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Western Scholarship on the Middle East

G.M. Wickens

It is proposed here to speak primarily of Western scholarship as such, not of imperialism, or Romantic literature and art, or the carving of personal careers and corporate fortunes.[1] In other words, there is no concern with Edward Said's recent statements, save tangentially—especially since countless others have said long since most of what should or can be said on this subject, and done so with zest and wit, or with learning and specialised insight, which it would be presumptuous indeed to ignore or to emulate. But there ought no doubt to be a brief declaration of stance towards the extraordinary phenomenon of *Orientalism*[2] (and its kindred publications).

Orientalism is a *tour de force* of its kind: written from personal feeling so savage as to be virtually out of rational control; a vainglorious parade of learning, paradoxes, half-truths, evasions, false relationships, and *non sequiturs*; and a specious pleading to a readership, avid for intellectual scandal and cultural self-mortification, and incapable of scrutinising much of the evidence at firsthand, even if willing to do so. If it surpasses practically anything so far written in a similar vein and from a like context (and there is a great deal of such material), it is mainly by its surface polish and sophistication, by the highly privileged position of the author,[3] and by its quasi-professional use of the turgid and the dense, and even the plausible and the sweetly reasonable, to conceal the trite and the questionable.

One is bound to marvel at the excitement it has generated, whether of admiration or of resentment. Where what it says can be grasped and verified, it usually turns out to be fairly obvious and has been said before. (As with McLuhanism, much of it can neither be grasped nor verified, but belongs to the

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category of bright ideas which intellectuals often have in youth, and may still have in age after some stimulation. And again, as with McLuhan, if one might question the validity or relevance of some of the facts and the connections, Said will be ready to sidestep nimbly and produce others.) What, apparently, many readers find brilliant and convincing is the sheer cascade of facts and ideas, and their integration into an ostensibly perfect and simple whole. And this is where doubts, rather than admiration might have been called forth, for this is a work offering an all-purpose passkey to diverse and complex structures of events and attitudes, and reducing them all to something near a conspiracy—witting or otherwise, it makes no difference. (As with most psychoanalytical and analogous procedures, the results are loaded in advance against the "subject.")[4]

Imperialism has been a major characteristic of Western culture, as it has been—and will be—of many others. Not surprisingly, it has often been an unpleasant phenomenon both physically and mentally: judging yourself to have a right to govern and influence others, and proceeding to do so, are not loveable matters, and they are not intended or likely to call forth love, even where they confer undoubted benefits on those governed and influenced. Nor is this true only of political and strategic imperialism: it applies equally to those distinct but organically related forms, commercial imperialism and imperialism of the mind, the heart and the conscience. Again, the philosophies generated in justification of such postures (whether before or after the event) will often seem uncandid, even consciously dishonest, particularly to those at the receiving end; certainly, they can easily be made to appear so, and such perceptions—as markedly in the case of Said—may be far more exciting and satisfying than any objective recognition of, let alone gratitude for, what is good and positive in the amalgam.

But what has this to do specifically with Western scholarship, carried on for the most part at a great and deliberate remove, both geographically and historically, from the Middle East itself? For Said, as for so many lesser critics nowadays, the great *trahison des savants* has been that Western Orientalists have fashioned the tools (again, wittingly or unconsciously; and crude and unrefined, and even misshapen and unrealistic, though he often declares these tools to be) which have enabled the politicians, the soldiers, the merchants and the missionaries to fasten their long and immoral hold on the region, and indeed on the world at large.

It is, of course, undeniable that Western scholarship was born and nurtured in the period of the Western world's "imperialistic" expansion and must accordingly, like dozens of other endeavours, share some part of the general mindset. There is a correspondence of sorts (symbolic, at any rate) between the call to govern and the imposition of power and all the rest, on the one hand, and the call to observe and experiment and the imposition of constructs and abstractions on the studied material, on the other. As Said himself frequently allows, all humans perform the latter set of operations at some time and to a varying extent. What seems to lie at the heart of his indignation here (assuming he is not merely rationalising some deep personal resentment) is that the West has performed them for so long, to such a degree, so consistently, and with such tangible results. (One might use the term "success," but it would certainly have to be qualified and

might, in any case, easily be misunderstood.) Said would perhaps be more than a little satisfied if the Middle East had done nearly as much; but so would we all. Its failure to have done so can hardly count for sheer virtue.

