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JOHN SERRANO DID NOT VOTE FOR
PROPOSITION 13

William A. Fischel

When Oscar Jiménez contacted me to write an article for the fiftieth anniversary of Serrano v. Priest,1 I thought he had dialed a wrong number. Good parts of my career have been devoted to arguing for the virtues of local fiscal control of public schools. I had published numerous papers and book chapters critical of the Serrano doctrine and arguing that it was the major factor in causing Proposition 13, which has been an incubus on California’s public education system for four decades.2 Inviting me to a Serrano celebration seemed a bit like inviting Captain Ahab on a Greenpeace-sponsored whale-watching expedition.

Ahab was the obsessive captain of the fictional whaling ship in Herman Melville’s classic Moby Dick.

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Ahab is at the center of the story, but he is no hero. His ungodly hunt to destroy the white whale is the cause of the demise of the crew of his ship, which is sunk by an attack from Moby Dick. Obsessions are unhealthful, and I would note that my last full article on the connection between Serrano and Proposition 13 was published in 2003. After publishing three full articles, miscellaneous commentaries, and parts of several books about it between 1989 and 2009, I concluded I had said enough.3 Rather than advancing new arguments, this essay will review my work on this subject in the form of a memoir (with popular-song headings that betray my vintage) about my evolving interest in the Serrano and Proposition 13 connection.

I. “I FEEL THE EARTH MOVE:” SERRANO AND THE UNDERPINNINGS OF LOCAL PUBLIC FINANCE

The 1971 Serrano decision, whose anniversary is the occasion for the suite of articles in this journal, was just the beginning of a train of legal and political jousting that continued for at least fifteen years. It still shapes California school finance, and it has influenced public education everywhere in the nation. The first decision, Serrano I, was largely a declaration of principles. But what principles! It declared that the system of local funding for education, which had been the fiscal foundation for public schools in California and almost every other state since the dawn of the Republic, was Constitutionally infirm. The lower court decision that was reversed and remanded by Serrano I had found no Constitutional basis for the plaintiffs’ complaint of unequal funding for education among local school districts. The state supreme court supplied a basis, invoking the Equal Protection Clause of both the federal and state constitutions and declaring that education was a fundamental right, thereby elevating deviations from equality to strict scrutiny. The state supreme court in 1971 did not prescribe any particular remedy, but most of those it suggested would have substantially reduced the inequalities in spending per pupil that then existed among school districts.

On June 6, 1978, California voters passed Proposition 13, a constitutional amendment that rolled back property tax assessments and cut rates on all property to a maximum of one percent of 1975 property values. Proposition 13 allowed assessments to rise by no more than two percent per year, and revaluation to current market value could occur only when property

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4 FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 13.
5 CAL. CONST. art. XIII A, §§ 1-2.
was sold or substantially renovated and upgraded. The voter initiative passed by a nearly two-to-one margin, and it cut property tax revenues statewide by more than fifty percent. Its persistence to this day is widely believed to be the reason that funding for California’s public schools has declined relative to most other states, and it has contributed to the state’s crisis-level housing prices, generational inequality, and the general privatization of municipal services.

In several publications I have argued that Proposition 13 was caused by the *Serrano* decisions and the legislative response to them. By requiring nearly equal school expenditures per pupil statewide, *Serrano* divorced local property taxes from the amount of local school spending. Prior to *Serrano*, voters at the local level could see a connection between their home values and locally-financed school spending. The down-side of increased school spending was that local taxes would rise, and higher local taxes were both painful to pay and bad for home values. Prospective homebuyers would pay less for a home that had higher taxes. The up-side of increased school spending, assuming it would improve education, is that it would make homes in the district more attractive to families with school children. If the benefits emerging from more spending exceeded the costs of higher taxes, homeowners would generally favor the spending in anticipation of higher home values. Even homeowners who had no children in school could benefit

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7 See Evelyn Danforth, *Proposition 13, Revisited*, 73 STAN. L. REV. 511 (2021) for an up-to-date critique and review of earlier studies.

8 See *supra* note 3.
Serrano did not vote for Proposition 13 from improved schools and be expected to support them.9

The second change, which is really the flip side of the first, is that prior to Serrano, California households could “vote with their feet”—move to another school district—to get a better-funded school. Migration of households to better districts is the method of revealing private preferences for public expenditures proposed by Charles Tiebout in a 1956 article that is now the touchstone of nearly all economic discussions of local public finance.10 Increased immigration to localities with better schools is the mechanism that raises home values. Serrano eliminated the Tiebout approach by which parents could get better-funded schools, so it made sense for the voters to nearly eliminate the local property tax for financing schools.

I had actually thought of this explanation almost as soon as Proposition 13 passed on June 6, 1978. (It wasn’t my first thought at the time; my wife delivered out first child four days later, so I was thinking more about Braxton-Hicks than Jarvis-Gann.11) The Serrano decision was widely known when I was a graduate student in economics at Princeton in 1971, and much of my research in the 1970s had to do with local government behavior and the economics of the property tax.

My doctoral dissertation posited that local governments were conscious managers of their tax base,


11 Howard Jarvis and Paul Gann were the best-known sponsors of Proposition 13. Braxton-Hicks contractions often occur before the onset of labor in childbirth.
particularly with respect to commercial and industrial property. This was completely contrary to assumptions of the *Serrano* litigators and the court, who supposed that the composition of the local property tax base was simply a “geographical accident.” My ongoing research led me toward the view that local land use controls, including zoning and the burgeoning environmental movement, involved conscious trade-offs of industry’s tax benefits and its inconveniences to local residents. A court decision that swept away the results of these decisions was likely to cause serious political consequences.

II. “CALIFORNIA DREAMING:” ON-SITE EVIDENCE

Two related constraints kept me from investigating the connection between *Serrano* and Proposition 13. The first was the suspicion that my theory was too easy. Surely someone in a better position than me was working through the details of the decision, the legislative response, and the political campaign that led to Proposition 13. The second constraint was information. Ensconced in New Hampshire years before the internet in a college without a law library, I did not have good access at the time to information about California’s ongoing struggle to respond to *Serrano* and head off


Proposition 13. The causes of Proposition 13, I assumed, would emerge from scholars in a much better position than me to do the research and test their theories against informed opinion.

But the possible connection still piqued my interest. My first opening to this was a conference on Proposition 13 held in Santa Barbara in December 1978. It was assembled by economists David Puryear, John Ross, and Perry Shapiro, and its proceedings were published as a supplement to the National Tax Journal in 1979.\textsuperscript{14} The presentations and papers were mostly by economists and California policy experts. The overall view of the causes was general perplexity.

The economists of my persuasion, which is that local governments mostly gave their residents what they wanted, were especially puzzled. Studies had shown that California metro areas generally met the standards of the Tiebout model, which was that differences in local taxes and school expenditures between districts were reflected in (“capitalized in”) home values.\textsuperscript{15} Why would the same voters overwhelmingly, in almost all regions of the state, vote to destroy the local fiscal system with an ironclad, constitutional cap on taxes and assessments?

