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Comparing Fundamentalisms: A Social Movement Theory Approach

David Romney

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The last forty years have witnessed the emergence of a number of Islamist and Jewish fundamentalist groups, resulting in a number of comparative studies that try to explain this phenomenon (e.g. Antoun and Hegland 1987; Sivan and Friedman 1990). Although scholars have argued varying reasons for this recent religious resurgence, most have recognized the importance of the 1967 war to both Jewish and Islamist fundamentalist movements. Some of these scholars see the religious resurgence following this war as a continuation of religious sentiments expressed by pre-1967 Zionist and fundamentalist Islamic groups rather than as a new movement (Davis 1987, 149–152). Others, while stressing the importance of previous Islamic revivalism, note that the 1967 war marked a turning point for both Islamist and Jewish groups (Esposito 2005, 160-65), and yet some see global trends that unite not just Islamist and Jewish fundamentalist groups but all fundamentalist groups (Keddie 1998). Others take a different tack, claiming that Islamic and Jewish fundamentalist movements are actually quite different from each other and only superficially mirror each other; for instance, Hunter asserts that Jewish fundamentalism focuses more than Islamic fundamentalism on the possibility of future failures and the importance of preventing these failures rather than on past grievances or experiences (1993, 31-32). However, in spite of this research, two basic questions about Islamism and Jewish fundamentalism remain unanswered: (1) what effect has the 1967 war had on the Islamist and Jewish fundamentalist movements and (2) do these movements mirror each other, or have they developed independent of one another?

Using a social movement theory (SMT) approach, I will argue that post-1967 Jewish and Islamic fundamentalist movements mirror each other in a number of crucial ways. According to SMT, individual political desires are translated into group-based social movements through the presence of appropriate social movement organizations (SMOs; Wiktorowicz 2004). As outlined

by Robinson (2004), the presence and use of three factors can enhance the viability of an SMO: changes in political opportunity structures, effective mobilizing structures, and correct cultural framing. Robinson and Wiktorowicz have shown how Islamist activist groups can be analyzed under a social movement theory framework, but aside from Munson (2008), no one has applied this framework to explain Jewish activist groups. In this paper, I will show that post-1967 fundamentalist Jewish movements, like their Islamist counterparts, can be better understood through SMT. By applying SMT, three things are made apparent: (1) the political opportunity structures for both Islamist and Jewish fundamentalist groups changed as a result of the 1967 war, stimulating the appearance of new SMOs on both sides after this war; (2) the SMOs of both sides have used similar mobilizing structures since the 1967 war; and (3) since the 1967 war, the SMOs of both sides have used cultural framing to address three similar issues: unfaithful co-religionists, the status of the land of Palestine, and past failures or tragedies.

I will use a purposefully broad definition of fundamentalism for this study. For the purposes of this paper, I define religious fundamentalist groups as those striving for religious orthodoxy. Although this definition is not specific, it allows me to look broadly at different fundamentalist movements. In this study, I will focus on examples from the fundamentalist movements of Hamas, Gush Emunim, and Kach, all of which conform to this definition of fundamentalism.

The 1967 Israeli war changed the political opportunity structures for Islamist and Jewish fundamentalist movements. For this study, changes in political opportunity structures are defined according to Robinson's (2004, 123) definition: political changes that alter the opportunities available for an SMO. For Islamist movements, the capture of the occupied territories in the 1967 war was such a change. The failure of the Arab forces in this war and Israel's occupation of

the Gaza strip and the West Bank led Palestinians to depend less on foreign sources of organization for their nationalistic movements because foreign powers were forced to loosen their hold on parts of Palestine. Up to the 1967 war, resistance against Israel by the Palestinians consisted of fedayeen attacks from Egypt or other states; however, as a result of the 1967 war, Israel began to occupy the areas that these attacks had been coming from (Tessler 1994, 399-464). Israel was able to rid these areas of many fedayeen fighters, but they were unsuccessful at getting rid of all of them. Over time, this neglect led to the emergence of many Palestinian activist groups, now more effective because they were operating inside Israeli-controlled territory.