To say that Western scholarship is in some senses kin to imperialism, or to the more exotic productions of the Romantics, or to the flamboyant careers of (say) Burton or Lawrence of Arabia, however, is not the same as saying that these things are identical or complementary, or that they can only really be understood in common. Western scholarship (and this is certainly not always a strength) is, and has long been, a self-sustaining, self-justifying unit, whether one is referring to the Classics, to Philosophy and History as "disciplines," or to Oriental (*sc.* here Middle Eastern) Studies. What are its essential or (if one objects to this word) its normally assumed characteristics?

In the most general way, it is undoubtedly one facet of a general cultural posture which takes for granted that we can both apprehend reality and express it in ways that have no necessary connection with revealed or "tribal" truths. Such a posture can be largely intellectual, as in science, philosophy or scholarship itself; sensory and emotional for the most part, as in art, music and literature; or personal and social, as in love, career-strategy and politics. These categories and others are not mutually exclusive, and often they will not only co-exist but overlap as well. But underlying them all is the same basic "open" assumption; open, that is to say, to possibility if not always to effective realisation. It will not lead to total experience, or to experience perceived in essence and unclouded, but it affords an immense and unique enlargement of life as lived by such other limited lights as accepted revelation, traditional wisdom, and conscience. Assuredly, here is nothing for shame or apology.

In its full-blown, self-conscious mode this posture goes back at most to the Renaissance, though there are many adumbrations of it in both the ancient and the medieval worlds of Europe, as well as in other cultures in the Middle and the Far East. Quite apart from the necessary inadequacies of all human realisations as set against the ideal, however, the pristine character of this attitude has undergone two main modifications in recent times. For the last 100 years or so, there has been a steady encroachment of relativistic thinking, i.e., it has come to seem increasingly clear that the reality apprehended and expressed is not only often far from absolute, but heavily dependent on the individual and his own culture; and for the past 50 years more or less, the individual has seen himself (or, of course, herself) as progressively less autonomous, in thought or action, under the pressure of mindless events and processes. But both these modifications too are in their own way part of the same Western posture of sophisticated and adaptable self-awareness. It is hard to see a case that any other culture has adopted this posture so consistently, so all-embracingly, and with such constant alertness as has the post-Renaissance West—not even once the possibility of imitation became available to most other cultures and still seemed attractive to some. Japan may yet prove an exception.

This is not the place to try to account for this virtually unique and highly productive attitude, though many obvious, not so obvious, and even dubious and improbable factors have been suggested at various times. For one thing, Western

society is not only generally pluralistic and still largely unhomogenised: it is full of active, if controlled, rivalry and conflict (a situation often not without its painful and, at best, reprehensible sides, either). Undoubtedly, the outward-looking posture referred to can also be seen as a form of aggression, of trying to come to literal grips with "the other," whether we think of the other as objects or ideas, or individual persons, or groups, or whole cultures. Again, Christianity (or Christendom) learned how to handle paganism, but it never thoroughly digested or eliminated it to the extent that Islam did. New waves or recrudescences of paganism (e.g. witchcraft, Catharism, and the like) kept up a spirit of challenge, and sometimes added—as with the newly re-evaluated Vikings[5]—their own unique contributions of piracy, entrepreneurial trade, aristocratic arrogance, and straightforward vigour, curiosity and adventure. Whatever the ultimate importance of all these possible strands in forming the Western mindset, the interplay and tension of the various forces, often their violent polarisations, to say nothing of their periodic resolutions, fostered the growth of many crucial independent agents, which appear and reappear in protean roles throughout Western history: church; state; throne; aristocracy; bourgeoisie; industry; the military; the arts; and, far from least, the academic world. (These tensions also, and this is not entirely irrelevant to the present case, allowed the growth of an irrepressible dissent, which—particularly in the form of potent and persistent humour and satire—has helped to create a measured, balanced view of the universe and one's place in it.)[6]

Just as we have disowned any intention of offering a detailed refutation of Said's *Orientalism*, so we should make clear at this point that it is not proposed, either, to present a digest of Fück's survey of Arabic Studies in Europe, or of Arberry's elegant and romanticised lives of selected British Orientalists, or of any other pieces of the heterogeneous material that has attempted to review or explain the rise and development of Western Orientalism.[7]