\textsuperscript{14} Perry Shapiro, David Puryear & John Ross, Tax and Expenditure Limitation in Retrospect and in Prospect, 32 NAT’L TAX J. 1 (1979).

Political scientists seemed just as perplexed. The notion that it was a “revolt of the rich” was undermined by surveys that showed that even if the top half of the income distribution was prohibited from voting, Proposition 13 would have easily passed.\textsuperscript{16} Survey researchers searching for reasons shrugged their shoulders with titles concluding that voters wanted “something for nothing.”\textsuperscript{17}

The notion that a cabal of “Leviathan” politicians had conspired to overtax and overspend never addressed why voters would hobble the minnows of government—counties, cities, and school districts—and not the whale-sized state government.\textsuperscript{18} Indeed, Proposition 13 seemed to send most governmental decisions away from localities and up to Sacramento. If you want to slay Leviathan, you don’t feed it with a constitutional constraint on local spending. The Leviathan theory also failed to explain why nearly every legislator who sought reelection after Proposition 13 succeeded, including most of those who had publicly opposed Proposition 13.\textsuperscript{19}

Despite my dissatisfaction with conventional explanations for Proposition 13, I wrote nothing about the \textit{Serrano} connection for almost ten years. During that decade I spent two separate academic years teaching at University of California campuses in Davis (1980–81) and Santa Barbara (1985-86). In Santa Barbara, my

\textsuperscript{16} See \textsc{David O. Sears} \& \textsc{Jack Citrin}, \textit{TAX REVOLT: SOMETHING FOR NOTHING IN CALIFORNIA} 102, tbl.5 (1982).
\textsuperscript{17} \textsc{Sears} \& \textsc{Citrin}, supra note 16.
\textsuperscript{18} \textsc{Brennan, Geoffrey \& James Buchanan}, \textit{The Logic of Tax Limits: Alternative Constitutional Constraints on the Power to Tax}, 32 \textsc{Nat’l Tax J.} 11 (1979).
\textsuperscript{19} Seiji Fujii, \textit{Political Shirking - Proposition 13 vs. Proposition 8}, 10 Japan. J. Pol. Sci. 213 (2009) (“In short, eight state legislators who sought reelection against their challengers were voted out from office in the 76 districts where the district and the incumbent had the different opinions about Proposition 13.”)
Serrano did not vote for Proposition 13. My son—the one born just after Proposition 13—was enrolled in the second grade in the Peabody Elementary School, reputed to be one of the better of the city’s several elementary schools. By 1985, the temporary bailout of local schools for Proposition 13’s revenue losses had spent itself, and the full effects on education were in place. My son’s second grade class had thirty students in it. The teacher had no in-class aide. My wife and other parents volunteered to help keep the school library open because the budget allowed for only a single librarian. Back in New Hampshire, even towns with mediocre elementary schools would have rebelled at a class size of thirty in early elementary years, and library volunteers are add-ons, not necessities. Why one of the richer university communities in a rich state would settle for such conditions goaded me into a more serious look at the Serrano decision and its consequences.

One difficulty for me was getting an accurate and coherent account of the legal and legislative events of the Serrano case and subsequent legislation. I had learned to read cases and other legal materials in the 1980s in pursuit of my interest in the burgeoning subdiscipline of “law and economics.” But connecting case law with legislation required more inside information than I could obtain at that pre-internet time. The Rosetta Stone for Serrano was provided by Judge Lester Olson, the Los Angeles County judge who wrote the trial court opinion that was adopted in Serrano III, which approved and closed the post-Proposition 13 response to the Serrano decisions. Olson’s opinion was of such detail and coherence that the California Court of Appeals adopted it with almost no modification, and the California Supreme Court declined to review it, thereby making Olson’s opinion the final word. At about the same time,

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20 Picus, supra note 6, at 45-46.
Joseph Henke, a law professor at the University of San Francisco published a parallel account from a wider perspective of the road from *Serrano* to Proposition 13.\(^{22}\) I felt confident enough to write a paper with the somewhat tentative title, “Did *Serrano* Cause Proposition 13?” It was soon published in the National Tax Journal in December 1989.

Shortly after that first publication on *Serrano* and Proposition 13, I spent another academic year in California, this time at Berkeley’s law school, then known as Boalt Hall. The purpose of my year-long sabbatical visit was to work on the book that was eventually published as Regulatory Takings.\(^{23}\) It was not about school finance, though other California court decisions were important for it. Shortly after my arrival at Boalt, I was invited to give one of the lunch-time seminars. Having no new paper on regulatory takings, I decided to talk about the recently published article on *Serrano* and Proposition 13. Jack Coons and Steve Sugarman, regular faculty at Boalt and central to the *Serrano* cases, were in the audience. My talk was well received, but Jack and Steve had some questions about it, as you might imagine.

### III. “What’s [Law] Got To Do With It?”

The critical problem with my theory was its faith in the Tiebout hypothesis and the “median voter” of local

\(^{22}\) Joseph T. Henke, *Financing Public Schools in California: The Aftermath of Serrano v. Priest and Proposition 13*, 21 U.S.F. L. Rev. 1 (1986). Professor Henke explained that the *Serrano* litigants felt they had to focus on property wealth rather than income differences because the US Supreme Court had rejected such arguments in other cases.

\(^{23}\) WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, *REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW ECONOMICS AND POLITICS* (1995). The *Serrano* cases did temper my enthusiasm for aggressive judicial review in other areas of the law, including land use regulation. *Id.* at 284.
government. The Tiebout model holds that residents sort themselves into communities that best match their demands for public services. The biggest public service is public education. The median voter model is the economists’ version of the political theory you learned in fifth grade: The majority of voters get what they want. Special interest groups take a back seat at the local level, especially when a single public service like education sets its budget and taxes independently of other municipal services. Given these two conditions, I argued that only an exogenous force like the decisions could induce these same voters to pull the chair out from under the local property tax.

For economists, this theory made a fair amount of sense. Jon Sonstelie, who had originally written (with

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24 A referee asked, “How does the Tiebout model apply to many minoritized communities that are not as privy to how educational and tax systems work or have the (financial) agency to move as readily as their more affluent counterparts?” My answer is a side-step: The Tiebout model is descriptive of how homebuyers behave, not a prescription for how the distribution of public services ought to work. It accepts the distribution of income and wealth and the preferences (and prejudices) of voters and homebuyers as given and asks what the result is. Beyond that, almost no economist of my acquaintance would rule out efforts by state and national governments to modify the outcome of the Tiebout model to assist the poor and combat prejudice. The problem with was not its motives or justification; it was, in my opinion, its extreme and unyielding standards of fiscal equality, which undermined much of what voters apparently preferred about local control and the school-choice system embedded in Tiebout’s “vote with your feet” model. See generally Harold M. Hochman & Shmuel Nitzan, Tiebout and Sympathy, 6 MATHEMATICAL SOC. SCI.195 (1983); Caroline M. Hoxby, Does Competition Among Public Schools Benefit Students and Taxpayers?, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 1209 (2000).

