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Christopher Rees

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Lindsay Leininger, photographer
NONDEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION IN SINGAPORE

CHRISTOPHER REES

Democratization scholars often assume that most nations will eventually democratize; the evidence of persistent nondemocratic regimes contradicts such assumptions. Theoretically it is possible to consolidate a nondemocratic regime. I examine the case of Singapore and conclude that Singapore has institutionalized many nondemocratic features, thereby establishing a consolidated nondemocratic regime.

Singapore’s authoritarian government has endured for over half a century whereas other developed Asian nations like Taiwan and South Korea have made significant strides toward consolidated democracy. Despite international pressure to democratize, the present regime has solidified its power to a degree that transition appears impossible in the short term and unlikely in the long run. The success of authoritarianism in Singapore has defied the conventional explanations of democratization scholars, forcing many to stipulate exceptions to their paradigms. However, Singapore is not merely an exception to models of democratic consolidation. Instead, it maintains authoritarian rule because it has achieved nondemocratic consolidation through the effective institutionalization of six requisites for nondemocratic consolidation. Authoritarian rule persists in Singapore because the present regime has legitimized its rule based on individual preferences. Residents of Singapore have no motivation to call for democratic transition because the expected benefits of the present

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NONDEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION IN SINGAPORE

regime outstrip the expected costs and the uncertainty associated with lobbying for regime transition.

Democratization has not occurred in Singapore because the current authoritarian government has established a consolidated nondemocratic regime by the paradigm of nondemocratic consolidation laid forth herein. The first section of this paper will address the present status of government in Singapore to ascertain the reality of nondemocratic rule in Singapore. The second section will outline competing explanations for nontransition in Singapore and demonstrate the inadequacy of these positions. The third section will proffer a definition of nondemocratic consolidation and establish the possibility of achieving such a status. The fourth section will analyze whether or not the present conditions of government in Singapore satisfy the conditions of nondemocratic consolidation. The final section will discuss the implications of nondemocratic consolidation for the future of democracy in Singapore.

Is Singapore truly nondemocratic?

Linz and Stepan provide an initial foundation for the study of modern nondemocratic regimes (1996). They characterize five general regime types: democracy, authoritarian, sultanism, totalitarian, and post-totalitarian. However, regimes vary in the degree to which they exhibit the traits ascribed by Linz and Stepan, and thus many regimes find themselves classified somewhere between two similar regime types. Singapore's regime possesses some democratic and some authoritarian traits that make classification problematic in the Linz and Stepan framework. For example, Singapore allows some democratic institutions such as regular elections, but the freedom and fairness of these elections is disputable.

Hybrid regimes like Singapore's have received much attention in the last few years. Larry Diamond notes that many regimes have superficially installed some democratic institutions but substantively remain authoritarian, and he classifies Singapore as a hegemonic electoral authoritarian regime (2002). Others have attached a wide array of descriptive terms to Singapore's governance, such as soft authoritarian, illiberal democracy, communitarian democracy, and semidemocratic (Mauzy and Milne 2002, 128). Only a few liberal definitions of democracy, like that of Francis Fukuyama, would classify Singapore as a democratic state (1992). Although Singapore has installed some democratic institutions, the present regime remains substantively authoritarian because of "the extra-parliamentary constraint on challenges to the ruling People's Action Party (PAP)" (Rodan 1993, 77). Regardless of limited democratic features, few scholars would term Singapore democratic. Thus, it reasonably qualifies as a nondemocratic regime.

Contemporary explanations for Singapore's nontransition

Intense debate surrounds the question of how Singapore remains nondemocratic when many surrounding nations of similar economic and cultural conditions have democratized. Some treat Singapore as a mere anomaly to
modernization theory (Huntington 1991, 302). Proponents of modernization theory argue that nations transition toward democracy after reaching certain thresholds of per capita GDP. Singapore has far exceeded any of the proposed thresholds and yet remains nondemocratic. Therefore, some purport that Singapore is anomalous and have introduced a caveat to modernization theory. This caveat suggests that nondemocratic regimes that remain in power after surpassing the threshold for democratization become less likely to transition in the future.

