. This scale was treated as semi-continuous and was analyzed in an ordinary, least-squares regression measuring the effect of
campaign in determining the difference in candidate party identification. A negative coefficient indicates voters saw Curtis as being more republican than Clark, and a positive coefficient indicates voters saw Clark as more republican. A response of zero meant voters saw no difference between the candidate’s party identification (Appendix 2, Figure 1).

Campaign effects were measured via a question asking voters the ways they were contacted by each campaign. The question included nine ways the voters could have been contacted, including personal contact from the candidate or campaign, mailers, blogs, etc. (Appendix 3, Figure 3). The results of this question can be seen in Table 4 (Appendix 1). We used this data in several ways. First, we included in the model if they had received a letter from Clark or a letter from Curtis. We analyzed this separately from the others, because it was the only campaign effect used to shape candidate party identification. We did this to see if the letters would have a significant impact on candidate party identification. After totaling the contacts, we calculated the difference between Clark’s total campaign contacts and Curtis’ total campaign contacts (Appendix 2, Graph 2) to examine the distribution of campaign contacts for Clark and Curtis. This distribution, as demonstrated by the negative values on the x-axis, shows Curtis’ campaign contacted more individuals than Clark’s. Lastly, we included a model controlling whether a voter had received mail from both candidates (Appendix 1, Table 3). This table shows the majority of individuals who reported being contacted by a campaign received letters from both Curtis and Clark. This was calculated to see if the impact of letters on painting the partisanship of a candidate was statistically significant beyond the impact of receiving a letter on its own. If our thesis is correct, then campaign effects would be significant in determining how voters perceived candidate party identification. A null finding would be because voters saw no difference in party identification between Clark and Curtis and, thus, the election was in reality nonpartisan.

Results

John Curtis ultimately won the election but not without Steve Clark attempting to make the election about party affiliation. As was predicted, Clark’s campaign sent out mail explaining to voters that Curtis had previously run for State Senate as a democrat and later was both the president and vice-president of the Utah County Democratic Party (Appendix 4, Figure 1). Curtis then countered with his own mailer explaining why he had previously run as a democrat and why it was not important for the Provo mayoral election (Appendix 4, Figure 2).

Candidate party identification was measured by calculating the mean party identification score for each candidate. These results may be seen in Table 2 (Appendix 1). This table shows Clark had a higher mean score than Curtis. Essentially voters saw Clark as being more republican. While Clark was not able to persuade
voters that Curtis was a democrat, voters did see him as being less-republican than Clark, which suggests that Clark’s mailers did have an effect on the voters’ view of Curtis’ party identification. A comparison of means test was conducted to see if this difference in candidate party identification was significant. These results can be seen in Table 2 (Appendix 1). The test statistic was -10.41, which means the difference in party identification was significant at the 95 percent level.

Table 3 (Appendix A) shows the percentages of voters who were contacted by only Curtis, only Clark, both of them, or neither of them. This table shows both candidates contacted 53.8 percent of the voters combined. Overall though, Curtis contacted more voters than Clark. While Clark’s campaign was successful at painting Curtis to be less republican, it is plausible that Curtis won because he simply reached a higher number of voters than Clark.

The responses for campaign contacts were calculated and are seen in Table 4 (Appendix 1). This table contains the percentage of respondents who were contacted in each of the nine categories. These percentages were calculated out of the 929 voters who responded to the question. This table shows Curtis contacted a higher percentage of the voters than Clark in every category except for blogs. This is supported by the campaign expenditures of the candidates where Curtis spent about $90,000 and Clark only spent about $36,000 (Provo City web site). It follows that Curtis would contact more by spending more.

For those voters who received mail from both Clark and Curtis, Curtis limited the effectiveness of Clark’s efforts to frame the election in partisan terms. Figure 1 (Appendix 2), which is a frequency distribution of candidate party identification, substantiates this claim. This figure shows a plurality of voters did not see a difference between the party identification of Clark and Curtis. A response of no difference would be zero on the negative six to positive six party identification scale.

