The Taming of the News: How the Mass Media Affect U.S. Foreign Policy
by Dave Campbell

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This year we have added a new Book Review section to PSAR. We chose to review books published in 1994 by BYU political science professors. The intention of this new section is to help more students become familiar with what their professors do outside the classroom.

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>The Taming of the News: How the Mass Media Affect U.S. Foreign Policy by Dave Campbell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Why the Southern African Development Council Should Participate in the World Energy Efficiency Association by Kevin Ellsworth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Mormons and the Christian Right: Are They &quot;Right&quot; for Each Other? by Dan Elenbaas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>The Supreme Politics: A Study of Partisan Influences on the U.S. Judiciary by Dana Morrey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Book Reviews:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Decisions and Images: The Supreme Court and the Press</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Politics and the Media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- America the Vincible: U.S. Foreign Policy for the Twenty-first Century</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- In the Lions' Den: The Story of Senator Orrin Hatch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- War and the Rise of the State</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Taming of the News:
How Mass Media Affect U.S. Foreign Policy

by Dave Campbell

There is an old axiom among members of the media: All local news is news and all foreign news is foreign. While obviously overstated, this saying neatly summarizes the long-standing perception about how the American public views foreign news. Conventional wisdom has held that owing to this seeming indifference, policy makers (particularly the executive branch) were free to formulate foreign policy without much input from public opinion. They needed only to keep policy within the very broad parameters deemed acceptable by the American public (Kelleher 1994, 235).

The question to be considered in this paper is whether the ubiquity of mass media with heavy foreign news coverage like the Cable News Network (CNN), has changed how U.S. foreign policy is made. In answering the question, the utility of a model developed by O'Heffernan (1991) will be evaluated. O'Heffernan's model appears useful because it takes into account two aspects of television's possible effect on foreign policy:

• the concept labeled "pictures driving policy" (Siegel 1993, 13). This phenomenon allegedly results from graphic scenes like those from Bosnia or Somalia broadcast on television, driving public opinion which then influences the decisions made regarding U.S. action abroad.

• the immediate information available through real-time media like CNN to foreign policy makers themselves.

In brief, O'Heffernan's model proposes that (1) the media add new information, rapidly, both to what the public and elite know about foreign policy issues, particularly crises; (2) the media give high profile to nongovernmental organizations and even individuals as they report on foreign affairs; and (3) the media introduce a broader range of goals and criteria than previously considered when making foreign policy decisions (1991, 91). Following O'Heffernan's lead, for the purposes of this paper mass media will be defined as both newspapers and television.

To evaluate this model two case studies will be compared—the 1965 U.S. invasion of the Dominican Republic and the 1994 U.S. intervention in Haiti.

Exposition

Before gauging the utility of O'Heffernan's model, it is necessary to review first the longstanding norms of academic opinion regarding the media's influence on the foreign policy process and then what seem to be recent changes in this opinion.

The landmark work on this subject is generally considered to be Bernard Cohen's 1963 book The Press and Foreign Policy (Taylor 1994). In his book Cohen paints a picture of an almost symbiotic relationship between key newspaper journalists and chief foreign policy makers. As Cohen saw it, prominent columnists and reporters could influence policy as "actors in the process, trying to influence the opinions of both the public and the government official" (1963, 39). Conversely, the media was also seen as an "instrument of government" (28), publishing information fed to them by high-level contacts in the State Department or White House.

The general public was viewed by journalists and policy makers as uninterested in the workings of foreign policy. Following World War Two foreign policy scholars like Cohen came to a consensus, based on the writings of Gabriel Almond and Walter Lippmann, that the general public knew little about foreign policy and policy makers cared little about how the general public felt regarding foreign affairs (Holsti 1992). Instead, scholars spoke of an "attentive public," a small percentage of the electorate who pay attention to foreign news sources like the New York Times, and offer opinions to those who formulate American foreign policy. This attentive public in turn influenced the opinions of the mass public, in what is generally labeled the "two-step" model of communication (Flanigan and Zingale 1994, 145).

With the rise of satellite-linked television services, and the overwhelming pervasiveness of
mass media outlets, these assumptions have begun to be re-evaluated.

It is clear that more and more Americans rely on television images as their international frame; the widening availability of CNN and other "instant reality" channels suggests this trend will continue. . . . The result may well be both oversimplification and a higher average level of information among attentive publics. There is clearly also a far greater emotional impact on the public as a whole. (Kelleher 1994, 233)

What Kelleher calls the emotional impact of television news is what has received the most attention of late. From the live broadcasts of Peter Arnett in Baghdad during the Persian Gulf War to coverage this April of bombs falling on a Sarajevo market, every strata of the American public is able now to experience what goes on across the sea like never before. Television is a visual medium, and images can evoke powerful responses:

More than print or radio, television news—especially as practiced with the more and more vivid and dramatic techniques of the 1970s and 1980s—provoke[s] an intense and often passionate reaction to foreign issues. (Beschloss 1994, 40)

Foreign news now receives more prominence in both the print media and on television than ever before, partly because twenty-four hour a day media outlets like CNN have a lot of time to fill, but also to a large extent because the technology now exists to broadcast events from around the globe as they happen. Newspapers too now have the capability to "receive typeset copy and digitized photographs by satellite around the world, enabling them to print same-day editions with current news" (O'Heffernan 1991, 4). It seems that more and more Americans are privy to foreign policy news, available with little effort. In 1963 Cohen estimated that the average American spent two and one third minutes reading foreign news (251). At the time, only 29 percent of Americans considered television a credible source for international news (Beschloss 1994, 39). Times have changed. In 1980, 51 percent of Americans found television news to be the most credible source for news, while the network news featured an average of ten minutes a night of foreign news (ibid. In 1989, 25.4 percent of the American public reported watching CNN within the last seven days (Stanley and Niemi 1992, 54). This fact is particularly significant for this discussion because CNN "is deeply committed to international news coverage" (Beschloss 1994, 40).

With data like this in mind, many have now called into question whether the Almond-Lippmann view of a public largely unaware of foreign news is still accurate (Holsti 1992). Due to the ubiquity of television, the public may not necessarily be more intrinsically interested in foreign affairs but may be more aware of it. While her thoughts are by no means conventional wisdom among academics, Kelleher claims that:

Almost every general foreign policy survey shows the public is increasingly well informed about global issues, devotes attention to evolving international events, and has clear opinions on most major foreign and defense policy questions. (1994, 235)

In light of what appears to be a radical shift in the salience of foreign news in America owing to the mass media, a new model to explain the relationship between media coverage of foreign matters and foreign policy decisions seems needed. In reference to advances in the technology used by the mass media, Snow and Brown have written:

In subtle ways that neither practitioners nor theoreticians yet understand, these advances are changing the international affairs that are the substance of foreign and defense policy, as well as the way policy is made. (1994, 227)

Considering this perceived lack of understanding, let us turn to an analysis of a new theoretical framework specifically developed in contradistinction to Cohen's conclusions, that of O'Heffernan.

Analysis

O'Heffernan's model is far too extensive to deal with completely here. For the sake of space, this paper will address only how the media provide input to the foreign policy process. Areas left unexplored include how the government uses the media as an outlet to persuade the public to support policy and how real-time television coverage (CNN especially) has changed the once fairly closed and deliberative world of diplomacy.

Media as a source of information

Perhaps the most apparent effect of the mass media's foreign news coverage is the sheer amount of information they make available. As Cohen saw it, the media relied on government sources exclusively for most of their foreign news. While today's media certainly still rely on information supplied by policy makers (apparent
in the Persian Gulf War), they are also able to shoot video, take pictures, and write stories at the scene of a foreign story, crisis or otherwise. Only with the technology available in the last few years—satellite hook-ups, miniaturized television cameras, etc.—has this been possible.

Turning to the comparison between the Dominican Republic invasion in 1965 and the Haiti intervention of 1994, we can see how technology has changed the manner in which the media cover foreign stories. The comparison between these two military invasions is particularly suited to this study for a number of reasons. They both involve approximately the same number of U.S. troops, twenty thousand (Collins 1991, 155). Both nations share the island of Hispaniola, and are therefore the same distance from U.S. borders. While the circumstances surrounding the two interventions are not identical, they both involve an American force landing in a small Caribbean nation to ensure the installation of a government friendly to the U.S. In 1965 the U.S. was worried that the Dominican Republic would fall to Marxist revolutionaries; in 1994 the U.S. was ostensibly worried about human rights violations by the Cedras regime. Beyond these broad similarities, there is an important difference between these two invasions. In 1965, the technology needed to link continents with TV signals bounced off of a satellite was only in its infancy. Ironically, the first test of such a system occurred five days after the U.S. troops landed in the Dominican Republic (Gould 1965, A1).

Without today’s technology allowing for real-time broadcasting, the media were forced, as Cohen’s model suggests, to rely upon the American Ambassador to the Dominican Republic for information. In retrospect, the information provided was highly inaccurate; the crisis was terribly exaggerated.

When the correspondents were finally allowed to visit the cities and countryside, they discovered that none of the horror stories that they had reported were true. Instead of the 1,000 and 1,500 bodies which, according to President Johnson, had made the intervention imperative, there were fewer than a dozen. (Graber 1984, 324)

Contrast this with Haiti. There the networks had set up broadcast equipment days before the U.S. troops landed. As one example, CNN had four locations in the tiny country from which it could transmit video. In the words of David Bohrman, an executive with NBC News, "This is the first event of this kind where the news organizations are not relying on the military for primary access. If the invasion is in Port-au-Prince, we’ll see all there is to see" (Carter 1994, A8). There is little doubt that President Clinton wanted to avoid the broadcast of U.S. troops either getting shot or shooting others, providing impetus for the Carter-Nunn-Powell delegation to negotiate with Haiti’s ruling junta and avoid a bloody invasion.

The first aspect of such media saturation is that the public knows more about the effects of foreign policy decisions made, and perhaps most significantly, can see more of those effects than at any time in the past. Recent research has shown that, contrary to Cohen’s description of the limited effect public attitudes have on foreign policy decisions, contemporary policy makers do heed what they perceive public opinion to be. Having conducted extensive interviews with officials from both the State Department and the National Security Council, Powlick concluded in 1991 that there is "virtually a cultural norm within the foreign policy bureaucracy, that the best policy is one which accounts for public opinion" (625). Lloyd Cutler, White House counsel to both Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton, has repudiated the Almond-Lippmann consensus (upon which Cohen based his work) that the opinions of only a select few in the electorate are considered when foreign policy is made.

To sustain its foreign and national security policies, an administration must not merely satisfy the minority of print readers who care about such issues, it must now satisfy the entire national television audience as well. This is especially true of policies that place U.S. forces at risk. (1984, 114)

More recently, National Security Advisor Anthony Lake has admitted that engagement of U.S. troops does depend on public pressure (Hoge 1994, 138-39).

Thus far, I have attempted to demonstrate that blanket media coverage of foreign news has affected mass U.S. public opinion, which is then taken into consideration by policy makers. Another implication of the constant barrage of new information provided by the mass media is that foreign policy makers themselves are often directly affected by what they see. In a questionnaire administered to top policy makers in the Reagan administration, 83 percent said that "they knew first or second hand of a case where
TV directly impacted policy by providing information that either contradicted official information or provided a visual element so powerful it affected policy officials who saw it" (O’Heffernan 1991, 73). Of that 83 percent, most commented that they saw was broadcast on the network news or CNN.

