Microfinance Impact Assessments:
The Perils of Using New Members as a Control Group

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Abstract: Microfinance institutions aim to reduce poverty. Some assess their impact through a cross-sectional impact methodology which compares veteran to new participants and then calls any difference between these two groups the “impact” of the program. Such studies have risen recently in popularity because they are cheap, easy to implement, and often encouraged by donors. USAID, through its AIMS project, encourages this methodology with its SEEP/AIMS practitioner-oriented tools. This paper intends to inform practitioners about the perils of using such a strategy, and suggests a couple of solutions to some of the larger problems with this approach.

Introduction

Microfinance institutions aim to reduce poverty. Some assess their impact through a cross-sectional impact methodology which compares veteran to new participants and then calls any difference between these two groups the “impact” of the program. Such studies have risen recently in popularity because they are cheap, easy to implement, and often encouraged by donors. USAID, through its AIMS project, encourages this methodology with its SEEP/AIMS practitioner-oriented tools. This paper intends to inform practitioners about the perils of
using such a strategy, and suggests a couple of solutions to some of the larger problems with this approach.

This cross-sectional approach makes many assumptions that are untested and others that are tested and false. For example, it assumes that drop outs have, on average, identical income and consumption levels to those who remain. Furthermore, this approach assumes that drop outs are not made worse off by participating in the program. This approach also assumes that when lending groups form they do not sort themselves by economic background. These assumptions not only are brave theoretically but are contradicted by existing empirical research. This paper suggests a method to address the above issues, and suggests further research be conducted on the other implicit assumptions before expending resources on a plausibly unreliable assessment methodology.

This paper proceeds as follows: the next section describes the cross-sectional methodology as implemented by USAID and the SEEP/AIMS practitioner-oriented methodology; the following three sections discuss problems created by drop out, by the selection process, by the dynamic nature of credit policy. Then potential solutions to some, but not all, of the problems are discussed.

Cross-Sectional Impact Assessments

A valid control group is the holy grail of any microfinance impact assessment and must have participants who possess the same “entrepreneurial spirit” as those in the treatment group that receive the loans. The cross-sectional approach claims to fulfill this requirement since both its control and treatment group consist of individuals who have opted to participate in the microfinance institution (MFI). The new entrants are the control group, whereas the veteran participants with two or
more years experience with the MFI are the treatment group. The methodology then attributes any difference between these groups to the MFI, since the new entrants have received little or no treatment from the MFI, but the veterans have received two or more years of loans.

The AIMS practitioner-oriented tools developed by USAID explain this process in detail (SEEP Network, 1999). In this approach, survey takers measure current income and consumption of members, both old and new, in an MFI. Then the analysis compares the income and consumption levels between old and new members. If the mean spending on food, for example, is higher for veteran members than new entrants, then the methodology concludes that participation in the microfinance program led to higher food consumption for its participants.

Advocates like this approach because of two operational advantages: no need to identify and survey nonparticipants in order to generate a control group and no need to follow clients over time as in a longitudinal study.

**Dropout**

Dropout causes two major problems. The first is an incomplete sample bias and the second is an attrition bias. The incomplete sample bias is created because those who drop out presumably were impacted differently, and potentially worse, than those who remained. Since an impact assessment should examine the impact of the program in its entirety, not just of its success cases, these individuals must be considered as well. The attrition bias is created because those who drop out are different from those who remain, irrespective of the program impact (e.g., wealthier participants stay and poorer participants drop out). Both are serious problems and somewhat easy to address, but the standard AIMS practitioner tools do not resolve them.

**Incomplete Sample Bias**

For simplicity, think of two types of participants, those who benefit from participation and those who are made worse off.
Those who benefit invest the loan proceeds in their business and generate more additional income than the interest they pay on their loan. These people stay in the program. Those who are made worse off fail to invest the money well and then drop out of the program. By including only those who remain in the program in the treatment group, those who suffer a negative impact are ignored. The cross-sectional impact analysis would find a positive impact, whereas the true impact depends entirely on the relative size of these two groups and how much they are benefited or are made worse off.

The above scenario assumes that drop out is generated by failure. Now assume that dropout is generated by success. After successfully improving their business, learning to manage their money, and developing their own savings base, clients no longer need the credit and hence leave the program. In this scenario, the cross-sectional impact analysis would underestimate impact since the greatest successes are ignored in the analysis.

