Criterion: A Journal of Literary Criticism

Volume 8 | Issue 1

1-1-2015

De-suturing Milton's Eden: Navigating from an Althusserian Bipartite System to a Badiouian Set in *Paradise Lost*

Brittany Strobelt

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/criterion

BYU ScholarsArchive Citation

Available at: https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/criterion/vol8/iss1/11

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the All Journals at BYU ScholarsArchive. It has been accepted for inclusion in Criterion: A Journal of Literary Criticism by an authorized editor of BYU ScholarsArchive. For more information, please contact scholarsarchive@byu.edu, ellen amatangelo@byu.edu.
Though Satan certainly catalyzes the Fall in Paradise Lost, his deception does not appear to be the only factor leading to original sin. Based on several passages within Paradise Lost, Adam and Eve already engage in a process of learning even before they taste of the fruit from the tree of knowledge of good and evil; such knowledge includes a moral education, even though the only moral command Adam and Eve actually receive from God is not to eat of the forbidden fruit. According to Eric Dunnum, we can and should connect Milton’s Paradise Lost and Louis Althusser’s ideas of the Repressive State Apparatus and Ideological State Apparatus. By doing so, we come closer to answering the question of why Adam and Eve should be educated on morality. But Dunnum’s Althusserian explanation still remains inadequate. Thus, I hope to shift his explication so as to better suit Milton’s complex interpretation of Adam and Eve’s time spent in the Garden of Eden leading up to the Fall, and I will do so by applying Alain Badiou’s ideas on set theory in order to expand Dunnum’s analysis. Ultimately, I aim to radically expand readers’ conceptions of Milton’s Eden by suggesting potentialities—concerning sin and alternative falls—within Eden.
In terms of who and/or what leads up to original sin, Satan aims and even claims to be the sole impetus of the Fall, and yet simply blaming Satan for the Fall underestimates Adam and Eve’s joint complicity. In fact, as portrayed in Milton’s version of the Fall, Satan probably only shortened the span of time spent in the Garden of Eden before the Fall, for Adam and Eve, even while still in the Garden of Eden, begin to progress—or, perhaps, even digress. For instance, though supposedly created perfectly, Eve appears to be naturally inclined toward sin. She recalls that soon after her creation, upon seeing her reflection glimmering in a stream, she immediately began to “[pine] with vain desire” after herself and would still be doing so if she had not been warned of her folly and led to Adam by an invisible voice (Milton 4.465–478). This longing after her personal reflection undeniably reflects a still immortal “perfect” being’s imperfect natural tendency toward sin—a seemingly blatant paradox. As mentioned in the footnotes of The Complete Poetry and Essential Prose of John Milton, Eve’s pining not only echoes Narcissus’s longing after his own image, but also echoes Satan’s pining, as in lines 511 and 848 of Book 4, where he pines after what he has recently lost. Thus, Eve’s first action in Eden already lowers her to a level at which she can be compared to the devil. But then again, even the devil was created perfectly, and he still fell. However, this comparison signifies that alongside an increasing self-awareness, an internal sense of pride is also brewing within Eve. And this manifests itself even before Satan enters the Garden. In addition, if readers missed this slightly subtle connection to Satan through the particular word choice of “pining,” they would find it much harder to ignore the connotation of “warned” when Eve recalls the invisible voice (Milton 4.467). Through this warning, Milton alerts readers that Eve is already in the process of making a mistake, which is one that Christians could easily identify as idolatry—self-idolatry, specifically. As such, Eve appears to be in the process of breaking the very first commandment, “thou shalt not have any other gods before me” (King James Bible, Exodus 20:3). Even though Eve has not been given this commandment explicitly, one would still think idolatry should be considered a sin, especially in the perfect paradise that is Eden. Does God just let this little mistake slip because Eve is just newly created? This allowance of something so close to sin appears to violate God’s strict adherence to justice. Hence, this calls into question the conditions determining banishment from the Garden of Eden in Milton’s epic.