Perry Shapiro) that Proposition 13 could only have been caused by overspending bureaucrats,26 came around to the idea that Serrano was the main culprit, and other economists have built up this idea.27 Coons and Sugarman were not economists, though. They were law professors, and they wanted an account of just how the courts had pushed the legislature so far as to cause an epochal voter initiative. How would voters have figured out these arcane economic theories of their supposed behavior?

It would not do to just point out that lots of successful economic theories are not intuitively obvious; if they were, we wouldn’t need social scientists. (No smart remarks, please.) And Coons and Sugarman, after all, were hardly naive about such matters. Their book (with William Clune), Private Wealth and Public Education, introduced the concept of “district power equalization,” which was central to the Serrano II remedy, and not a few economists thought it was a good idea.28 Asking the rich districts to share their tax-bases with the poorer districts seemed like a moderate form of redistribution. And I actually shared some of their doubts about the Serrano and Proposition 13 story. How did voters, renowned to be “rationally ignorant” about the particulars of politics,29 behave as if they had figured out a connection that was based on economic theory?

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29 ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 244–46, 266–71 (1957).
Serrano did not vote for Proposition 13

I did not set out to examine this immediately. That book about regulatory takings that sent me to Berkeley in the first place needed attention. Eventually, however, I began to piece together the progression of legislative and judicial events that were set in motion after Serrano I in 1971. The archives of the Los Angeles Times had impressively detailed reportage on both the Serrano litigation and legislative responses. The most notable aspect of the legislature’s response was their willingness to go along with the overall thrust of the Serrano decision: more money for schools, especially for schools with high concentrations of low-income students. In that sense, Serrano I did not seem to be a “counter majoritarian” decision, where the courts had to protect a “discrete and insular minority” from the will of the majority. Duly elected state legislators from properly apportioned districts wanted to help poor people, who were often characterized as racial and ethnic minorities stuck in big-city districts. In this sense, the Serrano decision looks more like a catalyst for reforms that were generally popular but that had been blocked by legislative and local inertia.

The other aspect of the response to Serrano that stands out was all parties’ ignorance of the characteristics of the poor districts that they wanted to help. Almost everyone thought that “property rich” communities were populated by rich people and “property poor” places were where the poor people lived. Polls that showed that Californians approved of Serrano

30 Fischel, How Serrano Caused, supra note 2, at 609 n.11.
32 A detailed study of the California legislature just before Serrano I found that "more than two thirds of the legislators said they were very concerned with interdistrict inequalities." ARNOLD J. MELTSNER ET AL., POLITICAL FEASIBILITY OF REFORM IN SCHOOL FINANCING: THE CASE OF CALIFORNIA 90 (1973).
cast the decision as one that took from the richest districts and giving to the poor.\textsuperscript{33} Aside from seeming to be obvious, the notion that \textit{Serrano} was a Robin Hood style decision was made palpable by the court’s and the plaintiff’s continuing reference to two paradigmatic opposites, Beverly Hills and Baldwin Park.\textsuperscript{34} The latter was a low-income and property-poor (low taxable values per pupil) school district and city east of Los Angeles. The former was, well, Beverly Hills, and it indeed was property-rich as well as income-rich.

It turned out, however, that cherry-picking two extreme districts was quite misleading. In 1974, after \textit{Serrano I} but before \textit{Serrano II}, John Mockler, who was Governor Jerry Brown’s Secretary of Education, and Ronald Cox did a study of all California school districts that showed conclusively that more than half of the poor children in California attended schools in districts whose value per pupil was above the state average.\textsuperscript{35} This had not been evident earlier because Census data showing resident’s income characteristics was not broken out by school districts, which often do not correspond to the usual Census units like cities and towns. Strict enforcement of a policy that took local funds from districts that were “property rich” (above average taxable wealth per pupil) and gave them to the “property poor” would more often penalize low-income students than reward them. Most of the \textit{Serrano} advocates were reported to be surprised by this finding.\textsuperscript{36}


\textsuperscript{34} \textit{Serrano v. Priest}, 487 P.2d 1241, 1248 (Cal. 1971) (\textit{Serrano I}).


\textsuperscript{36} \textit{See, e.g.}, McCurdy, \textit{supra} note 35.
This problem was especially acute because it was discovered that two of the districts that were “property rich” were Los Angeles and San Francisco.\textsuperscript{37} Both had disproportionate numbers of poor children in their schools, but both had large amounts of nonresidential tax base—office buildings, stores, malls, hotels, and factories—that offset the modest homes of low-income people. Taking money away from those big-city districts and distributing them to “property poor” districts in the suburbs was not the right thing to do, and claims that the public generally approved of \textit{Serrano} needed to be evaluated in light of the widespread misperception that property rich districts were mainly populated by rich people.

As a result of this new information about the regressive nature of taking from the “property rich” and giving to the “property poor,” \textit{Serrano} advocates had to shift to a remedy that, while taxing the “property rich” districts, still gave them more money than they would have had before. Responding to these arguments, Judge Bernard Jefferson held that the appropriate remedy was equalizing expenditures per student for every district in the state, but at the same time adhering to the power-equalization principle that any district’s property tax rate would generate the same amount of revenue as any other.\textsuperscript{38} The litmus for compliance was that all districts

\textsuperscript{37} See discussion and sources in Fischel, \textit{Did John Serrano Vote}, supra note 2, at 92, n.12.

\textsuperscript{38} \textit{Serrano v. Priest}, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976) (\textit{Serrano II}); A. Alan Post, \textit{Effects of Proposition 13 on the State of California}, 32 NAT’L TAX J. SUPP. 381, 384 (1979). A referee asked if district power equalization without the equal spending requirement would still have resulted in a tax revolt. The remedy does generate strong resistance. For example, Vermont’s 1998 reform used power equalization without an equal spending requirement. There was no Proposition 13-style tax revolt—Vermont does not have a statewide voter initiative—but the “property rich” districts applied enough
had to be within a $100 band of per student spending. As an incisive analysis of this remedy concluded, the only way the state could comply with this was for full state funding of local education.\textsuperscript{39}

This “level up” equalization satisfied the property-rich urban districts insofar as an equality of spending would still raise the total amount they got. And the legislature’s response to this, AB 65, did go a long way towards achieving this goal by pumping most of the state’s inflation-driven budget surplus into the schools. The trouble was that the fiscal foundation of AB 65 was still the local property tax.\textsuperscript{40} Home values were being driven up by general inflation and, I have argued, the newly restrictive land use regulations of the 1970s.\textsuperscript{41} This shifted the burden of taxation towards homeowners and away from business. In normal times and places, local school boards would usually reduce tax rates in response to inflated assessments.\textsuperscript{42} But AB 65 removed local discretion on tax rates; the state legislature needed


\textsuperscript{40} John B. Mockler & Gerald Hayward, School Finance in California: Pre-Serrano to the Present, 3 J. EDUC. FIN. 386, 394 (1978). AB 65 was preceded by several tax reforms that attempted to comply with Serrano. All of them continued to rely of local property taxes; their weakness in responding to Serrano was that they allowed voter overrides of state-imposed caps on local spending from local sources. See Picus, supra note 6.