Others assert that Singapore's present regime maintains power primarily because of its ability to foster sustained economic growth. They argue that the People's Action Party retains control because it governs well, and to the PAP and Singaporeans, "governing well means first and foremost the government's capability in bringing economic progress and material well-being" (Leong 2000, 76). The continued growth of the Singaporean economy enables the government to convince the people that they should continue to rule. However, this theory is both simplistic and problematic. Although the government certainly derives some of its legitimacy from economic success, this cannot wholly account for the PAP's continuity. The theory requires some mechanism to explain why individuals would concede political liberties for mere economic growth. Furthermore, it fails to explain the continued dominance of Singapore's government through several recessions, notably in the mid-1980s (Chee 1986, 164-5).

The explanatory approach of some scholars focuses on the pragmatism of the People's Action Party. They observe declining electoral superiority in the 1980s and suggest that the maintenance of the present regime is conditional upon its ability to change policy through functional concessions. These functional scholars argue that the Singaporean state constantly shifts policies in manners that are "intended above all else to preserve the essence of the authoritarian regime" (Rodan 1993, 78). The clever manipulation of policy, and even the introduction of token democratic institutions, allows the present regime to avoid serious dissension (Case 1996, 444-5). These theories again lack a mechanism to account for individual acquiescence to PAP rule. Theoretically, if the people want democracy, then why have they accepted the piecemeal concessions of the PAP over the last few decades? If some other theoretical constraint does not exist, then the people would have supplanted PAP power to a greater extent during key elections like those in 1985 and 1993 (Mauzy 1993). In addition, the level of democracy in Singapore has declined at many times during the PAP's forty years of control, and the nation even started as a democracy when the PAP took power in the 1960s. It appears unlikely that the mere introduction of a few democratic practices can explicate the nondemocratic tradition in Singapore.

The consistent weakness in these alternative explanations is the lack of individual-level mechanisms to account for nondemocratic continuity. The structural criteria that they advance are important, but they cannot by themselves fully explain nondemocratic consolidation. Furthermore, these theories fail to offer a systematic means of forecasting the future of nondemocratic rule.
NONDEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION IN SINGAPORE

in Singapore. Predictions for the future of Singapore's nondemocratic tradition require a model of nondemocratic consolidation. This model should include strong mechanisms to explain individual submission to the dominant People's Action Party and should not be dependent on transient structural mechanisms. The next section will advance the model and demonstrate the means for applying this model to test the status of nondemocratic consolidation in Singapore.

What is nondemocratic consolidation?

Scholars have failed to adequately address the theoretical possibility of a nondemocratic regime becoming consolidated. Some are beginning to study nondemocratic regimes more frequently, but the possibility of achieving nondemocratic consolidation and the means whereby it might occur have not been systematically studied. Many scholars seem to tacitly accept the notion that only the ideal form of government, democracy, could obtain the broad-based legitimacy necessary for consolidation. However, it is easy to imagine a utopian situation in which a benevolent dictator could gain the overwhelming support of his people. In such conditions it seems likely that nondemocratic consolidation could occur. Although nondemocratic consolidation would almost certainly result in this ideal scenario, it is also possible to consolidate nondemocratic authority in less than ideal circumstances.

Nondemocratic consolidation is theoretically similar to democratic consolidation. It implies a state in which a nondemocratic regime type has become "the only game in town" (Guiseppi Di Palma, as quoted in Linz and Stepan 1996, 5). A regime becomes "the only game in town" as it achieves broad legitimacy based on stable conditions. The structural elements emphasized in alternative explanations for Singapore's regime continuity are transient factors that cannot sustain legitimacy. Legitimacy is a condition for consolidated government, and legitimacy is derived from the people and their willingness to support the government. No regime can achieve consolidation based primarily on regime performance and structural conditions, because any such regime would collapse as soon as conditions became unfavorable. In order for a regime to achieve nondemocratic consolidation, it must create legitimacy based on individuals' preferences.

Since legitimacy is based on individual assessments of the validity of a given regime, it should be implicitly understood that individuals make regime assessments periodically. When they assess the viability of a given regime, they are faced with two alternatives: to accept or reject the regime in power. Thus as individuals make these periodic assessments to support or undermine a regime, they are, in effect, making consumption choices of regime type. These consumption choices reveal the nature of individual preferences regarding regime type. It is assumed that individuals make rational assessments of regime value according to their desires to maximize the utility derived from a regime.