For Jewish fundamentalist movements, the same event—the gain of territory after the 1967 war— changed political opportunity structures by allowing these movements to pursue their goal of incorporating Judea and Samaria in the state of Israel. Some groups, particularly the revisionist Zionists led by Jabotinsky, expressed early on their desire to bring all of historical Palestine within the borders of the modern Israeli state. However, before the 1967 war, this goal was impossible to achieve. There are two main reasons why the 1967 war changed this situation. First, after the war, the ownership of Judea and Samaria was a reality, not a dream (at least as far as the Israelis were concerned). Fulfilling these territorial desires was therefore a physical possibility. Second, many secular and religious Jews supported territorial expansion immediately following the 1967 war, not just fundamentalist groups. As Sprinzak outlines, immediately following this war, Israeli politics was dominated by two camps: the maximalists (those who advocated territorial expansion, believing that the occupied territories helped Israel better defend itself) and the minimalists (those who believed that territorial compromise with the Arabs would help better secure the state of Israel; 1999, 115-16). Some of these maximalists wanted to spur

the settler movement into the West Bank for religious reasons; Kahane, who drew from

Jabotinsky's ideology in explaining the religious justification for expansion, is perhaps the most

famous religious maximalist from this time period (191). However, other maximalists wanted to

expand for security reasons. They felt that gaining this territory would provide the state of Israel

with a buffer zone that would keep them safe from future attacks. This reasoning, although

opposed to the minimalists who could not "ignore the implications of having become an

occupying power (Oz 1983, 133), attracted secular Jews as well as fundamentalists, and therefore

the settler movement had a broad support base. For these two reasons, territorial gains after the

1967 war changed the opportunities available to Jewish fundamentalist groups.

Since 1967, Islamist and Jewish fundamentalist groups have also used similar mobilizing

structures, defined as networks that enhance the ability of an SMO to recruit new members. In

the years following the 1967 war, a huge spike in mosque construction and the creation of al-

mujamma' al-Islami—an "Islamic collective" that eventually oversaw 40 percent of the mosques

in Gaza strip as well as a university (Robinson 1997, 137)—formed an extensive mobilizing

structure that the Muslim Brotherhood and later Hamas used to recruit new members. As

outlined by Robinson, the 1973 establishment of the mujamma' in the Gaza strip was in part a

response to the secular nationalism of the PLO and in part a result of changes following the 1967

war (136-47). Seeing the success that the PLO had achieved in mobilizing activists through

grassroots movements at Palestinian universities, the Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza wanted

similar organizations that would promote nationalistic ideology with an Islamist tinge. Because

of the failure of secular governments in the 1967 war and increasing disatisfaction, the

mujamma's message was in some ways more palatable to an increasingly religious society.

Evidences of this increasing religious fervor include: a double in the number of mosques in the

Gaza strip, a rise in the popularity of religious literature, the establishment of a number of Islamic universities for teaching Islamic law (136). It was these mosques that, according to Abu-Amr, were the most important tool in recruiting (1993, 7-8). The Muslim Brotherhood, through the mujamma', also ran libraries, social clubs, and other social organizations that endeared the population to Hamas. But it was in the mosques, protected from Israeli interference out of a respect for religion, that they recruited members, disseminating their ideas after the daily prayer services (8). By channeling the society's religious fervor in a political direction, and by organizing several institutions under the centralized *al-mujamma' al-islami*, the Muslim Brotherhood and later Hamas thus gained an audience for their message.

Similarly, after the 1967 war, the yeshivot in Israel played a crucial role in the formation and the recruitment efforts of the Jewish fundamentalist group Gush Emunim. One yeshiva in particular, Yeshivat Merkaz ha-Rav, has been important throughout Gush Emunim's history. In May 1967, just three weeks before the 1967 war, Rabbi Zvi Yehudah Kook powerfully declared his frustration at the fact that the Jews did not yet hold all of Biblical Israel, stating, "Where is our Hebron—are we forgetting it? …Where is our Shechem? Are we forgetting it? And where is our Jericho—are we forgetting it? And where is the eastern bank of the Jordan?" (Segev 2007, 181). When, after the war, Israel gained exactly the cities that Rabbi Kook mentioned in this speech, many of his followers saw Israel's victory as a miracle. Some of the students from the Yeshiva, led by Rabbi Moshe Levinger, were inspired by this "miracle" to found *Kiryat Arba*, a settlement located just on the outskirts of Hebron. *Kiryat Arba* was the first settlement of what would later be called the Gush Emunim movement. Although the Gush Emunim movement would not be officially established until 1974, after the Yom Kippur war helped its movement gain more steam, its roots are found in the reaction of Yeshivat Merkaz ha-Rav to the 1967 war.