Serrano did not vote for Proposition 13

those higher property taxes to pay for the remedy demanded by Serrano II. In effect, AB 65 commandeered school district property taxes and left local boards with almost no discretion to raise or lower spending from local taxes.

This brings us back to the issue of how the voters got the message that increases in their local taxes no longer paid for better local schools. The answer came through their tax bills. They started to rise rapidly in the middle 1970s as a result of earlier Serrano-required legislation. At the same time, their schools were not getting better, as indicated by standardized test scores. It should be clear that voters knew that it was school taxes, not other taxing units, that were the source of the problem. Tax bills may be submitted as a single invoice by the county, but the taxes are broken out by which jurisdiction—county, municipality, school district, special district (water, fire, conservation)—is getting the revenue. Voters upset by their taxes could easily figure out where the source of their pain lay. Even if their taxes were paid as part of a mortgage in an escrow account, a quick phone call to the bank would reveal which entity accounted for the soaring taxes that many thought would drive them from their homes. It was taxes for the schools, not the municipalities or county governments, that were skyrocketing.

Proposition 13 voters did not have to know anything about the Tiebout model or the median voter model or the Serrano decision or the machinations of the

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44 See Fischel, Did John Serrano Vote, supra note 2, at 909-912. Most striking was that cities that had no municipal property taxes (because of large sales tax revenues) and thus proportionately larger school property taxes, were more inclined to vote for Proposition 13 than others. Id. at 909.
legislature. They knew that school taxes were going through the roof—for almost all districts, not just the “property rich”—and they knew schools were just about the same as before. Why not listen to that raspy old man, Howard Jarvis, whose ideas about tax limitations had been rejected repeatedly in the past ten years? If someone suggested that decimating local taxes would hurt the schools, voters could rationally respond that it was now the state’s responsibility to fund schools, not their local district; just ask the state supreme court.

IV. “IT DON’T MEAN A THING IF IT AIN’T GOT THAT SWING”

The statistical evidence for my thesis that was original to my 1996 article was something I called the “swing.” Proposition 13 was not the first proposal of its kind. Two other voter initiatives that would have severely limited the local property tax had made it to the ballot in 1968 and 1972. Both were proposed by the same person, Philip Watson, who was the assessor for Los Angeles County. He apparently got tired of people blaming him for high property taxes and devised a plan to alleviate their local burden by sending obligations to fund them to the state.

Watson’s initiatives were revolutionary, but responsibly so, if there is such a thing. Just like Proposition 13 in 1978, they would have imposed a cap of one percent of value on all property taxes. Unlike Jarvis-Gann, however, Watson did not roll back property

45 Id. at 915, indicating that Jarvis had failed to get four previous anti-tax initiatives on the ballot.
46 See text infra (explaining Swing calculation).
assessments and limit their growth; that was less of a problem for taxpayers before housing price inflation had taken off in the 1970s. Watson also indicated how the tax cut was to be paid for, mainly by shifting service obligations, including much of school spending, to the state. In his 1972 initiative, Watson also made a nod to Serrano compliance that shifted some funding to the county level, but it was hardly compelling insofar as the original Serrano decision had not actually specified a particular remedy.48

The big fact here is that both of Watson’s initiatives failed by large margins, almost two to one, while six and ten years later, nearly the same set of voters favored Proposition 13 by an almost two to one margin. I characterize that shift statistically as a 90 percent “swing” in the statewide vote: From a statewide 34.1 percent approval for Watson’s 1972 initiative to a 64.8 percent approval of Proposition 13 in 1978 is a 90 percent swing (= [64.8 minus 34.1] divided by 34.1).

This was obvious even if it was regarded only as a perplexing curiosity. What I did beyond that was to examine the swings in votes by individual school districts.49 The reason is that there were vast differences in the fiscal circumstances among school districts; the Serrano court was not wrong about that. Some districts were penalized by AB 65, the last Serrano-compliance bill, and others were ostensibly benefitted from it by getting more funds. (Earlier Serrano-inspired reform attempts had also penalized the “high wealth” districts but had not demanded the leveling remedy imposed by Serrano II.50) The penalized districts should have

48 Philip Watson, Do We Need a Tax Limit?, 25 NAT’L TAX J. 397 (1972); Fischel, How Serrano Caused, supra note 2, at 616.
49 Fischel, How Serrano Caused, supra note 2, at 617–18.
50 See Picus, supra note 6, at 39.
“swung” disproportionately towards Proposition 13 as compared with the 1972 Watson proposal.

The calculation of “swing” was less simple than it sounds because voting tabulations are by city, not by school district. Moreover, the Watson 1972 initiative tried to address school funding in a way that varied by county, so comparing the swings in different counties was not quite valid. The ideal study would compare districts within each county, but the only county that had enough cities that overlapped with their school districts to get a sizable sample was Los Angeles. I plotted the 1972 to 1978 swing votes for 29 cities that had the same name as their school districts (still an imperfect overlap) in Los Angeles County. I found a remarkably strong correlation ($r=.71$) between the swing and measures of their property wealth per pupil.\footnote{Fischel, How Serrano Caused, supra note 2, at 618.} The districts that had relied most on local taxes (and thus were penalized by Serrano-compliance) because of their high property values were those that had the largest swings.

For example, Beverly Hills had a swing of 154 percent. It was not the highest swing in Los Angeles County, though. That honor went to El Segundo, where the swing was 251 percent. You have seen El Segundo if you took a window seat on the left side of the plane and looked out as it landed (towards the ocean) at Los Angeles International Airport (LAX). It is the city closest to the airport and has a large industrial complex, dominated by oil refineries. In the midst of this industrial haven is a residential area of middle-class houses—the rich don’t live among refineries or next to busy airports. The compensation for that burden had been a low property-tax rate that nonetheless generously financed their public schools. El Segundo was a “property rich” district without many income-rich residents, and their shift from opposing property tax limits in 1972 to
embracing them in 1978 reflected their disappointment with the Serrano remedy.