With both policy makers and the public being saturated with so much information, O’Heffernan has identified a "fast-forward effect." No longer can policy makers have a time frame like the six days President Kennedy had during the Cuban Missile Crisis to mull decisions over. Instead, decisions must be made rapidly as new information becomes available. In looking at the Haiti intervention we have seen a textbook case of this "high speed" policy making. Originally, the troops sent to Haiti were under strict orders not to become a police force. This led to the spectacle on television of U.S. troops standing idle while Haitian police brutally beat Haitian civilians. Predictably, after only a few days of such pictures being beamed into America’s homes, the Clinton administration quickly changed the policy. The troops were instructed to halt such atrocities. Referring to coverage of U.S. soldiers being unable to stop Haitian-on-Haitian violence, one White House aide said "four or five nights of it on television would have undone us politically" (Jehl 1994, A1). Note that the decision to change the policy was made after U.S. forces had been in Haiti for only a few days. In the Dominican Republic incident, the decision to send troops was based on what is now generally considered to be bogus information. The media were not able to verify what they were being told by government officials for over a week (Graber 1984, 323). Unlike Haiti, there was no media presence to force the Johnson administration to reconsider its policy quickly.

To this point, O’Heffernan’s description of the effect of the rapid information provided by the media on foreign policy matters seems to be accurate. However, while O’Heffernan has dealt with whether foreign policy makers consider public opinion, he has skirted the question of whether the public is more knowledgeable now than they have been in the past about foreign affairs. Because he has explicitly stated that this work is designed to update that of Cohen, and Cohen based his work on the assumption of an uniformed public, this seems to be a glaring omission. Powlick, whose work is very similar to O’Heffernan’s, admits that no one has yet determined if such a "change hypothesis" is accurate (1991, 637). This question requires further research along the lines of the following discussion.

Earlier I noted that some academics have predicted that with the amount of foreign news available, Americans have overcome their notorious ignorance regarding overseas matters. While Kelleher (1994, 235) is confident of such an assertion and Snow and Brown (1994, 231) hypothesize that this is so, the evidence to date is hardly conclusive. In a comprehensive study of U.S. public opinion from the 1930s to the 1980s, Page and Shapiro (1992) concluded that there has been no noticeable increase in public attentiveness to foreign policy matters. Wittkopf (1990) conducted a similar analysis of public opinion data over thirteen years and likewise has noted no upswing in the percentage of the American electorate attentive to foreign affairs.

Anecdotally, however, a comparison between survey responses about Haiti in 1994 and the Dominican Republic in 1965 does lend credence to the assertion that Americans are more likely to have cogent opinions about foreign policy. When Gallup asked Americans in May of 1965 (a few weeks after U.S. troops landed in the Dominican Republic) whether they thought the troops were likely to stay there for a year or two, 32 percent said they had no opinion (Gallup 1972, 1943). But in 1994, a Time/CNN poll found only 7 percent of Americans were not sure when asked how long they thought U.S. troops would stay in Haiti (Time, CNN, and Yankelovich Partners 1994). Why would 25 percent more of the public have a fairly substantive opinion (beyond merely supporting or opposing the troops’ presence) about Haiti than the Dominican Republic? A likely reason is the media’s far more extensive coverage of one than the other.

While I was not able to compare television coverage thirty years apart, an analysis of New York Times coverage does show the much higher profile Haiti has had recently than that of the Dominican Republic in 1965. There is a likely link, however, between what the elite print media and television news cover. Robinson and Sheehan hypothesize that there is a "new" two step model of communication—"from the New York Times to Dan Rather [and television news outlets generally] to the public" (in O’Heffernan 1991, 62). In looking at the International section of the Times from the day U.S. troops landed and then six days after for both invasions, a greater
pervasiveness is apparent for Haiti than the Dominican Republic. In 1965, the *New York Times* ran forty stories about the Dominican Republic in that time period, none having a full banner headline. By way of contrast, in 1994 the *Times* ran fifty-four stories about Haiti during the first week of the troops’ presence there. More significantly, four consecutive days saw Haiti take a full banner headline across the top of the front page. Indeed, on the twentieth of September stories about Haiti filled five full pages in the *Times*. After only a few days, the *Times* began running a regular Haiti section of one to four pages of stories, diagrams, and pictures entitled “Mission in Haiti.” The Dominican Republic invasion received no such treatment.

Even taking into account Viet Nam as a rival story in 1965, at least one media outlet, and one of the leading ones at that, gave far greater prominence to the 1994 events in Haiti than those in the Dominican Republic twenty-nine years ago.

I mention this disparity in media treatment of the Dominican Republic case compared to the Haiti example because of the conventional wisdom among some scholars that while the media do not tell people what to think, they are able to influence what people think about (Fry, Taylor, and Wood 1994, 119). As Entman has pointed out, these two effects may not be as mutually exclusive as has been generally assumed. "[T]he media make a significant contribution to what people think—to their political preferences and evaluations—precisely by affecting what they think about" (1989, 347). Public opinion appears to grow out of an interaction between media messages and what audiences make of them. When the messages the media present are framed exclusively by government sources, the public is inclined to support the administration’s decisions. No better example exists of this phenomenon (which could perhaps be labeled the “limited information effect”) than the 1975 *Mayaguez* incident.

Throughout the crisis, [President Gerald] Ford was able to frame issues in his own way and present information in a fashion that supported his actions. Most Americans considered the liberation of the *Mayaguez* crew a triumph for the President, despite the fact that roughly twice as many Americans were killed in the venture as those rescued. (Beschloss 1994, 46)

In Haiti, the American public could see what was happening there first-hand and hear commentators compare it to the recent U.S. troop engagement in Somalia (another event covered extensively by the media). In the Dominican Republic, there was very limited television coverage, and relatively restricted newspaper coverage. All of this may help explain why 76 percent of Americans supported President Johnson sending troops into the Dominican Republic (Gallup 1972, 1942), but of a more jaded 1994 public, only 43 percent supported an invasion of Haiti (Gallup/CNN/U.S.A. Today 1994).

New actors

In his model, O’Heffernan goes further than simply point out that the media provide a lot of information rapidly in the course of a foreign policy event. He also notes that the media provide visibility for nongovernmental actors and players with a narrow interest in various facets of foreign policy.

Insiders perceive that the strength of these groups comes from their ability to publicize their issues widely through the mass media, and to use the media to develop the resources necessary to operate multilaterally. The media coverage gives these issues salience and occasionally becomes a channel for political influence. (O’Heffernan 1991, 93)

In the case study of Haiti, such a role has been played by Randall Robinson of TransAfrica, a group concerned with the immigration of refugees from mostly black nations. During April and May of 1994, Robinson conducted a twenty-seven day hunger strike to protest what he saw as unfair treatment of Haitians fleeing the Cedars regime. Robinson’s fast certainly had the media’s attention. And remembering Entman’s observation, if the media are influencing what people think about, they are affecting what they think. Over the twenty-seven days of his hunger strike, a search on a computer database (Lexis/Nexis) found that CNN ran fifty-six stories featuring Randall Robinson. During and following the hunger strike, Robinson and other Haitian advocates became regular features on CNN talk shows whenever the topic of Haiti was to be dealt with.

The rise of prominent individuals and special interest groups as influencing factors in foreign policy matters is a relatively new phenomenon. In the contemporary policy making process “policy officials perceive that these or-
ganizations are effective in placing global issues on the foreign policy agenda and maintaining their salience” (O’Heffernan 1991, 93). It was reported in May that President Clinton was very aware of the opposition to his Haiti policy resulting from Randall Robinson’s hospitalization (Fenyvesi 1994, 24).

Note that the coverage of Robinson’s fast also matches the two previously discussed aspects of the media’s information barrage. Both the general public and elite policy makers saw the same news broadcasts.

At the time of the Dominican Republic invasion, there was no equivalent advocate and/or special interest group pushing Dominican Republic issues onto the agenda of either the public or decision-making elites. This is hardly surprising. While newspapers were able to give coverage of such actors in print, television had not yet developed the inclination to provide the regular video images necessary to mobilize mass opposition to government policy. Many observers posit that not until the Viet Nam War’s Tet Offensive in 1968 was there an "end of media trust in the government’s conduct of defense and foreign policy" (Snow and Brown 1994, 224).

**Broader range of goals and criteria**

The third element of O’Heffernan’s model is the ability the media now have to "broaden the range of goals and criteria used for policy by interconnecting causes and effects that normally operate outside agency purview or perceptions" (1991, 91). In other words, the media can take an issue like overseas military intervention, which thirty years ago would have been perceived strictly as a foreign policy matter, and make a connection to domestic issues. This interconnection is why Randall Robinson’s concerns about Haitian refugees reaching U.S. shores are relevant to a discussion about U.S. military involvement in Haiti. The refugees represent the domestic side to a foreign issue. Indeed, in laying out this facet of his model, O’Heffernan comments that "military and diplomatic policies in Central America may create refugees in Texas and California" (ibid.). Substitute "Haiti" for "Central America" and "Florida" for "Texas and California" and we have an almost prophetic description of a key factor in the decision to intervene in Haiti.

Clearly the refugee issue has had salience. A survey of CNN transcripts from January 1, 1994 to November 1, 1994 found 274 stories about Haitian refugees. Comparatively, the Dominican Republic intervention was cast simply as a battle to thwart the spread of communism, to prevent another Cuba (Wiarda and Kryzanek 1982, 127). The media presented no domestic angle to compare to the connections made in the Haitian case to Haitian refugees and wealthy expatriates.

By way of analysis, it is difficult to determine whether this broader range of goals and criteria showcased by the media is a cause or an effect of the trend toward "intermestic" politics. At the time of the Dominican Republic intervention, foreign policy was viewed through Cold War glasses by both policy makers and the media. In the post-Cold War era, U.S. foreign policy formulation has been made far more difficult now that there is no longer a zero-sum competition for influence between the Americans and Soviets. With this complexity, many issues, like Haiti, are viewed as both international and domestic. Whether the media has facilitated this mixing of once separate policy spheres, as O’Heffernan asserts, or instead only reported on what would have happened even without their coverage is difficult to say. Further research is needed to strengthen this element of O’Heffernan’s model.

**Prescription**

O’Heffernan’s model, developed to update Cohen’s work of over thirty years ago, seems to be a useful analytical tool. However, more work is needed to refine it. Specifically, future research should be directed at determining whether or not media pervasiveness has made the American public more aware now of foreign issues than in the past. Meta-analyses of cumulative public opinion polls, along the lines of the work by Wittkopf (1990), seem to be a good place to start. Similarly, while O’Heffernan’s model incorporates the interconnection between foreign and domestic issues, the jury is still out on whether the media coverage of such is a cause or an effect.

Including public opinion in a discussion of foreign policy frightens many analysts. Since the days of the Founding, mass public opinion has been feared as irrational, especially in the sphere of foreign policy. However, this fear is unfounded. As Page and Shapiro (1992) have concluded, the American public has demonstrated an historical rationality about policy issues, not the capriciousness and volatility it is often as-
sumed to have. This is true even in an age with ever increasing foreign news coverage. If anything, television's fast-forward effect can simply speed up policy makers’ accounting for the opinions of those who ultimately employ them—the general public. In the words of Lloyd Cutler:

TV news can provide a useful early warning that a policy course that costs American lives or jobs will be very difficult to sustain over an extended period. It can force an administration to calculate fully the costs and benefits of such a policy before it casts the die. (1984, 118)

Sadly, in interviewing State Department and NSC staffers, Powlick (1991) has found that while most acknowledge the need for public approval of their policies, most also resent the role it plays. Such elitism is not only undemocratic, but misguided. While I admit that the average American may not know many of the niceties, nuances, and details of foreign policy matters, the average American does seem to be skeptical of the need to risk the deaths of U.S. soldiers when the nation's vital interests are not at stake. That hardly seems to be irrational. In fact, had the public been made more aware of the real situation in the Dominican Republic in 1965, objections likely would have been raised, U.S. troops would not have invaded, and U.S. relations would not have been damaged throughout the Caribbean and Latin America (Collins 1991, 156). In 1994, if the threat that the mass media would cover an invasion of Haiti kept President Clinton looking for a peaceful resolution of the conflict, then perhaps the fourth estate has filled the role it was meant to play.