This yeshivah continued to be the primary means of recruitment as the movement progressed, and other yeshivot also began to support Gush Emunim. Like *al-mujamma' al-islami*, the yeshivot combine both religious and social services into one institution. The students there grow up together and spend time with the same teachers, developing social ties equivalent to those developed in the social clubs and mosques of the *mujamma'*. Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Kook took advantage of these close associations between students to encourage them to join the settlements, forming the ideologically devoted core that the movement needed during this formative stage (Sprinzak 1991, 125). During the period between the 1967 war and the formal organization of Gush Emunim, other yeshivot began to join with providing support, particularly the yeshivot of the Bnei Akiva movement. Even after 1974, when formal organizations were created to help with recruitment, the youth of *Merkaz ha-Rav* still continued to play an important role, inspiring others to join the movement (126).

Cultural framing, the last similarity between Islamist and Jewish fundamentalist movements that I will address, is perhaps the most interesting of the three. In SMT, Cultural framing is an assemblage of tools through which we interpret the world around us (Wiktorowicz 2004, 15). According to Robinson, these tools are most effective when condensed into a pithy "bumper sticker" statement; statements like these allow potential members to easily understand and either identify with or reject an SMO's ideological leanings (Robinson 2004, 116-17). The religious rhetoric that Islamist and Jewish fundamentalist groups used to address certain issues conforms to this description. Particularly, after the 1967 war Islamist movements and Jewish fundamentalist movements began to use similar cultural framing devices to when approaching three topics: less faithful co-religionists, the status of the land of Palestine, and past failures or tragedies.

After 1967, fundamentalist groups on both sides increasingly demonized their less pious co-religionists, accusing them of undermining their righteous plans. According to Esposito (2005, 166), the issue of less faithful coreligionists is important for Islamist groups for two reasons: (1) they believe that it is necessary to institute sharia law before a government is considered legitimate and (2) they believe that jihad is incumbent upon all Muslims. In order for these two goals to be accomplished, Muslims in these fundamentalist groups need the help of other Muslims. For this reason, some of these groups have asserted that co-religionists who do not support sharia law or jihad against unbelievers are the same as atheists or infidels. However, unlike Jewish fundamentalists, those deemed "infidels" are often government leaders rather than those of another political party or leaning. For instance, Hamas has often criticized Fatah, the main faction of the PLO, on these terms. Because Hamas criticized them with respect to an increasingly popular religious viewpoint (as already outlined, Gazans were becoming increasingly religious at this point in time), this term reverberated well with the population.

Jewish fundamentalist groups tended to demonize their less faithful co-religionists in a similar manner. For Jewish fundamentalists, the issue of less faithful co-religionists was important because they believed that immoral actions by secular Jews would delay the coming of the Messiah. These fundamentalists also blamed the continuation of the Arab-Israeli conflict on the seculars, thinking that removing the seculars would allow God to fulfill the promises made to the Jews in the Hebrew Bible. A quote from Benjamin Ze'ev Kahane, son of Rabbi Meir Kahane, illustrates the intensity with which those on the Jewish side expressed these convictions:

> The problem is not the Arabs—the problem is the Jews. The truth, the way we look at it, is that there has never been an Arab problem. We could have solved that problem in 48 hours, if only we wanted to. The real war is not with Arabs but with the Hellenized Jews. All the blood shed by Arab terrorism is "as if" shed by the Arabs; the people really responsible for the bloodshed are Jews scared by the Gentiles and attached to distorted Western ideas. (Sprinzak 1999, 264-65)

Here, the outgroup being criticized is not, as is often the case, the Arabs; rather, it is secular Jews, who are not dedicated to the ingroup's idea of what it means to be a "righteous" Jew, that receive the criticism.

Similar sentiments are expressed by those who apply the term "self-hating Jew" to others. This term has a long history of use: Herzl used it to describe those opposed to Zionism; some applied it to Jews in America, Germany, and other Western countries when the expansion of Hitler's power and the persecution of the Jews in other countries threatened Jews as a people; and politicians have used it to describe those that oppose Israeli policy (Finlay 2005, 11-15). Following the 1967 war, it has been used by Jewish fundamentalists to describe secular Jews, and because of its long history and its relation to the holocaust, it has easily become one a "bumper sticker" term. An example of this use of the term is found in a statement by Rabbi Meir Kahane, a fundamentalist who in 1968 established the Jewish Defense League in the wake of the 1967 war. He used this term to describe Jewish leftists when he wrote that Israel is "crawling with… Hebrew speaking *goyim* [non-Jews] whose self hate… drives them to reject Judaism" (Paine 1994, 13). More recently, Ariel Sharon has used this term to describe the left when the Oslo peace process threatened the settler movement to the West Bank, saying, "Terrible self-hate engulfs us… Our leaders talk to Arafat about disarming Jews and dismantling Jewish settlements" (Finlay 2005, 15). Using this term helps other like-minded Jews to quickly identify with fundamentalists in a positive light. Therefore, both Jewish and Islamist fundamentalist groups used pejoratives as a cultural frame to attract new members who were opposed less faithful co-religionists.

