Social Movements and Civilizational Processes

Vytautas Kavolis
Dickinson College

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr

Recommended Citation
Available at: https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol8/iss8/5
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
AND CIVILIZATIONAL PROCESSES

Vytautas Kavolis

Social movements are usually thought of as collective enterprises, partly organized but to a larger extent spontaneous, seeking to promote or to resist a particular kind of change in the organization of society, in some basic elements or the whole design of a cultural tradition and, one should by now add, in collective and personal identities and sensibilities.* The major social movements, which have had the strongest impact on their societies and whole civilizations, pose special problems to the sociological study of movements and have tended in fact to be neglected in recent sociology.

They are apt to be internally inconsistent, with contradictory ideologies and sensibilities struggling for primacy within their overall thrust. They operate as movements-within-movements, more or less clearly identifiable groupings rising up, splitting or merging with others and then, in many cases, disappearing, only to revive, in some instances, under a new name, and with a different face, many years later, in distant lands. Whole movements emerge into dramatic visibility at times and lead a subterranean existence, as no more than a set of memories and a tracing of sensibilities, at other times. Their boundaries are not clear, people joining and taking their leaves, participating either passionately or calculatingly or merely giving support from the sidelines and sympathizing from a distance, ideas moving across all the dividing lines within the immense terrain which is the sphere of action, actual or imagined, of major social movements.

I. Social Movements and Modernization

A review, from the civilization-analytic point of view, of recent studies of social movements reveals two inadequacies in the current sociological mode of comprehending them. The first is a lacking in-depth attentiveness to the symbolic configurations activated by particular movements and to the interactions of these historically specific symbolic designs with the perhaps more general social processes of movement emergence and submergence. The dominant approach in the theory of social movements is concerned with the constraints and facilities
affecting the likelihood of occurrence of certain types of human actions. Much less, if any, attention is given to the historical construction of the deeper reasons for acting—the fundamental and subtle cultural processes which social movements not only presuppose, but in which they, to a greater or lesser degree, participate.

The second inadequacy in the sociological theory of social movements derives from the premise of disconnectedness to which much of sociological work, especially in the Anglo-Saxon countries, is subject. Each movement is theoretically comprehended as a processual entity delimited by boundaries almost as tangible as those which separate one organism from another and detached from long-term processes through which the civilization in which it occurs has acquired or is changing its fundamental character. A disconnecting attitude allows us to see particular phenomena more clearly in their distinctiveness, but it desensitizes us to the question of the deeper groundings of the particular phenomena.

The main theoretical exception to the disconnecting tendency in the study of social movements, especially liberal, revolutionary and nationalist, consists of efforts to link social movements to modernization. But this has been only a moderately fruitful approach—partly because it has not been systematically done over the whole range of movements, but mainly, it would seem, because of a constricted conception of modernization.

The theory (if theory it is) of modernization has suffered, until recently, from a conceptualization both uniformitarian and totalistic. The dominant premise has been that modernization has a preordained fundamental direction, derived from the West European "rationalizing" eighteenth-nineteenth century paradigm of modernization, different parts of the world being positioned favorably or unfavorably in relation to it. In the grip of this universal process of modernization, all parts of each socio-cultural entity, moved by the same advancing spirit, have been expected to change in a manner comprehensible by postulating the universal process.

The universal process itself has been conceived of onesidedly. The main thrust of modernization has been viewed as organizational and attitudinal "rationalization" (and claims to universal participation and accountability of elites). Such phenomena as the formation of emotional and spiritual energies ("mysticism," "romanticism," "spiritual reawakenings") and releases and dissipations of impulsivity which typically precede, occur simultaneously with, or follow upon advances in structural rationalization, have, with a few exceptions, not been incor-
porated into the systematic theorizing on modernization or considered of primary interest to it.3 (Or the complex cultural processes behind these phenomena have been reduced to psychological measures of ‘‘motivation’’ or speculations about ‘‘generational revolt.’’)

To the extent that the concern with modernization has given rise to causal-explanatory theories, modernization has been absorbed into the general framework of the theory of (linear or ‘‘multilinear’’) societal evolution. But perhaps modernization could also be understood as a historical series of efforts at updating of civilizational designs through a variety of interweaving, dialectical, and recurrent processes. Evolutionary theory is dominated by a drive-forward mechanism. Civilizational dynamics one would assume to be attuned to or sensitized by intuitions of fitness or adequacy of parts of a civilization to the persisting or emerging totalities to which they belong (where fitness is, more frequently than not, a matter of balancing discordant elements).

Modernization in the civilizational sense—as distinguished from societal evolution—suggests (a) a great diversity of designs of modernization (explicit or inferrable programs of ‘‘updating,’’ ‘‘improvement,’’ or ‘‘breaking-through’’ to ‘‘more advanced’’ modes of understanding or organization); and (b) a wide variety of processes of modernization within the distinguishable spheres of life of particular civilizations. The emergence of Buddhism with its universalistic ethics prior to Christianity, or the development, in the Japanese courtly culture, of aesthetic sensibilities capable of perceiving unforgettably high value in the transitory feelings of individuals, can be regarded as processes of cultural modernization. But they occurred within designs of modernization radically different from the European nineteenth-century model within which currently dominant versions of ‘‘modernization theory’’ continue to be built. We are more faithful to the experience of mankind as a whole if we disaggregate the concept of modernization and conceive instead of a multiplicity of modernizations extending far into the historical past; and if we do not assume that cultural and organizational modernizations proceed along parallel lines. The currently dominant model of modernization is one, though peculiarly explosive, historical construction within this ongoing, still proliferating series, quite likely to surprise us with as yet inconceivable ‘‘modernizations’’ (some of which will probably present themselves as antimodernist movements).

To find attentiveness to the deeper symbolic designs activated and reshaped by particular movements and a sense of their fit within long-term sociocultural processes, one has to turn from the sociological theory of movements to historical and cultural studies of the contexts in
which particular movements have emerged. Much has been done in tracing the continuities between millennarian and revolutionary movements (or, in Africa, between witchcraft and prophecy); in uncovering the details of transformation of basic civilizational metaphors, such as those of liberation, enlightenment, revolution, and of key notions, such as those of justice, welfare, knowledge and "the people"; in investigating the cultural, as well as the political and economic, effects of the Protestant Reformation or of the French Revolution (or of the more purely intellectual movements, such as the romantic or the psychoanalytic); in describing the complexities of intercivilizational encounters in the diverse social and intellectual movements arising in non-Western societies upon exposure to the West (and, to a lesser degree, in Western societies upon exposure to China, India, Africa, and even the South Seas).