This is not to say, however, that all is well in Washington. As Lee Hamilton, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, has commented:

Television ... encourages policy makers to react quickly, perhaps too quickly, to a crisis. ... Television, critics say, leads not to sound policy, but to sound bites masquerading as policy. (U.S. Congress 1994, 1)

Hamilton is right. While it can provide opportunity for the public to see the effects of foreign policy decisions in all their graphic detail, the mass media (television especially) must not become the sole agenda setter in the sphere of the international affairs of the United States. Instead, policy makers themselves must have an agenda on which the media can report. Otherwise the media will create one, often to the detriment of sound policy. Take Bosnia for example. When CNN broadcast pictures this April of a bombed out market in Sarajevo, policy makers felt forced to respond by ordering NATO airstrikes. But the pressure to respond, driven by CNN's pictures, was only felt because the Clinton administration had a weak policy on the Balkan War. In Somalia we had a similar situation—TV pictures prompted George Bush to send U.S. troops in, and TV pictures spurred Bill Clinton to pull them out. World politics abhors a policy vacuum. In the absence of real leadership on an issue, the media, not policy makers ultimately accountable to the electorate, will influence what the public thinks about, and therefore what they think.

Thus, if the current administration wishes to staunch the threat of having CNN's pictures drive policy, it must act now to formulate policy that can be explained to the American public. In Korea, where I believe the United States runs a higher risk of war than the Clinton White House admits publicly, sound policy must be developed and communicated to the public. The same must happen in Bosnia. Ted Koppel, the man pundits have called TV's Secretary of State (Snow and Brown 1994, 229), has put it this way:

To the degree ... that U.S. foreign policy in a given region has been clearly stated and adequate, accurate information has been provided, the influence of television coverage diminishes proportionately. (U.S. Congress 1994, 5)

In closing, it should be noted that the media have long affected U.S. foreign policy. A century ago, William Randolph Hearst's muckrakers helped foment U.S. public opinion in favor of the Spanish American War. The difference today comes in the speed in which the media report, the visceral impact of the visual images they broadcast, and the very pervasiveness of media outlets. Whether it is CNN at the barbershop or the New York Times at the bus stop, the media are everywhere. The model outlined here offers promise in making sense of how the new technology of the mass media has affected foreign policy. However, the opportunity presents itself for this and subsequent administrations to ensure that pictures do not drive policy. The media need not set America's foreign policy agenda. If the administration has already set and communicated one, they need only report on it.
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Why The Southern African Development Council Should Participate In The World Energy Efficiency Association

by Kevin H. Ellsworth

Modern transportation and communication have provided the international community with an unprecedented potential for economic growth and development through global and regional cooperation. To harness this potential for cooperative development, international regimes and regional organizations have mobilized to provide forums for cooperation. Unfortunately, organizations supplying services and those seeking the services do not always find one another. Such is the case with the World Energy Efficiency Association and the Southern African Development Council.

The Southern African Development Council or SADC (pronounced sad’ick) comprises ten southern African states working together for common economic and developmental goals. The states coordinate developmental efforts among themselves and reach abroad for developmental assistance. On the other hand, the World Energy Efficiency Association or WEEA (pronounced wee’ah) dedicates itself to helping developing nations use and produce energy efficiently by supplying those nations with a variety of coordinating and informative services. Dozens of developing countries have begun seeking WEEA’s assistance.

Unfortunately, southern African states have had remarkably little contact with WEEA, and SADC has had no involvement in WEEA. In fact, of the 33 countries represented at WEEA’s organizational conference, Senegal was the only Sub-Saharan African nation represented. This paper introduces SADC and WEEA by presenting their backgrounds, goals and abilities. It then exposes the general state of SADC’s energy sector and its need for development. Finally, it analyzes SADC’s developmental needs and WEEA’s ability to address some of those needs, making it clear that SADC has much to gain by participating in WEEA.
in Lusaka, Zambia, determined four main objectives:

- "The reduction of economic dependence, particularly, but not only on RSA [the Republic of South Africa];
- The forging of links to create a genuine and equitable regional integration;
- The mobilization of resources to promote the implementation of national, interstate, and regional policies;
- Concerted action to secure international cooperation within the framework of the strategy for economic liberation."

(Zehender 1983, 18)

Since that time, SADC has met yearly to discuss developmental policies and coordinate development projects.

Due to the SADC states' vast political differences, the countries attending the Lusaka conference formulated a strategy that enabled cooperation without limiting the members' sovereignty. To protect the states' sovereignty, SADC created a highly decentralized structure with a very small central bureaucracy. The states agreed to make all council decisions by consensus, and to grant each state complete control of projects within their territory. To enable coordination, on the other hand, each state oversees one development sector for the entire SADC region. Several countries also preside over subsectors that more evenly distribute Mozambique's weighty responsibility in the transportation sector (see Table 1). The country responsible for each developmental sector secures financial aid and other guidance for projects throughout the region associated with its sector. Angola bears responsibility for SADC's energy sector.

Since its conception, SADC has played a vital role in many developmental projects. The leader of the Organization for African Unity (OAU) describes SADC as "the most successful regional grouping in Africa" (Botswana Daily News 27 August, 1990). By 1988, SADC had hosted 571 projects utilizing over seven billion dollars of domestic and foreign funding (Mulaisho 1988, 36). Due, however, to a civil war in Angola, lack of resources, and lack of coordination with other developing countries, SADC has accomplished little in the critically important energy sector.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SADC Country</th>
<th>Development Sector</th>
<th>Subsector</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Energy conservation and security</td>
<td>Energy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>Animal disease control</td>
<td>Telecommunications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>Soil conservation and Land utilization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>Fisheries, Forestry, and Wildlife</td>
<td>Roads</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>Transportation and Communications</td>
<td>Shipping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>Manpower development</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>Industrial development</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>Southern African development fund, Mining</td>
<td>Airways</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Food security plan, Printing of security papers</td>
<td>Railroads</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: (Anglin 1983, 693; Gambari 1991, 90).

The World Energy Efficiency Association

The World Energy Efficiency Association originated in the United Nations' 1992 Earth Summit. Of the many ideas developed in that conference, the Atlantic Council of the United States (a Washington, D.C. think tank) selected several issues it found particularly important to international affairs. The Atlantic Council assembled a working group of 73 energy experts from around the world to develop a policy plan which they presented in a policy paper entitled Energy Technology Cooperation for Sustainable Economic Development (Atlantic Council of the United States 1992).

In this policy paper, the experts recommended how governments could best assist the world energy sector's development, particularly in developing countries where energy needs are
growing rapidly (International Energy Agency 1982, 155). One of these recommendations received overwhelmingly positive feedback the recommendation to form a "World Council for Energy Efficiency." This organization would serve three key purposes:

- "to serve as a clearinghouse for information on energy conservation programs, technologies and measures;
- to disseminate this information worldwide; and
- to publicize international cooperation efforts in energy conservation."

(Atlantic Council of the United States 1992, 27)

To make the World Council for Energy Efficiency a reality, the Atlantic Council's Office of Energy and Environment formed an Organizational Committee. This committee established a legal framework, compiled a list of potential participants, and solicited the first year's funding. On June 14, 1993, the World Energy Efficiency Association became officially incorporated as a private, non-profit organization. During the following two days, 63 world experts met in an organizational conference and decided that WEEA should focus its attention on the following:

- "Develop a more comprehensive directory of institutions interested in energy efficiency;"
- Develop in-depth profiles of energy conservation centers;
- Prepare a guide to data bases on energy efficiency technologies;
- Assist members, in particular energy conservation centers, in establishing contacts with knowledgeable institutions which can help solve specific problems;
- Providing general comments on members future programs;
- Help members to find information on general policies and programs which contribute to increased energy efficiency;
- Participate on a cooperative basis in conferences on energy efficiency;
- Prepare public relations material on energy efficiency and conservation;
- Help coordinate voluntary support for individual members to the extent possible."

(World Energy Efficiency Association 1993)

The significance of these goals becomes more evident when viewed in the context of SADC's energy needs.

**SADC's General State Of Energy Development**

Perhaps nowhere in the world is it as evident as in the SADC countries that "energy cuts across the whole of the economy, [and] its crisis caused severe disruptions in virtually every sector of society" (Bhagavan 1990, ix). In SADC, as in most underdeveloped regions, the lack of energy development negatively affects the economy, the environment, the social structure and the citizens' quality of life.

The SADC nations' energy sectors are extremely limited when compared with the Republic of South Africa and its immediately dependent states (S.A.C.U.) and more so when compared with the United States. Per capita energy consumption in the United States is three hundred times that of Mozambique, meaning that the average American uses almost as much energy in one day as the average Mozambican uses in a whole year. In spite of SADC members' low consumption, all but Angola is forced to import much more energy than they export. Malawi, Mozambique, and Tanzania produce almost no energy at all.

The limited state of energy development alone is not necessarily negative--many developed nations are actively seeking to lessen their energy consumption. Combined, however, with the energy sector's nature and its environmental, social, and economic impact, SADC's energy sector does present some severe problems.

An underdeveloped energy sector negatively affects a countries' economic development due to the "complex relationship between economics, energy and social development. The consumption and production of energy will shape the pace and pattern of economic development and the direction of social and institutional development" (International Energy Agency 1982, 154). As the energy sector falls, so does overall economic growth (International Energy Agency 1982, 159).

In terms of economic development, all ten SADC countries combined have only one third the gross national product of the Republic of South Africa (Ellsworth 1993, 15). Furthermore, the average gross national product per
Table 2. Comparison of SADC Countries Energy Statistics.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SADC Country</th>
<th>Energy(^1) Production</th>
<th>Energy Consumption</th>
<th>Energy(^2) Consumption per capita</th>
<th>Energy Exports</th>
<th>Energy Imports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>32,259</td>
<td>848</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>29,817</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>494</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>546</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>939</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>1,013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>1,425</td>
<td>1,887</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>881</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>5,373</td>
<td>6,574</td>
<td>720</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>1,401</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.A.C.U.(^3)</td>
<td>135,804</td>
<td>107,982</td>
<td>2,760</td>
<td>43,307</td>
<td>23,040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>2,054,484</td>
<td>2,457,913</td>
<td>10,015</td>
<td>119,359</td>
<td>548,483</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (United Nations 1990, 2-15)

1 All energy units except energy consumption per capita are measured in terms of 1,000 metric tons of coal equivalent.
2 Energy consumption per capita is measured in terms of kilograms of coal equivalent.
3 The Southern African Customs Union, comprised of the Republic of South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland.

capita of the SADC nations was only $340 in 1990, down from $380 in 1980 (Ellsworth 1993, 11). These countries, already desperate for financial assistance, are losing money on inefficient and inappropriate means of energy production. Not only does this deplete these countries' resources, but it also deters industrial development which prefers cheap and abundant energy.

One of the most rapidly depleting resources resulting from SADC's energy needs is wood. Low levels of energy development require that most people rely on wood for energy which leads to wood shortages. Wood burning currently comprises 79 percent of all SADC energy consumption (Munslow et al. 1988, 5), which is significantly higher than any other underdeveloped region (Frisch 1983, 65). Unsustainable wood-burning destroys forests, which in turn speeds up the process of desertification and drives wildlife and people from their traditional lands.

These effects impact the social structure of a country, and the well being of its citizens (Bhagavan 1990, xi). Because most people depend on wood for their energy, fuelwood supplies are rapidly diminishing in many areas of SADC countries. Consequently, people must seek energy in other ways. Electricity, however, makes up only 4.5 percent of SADC energy use, and many rural villages are far from cities where electricity is accessible (Bhagavan 1984, 40; Wisner 1984, 109).