After the 1967 war, both Islamists and Jewish fundamentalists also began to use cultural frames when discussing the land of Israel or Palestine. Before the 1967 war, Palestinian claims to

the land of Palestine were based on previous land ownership. This still is the main reason that Palestinians want to return to Palestinian; many even still keep the keys to the homes they had to leave after the 1948 war, a symbolic reminder of their ownership rights. However, after the territorial gains by Israel during the 1967 war caused Islamic soul searching and increased religiosity, Hamas began to emphasize that all of Israel belonged to the Muslims by religious mandate. They did this by using a well known Islamic concept, the *waqf*—a religious endowment, usually consisting of property or buildings, given by Muslims to the community. Giving ones land as a *waqf* is equivalent to donating it to God. After the 1967 war, Hamas began to declare that "Palestine is a *waqf,*" a unique application of this religious term (Robinson 2004, 130-31). Although using this term in this manner is historically inaccurate, it was still effective insofar that it helped add a religious flavor to the traditional Palestinian right of return.

Similarly, Jewish fundamentalist groups have used religious cultural frames when discussing the occupied territories. They did this by using biblical names and stories in their attempts to get people to move into settlements. For instance, the leaders of Gush Emunim and the leaders of other fundamentalist groups call the West Bank by its biblical names, Judea and Samaria. Also, present day ads for the settlements often make reference to famous stories from the Bible, implying that the settlers are a continuation of a holy tradition. Since these groups and other like-minded people considered the victory in the 1967 war a miracle, using Biblical names like these remind potential members of this spiritual nature of the 1967 victory, thereby framing the current settler movement in a similar manner.

Lastly, Islamists and Jewish fundamentalists have both used cultural frames when addressing how to overcome past failures or tragedies. For many Arabs, their loss in the 1967 war marked their biggest failure in recent history. According to Esposito, many Islamists blame

recent Muslim failures, including the loss in 1967, on a decline in religiosity (2005, 160-162). Therefore, religious frames during this time period were effective for reaching out to those disaffected with the status quo. For Islamists, and particularly Hamas, the greatest such frame has been that "Islam is the solution." Robinson cites this slogan as the most popular slogan among modern Islamist movements in the Middle East, noting that this specific phrase and its sentiments appear in Hamas's 1988 charter (2004, 130-31). Again, using a religious cultural frame proves useful in attracting new members.

Jewish fundamentalist groups, on the other hand, have used the slogan "never again" when addressing this issue. This is perhaps their most effective frame, since the holocaust left such a large impact on Israel. This term was not used only after 1967; it was actually popularized after the 1948 war as a deliberate attempt by the government to wipe away the image of the "holocaust Jew" (Almog 2000). Because these efforts by the government still affect Jewish perceptions today, this frame resonates particularly well with potential members. For this reason, Kahane used this phrase as the title of one of his books, which outlined the need for American Jews to rise up against those fighting the state of Israel rather than being passive in this fight (1971).

Looking at these examples, we see that SMT is particularly useful for evaluating Jewish fundamentalist movements. By applying SMT in this study, we also see that Jewish fundamentalist movements are quite similar to Islamist fundamentalist movements. Lastly, through application of SMT, we see that there is a common explanation for the recent resurgence, namely that changes in political opportunity structures, an effective use of mobilizing structures, and a correct use of cultural frames since the 1967 war have together caused the recent increase in the number of Islamist and Jewish fundamentalist groups.

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Why the Two-state Solution isn't Working
David Romney and Basseem Hallac

The Arab-Israeli peace process has hit another dead end, and as usual, bickering over settlements is the reason why. After a fruitless ten-month settlement freeze, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reopened construction this last September to appease Israeli settlers. Since then, negotiations with the US have opened the door for a second freeze, but settlers have been pressuring fundamentalist parties in Netanyahu's coalition to prevent it. Strong opposition like this leads Americans to believe that Arab-Israeli conflict is insoluble, but the truth is more complex. Certain issues, such as deciding who controls Jerusalem and whether or not Palestinian refugees should return to their homeland, really are divisive. However, most Israelis and Palestinians support a two-state solution, and many Israelis are willing to concede some settlements for peace. If this is really the case, then how do minority fundamentalist parties prevent concessions that most Israelis support? The answer lies in Israel's electoral system. This system, combined with increasing political factionalization over the last decade, allows fundamentalist parties to kill the two-state solution.