Individual utility from a given regime is conditional upon the quality of life that individuals enjoy when ruled by a particular regime. In essence,
individuals have a utility function based on the benefits that they expect their
government to provide. The basis of the social contract between man and
government involves the "surrender of individual sovereignty for the protection
of life, liberty, and property" (Pangle 1988, 28-39). Thus a common evaluation
of a regime's success involves an assessment of its ability to provide for political
and economic needs and wants. A simple model of an individual utility function
derived from a regime would therefore resemble the function, \( U(R) = f(EB, PB) \), where \( U(R) \) is the utility derived from a given regime and \( f(EB, PB) \)
represents a function composed of economic and political quality of life.

The optimal level of \( U(R) \) would be the choice of all rational individuals
under ideal circumstances. Although one might expect the highest levels of
economic and political benefits to yield the maximization of \( U(R) \), in reality
this may not be the case. There are costs associated with regime transition that
may inhibit optimization of utility. The uncertain results of any transition for
both regime type and individual welfare make optimization of \( U(R) \) problematic.
Since most individuals exhibit tendencies toward risk aversion, they generally
opt to remain at less than ideal circumstances when risk is involved (Friedman
and Savage 1948). Consequently, in order to avoid the uncertainty of transition,
individuals will accept fewer political and economic benefits than they might
achieve under a democratic regime.

This propensity for risk aversion in populations allows nondemocratic
consolidation to occur. The functional implications of risk aversion in regime
choice imply that individuals might choose to sacrifice some benefits in
exchange for stability. These also suggest that regimes might induce individuals
to inaction by altering citizens' abilities to accurately assess the risk and benefits
associated with initiating transition. As a consequence of these functional
implications, there exist six characteristics that nondemocratic regimes can
pursue to consolidate nondemocratic rule.

For individuals to initiate a transition, they must perceive that the transi­
tion's chance of producing democracy is greater than the risk of a worse regime
type. Accordingly, the first factor to consider is the probability of successful
democratization after the initiation of a transition. The second factor for non­
democratic consolidation is the current level of political and economic benefits.
If the current expectation of benefits is sufficiently low, then the expected
benefit of a transition may be high enough to warrant revolt. The next factor
to consider is the expected outcome for an individual that initiates transition
toward an alternative regime. The costs of rebellion must remain fairly signifi­
cant in order to effectively discourage dissent in a consolidated nondemocratic
system. Another characteristic of a consolidated nondemocratic regime is
greater emphasis assigned to the importance of economic benefits relative to
political benefits. Since a nondemocratic regime necessarily limits political
benefits, the regime should attempt to convince its citizenry to base legitimacy
more on economic benefits. In addition, successfully consolidated nondemocratic
governments would control the activities of elites and civil society to diminish the emergence of a viable opposition. Finally, nondemocratic consolidation requires the establishment of and adherence to viable institutional paradigms for leadership succession. The assessment of nondemocratic consolidation in Singapore will focus on these six characteristics of nondemocratic consolidation.

Has Singapore achieved nondemocratic consolidation?

Previous studies of nondemocratic continuity in Singapore focus primarily on structural factors that affect regime stability and fail to fully consider the importance of individual behavior. Although structural factors are important, they only affect nondemocratic consolidation insofar as they affect individuals' choices. Unless the citizenry chooses to accept nondemocratic rule, consolidation cannot occur even under ideal structural conditions. Therefore, to determine whether Singapore has achieved nondemocratic consolidation, conditions in Singapore must be examined to determine the disparity between individual costs and benefits of regime transition. If the six areas mentioned in the previous section reflect the high expected costs of revolt relative to low expected benefits, then Singapore should be considered a consolidated nondemocratic regime.

Probability of democratic transition

This characteristic of nondemocratic consolidation is somewhat speculative because there is no means of measuring actual probabilities of transition outcomes. Nevertheless, the measure focuses on the expected outcomes, and residents of Singapore seem to view continued authoritarianism as the most probable outcome of any transition. In addition to this, the government has nursed fears of the possibility of a substantially worse outcome than the current levels of authoritarianism. Government propaganda and cultural tendencies toward risk aversion augment the expectation of a remarkably similar or even worse outcome as a result of transition.

The government developed this aspect of nondemocratic consolidation early during the rule of the People's Action Party. It cultivated fears of communism and aggression from neighboring states during the 1960s and 1970s to serve as a "rationalization for the authoritarian regime" (Rodan 1993, 104). The people and government perceived an imminent threat, and thus "the 'survival' motif became a prominent part of Lee Kuan Yew's rhetoric and dominated political discourse" (Barr 2000, 32). During the early years of PAP authority, citizens chose not to oppose the PAP because they feared the turmoil and vulnerability of a transition that would allow outside forces to capitalize on Singapore's weakness.