Attrition Bias
Again for simplicity, think of two types of participants, rich and poor. Suppose for the moment that the program has no impact whatsoever, neither positive nor negative, on any participant. Who drops out? If the rich drop out, the “veteran” pool will consist only of the poor types. Then, a comparison of veterans to new participants will conclude a negative impact, since the veterans are only poor but the new participants are a mix of rich and poor. On the other hand, if the poor are more likely to drop out, the “veteran” pool will consist only of the rich. Then, a comparison of veterans to new participants will conclude a positive impact, since the veterans are only rich but the new participants are a mix of rich and poor. Note in both of these stylized cases, there was no impact whatsoever; hence, drop out is not “failure” in this case, merely bad fit. Yet the cross-sectional methodology produced a positive impact (if the poorer individuals are more likely to
Selection

A selection bias refers to the problem of attributing causation to a program with voluntary selection. Those who participate in microfinance programs are more entrepreneurial in spirit, more resourceful in business, and hence more likely to overcome life’s problems one way or another. Attributing their success to microfinance then becomes difficult. The cross-sectional impact assessment purports to overcome this problem, since those in both the treatment and control groups self-selected into the program. This claim only examines the selection bias statically and fails to realize the full dynamics of the decision to participate. Why did those in the treatment group join two years ago whereas those in the control group just joined? The answer is important. Do participants join only at certain points in life? Or if peer selection determines participation, why was one person chosen two years ago and the other not until recently?

Timing of Decision Problem

Why does someone join a credit program now rather than two years ago? I do not know, but I intuit that there is a reason, and it is significant. Imagine that individuals join after coming to an epiphany that they must grow their business in order to pull themselves out of poverty. Or perhaps participants join when everyone in their household is healthy, and hence does not need constant care in the home. Such a situation suggests that perhaps access to credit is not the problem, but rather access to good health care. If ample opportunities exist for credit and savings in their community, then attributing the improvement in their lives to the microfinance institution would be erroneous. Their epiphany or their family’s health should get full credit.
One way to address this problem is to analyze the alternatives for credit and savings that clients have in their communities. Since social networks can create both credit opportunities (e.g., informal loans) and savings opportunities (e.g., Rotating Savings and Credit Associations, ROSCAs), evaluating a client’s next-best alternative is not an easy task. Further research to understand the informal opportunities to borrow and save is essential for understanding the seriousness of the timing problem.

Peer Selection Problem

Imagine banks form through a process like a draft for sports players. The best candidates get drafted first, the good-but-not-best candidates get drafted second, and so. Theory suggests (Ghatak, 2000) and evidence supports (J. Hatch, personal communication, 1997) that individuals are selected into banks in just this way, assortatively by quality of participants, where wealth is used by peers as a proxy for quality. Hence, one group to form in a community contains the best off; the second will be slightly less well off, etc. Again, without any impact at all, a naïve cross-sectional analysis would find veterans have higher wealth than new participants and would attribute this difference to program impact. In fact, if one is targeting the poorest of the poor, then finding positive impact through this method suggests failure since it suggests that perhaps the wealthier are always served first. This issue is heightened by the SEEP/AIMS practitioner-tools because their tools specifically instruct practitioners to use two-year-old banks for the two-year-old veteran pool, one-year-old banks for the one-year-old veteran pool, and new banks for the new entrant pool.

The point of the above story is not limited to the stylized case provided. Take the following scenario as another potential situation. The poorest join first because they are the ones willing to take the risk of participating in this unknown project. Next come the better off clients who only moved once they saw the product tested. Then come the middle tranche. In this scenario, comparing new entrants to veterans will underestimate
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impact, since the veterans will have started out poorer than the new entrants.

Institutional Dynamics
Microfinance institutions change their strategies and/or client identification process, and such changes could affect materially the composition of a new versus veteran participant pool. If any such change systematically alters the relative wealth or income of the new versus veteran participants, again a naïve cross-sectional analysis would erroneously attribute differences to impact. I will discuss two plausible scenarios, both of which I have witnessed in the field.

Program Placement
Microfinance institutions typically have a multi-year strategy for which communities to enter and why. Suppose, quite reasonably, that a young microfinance institution prefers to start out cautiously, and hence enters slightly more well-off communities. Then, after achieving comfort with the local culture, economy, and business practices, the MFI branches out to the poorer neighborhoods. In this situation the veteran participants would all be wealthier than the new participants even if the program has no impact. Hence, a naïve cross-sectional analysis would erroneously attribute impact to the program success. The SEEP/AIMS practitioner-oriented tools try to address this issue by instructing practitioners to choose similar neighborhoods. Assuming the similar communities exist, this might work, but if the implementation plan follows the pattern described above, similar-enough neighborhoods simply might not exist. This becomes a timing issue for the practitioner: at what point in the implementation of the plan will the practitioner learn that no valid control communities exist?

Changes in Credit Requirements
Just like banks, MFIs often respond to changes in the economy by tightening or loosening their credit requirement. In a recession, when even microentrepreneurs are hurt, MFIs might be
more stringent about the credit criteria for participating. Or perhaps they are more lenient. If tighter credit requirements effectively filter out the poorest of the poor, then individuals who join during a recession will be better off than those who join in a normal or boom time. Or if policy becomes more lenient, individuals who would not have previously received credit now do. If the impact assessment is being conducted in the middle of a recession, and two years earlier the economy was either normal or in a boom, then the new participants will be more well off than the veteran participants. In this situation, a cross-sectional analysis will underestimate the true impact of the program. Or if policy becomes more lenient, the analysis will overestimate the true impact of the program. The point here is not which direction the bias is, but rather that this approach to impact assessment demands that no such policy change is made, whereas reality dictates that policy does change as the economy changes.