But the theory of social movements has not gained as much from the historical studies as one might expect. The historical studies of social movements, while illuminating particular cases in particular respects, have not given us a general analytical grip on the question of how identifiable social movements relate to the development of a civilization as a whole. Nor should historians be expected to provide us with a system of analytic handles on this issue.

I propose here to explore an approach to social movements which takes their location in relation to a rich, but not unlimited, plurality of systematically comprehended civilizational processes as its problematic.

II. On the Conceptualization of Civilizational Processes

A civilization is the largest unit of sociocultural analysis which has both a symbolic configuration of its own, with a distinctive script, and an identifiable history of close economic, political, or ritual interdependence of its parts (more than a record of parallel processes and unpredictable encounters).

The symbolic configurations of civilizations are distinguished by two elements not shared with "non-civilizational phenomena" both within and outside of them, including "primitive cultures": (1) a thrust toward a coherent mastery—or comprehensive understanding—of the world within and beyond the bounds of any particular organized society; (2) a set of principles by which any empirical condition within the existing society, any pattern of human behavior, including one's own "self," must be critically judged. The simultaneous presence of this intellectual thrust with this set of principles is what winds up the springs of action of...
any generally recognized civilization (as distinguished from the moving mechanisms of an empire or a system of states with which a civilization may coincide in space).

It is not helpful to conceive of civilization as referring primarily to a stage of societal evolution and to think of the civilizational process, with Darcy Ribeiro, as that mix of technological and political developments which advances socioeconomic evolution and in particular accounts for the big steps into its urban and then industrial stages. One is not faithful to the spirit of the subject being studied if, in studying civilizations (as contrasted, for example, to economic, political, or social systems), one puts the primary emphasis on the generalized stages of societal evolution and not on the distinctiveness of particular symbolic configurations that have proved to be capable of persisting, with modifications but without loss of continuity, over several evolutionary stages and capable also of encompassing within their patterns a wide range of societies on varying levels of societal evolution.

It is not much more helpful to conceive of "civilization" as equivalent to civility—as the refinement of manners and the internalization of the inhibitions appropriate to polite society, and to view the civilizing process, with Norbert Elias, as that process, in the singular, by which refinement of manners is acquired by social classes seeking to surround their privileged status, or their claims to privilege, with continuous demonstrations of the distance of the "cooked" from the "raw." The particularities of symbolic design which define each civilization as that which it is do not reside in the general tendency toward refinement of manners and repression of gross physicality in the pacified elites of hierarchic societies, nor mainly in the specificities of the ideal standards of good manners of particular civilizations.

If one conceives of a civilization as a symbolic design of the largest empirically given scope that orients social action in a major region of the world continuously over several centuries, then civilizational processes can be thought of, first, as the dynamics of emergence of the distinctive configurations of particular civilizations and, second, as long-term shifts in the relative intensities and forms of relation of basic orientational elements within a civilizational design. It is the latter—not origins, but transformations of symbolic designs—that will be of concern here. Both of these types may be thought of as general civilizational processes. They encompass, but should nevertheless be distinguished from, the special civilizational processes by which a particular ideological component of a civilization, such as the idea of "fair play," emerges and changes over time or moves in social space.

Perhaps a normative type of civilizational process, consisting of
changes in the obligatory guidelines for perception and action, can be
distinguished from a sensitizing type of civilizational process, that is
from what we reconstitute as the histories of particular sensibilities, of
"the development of the feeling for nature," or of the "nobility of
failure," the changes in "attitudes toward death," or toward "wild
men" or toward madness, imprisonment, and love, the oscillations of
religious "enthusiasm," the voyages of *The Demon of Noontide—
ennui.* Sensitizing processes can be viewed as currents ("ghosts")
swirling around (or within) the more definitive structures ("machines")
being reshaped in the normative processes, imaginative representations
of how it feels to be subjected to such normative structures, their
changes, breakdowns, conflicts—or to their absences or insufficient
presences (anomie).

I will be primarily concerned here with the normative type of civiliza-
tional processes—but not because of any assumption that the normative
is either more illuminating or has a civilizational-genetic priority over
the sensitizing. In periods of historical discontinuity, it may be the op-
posite,¹⁴ and it is a good guess that at present there are greater possibili-
ties of discovery precisely in the study of the sensitizing processes and
of their influences on the normative ones. But there is little cross-
civilizational work on sensitizing processes. It is not even clear whether
sensibilities, in their pure, ideologically uncontaminated condition, can
not only be evoked but also analyzed.

How much of a theoretical basis do we have for studying civiliza-
tional processes of the normative type? A sociologist raised in the tradi-
tion that extends from Max Weber to Benjamin Nelson immediately
hears a few designations ringing in his ears: rationalization, universal-
ization, fraternalization—a veritable equivalent of "liberty, equality,
fraternity." Of these, rationalization has been most widely used in
social-science literature, and with the greatest diversity of meanings.
Even in Weber's own work, as Arnold Eisen has recently reminded us,
"rationality" might signify *either* consciousness of purpose *or* calcula-
tion of means *or* control *or* logical coherence *or* impersonal universality
*or* systematization (of anything, including magic and mystical contem-
plation), not to mention the crucial but difficult distinction between for-
mal and substantive rationality.¹³

If one moves beyond Weber and asks how the thrust of what is meant
by rationalization might differ in the West, with its tradition of separat-
ing a calculating reason from an impetuous emotion, and in China, with
its history of integration of mind with heart; in Greece, where reason
consolidates structures, and in India, where reason dissolves structures;
in rabbinical Judaism, where reason locks out incomprehensible mystery, and in medieval Christianity, where it opens up to mystery, and in our own times when reason seems for many to have become the capacity for inconclusive understanding,—when one takes all of this into account, the notion of rationality becomes a foundation for the comparative study of the meanings, nuances, and semantic linkages of the category "reason" (and consequently of the notion of the "reasonable man" and of his responsibilities), but we are no longer allowed to speak of the civilizational process, or processes, of rationalization in the singular.

While the concept of "rationalization" can perhaps be employed, in a fairly unambiguous but narrowly conventionalized sense, in developmental economics, in civilizational studies it has become a term for a not yet available inventory of meanings and of their semantic linkages, and for a series of historical comparisons of the processes of formulation, refinement, application, and dissolution of these meanings and linkages, with a big question mark on the issue of what justifies the subsumption of all of them under the same category. And the same may well be true of any one concept we have for analyzing civilizational processes in comparative perspective.

The concept tends to be of Western derivation and to suggest that what matters is that which matters in the West, and that differentiations and connections must be comprehended in ways familiar to Western thought. But perhaps when a network of concepts pointing to different dimensions of experience or probabilities of concern (each stated in several culturally alternative ways), and allowing for different kinds of connections between them, is stretched out and the whole of it employed simultaneously for grasping any object of sociocultural investigation, problems of cross-civilizational comparison can be handled more adequately.