Though Dunnum’s article “The Bipartite System of Laws in ‘Paradise Lost’” does not necessarily clarify all of the questions raised by such actions and
their allowance in Eden, it certainly does at least brings readers closer to solutions. Throughout his article, Dunnum emphasizes the two Althusserian systems within *Paradise Lost*: the Repressive State Apparatus and the Ideological State Apparatus. Briefly summarizing such apparatuses, the Repressive State Apparatus equals the external system, such as the two commandments God gives Adam immediately after the creation, whereas the Ideological State Apparatus is an internal system by which “the Father’s control over his subjects goes further and deeper” as He “exerts power through an ideology of obedience” (Dunnum 152). In fact, Dunnum asserts “that this ideology of obedience is always already internalized in the subjects through laws that are worked in the fabric of creation and implanted as ‘gifts’ to human beings by the Father”: namely, “freedom and reason” (152). For instance, Dunnum mentions Adam’s “argument” with God about his (Adam’s) need for a female companion after his creation as the embodiment of these “gifts” of freedom and reason. Milton does not purvey Adam’s ability to reason (to connect the animals’ needs for a companion as a symbol of his need for one) and his freedom to disagree with God and freely speak his opinions in a negative light. In fact, God is actually pleased with Adam’s aptitude. This example of freedom indeed adheres to what Dunnum explicates as Milton’s definition of freedom because, according to Milton, freedom does not necessarily equate to a state without any fetters or restraints but rather signifies a state of using one’s freedom to make choices that mesh with both God’s Repressive State Apparatus and Ideological State Apparatus. In this way, Adam uses both his reason and freedom to adhere to God’s bipartite system. However, by universally applying such Althusserian interpretations to *Paradise Lost*, can we reconcile Eve’s pining with vain desire after her own reflection?

Unfortunately, Eve’s development of ego does not align with God’s will, and the warning which leads her to Adam indicates that. Of course, Eve *does* instantly choose to follow the voice of warning, but she indicates that her natural instinct to stare pining after herself would not have been overcome otherwise. If this brief development of pride indicates only the beginnings of sin, how long would Eve have had to pine after her reflection for it to turn into sin? Since Milton has provided no way of ever truly determining an exact answer to such a complex question, we are left to only wonder and surmise possibilities. However, Eve’s brief encounter with pride after her creation does still hint at a much larger question: might this brush with sin only be the beginning of Adam and Eve’s moral digression within the Garden of Eden, which culminates in
the Fall? In other words, might there have been a fall within the Fall? And if so, how can we reconcile this with Dunnum’s Althusserian model of God’s laws for *Paradise Lost*?

Indeed, when we view Adam and Eve in Milton’s *Paradise Lost* as two innocent and inherently righteous beings who, beguiled by the devil, partake in original sin, then yes, Dunnum’s account of the external Repressive State Apparatus and internal Ideological State Apparatus suitably describe God’s rule over the original father and mother of mankind. And yet, as mentioned, if Eve had been left to her vain desires, her brush with sin would almost certainly have turned to outright sin, at least by Christian standards. If Eve were not interrupted and had sinned, would she have gone unpunished? Even the mere existence of such a possibility must certainly trespass against and undermine God’s Ideological State Apparatus. This incongruency suggests a hole either within Dunnum’s theory or within Milton’s *Paradise Lost*—either Dunnum’s theory is too limited or Milton’s depiction of Eden perhaps allows for a little too much freedom. So which is it?

In order to even begin an attempt to unravel such mysteries, readers should consult yet another philosopher: Alain Badiou. His *Manifesto for Philosophy* ushers in postmodern philosophy by countering the modern philosophical notion that philosophy is dead. While contradicting such notions, Badiou argues that “philosophy is possible today”; moreover, “this possibility does not take the form of a final stage” (32). And so, in order to revive the perennial nature of philosophy and disprove Jean-Francois Lyotard’s assertion that “philosophy as architecture is ruined” (Badiou 28), Badiou promotes a mathematically structured philosophy based on set theory. This new Badiouian, mathematical structure actually provides more flexibility than before imagined for philosophy. And surprisingly, it also provides more flexibility for *Paradise Lost*.