Israel's electoral system, a proportional representation (PR) system, is a problem because its low electoral threshold allows radical parties to emerge. America's electoral system tends to produce two parties that converge ideologically in the center; PR systems, on the other hand, tend to produce multiple parties that diverge ideologically, allowing smaller, more radical groups to take gain a political voice. Governments concerned with this tendency often establish electoral thresholds—most ranging from 3% to 10%—that make it difficult for these groups to gain power. Although Israel should arguably be concerned with radical parties, Israel's electoral system has an unusually low threshold. Originally at 1%, its threshold has risen to 2% since 2003. This is a step in the right direction, but it's still too small to prevent the emergence of fundamentalist parties.

These parties wouldn't prevent peace if they never ended up on a majority coalition. However, they often do because of competition between the mainstream parties, Likud, Kadima, and Labor. Getting these parties to cooperate is like trying to get Democrats and Republicans to cooperate on healthcare reform. Although they will ally out of necessity, the winning party would rather form a coalition with an outlier than with the "enemy." For instance, after the 2009 parliamentary elections, Netanyahu's Likud tried to form a coalition with Kadima. However, its leader Tzipi Livni refused to join with fundamentalist groups in Netanyahu's coalition, stating that Netanyahu either "goes with the Right or with us." So Netanyahu chose the Right, even though Likud and Kadima would have been just five seats short of a parliamentary majority. In the end, the result is a coalition government that contains fundamentalist groups and does not reflect Israeli majority opinion.

In addition, changes in public opinion over the last decade have amplified these problems. Although most Israelis agree on several important issues—for instance, the two-state solution—data from recent Israeli parliamentary elections shows that they are becoming politically factionalized. Before 1996, most voters cast their ballots for just one or two major parties, and the largest party in the Knesset, the Israeli parliament, always controlled 40–56 seats. Because the Knesset has 120 seats, this means that the largest party always controlled 33%–46% by itself. But since 1996, the largest parties have each

controlled only 26–38 seats, or 22%–32%. Given that Israel's electoral system guarantees polarization, these recent changes in public opinion don't bode well for the viability of future peace attempts.

Since Israel's electoral system is contributing to the growth of the settler movement and the failure of peace processes, changes should be instituted quickly so that fundamentalist minorities don't frustrate majority-supported peace efforts. If not, the Arab-Israeli conflict could soon become truly insoluble.

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1st Knesset ('49

Party	Seats			
Mapai	46	0.38	0.147	0.789
Mapam	19	0.16	0.025	**4.73**
United Religio	16	0.13	0.018	0.608
Herut	14	0.12	0.014	
General Zioni	7	0.06	0.003	
Progressive P	5	0.04	0.002	
Sephardim ar	4	0.03	0.001	
Maki	4	0.03	0.001	
Democratic Li	2	0.02	3E-04	
Fighter's List	1	0.01	7E-05	
WIZO	1	0.01	7E-05	
Yemenite Ass	1	0.01	7E-05	

2nd Knesset ('51

Party	Seats			
Mapai	45	0.38	0.141	0.802
General Zioni	20	0.17	0.028	**5.05**
Mapam	15	0.13	0.016	0.525
Hapoel haMiz	8	0.07	0.004	
Herut	8	0.07	0.004	
Maki	5	0.04	0.002	
Progressive P	4	0.03	0.001	
Democratic Li	3	0.03	6E-04	
Agudat Yisrae	3	0.03	6E-04	
Sephardim ar	2	0.02	3E-04	
Poalei Agudat	2	0.02	3E-04	
Mizrachi	2	0.02	3E-04	
Progress and	1	0.01	7E-05	
Yemenite Ass	1	0.01	7E-05	
Agriculture ar	1	0.01	7E-05	

3rd Knesset ('55

Party	Seats			
Mapai	40	0.33	0.111	0.8332
Herut	15	0.13	0.016	**5.995**
General Zioni	13	0.11	0.012	0.6667
National Relig	11	0.09	0.008	
Ahdut HaAvo	10	0.08	0.007	
Mapam	9	0.08	0.006	
Religious Tora	6	0.05	0.003	
Maki	6	0.05	0.003	
Progressive P	5	0.04	0.002	
Democratic Li	2	0.02	3E-04	
Progress and	2	0.02	3E-04	
Agriculture ar	1	0.01	7E-05	

