Selected Papers in Asian Studies: Western Conference of the Association for Asian Studies

Volume 1
Number 51 *Japanese Casualties of the Company Towns: Nevada's Peculiar Cass of Mass Internment and Forced "Evacuation"*

Article 1

1994

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Selected Papers in Asian Studies

NEW SERIES # 51

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

Western Conference
Of The Association
For Asian Studies

WESTERN CONFERENCE OF THE ASSOCIATION FOR

ASIAN STUDIES

Selected Papers In Asian Studies

New Series

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by

Andrew B. Russell

The author deserves full credit and blame for the opinions expressed in this article, but he has incurred many debts during the course of his research. He especially wishes to thank his advisor, Sue Fawn Chung, for her unlimited encouragement and assistance, and the Graduate Student Association of the University of Nevada for funding several research trips.

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JAPANESE CASUALTIES OF THE COMPANY TOWNS: NEVADA'S PECULIAR CASE OF MASS INTERNMENT AND FORCED "EVACUATION"

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ANDREW B. RUSSELL

JAPANESE CASUALTIES OF THE COMPANY TOWNS: NEVADA'S PECULIAR CASE OF MASS INTERNMENT AND FORCED "EVACUATION"

The World War II incarceration of Japanese Americans has been viewed in a different light since the early 1970s. To that point, writers typically adopted euphemisms, devised by the United States government, when recounting the "evacuation" of the West-Coast Japanese to "assembly centers" and "relocation camps." Few postwar scholars concurred with the government's claim that "military necessity" dictated and justified the wartime exile. Nonetheless, the early writers rarely dismissed national defense concerns completely and frequently emphasized positive aspects of "camp life." In contrast, the studies that have proliferated in recent years almost invariably refer to the "internment" of the Japanese in "concentration camps." Historians and others focus on the high-level racial prejudice that caused this travesty of American justice and emphasize the negative affects of mass relocation on the ethnic group.

The new scholarship has brought us closer to the truth, but some of the best scholars have admitted problems with the new terminology. The words concentration camp evoke lurid, misleading images, and, technically, internment is a misnomer for typical wartime experiences of Japanese Americans.[1] *Internment* camps and *relocation* camps were distinctly different institutions. Although residents of both types of facilities suffered a similar fate--detainment behind barbed wire--generalizations should end there.

Most internees were arrested by federal agents during the early weeks of the war and labeled with the official, temporary title "detainee." Theoretically, each detainee received an individual loyalty hearing, which

weighed evidence to determine if the person should be released, paroled or interned. The internees spent the war in facilities operated by the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Army. "Evacuees," or excluded residents of West Coast states, were herded *en masse* to make-shift camps in 1942 under a blanket military order (sanctioned by President Franklin Roosevelt and Congress) and became wards of the War Relocation Authority (WRA), a quasi-civilian agency. Male, Japanese immigrants, or *Issei*, accounted for a disproportionately high percent of the interned group. But these early "round-ups," conducted primarily by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), also netted hundreds of Italian and German nationals. Only people of Japanese ancestry--mainly *Nisei* or second-generation citizens of the United States--fell prey to mass relocation and wartime exile from the West Coast. Descriptions and analysis of the relocation tragedy abound, but little has been written about actual Japanese internment cases.[2]

Nevada, just beyond the military exclusion zones, rarely is mentioned anywhere in the extensive literature. Yet one of the earliest instances of mass internment and Japanese American "exclusion" occurred in White Pine County, an isolated copper-mining region in east-central Nevada. Within hours of the attack on Pearl Harbor, the FBI arrested Eiichi "Roy" Muranaka and Shizutaro "Fred" Toyota, two labor agents who administered Japanese work crews in the company towns of Ruth and McGill. On the evening of December 8, partly in response to demands voiced by white workers--partly on advise from the FBI--the Nevada Consolidated Copper Corporation (NCCC) laid off all Japanese workers at Ruth and posted an armed guard over the Japanese section of the mining town. Three days later, NCCC laid off Japanese laborers in the mill town of McGill and along the Nevada Northern Railroad, a subsidiary of the copper giant. The company transported the railroad workers and their

dependents to Ruth and McGill, where the NCCC Japanese awaited the arrival of more FBI agents.

Official mass arrest followed several unpleasant days of local incarceration within the company towns. Finally moved to the county jail in nearby Ely, twenty-six McGill *Issei* were transported by federal agents to Salt Lake City, Utah a few days later. Forty Japanese prisoners from Ruth (via Ely) followed, and by the first week of January both groups of *Issei* were in DOJ internment camps in Montana and North Dakota. A few Nevada detainees won qualified freedom at their loyalty hearings, but most spent the remainder of the war in "those other camps."

Meanwhile, a sizable number of Japanese Americans (wives and dependents of those arrested, adult *Nisei* workers and railroad employees) remained in the company towns for a time. But Japanese "evacuation" from Ruth and McGill (which involved neither the FBI nor the military) began almost immediately and culminated around June 1942. Three *Issei* had committed suicide by that point in the drama. Fewer than ten Japanese Americans survived these months of ethnic cleansing, company-town style, and they too became casualties of racism in the copper camps by war's end.