In order to explain which campaign contacts had the biggest effects on voter perceptions, we ran four different models utilizing various measurements of campaign effects on the dependent variable, difference in party identification. The results of these four models may be seen in Table 5 (Appendix 1).

The first model included whether or not the voter received a letter from Clark explaining Curtis’ ties with democrats and whether or not they received a letter from Curtis countering Clark’s claims. We recognize that we do not know which specific mailer(s) the individual voters received from either candidate, but we assume the voters who received mail most likely received multiple mailers, at least one of which framed Curtis as a democrat. This model reveals that those who received a letter from Curtis thought Curtis was more republican. Conversely, those who received a letter from Clark thought Clark was more republican. This is evidenced by the negative coefficient for a letter from Curtis and a positive coefficient for a letter from Clark. Additionally, both of these variables are significant at the 99 percent level. This pro-
vides evidence that Clark's campaign was successful at making Curtis appear less of a republican and that Curtis' campaign was successful at countering Clark's claims. It is important to note that the coefficient for the letter from Clark is larger than the coefficient for the letter from Curtis, because it suggests Clark's letter had a more substantive difference in affecting voters' perceptions of his party identification than Curtis' letter.

The second model consists of all nine campaign contact categories for each candidate, where the first model only looked at the letters sent by the candidates. The coefficients are still significant and still in the same direction, but they are smaller in magnitude than the coefficients in Model 1. When all campaign contacts are included in the model, the impact of each campaign on party identification decreases but is still significant. This could be because the content of the other campaign contacts did not concern party identification but could have been about other issues.

The third model contains the difference between the total campaign contacts of Clark and the total campaign contacts of Curtis. This variable's coefficient was significant and positive. This suggests that in total, Clark's campaign was better at influencing candidate party identification than that of Curtis, despite Curtis contacting a significantly larger percentage of voters.

The fourth model is the most complete, because it controls for the voters who received mail from both candidates (which was the largest percentage of voters). This makes it easy to analyze which campaign had greater impact on shaping voters' perception of the candidates' party identification. Including whether or not voters received mail from both candidates resulted in Curtis' coefficient becoming larger than Clark's. This is noteworthy, because in the first model excluding the "both mail" variable, the coefficient for the letter from Clark was larger than the letter for Curtis. This means ultimately the Curtis campaign successfully counteracted Clark's effort to turn the election partisan. Both letter coefficients for Clark and Curtis were still significant. Also, the "both mail" variable was not significant. This indicates voters who received letters from both candidates did not see a difference in their party identification. This explains why Curtis won in such a conservative city despite Clark's efforts to paint him as a democrat. The r-squared values for the first three models were very low, the highest being 0.10. The r-squared value for the fourth model was 0.57. This large increase provides evidence that the fourth model is the best at explaining the difference in party identification between Clark and Curtis.

Limitations

The nature of nonpartisan elections limits how much we can generalize. A major theme of this paper is that candidate campaigns can have a huge impact on the level of partisanship in these types of elections. Additionally, a candidate's personal and political history can have a huge impact on nonpartisan elections. Also, the presence
of divisive issues where differences in political ideology are noticeable could affect whether or not nonpartisan elections really are nonpartisan. While we are confident about the Provo City mayoral election, it would be impossible to use these results to predict other nonpartisan elections, because there is too much variation in unobservable characteristics between cities.

Our study of the Provo City election gave us the ability to see the power of campaign effects in nonpartisan elections given the homogenous demographics of both the candidates and the electorate. While the homogeneity worked to our advantage in this case study, it also makes it difficult to apply our findings to other, more heterogeneous cities. Individual voters will react differently to campaign effects. For example, republicans and democrats might react differently to campaign effects, the effect of which was immeasurable in Provo due to the small presence of democrats. Gender, race, socioeconomic status, and education might also affect the voters’ vulnerability to campaign effects. Further research on campaign effects in nonpartisan elections should be done in varying locations to take into account these considerations.