When this paper (“How Serrano Caused”) became more widely known and, at least in some circles, accepted as a valid possibility,\(^{52}\) Kurt Stark and Jonathan Zasloff undertook a lengthy critique of my explanation and evidence.\(^{53}\) They did a more sophisticated statistical analysis of the “swing” of votes from 1972 and 1978 using multiple regression analysis and a larger sample of districts. I had thought of doing this earlier but could not think of what variables would be appropriate to explain the swing. Using these variables, Stark and Zasloff concluded that property wealth per student, which Serrano was keyed on, was not the critical variable to explain why voters shifted so much. They found that family income, the elderly population of a district, and (of lesser importance) percent registered Republicans were more statistically significant and potentially better explanations for the success of Proposition 13.\(^{54}\)

Provoked by Stark and Zasloff’s evidence, I began to think about the denominator, the “per pupil” measure instead of just the numerator, aggregate taxable property. Up to that time I simply accepted the courts and plaintiffs’ view that, at least in the short run, the number of public-school pupils in a district was a given. But why would San Francisco, say, have a majority of its students from poor families but still have a high tax-base per student? It wasn’t just the commercial buildings that raised the numerator (taxable property). It was the relatively small fraction of families who had any children at all who lived there. People with children avoided San

\(^{52}\) See Glaeser, supra note 7; Silva & Sonstelie, supra note 27; Danforth, supra note 7.


\(^{54}\) Id. at 897-98.
Francisco’s schools if they could afford to do so. They either moved to the suburbs or sent their children to private or parochial schools.\textsuperscript{55} The low quality of inner-city public schools reduced the total number of potential students, thus lowering the denominator and making the San Francisco schools look “property rich.”\textsuperscript{56} Because the Serrano remedy focused on property and not on people, it penalized many urban school districts with problematic school systems, the very districts in need of additional state funds. And as a result of the flight by families from the central cities, the remaining population was full of older people. In statistics-speak, the variables representing older residents as well as (more obviously) higher income residents were closely correlated with property value per pupil. The apparently contrary results of Stark and Zasloff were actually consistent with what I had originally found with my simple two-variable comparisons.

This does not prove that Serrano caused Proposition 13. There is no standard to measure such a claim. All one can claim in matters such as this is that some stories make more sense than others. I am nonetheless increasingly confident that this story is better than other accounts. This is mainly because of the test that I first thought of when Proposition 13 first passed: Some other story will arise that will make sense of this seemingly self-destructive vote. It did not happen.

The stories that attribute Proposition 13 to one-off events such as the growing state budget surplus (which

\textsuperscript{55} That families with children move in significant numbers to better public schools is shown for the Boston area by Katharine L. Bradbury, Christopher J. Mayer, & Karl E. Case, \textit{Property Tax Limits, Local Fiscal Behavior, and Property Values: Evidence from Massachusetts Under Proposition 212}, 80 J. PUB. ECON. 287 (2001).

Serrano did not vote for Proposition 13 was deliberately allowed to accumulate to deal with Serrano\textsuperscript{57}), the supposed political astuteness of Howard Jarvis,\textsuperscript{58} the rise of Ronald Reagan (who did not support property tax limitation initiatives when he was governor,\textsuperscript{59}) the dilly-dallying of the state legislature (which I dispute\textsuperscript{60}), or the disproportionate rise in homeowners’ assessments\textsuperscript{61} are based on transitory events that could have been corrected but for the demands of Serrano. Mine is the only story (so far) that makes sense within the framework that modern political economy has used to successfully explain other phenomenon.\textsuperscript{62}

My thesis is supplemented by the remarkable endurance of Proposition 13 itself. Political figures regard it as the “third rail” of California politics, liable to

\textsuperscript{57} See Fischel, \textit{How Serrano Caused}, supra note 2, at 628.


\textsuperscript{60} Fischel, \textit{Did John Serrano Vote}, supra note 2, at 920.

\textsuperscript{61} See generally ISAAC WILLIAM MARTIN, \textit{THE PERMANENT TAX REVOLT: HOW THE PROPERTY TAX TRANSFORMED AMERICAN POLITICS} (2008). Why the property tax, which was a steady source of local government revenue throughout the twentieth century, should have been transformative in 1978 remains unexplained. \textit{See also} John Joseph Wallis, \textit{A History of the Property Tax in America}, in \textit{PROPERTY TAXATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE} 123 (2001).

\textsuperscript{62} An example of durability is the original test of the Tiebout model by the late Wallace Oates in 1969. Wallace Oates, \textit{The Effects of Property Taxes and Local Public Spending on Property Values: An Empirical Study of Tax Capitalization and the Tiebout Hypothesis}, 77 J. POL. ECON. 957 (1969). The study has been replicated scores of times and has survived updated data, venues, and econometric techniques. Oates was my thesis advisor at Princeton, and his modest demeanor, openness to alternative views, and dedication to factual inquiry were life-long guideposts to my career, though I have tried to avoid his wordy titles for articles.
electrocute the careers of anyone who dares challenge it. Even incremental reforms such as bringing commercial and industrial property back to normal taxation standards were rejected by California’s voters in 2020. Bad political ideas do get adopted by democracies sometimes. National Prohibition was imposed by Constitutional amendment in 1920 and did a lot of damage until it was reversed by another amendment in 1934. Proposition 13 has done much more damage to California than Prohibition, and it has so far lasted more than twice as long as Prohibition. Moreover, the state constitutional amendment process is considerably easier than a national amendment, as the tribulations of the national Equal Rights Amendment (for gender equity) surely demonstrate.

Californians cannot be promised a return to local fiscal control of schools under any amendment to Proposition 13 alone. That is because the Serrano decision still stands. A return to taxation of even nonresidential property would still, under Serrano, require that the revenues earmarked for education would have to be distributed by the state government, not districts in which the property was located. Only a serious modification of Serrano’s insistence on equal spending and property tax-sharing would, I believe, incline the voters to accept any modification of Proposition 13.

V. “I CAN’T GET NO SATISFACTION:” THE LEGEND OF JOHN SERRANO

In my last full-length paper on Serrano, the title led with the question, “Did John Serrano Vote for Proposition 13?” This was meant not to answer the

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63 Conor Dougherty, California’s 40-Year-Old Tax Revolt Survives a Counterattack, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2020 (§B), at 3.
question. It was a lead-in to debunk the common view that the plaintiff in the case was a poor Chicano who couldn’t get a decent education for his son and so turned to the law to vindicate his right to an education. Here’s the true story.

Near the beginning of the school year in 1967, John Serrano, Jr., had a talk with the principal of his son’s elementary school in East Los Angeles. John was a social worker in East L.A. He had a bachelor’s degree from Cal State Los Angeles and a Masters of Social Work from the University of Southern California. His young son, John Anthony Serrano, was a bright student, and the older John (he was the “Jr.” and sported no middle name) was concerned that his son was not getting an education that would develop his talents. The principal of the school, one of many in the Los Angeles Unified School District, gave a candid but kindly answer. John Anthony would be better off in another school, apparently admitting that the present school did not have the wherewithal to deal with especially bright students.