Popular histories of White Pine County make only passing references to the internment and avoid the protracted forced exodus altogether. These sources reflect the position of many resident old-timers, who state that federal authorities removed the Japanese to safe-guard the area's "strategic" copper industry.[3] Nevada historian Russell Elliott knew otherwise. Elliott grew up in the region and was in McGill during part of the war. In his best account, he suggests that the mass internment was driven by suspicions and animosity within the company towns. His *History of Nevada* offers that: "Most of the immediate reaction in the copper district apparently was due to fear of

sabotage based on the fact that most of the Japanese there were aliens." Elliott adds that decades of company-imposed segregation and long-standing "antagonism" on the part of "white workers" fueled the disaster.[4]

Elliott was correct in pointing to the primacy of local influences, but his various accounts overlook a great deal. Personally acquainted with numerous figures involved, and privileged to company records, McGill's home-town historian offered no testimony or evidence to support his position. His three known accounts are practically devoid of names and characters, while Elliott's most recent book, *Growing Up in a Company Town*, adds little of value about the McGill Japanese. The latter does, however, contains some misinformation about Fred Toyota's family that reeks of the McGill myth mill and emphasizes the need to improve the historical record.[5]

Although Elliott's descriptions and analysis are flawed, they offer a disembarking point for exploring this peculiar chapter in the history of the Nevada Japanese. Indeed, a long history of segregation, hostility on the part of some workers, and demographic imbalances did shape this local disaster. But these adverse variables defy simple explanations, while other significant factors seemingly were beyond Elliott's ability (or propensity) to describe. Naturally, real characters were involved on both sides.

Before proceeding any further, this author needs to clarify his objectives and his terminology. Those perimeters may best be described by stating what this article is *not*. It is not, first of all, an effort to vindicate Japanese victims, vilify the White Pine vicinity, or view the weaknesses of other interpretations. For the sake of accuracy, some points need to be set straight; some "players" must come to the fore. Still, the researcher has tried to focus on processes and circumstances that influenced wartime events, not on individual acts or participants of either side. His target is an explanation

for why mass internment resulted here and no where else in Nevada,[6] and he believes the answer lies in local history.

Secondly, this article is not an effort to introduce new (or old) causal theories and general descriptions about Japanese internment and the better-known "evacuation." In fact, the Nevada "evacuation" has no real connection to what occurred on the West Coast except, perhaps, that both actions were fueled by race prejudice, war hysteria, and a failure of leadership. Evacuation terminology used herein is figurative, reflecting a lack of more appropriate terms. When discussing internment matters, on the other hand, the author adheres to the official language.[7] The Nevada internment should be of comparative value for scholars interested in these types of cases. However, it was tied to peculiar historical developments and unique wartime circumstances. As Fred Toyota's wife, Kame Toyota, put it in a 1944-farewell letter to Nevada: "This case in White Pine is very funny and there is no other like it."[8]

SETTLEMENT: THE FIRST AND SECOND JAPANESE INFLUX

The first large influx of Japanese into White Pine County coincided with Nevada's twentieth-century mining boom. In 1905, mining and milling techniques were introduced to process the low-grade copper deposits of the area. Investment capital was secured through a partnership between the infant Nevada Consolidated Copper Company and the wealthy Guggenheim family of New York. Suddenly, the Steptoe Valley stood poised for greatness among the mining regions of the West.[9] NCCC put engineers and laborers to work designing and building the mine site at Ruth and milling facilities on the old McGill Ranch, about fifteen miles northeast of Ruth. It also began

constructing a railroad with backing from its eastern partners. The Nevada Northern would span 140 miles, connecting Ruth, McGill and Ely (the county seat located in between) to a Southern Pacific Railroad link at Cobre to the north. In Nevada at the time, railroad construction most frequently included Japanese labor, and this project was no exception.[10]

Utah Construction Company based in Salt Lake City (the closest urban area, 250 land-miles east) was awarded the construction contract. In the summer of 1906, it brought in a sixty-four-man Japanese section gang to aid the project. The Japanese contingent was supplied by Salt Lake's noted labor contractor Edward Daigoro Hashimoto. The shortline was completed in late September, but scores of Japanese remained in the area until 1909, completing links between the mining and milling facilities at Ruth and McGill. Among other contributions, they helped construct McGill's amazing hi-line trestle, which spanned 1,720 feet. This great wooden edifice carried Ruth ore cars to the upper tier of the McGill concentrator, where the copper reduction process began.[11]

So far these Japanese early-comers have not been researched closely, but some generalities probably apply. Typically, labor contractors collected a monthly fee from each man through the local crew foremen. The foremen often took "translation fees" from their men too (generally only these supervisors spoke English); they also charged their men for sending remittances back to relatives in Japan.[12] Companies that hired Japanese workers took a share of their earnings as well, often paying them a lower wage than other immigrant and non-immigrant workers.

As the Japanese were hired into permanent section maintenance crews on the Nevada Northern, they probably severed their ties to the Utah contractor. However, pay disparities between the Japanese and other

immigrant laborers still existed in 1908, with the Japanese earning, on average, twenty-five cents less per day than Greeks and Italians. The Japanese also were denied company hospital privileges during this early period.[13]

The 1910 Census reflects a substantial decline in the Japanese work force after railroad construction ended.[14] Those who remained were incorporated into smaller maintenance crews and stationed at McGill Junction, Decoy, Duck Creek, Goshute, Cherry Creek, Cobre, and other small railroad outposts over the years. Into the 1920s and 1930s, Japanese crews manned the tracks at McGill Junction (just north-east of Ely) and along other stretches of the railroad. Several advanced to become foremen or section bosses, sometimes supervising non-Japanese crews. But since the experiences of this group differed from Japanese experiences in Ruth and McGill, they do not figure much into the rest of this article.[15]

Meanwhile, changes were affecting Nevada Consolidated which would eventually lead to a new and larger influx of Japanese. In late 1906, the Guggenheim family and their corporate extension, Guggenheim Exploration, wrested control of NCCC and the copper-producing infrastructure of the region from the locals who had staked the original claims. In another affront to local pride, Utah Copper, a Guggenheim holding which mined similar deposits near Salt Lake City, became a big-sister company to the Nevada operation. This strange union between a collection of Nevada mining settlements and Utah would bind the two through the period and events under discussion.[16]