III. Axes of Differentiation in Civilizational Designs

I propose to conceive of civilizational processes as shifts along one of several axes of differentiation that we might expect to find in the basic symbolic configurations of any civilization and its major components. The axes of differentiation in the symbolic designs of civilizations are points at which choices (whether explicit or implicit) have to be made as to the degree of emphasis to be placed on, and the kind of elaboration to be given to, each of mutually opposed, but always imaginable alternatives of orientation of basic importance in any civilizational configura-
tion. These ever-present axes of differentiation, which are all drawn from existing literature, would seem to include the following, stated here in the form of analytically sharpened dilemmas of tendency or attitude, though in actual historical situations they do not necessarily relate to each other as battling opposites, as they have tended to do in classical western traditions and their more obvious derivatives (but not in Confucianism or the Japanese folk psychology, where they may be conceived of as perpetually cooperative or “consubstantial,” continuous at all points).

Structurally one can distinguish orientations, and processually one can discern shifts, whether intended or not, toward one or the other polarity of the following set of guiding directions for social action, for ontological comprehension, and for spontaneous perception: (1) Controlling (or ascetic, or substantializing, or exoteric, or formalizing, or determining, or closing) vs. liberating (or mystical, or desubstantializing, or esoteric, or energizing, or indetermining, or opening);\(^\text{4}\) (2) Internalizing (intrapsychic or “subjectivizing”) vs. externalizing (recognizing or establishing of “objective realities” outside of the human psyche); (3) Rationalizing (confident advancing of the individual or collective reason, however conceived, to grasp what is regarded, in a particular tradition, as important) vs. emotionalizing or sensualizing (trust in the validity of personalized or impersonal feelings or sensations, seeking to intensify them); (4) Connecting (or totalistic, or continuous, or synthesizing, or integrating, or organic, or realistic) vs. disconnecting (or individualistic, or discontinuous, or analyzing, or differentiating, or mechanical, or nominalistic);\(^\text{15}\) (5) Hierarchizing vs. equalizing (or centralizing vs. decentralizing); (6) Empiricizing (Sensate, this-worldly, quantifying, temporalizing, “carnal” or “organizational”) vs. transcendentalizing (Ideational, other-worldly or acosmic, non-temporalizing, qualifying, “spiritual”, including faith in secular messianisms of the kind that seek an “end to history”); (7) Naturalizing (or sacral: acceptance of obligations and meanings as given in the structure of the universe or spontaneously arising without conscious human action to establish them) vs. artificializing or art-making (or secular: assumption that obligations and meanings arise entirely from human actions intended to establish them); (8) Universalizing (or uniformitarian, the same standards for all) vs. particularizing (or diversitarian); (9) Expanding (in limitless space, energy activating) vs. stabilizing (in limited space, energy-refining, receptivity-enhancing, “homeostatic”); and (10) Archaising (or primitivizing, origins- or roots-seeking) vs. futurizing (or eschatologizing, infinite-progressing, redemption-seeking).\(^\text{16}\)
The historical record indicates that these axes of differentiation or dimensions of concern constitute issues, at some point (but especially in times of "civilizational crisis"), in the history of any civilization, sometimes of course under the impact of an encounter with an alien tradition powerfully representing unfamiliar affirmations. Different axes become especially salient (attention-attracting and anxiety-provoking) in different civilizations or parts thereof and the relative degree of salience of a particular axis within a civilization changes over time.

The empiricity-transcendentality axis has generally been of greater salience in the West than in China, although the West may now be moving in the Chinese direction. Indeed all the axes of differentiation have been more salient in the historic West than in Confucian China, for the simple reason that foundational Western traditions differentiate more rigorously—a tendency suggesting a preference, on the cultural level, for seeing more clearly over living well. (East European peasants have, however, remained "Chinese" in comparison to their intellectuals.)

Within the generally lesser salience of axes of differentiation in historic China, the expanding-stabilizing axis seems to have been treated more onesidedly than the controlling-liberating axis (with liberation, however, pertaining not to social-political action, as so frequently in the West, but to religious pursuits and friendship, which in the West tends to be conceived as a confirming rather than liberating experience). The naturalizing vs. artificializing dimension has been of more anxious concern to the Taoists than to the Confucians, who saw it adequately dealt with by the assumption of a nature-culture continuity from which only a few cultural products, such as written law, were exempt. The universalizing-particularizing axis was especially important to the Mohists. The empiricizing-transcendentalizing axis became crucial only for the Buddhists. Similar variations in the saliency of civilizational axes of differentiation for particular cultural movements and the various social classes are demonstrable for the West, and probably could be discerned in any other civilization for which adequate records exist. A full description of the historical varieties and shifts in axes of differentiation would go far toward a comparative dynamic analysis of the basic structures of particular civilizations.

I further presume a civilizational requirement that, in the normal course of affairs, both sides of each axis of differentiation will, perhaps not simultaneously but over a period of time, be sufficiently elaborated, in theory or in practice, to provide for a degree of tension between them, without which a civilization would stand in danger of ossifica-
tion. "Sufficient elaboration" does not require equality of attention; a firm presence, even if recessive, may be enough.

The theoretical reasons for this expectation are (1) the general logic of the human mind which allows, although perhaps not with the same ease in all languages, the opposite of everything that is affirmed in a civilizational design to be imagined as a possibility, either threatening or enchanting (although its opposite may of course be incorporated into the affirmation itself); (2) the psychological anchoring of civilizational processes in a human nature which, however shaped into historically specific types, is presumed to suffer, in some measure, from the radical exclusion of "anything human" (even though the visible signs of such suffering may appear only cumulatively over several generations, the "sins of the fathers" being, in this sense, visited upon the "children"); and (3) the historical tendency for structures of signification for which there are no alternatives to cease to provoke creative efforts except those of marginal ornamentation and conceptual clarification.

Civilizations can be comprehended structurally—as unique configurations of symbolic designs to be maintained and expressed in action. Dynamically a civilization may be viewed as a tighter or looser bundle of a number of analytically identifiable processes which generate needs (in the sense of deficiencies that cannot be met from within the type of action which has resulted in them) for each other.