John Jr. considered his options and decided to move out of East Los Angeles. He and his family first moved to Whittier and then to Hacienda Heights, both

64 James W. Guthrie, Twenty-first Century Education Finance: Equity, Adequacy, and the Emerging Challenge of Linking Resources to Performance, in MONEY, POLITICS, & LAW: INTERSECTIONS AND CONFLICTS IN THE PROVISION OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (2004). As I noted in Did John Serrano Vote, supra note 2, at 892, n.14, Professor Guthrie cheerfully admitted that his account was based on “hearsay.”


66 John’s degrees were earned over several years after he realized that his lack of education led to dead end jobs. Id.
independent school districts east of Los Angeles. John Anthony did well in school and excelled in sports, especially track and field events. I coincidentally found his image in a book by a friend, Frank Zarnowski, about outstanding decathlon athletes. John is pictured doing the pole vault while he was a student at the University of California at Santa Barbara. (His younger brother, David, also attended UCSB.) He also could vault well in the corporate world. John Anthony is now a director at Deutsche Bank in Fountain Valley, California, according to the obituary of his father in the Los Angeles Times in 2006 and John Anthony’s current LinkedIn page (which does not contain his middle name).

How should we think about this apparent success story? The view that I took was that the Serranos were lucky to have options to deal with what could have been a bad situation. The early grades of education are now regarded as crucial for success years later, according to both recent studies and to the intuition of parents ever since age-graded schooling was invented. The Serranos voted with their feet to avoid what their original school’s principal anticipated as a poor fit for John Anthony. In this view, it is a good thing that there were options such as Whittier and Hacienda Heights. Economists who specialize in local government behavior would call this a success story.

68 Valerie Nelson, John Serrano Jr., 69; His Lawsuit Changed the Way State’s Schools are Funded, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2006.
Serrano did not vote for Proposition 13

The districts to which the Serranos moved were not rich districts as measured by the taxable-wealth standard adopted in the Serrano litigation. Their property tax-bases per pupil were both less than half that of Los Angeles Unified, in which East Los Angeles was located. But back in those days (pre-Serrano), being “property poor” was not an absolute barrier to better funded schools. Local school boards and the voters who elected them could vote for higher spending to fine-tune their schools, even if it meant higher tax bills. (As noted above, this is affordable because better schools increase taxable property values.) And the housing market back then was sufficiently robust that a middle-class family like the Serranos could find accommodations outside of East Los Angeles. John Jr. continued his work as a social worker in East Los Angeles, an unincorporated community in Los Angeles County. He eventually became “chief of social services for the East Los Angeles Regional Center in Alhambra, a state-funded corporation that serves the mentally retarded.”

John’s meeting the school-finance lawyers happened well after the Serranos moved out of East Los Angeles. It was apparently the product of serendipity, not desperation. According to David Kirp, Mr. Serrano happened to meet Harold Horowitz at a dinner party and told him the story of the principal well after he had voted with his feet. Horowitz was looking for a plaintiff for the litigation challenging the constitutionality of California’s system of financing public education. In a later interview, Mr. Serrano clearly indicated that it was

70 Fischel, Did John Serrano Vote, supra note 2, at 892 (citing CAL. STATE DEP’T EDUC., CALIFORNIA PUBLIC SCHOOLS: SELECTED STATISTICS, 1970-71, at 95, tbl. IV-11 (1972)).
71 Nelson, supra note 68, at 69.
the lawyers’ idea to file suit; he was only a figurehead, but proud enough to have served that role. There were other plaintiffs, all recruited by the lawyers, and one source indicated that it was Mr. Serrano’s Hispanic name that made him the lead plaintiff.73

In my 2004 article, I went on to point out a further irony. I will quote myself:

John Serrano did, however, use his fame for another purpose. He was not cut from the same reformist mold as his attorneys. They regarded the Serrano litigation as following in the footsteps of the Civil Rights attorneys, who litigated for racial desegregation of public schools as well as all other public accommodations. Mr. Serrano, however, opposed busing and campaigned against its use to desegregate schools in the Los Angeles area, which had been required under a court decision. His name appeared as one of the three official sponsors of an initiative, the purpose of which was to reverse a state court decision that required busing to desegregate Los Angeles schools. One need not speculate that the sponsors of the initiative were eager to have his endorsement because of his connection with the famous court case. He is listed on the official ballot information as "John Serrano, Jr.; Plaintiff, Serrano v. Priest. In a March 13, 1978 Los Angeles Times interview, Serrano explained his activism against busing: "As a taxpayer and parent, I'm getting sick and tired of people blaming

serrano did not vote for proposition 13

schools for every social problem." The article went on to indicate that Mr. Serrano still stood behind the litigation that had made his name famous.74

In this view, John’s decision to lend his name to the litigation that resulted in the demise of the system he benefitted from seems feckless or at least ironic. That was the implication of my use of this story in my last full-blown article on this topic, Did John Serrano Vote for Proposition 13? I used John in the same way that his lawyers used him, as a convenient symbol for their pre-arranged agenda.

But there is an alternative view which would focus on the inadequacies of John Anthony’s original elementary school. Its principal admitted that the school could not provide a satisfactory education for the likes of the young Serrano. The Serrano family gave no indication that they were otherwise unsatisfied with life in East Los Angeles. Making them change communities just to get a decent public education would seem to be an unreasonable burden, not least because other families in the Serrano’s situation might not have the wherewithal to move away. And moving away has other costs. John Jr.’s commute to East LA changed, one presumes to a longer and more tiresome distance, and the friends that young John Anthony and others in the family had made in their East LA neighborhood were abandoned or at least made more distant. The new districts were at least for a time terra incognita, not something eagerly sought by young children, however well they may have adjusted later on.

I want to rehabilitate Mr. Serrano’s reputation that may have suffered from my previous paper. An earlier

74 Fischel, Did John Serrano Vote, supra note 2, at 893–94 (footnotes omitted).
version of “Did John Serrano Vote for Proposition 13” apparently made its way to David Serrano (John Anthony’s younger brother), who was then (and apparently still is) an executive for a construction company in the Los Angeles area. He contacted me and gave me the phone number of his father. I called him on February 25, 2004. I had the wit to write a summary in my daily log of my notes I made during the call, which is reproduced below. I have not edited or omitted a word (or corrected ungrammatical expressions). I apologize to the Serrano family for any embarrassment this may cause, but I think it is important to record this. The material in parentheses and brackets was included in my original notes; I did not add them here.