Daniel Jackling introduced open-cut mining, or surface mining, to the region and soon became Managing Director of both Utah Copper and Nevada Consolidated. Possibly involved in hiring the Nevada Northern Japanese, we know that in 1910 Jackling contracted with Hashimoto for over 200 Japanese

and Korean laborers to help construct the Bingham-Garfield Railroad. When completed, Utah Copper hired most of the Asian crew on at the Bingham Canyon mine, where they worked under independent labor bosses. Many worked as powdermen, performing the dangerous but well-paid work of setting off charges in the tiered, multi-colored walls of the copper pit.[17]

The introduction of Japanese into the mining operation at Utah Copper was no fluke. According to Guggenheim biographer Harvey O'Connor, other western mine operators viewed Jackling's Japanese labor force as a radical "innovation"--a way to "short-circuit labor trouble by avoiding troublesome native Americans as much as possible....The Japanese were strong, industrious, fed themselves on rice and a shred of meat and understood discipline and loyalty."[18] Native workers and union organizers naturally had other views about this "innovation." But when a strike erupted at Bingham Canyon in 1912, Japanese labor was not an issue of major contention. Trouble with a corrupt Greek labor boss and grievances over the deplorable working and living conditions in the mining center caused this violent strike. The Japanese even joined the Greeks in the battle against Utah Copper.[19]

Indirectly, the Bingham strike of 1912 percipitated the second influx of Japanese into White Pine County when it spread to the Guggenheim properties there. The Ely Central Labor League (dominated by conservative craft unions of the American Federation of Labor, or AFL) stood in opposition to striking. According to Elliott, no major conflicts existed between employees and the company at the time. Nevertheless, after lobbying by national leaders of the World Federation of Miners (WFM) and the International Workers of the World (IWW), the strike spread to McGill and Ruth on October 2. Violence resulted: two McGill Greeks were shot and killed by company guards and Nevada's

governor intervened with state troops. But compared to Bingham the White Pine strike was mild, and it ended within the month.[20]

The Japanese arrived in the wake of the strike, mainly to fill the shoes of fast-exiting Greeks. Greek immigrants comprised a sizable percent of the unskilled labor force and helped lead the McGill rebellion (other Greek Americans opposed it). The settlement agreed upon by labor and management stipulated that strikers would be reinstated in their old positions without recrimination, but newspaper reports indicate that the company was selective in whom it hired back. Combined with a large, unrelated exodus of Greeks (many were returning to Europe suddenly to fight in the war between Greece and Turkey), the strike caused openings at the mines and milling facilities. A group of over one hundred Japanese arrived in December 1912 to help fill the labor void.[21] Because inter-racial labor relations are so central in this study, it should be emphasized that the "second coming" of the Japanese was not directly tied to the 1912 strike. Yet, it did coinside with a period of bitter memories.

Daniel Jackling appointed Shizutaro "Fred S." Toyota to lead this massive Japanese influx. Born March 18, 1885, Toyota was a native of Urasaki, Hiroshima Prefecture and had studied English in his Japanese high school before emigrating to the United States in 1905. Over the next seven years, he worked (probably through Hashimoto) on the Nevada Northern and other lines, often serving as an interpreter. In 1910 he became a permanent bookman for the Bingham Garfield Railroad. Two years later, after an extended vacation in Ogden, Utah, Toyota was "put in charge of the Japanese labor camp[s] at Ruth and McGill under the supervision of D.C Jackling...."[22] In 1914 the company reassigned him strictly to McGill, where he remained as Japanese labor agent for the next twenty-seven years.

Eiichi "Roy" Muranaka soon assumed the role of labor agent, or "Japanese boss," in Ruth. We still know little about Muranaka's background, but the Japanese section of the 1920 Census Manuscripts (which he narrated at the company chow hall) says he was born around 1888, that he immigrated in 1910, and that he was literate in Japanese and spoke English. Most of the Japanese first-comers to Ruth were powdermen, no doubt helping to combine two smaller mines into the massive Liberty Pit open-cut mine. However the Ruth powdermen were not paid more than common laborers, in contrast to their Utah counterparts. When the major excavation was completed, most Japanese became track laborers, who performed the also-dangerous but more grueling task of building and clearing steam shovel tracks within the pit. McGill's Japanese workers also found their niche at the bottom of the employment hierarchy on the McGill tracks and, at times, within the mill and smelter.[23]

The company-towns of McGill and Ruth were in other ways different from the rowdy camp at Bingham Canyon. Almost from their inception, the Nevada towns were created in accordance with the philosophy and practices of welfare capitalism. Dan Guggenheim, a son of the founding patriarch, oversaw the corporation when Ruth and McGill were built, between 1907 and 1916. Reportedly he had long viewed the captains of industry as the modern industrial counterpart of the "medieval barons, surrounded by faithful, well-fed and happy yoemanry."[24] Guggenheim heartily embraced Welfarism, while state and federal leaders also lent support to this strategy for combating labor unrest in heavy industry. Actively, and with some success over the years, the local managers of NCCC tried to forge a stable, tractable, and more productive labor force through town grooming and hegemonic control.[25]

The company came to provide many benefits to its workers and their families. They included: well constructed and affordable housing; recreation facilities; provisions and coal at reduced prices; and free electricity, water, and sanitation services. County residents as a whole profited from good hospital care, provided by Nevada Consolidated at a nominal fee, and reduced taxes, since NCCC assisted in constructing and maintaining schools and police and fire protection. But it seems that the local captains of industry were able to extract much more than they invested into the county, and the best interests of Nevadans were not always uppermost in their minds. NCCC quickly became the largest industrial enterprise in the state, and its influence on county and state politics remains unexplored. The company's control over Ruth and McGill, on the other hand, was nearly absolute. Company-towners were denied basic political representation. Though NCCC did not own or manage most local businesses, it held lease on Ruth and most of McGill and tinkered with their general economies. It had almost unrestricted control of the livelihoods of its resident population and unnatural control over people's life-styles. Where people lived and worked NCCC apparently decided on criterion of race, ethnicity, and "class."[26]