Few would be likely to disagree on certain basic facts. Western interest in the Middle East, intellectual or otherwise, has been stimulated by certain very obvious factors, operating continuously or at various times: sheer physical proximity at many points; a vaguely perceived common heritage; intermittent military, cultural and religious hostility on both sides, throughout the Middle Ages and well into the 18th century; strategic and commercial interest on the part of the West from the 16th century to the present. But as far as scholarship is concerned, these were only start-up factors. The Cambridge chair of Arabic (established in 1633 by the merchant Sir Thomas Adams) and its Oxford counterpart (founded at almost exactly the same time by the Anglican Archbishop William Laud) have not regularly borne any peculiar imprint of the respective interests of their patrons. Their early incumbents (and many of the later ones too) would necessarily have been at least nominal Anglicans in both universities, and were interested in Arabic (and other Middle Eastern languages) in relation to the study of Hebrew and the Bible, and perhaps of religion generally. Most of them almost certainly also took for granted that the British way of life was best and could be of nothing but benefit to mankind if widely disseminated. (French scholars often felt the same, and Islam holds a parallel position.) But they did not

normally work for political, commercial, or missionary enterprises, not even indirectly. The same is true of the holders of other chairs established at this time and later, even when compulsory war-service in modern Western countries enlisted virtually all citizens, willing or unwilling, scholars or laymen; for few—at any rate, among the traditional academics—have elected, once their freedom of action was restored, to do anything but get back to their scholarship. One may risk being charged with naïveté, but it is not implausible to assert that most have likewise, on the whole, regretted their periodic involvement, post-1945, with government and other agencies disposing of large funds. We have all known a sudden sense of power go to the odd head or two in this connection (even in Classics or English departments), but this has expressed itself in relatively innocent ways, and any harmful effects have fallen more upon immediate colleagues than upon hapless victims in the Middle East or other distant targets.

To sum up so far: Oriental Studies grew up as part of Western scholarship generally, and were (and have remained) subject historically to the same influences, pressures, distortions, and inadequacies. True, there were erudite dabblers with a cause like Ernest Renan, just as there were sophisticated dabblers with a cause like Edward Gibbon. As regards the perceptions of artists and the general public, you can no more hold, say, the great German pioneer Arabist Ferdinand Wüstenfeld responsible for the flights of fancy of Said's Gérôme (and the whole life-in-the-harem type of soft pornography)[8] than you can pin Hollywood's notion of a Roman orgy onto classicists like Theodor Mommsen or A.E. Housman. Moreover, not only were the "rules of the game" and the procedures in strict Orientalist scholarship the same as in the other branches of Western scholarship, but the actual persons involved had usually entered the Orientalist field or fields from other comparable areas, chiefly Classics and Biblical Studies—as they have continued to do up to very nearly the present-day. They did not so much confront a tendentiously prepared construct as take their tools with them to do their own building.

It may be appropriate at this point to refer to two articles of the writer's, one of which is still unpublished while the other appeared in a publication with which few "Orientalists" will be familiar, the *Yearbook of Comparative and General Literature* (for 1971). These passages may show convincingly how at least one unashamed Orientalist saw these matters when not primarily addressing them, and when the atmosphere was still relatively tranquil generally.

The first reference is by way of preamble to an article long meditated on the 13th century popular cosmographer, al-Qazwīnī (the material was actually presented as a paper to the Oriental Club of Toronto on March 12, 1963):

In an understandable cultural reaction many modern Muslim scholars criticise the traditional Orientalists of the past (and such of their pupils as survive) as being fundamentally anti-Islamic and/or imperialistic in outlook. Even if we allow, with some social scientists, that people are rarely aware of their real motivations or postures, this charge is in many cases both unfair and unscientific. Before we can make useful pronouncements on these or similar matters, we must carefully categorise

times, places, and individuals. E.G. Browne of Cambridge, for example, was a wealthy upperclass Briton of the Victorian and Edwardian era, a doctor by training, who strayed into Islamic Studies; but he was a man of the broadest sympathy and culture, deep (if often misguided) learning, and enthusiastic convictions that were practically always at odds with his own government, if not his own society: to lump this generous advocate of Iranian (and Irish) liberties together with "old Middle Eastern hands" like P.M. Sykes, Gertrude Bell, Arnold Wilson and the like, is simply absurd. Nor is he by any means an odd exception: such mild and scholarly persons as R.A. Nicholson, Louis Massignon, and A.J. Arberry were themselves the first to deplore the rabid denunciations and falsifications of Islam that were current in the West from near the beginning of the Islamic era until at least the days of the Enlightenment. Again, what had independent-minded, high-principled, "pure" scholars like Hamilton Gibb or Joseph Schacht to do with anything but the best in the whole human heritage? They may often have been arrogant, eccentric, and wrong in their learning or their judgment, they were certainly "outsiders" to Islam, but they were nobody's mouthpiece, religious or political; and their passionate attachment to their studies, and to the human objects of their study, was their mainstay through many difficult times—personal, social and academic. It was no accident that the most devoted students of such scholars as the above were the many Muslims whom, over the years, they attracted to work with them in the West. What often irked such students as these, especially where they themselves later achieved eminence at home and internationally, was not their old teachers' failings (some seemed to think they had none!) but the anomalous and obscure position of these latter in Western society and academic life. Such people cannot easily be dismissed as Middle Eastern Uncle Toms.