But just what is mathematical set theory? First and foremost, a set is a designated collection of distinct objects (numbers, in mathematics). In relation to *Paradise Lost*, the fundamental set is Eden, which, though comprised of a conglomeration of objects, still is seen as a complete object in itself. And so set theory describes collections—collections that in themselves can represent a complete whole (another object). In *Lectures in Logic and Set Theory*, instead of giving readers a purely ontological definition of sets while describing axiomatic set theory, George Tourlakis likens sets to “collections” (99) but then informs readers that “from the mathematical point of view we are content to have tools (axioms and rules of logic) that tell us how sets behave rather
than what sets are” (101). One fundamental behavior is that sets are comprised of urelements, which are atomic or non-divisible (115). These urelements can exist separately or can be grouped together to build actual sets. In Paradise Lost, some of these urelements might be freedom and agency—two core principles that render the Fall’s possibility. Furthermore, set theory also contains an axiom that claims we can continually build sets upon existing sets (130), which is why we can build the set of Eden upon the set of a bipartite system. However, set theory begins to become more complicated when we reach axioms like the axiom of pairing, which says that for sets A and B, there exists a set C, of which A and B are both elements (145). Conversely, we can break down existing sets to create smaller subsets, as long as the sets are not atomic (146). In this manner, Tourlakis expounds upon set theory, ending in the axiom that states that even infinite sets—or rather inductive sets (originally atomic level sets that perpetually fit into larger sets)—exist, too (234).

So how does set theory save the allegedly dying field of philosophy? Set theory provides a structure—sets—that, through multiplicity, create a flexible whole. Because, as Badiou claims, philosophers have continually “sutured” or fettered philosophy to other conditions (namely to “the matheme, the poem, political invention and love” [35]), this flexibility is absolutely vital to philosophy’s existence. Thus, Badiou asserts that “if philosophy is threatened by suspension, […] it is because it is captive of a network of sutures to its conditions […] which forbade it from configuring their general compossibility” (64). In other words, philosophy’s sutures restrict its growth and perpetuation, rendering inductive sets a highly unlikely possibility. However, set theory suggests that these philosophical constructions are only parts of the whole—are only urelements of a larger set. In fact, according to Badiou’s concept of philosophical set theory, though we may not have realized it before because of suturing, these sets might actually be inductive sets—sets that unceasingly fit into larger sets. As such, philosophers can unceasingly reimagine the set that is “philosophy.” Actually, Badiou would probably object to any such definitive attempt since defining the set of philosophy implies it is a closed set, rendering even a general compossibility of philosophy impossible; hence, focusing on behavior is ideal. However, instead of recognizing immutable urelements of a philosophic set and labeling them as mutually exclusive with other possibilities, Badiou claims future compossibility. In other words, though philosophy may seem to be made up of certain components now, depending on the circumstances, it might soon be comprised of radically different urelements or even of other sets. As such,
although Badiou’s argument focuses upon philosophy, his work simultaneously and indirectly encourages his readers to consider expanding and reordering sets in order to reimagine the preconceived world.

Returning to *Paradise Lost* and Dunnum’s Althusserian evaluation of Milton’s Eden, I propose something similar to Badiou; utilizing set theory, we must also consider expanding and reordering sets in order to reimagine Milton’s Eden. Currently, based on Dunnum’s theory of God’s Repressive State Apparatus and Ideological State Apparatus, Milton’s Eden is sutured to political invention, particularly an Althusserian bipartite law system, which certainly enlightens the state of rules, laws, and commandments within Eden, but also simultaneously forms a dead end when exploring Milton’s Eden. According to the workings of the Ideological State Apparatus, Adam and Eve should both be inherently inculcated with God’s ideology and further brainwashed by His angels who, before the Fall, discuss only the sin of turning away from God, of rebelling against God. But these ideologies only appear to be leading up to the Fall. Perhaps such a bipartite system simply reveals a manipulative ruler who only wishes to establish a legal system which merely possesses the appearance of agency. If such is the case, then God narrows the set of Adam and Eve’s decisions and actions; He eliminates a general compossibility, or coexistence of other possibilities beyond the derived ideology, within agency. Because of this lack of compossibility in decision, readers can hardly hope to ever fully explain Eve’s narcissistic self-admiration after her creation. Because of such a bleak outlook, can readers—can God, the embodiment of justice—simply ignore such opposition to the bipartite system?

Because Milton undeniably sets the stage for an Ideological State Apparatus, the idea of an Edenic bipartite system cannot be simply ignored. This stage is set most poignantly through Adam and Eve’s relations with God and the angels. For instance, when righteous, Adam and Eve did not “[shun] the sight/Of God or angel, for they thought no ill” (4.320, emphasis added). Through such a statement, Milton implies the possibility to sin through thought, though it still remains unclear as to whether that would actually ever happen and, if it did, whether or not it could also cause Adam and Eve to fall in the same way as they did after partaking of the forbidden fruit. Perhaps, if only viewing *Paradise Lost* through the lens of the Edenic bipartite system, one might believe such a statement, which indicates the possibility to feel guilt from sin, merely refers to and foreshadows what happens once in a fallen state. Only after the Fall do Adam and Eve, recognizing their nakedness, hide from the Savior and begin to think
ill of one another. However, other instances of ill thoughts appear even before the Fall occurs, revealing that Eve's self-longing is not an isolated, accidental incidence. Thus, since Eve's earliest encounter with sin is not the only complexity of its kind in Paradise Lost, readers cannot feign blindness to it or any other encounter with sin.