As populations deplete the wood supply and cannot find or create alternative energy sources, they are compelled to move to locations where energy is available. Many people move to rapidly overcrowding cities where they can more easily obtain energy sources such as electricity or kerosene. This trend, in concert with other social and environmental factors, contributes to massive urban migration. Between 1960 and 1985, the percentage of the total population living in urban areas grew dramatically. Zambian cities which hosted only 17.2 percent of the total population in 1960, housed 49.5 percent by 1985. Botswana's urban populations grew from 1.8 percent to 19.2 percent during that same time (Munslow 1988, 112). Between 1985 and 1990, SADC urban
populations were expected to rise an average of about 7 percent per year whereas rural populations were expected to grow only 2 percent per year (Munslow 1988, 112). This mass urbanization has altered the social fabric of the SADC countries and contributes to unemployment, health problems, and loss of traditional lifestyles.

Each of these problems (economy, environment, and urban migration) are further compounded by the anticipated trends in economic and population growth--too little of the former and too much of the latter. An underdeveloped and inefficient energy sector not only restricts economic growth but is also a result of poor growth. As other countries develop, they will be able to attain the economic resources needed to develop their energy sectors, and improve their electric grid (among other solutions) to relieve much of the stress caused by an underdeveloped and overtaxed energy sector. Southern Africa, however, is not expected to experience the economic development which would be necessary to accomplish this feat.

SADC countries experience economic growth rates currently ranging from 10.2 percent to -5.0 percent, and even those successful cases of economic growth are lessened when population growth is factored in. Consequently, the region is experiencing negative GNP/capita growth.

Table 2. SADC Population and Economic Growth Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SADC Country</th>
<th>Population 1993 in thousands</th>
<th>Population Doubling Time (in years)</th>
<th>Pop. Growth Rate (in percent/year)</th>
<th>GNP Growth (percent/year)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>9,142</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>1,327</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>1,896</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>9,781</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>16,535</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>-5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>1,632</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>906</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>28,727</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>9,048</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>11,351</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (Broderbund Software 1993).

As a result of these problems, SADC has recognized that energy is an important developmental issue and has assigned Angola to preside over energy development. Unfortunately, Angola has been unable to tackle so huge a problem, and many energy developmental needs remain unfulfilled.

SADC’s Energy Development Needs And WEEA’s Ability To Address Those Needs Energy Efficiency

SADC needs a way to increase the productive capability of its limited energy resources. Because massive new power stations are neither affordable nor necessarily helpful, SADC must focus its efforts on other developmental strategies. Because of the low amounts of capital required, the In-
ternational Energy Agency has declared that "increasing energy...efficiency...presents the greatest potential for short-term improvements in the energy balances of developing countries (1982, 167)."

The World Energy Efficiency Association focuses specifically on energy efficiency. In a variety of ways presented later, WEEA encourages and enables developing countries to improve the efficient production and consumption of energy.

**Tailored Developmental Information**

Specifically tailored advice and guidance is crucial to the efficient production and use of energy. For decades, most of the energy development effort in developing countries has been led by insufficiently funded central governments or first world private and governmental powers. Both of these actors have too frequently looked to developed nations to learn how best to develop their energy sector. Historically, this approach has failed (Peet 1984, 83). The problem lies in the vastly different conditions facing many third world countries as compared with the developed world. Africa, especially, needs tailored developmental assistance. One author claims that "Africa as the poorest and most rural area of the world experiencing some of the worst environmental problems is widely regarded as being particularly suitable for AT [appropriate technology]" (Segal 1992, 124).

Where people depend almost exclusively on wood for their energy, effective development is not necessarily found in skyscrapers or nuclear power plants. Such technologies are not necessarily suited for SADC's present state of development. Instead, simpler technologies for burning wood more efficiently may be much more helpful. A simple metal ring surrounding the fire will burn wood almost twice as efficiently as the three-stone fire traditionally used in rural Africa; a kerosene pressure stove is five times more efficient (Munslow 1988, 124). Considering SADC's heavy reliance on wood as an energy source, these simple technologies could have a revolutionary effect. Ideally, substituting a simple stove for the traditional three-stone fire pit would cut SADC's fuel-wood consumption in half, requiring only 132 kilograms of wood per month rather than 264 (Munslow 1988, 124). Rural habitants could spend half as much time collecting wood and spend that time in more productive pursuits. Urban migration might slow and the environmental taxation would reach more sustainable levels.

This simple example demonstrates potentially successful energy efficient development. Were such developmental techniques able to spread to other applicable countries, they could benefit millions of people. Having acknowledged this potential benefit, WEEA planned one of its primary purposes to serve as a clearinghouse for information on energy conservation programs "and disseminating this information worldwide (Atlantic Council of the United States 1992, 27)." The World Energy Efficiency Association, through access to large data bases, can coordinate technologies with conditions to find successful matches. Conditions in SADC are very similar to other African and developing countries, and it might be able to profit from their experience.

**Information Exchange**

Not only is it important that SADC countries exchange technology and experience with countries outside the region, but it must also be able to efficiently exchange information and coordinate research among its own members. Earlier efforts to achieve this coordination through organizations such as the Europe-Southern African Research Group (ESARG) or the Southern African Development and Research Association (SADRA) are often considered too outdated and repetitive to be useful (Brown 1989, 80). Therefore, some feel a great need for a forum which could better disseminate information and coordinate resources and research efforts. WEEA could potentially act to fill this void by not only establishing a more efficient network base regarding energy efficiency research, professionals and resources within SADC, but also by linking that network to a world-wide net of similar expertise and information.

**International Recognition**

SADC's plea for developmental assistance must be heard if it is to be answered; it needs international recognition.
SADC represents a cause that many countries might like to assist, but without the necessary publicity it is unlikely to receive that assistance. Most of the first world does not know SADC exists; only one institution does any significant research concerning it—the Scandinavian Institute for African Studies. WEEA’s founding president had no relationship with SADC (Guertin 1993). Other African nations, however, know of its presence and potential; Dr. Youba Sokona, a WEEA delegate from Senegal, stated that SADC would be well suited to participate in WEEA (Sokona 1993).

WEEA would provide SADC at least two opportunities to gain publicity. First, WEEA publishes a directory of energy efficiency centers throughout the world. SADC could be included in this publication. Second, WEEA hosts conferences which SADC representatives could attend.

**Political Neutrality and Uninfringed Sovereignty**

Throughout SADC’s existence, political neutrality has been necessary for its survival. The ten member countries range in governmental structure from democracies (Namibia) to monarchies (Lesotho) to single-party Marxist governments (Mozambique—until recently). They have always been careful not to infringe on each other’s political sovereignty by making every decision by consensus. SADC even boasts it is “an organization which prides itself on moving at the pace of the slowest member and thereby never risking disagreement (Weisfelder 1991, 5).” SADC decided that it was better to transcend political differences for the common goal of development than to let the political differences interfere with the common good. Any international organization in which they participated would need to do the same.

WEEA is politically neutral; it simply provides a service. For WEEA’s purpose, worldwide participation is more important than a political agenda. To achieve its purpose, WEEA encourages broad-based participation, and attempts to transcend political differences. This only becomes a problem when mutually unrecognized countries are both invited, as was the case with Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China. Each refused to participate if the other were invited. Eventually both agreed to participate.

Just as WEEA enabled Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China to form non-political ties, WEEA could also help SADC to form ties with South Africa and the rest of the world in non-threatening relationships. WEEA’s non-imposing strategy could protect its members’ sovereignty, while at the same time enabling them to reap the benefits of broader cooperation.

**Flexibility**

SADC is now experiencing a transition phase; it needs the flexibility to adjust to changing times. SADC is currently considering forming a regional free trade area (Holman 1992, 8) and is adjusting to a changing South Africa (Holman 1992, 6). Consequently, SADC needs an organization that allows and enables flexibility and change.

WEEA provides SADC an opportunity to expand its degree of regional cooperation in both breadth and depth. WEEA could provide expanded breadth through cooperation on a world level, and it could strengthen the depth of its focus in a very crucial issue of economic development, the efficiency of its energy sector. WEEA enables greater flexibility of action, without compelling any action from its members.

**Financial Assistance**

Much of SADC’s energies are spent trying to locate international assistance for developmental projects. WEEA is not capable of providing any direct funding, but it could “help coordinate voluntary support for individual members to the extent possible (World Energy Efficiency Association 1993).” Often a key to fund-raising is developing the necessary contacts. WEEA’s networking approach would be invaluable in such an effort.

**Timeliness**

WEEA’s recent entrance onto the world stage is ideal for SADC for two main reasons: 1) SADC needs its assistance now more than ever, and 2) if SADC participates now, during WEEA’s organizational stage, it could exercise its influence over WEEA’s formation. Each is worth considering.
First, SADC's economic, environmental and social needs demonstrate how vital energy-efficient developmental assistance is. Especially in relation to the fuel-wood crisis, SADC is quickly falling from its precarious subsistence, scavenger economy (Karenzi 1990, 43). As SADC faces soaring population growth, bleak economic growth rates, massive urban migration and environmental degradation, action now becomes urgent. The Atlantic Council saw the urgent need for WEEA while attending the United Nation's Earth Summit. The international community echoed that observation (Atlantic Council 1992, 27).

Second, SADC could influence WEEA's development to better meet SADC's needs. Many issues in WEEA's organization remain unsettled and will continue in a state of flux during the formative years. In spite of the low Sub-Saharan African representation at WEEA's organizational conference, many developments are beginning to work in SADC's favor. Even though Africa was not well represented, the developing world was represented by 37 participants who have desires and needs similar to SADC's. Membership dues for developing countries are becoming substantially less than those for institutions from developed countries. The third world WEEA representatives also strongly supported the establishment of regional WEEA offices, one of which would be in Africa.

Recent events also have granted Sub-Saharan Africa a greater direct influence over WEEA's formation. The sole Sub-Saharan African in attendance, Dr. Youba Sokona, was nominated and confirmed to the Board of Directors as a Vice Chairman as well as a member of the Development and Executive Committees. Another South African not in attendance was nominated to the Nominating Committee.

To summarize SADC's needs and WEEA's abilities to assist, note Table 3.

Conclusion

Today's world is filled with both devastating needs and the ability to provide solutions for many of those needs. Unfortunately, lack of coordination prevents many of the world's ills from finding their cure. Such a situation now faces SADC and WEEA. WEEA is capable of providing SADC a great service once the two organizations find one another.

WEEA is currently seeking out potential members, but the scope of this search is so vast that it might completely pass over SADC if someone does not bring it directly to WEEA's attention. Consequently, the Southern African Development Council should take the initiative of contacting and seeking to participate in the World Energy Efficiency Association.
Table 3. Comparison of SADC's Developmental Needs and WEEA's Ability to Fulfill those Needs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SADC's Needs</th>
<th>WEEA's Abilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Energy efficiency.</td>
<td>Assist energy-efficient development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Applicable technological information.</td>
<td>Provide a clearinghouse for energy efficiency technologies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Link SADC with other developing countries who have very similar experiences and developmental conditions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information exchange within SADC</td>
<td>Provide structure for a database which could be applied to an intra-regional technology network.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to the international community.</td>
<td>Provide a listing of energy efficiency centers throughout the world.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Provide a database of many public and private institutions related to energy efficiency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Publicity and recognition in the international community.</td>
<td>Include SADC in international guides and databases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political neutrality and uninfringed state sovereignty.</td>
<td>WEEA is politically neutral and does not infringe whatsoever on a state's sovereignty.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flexibility.</td>
<td>WEEA would enable and allow change as SADC faces transitional times.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial aid for development projects.</td>
<td>Unable to provide funding, but provides an excellent forum for creating contacts with potential funders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timeliness.</td>
<td>SADC needs a forum like WEEA now.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>WEEA is in its organizational stage and could be influenced by SADC to better meet southern Africa's needs.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
WORKS CITED


Mormons and the Christian Right: Are They “Right” for Each Other?

by Dan Elenbaas

The Christian Right represents one of the most significant political movements in modern U.S. history. Despite what many political analysts and liberal activists have characterized as the decreasing influence of the conservative Christian movement (see especially Frum 1994, 17; Jelen 1993, 178; and Jelen and Wilcox 1992, 199), the Christian Right scored a major victory in the recent 1994 mid-term elections, helping the Republicans gain control of both houses of Congress for the first time since the Eisenhower Administration. According to John Green, a Christian Right expert at the University of Akron, twenty-four of the thirty Christian Coalition-supported candidates he followed won their 1994 congressional elections (Shanahan 1994, 3). The Coalition itself takes credit for helping Republican candidates win forty-four House Seats (including most of the new seats), eight new Senate seats, and seven governorships (American Political Network 1994). Regardless of whose numbers are more correct, no one is refuting that the Christian Right played a significant and expanded role in this year’s elections.