4th Knesset

Mapai
Herut
National Relig
Mapam
General Zioni
Ahdut HaAvo
Religious Tora
Progressive P
Maki
Progress and
Cooperation a
Agriculture ar

Second government
Same parties

Fourth government
Dropped Agudat Yisreal
Added General Zionists
Added Progressive Party

Fifth government
Same parties

Sixth government
Dropped General Zionists and Progressive Party

Eighth government
Same parties

('59				Party	5th Knesset ('61				Party	6th Knesset ('65				Party	7th Knesset ('69
47	0.392	0.153	0.797	Mapai	42	0.35	0.123	0.8136	Alignment	45	0.38	0.141	0.7882	Alignment	56
17	0.142	0.02	**4.921**	Herut	17	0.14	0.02	**5.365**	Gahal	26	0.22	0.047	**4.721**	Gahal	26
12	0.1	0.01	0.717	Liberal Party	17	0.14	0.02	0.5833	National Relig	11	0.09	0.008	0.625	National Relig	12
9	0.075	0.006		National Relig	12	0.1	0.01		Rafi	10	0.08	0.007		Agudat Yisrae	4
8	0.067	0.004		Mapam	9	0.08	0.006		Mapam	8	0.07	0.004		Independent	4
7	0.058	0.003		Ahdut HaAvo	8	0.07	0.004		Independent	5	0.04	0.002		National List	4
6	0.05	0.003		Maki	5	0.04	0.002		Agudat Yisrae	4	0.03	0.001		Rakah	3
6	0.05	0.003		Agudat Yisrae	4	0.03	0.001		Rakah	3	0.03	6E-04		Progress and	2
3	0.025	6E-04		Poalei Agudat	2	0.02	3E-04		Progress and	2	0.02	3E-04		Poalei Agudat	2
2	0.017	3E-04		Cooperation a	2	0.02	3E-04		Poalei Agudat	2	0.02	3E-04		Cooperation a	2
2	0.017	3E-04		Progress and	2	0.02	3E-04		Cooperation a	2	0.02	3E-04		HaOlam HaZe	2
1	0.008	7E-05							HaOlam HaZe	1	0.01	7E-05		Free Centre	2
									Maki	1	0.01	7E-05		Maki	1

Eleventh government
Same parties as above

Gahal and Rafi joined w/ Six-Day war to form NUG

Fourteenth government
Gahal
National Religious Party
The Independent Liberals
Progress and Development
Cooperation and Brotherhood
Merger of Mapam and Rafi into alignment

Twelfth government
Same parties as above
Herut and Liberal party combine into Gahal

8th Knesset ('73)

			Party	Seats		
0.467	0.218	0.71986	Alignment	51	0.43	0.181
0.217	0.047	**3.5697**	Likud	39	0.33	0.106
0.1	0.01	0.85	National Relig	10	0.08	0.007
0.033	0.001		Religious Tora	5	0.04	0.002
0.033	0.001		Independent	4	0.03	0.001
0.033	0.001		Rakah	4	0.03	0.001
0.025	6E-04		Ratz	3	0.03	6E-04
0.017	3E-04		Progress and	2	0.02	3E-04
0.017	3E-04		Moked	1	0.01	7E-05
0.017	3E-04		Arab List for I	1	0.01	7E-05
0.017	3E-04					
0.017	3E-04					
0.008	7E-05					

9th Knesset ('7)

	Party	Seats		
0.7018	Likud	43	0.36	0.128
3.3535	Alignment	32	0.27	0.071
0.5417	Dash	15	0.13	0.016
	National Relig	12	0.1	0.01
	Hadash	5	0.04	0.002
	Agudat Yisrae	4	0.03	0.001
	Flatto-Sharon	1	0.01	7E-05
	Shlomtzion	2	0.02	3E-04
	Left Camp of	2	0.02	3E-04
	United Arab L	1	0.01	7E-05
	Poalei Agudat	1	0.01	7E-05
	Ratz	1	0.01	7E-05
	Independent	1	0.01	7E-05

10th Knesset ('81)

	Party	Seats	
0.7711	Likud	48	0.4
4.3689	Alignment	47	0.39
0.5083	National Relig	6	0.05
	Agudat Yisrae	4	0.03
	Hadash	4	0.03
	Tehiya	3	0.03
	Tami	3	0.03
	Telem	2	0.02
	Shinui	2	0.02
	Ratz	1	0.01

Seventeenth government
Alignment
Ratz
Independent Liberals
Progress and Development
Arab List for Bedouins and Villagers