Though at a particular historical moment many of these needs may remain unmet, a civilization, if it endures, has life enough and time to wait, as we do not. (In this respect the perspective of the civilizationist differs from that of the sociologist.) The balancing of these processes may occur over time and at various levels of a civilizational configuration and its social contexts. Trends evident in one institutional sector or in one social class may be compensated for by opposite trends in another institutional sector or class. The balancing tendencies may latch on to the traditional cultural differences between—or political rivalries among—major social formations within a civilization, such as nations, regions, social strata, or religious and ideological groupings (or even the durable differentiations within religious or ideological groupings, such as "high" vs. "popular", "left" vs. "right", "orthodox" vs. "heterodox", "public" vs. "private" "male" vs. "female").

In Islam, the bedouins and the city, the imperial bureaucracy and the religious notables, the orthodoxy and Sufism, Arabs, Persians, Turks, and Malayo-Indonesians; in the post-medieval West, the Mediterraneans and the Nordics, mystics and managers, France and Germany, aristocratic and bourgeois cultures (and the ideological emanations of the
latter, conservatism, liberalism, romanticism, and socialism), the images of "Athens" and "Jerusalem," of "Europe" and "America," and the counter-image of "Russia" (heir of the earlier counter-image of the "Mongols"), Christianity and Marxism, each in several versions, and the opiates of "Orientalism" and the "Third World" have at various times provided structural bases—though not quite invariant points of reference—for the balancing tendencies to center on.

Can we in fact anticipate that, if one side of an axis of differentiation is strongly elaborated in a civilizational design, the need for its counterpart correspondingly increases and, if this need is not eventually met by internal generation or by creative borrowing, a "deformation" in the construction of a civilization can be identified, a one-sidedness with demonstrable pathological effects, a reduction of vitality in competing with other civilizations? Can the civilization of India be said to have been "deformed" by the insufficiency, between Buddhism and the bhakti movement, of equalizing tendencies within its sacred hierarchic totality? Can a variety of Western pathologies be explained by an over-development of the increasingly secular individualizing egalitarian design so ably explicated by Louis Dumont?18

In both cases, the reference is not to the empirical presence of egalitarian or hierarchic social relations, but to the symbolic frameworks legitimating hierarchic totality (composed, in India, of infinitely divisible components) or egalitarian individuality (composed, in the traditional West, of indivisible parts) as norms of what is properly expectable in human experience.19 The argument is not that society needs hierarchic organization for the efficiency or decisiveness of administration and equality for cementing solidarities among its members. It is rather that cultural tradition, to be adequate to what human beings need of culture, requires a firm sense both of the hierarchy of values intrinsic to it and of the equality of the claims of the orientational alternatives to constitute challenges to the human imagination. (By this criterion, it is possible for a cultural tradition to be deficient in both hierarchy and equality simultaneously.)

It is generally recognized in sociological literature that strains between culture and social structure arise when egalitarian culture is confronted with the persistence of established hierarchies in the administration of human affairs. I am concerned here with the question whether a culture of great complexity is not impoverished, in some recognizable sense, if it is too emphatically either hierarchic or egalitarian in the symbolizations it constructs—or onesided along any other axis of civilizational design.20

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1982
The problem of a balanced state of a civilization—a condition one might consider most conducive to the realization of the plenitude of human possibilities—can be approached only through a comparison of historical cases, which may well prove to be too complex to be directly compared or unambiguously interpreted. Moreover, approximations to a balanced state of civilization seem capable of existing only as protracted efforts to overcome previous imbalances likely to terminate in the establishment of new ones. They are therefore likely to be periods of cultural conflict, violent and "uncomfortable"—yet exhilarating and creative. While the historic civilizations would seem to possess, by virtue of their internal diversity, traditions of reflection, and cross-civilizational contacts, a superior capacity for self-revision and rebalancing of their symbolic designs, they may also be capable, due to their great resources, of surviving longer in a badly unbalanced condition.

The efflorescence of T'ang China, when Buddhism, Taoism and Confucianism coexisted on roughly the same level of intellectual sophistication and social acceptance suggests that the multisidedness of a civilization, when the symbolic alternatives it contains are of approximately equal strength and mutually permeable without losing their own distinctive character, is powerfully conducive to cultural vitality. But a plurality of apparently different traditions can still add up to an "unbalanced" state of the whole, if they are all heavily influenced by one set of fundamental civilizational orientations, as is so frequently the case in present-day West, especially where traditions of Romantic derivation are weak or where they have been neutralized—relegated either to the sphere of private consumption or party propaganda, the latter in official Marxism.

While onesidedness in civilizational designs is bound to be, at least in the long run, devitalizing, a high degree of disconnection between the elements of culture representing opposites on the axis of differentiation schema, even when both sides are equally strong, can be disruptive, not only of the basic design of a civilization, but also of the identities of individuals carrying on their lives within it (cf. "reason" and "emotion" in Rousseau). The particular symbolic designs embodying alternative orientations can be connected to each other either through an overarching imperial synthesis (the medieval Christian, Islamic, Communist), or by mutual permeability of the particular symbolic designs within a historically continuous civilization (China, Japan), or through the intricate patterns of a dance in which opposite principles succeed each other over time in a series of "eternal" postures (India, Indonesia). Ideological alternatives may be partly integrated—in a way, how-
ever, which tends to maximize violent competition for domination among them—through their common origin and the sharing of essential components derived from it. A clear division of spheres between alternative orientations, such as post-medieval Europe has increasingly attempted to establish in a variety of spheres, is better than chaos, but it seems likely to prove excessively rigid, too artificially aseptic, hence unsatisfactory to the demand for the unity of human experience, hence unstable. (Traces of all modes of integration can be found in the West.)

There is the further problem of inter-axial equilibria, the establishment and disturbance of attunements among the different axes of civilizational design. It may be presumed that a pronounced development along one civilizational axis causes a "deformation" in the total design which sets up pressures upon the other axes, and that some sort of compensatory or isolating or suppressive development is likely to take place on the other axes of a civilizational design, though not necessarily at once. Thus the Marxist thrust toward equality and connectedness had the unintended effect, in the Soviet Union where one version of the Marxist movement has come to power, of increasing rationalization at the expense of emotionality, and control at the cost of liberation, along the latter two axes of civilizational design. An investigation of such inter-axial thrusts promises a fruitful approach to understanding the part of specific social movements within long-term processes of civilizational change, once the analytical axes of civilizational design have been more securely identified than has been possible so far.