However, in order to determine what thoughts of Adam's and Eve's are “ill,” we must first explore general definitions of “ill” and then relate them to definitions of ill thoughts. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, “ill” in its noun form actually possesses a number of nuanced definitions, a few of which might fit Milton's use in line 320 of Book IV. First, “ill” can be interpreted as “evil, in the widest sense” or as “the opposite of good,” though it is “now” considered as “chiefly in antithesis with good” (“ill” B.1.). Certainly Satan may be said to have countless ill thoughts of this type, but claiming that the thoughts of Adam and Eve are so starkly contrary to good, especially before the Fall, is too questionable and probably incorrect. Moreover, the second definition of “ill” in its noun form also does not quite mesh with Adam and Eve's state of mind before the Fall, for it would be quite a stretch to characterize their thoughts as those of “moral evil, depravity, wickedness, iniquity, sin, [and] wrong-doing” (“ill” B.2.a), especially since Adam and Eve are sinless up until the Fall. However, the third definition—“hostile, malevolent, or unfriendly feeling, ill will,” as in “to take [something] ill” or to “take offence at it” (“ill” B.3.a)—actually might connect to Eve's thoughts at one point before the Fall. During the episode before Adam and Eve separate in the garden, though subtle, Eve actually takes offence to Adam's unwillingness to separate, asserting, “[Satan's] fraud is then thy fear, which plain infers / Thy equal fear that my firm faith and love / Can by his fraud be shaken or seduced; / Thoughts, which how found they harbor in thy breast / Adam, misthought of her to thee so dear?” (Milton 9.285–289). In response, Adam uses “healing words” (9.290) in order to assuage her feelings of hurt. Ironically, by blaming Adam of thoughts of ill towards her, Eve actually engages in her own thoughts of ill. Perhaps this is not quite a sin, but it certainly echoes the imperfections of Eve. But this is not the only time “thoughts of ill” occur in Paradise Lost.

If utilizing such strong forms of “ill” which implicate a sense of “sin” and pure “evil,” then perhaps Eve's offence to Adam's supposed doubt of her “firm faith and love” truly is the only offence of thinking ill thoughts. But not only does this characterize Eve as the only imperfect human creation (which would undoubtedly lead to a discussion on misogyny) but it also complicates the
actual Fall itself. If the Fall truly is centered on the agency to fall, then is this pivotal event really so organic and free, even when it is tied to perfect beings whose worst transgression before the Fall was taking offense? Before answering such a question, “ill” still might offer more clarity, for I believe it can be interpreted slightly differently in order to accommodate the mathematical set that characterizes the Fall. Though Milton uses the noun form of “ill,” the first adjectival definition of “ill” in the *OED* actually helps to unveil a more nuanced and significant form of “ill.” Similar to definition B.2.a, definition A.1 defines “ill” as meaning “morally evil; wicked, iniquitous, depraved, vicious, immoral” but also adds “blameworthy” and “reprehensible” (emphasis added). Of course, sins, evil, wickedness, and so forth are all “reprehensible” and “blameworthy,” but some actions may still be “blameworthy” and “reprehensible” without necessarily being “evil” or “sinful.” For example, Eve’s aforementioned dabbling in self-idolatry could be, to some extent, considered “blameworthy,” even though she still does not have to repent for her lustful thoughts. But again, this returns to the previous discussion of where to draw the line for sin and furthermore perpetuates the narrow focus on Eve’s blame in the Fall—unless, of course, Adam also displays instances of possessing thoughts of ill.