As the nation’s political scientists attempt to unravel the mysteries behind the Republican landslide of 1994, renewed attention is appropriately being given to the role of the Christian Right. Among the important questions being asked are, “what is the Christian Right?”, “who is included in the Christian Right?”, and “what is the future of the Christian Right?” A recent Campaign and Elections article attempting to answer some of these questions, discussed how to best classify members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons):

There is reasonable dispute over whether all of the considerable Mormon influence in the Utah Republican Party organization should be considered as being part of the Christian Right (Persinos 1994, 22).

The explanation for this “reasonable dispute” is that while Mormons seem to behave and vote like the Christian Right, they do not tend to belong to any of the organizations associated with the Christian Right.

In this paper, I will show that Mormon voting behavior has indeed been substantially consistent with the Christian Right, and will attempt to provide reasons for the similarities. I will also show, however, that despite the resemblances, there are many significant institutional, historical, and cultural barriers to Mormon involvement in the political organizations that comprise the Christian Right.

Background

The New Christian Right is the modern incarnation of a long tradition of conservative Protestant political activity in the United States. Since the turn of the century, fundamentalist Christians have coalesced into significant political movements at least three distinct times (Wilcox 1992, 4-20). In the 1920s, the Christian Right’s first political battle was against the teaching of evolution in public schools. Although the anti-evolution movement enjoyed only limited success, their organizational and political strategies were fairly sophisticated. Following a relative decline in the 1930s and 1940s, the Christian Right reemerged in the fight against communism in the 1950s and 1960s. The third major wave of conservative Christian activism, which continues today, started in the mid-1970s with the election of born-again Christian Jimmy Carter.

Since Carter’s election over twenty years ago, the New Christian Right (so called to distinguish itself from previous Christian Right movements) has enjoyed mixed success. The most notable organization of the late 1970s and 1980s was the Moral Majority, founded in 1978 by televangelist Jerry Falwell. After an initial period of high-profile success, the Moral Majority’s financial support waned, and in 1989 Falwell disbanded the organization after claiming that it had achieved its goals. Pentecostal and Charismatic Christians wasted no time in picking up where Falwell left off. Pat Robertson, another popular televangelist, immediately organized a new conservative religious organization called the Christian Coalition.
Since its inception in 1989, the Christian Coalition has become the leading Christian Right organization in the U.S. The Christian Coalition claims a current national membership of over 1.4 million members, organized in 1,144 chapters and covering all fifty states (Griffith 1994, A10). In the 1994 elections, this grass-roots oriented organization spent millions of dollars and passed out over 33 million voter guides throughout the country (Shanahan 1994, 3). A recent survey by Campaigns and Elections showed that the Christian Right, primarily through the organizational strength of the Christian Coalition, has become the dominant working majority in eighteen state Republican Parties, and has substantial strength in thirteen other states (Persinos 1994, 22).

Like Jerry Falwell, who claimed to speak for “‘Catholics, Jews, Protestants, Mormons, and Fundamentalists’ seeking to restore moral equilibrium to the United States” (Wilcox 1992, xii), the Christian Coalition is open to members of all faiths. Despite their open-membership policy, however, the Christian Coalition is primarily comprised of fundamentalist, Pentecostal, and Charismatic Christians. Mormon membership in the Christian Coalition continues to remain small, however, in spite of the fact that Mormons seem to agree with the Christian Right on most of today’s political issues.

**Similar Political Behavior**

Defining the Christian Right can be very difficult. Some analysts limit membership to born-again Christians, while others include only those who are dues-paying members of Christian Right organizations (Hamilton 1994, 28). The first method is not particularly useful in analyzing Mormon membership in the Christian Right because Mormons may or may not be considered “born-again”; the second method is flawed in the same way that saying only those who pay dues to the Democratic party should be considered Democrats. A more valid measure of membership in the Christian Right movement is political behavior. In this respect, Mormons seem to fit the Christian Right mold quite well. Data from the 1994 KBYU/Utah Colleges Exit Poll administered by Dr. David Magleby, Professor of Political Science at Brigham Young University, shows a strong correlation between the voting attitudes and behavior of Mormons and the attitudes and behaviors that characterize the conservative Christian movement. Particularly in terms of ideology, partisanship, and social issues, Mormons in Utah appear to fit the Christian Right mold perfectly.

Ideologically, there is consensus that members of the Christian Right are predominantly conservative (Hamilton 1994, 28; Green, Guth, and Hill 1993, 87; Wilcox 1989a, 403-4). Data from the BYU exit poll shows that self-identified “active” Mormons in Utah tend to consider themselves substantially more conservative than their inactive-Mormon and non-Mormon neighbors (see Figure 1).

**Figure 1 (Magleby 1994)**

Data collected by the National Opinion Research Center reveals that while 54 percent of Mormons surveyed classified themselves as conservative, only 40 percent of Evangelical Protestants classify themselves that way (Wald 1992, 82). These studies confirm that Mormons are actually more conservative as a group than the fundamentalist Christians who comprise most of the “official” Christian Right.

Another significant determinant of Christian Right membership is party affiliation. There is a strong and continuous correlation between support of the conservative Christian movement and identification with the Republican Party (Green, Guth and Hill, 87; Wilcox 1989a, 404; Wilcox 1989b, 58). In Utah, 75 percent of all Mormon voters classified themselves as Republicans (Magelby 1994). Nationwide, according to data from the National Opinion Research Center, 57 percent of Mormons classified themselves as Republicans, compared to only 33 percent of the Evangelical Protestants (Wald 1992, 80). The relationship between Mormons and the Republican party is espe-
cially clear when looking at the recent voting behavior of "active" Mormons in Utah (Figure 2).

Figure 2 (Magleby 1994)

*Although popular conservative Democratic incumbent Bill Orton easily won reelection in Utah's 3rd Congressional District, when voters were asked whether they would support a Republican or Democrat if Bill Orton was not running, an overwhelming majority said they would choose the Republican.

Once again, Mormon party identification and voting behavior appear to make them natural candidates for inclusion with the Christian Right.

A third well-established measure of support for the Christian Right is position on certain social issues. Members of the Christian Right tend to hold conservative positions on most social issues such as abortion and school prayer (Wald, 227-78). As shown below, active Mormons take very conservative positions on these and other contemporary social issues (Figure 3).

Figure 3 (Magleby 1994)

By nearly every measure, Mormons seem to be more conservative, more Republican, and more in-line with Christian Right issue positions than most other religious groups that currently constitute the conservative Christian movement. In terms of ideology, party affiliation, and social issues, Mormons may even "out-right" the Christian Right. Based on their political behavior patterns, Mormons should be included in the Christian Right.

Reasons for the Similarities

The similarities in political attitudes and behavior between Mormons and the conservative Christians can be substantially accounted for by key similarities in their religious values, beliefs, and practices. While both sides may be hesitant to admit it, there is significant overlap in the doctrines of the Mormon church and the various Protestant churches typically associated with the Christian Right. These overlaps are in areas that bare a direct relationship to political behavior.

One significant indicator of support for the Christian Right is an individual's level of religiosity. It has been shown that members of the Christian Coalition are considerably more active in their religious worship than members of their faith who are not part of the Coalition (Wilcox 1989b, 57). Based on the data from the 1994 KBYU/Utah Colleges Exit Poll, 78 of the respondents were Mormon, and over 90 percent of those considered themselves religiously active. How does religiosity translate into participation in the conservative Christian movement? It seems the more devout an individual is in his or her faith, the more likely he or she will attempt to actively promote the values associated with that faith.

In the effort to promote the values connected with their respective religious traditions, the fact that Mormons and members of the Christian Right have been shown to take substantially similar positions on most contemporary issues is not a fluke. Although there are important theological differences between the Mormons and the fundamentalist Protestants, they both believe that the Bible is the word of God, that Jesus Christ is divine, and that he will return to the earth to rule during a Millennium of peace. Both groups are guided by Biblical commandments against adulterous sexual relationships (including a prohibition of homosexuality), against abortion, and against many other modern-day vices.

The combination of similar moral codes based on Christian teachings and high levels of religiosity equates to Mormon and Christian Right political behaviors that seem to mirror each other. Based on this data alone, one would presume a high-level of Mormon membership in the various Christian Right organization. A closer look, however, will show that this is not the case.
**Different Motivations, Different Tactics**

While similarities in political behavior can be attested to the Mormons' similar religious values, that same value structure also results in several important differences between Mormons and the Christian Right. These deeply rooted differences have been strong enough to preclude Mormons from active participation in Christian Right organizations, and will likely continue to have that effect. Some of the reasons for lack of Mormon participation are the role, policies, and mission of the Mormon church itself, the animosity between Mormons and fundamentalist groups, and the cultural tradition and history of Mormons.

One major reason for the lack of Mormon membership in the formal organizations of the New Christian Right is the official policies of their church regarding institutional political involvement. The church itself employs a specific policy of political non-involvement which prohibits the use of church resources and facilities for political causes (Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints 1985, 11-12). While this does not mean that the Mormon church is apolitical (it has taken positions on several moral-political issues), it is a significant contrast to the norms of political participation in fundamentalist Christian churches, where religious leaders often play a primary role in politics (e.g., Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson).

In an article examining the relationship of the Mormon church to the then popular Moral Majority, Brinkerhoff, Jacob, and Mackie (1985, 243) conclude that not only is the Mormon church non-political, but that open political involvement is actually inimical to the stated "mission" of the proselytizing church:

> The attempt to build the Church (for Mormons this means gaining converts) through the presentation of the virtues of Mormon culture (emphasis on the family, achievements of members, etc.) requires a focus of energies and a distancing from extremism.... The late Mormon President Spencer W. Kimball exemplified this focused pragmatism when he stated that while there were some political issues on which the Church might take an institutional stand..., a broad-based political activism should be avoided since "the result would be to divert the Church from its basic mission of teaching the restored gospel of the Lord to the world."

Rather than the widespread integration of politics and religion found in fundamentalist Christian churches, the Mormon church has tried to remain as politically subtle as possible in order to appeal to the greatest number of potential converts. This focus not only applies to the church as an institution, but also has a significant impact on the lives and levels of political activism of its members.

For active Mormons, the church is second only to the family in terms of loyalty and participation. The Mormon church requires such a high level of commitment and activity from its members that participation in other outside groups is typically limited. This is due in part to the lay nature of the Mormon church, in part to the doctrinal focuses of the importance of the family, and in part to the many time-consuming programs (including missionary work) implemented by the church. Participation in outside groups, especially ones with near-religious vigor like the Christian Right, is difficult for active Mormons due to the established loyalties and significant time constraints resulting from membership in their church.