02/25/04 wed: talked with John Serrano, Jr.: he was active in speaking about case, but not in court (except depositions) or planning; he did not vote for Prop 13 and did speak against it as a social worker and because of its effect on schools; only lawyer in regular contact was McDermott; I told him that David S had said he signed petition, which J confirmed, but said he had not paid attention to its content; mentioned that his mother was in danger of losing her house in Pasadena because property taxes were getting so high; daughter still lives with him; grandchild goes to school in West Covina instead of Hacienda b/c cultural fit in HH not right: over half are wealthy Chinese; noted own house taxes low b/c prop 13, but wife wants to move, JS thinks taxes would go up [told about portable assessment]; confirmed that he opposed busing; “sham” reform because of long bus rides for kids
Serrano did not vote for Proposition 13

out of community; his kids OK, David somewhat jealous to attention to John, who was introverted but excellent athlete, decathlon at UCSB (after 2.5 years at UCSD [or state?]), coach was Sam Adams, David also UCSB; said his MSW from USC; dinner party at home of Armando Morales, UCLA psychiatry, active in police brutality control; Derrick Bell, not Horowitz, brought up the idea of Serrano joining litigation as plaintiff after telling the principal story; Bell’s asst at Western Center Poverty Law was Chuck Jones; said principal of school, Kirk Collum (?) advised in confidence; bought into lionization of his role because “we need figureheads”

The intelligence I got from this call came well after “Did John Serrano Vote for Proposition 13?” was edited for publication in the UCLA Law Review, and working papers with that title had been widely distributed. As a result, I did not change the title, which also had the appeal of emphasizing the ironic contrast between Mr. Serrano and his lawyers. I did make note of our conversation in a footnote (n. 30, p. 894), but few readers would have noticed it. So that is why the present article is titled with the declarative, “John Serrano Did Not Vote for Proposition 13.”

Rereading these notes, I suspect that I had underestimated John, and I think he may have underestimated himself, as well. John was well connected. The home at which he had dinner was that of a well-known psychiatrist, Armando Morales, who was also active in promoting community mental health and combatting police misconduct. He was an important figure, and his guests, Derrick Bell (and perhaps also
David Horowitz) were already notable activists. John wasn’t just tagging along for the ride. He volunteered the story of the principal; it wasn’t a side note in his life. Something must have troubled him about the need to abandon a community, East Los Angeles, about which he deeply cared in order to get a competent education for his children.

It seems possible, then, that John’s commitment to community was what caused him to become a public foe of busing. He was a named sponsor of Proposition 1, whose intended effect was to halt the ongoing busing of students from neighborhood schools to achieve racial balance throughout the giant Los Angeles Unified School District. LAUSD includes all of the city and several adjoining communities and unincorporated areas of the county, including East Los Angeles. It should be noted, however, that Mr. Serrano’s decision to move out of East Los Angeles was in 1967, well before any busing plan had been ordered. He was not among the thousands of families, including some of my extended-family members, who either moved to the suburbs or enrolled their children in private schools as a result of busing’s implementation.  

The busing order in Los Angeles came from a ruling by the California Supreme Court, not, as in many other places, from the federal courts. Los Angeles had not engaged in intentional segregation of students by race in the past. Federal courts held that racial segregation of schools did not require busing if it was the product of supposedly “race neutral” public policies, including zoning. But the California courts took a broader view and regarded the “de facto” segregation that caused neighborhood schools to be segregated required a remedy. Proposition 1, which was adopted

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Serrano did not vote for Proposition 13 overwhelmingly in 1979, required the California courts to hold to the federal standard and thus unravel busing in Los Angeles.76

As mentioned above, John Serrano was a named sponsor the Proposition 1. In this case, he was not a figurehead. He actively opposed busing and spoke against it. I quoted his defense of his position for ironic effect, contrasting his position with what I am still pretty sure was position of the Serrano legal team, who saw school finance litigation as a logical extension of the same Civil Rights litigation that had begun with Brown v. Board of Education.77 My smug implication was that the lawyers’ symbolic choice had turned out to be a loose cannon in their broader legal fight.

VI. “BRIDGE OVER TROUBLED WATER:”
BUSING AND SOCIAL CAPITAL

Here is why I think John Serrano was principled in his fight against busing. As I mentioned above, I spent an academic year in Berkeley in 1991-92. My wife and I had to find a place to live and a school for our son, who was entering the eighth grade. I called around to acquaintances in Berkeley who had school-age children and found that none of them had sent their children to public middle school (or most any other public school) in Berkeley. An acquaintance from Vermont Law School had visited Berkeley earlier and sent his child to middle school there. He said it went okay but added that it helps to have a tough kid.

I had no interest in finding out how tough my kid was, so I looked for private middle schools. As if by magic, we learned of one that had started recently in a

76 The final judicial statement upholding Proposition 1 and its complex judicial history is described in Crawford v. L.A. Board of Educ., 458 U.S. 527 (1982).
77 Henke, supra note 22, at 5.
decommissioned public elementary school that was a couple of blocks from the home we rented near the Berkeley campus. I interviewed the principal and founder and enrolled our son in the grandly named East Bay Junior Preparatory School. Class size was almost tutorial, and after a first-day meltdown, Josh quickly adapted to his new school and found himself elected to a position in student government. It looked like a great start for our third year-long sojourn in California.

After a month or so, though, we noticed that something was different about our stay in Berkeley as opposed to our year-long visit in Santa Barbara six years earlier. We were not getting to know many other people in Berkeley. My university connection was fine—I could walk to the law school—but our community social capital was meager. The reason was that the other students at East Bay Prep were drawn from a wide range of communities and distant neighborhoods. Only two of his classmates lived nearby. Josh’s public school had overcrowded classrooms in Santa Barbara, but we got to know many of the parents of his classmates. Those acquaintances formed a matrix of connections with the rest of the community, people we still keep in touch with.

That matrix was attenuated in Berkeley. Josh’s school was in a way like a magnet school with voluntary busing. These have special programs to attract students from outside the community in an effort to reduce school segregation. Another characterization could be that it was like a voucher school, where parents could choose to send their kids regardless of what neighborhoods they lived in. The “voucher” in my case was enough personal income to forego free public education for a year, but that same condition also freed his classmates’ parents to live in Oakland and Richmond, neither of which had well-regarded schools, as well as Berkeley. But being footloose also meant that, like us, the parents lost much of the network of local school-related friends and
acquaintances that a system of neighborhood public education provides.

Years later I built on our Berkeley school experience to write an article titled “Why Voters Veto Vouchers.” The main idea was that vouchers undermine community-specific social capital by sending children in the community to different schools. For Darwinian reasons, parents want to know who their kids are associating with and what their parents are like. As a result, school children are an important pathway to forming adult social capital. This network of adult acquaintance lasts longer than their children’s years on school, and the network facilitates citizen involvement neighborhood and municipal projects and initiatives.