What can justly be criticised, even attacked, about most traditional Orientalism is something worlds away from anti-Islamism and imperialism, and its effects are still extraordinarily difficult to dispel. It arises, in a word, from early formation along Classical lines (Latin, Greek and Hebrew studies), and from a too ready acceptance of the 19th century's narrow, but in the contemporary circumstances highly plausible, view of science. The Classical approach was, from the outset, doomed to failure, given the sheer volume of Islamic writing and documentation as opposed to Latin and Greek survivals and to the Bible. Even more serious, it led the Islamicist to concern himself almost exclusively with "philology" and "texts" (especially the learned, high-culture material in which Islamdom is so rich), and largely to ignore the "post-classical," the popular and the vulgar, the great non-Arabic and non-Sunnī manifestations of Islamic culture, and the new specialised "disciplines" of all kinds that tried to deal, however clumsily in the event, with the real rather than the ideal, the concrete or material rather than the abstract or theoretical.

At the same time, the pretended assumption of "scientific" postures,

as then accepted, both reinforced the preoccupation with textual exactitude (however trivial the matter involved) and encouraged (what might have initially been a merely personal) lack of receptiveness and perception towards religion and religious attitudes generally. These latter were just one of many "styles" that had gone out of fashion by the mid-19th century (catholicity and refinement of taste, and concern with the essentially human and personal, were other victims of "progress"). There was rarely hostility as such towards religion; and if there was, it was directed as much against the scholar's native Christianity or Judaism as against Islam. By the end of their lives, thanks in part to their prolonged study of Islam, scholars like Massignon, Nicholson and Arberry had even found their way to a personal religious position, though it was eclectic rather than Islamic in any clearly identifiable way. If one believes that exposure to a perceived religious reality must *effect conversion in any pure heart, then they are culpable of invincible ignorance. To respect their position, one must accept (and many will not) the inscrutability of divine grace, the primacy of the striving conscience, and the weight of natural and social experience. [Said is particularly hard on poor Massignon for his attachment to al-Ḥallāj rather than the Prophet, p. 268 and* passim.*]*

Several of the above-named were exceptions in varying degrees even to these strictures on the "classical" and the "scientific" methods as applied to Islamic Studies. Goldziher is a notable example, and suffered for it professionally. But the general legacy of a perspective that sees our primary (and often our only) tasks as being to edit texts slowly and meticulously (even where most of the variants concern the tiniest trivia), to catalogue MSS (however commonplace or insignificant), and to discuss minute and out-of-the-way problems of scholarship rather than matters of broad human concern—this is with us still, though challenged by other factors now emerging, financial considerations, for example. It is justified, even today, with an astonishing naïveté and lack of realism: I have myself often been told in reproof that before any general statement can be made or any priorities established, we must know all the facts, and only the facts, that can be known; and we must know them exactly! Meanwhile, the Classics and the sciences properly speaking have themselves moved on to much more sophisticated positions.

The second reference falls, as has been said, in the area of Comparative Literature, and comes from an article entitled "*Lalla Rookh* and the Romantic Tradition of Islamic Literature in English."[9] Since the immediately relevant passage is of some length (63, col. 1, "What I would suggest . . . " to 66, col. 1, ". . . ever returned."), it is perhaps best consulted in the original. It offers some particularly stringent criticisms of Islamicist scholars operating as latter-day Romantics in their renderings of the various Islamic literatures. But it would be difficult, even for the ingenuity of Edward Said, to make a convincing case that the remarks therein really apply to historiography as well, i.e. to the central

discipline of Islamic Studies (as of all the Humanities): Ignaz Goldziher, Theodor Nöldeke, and Gibb, for example, would have attained unquestioned recognition in any comparable scholarly field (though Said scarcely mentions the first two, and speaks at length of Gibb as a "dynastic figure,"[10] the operator of a more or less questionable bag of institutionalised tricks). The same would perhaps not be true of Sir William Muir, but who—apart from Said—would pretend that his books are nowadays considered as "reliable monuments of scholarship"?[11]

Be that as it may, these references will show that, in common with many of the Orientalist scholars known to the present writer over the last 30 years or more, he himself has long been aware of some of the shortcomings of Western scholarship in its address to the Middle East. But, disregarding the fact that the Middle East (unlike, say, classical Greece and Rome) is a live, ongoing organism, these are the typical shortcomings of the Western humanistic tradition at large. Where scholars *have* addressed the modern, living Middle East deliberately, they have usually—as with Gibb—had every personal and intellectual right to do so, whatever their attitudes and conclusions might ultimately prove to be.