One would assume fuzziness on the civilizational dilemmas—lack of clarity of intellectual commitment to any particular position with regard to them—especially among the intellectual elites (and their students), to be problematic. The "narcissistic personality," of which a veritable cult has recently been made, especially in the United States, can be best described as an expression of onesided affirmations of liberating, equalizing, empiricizing, and expanding (the "omnivorous egalitarian consciousness")—and of widespread "pop-sophisticated" fuzziness on the issues of internalizing vs. externalizing, rationalizing vs. emotion-alizing, connecting vs. disconnecting, universalizing vs. particulariz-ing, and archaizing vs. futurizing.23

Obsessive boring into the self or casual boredom with it, but in either case without a credible way of understanding its character or establishing a mutually sustaining relationship to any external institutional structure sensed as appropriate to it. Instrumental and procedural rationalization without much conviction in the directive capacity of reason or any way, outside of psychotherapy perhaps, of communicating between
these rationalizations and one’s emotions, if one can spontaneously, without artificial aids, experience emotions (as contrasted to anxieties) at all, let alone trustworthy ones. Temporary pseudo-intimacies, perpetual absences of a rooted standpoint. Breakdowns of standardization, weightless particularisms. And a future consisting mainly of a misunderstood past—which may in fact be the past of the analyst, or of an analytic machinery (conceivably even of civilization analysis), rather than one’s own living past. These are perhaps psychological, or psychocultural, predicaments, but they arise from or express fuzziness on some of the major civilizational dilemmas for which other times—though not all times—have managed, or mystified, to provide more “gripping solutions” (not necessarily fully understandable, but powerfully credible).

Fuzziness of experience, most strikingly evident among the fashionably educated of advanced industrial societies (and to some degree the product of fashionable education), confronts, as psychological “raw material,” the symbolic designs, established or emerging, intended to give coherence and direction to human experiences. Fuzziness carries the potentiality for rearrangements of traditional designs, a task best performed in the last two centuries by Romanticism-inspired movements. It is the historical trajectories of the symbolic designs that civilization analysis is concerned with.

But the historical trajectory of a civilizational configuration is not a history of ideas. In the first place, it has to do not with the ideas of distinguishable individual thinkers, but with the structures of and changes in the underlying collective matrices of consciousness within which the ideas of individuals germinate (and which they interpret, modify or offend against).

In the second place, civilization analysis is concerned not with the symbolic designs alone, but with the predicaments in experience to which symbolic designs respond and the predicaments in experience which established symbolic designs, in concrete sociohistorical settings, generate. The problem is that of the historical dialectic of individual experiences and their collective comprehensions.

IV. Relations of Social Movements to Civilizational Processes

The following hypotheses appear to hold for social movements of world-historical significance. First, such movements emerge in response to a rapid trend toward deauthorization of traditions that have synthesized, or held together, the opposite poles of orientation along most or all of the civilizational axes of differentiation within a tolerably
coherent and intuitively credible pattern (which may have been seriously unbalanced yet satisfactory until challenged by external influences or proved inadequate by unanticipated events). \(^{25}\)

Tendencies toward fragmentation of unifying patterns precede, either on the level of "raw experience," or of conscious interpretive thought, the emergence of major social movements. Bizarre, short-lived popular movements, such as that of Sabbatai Zevi, constitute only one specific, but highly characteristic, indicator of such fragmentation. \(^{26}\) Such movements tend to be sociologically incompetent efforts at resolving primarily the civilizational, and only secondarily, if at all, the practical problems arising from such fragmentation. Deauthorization is, in the normal course of affairs, accompanied by a sharpening of tensions between alternative orientations, by violent oscillations between them in popular attitudes, and by increased confusion, indifference or fuzziness on basic civilizational matters. \(^{27}\)

Second, social movements of world-historical significance (as well as many lesser movements) define such orientational tensions more clearly, transforming much of prior confusion and inconclusiveness into rigid alternatives, and intensify intracivilizational contradictions both in social action and in the identities of individuals.

However, third, social movements of world-historical significance more than other movements also promulgate effectively vitalizing partial resolutions of these tensions by bringing forth or popularizing intuitively credible symbolic designs that, for the time being, appear to incorporate, allow for, or reconcile a great many of these contradictions. To be sure, it is not only the "charismatic" synthesizing of discordant sociocultural trends into a coherent symbolic design, but also the ability to offer pragmatic advantages (security, power, fame, wealth) to their adherents, that explains the success of sociocultural movements. \(^{28}\)

Fourth, if such a movement is successful in attracting large numbers of adherents for long periods of time and/or acquiring power in a society or a significant section thereof, the group interests and the psychological needs of the later adherents of the movement contribute much to deciding which side of each axis of differentiation will be further developed and socially institutionalized.

By neglecting the considerations put forth in the first three of these hypotheses, the current sociological theory of movements cannot account for deeper levels of their symbolic constitution beyond programmatic declarations (and consequently finds much in these movements inexplicably "irrational"). Nor can theory locate these movements in relation to their cultural matrices or identify the processes by which
their spiritual prerequisites have been assembled and their psycho-
cultural influences diffused in a variety of directions.

Our primary concern here is with the major social movements which
have aimed at, and to some degree (though, in all likelihood, not wholly
in accordance with their original intentions) succeeded in, a reconstruc-
tion of the general quality of life of humanity, a nation, or a historically
significant ideological community. Among the major civilizationally
significant movements of the last two centuries may be listed the liberal,
the romantic (including in part the anarchist), the nationalist (with the
special case of the Zionist), the socialist, the psychological, and the
ecological, each in a variety of regional and period versions. Some of
the movements of revitalization of traditional religions, especially the
Islamic, can be added to this list. Each of the major civilizationally
significant movements needs to be considered, in a complete analysis,
together with its antecedents and pathbreakers as well as the movements
of reaction against it.

One might distinguish civilizationally significant movements from
special-interest movements that address themselves to a particular type
of practical concern (e.g., the labor movement, the gay rights move-
ment). Special-interest movements, which tend to represent long-
enduring interests, should in turn be distinguished from movements of
occasional responsiveness, originating in and expressing short-lived
emotional responses to particular situations (e.g., the Dreyfussard
movement, the movement of protest against American participation in
the Vietnamese war). These two types of movements may overlap.
Special-interest movements may start as movements of occasional re-
sponsiveness. But, in most movements of the latter type, such transfor-
mations do not happen. Both of these types of movements may influ-
ence the historical development of civilizations. But they lack the
overall thrust, the comprehensive programs, and the plurality of forms
within a single design characteristic of the major social movements.