Localized social capital is one reason, I hypothesized, that voucher initiatives are received so tepidly by the public. After Serrano and Proposition 13, one would think that school vouchers, in which the state gives money to parents with school-age children and lets them choose which school they want to attend, would have been more attractive. Jack Coons and Steve Sugarman, two of the law professors behind the Serrano litigation, in fact promoted a pro-poor voucher initiative in its aftermath. Vouchers were all part of their plan to reform the system, allowing poor and minority inner-city children to choose private or public schools outside of the neighborhoods they could not for economic reasons move out of. But their initiative could not raise enough signatures to get on the ballot, and subsequent statewide


voucher initiatives, which were less sensitive to the needs of the poor, were all defeated in California and in most other states.80

The public’s appreciation of the social-capital benefits of local schools may also explain why the number and boundaries of California’s school districts have remained so steady, as they have in most other states.81 This is in a sense surprising to scholars who, in the Tiebout tradition, regarded school district boundaries as protecting the locality from fiscal erosion by the poor. The high-spending districts taxed themselves to keep their schools strong, and they did not want to merge with low-spending or property-poor districts in order to maintain their fiscal advantages.

After Serrano II and Proposition 13, such calculations were moot. The size and wealth of the district was irrelevant; there was no longer any locally determined taxation that could be directed only to a district’s own students. Inefficiently small districts could merge with others to take advantage of the economies of scale in administration, and inefficiently large districts could be broken into smaller units so their unwieldy bureaucracies could be streamlined.

That did not happen, either. School districts in California have not changed much from the approximately 1000 that they numbered in 1970.82 Their borders are at least as secure now as before Serrano and Proposition 13. Indeed, housing prices continue to shift up or down at school district borders despite nearly equal spending per pupil.83 This suggests that a more powerful

81 Fischel, Making the Grade, supra note 2, at 157.
82 CAL. DEP’T EDUC., SCHOOL DISTRICT ORGANIZATION HANDBOOK 11 (showing that merger of districts slowed after 1970).
Serrano did not vote for Proposition 13

force than fiscal advantage was maintaining school districts as separate entities. Two related possibilities for this steadiness are the increase in zoning restrictions since Serrano\textsuperscript{84} and the continuing importance of local schools as sources of community-specific social capital. It is possible that the latter, social capital, was the principled source of John Serrano’s objection to Los Angeles busing program. He mentioned in our phone conversation the long bus rides for the children, which is certainly a loss for them in terms of study and recreation time. But consider also the parents of the children subject to removal from their local schools. They had much less opportunity to get to know the parents of the kids’ new classmates in a remote neighborhood. The parental social capital generated by participation in school and after-school activities is dissipated in much the same way that a voucher program would dissipate it.

Of course, vouchers allow students to select their own schools, while busing generally is compulsory. But the effect of both programs on home neighborhoods is nearly the same: The neighborhood kids that you knew in their pre-busing or pre-voucher days go off to different schools. Their parents follow them and get to know other parents, but those other parents most likely do not live in the same neighborhood. The likelihood that those relationships will be helpful in solving a neighborhood problem is much lower as a result.

One could imagine that John and Aurora Serrano felt some sense of loss when they moved out of East Los Angeles. John’s job as a social worker remained focused on that area. He surely felt some kinship with the largely Hispanic population, many of them first-generation immigrants from Mexico like himself. And he was not unmindful of the problem of racial segregation. In an

interview about his support for the anti-busing Proposition, he argued that desegregation was better dealt with by housing policies. Requiring communities to accept a variety of housing types would allow for neighborhood schools and truly integrate families into the network of neighborhood connections that such schools generate. In this respect, his policy preference was prophetic. Zoning has since been identified as the primary cause of the increasing isolation of the poor in urban areas, especially in California. It is possible that the energies of school finance reformers would be better spent in reforming land-use regulations.

VII. “GOD ONLY KNOWS:” THE FUTURE OF SERRANO AND PROPOSITION 13

I had originally proposed to Oscar Jiménez the title, “Could Serrano Not Have Caused Proposition 13?” The idea was to consider the many successive school-finance lawsuits that were inspired by Serrano and see whether they had resulted in a voter inspired tax revolt. But it soon occurred to me that I had already considered this possibility. In my chapter on this topic in the Homevoter Hypothesis, I asked whether Serrano was a “natural experiment” of the type that economists are always

87 FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS, supra note 3, at 100.
looking for to test theories.\textsuperscript{88} We cannot arrange (for good reason) controlled experiments, telling one group to forgo a reform while the other goes ahead.

The reason we like natural experiments, as opposed to observational studies, is that we have some assurance that the actors involved did not foresee the results and thus steer the outcome to a different result than was predicted. Predictions by astronomers that a comet will strike Mars are not complicated by the possibility that Mars will duck out of the way. Predictions that we would run out of oil by 2000, a popular theme in the 1970s, were complicated by the possibility that oil consumers and producers would respond in such a way as to not make it happen. And of course, it did not; the post-2000 worry is that the world will not run out of oil and other greenhouse-gas sources.

It is well known that the success of \textit{Serrano} inspired litigation in other state courts.\textsuperscript{89} But we need to keep in mind that the potential defendants in these cases (usually an agency of the state government) realized that after \textit{Serrano} the reformers had a much better chance of succeeding than before. They began to adopt reforms and defensive strategies that would forestall litigation or soften its blow when the plaintiffs actually succeeded. In turn, the reform plaintiffs began to alter their strategy to get more of what they wanted in court. Rather than rely on equality of spending, expecting that it would always raise spending of all districts, they sought to augment previous programs of state funding and move funds


towards needy districts. 90 Bargaining between parties changed in the shadow of Serrano’s success.

It is possible also that Proposition 13 has also cast a shadow on the enthusiasms of school finance litigation. I may have to accept some of the credit (or blame) for this. 91 I deliberately set out in “How Serrano Caused Proposition 13” to use the story as a warning against following it too much. 92 I noted that the US Supreme Court had, by the narrowest possible margin (5-4) declined to apply the Serrano standard to schools nationwide, and I used the Proposition 13 theory as a reason to stick to that abstention. (There are no doubt more pressing reasons for them to have abstained, not least the practical difficulties of enforcing a national standard among fifty states with 15,000 school districts.) A vigorous argument to the contrary, arguing for a national right to education standard, was written by then-law professor Goodwin Liu, 93 who is currently a member


91 “It is no exaggeration to say that the Fischel hypothesis is among the most influential interpretations of the property tax revolt.” Isaac Martin, Does School Finance Litigation Cause Taxpayer Revolt? Serrano and Proposition 13, 40 Law & Soc’y R. 525 (2006). Martin nonetheless rejects the theory using data different from both Stark and Zasloff, supra note 53, and myself, Did John Serrano Vote, supra note 2. For my explanation for why Martin’s approach is unconvincing, see William A. Fischel, Serrano and Proposition 13: The importance of asking the right question, 49 STATE TAX NOTES 535 (2008). I nonetheless appreciate the extensive criticisms of both Martin and Stark and Zasloff for sharpening my own understanding and for confirming that the topic is worth the attention of serious scholars.


Serrano did not vote for Proposition 13 of the California Supreme Court. It seems unlikely that that court will revise *Serrano* anytime soon.