It can readily be allowed that concern with languages and texts is not enough—though with a high-culture, scripture-based society (and, as regards Islam, this is surely a palpable fact, rather than, to use the terms favoured by Said, a "code" or a "construct") they are an absolutely primary essential for most work. One might also argue that if the Humanities (and not just in their confrontation of the Middle East) had developed fully and fruitfully, the Social Sciences need never have arisen as a separate, and often opposed, endeavour; so that we would have uninhibited "Orientalists" who—while being as well-grounded linguistically and literarily as, say, Leopold von Ranke or Arnold Toynbee—would do specialised work within one or more disciplines with full acceptance on the part of the "straight" practitioners. So far we have seen this only to some extent in History; and, given the prolonged and difficult process of acquiring the "philological" equipment (again, a fact, not a self-serving myth or mystery), and the explosion of knowledge and techniques in the Social Sciences, a prompt expansion of the interactive process is scarcely to be looked for. (For Said, of course, preoccupation with the Social Sciences in this area is itself just one more trick to keep Orientalists in, if not ahead of, the game.)[12]

Even the alleged deficiency of "remoteness" from the real and the contemporary is a typical humanistic failing, if it is a failing at all (rather than an instinctive and prudent limitation of endeavour). The average Western Islamicist, certainly before World War II, saw his work as would a specialist in Greek and Latin: a visit to the sites might be interesting and informative, but it was not essential; it might even, given human nature and the harsh realities of the actual situation, damage one's confidence in, and enthusiasm for, the work on which one was engaged. If the present writer personally admits that he finds Ghazālī or Hāfiẓ (or whoever) more congenial and exciting than the overwhelming majority of modern Middle Easterners he knows, this should be taken as a confession of bookishness and age rather than as an insult to a culture. He feels the same about Goethe or Shakespeare or Voltaire or Theodor Fontane. Quite simply, one can be allergic to the 20th century and to most of its manifestations in both East and West. And

since a scholar is damned for not looking at the modern Middle East, and damned when he does, the best he can do is not to go where he does not *believe* himself to have at least some competence to find his way. I may "encode" and "filter" what I perceive as my data—but so does everybody else, all the time. Hence I do not perceive my processes as more illegitimate than those of others: if Islam is entitled to see enduring Christianity and Judaism as corrupt versions of God's word, why may not D. B. Macdonald exercise his right to interpret Islam as a "second order Arian heresy"?[13]

It is not a matter of stereotypes, though the uneducated and the ill-educated, particularly in the age of easy communication, will always fashion stereotypes of the unfamiliar or the unaccepted; and if the dominant part of a group or a culture makes a leading folk-hero of someone like Yasser Arafat or Menahem Begin (even as a defiant reaction), it must expect to be stereotyped in his image. But for the educated, more particularly the scholar, it is no more illegitimate to make abstracts and constructs and one- or two-dimensional interpretations of a culture, for serious and specific purposes, than it is for the physiologist or the neurologist to reduce a human being to a system of chemicals and electrical impulses, again for serious, limited methodological ends—and with some ethical sense of what is being done.

Ironically, if anything has justified the traditional Orientalists' stance towards the Middle East—in their reliance on fundamental texts, their general distancing of themselves in time and space and feeling, and their conviction of the relative uniformity of the object of their study—it is the old cry, sometimes literally formulated, of "back to the *salaf* and to hell with the infidel!" now being raised far and wide throughout the Islamic world.[14] Whatever the complexities of the total picture, and the need for restraint and qualification on our side, this unhumanistic centrality cannot be wished or hoped away. It is bound to leave its mark on our scholarship if that scholarship is to be true to itself. Broadly speaking, the Islamic way of life—however realistic and decent in practice—does not have a theoretical and categorical basis for charity or objectivity towards the non-Islamic. Such a basis—however imperfectly built on in practice, and while it is even ignored and spurned—remains the ideal for the Western world and has been nowhere so well realised as in its academic life.