Among movements that have civilizational implications, one might
consider as second-rate those movements which, whether successful or
not in achieving their stated goals, merely express the civilizational di-
lemmas, but do not advance their resolution in a fruitful manner. Second-rate movements dredge up and temporarily activate a lot of civi-
lizational "raw material," but they do not establish synthesizing de-
signs capable of enduring for longer than a generation and of contribut-
ing to subsequent developments on both sides of a great many
civilizational axes of differentiation. What is identified, without further
qualification, as youth movements, tend to be second-rate. But so, I
think, tend to be purely populist movements without a firmer ideology than populism itself is capable of providing.31 Feminist movements, on the other hand, appear to be non-reducible to their special-interest and second-rate components.32

One might also distinguish, among social movements of world-historical significance, an impoverished type that puts an overwhelmingly strong stress on one side of a series of civilizational dilemmas at the expense of the other and consequently, if it succeeds, impoverishes the civilization of which it is a part. Such was the Bolshevik movement in Russia, and, to a lesser degree, such might have been the Taiping rebellion, if it had succeeded in its original design. The latter enriched the Chinese tradition by inserting a profusion of distorted Christian elements into it, but diminished it by imposing a totalitarian mold on a configuration of subtle diversity—though a full awareness of its subtlety was presumably largely limited to sections of the educated gentry.33

I will consider the English Puritan movement in greater detail as the type case of a modernizing social movement that was neither second-rate nor impoverished.34 All ten axes of differentiation constitute important foci for the Puritan—or, in a broader sense, the English seventeenth-century revolutionary—movement.35 Along nine of these ten axes, it is demonstrable that the Puritan movement, with all its accompaniments, has advanced civilizational developments on both sides of each dilemma. Only on the issue of expanding vs. stabilizing has Puritanism been onesidedly energy-activating: little can be credited to its influence in any contemporary or subsequent energy refining and receptivity enhancing. This is what has contributed greatly to the making of Romanticism and psychoanalysis so appealing to the distant heirs of Puritanism: both Romanticism and psychoanalysis restore, in their diverse ways, a balance between expanding and stabilizing, the energy-activating and the energy-refining orientations.

As for the rest: the Puritans stressed, more universally than the medieval Church had done, both the "asceticism" of the methodical control of the self as well as of society and the "mystical" freedom, through one's own "inner light", to one's own understanding of the workings of the principle of salvation in one's life, and to being "born again" in adulthood to a new spiritual consciousness. The Puritans emphasized the inner capacity of each individual to be, in his conscience, his own judge (internalizing) and they more strongly insisted on the responsibility to transform the secular society into a utopia—the earthly kingdom of God—by building impersonal, dispassionately operating institutions (externalizing). They perceived nature, from which God had withdrawn.
and in which therefore the possibility of miracles no longer existed, as more rational than before. But they also contributed to the emotionalization of modern culture, by unleashing religious enthusiasm from institutional controls, and by formulating, as Edmund Leites puts it, the duty not only to love but also to desire one's spouse, thus advancing, under moralistic auspices, the synthesis of marriage and the older tradition of courtly love.

The Puritans saw individuals as more disconnected from each other in their callings, in their separate concerns with the all-important personal salvation and in the interminable search for the place in life in which best to perform one's own mission of devoted work. But they also insisted more universally on the supreme religious obligation both to reveal one's "soul-experiments" publicly to other fellow-believers (connectedness through mutual revelation of inwardness) and to establish in the world impersonal voluntary associations of the faithful, devoting all talent beyond one's own occupational pursuit and all one's surplus wealth to the service of these artificial communities (connectedness through well-organized service.) The Puritans equalized men and women in all social conditions in their moral obligations and in their capacity to understand them, but they more rigidly hierarchized the saints and the sinners, which medieval Christianity viewed as varying only in degree. (From this hierarchy, it has been suggested, the recent rigid separation of the sane from the insane has received much support in Protestant-influenced traditions.)

The Puritans reasserted the absolute transcendence of God against the God-humanizing tendencies in late-medieval and Renaissance Catholicism, thus imparting to his commands a more rigid structure, less likely to be softened by the human qualities of unsystematic, personal compassion. But, by their emphasis on individual reason and direct experience, they also advanced the empirical understanding of the world outside of the human self. (Since the human self contained, for the Puritans, the soul or what they called the "spiritual self," and this was the voice of God within man, the self—or rather the "spiritual" part of it—could not become subject to the empiricizing understanding of everything that was not God; the "rat" part of the self could be subjected, later on, to experiments in psychology laboratories, which have produced a psychology that can only talk about that part of the self and has consequently helped to generate a counter-tendency to feel that whatever is not "rat" in the self must therefore be "God.")

The fundamental structure of moral obligations and meanings is, for the Puritans, more rigorously preordained, more unmanipulably sacred, but all the social obligations have to be artificially established by acts of
human conscience (through which God may or may not speak) and by collective agreements. With regard to the merely traditional, insofar as it is not specifically commanded by God, the Puritan is a secularizer, the maker of respect-worthy—but not enjoyable—artificial structures. (He has indeed been commanded by his God to be a serious artifice-maker, and to impose these artifices on desacralized, and therefore either indifferent or evil, nature—to transform nature into a machinery, to leave no human reality unconstructed by himself. The left wing of the Puritan movement was, as Christopher Hill suggests, more favorable toward nature, in accordance with the presumed tendency of both the European working class and the aristocracy to oppose themselves as the upholders of “nature” against the “artificialism” shared by the bourgeoisie with mainstream Puritanism.) The same standards hold for all, yet the movement divides into an immense diversity of particularizing sects. Finally, an archaizing re-emphasis on the Old Testament and, in some cases, on “primitive communism” coexists with futuristic projects of building the City upon the Hill.

V. Questions and Comments

Is this simultaneous pointing in a variety of opposite directions characteristic of all major movements that could be designated as “modernizing”? Or is this a characteristic only of movements that arise and acquire a central role in the transitions, in Sorokin’s terms, from one fundamental culture mentality—that is, from one conception of ultimate reality—to another? Are all social movements of world historical significance as rich in alternative directions embodied in their symbolic designs as the Puritan movement has been?

If one takes all the varieties of nineteenth- and twentieth century Socialism, including the utopians and the Edel-Marxisten such as Adorno, as components of another such movement, one might find a wealth in alternative possibilities to rival—but not quite—that of the English seventeenth-century revolutionaries. There appears, however, to be a greater gap between the theories of the intellectual formulators and the beliefs of the masses in the Socialist movement, at least in the European world, than among the Puritans. It seems to be a response to the kind of civilization-balancing need I have presumed that intentionally egalitarian movements end up with theories that are neither comprehensible nor interesting to ordinary people. The ironies of the history of culture—though possibly more ironic in Europe than elsewhere—are securely anchored in the structural connections of civilizational design.

Dickinson College

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1982
NOTES

*Presidential Address, presented at the eighth annual meeting of the ISCSC, March 22, 1979, at California State University, Northridge.


2. Revolutions are standardly associated in social-science literature with modernization. For a rare systematic analysis of the relations of nationalistic movements to modernization, see Anthony D. Smith, Theories of Nationalism (New York: Harper & Row, 1971). Conservative movements, too, respond to modernization—and can even constitute modernizing movements. For an introduction to the comparative study of European conservative movements, see Noël O’Sullivan, Conservatism (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1976).