As the threat of communism or invasion has diminished, the government has replaced the old propaganda to renew the popular perception of the probable failure of transition. The new wave of propaganda focuses on economic factors, insinuating that any transition will disrupt economic development and lead to worse economic benefits without improving political benefits. The early campaign built PAP legitimacy, and the latter campaign maintains that legitimacy by creating a fear of probable reduction in benefits due to transition.
This fear is magnified by the Singaporean's comparatively high tendency toward risk aversion. Singapore has cultivated a culture of risk aversion partly because of the extended period of one-party, authoritarian domination. Furthermore, Singapore's society is achievement-oriented and based largely on meritocracy. This has strengthened individual fear of failure. These aspects of Singaporean culture have bred a "culture of insecurity [that] has ensured that ordinary Singaporeans have earned a reputation for risk-aversion, circumspection, and indecision" (Barr 2000, 229). The intolerance of failure has exacerbated tendencies of risk aversion in a culture that possessed "risk aversity and cautiousness from the very start" (Yuan and Low 1990, 191). The Singaporean culture of risk aversion allows the governmental propaganda to achieve maximum effectiveness, and the people in Singapore consequently would be unlikely to believe in the feasibility of successfully opposing the dominance of the People's Action Party.

**Expected political and economic benefits**

Potential dissidents in Singapore face the reality that initiating a transition would yield few substantive changes in Singaporean politics. Singapore already enjoys fairly high levels of political and economic benefits, so a transition would afford only marginal increases in these two components of utility. Through current provision of high benefits, stable patterns of long-term growth, and government responsiveness, Singapore maintains relatively high levels of expected benefits.

The levels of political and economic benefits in Singapore are currently high. Freedom House ranks Singapore as a partly free democratic state with scores of 5 in 2000 for both civil and political liberties (Freedom House). Polity IV also ranks Singapore as a moderate authoritarian regime, giving it scores of 2 for democracy and 4 for autocracy in 2000 (Polity IV 2003). These scorings suggest that Singapore does not grant significant democratic freedoms to its citizens, but neither is it overly oppressive in its autocratic policies. As a consequence, individuals do not generally have strong motivations to rebel because the government does not oppressively deny their rights.

Economically, Singapore enjoys relatively high levels of benefits that support nondemocratic consolidation. For 2000, Singapore reported per capita GDP as $39,796 (Singapore Department of Statistics 2003). In 1998, it ranked as third in the world behind only Luxembourg and the United States when adjusted for purchasing power parity (Global Geografia 2003). This measurement of economic benefits, though simplistic, accurately portrays the excellent performance of the Singaporean economy. Citizens perceive that their stable political regime is largely responsible for this performance, and as a result, the government is legitimimized based on current economic benefits. Certainly the consistent economic success inhibits any outcry for regime change in Singapore.

Another cause for these bland sentiments toward the government is that the levels of benefits have not changed significantly in Singapore. In both the
Freedom House and Polity IV data, the rankings for Singapore have remained consistent since the PAP gained power in 1965. Polity IV has ranked Singapore with scores of 2 for democracy and 4 for autocracy in every year without exception. Freedom House has given scores of either 4 or 5 in both political rights and civil liberty in every year as well. In terms of economic benefits, Singapore has averaged nearly 10 percent growth in per capita GDP per annum with little variation each year, rising from roughly $10,000 in 1980 to $20,000 in 1990 and roughly $40,000 at present. This predictable growth and prosperity lends itself to regime stability. Combined, these steady levels of political and economic benefits allow Singaporeans to establish clear expectations of moderate political benefits and high economic benefits. Compared with the uncertain expectations of transition, these predictably moderate levels of benefits satisfy Singaporeans.

In addition to these consistent and fairly high benefits, Singaporeans have reasonable hope for future improvements in benefits because of the responsiveness of the present regime. Although the People’s Action Party has only minimal democratic accountability, it voluntarily solicits public opinion and adheres to many requests of its citizenry. Singapore established the Feedback Unit in 1985 “to elicit responses from the public in writing and in open meetings on specific issues” (Leong 2000, 197). The government still maintains autonomy from transitory public opinion, but does not completely ignore it either. This consideration and concern for public opinion helps stifle potential opposition. For example, the controversial Graduate Mothers Scheme of 1984 produced significant public opposition, and the legislature eventually retracted the legislation. In addition, the PAP uses intricate economic surveys to assess the needs and wants of its people, and shapes policy accordingly (Chee 1986, 160-1). The responsiveness to public opinion curtails extreme opposition, yet Singapore remains nondemocratic because the government maintains its prerogative to adhere to these mechanisms of accountability.