Notes

1. This article, in somewhat different form, was originally presented as a paper at a Colloquium entitled *Mutual Perceptions: East and West*, held at the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, September 1-3, 1981.
2. Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (Random House, 1978, and republished). At the time of writing, this work has been discussed in most "Orientalist" journals, as well as in many "intellectual" periodicals and newspapers. It has also been a topic, even *the* topic, at several conferences, colloquia and seminars.
3. He enjoys a not unmerited professional reputation as a Professor of English and Comparative Literature at Columbia University, but *Orientalism* derives much of its *popular* authority from his presumed omniscience in intellectual history generally and (as an Arab) in Middle Eastern matters in particular.
4. A few random samples may serve to illustrate Said's mode of what one might term "suggestive implication." The application of a retirement age of 55 to the British public administration is fleetingly admitted to have been general, but is then given special significance in the case of India as a means of preventing Orientals from seeing their masters in senile decline (p. 42). (This is, of course, to ignore the whole master-servant relationship, in which the latter would have had ample time to study, and possibly even to forgive, all manner of deficiencies in the former.) Again, Silvestre de Sacy's introduction of Islamic materials to his students by means of chrestomathies of his own devising is represented (p. 123ff.) not as a necessary and heroic piece of pioneering, but as a subtle way of controlling the picture of the Orient they were to receive. (Anyone who has had to work within the physically limited availability of Islamic texts even as late as the nineteen-fifties, when xerox reproduction and other processes came into general use, will appreciate what de Sacy was trying to achieve at the purely practical level—though doubtless his choices, like anyone else's, reflected his own interests and prejudices as well.) Perhaps the most general trend of distortion, for it is one which runs throughout the whole book, is exemplified (p. 45) by Said's elevation of a simple and picturesque illustration of hierarchical authority by Kipling—drawing on the world the poet then knew best, i.e. British India as part of the Empire—to the level of "a mock chain of being" and a "monstrous chain of command." (One may not like such authority, or the various levels at which it is exercised, or the sources from which it ultimately derives; but it is a reality in all societies, and the normal person describes it in terms of his own experience, particularly where such experience appeals to the artist by its vigour and vividness.)
5. Recent years have seen several exhibitions and many popular studies, particularly relating to the Viking contribution to British history and (in the widest sense) British culture and expansion. A good example of the learned-popular is *The Vikings*, by Johannes Brøndsted (1960, Penguin 1965 and several reprintings).
6. It may also be suggested that Western academe itself, whenever it degenerated into routine or sloth, was frequently challenged and stimulated by outside intellectual rivals. Here lies much of the importance of the Royal Society in 17th-century Britain, the Encyclopédistes in 18th-century France, the engineers in 18th- and 19th-century Europe and America, "non-establishment" scholars like G.F. Grotefend and Heinrich Schliemann—and even the technological and computer revolutions of our own day. Even *within* Western academe, new ferment—often bitter in the extreme—has led to the growth of such fresh disciplines as economics and sociology, which have no real counterpart outside Western culture.
7. J. W. Fück, *Die arabischen Studien in Europa bis in den Anfang des 20ten Jahrhunderts* (Harrassowitz, 1955); A.J. Arberry, *Oriental Essays: Portraits of Seven Scholars* (Macmillan, 1960); and *British Orientalists* (Collins, 1943).

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8. Jean-Léon Gérôme (1824-1904): see the titillating reproduction from his painting *The Snake Charmer* chosen to decorate the cover of *Orientalism*.
9. *Yearbook of Comparative and General Literature*, Number 20, 1971 (Indiana University), pp. 61-66.
10. Said *Orientalism*, pp. 275ff. and *passim*.
11. Said, *Orientalism*, p. 151.
12. Said, *Orientalism*, p. 107f. and *passim* (ref. Index under "social sciences").
13. Said, *Orientalism*, *p. 63*.
14. A parallel irony touches the great19th/20th century rescue operations by Western scholars on the lost or half-forgotten literary monuments of Islamic culture, e.g., the *opera* of Ṭabarī, Ibn al-Athīr, Ibn Jubair, Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, and Ibn Khaldūn; or the neglected Persian prose-classics like the *Qābūsnāma*, the *Siyāsatnāma*, and the *Chahār Maqāla*. These heroic deeds of scholarship are now often ignored or played down, or appropriated without a acknowledgement, by Middle Eastern intellectual trendsetters.