**Solutions**
The dropout biases are particularly important when attrition is high. Both dropout problems are solvable within the constraints of the one-shot, cross-sectional AIMS approach. Although the current SEEP/AIMS tools do not address the problem, a change to the sampling technique can solve both problems. Conceptually, the two samples are not the same: the veteran group consists only of those who remain, whereas the new member group consists of members who will drop out. One can alter the veteran group to include those who drop out, or can alter the new member group to include only those expected to remain. The first approach is far better and solves both of the problems. The second approach requires some econometric work and solves only the second problem.

As discussed earlier, one major issue is that those who drop out probably were impacted differently than those who remain, and any analysis which ignores them is akin to cherry-picking one’s successes, ignoring one’s failures, and then claiming victory. The solution requires conducting the “veteran” survey on
a sample of members who were in the bank two years ago, some of which are still present but others of which have dropped out. Then the analysis which compares consumption and income levels across veteran and new groups would include the complete “veteran” pool. This approach solves both the incomplete sample and the biased-dropout problems. It would be important when implementing this approach to sample randomly the veterans to interview (not just pick those easiest to contact) and to pursue them diligently. A recent study in Indonesia found that the extra effort to pursue the difficult-to-find pays off tremendously, as these individuals are significantly different from those who remain in their neighborhoods and are easy to reach (see, for example, Thomas, Frankenberg, Beegle, and Teruel, 2000).

The second approach requires combining the data on the veteran members and the dropouts to attempt to find predictors of dropout. The predictors must be observable when someone enters since they will be used to predict which new members will drop out. For instance, distance to the meeting place, number of family members in the lending group, age of business, history of prior credit use, and history of prior savings are all observable and plausibly predictive of dropout. Using this information, one would then use econometric tools to predict who will remain amongst the new members, and then weight the new entrant sample according to their probabilities of remaining. As long as poverty is correlated with some of the observable information used to predict dropout, this solves the second dropout problem. However, this does not solve the first problem discussed, since we have simply modeled who will drop out, not who will have the biggest impact. The veteran sample still contains only those with positive impacts and ignores those with negative or no impact.

Conclusion

The impact evaluation debate rages on in microfinance. Some believe all impact evaluations are useless, but targeting evalu-
tions are appropriate to ensure at the minimum that the clients
are the intended recipients. Others believe that mid-level
impact evaluations, such as the one analyzed here, are useful
and informative. As this paper highlights, the dropout biases
inherent in a cross-sectional impact evaluation are problematic
but solvable. However, the selection and institutional dynam-
ics problems are more difficult. Depending on the circum-
cstances in a given project and economic setting, these issues
suggest that any findings cannot be attributed easily to the pro-
ject, and hence the cross-sectional approach is not appropriate.
A solid understanding of the selection process, economic envi-
ronment, and institutional dynamics is important in deciding
whether or not to employ this mid-level, cross-sectional
approach.

An alternative to mid-level impact assessments would be a
two-prong approach, with many “targeting” evaluations and a
few methodologically rigorous longitudinal evaluations. The
“targeting” evaluations would be small, frequent tools which
monitor client targeting (but do not claim to measure impact),
combined with institutional analysis which examines, from a
management perspective, the efficiency and flexibility with
which a program delivers its services. The longitudinal studies
would have proper control groups, which follow all members,
including dropouts. Such projects could inform the rest of the
microfinance community about proper targeting, impact, and
mechanism design issues. Ideally such studies also would test
different product designs, so that one could assess the differen-
tial impact of one product over another. Organizations which
conduct such studies would be contributing to a public good,
wherein other MFIs can learn from their studies and learn how
to target better and design better products so as to achieve their
primary goal, poverty alleviation, more effectively.

Creating a control group in a longitudinal study does not
necessarily imply impositions to operations. This author, for
instance, is currently working on a longitudinal impact study in
urban South Africa, where the control group is randomly cre-
ated and hence strong methodologically. The process is of little to no cost, and is even a benefit, to operations. The strategy took advantage of the natural organizational limitations of a project as it entered a new area. Not all MFIs are in the situation to do what is necessary to conduct such a study, but if enough are, and the studies are conducted, then we as a community can learn more about whether MFIs can alleviate poverty, who we can help the most, and how we can best help them.

Notes

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1. The author bases the analysis of the AIMS tools on his personal observation of the evaluation tools being implemented by AIMS for FINCA-Peru, and the draft version of the practitioner tools manual.

2. Specifically in the case of FINCA International, Hatch found that older banks invited wealthier individuals to participate than did younger banks, and that new banks in old areas were poorer than old banks in old areas.

3. Proper control groups are particularly difficult to create for microfinance impact studies since the entrepreneurial spirit of participants is presumably quite unique. Hence, merely finding "similar" individuals as a control group does not solve this problem.

References