NRP joined later and Ratz left

Dash joined later b/f fell apart

Twentieth government
Same parties

		11th Knesset ('84				12th Knesset ('88				13th Knesset ('92		
0.16	0.68	Alignment	44	0.37	0.134	0.74 Likud	40	0.33	0.111	0.772 Labor Party	44	0.37	0.134
0.153	3.125	Likud	41	0.34	0.117	3.86 Alignment	39	0.33	0.106	4.38 Likud	32	0.27	0.071
0.003	0.55	Tehiya	5	0.04	0.002	0.84 Shas	6	0.05	0.003	0.808 Meretz	12	0.1	0.01
0.001		National Relig	4	0.03	0.001	Agudat Yisrae	5	0.04	0.002	Tzomet	8	0.07	0.004
0.001		Hadash	4	0.03	0.001	Ratz	5	0.04	0.002	National Relig	6	0.05	0.003
6E-04		Shas	4	0.03	0.001	National Relig	5	0.04	0.002	Shas	6	0.05	0.003
6E-04		Shinui	3	0.03	6E-04	Hadash	4	0.03	0.001	United Torah	4	0.03	0.001
3E-04		Ratz	3	0.03	6E-04	Tehiya	3	0.03	6E-04	Hadash	3	0.03	6E-04
3E-04		Yahad	3	0.03	6E-04	Mapam	3	0.03	6E-04	Moledet	3	0.03	6E-04
7E-05		Progressive Li	2	0.02	3E-04	Tzomet	2	0.02	3E-04	Arab Democra	2	0.02	3E-04
		Agudat Yisrae	2	0.02	3E-04	Moledet	2	0.02	3E-04				
		Morasha	2	0.02	3E-04	Shinui	2	0.02	3E-04				
		Tami	1	0.01	7E-05	Degel HaTora	2	0.02	3E-04				
		Kach	1	0.01	7E-05	Progressive Li	1	0.01	7E-05				
		Ometz	1	0.01	7E-05	Arab Democra	1	0.01	7E-05				

Look more closely at this period - post '82 paralysis
Unified block of religious and secular maximalists, not many minimalists now

Twenty-second government
Likud
Alignment
National Religious Party
Agudat Yisrael
Shas
Shinui
Ometz

Shinui later leaves

Twenty-fourth government
Likud
National Religious Party
Shas
Agudat Yisrael
Degel HaTorah
New Liberal Party
Tehiya
Tzomet
Moledet
Unity for Peace and Immigration
Geulat Yisrael

Support from Hadash and Arab De
Shas leaves
Yi'ud joins (broke away from Tzom

Twenty-sixth government
Labor
Meretz
Yi'ud

14th Knesset ('96

	Party	Seats			
0.772	Labor Party	34	0.28	0.08	0.822
4.393	Likud-Gesher	32	0.27	0.071	5.61
0.517	Shas	10	0.08	0.007	0.55
	National Relig	9	0.08	0.006	
	Meretz	9	0.08	0.006	
	Yisrael BaAliy	7	0.06	0.003	
	Hadash-Balad	5	0.04	0.002	
	United Torah	4	0.03	0.001	
	The Third Wa	4	0.03	0.001	
	United Arab L	4	0.03	0.001	
	Moledet	2	0.02	3E-04	

15th Knesset ('99

	Party	Seats			
	One Israel	26	0.22	0.047	0.887
	Likud	19	0.16	0.025	8.81
	Shas	17	0.14	0.02	0.625
	Meretz	10	0.08	0.007	
	Yisrael BaAliy	6	0.05	0.003	
	Shinui	6	0.05	0.003	
	Centre Party	6	0.05	0.003	
	National Relig	5	0.04	0.002	
	United Torah	5	0.04	0.002	
	United Arab L	5	0.04	0.002	
	National Unio	4	0.03	0.001	
	Hadash	3	0.03	6E-04	
	Yisrael Beitein	4			
	Balad	2			
	One Nation	2			

16th Knesset ('03

Party	Seats			
Likud	38	0.32	0.1	0.838
Labor-Meimad	19	0.16	0.025	6.17
Shinui	15	0.13	0.016	0.567
Shas	11	0.09	0.008	
National Unio	7	0.06	0.003	
Meretz-Yacha	6	0.05	0.003	
National Relig	6	0.05	0.003	
United Torah	5	0.04	0.002	
Hadash-Ta'al	3	0.03	6E-04	
One Nation	3	0.03	6E-04	
Balad	3	0.03	6E-04	
Yisrael BaAliy	2	0.02	3E-04	
United Arab L	2	0.02	3E-04	

mocratic Party

et)