Costs of dissent

For the average Singaporean citizen, the costs of provoking a revolutionary movement are extremely prohibitive. The PAP utilizes the ambiguity of the Internal Security Act (ISA) to imprison suspected dissenters without trial. For instance, officials imprisoned twenty-two people in 1987 without trial because they were allegedly involved in a communist conspiracy to overthrow the government (Rodan 1993, 92). The ISA also allows the regime to expel foreigners for any perceived criticism of the government, as occurred with a group of Christian missionaries in 1987. The strict enforcement of the ISA discourages Singaporeans and foreigners from expressing dissatisfaction with the People’s Action Party.

Singapore employs various means to inhibit dissenters from expressing their voices. The government levies heavy fines or punishments against any disruption of social order. The caning of the American Michael Fay for graffiti
is just one notable example of the severe punishments available to Singaporean officials. Protest is allowed but is subject to numerous regulations that make organizing protests costly. It takes significant time to gain approval for any group gathering, and thus in most cases the cost of gaining a permit outweighs the desire to protest. Furthermore, opposition elements are constrained by Singapore’s defamation laws. The PAP has sued numerous opposition leaders and citizens for engaging in criticism of its regime. In most cases, the PAP succeeds in its suits and the courts impose substantial fines on the opposition leaders. For example, in 1997 the courts awarded S$8 million in damages when the PAP sued Tang Liang Hong for defamation, and the PAP achieved similar results in its 1988 suit against J.B. Jeyaretnam (Mauzy and Milne 2002, 135). These threats of financial penalties or physical punishment and imprisonment effectively sustain the high costs of dissent in Singapore and limit opposition voice. Those who would rebel often leave because of these high costs of dissent. Singapore currently experiences extremely high rates of emigration as those that have means to leave the country do so. The cost of leaving Singapore is significantly lower than the individual cost of reforming the nation, especially because many Singaporeans feel few patriotic ties to their nation (Bell 1997, 9). This decline in patriotism has occurred largely since the rise of authoritarian government in the late 1960s. Thus the high costs of dissent are even more effective because those most likely to initiate rebellion have little incentive to promote reform if they possess the capacity to abandon their country.

**Emphasis on economic benefits**

Although Singapore claims some legitimacy because of preserving political order and a fair amount of benefits, the government tries to focus the periodic assessments of its citizenry toward economic issues. While these issues alone do not legitimate the People’s Action Party, their emphasis can deflect some attention from inadequacies in political benefits and freedoms. Through propaganda and the natural cultural values of its people, Singapore has managed to direct citizens’ assessments of governmental performance from political benefits toward the provision of economic benefits.

The current focus on economic benefits did not exist before the ascension of the People’s Action Party. During the period of political independence in the 1950s and early 1960s, these “economy-based values were not extant on the island” (Chua 1995, 105). The regime emphasized meritocracy and consumption as it strove for economic development, and these values have strengthened a cultural emphasis on economics. Discipline in the work place and in society and a desire to achieve consumption advantages have engineered a culture where “economy-dictated values are the predominant defining characters of the high-growth city-state, over and above all other cultural sentiments” (Chua 1995, 105). The cultural emphasis on economic benefits has superseded concerns for improved political benefits in many cases, and as a result, the PAP manages to continue its authoritarian control of political and civil liberties in Singapore.
The People’s Action Party places tight controls on the activities of opposition leaders and civil organizations. Without a strong core of opposition leaders or a vibrant civil society, nondemocratic rule will continue unimpeded in Singapore. Although Singapore imposes significant and direct constraints on opposition leaders and civil society, they rely primarily on other means. In addition to regulation, Singapore effectively limits the voice of potential opposition leaders and groups through co-optation.