In Book VIII, Adam reveals to Raphael some of his own “reprehensible” thoughts while he relates his memory of the creation. Particularly while recalling his memory of Eve’s creation, Adam admits that “when [he approaches] / Her loveliness, so absolute she seems / And in herself complete, so well to know / Her own, that what she wills to do or say, / Seems wisest, virtuous-est, discreetest, best; / All higher knowledge in her presence falls / Degraded, wisdom in discourse with her / Looses discount’anced, and like folly shows” (8.546–553, emphasis added). Not surprisingly, Raphael lightly reprimands Adam for such thoughts and warns him of misplacing Eve’s wisdom above even his own, only because of her entrancing physical beauty. In this sense, we do see that Adam possesses “reprehensible” thoughts—thoughts of *ill*. But similar to Eve’s thoughts of ill, Adam has not yet sinned in his thoughts. And yet his thoughts are not entirely pure, for he is placing Eve upon a pedestal raised above “all higher knowledge”—meaning he is even putting her wisdom above God’s. Indeed, this could be said to be yet another form of idolatry. Thus, recognizing hidden elements within the set of “ill” reveals that Adam and Eve, even before the Fall, do have some “thoughts of ill,” which returns to the aforementioned issue of needing to call into question the larger set of Eden as a bipartite system—a set much larger than “ill.”
Returning to the question of an Althusserian bipartite system in *Paradise Lost*, I still am not arguing that this structure should be entirely rejected; rather, I believe it is only one part of the whole—perhaps a set within another, inductive set. Unfortunately, when this set is only viewed alone, outside of the other set(s) in which it exists, it excludes compossibility of committing other sins within Milton’s Eden. However, even if focusing on the larger set, compossibility of sins (other than eating of the forbidden fruit) is still complicated. But these aforementioned “thoughts of ill” coordinate very well with how Adam and Eve both fell—Eve fell because of her pride and self-idolization while Adam fell because of his willingness to put Eve’s logic above God’s—that they cannot be coincidental. But if these “thoughts of ill” are precursors for the Fall, then that would most likely mean that the set of the Fall could not actually include “freedom” and “agency” as urelements.

In terms of freedom and agency’s possible annihilation in *Paradise Lost*, John Tanner’s *Anxiety in Eden*, though focused on Kierkegaardian philosophy within *Paradise Lost*, provides an analysis on the question of a fall before the Fall, which if true, would conflict with the “freedom” and “agency” urelements’ compossibility. First of all, Tanner asserts that because Milton emphasizes the origination of Adam and Eve’s guilt as occurring after the Fall, Adam and Eve are not subject to original sin; thus, in *Paradise Lost*, “though Milton initially describes such evil desire [concupiscence] as a precedent mode of sin—normally related to evil deeds as cause to effect—he ends the chapter resolving to treat concupiscence as a ‘consequence of sin’” (18). But even though the Fall stands as the line between innocence and guilt, Milton’s depiction of this event is as a “gradual process” (20). But do “Milton’s proleptic hints of the Fall [come] to be seen as explanations of it” (21)? Or, as others have misconstrued, do these hints indicate a fall before the Fall? Tanner, referencing Stanley Fish’s *Surprised by Sin*, claims that this assumption removes free will—the most vital component—from the Fall, and so a fall before the Fall could not be possible. So why provide such “thoughts of ill” before the Fall, especially when a Milton scholar like Tanner suggests that “the point of the scenes in Paradise from Book IV to Book IX is their irrelevance, as determining factors, to the moment of crisis experienced by the characters” (27)? According to Tanner, such hints create an Edenic “borderland of becoming, a profoundly nebulous region located somewhere between innocence and guilt” (28). If true, this radically alters the preconceived set of Eden, even if it provides a means of free will’s compossibility in Eden.
If Eden truly is a borderland between innocence and guilt, then the strict structure of an Althusserian bipartite system is not an appropriate description of Edenic laws. But again, this idea should not be simply deemed useless, for the concept of an Ideological State Apparatus does help describe a great deal of what occurs in *Paradise Lost*. In fact, if we apply set theory’s axiom of pairing, we can better envision how a smaller set of a bipartite system could still coexist with another nuanced set describing Eden’s legal system, all within the larger set of Eden. Therefore, we cannot forget that restricting Eden’s set to certain elements or sets that only partially make up Eden’s legal system creates a harmful suture. And so, how exactly does entertaining the possibility of a borderland-like Eden that is governed by a bipartite legal system alter notions of the set of Milton’s Eden? For one, free will and “thoughts of ill” can simultaneously exist within Eden. Additionally, Adam and Eve already begin receiving a moral education, allowing them to additionally begin the process of progression and digression. And though the seemingly proleptic hints may not actually point to a fall before the Fall, perhaps in the borderland of Eden, they instead simply highlight Adam and Eve’s individual weaknesses, which then unsurprisingly end up being manifest in the Fall. Just as some have greater tendencies toward certain sins, so it is with Adam and Eve. However, one question still remains: would this Edenic set allow for a different kind of fall?