The town of McGill had already taken shape on the lower alluvium of the Duck Creek Mountains when the Japanese arrived. Five fine homes, known as "The Circle" and occupied by top management, sat about half a mile southwest of the great smelter. Just south of the Circle was the Upper Townsite (later known as Middle Town), a collection of comfortable but indistinguishable homes occupied by skilled workers and their families. Down and west of that stood the boardinghouses, bunkhouses and smaller homes of the unskilled workers, an area known as the Lower Townsite. It was divided between "whites"--native Americans and Northern-European immigrants--

and "foreigners," immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe. The "foreign" section (mostly shy of amenities like indoor plumbing and family dwellings) was further divided into "Greek Town" and enclaves of other immigrant groups.

Around 1910 problems related to cultural and religious differences had erupted from a policy of housing all immigrants from the Southern Balkans together. The company responded by establishing "Austrian Town," about a mile north of the Lower Townsite to house Croats, Rumanians, and Hungarians. NCCC erected its Japanese Town directly south of Austrian Town, still well removed from the central business district, which began just north of the Lower Townsite.[27] "Jap Town" (as it is commonly called in print and White-Pine conversation) sat on something less than prime real-estate. To the east stood the smelter, to the west, the noxious slag deposits that emptied out below the townsite. Next to it ran the channel that carried the chemical laden waste material from the smelter in a thick, muddy current, which Japanese workers crossed by way of a bridge.[28] Segregation in housing and employment at McGill was strict before World War II. Southern and Eastern Europeans rarely moved from the category of unskilled to skilled worker or from their ethnic enclaves to the better homes of Middle Town. No Japanese were able to advance up or out.[29]

We know far less about the early days of Ruth, except that haphazard settlement soon gave way to orderly development. The 500 men working there in 1910 considered the mining camp "a pleasant place to live." According to another source, the first NCCC mine superintendent lived on Vanderhoef Hill and exercised austere control over Ruth. E.E. Vanderhoef permitted no saloons early on and "hired no man with cigarette stains on his hands." When F.E. Grant replaced Vanderhoef as Superintendent in 1918, moderation became the

rule. The company built some saloons and pool halls and even allowed a few prostitutes to operate behind a fenced compound close to the finer residences on the hill (by then known as Grant Hill).[30]

The Japanese lived at Copper Flat, an extension of Ruth located near the Liberty Pit. Although White Pine author Effie Read describes Copper Flat as a "melting pot" (home to Japanese, Greeks, and American-born whites), living quarters and work crews were separated by ethnicity. Read adds about Copper Flat that there "were Japanese bunk houses, a bath house, a noodle parlor, and a Greek pool hall as well. The Japanese had a few gardens and grew their favorite kinds of vegetables plus a few trees,"[31] no mean accomplishment on the edge of a copper pit.

White Pine writers have shed some light on Japanese life in the company towns, but their descriptions are mainly cosmetic. The following section tries to penetrate more deeply into the internal and external social forces affecting the Japanese and community relationships in Ruth and McGill before the war.

SOCIAL SIGNPOSTS POINTING TOWARD DISASTER

During the thirty-year existence of these Japanese towns, very little about their physical make-up or their residents' economic and social standing changed. A categorical, rather than chronological, approach to analyzing the group and its relationships to the larger community is therefore used in the following discussions. Exploring three broadly defined categories, this section identifies and assesses what seem to be key factors that influence the World War II tragedy.[32]

Demographic Factors

When investigating the experiences of any group, a demographic profile can be a valuable tool. In the case of the Japanese of Ruth and McGill, the size, nationality, gender, and age structure of the population becomes crucially important. Statistics alone will not tell the whole story. But they do offer helpful insights and a foundation for other discussions.

In combination with 1920 Census Manuscripts for Ruth and McGill, a collection of service records for Ruth employees offers some valuable information on the Japanese immigrant who entered the region. The following profile is based on a sample of fifty Japanese employees of Ruth, hired between 1918 and 1923, with additional data being drawn from the Census.[33] It indicates that the Japanese, like other immigrants who came to Ruth and McGill, arrived with connections to their home country intact. To a greater degree than the others, however, powerful internal and external forces radically stabilized the demographic structure and orientation of the Japanese.

Virtually all of the Japanese employed by Nevada Consolidated early on were *Issei*; most were in their thirties by 1920. Slightly less than half of the Ruth sample (23) were single, and of those listed as married (21) or widowed (6), approximately two-thirds had one-to-three dependent children living with wives or relatives in Japan. None from the sample had wives or children in the United States, and only four women show up in association with the Japanese labor force of Ruth and McGill in the 1920 U.S. Census--out of a population of 149. Only three infant children appear, so much a novelty to the census-taker, apparently, that the documents erroneously list them as "aliens."[34]

These figures indicate that most of the Japanese laborers who came to work in the mine and mill were of the *dekasegi* orientation identified by Yuji Ichioka. They were sojourners, seeking wealth in America and working to support families back home, probably with the intention of returning to Japan one day. Under deductions for dependents, all but three of the married men in the Ruth sample, and all but one of the widowers, asked that an average of half of their pay be sent to relatives in Japan. It is perhaps more surprisingly that about half of the single men were sending home between one-third and three-fourths of their yearly income.[35] If intentions were to bring family over, more money would have been invested here, as required under Japanese emigration law. The high number of existing children, and the relatively close age differences between husbands and wives (averaging about seven years), are also indications that these women were not the "picture brides" traditionally secured by *Issei* men who intended to settle more permanently in America. Lost in this rough statistical analysis are some, certainly, who did have ambitions beyond building for a future in Japan. It seems, however, that most from that category moved out of the mining business for other pursuits.[36]

