10-1-1990

Matthew Melko, *Peace in Our Time*.

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(p. 7). By ‘spiritual self’ Roland means “an inner spiritual reality . . . usually expressed in India through a complex structure of gods and goddesses as well as through ritual and meditation and is deeply engraved in the preconscious of all Indians . . .” (p. 9). But in Japan, Roland feels that “the avenues toward realization of the spiritual self are different, tending toward a more aesthetic mode such as the tea ceremony, flower arranging . . . and communion with nature” (p. 9).

It is the individualized self which Roland views as “the predominant inner psychological organization of Americans” (p. 8). The individual self seems to be the mischievous source of the identity problem in Asians because it functions as the destabilizing, seductive and even villainous force that ultimately undermines the collective harmony and equilibrium of the familial self, compelling many an Indian and Japanese person to seek psychoanalytic help. The characteristics of the individualized self that are most damaging to the Asian immigrant are I-ness, narcissistic structures of self-regard, and ego-ideal saturated with competitive individualism and self-actualization and “modes of cognition and ego-functioning that are strongly oriented towards rationalism, self-reflection, efficiency, mobility and adaptability to extra-familial relationships” (pp. 7-8). Here, then, in the struggle between the security of the human family, the fulfillment of the human spirit on the one hand, and the irresistible appeal of individual freedom on the other, lies the source for the pain and suffering of many Asians trapped rather than liberated by the acculturation process.

David Kopf

A CIVILIZATIONAL GENERAL PEACE?


Matthew Melko predicts peace in our time (at least in Europe) on the basis of the rhythms of modern European history, which began in 1485 with some 13 decades of relative peace, followed by the 30 Years’ War. Then some 14 decades of peace, followed by three decades of the World Wars. Now some four decades of peace so far. According to this pattern, some 60-100 more years of peace might be expected in the Western World, including North America, Australia, and New Zealand. Maybe Russia and the Far East. Melko calls the peaceful decades “normal periods” and the decades of war “crisis periods.” His prediction assumes that the patterns of the past will be repeated in the future (p. 169).

Melko establishes the rhythms of modern European history (since 1740) primarily on the basis of Bouthoul & Carrere’s fatality estimates, which the author was converted into fatalities per year and annual fatalities per 100,000 population (p. 56). Both measures show many more fatalities in crisis periods than in normal periods, leaving no doubt about the difference between these two kinds of historical period.

Why the current remission of violence in the West? Melko wonders. He
considers nuclear deterrence, but dismisses it: “The bomb does not preserve the peace; the peace deters the use of the bomb” (p. 38). But, what caused the peace? “It had simply become evident that the peace of Europe was a product of political rather than military factors” (p. 75), and “All in all there are some good reasons for anticipating a continuity in political structure for the remainder of our time” (p. 89).

Melko spells out in some detail the characteristics of “our time” (remembering that “our time” is actually a space-time limited to postwar Europe et al), which presumably make some contribution toward peace in “our time.” The relational outlook is emphasized, which looks at everything in relation to everything else, and especially in the context of a larger system. There has been a vast revolution in transportation and communication, and population explosion. Organizational committees have superseded individual entrepreneurs. Social institutions tend to be conservative. Charismatic leaders are out, and “the profit motive seems certain to play a subordinate role” (p. 152). We are getting older, and the baby boom will make more of us older soon. We are corrupt as usual, but no more immoral than usual. We are relatively free in Melko’s sense of “an awareness of the possibilities of one’s own situation” (p. 159). But many value equality more than freedom. In any event, the more freedom we have, the less freedom we have, in the sense that free choices limit further choices: “Freedom, therefore, is limited by the exercise of freedom” (p. 160). In which case, the best way to be free is not to exercise freedom. In any event, “in the freest of all situations, you have no political choice” (p. 161). Originality is a handicap and is in no great demand. All of these characteristics add up to making “our time” a very “normal” time indeed, which is what makes it relatively peaceful. A “normal time” seems to be a time when enough people are so satisfied with the status quo, that there is no crisis to impel anyone to go to war.

Problems remain, to be sure: “the nuclear dilemma and the energy crisis . . . inequality and the waning prospects for world development . . . the possibility that peace itself can be a cause of war” (p. 166), and the possibility that the West may really be declining, as some have predicted since the end of the first world war, in which case there may be nothing that we can do about any of these other problems.

Since larger systems of the past have always been brought into being by conquest, the possibility of a world government peacefully achieved is unlikely. So, where do we look for our salvation?