Conclusion

Both Clark and Curtis ran successful campaigns. Both influenced voters’ decisions on Election Day through campaign effects. Clark was successful at framing Curtis as a democrat, but Curtis was more successful at counteracting Clark’s attacks, and, thus, won the election. Curtis not only successfully counteracted his opponent’s attacks, he clearly won the campaign contact battle, which likely contributed to his election victory.

The study of campaign effects in nonpartisan elections should be an area of continued research. Our research has focused specifically on the effect campaigns have on shaping the voters’ view of party identification in a nonpartisan race. Nonpartisan elections were originally established to remove party identification from the candidates in order to focus the election on “who the best man for the job is” (Schaffner et. al 2001). As long as voters refuse to research each candidate and the issues, they will be easily swayed by low-cost cues typically sourcing from campaign efforts. Further research of the role party identification of candidates plays in nonpartisan elections would provide evidence for the continued use of nonpartisan elections or to their demise.

REFERENCES


Appendix 1

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Voter Party ID</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strong Democrat</td>
<td>4.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>7.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>14.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>24.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>13.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong Republican</td>
<td>34.55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Candidate Party ID Summary question.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Summary</th>
<th>Obs.</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>t-test</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party ID Curtis</td>
<td>618</td>
<td>4.67</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>-10.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party ID Clark</td>
<td>615</td>
<td>5.52</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Answers of 0 (no response), 8, 9 (prefer not to say, don’t know) were all dropped from the Party ID

Table 3: Who contacted Whom

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Curtis</th>
<th>No Contact</th>
<th>Contact</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No Contact</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6.</td>
<td>32</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>68</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>60.6</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4: Campaign Contacts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Campaign Affects</th>
<th>Clark</th>
<th>Curtis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personal Contact</td>
<td>21.42</td>
<td>25.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact by a Campaigner</td>
<td>23.57</td>
<td>30.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flyer at House</td>
<td>60.50</td>
<td>72.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mail</td>
<td>60.60</td>
<td>68.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church Friends/Activities</td>
<td>23.25</td>
<td>24.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Email</td>
<td>9.47</td>
<td>11.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blogs</td>
<td>10.33</td>
<td>8.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbor Contact</td>
<td>24.33</td>
<td>25.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News/Magazine</td>
<td>24.87</td>
<td>27.34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These values are given as percentages.

Table 5: OLS Models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regressor</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Curtis Letter</td>
<td>-0.72** (0.21)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.93** (0.27)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clark Letter</td>
<td>1.12** (0.19)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.72* (0.37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curtis Campaign Contacts</td>
<td>-0.18** (0.04)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clark Campaign Contacts</td>
<td>0.32** (0.04)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference in Candidate Campaign Contacts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.26** (0.03)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mail from Both Candidates</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.56 (0.43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>0.63** (0.16)</td>
<td>0.52** (0.15)</td>
<td>0.92** (0.08)</td>
<td>0.72** (0.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R^2</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors are given in parentheses under coefficients. Individual coefficients are statistically significant at the *5% level or **1% level.
Appendix 2

Graph 1

Difference in Candidate Party ID

Graph 2

Difference in Campaign
Appendix 3

**Figure 1: Voter Party Identification**

**[Q] Generally speaking, do you consider yourself to be a(n)**

1. Strong Democrat
2. Not so strong Democrat
3. Independent leaning Democrat
4. Independent
5. Independent leaning Republican
6. Not so strong Republican
7. Strong Republican
8. Other
9. Don’t know

**Figure 2: Candidate Party Identification**

**[O] On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is a strong Democrat and 7 is a strong Republican, where would you place each of the following people? Circle one number for each line.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strong Democrat</th>
<th>Independent</th>
<th>Strong Republican</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Governor Herbert</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Senator Bennett</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. John Curtis</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Steve Clark</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 3: Campaign Effects**

**[J] Candidates contact voters in many ways. Please mark the ways in which you have had contact with Steve Clark and John Curtis or their campaigns.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Steve Clark</th>
<th>John Curtis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Personal Contact</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Contact by a Campaigner</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Flyer at House</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Mail</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Church Friends/Activities</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Email</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. Blogs</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h. Neighbor Contact</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. News/Magazine</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 4