That the Japanese towns were not well suited for families in any case seems pretty clear. Located at the apex of tracks connecting Ruth to Ely, and to the sixteen miles of narrow-gauge track that spiraled down into the Liberty Pit, Copper Flat was a constant din of steam shovels, ore trains, and miners marching to and from the pit, which at times operated in three shifts. The bunkhouses most Japanese shared in Ruth and McGill (ten-room, barrack-type structures that housed ten to twenty miners) were not designed for families either.[37] Whatever the intentions of the early mine and mill workers, the 1924 Immigration Act ended immigration from Japan, eliminating any option

of bringing family over. Fred Toyota had brought a twenty-three year-old picture bride and former teacher, Kame, to McGill in 1917. A few other women spent time in the company towns over the years, often doing domestic service-work for company officials while their husbands worked the tracks.[38] But women--and, as a result, children--were rare in the Japanese colonies of Ruth and McGill.

In the 1930s, the Japanese towns did see some increase in the second generation. Pushed by hardships of the Great Depression, some *Nisei* from farms in Utah and elsewhere came to work as laborers at the mine and mill sites. In a sense, however, it seems they too were "sojourners." Sent here to support families elsewhere, most were unable, or uninterested, in starting families of their own in White Pine County.[39] They were a minority within the Japanese population and, apparently, almost as socially isolated as the *Issei* from Euro-Americans. In short, the only significant change in the demographic structure over a thirty-year period was a uniform aging of the dominant, male-*Issei* population.

Further stifling strong community bonds was a nearly constant turn-over in the work force, Japanese and non-Japanese. Throughout the period under discussion, minor strikes, temporary shut-downs, and major economic down-turns led to lay-offs. The Japanese employee pool fluctuated between an apparent high of just over two hundred working the tracks and mill equipment for NCCC in 1917 to a low of fifteen workers in 1921.[40] Not all workers abandoned the towns during temporary lay-offs. By the 1930s some Japanese had lengthy service records with Nevada Consolidated; nevertheless, each year saw many personnel changes as well. The fifty Ruth Japanese sampled, for instance, only worked at the mine an average of seven months before terminating employment permanently.[41]

Though faces changed, a strong Japanese presence remained in the company towns. Each Japanese colony probably numbered between seventy and one hundred residents over the extended time frame, comprising a large minority blocks. By 1920 Ruth had about 1,300 total residents. After the population peaked, right before the Great Depression, the sum fluctuated between 1,000 and 2,000. McGill's growth rivaled Ely's for a time. The model company town boasted nearly 2,000 residents in 1910 and almost 3,000 by 1920, after which the population gradually declined. Using a conservative, average estimate of eighty Japanese living in either community at any given time, the Japanese would account for two to four percent of McGill's population during the twenties and thirties and upwards of six percent of Ruth's. That is many times greater than the state average and even rivals most counties in California, where the vast majority of Japanese Americans in the Continental United States lived. Although there was no shortage of immigrants in either town, the Japanese comprised the largest "non-white" minority until 1942.[42]

In sum, this demographic profile suggests a number of problem areas for the Ruth and McGill Japanese, which go beyond a "large" *Issei* presence at the outset of the war. In both towns a mostly male, mostly immigrant Japanese population arrived with strong ties to their mother country and few English-language skills. Constant turnover occurred in the workforce, yet company policy and sufficient population levels worked to sustain separated ethnic enclaves. Some sociologists and social historians have pointed to a "critical mass" as a chief cause of racial prejudice, and there was such a mass in both Ruth and McGill.[43] But even this expanded look at demographic influences leaves much unanswered. It will help to also address the economic "antagonism" Elliott flagged.

Economic Factors

Unquestionably, economic relationships played a key role in wartime events. Elliott suggests that a lower Japanese wage-scale led to grievances on the part of white workers; others, like Read, blatantly point to the Japanese internment as the "cure" for depressed wages in the district. Neither assessment seems accurate. Nonetheless, the labor sphere was wrought with problems and acrimony directed at the Japanese. A balanced appraisal of economic factors, however, should also look beyond interracial labor relations to passive, negative factors in the economy. The wartime disaster may have been fueled by animosity, but it was effected because of widespread indifference. The latter was tied in part to the boss system itself and to Japanese isolation from the larger economies of the towns.

Fred Toyota still is remembered by some McGillers as "what you would call, King of the Japs."[44] Despite the racial slur, the implications in that description are not far from the truth. As overseers of their respective communities, with the power to hire and fire at will, Toyota and Muranaka held far-reaching power over the lives of their "subjects" (much like the company's power over all employees). By the mid twenties, the bosses also controlled the bunkhouses, where most of the Japanese lived, the boarding houses, where they ate, and the club houses where they socialized.

However, if Fred Toyota was "king" of Japanese Town, the memoirs of Kame Toyota recount something far short of a regal life-style. After taking on the responsibility of running the boarding house, the Toyotas rose every morning between 3 and 4 o'clock to prepare meals for the McGill crew. At dawn Fred left the house on his long daily rounds. Fred Toyota had recurring stomach problems, probably work related, and never took a vacation after he came to McGill in 1912 because he felt his job demanded constant attention.