3. The onesidedness of the theory of modernization is evident in the radical disjunction between the meanings of “modernization” in social science and “modernism” in literary usage. For two efforts to overcome this disjunction, see Vytautas Kavolis, “Post-modern Man: Psychocultural Responses to Social Trends,” Social Problems, 17 (Spring, 1970), pp. 435-448; Marshall Berman, “‘All That is Solid Melts into Air’: Marx, Modernism and Modernization,” Dissent, 25 (Winter, 1978), pp. 54-73.


6. “The people” can mean the people who count (the prince’s retinue or die Gebildeten) or, conversely, the people who have not so far counted (but, in the latter case, ethnically or religiously heterogeneous elements may still be excluded, as were the Jews and the Gypsies in European populist thought). Women also may or may not be counted among “the people.” On the extraordinary difficulties of the German liberals with their mythologeme of “the people”, see James J. Sheehan, German Liberalism in the Nineteenth Century (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1978). In the course of modernization, the coverage of “the people” may either expand, as it tends to do in the long run, or contract. For an example of a contraction of “the people,” see T.
Dunbar Moodie, *The Rise of Afrikanerdom: Power, Apartheid, and the Afrikaner Civil Religion* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), p. 32: toward the end of the nineteenth century, "‘the People,’ who in theory included all the white inhabitants of the land, began to be limited in practice to ‘the old inhabitants of the land.’"

7. Romanticism is of interest in the study of social movements as "a changing and various movement of ideas, influences and attitudes" active not only in the minds of literary-artistic elites, but also on popular levels, where it entered into the formation of European nationalism, socialism (and especially its Marxist variety), anarchism, the women’s movement, both racist and racial-liberation movements and even the Knights of Labor with their notions of idealistic cooperation. But Romanticism is also the very matrix from which the intellectual fascination with movements arises: "‘movement’ was a characteristically Romantic paradigm." A. K. Thorlby, *The Romantic Movement* (London: Longmans, 1966), p. XIII. Romanticism, more than anything else, has shaped the frame of mind within which the study of social movements can be considered a serious intellectual enterprise (though in actuality it rarely is).

8. For a bibliography of major works on inter-civilizational encounters, see Benjamin Nelson, with the collaboration of Donald Nielsen, "Civilizational Patterns and Inter-civilizational Encounters," *Comparative Civilizations Bulletin*, No. 6 (Summer, 1973), pp. 3–16.


12. It remains difficult to demonstrate rigorously that "in dreams [and, let us add, nightmares] begin responsibilities" (Delmore Schwartz)—that sensibilities beget norms. But consider Herbert Butterfield's observation on the importance of different kinds of "feeling" in regard to objects of scientific investigation in the development of science. *The Origins of Modern Science 1300–1800*, Rev. Ed. (New York: Collier Books, 1962), p. 26. Butterfield's schema is: image—feeling—theoretical difficulty—new image—different feeling—scientific discovery. Feeling-charged images are the stock-in-trade of the sensitizing type of civilizational process. Normative responses to sensibilities and the images evoking them can be either "direct reflections" or "inversions" of the sensibilities in question, either the confirmations of attractive sensibilities foreclosing otherwise conceivable alternatives to them or reactions intended to hold threatening sensibilities in check.


14. There is a strong tendency in various Indo-European traditions—and in Taoism—to perceive the controlling polarity as masculine, and the liberating polarity as feminine (where "liberating" may have the character of either miraculous plenitude or meaningless chaos).

15. In the "connecting" disposition, the degree of looseness or tightness of the connections is also important. A loose connectedness is not the same as disconnection. Furthermore, while disconnection is a state (or a facet of a more complex relationship) that either is or is not, connectedness can be either "surface" or "deep." The loose but deep connectedness of a movement of sensibilities may be contrasted with the tight but surface connectedness of a band of demonstrators. The connecting/disconnecting dimension is not the same as universalizing/particularizing. There can be differentiated (particularizing) connectedness, as in the Romantic schema, and a universal disconnectedness (the "universal otherhood" of Benjamin Nelson). And historical "jumps" may be either disconnecting (Foucault) or connecting (Hegel).

the Beginnings of Christianity, 2nd Ed. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1963); Dudley and Novak, The Wild Man Within, op. cit.; Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1958); George Simmel, The Conflict in Modern Culture and Other Essays (New York: Teachers College Press, 1968). The cross-cutting of the control-liberation and the internal-external dimensions yields four analytical types: (a) external control-internal liberation (imperial-Gnostic, Stoic, Lutheran), (b) internal control-external liberation (Buddhist, Puritan, liberal), (c) external control-internal control (Confucian, Hebrew, Catholic, Islamic, samurai, Bolshevik, (d) internal liberation-external liberation (Taoist, romantic-anarchist). But the critical issue is the degrees and intensities of the mixes of the four elements, all of which are likely to be present in some measure in any civilizational tradition. (3) On the rationalizing vs. emotionalizing (or sensualizing), Weber, Sociology of Religion, op. cit., pp. 48, 236. If it is true that “the dream of many people [today] seems to be to combine the emotions of a primate with a computer-like brain,” are we facing the modern equivalent of the “renaissance of orgiasticism against the single dominion of Brahmanical contemplation as a holy technique”? Erich Fromm, The Revolution of Hope: Toward a Humanized Technology (New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1968), p. 46; Max Weber, The Religion of India: The Sociology of Hinduism and Buddhism (New York: The Free Press, 1967), p. 314. These observations suggest that science or another kind of highly systematized technology of thought can provoke a seeking for intensified emotions or sensations (which are capable of either being fused or of substituting for each other as functional equivalents). Possibly, however, immersion in theoretical systems has this effect only if it coincides with a radical weakening of the community, as frequently in the West, or with a cultural devaluation of concrete social relations, as in the world-denying traditions of India. The opposite process of emotionalization advancing rationality also occurs. “The upshot of all this unlimited emotionalism [of the Hasidic movement] was paradoxically enough a return to rationalism...emotion turned against itself.” Gershom G. Scholem, Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism, Rev. Ed. (New York: Schocken Books, 1941), p. 345. Its has been argued that fourteenth-century German mystics performed a therapeutic function for the “rationalizing” merchants of the period, and that the hippie movement may have done the same for the “post-modern” professionalized occupations. In both cases, emotionally oriented minority movements may have enabled the majority of economic rationalizers to function more effectively by taking care of their “irrational” needs. James L. Peacock, “Mystics and Merchants in Fourteenth Century Germany: A Speculative Reconstruction of Their Psychological Bond and Its Implications for Social Change,” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 8 (Spring, 1969), pp. 47–59; Jesse R. Pitts, “The Hippies as Contrameritocracy,” Dissent, 16 (July–August, 1969), pp. 326–337. (4) On the connecting-disconnecting dichotomy (or continuum), Louis Dumont, Homo Hierarchicus: An Essay on the Caste System (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), Religion/Politics and History in India: Collected Papers in Indian Sociology (Paris: Mouton,