In addition to the more practical considerations, however, there is a deeper, historical reason Mormons have excluded themselves from Christian Right organizations. Much of the substantial persecution levied upon the Mormon church and its members in the nineteenth century was at the hands of the members of the same churches that now make up the New Christian Right. Although manifestations of the enmity between the Mormons and fundamentalist Christians have toned down over the years, an underlying intolerance remains. A 1985 study of religious social distance in the U.S. found that the "greatest degree of intolerance or social distance manifest by one religious group towards another is that of the Conservative Christians for the Mormons" (Brinkerhoff, Jacob, and Mackie 1985, 241).

The intolerance for Mormons held by many fundamentalist Christians is no secret. Even in their attempts to welcome Mormons into their organizations, fundamentalist Christians often refer to the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints as a "non-Christian cult" — a very offensive characterization to Mormons. At a recent Christian Coalition Conference, an evangelical was overheard saying that "even though Mormons are a cult, they are welcome in the common moral cause" (Witham 1994, A4). To many Mormons, these hardly represent words of welcome.

As a consequence of Fundamentalist antipathy toward them, Mormons are unlikely to
feel comfortable associating with one of the main sources of anti-Mormon literature. As recently as the 1994 elections, Mormons were credited with helping defeat what would normally be considered a doctrinally sound anti-gay measure in Idaho (Dunlap 1994, 9). Mormon opposition to the initiative was due in part to their historical memory of being persecuted as a minority group, and in part as a response to revelations that the bill’s sponsors hired the same film studio that was used to promote the highly publicized anti-Mormon film, “The Godmakers” (Trillhaase 1994, B2). It is exactly this kind of case that shows how Mormon political behavior is significantly impacted by their unique religious goals and cultural history.

In addition to helping defeat the Christian Right’s anti-gay efforts in Idaho, Mormons and Mormon politicians have often departed from their staunch conservative positions, especially when the rights of a minority group are affected. Although Mormon Representative Earnest Istook (R-Oklahoma) has been selected by new Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich to “take the lead on school prayer” (Merida and Dewar 1994, A1), renowned Mormon Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) has attempted to play a moderating role on such important Christian Right issues as school prayer, abortion, and term limits (Roderick 1994, 170, 213). While neither Hatch nor Istook officially represent the Mormon community, they are representative of the sometimes unpredictable political behavior of Mormons.

Conclusions

The data is incontrovertible: Mormon political behavior on an individual level qualifies them to be included in the broad definition of the Christian Right. Mormons tend to be ideologically conservative, they tend to be Republicans, and they tend to hold traditional positions on social issues. Much of the similarity between Mormons and the Christian Right can be ascribed to the similarities of their value systems. Although theologically different, both have many key doctrines in common.

In spite of their agreement on most socio-religious issues, as Brinkerhoff, Jacob, and Mackie (1987, 247) aptly put it,

...the dynamics of Mormon organizational culture, however, with its emphasis on respectability and moderation and a religious pragmatism that channels most of its energies into church expansion, makes ongoing alliances problematic.

Mormons may act like they belong to the Christian Right, but because of the institutional requirements and doctrinal differences of the Mormon church, together with the historical enmity between the two groups, Mormons will likely never become a significant part of the formal conservative Christian movement.

WORKS CITED


NOTES

1 The 1994 KBYU/Utah Colleges Exit Poll surveyed over 7,000 Utah voters in ninety polling places on November 8, 1994.

2 Active LDS includes voters who classified themselves as either “very active LDS” or “somewhat active LDS.” Inactive LDS includes voters who classified themselves as either “not very active LDS” or “not active LDS.” Non-LDS includes all other voters.
The Supreme Politics:  
A Study of Partisan Influences on the U.S. Judiciary  

by Dana Morrey

In 1981, first-year President Ronald Reagan nominated Sandra Day O'Connor to replace retiring Justice Potter Stewart to assume the role of Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court. The Republican-controlled Senate easily confirmed Justice O'Connor in a convincing 99-0 vote. Five years later Reagan nominated Justice William Rehnquist to succeed Warren Burger as Chief Justice, and Antonin Scalia to assume Rehnquist's position. Again both nominations were given to a Republican Senate, and again both nominees were confirmed. Scalia gained a 98-0 Senate vote, and even the proven strict conservative Justice Rehnquist weathered a filibuster intended to block his promotion, and was confirmed by a 65-33 margin. In 1987, Reagan again had the chance to name a justice to the Supreme Court, and he offered another known conservative, convinced the confirmation would be as easy as the last three. Robert Bork, however, was rejected by a 58-42 vote on October 23, 1987. On October 29, 1987, Reagan tried again, nominating Douglas Ginsburg, only to see this nomination withdrawn after heated Senate debates. It was only with third-choice Anthony Kennedy that Reagan found success, as Kennedy was confirmed by a 99-0 vote on February 3, 1988 (Massaro 1990, 157-58).

What was the difference between Reagan's failed nominations and the successful ones? What had changed that turned a president with an excellent nomination track-record into a two-time nomination loser? Could the Reagan Administration have avoided these failed attempts to confirm a conservative justice to the Supreme Court bench?

Former Reagan staff members must still muse about these questions. One explanation that is obvious, perhaps even too obvious, and therefore is easily overlooked. The successful Reagan nominations were handed to a Senate controlled by the Republican Party, and the failed attempts were handled by a Democratically-controlled Senate. Did the divided party control of the presidency and the Senate cause the downfall of Bork and Ginsburg? If so, to what extent can party politics be blamed for failed nominations?

Have other nominees been victims of the same fate? What role does party politics play in the Supreme Court? What role does it play in the judicial branch as a whole?

It is clear that "political party considerations are hardly absent from the judiciary (Beck and Sorauf 1992, 419)." While not as visible as in other branches of government, partisanship plays a role in shaping the nature of the judicial branch, including the Supreme Court. Party politics and partisanship can impact the members of the Court and judiciary in four ways: First, partisan influences on the selection process itself; second, in the confirmation arena; third, in judging cases while on the bench; and fourth, party considerations on the subject of retirement. Each of these areas of party influence will be examined in detail.

To Nominate the "Party Man"

There is no question that party considerations play a role in determining who a President will choose to nominate. Theodore Roosevelt, in considering a Supreme Court nomination, once wrote:

[But] in the higher sense, in the proper sense, [a Supreme Court Justice] is not in my judgment fitted for the position unless he is a party man, [and a] constructive statesman (Beck and Sorauf 1992, 421).

Clearly, Theodore Roosevelt is not alone among presidents who nominate "party men" (or today including "party women") to fill the Supreme Court. Since the Eisenhower Administration, only two nominations have been put forth involving a nominee that was not from the president's own party; William Brennan by Eisenhower, and Lewis Powell by Nixon (Ducat and Chase 1992, A17-A19). This pattern of partisan selection is also seen in Table 1, which lists the percentage of lower federal judicial appointments that belong to the same party as each president, beginning with Grover Cleveland:
Table 1. Percent of Judicial Appointments to Federal District and Appeals Courts From the Party of the President

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>President</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cleveland</td>
<td>97.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harrison</td>
<td>87.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McKinley</td>
<td>95.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T. Roosevelt</td>
<td>95.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taft</td>
<td>82.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wilson</td>
<td>98.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harding</td>
<td>97.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coolidge</td>
<td>94.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hoover</td>
<td>85.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. Roosevelt</td>
<td>96.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truman</td>
<td>90.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eisenhower</td>
<td>94.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kennedy</td>
<td>90.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johnson</td>
<td>94.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nixon</td>
<td>92.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ford</td>
<td>81.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carter</td>
<td>90.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reagan</td>
<td>93.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bush</td>
<td>89.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clinton (to June 1994)</td>
<td>88.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


From this table it is clear that presidents seem to have no difficulty making a strong majority of their selection and appointment decisions along party lines. The notable exception to this general rule was former President Jimmy Carter, who attempted to establish a "merit-based" system of selecting federal judges (Ball 1980, 172). This innovation never got by the Senate, and ironically, Carter maintained a 90.3% party selection rating.

Thus, even the potential nominees themselves have accepted the reality that ascending to the Supreme Court bench generally requires prior experience at a lower federal bench. Often, nomination to a federal bench is possible only by establishing contacts among government officials. This is most easily accomplished by ascending in the party ranks.

**Confirmation Partisan Conflict**

After the selection has been made, the confirmation process begins. Perhaps in this area especially the influence of party and partisan behavior is most strongly visible.

Clearly, partisan differences will be most evident in the cases of failed nominations. According to John Massaro, there are three leading factors which could move the Senate to oppose a confirmation: 1) the nominee's ideology, 2) the nominee's party affiliation, and 3) non-ideological considerations (1990, 1). Massaro further suggests that ideological opposition alone would likely not bring about a Senate's disapproval, and either would strict partisan concerns, as the Scalia and O'Connor votes show. There are two conditions, however, that when present can bring ideological concerns or partisan concerns to the surface which will more likely block a nomination. These two conditions are: 1) the majority of the Senate does not share the same party affiliation as the president, and 2) the nomination is forwarded to the Senate in the last full year of a president's term. Table 2 shows the Senate's refusal rates when one or both of these conditions is present.
Table 2. Senate Rates of Refusal to Confirm, 1789-1988

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Presence of Unfavorable Conditions of Senate or Timing</th>
<th>Nominations Made</th>
<th>Refused</th>
<th>Rate of Refusal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Neither condition present</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One condition present</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both conditions present</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Notice how refusal rate increased by 9% when one of the negative conditions is present, but jumps to an astounding 71% when both conditions are present (1990, 135-7). These data can be cause for concern for a last-year Senate-opposed president.

The data from Table 2 suggest that partisan or ideological motivations for rejecting a nominee may lie dormant until one or both of these conditions come into play. This may explain the failures of the Fortas, Haynsworth, Carswell, Bork, and Ginsburg nominations as one or both of these conditions were present in each. Both of these considerations can be called "party-based" as the first obviously taps the natural opposition the Senate controlled by the opposing party will feel toward the president, and the second as it taps into the "lame-duck" situation a serious non-ideological, non-partisan grounds for opposing confirmation can be critical in activating this opposition (1990, 147). Such non-partisan concerns can serve as a rallying point for those who truly oppose the nomination on ideological or partisan grounds. This particular phenomena was most recently evident in the Ginsburg nomination where his past experience with marijuana became the focal point of the confirmation debates, and ultimately forced Ginsburg's withdrawal.

Not to overstate the role of the party in the nomination process, Massaro makes it clear the ideology plays the "dominant role" when looking at reasons for opposition. This was seen in the Fortas, Haynsworth, and Carswell nominations as the following table, which focuses on the "deviant votes" of the Senate, illustrates:

Table 3. Deviant Votes Generated by Party And Ideology: the Fortas, Haynsworth, Carswell, and Bork Nominations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nominee Votes Deviating from Party</th>
<th>Votes Deviating from Ideology</th>
<th>Change in Deviant Votes with Ideology</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fortas</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haynsworth</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carswell</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bork</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


This data clearly shows that ideology was a key reason for senators to deviate from their party and oppose the nomination. The Bork data seems to suggest that partisanship was actually a stronger factor than, ideology but this data may simply be the result of stronger ideological parties at the time of Bork's confirmations, or the partisan and political need to support a popular President Reagan. Whatever the reason for ultimate partisan voting regarding Bork, it was clear in the debates that the opposing Senators' primary concerns centered on his 'extreme' ideology. A more recent example that shows the superior position of ideology is the withdrawn nomi-
nation of Lani Guinier during Clinton's administration. The Senate was held by the Democrats at that time, and it was Clinton's first year as president, so the Guinier nomination should have been easy by the original "conditions" model. Guinier's ideology was so at odds with even the most liberal Democrats, however, that Ted Kennedy, probably the most liberal of them all, stated that Guinier's views were "a threat to the Constitution." With such obvious ideological opposition, Clinton was forced to withdraw the nomination (Carter 1994, 35-53).