As aforementioned, Badiou greatly stresses the importance of compossibility, which encourages his readers to not just limit their imaginations to philosophy but to imagine their entire worlds differently. With compossibility, though circumstances may currently be one way, that does not necessarily mean they could not be otherwise. In reality, the principal restrictions upon otherness, upon being *otherwise* (compossibility), are artificial sutures. I propose that we, if even for a moment, remove the suture that the Fall must occur by partaking of the forbidden fruit. As evidenced in Books IV through IX, Adam and Eve do grow and learn and, throughout these processes, are visibly fallible. As such, if Satan did not ever tempt Eve, could the Fall have happened otherwise because of this process of growth? Clearly, Satan’s role is not to bear the entire brunt of the blame but instead is primarily to *catalyze* the Fall; he quickens the process that might otherwise have been more prolonged in an experimental borderland-like Eden. And although Adam and Eve’s “thoughts of ill” seem to be of a lesser degree of “ill-ness,” the compossibility of those “thoughts of ill” progressing (or perhaps digressing) to a degree at which Adam and Eve would
shun the presence of God and His angels seems probable in this de-sutured set of Milton’s Eden.

In the end, while aiming to de-suture Milton’s Eden, our aim is not actually to discover exactly what happens in Milton’s Eden; Milton has already adequately explicated the action. Our objective actually primarily centers on the internal (Adam and Eve’s thoughts, the internalized moral/legal system, etc.) rather than the external action. In doing so, due to the complex nature of the internal, our focus shifts to compossibility. Even if Adam and Eve did not actually experience a fall before the Fall, determining its compossibility is important to identifying key urelements of the set that makes up the story and to recognizing the behavior of these urelements. Most likely, if a fall occurred before the actual Fall, then it would utterly alter the nature of *Paradise Lost*, but this alteration is not conducive because of the absolute necessity of free will to the Fall. However, removing Satan—the catalyst—from the story just might reveal a possibility of a different means of falling. If Satan were not part of the set, might God have given different restrictions on sin that would be more encompassing and that would, thus, better suit the progressing/digress-ing original parents of mankind? Such questions reveal limitless possibilities for scholarship on an author’s work that has been already thoroughly studied *limitless* possibilities, possible through a de-sutured version of Eden.
This is only a (very) shortened version of Badiou’s *L’Etre et l’évenement*. In the abridged version, he does not even mention mathematical set theory (which I will explicate in the following paragraph), but the conclusions he makes are based on it. And, I believe, in order to really understand what Badiou is doing, we must also delve into set theory (at least the basics).

In math, a set is depicted with braces. For instance, if we have a set with the numbers 7, 44, and -128, we would depict it as so: \{7, 44, -128\}. A set can be chosen arbitrarily, but more often than not, in mathematics, a set indicates some sort of relationship between the numbers. For example, we might be given a function \(y=3x\). Perhaps we arbitrarily choose to plug in 2, 5, and -3 for \(x\), which means that our set for \(x\) would be \{2, 5, -3\}, but then our set for \(x\) would necessitate that our set for \(y\) would be \{6, 15, -9\}.

Today, the commonly used set theory is an axiomatic one called the Zermelo-Fraenkel system—or ZFC, as it is more commonly known (Ferreirós 366).

This idea is quite significant when imagining Eden and determining how to describe its behavior, for it opens up the possibility of multiple sets—or structures/systems—existing and operating within one larger set. This does not necessarily demand that these two smaller sets within the larger set overlap (or possess some of the same urelements), nor does it dictate that these two smaller sets cannot overlap whatsoever.

These concepts of breaking down larger sets and building up smaller sets are probably the most important concepts within set theory in relation to Badiou’s ideas (and, consequently, my ideas for reimagining Milton’s Eden), for they provide flexibility and even creativity in seemingly fixed and determined structures without actually tearing apart those structures. Thus, ironically, they allow for a seemingly contradictory existence of a pliable structure or framework.

Certainly, we cannot simply deem all sutures as doing only harm and no good. In fact, surgical sutures (stitches) are meant to heal, and even philosophy’s sutures have helped philosophy advance—but only so far. Just as surgical sutures must ultimately be removed in order to keep from restricting movement, so must philosophical sutures be removed. Keep this in mind when considering Eden’s legal system as an Athusserian bipartite one.