**Figure 1: Clark letter/Front Side**

**IF CONSISTENCY IS IMPORTANT TO YOU, REVIEW THE HARD FACTS:**

- **FACT** John Curtis: "I grew up a Republican in Salt Lake City."
- **FACT** In 2000, John Curtis switched to the Democratic Party to run for State Senate as a Democrat, and lost.
- **FACT** John Curtis then served as Utah County Democrat Party Vice Chair.
- **FACT** Next, John Curtis served as Utah County Democrat Party Chair.
- **FACT** In 2007, when a Republican state legislator retired, John Curtis switched parties again to campaign for the open seat as a Republican, and was not elected.

**FACT** Steve Clark has represented Provo for 9 years as a Republican in the Utah State Legislature.

**FACT** Steve Clark served for 7 years on the Provo City Council as an advocate for conservative principles and values.

**FACT** Since 1999, Steve Clark has owned Clark Mechanical Contractors, a successful Provo business, known for fairness, quality work and fiscal responsibility.

"My conservative values are part of who I am. I don't change them year by year depending on the situation I'm facing. My principles guided me for seven years as I served on the Provo City Council, and during the nine years I've represented Provo as a Republican in the State Legislature. They'll continue to guide me as Provo's mayor." — STEVE CLARK

**CONSISTENT VALUES & PROVEN LEADERSHIP**

VOTE STEVE CLARK NOVEMBER 28th!

---

**Back Side**

**Facts are stubborn things.** — Ronald Reagan

> BEFORE YOU VOTE FOR PROVO MAYOR THIS YEAR, REVIEW THE FACTS

Paid for by the Committee to elect Steve Clark
Hedvick & Krell Advertising
Provo, UT 84609

For more information about Steve and the issues facing Provo, visit www.StephenDClark.com
Dear Concerned Citizens,

From the outset of this campaign I have been committed to focusing on the issues and being positive in my approach. This campaign is about principles not politics. No office is worth holding if you have to step on others to get there. For most of my campaign I have taken the false accusations about me quietly while I focused on the issues. However, this last attack by my opponent requires clarification and that is the purpose of this letter.

As I have often discussed, I have had significant involvement in both major political parties.

Almost a decade ago I became concerned that we lived in an area where elected officials were based solely on their party affiliation or were running unopposed. As a result, there appeared to be a lack of checks and balances which was not healthy and removed accountability from the process.

The verdict is still out on whether it was the right way to deal with the problems but I knew I had to try. I decided to work with the Democratic Party to build a platform that better represented Utah County values with issues like personal responsibility, limited government, and protection of the unborn as well as other conservative values. The goal was to give the voters a choice. Under this platform I ran for the State Senate. Many find it note worthy that my Republican opponent in that race has now endorsed me for mayor.

Ultimately the national issues of the Democratic Party were too uncomfortable for me and like many of you I listed myself as unaffiliated. Several years later I found myself once again a Republican running for Jeff Alexander’s open seat at the persuasion of many good Republicans. Thanks to the informed Republican delegates who knew my history I received the most votes of the ten candidates running. However, the State Party Chair chose another candidate who has now also endorsed me for mayor.

I am currently a delegate in the Republican Party, a member of the State Ronald Reagan club, a contributor to the local Republican Party and a Mitt Romney Honorary Campaign Trustee. My run for mayor is endorsed by the former Republican House Majority Leader, two former Republican US Congressmen, all three Republican County Commissioners, the Republican County Sheriff, current and past Utah County Republican Party Leaders and four of our City’s Republican State Senators and Representatives (colleagues of my opponent).

While some have not understood my involvement none have questioned my devotion to strong conservative principles that have made this country great. I will always place principles above party and make no excuses for that.

Sincerely,

John Curtis

P.S. Ironically Ronald Reagan, which my opponent chose to use in his attack, was once a Democrat as well.

Paid for by: John Curtis for Mayor. 443 N University Ave, Provo, UT 84601
There he goes again...

—Ronald Reagan

> MY OPPONENT IS TRYING TO DEFINE ME.
YOU BE THE JUDGE