Thus, while party and partisanship play a secondary role to ideology, there is no question that it plays some role, if not a significant one. It is as John Frank stated about the Fortas failure: "the entire process, from one end to the other, was hardball politics (Frank 1991, 133)."

Judicial Partisan Activism?

The third area of party influence on the Supreme Court revolves around the actual adjudicating once a nominee successfully attains office. It is, however, more difficult to show partisan influences when the Court has a strong tradition of relying on legal precedent and established legal test. Still, as Professor Jack Peltason once noted, "the decision as to who will make the decisions affects what decisions will be made (Peltason 1955, 29)."

Along these same lines Ball noted the following:

Who hears the case often determines the outcome of the case; the turn of mind of the judge is often the decisive factor in the outcome of the litigation. This fact has not escaped the notice of the president (1980, 160).

Indeed, history provides ample examples of presidents who hoped to "stack the Court" with strong partisans that would be more likely to agree with the president's own policies. Franklin Roosevelt tried to increase the number of justices allowed to sit on the Supreme Court bench in order to pack the Court with supporters of his New Deal social reforms. Reagan and the Republicans also hoped to pack the Court in order to overrule Roe v. Wade and abortion rights. As Stephen Carter stated:

This is certainly true on abortion, where pro-life and pro-choice forces alike have insisted on the privilege of packing the Court. Naturally, they have done so not in the name of partisanship but that of the American people, who evidently are on their side (1994, 81).

So while few judges would admit their reasoning on a decision is based on partisan holdings, and few presidents would care to admit they want to pack the Court, it is clear there is at least some connection between the decision-making process of a justice and the party affiliation of that justice, and this connection cannot be totally eliminated.

John Gates outlines three major theories important to understanding the dynamic of partisan behavior in Supreme Court adjudication. These are: 1) the Legitimation Thesis, 2) the Delegitimizing Role, and 3) the Agenda-Setting Role.

One of the more pervasive roles given to the Supreme Court is that it serves to legitimize the policies of the other branches of government, especially the executive, who has the power to change the Court make-up. This position was first advanced by Robert Dahl in 1957 and has gained some support over the years from Charles Black and others. The most important conclusion to draw from this theory, states Dahl, is that:

...policy views dominant on the Court are never for long out of line with the policy views dominant among the law making majorities of the U.S. Instead of serving as a protector of minority interests, the Court serves to enhance majoritarian democracy by conferring the approval of the much-revered Constitution on the policies of the other branches (1957, 285).

Thus, according to this view, the Court has an inherent nature to eventually support the policies of the majority, and often these policies align along partisan lines.

The second theory sees the role of the Court in an opposite light. The supporters of this theory assert the Court:

...will find itself in conflict with Congress following a critical election. The role of the Court may be to impede the policymaking of new majorities ushered into power in one or more critical elections. ...The Supreme Court remains as custodian of the old regime's ideology. ...Richard Punston has termed this period [between the critical election and replacement of "old regime" justices] as the "lag" period, when the Court is ideologically behind majoritarian forces (1992, 15).

Thus, the Court's partisan make-up may be in conflict with a newly elected government, and these forces may sway the decisions of the justices who are now "the last defense of the upset party." This theory has some historical support most notably when John Adams attempted to
"stack" the judiciary with loyal Federalists after the party's crushing defeat by the Jeffersonian-Democrats in the election of 1800. Led by John Marshall, these Federalists did at times effect­ively block the implementation of new policy by the new government.

The final theory applied to partisan Court behavior also centers on critical elections. The Agenda-Setting Role Theory asserts that before a critical election, the Court can play a significant role in "setting the agenda" or positions of the majority party. Gates states:

during times of instability in the parties, the Court has an unusual opportunity to shape the majority party's position on the realigning issues. This is consistent with Dahl's (1957, 294) observation over twenty-five years ago: There are times when the coalition is unstable with respect to certain key policies; at very great risk to it legitimacy powers, the Court can intervene in such cases and may succeed in establishing policy (1992, 20).

This theory also has some historical evidence to support its claims. David Adamany's analysis of the historical record of two critical presidential election periods, 1896 and 1960-1964, finds that "the Court played a significant role in setting the majority party's position, which was later vindicated at the ballot box (Gates 1992, 20)." Whichever theory is most accurate does not change their common assertion that party politics and partisanship play some role in the judgments of the Court.

It should be noted, however, that these theories describe the relationship of the Court to the large political environment. The actual internal working of the Court are largely void of party influences. The justices do not organize in partisan blocs, they shift voting coalitions often, they are not affected by their own reelection concerns, and they do not interact with party leadership in general. Still, as was already mentioned, it is often difficult to draw a distinction between ideology and party bias when deciding issues. Years of partisan involvement may be difficult to set aside with true objectivity. Ultimately, the Court remains a "political" body.

Supreme Court justices may not be the only ones affected by the partisan forces involved in the selection and adjudicating of the Court. Christopher Smith argues that the controversial nomination and strictly conservative judgments of Justice Clarence Thomas, and the effects of the Anita Hill testimony during his confirmation trial, served to mobilize women, and feminists in particular, against President Bush and the Republican Party (Smith 1993, 126-30). This may partially explain the party's loss of the female vote in the 1992 elections. This analysis suggests that regardless of supposed unbiased judgments, the effects of Supreme Court decisions can effect the partisanship of the electorate.

The Party's Last Call

The final area in which Supreme Court justices reveal some partisan motivations is in the selection for a time of retirement. Justice Thurgood Marshall was reluctant to retire while a Republican was president. Justice Marshall was a devout liberal who did not like the idea of being replaced by another of Reagan's "ultra-conservatives." Clearly, Justice Marshall hoped to hold on to his position until he could be replaced by a Democratic president's nominee. Unfortunately for Marshall, his health could not withstand eight years of Reagan and four more years of Bush, and he was forced to retire during the term of the Bush presidency (Smith 1993, 45). Ironically, Marshall was replaced by what must have been his worst nightmare, Clarence Thomas, who immediately joined the extremely right-wing faction of Scalia and Rehnquist once in the Court. Clearly, this was the very thing Marshall had hoped to avoid.

The experience of Marshall is not unique. Most justices make it no secret they hope to retire during the administration of a president whose party affiliation agrees with their own. Professor Rainey, in studying the retirement patterns of federal-level judges, found the following:

Of those who reached eligibility for retirement prior to 1975 and who had a known party identification, 35% of Supreme Court justices, 45% of Court of Appeals judges, and 51% of District Court judges took retirement while their party was in office. Among the Appeals and District judges there is substantial contingent who bring to the bench political loyalties that encourage them, more often than not, to maneuver their departure in such a way that will maximize the chance for the appointment of a replacement by a president of their party (1976, 1).

Thus, while Supreme Court justices do not seem to follow this trend of partisan-influenced retirement as strongly as lower-level judges, it is clear that some do, and party considerations are never completely absent in the decision to retire. Certainly, Marshall's experience can attest to that.
Supreme Politics

In conclusion, it is clear that party and partisanship definitely play a role in the judicial branch and in the selection, nomination, adjudication, and retirement plans of Supreme Court justices. Gates summarizes this fact in the following:

The traditional idea of the judicial function is that it is essentially nonpolitical. ... This portrayal of the judicial function, however, is rejected by social scientists. ... The realists observed that when precedents are available as a guide to resolving a legal dispute, judges can often distinguish or overrule precedents. Implicit in this view is the assumption that the attitudes and values of individual judges affect their perception of valid claims....

In the modern view of the judicial process there is also a recognition that courts make policy simply as a matter of function. Judicial decisions will aid certain values and societal interests over others. ... Discretion is often available to judges, and at the level of Supreme Court adjudication, few cases are unimportant (1992, 10-12).

So what are the implications of partisan influence for a president who seeks the confirmation of his nomination? Clearly, the president must look at the relevant factors in each case. Is the current Senate majority from the opposing party? How far into the presidential term is this nomination taking place? Does the candidate have non-ideological characteristics that might adversely polarize the Senate vote? What implications will the candidate's likely ideology and judgment behavior have on the issues that are partisan "flashpoints?" All of these questions should be looked at carefully in each nomination a president considers.

In this way, the president can better organize his resources for "battle" if necessary, or quietly pull out a nominee before a drawn-out and potential damaging debate series. Perhaps if Reagan had better considered these factors in 1987, he could have mobilized enough support to confirm Bork, and he certainly would have avoided offering Ginsburg as his "sacrificial lamb." President Clinton may well have avoided the embarrassment of the Lani Guinier withdrawal. Clearly, these partisan factors should always have a strong impact on the president's choices.

Finally, the president must set aside any lingering strong beliefs in the "neutral integrity" of the Supreme Court, for in the end as Massaro states, "the Senate's action in refusing to confirm some future Supreme Court nominee will be, as it always has been, supremely political" (1990, 197). Thus, to work in a political system, the judiciary too must remain political.

WORKS CITED


No doubt Americans have been debating the role of the United States Supreme Court since the Federalist Papers. Some believe the Court should be active, some believe the Court should be more reticent, some believe the Court should strictly interpret the Constitution, some believe a more "loose" interpretation is required. In the midst of these debates, Richard Davis has suggested another perspective to consider: the Court's interaction with the media and the effect this interaction has on the general public.

In Decisions and Images, Davis has two main contentions. First, Davis argues that the Court (contrary to traditional belief) is a political institution and, as a political institution, must pursue specific relations with the press in order to maintain public support. Second, Davis believes that each individual justice has opinions, aims, and objectives separate from the objectives of the Court, and the justices try to achieve their aims through separate interactions with the press.

To argue his position, Davis first presents the theoretical background, including which images the Court must sustain images of unanimity, of independence, of distance, and of immunity in order to achieve its institutional objectives of deference and compliance. As Davis discusses how justices interact with the press and what the motivations of each are in their interaction, he consistently returns to the images and the objectives that the Court must preserve. He suggests, for example, that the Court's images were threatened in the 1930s. The Court seemed unwilling to...

...sanction the constitutionality of the New Deal. Severe criticism of the Court's decisions arose from some prominent newspapers. Harlan Stone commented in a letter to his sister at the end of the 1935 term: "We finished the term of Court yesterday. I think in many ways one of the most disastrous in its history." (31)

Without public support, it was possible for Franklin Delano Roosevelt to question the number of justices on the Court and to suggest changes. Pointing to this example and others, Davis argues that the Court must care about how the public perceives it and actively work to perpetuate positive images.

Richard Davis' thesis is quite interesting. It is a tricky argument however. Davis argues that the Court wants to perpetuate an "image" of aloofness, an image of simply focusing on duty, of independence from public pressure. Preserving these particular images is rather difficult. Davis recognizes the paradox when he notes, "[t]his is the crux of the paradox in imagemaking--to engage in imagemaking while denying its existence to maintain the image" (9). Despite the fact that he recognizes the difficulty, it seems that Davis finds it difficult at times to discuss how it is that the Court is actively perpetuating its image of doing its job--rather than simply doing its job. For example, it is no doubt true that the "[n]ews of the U.S. Supreme Court is the product of the interaction between the justices and the reporters who cover them" (144). Moreover, it is quite obvious that by picking certain cases and denying others, the Court is "successful at setting the agenda for press coverage" (144). Simply by virtue of doing its job, the Court decides what will become newsworthy. However, there seems to be a missing link between the Court doing its job (and choosing whether or not to hear cases), and the Court choosing cases in order to purposely "[offer] the news it wants the press to cover," or, in other words, the Court choosing cases to purposely perpetuate an image (144). The distinction is difficult to define because it is in part a distinction between what is and what appears to be--and with an organization that is (or, at least, appears to be) as aloof and private as the U.S. Supreme Court, the distinction is not always obvious.