Kame's accounts add that much of what Fred Toyota earned he lost over the years through unclaimed loans to his workers.[45] His income came from a company salary, from boarding fees, and perhaps from some rent royalties from the company. He did not take a commission from his workers, as under the old boss system.[46] Better off than regular employees, the bosses earned their paychecks and commanded the affection and respect of most of their men.[47]

Although the system worked to the satisfaction of the Japanese and the company, it had some passive, negative consequences. Not the least of which, it relieved the company of fundamental responsibility for--and contact with--its Japanese workers. It is probably safe to assume that to management at Nevada Consolidated, the Japanese were nothing more than numbers in the payroll ledger books. That may sound trite today, but it was anathema to the philosophy and practices of welfare capitalism. In the small towns of McGill and Ruth, it was not uncommon for the top officials to know some workers by their first names.[48] But Japanese first names were considered too hard to pronounce and were changed to Frank, Joe, Bill, or the condescending "Charlie" by whites on the job site.[49] The only Japanese names that really meant anything to management were "Fred" and "Roy." When the bosses were arrested, the link between the Japanese and management was severed.

Japanese connections to the larger economy of the company towns were equally tenuous. Between 1912 and 1941 the Japanese were not proprietors of any thriving businesses in Ruth or McGill, nor were they faithful patrons. During the 1930s, a Japanese man named "Charley" Hosono operated a small farm outside McGill and sold a little produce locally. As noted, there was a Japanese-owned noodle house and a bath house at Copper Flat; there was a Japanese-operated club house, bath house, and barber shop in McGill's

Japanese town too.[50] Rarely, however, did any of these establishments see non-Japanese customers.

The Japanese rarely visited white-owned businesses of the towns either. Room and board arrangements precluded normal grocery shopping, while special amenities like liquor, housewares, ethnic foods, and Japanese reading materials were delivered to the community by rail, bus, or Japanese merchants and peddlers from Salt Lake City.[51] Deductions listed in the NCCC payroll ledgers show that the Japanese rarely had outstanding credit accounts at the saloons, mercantiles, dairy outlet, banks or other institutions that typically extended advanced credit to workers and their families. Many *Issei* laborers did frequent (generally on Saturday nights) the gambling halls, saloons, and red-light district of Ely known as "Bronc Alley" (sic). Yet, the positive effects of these types of interaction is questionable. [52]

A quick contrast might be drawn to the more economically diverse Japanese community of nearby Ely. That group had long been involved in the laundry trade, farming and stock-raising, restaurant operations, and in working at various wage-jobs that put them in daily contact with the general public. Ely-area businesses operating at the outbreak of the war included the Ishii family's truck garden, the Okis' pig farm, the Ely Home Laundry, the Yokohama Laundry and Cleaners, the Tokyo Dry Cleaners, Tom's Noodle Shop (the oldest establishment in town), and a Japanese barber and bath.[53] As in other Nevada towns, business activities like these fostered cross-ethnic ties and diminished interracial hostility before and during the war.

The relationship between Japanese and "white" workers played a central part in wartime events and it demands special attention. Newspapers indicate that the roots of animosity stretched back to the first influx of the Japanese. The *Ely Daily Mining Expositor* (which proudly bore a union label

in its masthead) supported efforts to keep White Pine County a "White Man's Camp" in 1907. It joined with an alliance of building trades unions and announced labor's desire to maintain "harmony," advising the best way to insure that was to employ only "white labor, meaning thereby an American citizen."[54]

The Japanese accounted for only a small part of the labor force in the county between 1907 and 1912. Apparently, no Japanese worked in the mining camps, where anti-foreign feeling was most intense. Mass hiring of Greeks and other Southern Europeans ignited the foreign-labor controversy. Nonetheless, the *Expositor* launched particularly cruel attacks against Japanese and "Hindoos," presenting the latter as "a poor class physically" and even "more treacherous, if possible," than the Japanese.[55] The campaign against Asian labor might help explain the reduction in the Japanese railroad work force by 1910, and the apparent company policy of stationing those left in less visible, remote outposts.

By the time the Japanese entered the company towns, however, labor's opposition to foreigners generally, and the Japanese specifically, had subsided. During earlier labor unrest in the district, Greeks and other immigrants (excluding the Japanese) had taken sides with the radical unions and were accepted into their ranks. Although the IWW and WFM quickly lost support and influence in the region after the 1912 strike, immigrant labor had made gains and carved out a niche.[56] Opposition to the Japanese may have been mitigated by the "Gentlemen's Agreement" of 1908 and subsequent measures that restricted the immigration of Japanese laborers.[57] The company used its considerable influence to stymie intense, anti-foreign-labor sentiment too.

Under comfortable surroundings and company controls, the copper camps were relatively free from labor agitation after 1912. A general acceptance of the immigrant's place in the labor force developed. "Foreigners" were delegated to performing the difficult and unpleasant "grunt-work" in the copper pits and around the mill, at wages respectable "white men" did not care to accept. An extensive labor history of the region by David M. Anderson shows that conservative AFL trade unions (which were not accepted as official bargaining agents but negotiated workers' demands with the company) helped maintain quiet labor-company relations.[58] As Elliott also noted, skilled workers came to occupy a prestigious place in the hierarchy of the company towns. But there was stratification among the immigrant laborers as well, with the Greeks at the top, the Slavs (or "Bohunks") in the middle, and the Japanese occupying "the lowest rung of the social ladder...."[59]

While Elliott's descriptions of the local pecking order are sound, his suggests that anti-Japanese sentiment "stemmed from their accepting lower wages and a longer working day than the white workers" is inaccurate or confused.[60] NCCC payroll ledger books illustrate the error. On average, the Japanese hired after 1912 were paid less than whites, but they received the same pay as any immigrant or white in the "laborer" job classification. At various times, the Japanese did work nine-hour days, instead of the standard eight, but they received just compensation for the extra work at an over-time rate of pay. Perhaps Elliott meant to suggest that some Japanese came to perform duties of a more skilled nature without demanding higher pay, which seems likely, or that there was antagonism over their accepting overtime while most others would not.[61]

Outright hostility probably had more to do with the Great Depression than with any ancient memories of actual wage disparities in the region. During the early 1930s, both the mine and the mill shut down for extended periods; when they produced, they rarely operated at full capacity.[62] These devastating downturns also affected the Japanese, but possibly not to the same extent as other workers. Only twenty-three Japanese appear on the McGill payroll in April 1934 for instance.[63] But at least these men were working, while most of the labor force was not, and other Japanese may have been able to "tough out" the hard times in Ruth and McGill with help from Muranaka and Toyota (i.e., through reduced boarding fees or loans).