17. It is of course not only the abstract, “skeletal” relationships among the points of reference of the axes-of-differentiation scheme that matter, but also the concrete correlates of these points of reference. Thus one notes that women who stood for carnality, that is “empiricity,” throughout the Middle Ages, are increasingly identified in Anglo-Saxon Protestant thought of late eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries (at least partly due to their growing relative importance in the ministers' audiences) with higher spirituality, thus with "transcendental-ity." To be sure, this seems to have been, at least in the nineteenth century, a "delicate," fragile spirituality, which made women more susceptible to delusions than the men were: in contrast to the Medieval tradition, spirituality was a source of weakness. When in the West, spirit is thought to be weak, it is assigned to women. Barbara Welter, "The Cult of True Womanhood: 1820-1860," American Quarterly, 28 (Summer, 1966), pp. 151-174.

18. Dumont, op. cit.


20. Social movements—of a conservatively protective kind—may arise for the defense of one's culture against the restrictions or temptations of a social structure perceived as alien to it. But movements—of a more radically innovative character—may also arise to reform one's own "deformed" cultural tradition, in response to a widely perceived onesidedness or confusion in civilizational designs. Large-scale popularity of social movements, including the most vicious, such as the Nazi movement, provides clues to distorted balances in the civilizational designs of societies in which these movements have acquired popular appeal. Cf. Peter Gay, Weimar Culture: The Outsider as Insider (New York: Harper & Row, 1968). Even short-lived popular movements have this diagnostic significance. It is by no means to be assumed that once a popular movement disappears, the distortions to which its existence pointed have also disappeared—unless in fact something has changed as a result of the movement's activities or the fears generated by it so as to affect the balance of elements within the overall civilizational design.

21. The civilizational balance in T'ang China is well summarized by Twitchett: "All classes from emperors to peasants were influenced by the new faith [Buddhism], which not only fulfilled a deep spiritual need in a period of total insecurity, but also introduced a new level of sophistication in philosophical thought and in theology. The original forms of Indian Buddhism were modified by the native Taoist tradition, which in its turn took over from Buddhism its tradition of monastic life and much of its purely religious content. . . . Most people during this period applied Confucian moral criteria to their public life and family affairs, and tended to think of the universe in Taoist terms, even though they personally were committed Buddhists." Denis C. Twitchett, "The Sui (589-618) and T'ang (618-907) Dynasties: An Introduction," in John Curtis Perry and Bardwell L. Smith, eds., Essays on T'ang Society: The Interplay of Social, Political and Economic Forces (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1976), p. 4.


25. For an approach to deauthorization that connects with modernization theory and might therefore be of considerable use in explaining social movements linked with the most recent cycle of modernization, see Fred Weinstein and Gerald M. Platt, *The Wish to be Free: Society, Psyche, and Value Change* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969). The Weinstein-Platt theory sees deauthorization as due to disconnection of rationally organized power from emotional responsiveness. It seems necessary to reformulate this theory in more general terms to mean that any kind of sharply increased differentiation along the civilizational axes of orientation will produce some deauthorization and that, conversely, reauthorization is attained through genuine, experientially credible reconnections of the formerly differentiated. It is also necessary to distinguish deauthorization of symbolic designs due to the failure of those who represent these designs to meet the practical (or “material”) needs of a population, and deauthorization due to failure of the designs themselves to resonate to the emotional (or “spiritual”) needs of the people. On differences in psychocultural responses to these two types of deauthorization, see Vytautas Kavolis, “The Social Psychology of Avant-garde Cultures,” *Studies in the Twentieth Century*, No. 6 (Fall, 1970), pp. 13–34. Perceptions of what constitutes the “instrumental” and “expressive” needs of the people—and, for that matter, who the relevant “people” are—vary over historical time.


29. Peasant movements are, in a sense, special interest movements. But they
are also movements of restoration of an archaic culture which, by the radicality of this "reactionary" claim, may evolve into or join with existing revolutionary movements. For a critique of the "safety-first" view of the peasant moral economy, see Samuel L. Popkin, *The Rational Peasant: The Political Economy of Rural Society in Vietnam* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979). For a civilizational analysis in a broader framework which includes peasant rebellions, see Yuji Muramatsu, "Some Themes in Chinese Rebel Ideologies," in Arthur F. Wright, ed., *The Confucian Persuasion* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1960), pp. 241–267. Muramatsu's major point, applicable to all movements, is that there are, within a particular civilization, culturally established (but changing) traditions of moving and that these traditions share major themes with the cultures of the privileged groups against which rebellions are directed.


32. There is the further complication that, especially in the West during the last two centuries, diverse components of a specific social movement may participate in several different, and even mutually opposed, larger-scale, more general historical movements. Thus youth, feminist, and black liberation movements have included elements that participated in either the general liberal, romantic, or socialist movements—which in themselves partly overlap. For example, Richard Stites, *The Woman's Liberation Movement in Russia: Feminism, Nihilism, and Bolshevism 1860–1930* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1978). A movement may be a failure in itself, yet important as a "moment" of a larger-scale, deeper-level, more general historical movement.


36. “Not only were the personal testimonies before the faithful required of converts who had discovered in themselves the signs of election; they were also encouraged to keep spiritual diaries, in which they noted the further workings of the law of predestination in their souls. . . . There was a strong congregational sense among the Puritans which encouraged them to feel concern and curiosity about their neighbors’ spiritual symptoms, over and above the intense introspective care which they lavished on their own.” Margaret Bottrall, Every Man a Phoenix: Studies in Seventeenth-Century English Autobiography (London: John Murray, 1958), pp. 114–115. Puritanism made people more interested in each other’s inner lives (which had previously been largely the prerogative of the priest in the confessional), though simultaneously more distant in the flesh. If one increases social or physical disconnection, psychological or metaphysical connectedness becomes all the more necessary. “Soul-experiments” is a term Richard Baxter uses in the section on “Self-Analysis and Life-Review” of his Autobiography (London: J. M. Dent & Sons, Ltd., 1931), p. 103.


40. This in spite of the general tendency toward disconnection, toward distance, in Puritan thought, and a general thrust toward connectedness in Socialist consciousness.