Although Melko sees small chance of a nuclear war in the short run (“mushroom clouds are simply not on the horizon,” p. 172), he is concerned that a small chance in the short run can become a larger chance in the long run: “if there is even an average of 1% chance of nuclear war in a given year, over a 64-year period there would be almost an even chance of a nuclear war” (p. 174). I think that the author has slipped on a statistical fallacy at this point (and, of course, he thinks that I have done the same). As I understand probability theory, if there is a 1% chance of nuclear war in a given year, and if this chance is significantly different from zero, then we could have 3.65 days of nuclear war in any
given year and, in 64 years, we could have 0.64 years of nuclear war. The amount of time would increase, but the proportion of time would remain constant. However, since we don't have a clue as to the overall chance of a nuclear war, both of us have slipped on a fallacy of misplaced statistics. So far as probabilities are based on the relative frequency of past events (or logical inferences based on the number of sides on a coin, the number of sides on a die, or the number of cards in a deck, none of which seem to apply to wars, nuclear or otherwise), the most we can say about nuclear wars would have to be based on the fact that the USA dropped two atom bombs (10-20 thousand tons of TNT) on two Japanese cities, toward the end of the world's biggest and deadliest war ever, 45 years ago when they first became available. The chances are that the USA (or a nation like it) might drop two such atom bombs under similar conditions once every 45 years except, of course, that the condition of their first becoming available cannot be replicated. Next year the chances will drop to one in every 46 years, if the same conditions ever prevail, which they cannot. We can say nothing about any other country, because we have no experience of any other country dropping such bombs under any conditions except for testing purposes.

When it comes to hydrogen bombs (10-20 million tons of TNT, or more, which is a kettle of fish of a much higher magnitude), we have no experience of any country at all dropping such bombs under any conditions except for testing purposes. Consequently, we can make no statistical inference concerning the chances of their doing so in the future since we have no information concerning their doing so in the past. Or, we can infer that, since no hydrogen bomb has been dropped in almost 40 years, the chance of any being dropped is zero—so far. That's like the man who fell off the top of the Empire State Building: When he reached the forty-fourth floor, he said, "So far, so good!" That's all we can infer on the basis of past experience. After one has been dropped, then we can change our predictions, if any one is left to make the necessary calculations.

We can have our subjective feelings, of course. During the Cuban missile crisis, I felt that the chances of a nuclear war were very high indeed, but my feelings had nothing to do with statistical probability estimates. They were based on my fears, and not on any relatively frequencies of such events in the past, nor on any logical necessities imposed upon the world by the rigid structure of a coin, a die, or a deck of cards.

In any event, if war and peace are determined by the normality or crises of space-times, what can governments do in our space-time? They can save some money by reducing military expenditures, but keep their formulas in a safe place for the next crisis period, which is bound to come according to this theory: "This normal period in which we live will not last forever" (p. 27), but it should continue "at least until the middle of the twenty-first century" (p. 207), at which time "It is difficult . . . to conceive of any social action that can resolve the nuclear dilemma in the next crisis period" (p. 209). This is a sad scenario indeed. Melko is optimistic in the
short run, but quite pessimistic in the long run. Peace now, but the fire next time.

If there is little or nothing that governments can do, except to adjust to the rhythms of modern European history, what is the role of the activists? First and foremost, they should remember that they are in the minority and, therefore, they count for little in normal times, which satisfy the overwhelming majority of us all too well. They should join the mainstream and enter the political process.

However, if Melko’s theory is wrong, “it doesn’t make much difference. Nuclear war would come, and most people would be killed, whether or not they had prepared for it” (p. 208). This is a theory that is hard to beat. You cannot lose whether it is right or wrong. If it is right, nuclear war comes later; if it is wrong, nuclear war comes sooner. Sooner or later, the theory predicts, there will be a nuclear war. How can you lose with such a theory? or, rather, how can you win?

Finally, what becomes of peace researchers like the author himself, who has pioneered the emphasis on “peace” in peace research? What can be learned and taught except the rhythms of modern European history? And what would be the use of learning and teaching them, since whether they exist or not makes little difference either way? Nuclear war is predicted whether these past rhythms continue in the future or not. What’s to learn or teach, except how to prepare for the apocalypse now or later? And what do peace researchers know about that? They might as well go fishing.

This book is loaded with sociological insights that are presented in a most delightful style. The emphasis on peace and its normality is a welcome emphasis in a field where war usually attracts our attention. The author deserves many thanks for this emphasis in this and other books as well, on which he has been working for almost 25 years: 52 Peaceful Societies (1973, but the search for these societies began in 1966), Peace in the Ancient World (1981, coauthored by Richard D. Weigel), and Peace in the Western World (1984, coauthored by John Hord).

William Eckhardt

**MYTHOLOGIES CIVILIZATION DESTROYS**


Antonio M. Stevens-Arroyo has presented a fascinating account of the beliefs of the Tainos Indians of the Caribbean islands, the first non-European peoples to discover Columbus nearly 500 years ago. They were first enslaved and eventually extinguished by their discoveries. This book concerns itself with those beliefs that prevailed from about 200 AD to 1500 AD.

According to Stevens-Arroyo, Taino mythology reflected their stage of development, which had gone beyond gathering and hunting, but had...