In a round-about manner, it also worked to the advantage of the company to keep the Japanese active. The company extended credit to other employees for food and housing during slow-downs, thereby keeping workers on hand and, in a sense, hedging their losses because the debts could be reclaimed when work resumed.[64] However, since the Japanese were not participating in this system (their sustenance was provided by the bosses), the company was not amassing a credit bill on these workers. Yet the Japanese were occupying company housing and using services, so it was best to work them whenever possible. Furthermore, tracks had to be maintained regardless of output. This also helps explain why Japanese trackmen worked for periods of the depression (albeit at greatly reduced hours) while few others worked at all.

A distorted but still valuable sketch of the labor situation was provided by a Works Project Administration observer who visited the area in 1936. He reported 150 Japanese living in Ruth, adding: "their paychecks are all made out to one man, who settles bills they run at the company store and acts as banker for the group." More to the point, he noted strong opposition to the

Japanese, "native miners insisting that they help to lower the wage scale."[65] Other data suggests that the WPA man was wrong on all counts.[66] Clearly he received a one-sided view of the situation. But whether or not his report was correct or complete, the animosity he detected was real and intense.

The same can be said about the Japanese labor situation as a whole. Perceptions about the Japanese and their effect on the wage scale were distorted: intensive, eventually successful efforts to unionize NCCC's "contented workers" cured disparities in pay between White Pine and other regions in 1943--well after Japanese removal.[67] Still, the Japanese were commonly blamed for labor's failure to effect its desired wage increases.

Each of the economic anomalies discussed (and the psychology attached to them) merit more intensive research and analysis. However, to fully survey the negative preconditions that influenced wartime events we must move ahead.

Cultural and Racial Factors

Alone, demographics and economics offer less than satisfactory explanations for the widespread hostility that would surface during World War II. A look at the cultural make-up of the Japanese enclaves and the company towns can bring us closer to melding those influences into a broader assessment of why White Pine County reacted as it did. Borrowing from Robert Park, culture is loosely defined here as, "the sort of order existing in a society which has a cult or religion. It preserves the morale and enables the group to act collectively." This order, embodied in institutions, "enables us in our society to act with unanimity in times of danger...[and] face the physical 'evil forces.'"[68] Armed, admittedly, with an incomplete picture of the entire "order" existing in the company towns and the Japanese enclaves, this segment looks

at some of the cultural institutions that were actively at work on relationships and experiences in White Pine County.

Looking back on the twenties and thirties, many residents and writers point to White Pine High School in Ely as one of the county's premier institutions. To most people, the high school was the embodiment of all the county held sacred--knowledge, virtue, cleanliness, Godliness, sports-prowess, and patriotism.[69] To the immigrants of the county, the classrooms, school yards, and playing fields were great equalizers--places were barriers came down for children and partly for their parents. To the latter, schools symbolized hope for their children's future in America, but parents also earned direct benefits through helping their elementary-school aged children with English studies. Finally, to the off-spring of the Japanese, Greeks, Italians, Slavs, Mexicans, Norwegians, and "native stock," school was a place where the racial prejudices carried by parents got in the way of fun and were pushed aside.[70]

Almost totally denied the positive effects this institution had on race relations were the Japanese colonies of Ruth and McGill. With the exception of the Toyota children, those two areas apparently produced only one White Pine High graduate, George Yasumatsu.[71] In contrast, the smaller Japanese community of Ely sent no fewer than twelve children to high school between 1934 and 1943, and most were very active in sports and other extra-curricular activities.[72] If the company towns did not have the *Nisei* population base to help immigrants learn English and familiarize them with American ways, neither was Nevada Consolidated sufficiently progressive, or advanced in the ways of Welfarism, to sponsor language or "Americanization" courses for immigrants.[73]

The exceptions, the Toyota children, were exceptional indeed. Ironically in retrospect, Taro ("Fred Jr.") was elected Student Body President by his classmates at WPHS in 1938. Fred won supporters from being a star athlete and top student. He was also a member of the Bobcats Association and the Service Club, groups which helped keep order, maintain school spirit, and assist with various odd jobs around the school grounds. His sisters, Yoshiko, Toshiko, Shizuko, and Kimiko (born between 1918 and 1925), were very intelligent and popular and were active in school bands, the Glee Club, the newspaper, and the creative writing club. Toshiko graduated toward the top of her class and went on to become one of the first woman-*Nisei* physicians.[74] But the Toyota children were distanced from others in a negative sense too. When the final bell rang, the Ely *Nisei* returned to their ethnically mixed neighborhoods, while the Toyotas went home to the isolated Japanese colony of McGill.