Twenty-ninth government
Likud
Labor-Meimad
Shas
Centre Party
National Religious Party
United Torah Judaism
Yisrael BaAliyah
National Union-Yisrael Beiteinu

National Union leaves
National Religious Party leaves
Shinui leaves
Labor-Meimad joins
Agudat joins
Labor-Meimad leaves
Kadima formed and becomes leader
Likud leaves

17th Knesset ('06

Kadima	29	0.24	0.058	0.873
Labor-Meimad	19	0.16	0.025	**7.843**
Shas	12	0.1	0.01	0.558
Likud	12	0.1	0.01	
Yisrael Beiteir	11	0.09	0.008	
National Unio	9	0.08	0.006	
Gil	7	0.06	0.003	
United Torah	6	0.05	0.003	
Meretz-Yacha	5	0.04	0.002	
United Arab L	4	0.03	0.001	
Hadash	3	0.03	6E-04	
Balad	3	0.03	6E-04	

18th Knesset ('09

Kadima	28	0.23	0.054	0.852
Likud	27	0.23	0.051	**6.77**
Yisrael Beitei	15	0.13	0.016	0.617
Labor Party	13	0.11	0.012	
Shas	11	0.09	0.008	
United Torah	5	0.04	0.002	
United Arab L	4	0.03	0.001	
National Unio	4	0.03	0.001	
Hadash	4	0.03	0.001	
New Moveme	3	0.03	6E-04	
The Jewish H	3	0.03	6E-04	
Balad	3	0.03	6E-04	

1949	4.73372781
1951	5.04908836
1955	5.99500416
1959	4.9213944
1961	5.36512668
1965	4.72131148
1969	3.56965791
1973	3.35351653
1977	4.36893204
1981	3.125
1984	3.8585209
1988	4.38489647
1992	4.39292251
1996	5.60747664
1999	8.8127295
2003	6.17495712
2006	7.84313725
2009	6.76691729

Yisrael Beiteinu joins
Yisrael Beiteinu leaves

Electoral rules and the size of the prize

Allen Hicken
Orit Kedar
Measure of political fractionalization

Truman center at Hebrew University
Taubman center
Sammy Smooha - polls

Outline the theory

Read about what effects the effective nun

0.78875	61%
0.80194444	53%
0.83319444	67%
0.79680556	72%
0.81361111	58%
0.78819444	63%
0.71986111	85%
0.70180556	54%
0.77111111	51%
0.68	55%
0.74083333	84%
0.77194444	81%
0.77236111	52%
0.82166667	55%
0.88652778	63%
0.83805556	57%
0.8725	56%
0.85222222	62%

Coefficient

Effective parties

Maj. Coalition %

nber of parties

Report for David Romney

Use of Library Resources

The library's greatest research sources for me were its books and the online databases available through the library. I found these sources generally useful. I only once had difficulty finding a book, and the online databases always contained the articles that I needed. I did not use the library staff very often; I never had any difficulty finding the sources that I needed. I also did not coordinate with Brian Champion, the librarian whom I submitted my research application through; working with my mentoring professor was easier.

What I learned

I have taken three main lessons from my experience. First, I have learned that the subject of a research paper can turn out, in the end, to be far different than what you intend in the beginning. My subject actually changed a couple of times, allowing me to publish twice from my research. Second, I have learned to keep my schedule flexible. Changes in my subject, as well as other matters, necessitated adapting my schedule. Third, I have learned what a great help and friend professors can be, both within the research process and in other ways. Professor Gubler met regularly with me to discuss the progress of my research. Because of my involvement with him in this research project, he also gave me a position as a research assistant and has written further letters of recommendation for me. These three lessons will help me with future endeavors.

Publishing

I published twice as a result of my research. My first publication was in *BYU Political Review*. Although not a research paper, preparing my article for this publication took much research. This first article focuses on the effects of Israel's unique electoral system on the peace

process. After completing this article, I switched my focus to Jewish fundamentalism in Israel, in which I had found myself becoming more interested as I went along. I used this research to write an article for *Sigma*, a BYU political science journal. Writing this article involved more research than the first did, especially in outlining my theoretical framework for the paper. After submitting this article to *Sigma*, my interested turned to fractionalization in Israel's electoral system. I constructed a data set from my preliminary research, and I want to write an article about changes in the number of effective parties—a political science measurement of political fractionalization—over time.

Funding