Davis presents his arguments and supports them by discussing the everyday role of the press at the Court as well as everyday role of the Court. He argues that the justices and the reporters engaged to cover the Court are involved in an intricate "dance," a dance that the justices are "leading." "By limiting press access with one hand and simultaneously feeding the press with the other, the Court is acting much like other political institutions, especially the presidency, in
Pi Sigma Alpha Review

Pi Sigma Alpha Review

attempts to use its power to control the information flow to its own advantage" (130). Once again the paradox of the text is evident: Davis argues that "[the justices seek to convey the impression that they are disinterested in news coverage about them and that they would be satisfied if the press would just go away" (131). He suggests that this practice (of consciously "active" disinterest) forces the reporters to turn to the news that the justices want them to turn to, namely, the written decisions. This certainly could be true. Or, it could also be true that the justices simply "enjoy their relative obscurity as individuals," which Davis suggests a few pages later (152). As reporter Tony Mauro explains, "They [the justices] much covet their privacy and their anonymity...They’re very loath to lose that" (152). Whether the justices are purposely perpetuating an image of disinterestedness or whether they simply are disinterested is difficult to determine.

Despite the difficulty in overcoming this paradox once and for all, Davis’ book is well worth reading. His efficient research and his extensive sources are thorough and persuasive. The text is clear and supported by interesting examples. Moreover, reading is further facilitated by appropriate headings and excellent summaries in each chapter. Overall, Decisions and Images: The Supreme Court and the Press is timely and insightful. Richard Davis certainly raises issues which should be discussed and debated along with other Supreme Court debates.

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In Politics and the Media, Davis has compiled articles, opinion pieces and empirical studies representing each species of political media players. He juxtaposes studies by media and communication scholars with opinion papers and anecdotal accounts by journalists, politicians, public officials, and interest group agents. This presentational style allows Davis to structure the information in an orderly discussion of the history, present reality, and potential future of the media’s role in American politics; but at the same time Davis avoids telling us what the political players think in favor of allowing them to tell their stories themselves. This book gathers the otherwise scattered thoughts and experiences of many experts in narrow aspects of the political media into a format that tells a more comprehensive, understandable story of the mass media’s political influences.

Davis structures the book in an instructional format, with a brief discussion of a wide spectrum of political media topics. Each section is supplemented with suggested readings on the subject discussed. The book would be excellent as a text for courses focusing on the media’s influence on government.

The book is not limited to a discussion of campaigns and the media, although that topic is addressed. It begins with a brief discussion of media’s historical development as a player in American politics and moves into a inclusive discussion of the modern media’s relationship with each branch of government and all of the major players in American politics. Political and media institutions, individuals, and interest groups are considered in turn. The effect of media coverage on voters, candidates, policy makers, bureaucrats, and Supreme Court justices is discussed. The alleged biases of the media and the effect those biases have on coverage and content of the news is also addressed, along with the interaction of individual media and political personalities.

Davis carefully observes the symbiotic interaction between the media and political figures and institutions. Davis’ introductory analysis of many of the articles he selected mentions the constantly changing relationship as the media needs sources of hard news and as political officeholders or officeseekers need media coverage. Davis presents an excellent consideration of how presidents are, in turn, controlled and controlling of the news media, with an examination of how policy demands made on presidents accelerate as the results of their action or inaction are played out on the public’s television screen.

Davis’ strength is his continuous inquiry into the role of mass media in modern politics, addressed through a series of thoughtful ques-
tions. Even more effective are their partial answers, allowing the readers to draw their own conclusions. How do journalists see their role? How do we as voters and media consumers see their role? Is the media to interpret the complex events of the day and give us a synopsis? Davis points out that scarcity of time and interest requires that media representatives do so, and in so doing the news selection process "guarantees that the news will reflect particular individual or group perspectives on reality" (34).

Would we rather the media be "neutral carriers" of the news, or do we want the press to challenge officeholders in order to elicit otherwise withheld information (93)? It seems that media consumers respond to both. We want the media to perform a multitude of functions, from watchdog to informer to entertainer.

Davis presents his inquiry into the politics and media inter-relationship in a style that is both informative and entertaining. The pieces he selects address current media issues and point to future concerns. For students of politics or communications, Politics and the Media is a great way to better understand the love-hate relationship between politics and the news.

Jay T. Jorgensen
BYU Law Student


Fry, Taylor, and Wood take a refreshing look at America's role in the next century. They are not doomsayers, arguing (like Paul Kennedy) that America is a great power quickly falling to has-been status. Nor are they naive, blind to the significant challenges facing the United States in a world full of rising rivals in the military, economic, and technological spheres. Their title has been chosen carefully to reflect their thesis. America is "vincible," not invincible nor vanquished. The authors, in considering America as vincible, answer their own call for "a sober assessment of the conditions and responsibilities of a great power" (6).

The book is split into three parts. First is a discussion of how U.S. foreign policy is made. The analysis runs the gamut from constitutional matters to American society and culture. In particular, there is a thorough explanation of the role played by the National Security Council in foreign policy formulation. The authors advocate having the Secretary of State assume the responsibilities now held by the constitutionally unaccountable National Security Advisor. Vital energy is sapped by internecine bureaucratic battles within the executive branch. "Presidents need to focus on resolving conflicts between America and other nations, not on resolving conflicts between competing sections of their administrations" (67).

Second, America the Vincible moves on to U.S. defense policy. Fry, Taylor, and Wood have taken pains to examine America's role in a post-Cold War world, by detailing the history of U.S. defense policy and then considering the strategic considerations ahead in the next few years. Specifically, the chapter on terrorism reinforces their thesis that in an increasingly interdependent world, Americans (both at home and abroad) are vulnerable to terrorist attack. They assert that "an appropriate perspective may be the single most important weapon to use against terrorists" (256). The perspective offered is that, while there are some specific steps to be taken to combat terrorism (which they detail), there are nonetheless more serious threats to American interests.

The third section of the book deals with economic policy, which "may have now moved up to the top tier on the U.S. foreign policy agenda" (241). Not only is the reader offered a concise explanation of how America fares in the web of nations which constitute the world economy, but also a sober look at the environmental challenges facing the nation. The result is an argument for both further economic engagement internationally, and "decisive" government action to prevent further degradation of the environment.

This is not a textbook. It is a book by foreign policy experts for foreign policy experts. But those who would enjoy the book are by no means restricted to the experts—whether undergraduate political science students or just interested lay-
men. The data and sources used are impressive, even if the frequency of their use is inconsistent. Some chapters have nearly one hundred endnotes, others fewer than ten. Throughout, however, the book is written with a clarity and style which set it apart from much academic work. Whether as a source for research papers or merely for stimulating reading, America the Vincible stands as a book worth adding to one's library.

David Campbell
Senior, Political Science


Having two favorable books published about you in the midst of a reelection campaign would boost anyone's hopes for victory. Besides Vetterli and Hainsworth's book, journalist Lee Roderick also published a biography about Orrin Hatch (Leading the Charge: Orrin Hatch and 20 Years of America, Gold Leaf Press, 1994). Both are overwhelmingly favorable toward the Senator.

Vetterli and Hainsworth did not write a political science book in the traditional sense. Instead, it's a political biography written in a style that's easy to read. The theme centers on the political battles fought by Orrin Hatch, both for election to the Senate and within the Senate. Vetterli and Hainsworth use the images of the mace and the olive branch throughout as they describe scenes where Senator Hatch battles Senate liberals one day and makes peace the next (104).

Vetterli and Hainsworth have carried over several chapters from an earlier book by Vetterli, Orrin Hatch: Challenging the Washington Establishment (1982, Regenery Gateway). Throughout the book the documentation is sometimes confusing: usually it is given as part of the text, but in the end chapters, it is placed in endnotes. At times I wished for more detail in their sources. For example, they quote James Q. Wilson about the liberal bias of the news media without documentation (108).

The book begins with Hatch's election in 1976, perhaps the most entertaining part of the book. Vetterli and Hainsworth describe Hatch's emergence as an unknown Salt Lake lawyer who makes a stunning victory in the primary after a late campaign start and then caps it off by defeating incumbent Democrat Frank Moss. Hatch was aided by then BYU President Ernest Wilkinson and bolstered by an unusual pre-primary endorsement from Ronald Reagan, already very popular in Utah at the time. Less detail is offered about subsequent elections, probably because they lack the same excitement as 1976.

Vetterli and Hainsworth cover many Senate battles over such topics as labor law reform, the balanced budget (1995 was not the first time), the Equal Rights Amendment, and confirmation hearings for Robert Bork and Clarence Thomas. In each case, the perspective is very favorable toward Hatch. If the new Senate minority is looking for a model for a successful filibuster, they should examine Hatch and company's successful filibuster of labor reform legislation in 1978. "[T]he filibuster lasted five, gut-wrenching weeks. And when it was over it had withstood a total of six cloture votes, one of them by a single vote" (117).

Overall, the book is an intriguing account of the political experiences of Orrin Hatch as seen through the eyes of two favorable observers. If you like Orrin Hatch, you'll like the book.

Quin Monson
Senior, Public Policy


War and the Rise of the State provides an interesting and insightful description of the interaction between war and the modern state. It traces the rise of the modern state, linking each increase in centralized power to war or the threat of war. Almost without exception, books that in-
vestigate the relationship between war and the state focus on how the structure of the state affects war. Porter takes a different approach: he examines how war affects the state, specifically, how war has facilitated the rise of the modern state.

Porter divides the effects of war on the state into three categories: (1) organizing or formative effects, (2) disintegrative effects, and (3) reformative effects. Currently civil wars in Bosnia, Chechnya, and ethnic or religious conflicts in many third world countries amply demonstrate the disintegrative effects of war on the state. War and the Rise of the State, however, provides examples of the formative and reformative effects of war. Germany and Italy, for example, became unified states through warfare. Prussian Chancellor Otto von Bismark deliberately led Prussia into three wars to unify Germany. Those examples should be well known to both students and historians. Few, however, have recognized war as the source of reform movements. For example, women gained the right to vote in many countries as a direct result of their involvement in World War I (178). Eisenhower even justified his proposal for an interstate highway system as an essential element in improving America's defense capabilities (293).

Porter's book is replete with additional examples which illustrate a fascinating paradox of war: on the one hand, war is the most destructive of all human activities, and yet, on the other hand, it is the most organized. Wartime mobilization provides examples of the greatest cooperation of human effort. Modern wars in particular require the complete mobilization of society in support of the war effort. This type of unified effort can only be organized from the top down. Central governments manipulate patriotism and nationalism to garner support for military activity. In such circumstances, power inevitably accrues to the central government. Typically, states emerge after a war with much greater centralized power than before. Furthermore, what Porter describes as the "ratchet effect" ensures that the state will remain stronger. Governments invariably increase taxes and create new agencies to support the war effort. After the war, however, governments rarely rush to lower taxes or to dismantle new agencies. While some demobilization occurs, the government remains more powerful and more centralized.

Porter notes that wars often provide a potent stimulus for social welfare reform. During
Pi Sigma Alpha (PSA) is the national political science honor society. BYU’s chapter is called Beta Mu. At BYU, PSA’s traditional activities include monthly socials in faculty homes, guest speakers, Oktoberfest, a monthly newsletter, an annual closing banquet, an annual writing contest which culminates in this journal, and other activities unique to each year. PSA provides students with many opportunities to get involved and get better acquainted with their fellow students and professors outside the classroom setting.

The Beta Mu chapter is one of PSA’s largest and most active. If you are interested in becoming an associate member of PSA, you can pick up an application in 745 SWKT. PSA is active during Fall and Winter semesters.