Many groups and individuals are severely limited by regulations governing the actions of potential opposition. The government directly controls much of the media in Singapore, limiting its capacity to supply alternative information that might question the legitimacy of PAP rule. The government imposes fines and circulation restrictions on private and foreign media sources (Means 1996, 109-110). Opposition candidates generally face legal action if they win an election, and in many cases they are driven to bankruptcy and are subsequently stripped of their office (Mauzy and Milne 2002, 134-5). The government uses the Societies Act to control civil society, requiring that all organizations of more than ten people register with the government. The PAP keeps a close eye on all of these groups, and frequently retracts registration for groups that exhibit characteristics of significant opposition or social disorder (Mauzy and Milne 2002, 131-2). All of these mechanisms maintain a tight leash on the groups in Singapore that might have the greatest capacity of successfully motivating regime transition.

Besides limitations resulting from these direct controls, many potential opposition elements in Singapore are stifled because the government incorporates their dissenting voice into official government programs. For instance, the role of labor and trade unions has been “restrained by successive legislation in 1968, 1982, and 1984” (Chua 1995, 109). These legislations merged private trade organizations into the National Trade Union Congress that would advocate labor concerns subject to the interests of the government. In this manner, Singapore has avoided much of the labor opposition that has undermined nondemocratic rule in other nations. Singapore has also co-opted the activities of non-labor groups. Through financial incentives and the incorporation of many registered groups into national organizations, Singapore has managed to limit the voice of a once vibrant civil society (Mauzy and Milne 2002, 158-9).

In other cases, potential opposition stagnates because individuals allow the government to buy their silence. For example, opposition constituencies are discouraged because the government gives priority in public housing improvements and maintenance to pro-PAP constituencies. The pragmatic views on politics in Singapore allow this “carrot and stick” approach to function (Hill and Fee 1995, 191). Another example illustrating the government’s acquisition of the opposition’s silence comes from the activities of opposition candidates in Singapore. Singaporean politics emphasize meritocracy and elitism. Opposition elements “give every
appearance of having embraced elitism as unquestioningly as the West has embraced democracy” (Barr 2000, 234). Instead of continuing to oppose the People’s Action Party, many opposition candidates simply join ranks with the meritocratic structure of Singaporean politics, hoping to change the PAP from within. However, most of these former opposition leaders merely succumb to PAP ideology or fight for change only on periphery elements of the PAP platform.

Institutional paradigm for succession

The downfall of many nondemocratic regimes occurs because of the instability associated with leadership transition, usually due to the death of a popular leader. During the time of leadership transition, policy implementation may be less effective and performance less than optimal. Political opponents may focus on this time of weakness as a desirable situation in which to initiate regime transition. However, if viable political institutions exist to ensure smooth transition, then nondemocratic regimes may avoid this time of weakness. Singapore potentially faces this problem when the popular PAP leader Lee Kuan Yew dies, but they have already made several institutional provisions to avoid the uncertainty associated with leadership transition.

Lee Kuan Yew dominated the activities of the PAP during its first twenty years of rule. However, in the 1980s he began grooming several possible successors, among them prominent figures such as Goh Chok Tong. In 1985 he moved Goh into a ministerial position, and in 1990, Lee surrendered even more power, allowing Goh to become president. Nevertheless, Lee retained much of his party control (Kim 1991, 172). During this transition, the PAP lost some of its electoral dominance as it gained only 61 percent of the popular vote in 1991. Their share of the vote returned to normal by 1993 with 73 percent of the vote, sparked in part by Lee Kuan Yew’s campaign to support Goh Chok Tong (Mauzy 1993). The People’s Action Party has successfully implemented the transition from one enormously popular leader to the next, and with this mechanism established, the party should avoid the future instability associated with leadership transition.

The future of democracy in Singapore

Singapore currently exhibits all of the major components of a consolidated nondemocratic regime. The future for democracy in Singapore appears fairly bleak in the near future. However, a significant structural change could lead to some democratization in Singapore, although the strength of Singapore’s currently consolidated nondemocratic rule seems to preclude this possibility. The only possible event that seems capable of inducing transition in Singapore is a severe and prolonged recession. Short of this occurrence, there is no rationale to support the likelihood of transition in the near future. There exist long-term prospects for transition in Singapore, especially given the electoral framework already extant in the nation. However, even this is unlikely barring dramatic shift in the next generation of political leaders, because even the opposition elements in Singapore do not support the complete removal of some authoritarian policies.
Chris Rees is a senior at Brigham Young University studying economics and political science. He will commence study toward a PhD in economics in September 2003. Originally from Austin, Texas, he currently lives in Provo, Utah, with his wife Katie.

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