As the *Nisei* grew into young adults, they carried their bonds of friendship with them. Inevitably the older generations on both sides of the racial divide were influenced by those bonds. White Pine resident Elsa Culbert remembers that when her husband would see Sam Hase, Fred Toyota, George Miyama, or their Euro-American friends hanging around the corner by the Ely drug-store where he worked, he would send them down to the house to "keep them out of mischief." Elsa gave the teens milk and cookies and she remembers the prized set of miniature boxing gloves Fred Jr. gave to her son after he was born. She did not associate with their parents. But she remembers "Soap Suds" (Takichi Nakashima, as he was universally known around town), Mrs. Hide Nakashima (who was "sharp" at betting horse races), and the other "beautiful families" of the Ely Japanese community.[75]

As important as they were, the schools were not the social centers of the adult population. Along with saloons, churches may have been. From what was gathered, Mormonism and Catholicism were the dominant faiths in the region, with a smattering of smaller Protestant congregations about. Buddhism was the faith of choice among virtually all of the *Issei* in the area, yet they had no temple or organized services. At times, a traveling Buddhist priest would come into the area to perform services and say prayers for the dead in the Japanese section of the Ely Cemetery.[76]

The *Nisei* of Ely (and perhaps McGill) were welcome at the Methodist Church; some attended Sunday school there but interest in church activities varied.[77] If, over the course of years, there was any efforts to "bring the Word," to the Japanese living in Ruth and McGill, evidence of that was not found. Nor, however, was there any glaring signs of hostility toward the Japanese under the guise of Christianity, aside from some Ku Klux Klan cross-burnings that took place in Ruth, McGill, and Ely during the early 1920s.[78] It cannot be ignored as a source of fundamental division between the larger society and the Japanese, but it does not seem that religion, or religious institutions, greatly contributed to hostile feelings.

Political ideology was another matter. Although political activity was kept to a minimum in the company towns, the company seemingly fostered a strong sense of Yankee patriotism in the region.[79] As Japan emerged as a military power, and as it grew to be a competing, expanding force in the Pacific, patriotic Americans became increasingly concerned. Japanese national pride was likewise very strong among many *Issei*, particularly those whose family ties were in Japan. The Sino-Japanese War caused escalated emotions on both sides.

We can now only speculate about the national leanings of the *Issei* in the company towns--or how they may have changed over time. There are, however, some indications of mixed sympathies leading right up to the war. On the one hand, some Japanese in McGill had pursued a practice of buying scrap aluminum foil from the youngsters of the town (who stripped it from cigarette packages found around the McGill Club and Victory Club). They sent this "*gin kami*" (silver paper) to Japan for its war effort. Some of these aluminum balls would be found when the FBI ransacked the living quarters of the Japanese.[80]

On the other hand, if some of the Ruth and McGill *Issei* remained sympathetic to Japan, others apparently developed strong loyalty to this country. Mr. and Mrs. Toyota were fiercely committed to America and went through a complicated process to have the Japanese portion of their children's duel citizenship status removed. According to Kame Toyota, the entire camp agreed to support America when war with the United States broke out. Ruth *Issei* Yoshehiro Mitsuhata also registered his American loyalty rather defiantly by purchasing, through a friend, $1050 worth of U.S. Defense Bonds just before he was forcibly removed from Ruth.[81]

A final background cause relevant to wartime events needs to be examined; that is, Japanese relations with White Pine's law enforcement institution, a mix of county and company policemen.[82] It seems the Japanese had long been isolated from the standard legal system of the county. Back in the early twenties, the Japanese communities of this region had, according to one source, their own system for handling trouble-makers. Disguised as a traveling gold peddler, a man known as the "*Sin dai*" would visit the Japanese settlements of the area to meet with community leaders and ask if there were any persons who were causing problems and needed to be "taken care of."[83]

There is no solid evidence that his services were ever employed locally, but it seems the *Sin dai* was more than a legendary figure. He represented a system of community policing from within and not through the authorities or procedures of the host society.

At times, however, the Japanese and the law met. In a situation that was very atypical of Japanese settlements, including those in Ely and McGill, violent incidents were fairly common at Copper Flat.[84] These contentious outbreaks, which only involved *Issei* in conflict with other Japanese, may have been symptomatic of larger social problems like an absence of families. And, when Roy Muranaka moved away to take up residence in Ely,[85] "lawlessness" may have increased. One thing is certain: crimes occurred and county law enforcement remained a distant entity to the Japanese. An attempted triple-murder and suicide case that occurred at Copper Flat in 1940 bears this out.

The basic facts of the case were relatively easy to determine. On an August night, Mr. S. Mochizuki drove up to the noodle house at Copper Flat and exited his vehicle. Spotting one of his victims, he fired two shots from his newly-purchased .45 caliber Colt Automatic at Mrs. Ito, one of three proprietors of the establishment. One bullet passed through Ito's upper torso, but she was able to flee to her residence across the road from the restaurant. Mochizuki then entered the noodle house and (paying little mind to a customer/witness) proceeded to empty the revolver into Mr. Y. Uraki, a cook, and Mrs. H. Shiki, mother of the first female victim and also a partner in the business with Mr. and Mrs. Ito. Apparently satisfied, Mochizuki left the noodle house, walked to his own living quarters a short distance away, placed another shell in the chamber of his .45, and unloaded it into his right temple.[86]

During his inquest, the county coroner pummeled the witness with questions through interpreter Roy Muranaka--searching for the missing motive:

Q. Did they quarrel?

A. (Witness G. Shigimi) No, sir, no quarrel whatever.

Q. No talk?

A. No talk whatever...no trouble...no arguments....

Q. [Reaching] Did he kick about the grub?

A. No, sir.

Shigimi said that Mochizuki had been accused of insanity a long time prior to then in Utah, but he and other witnesses testified that Mochizuki was not a heavy drinker and had not acted irrationally during his twenty-month residency at Copper Flat. The surviving victim's husband, Mr. Ito, offered that perhaps the perpetrator "was sore at everybody because he lost his job and everything." Mochizuki had been laid off three months previously, but he was receiving unemployment benefits.[87]

Thanks to Ely resident Nobuo Nakashima, we may know more about the murders and the motives than the coroner and the police knew. Nobuo says Mochizuki visited his father on the afternoon of that fateful day. "Nakashima-san," he said, "I come to say good-by." No, he was not planning to leave the area. "I'm going to go kill these three guys that own the noodle shop in Ruth." He added that they were getting Japanese workers drunk, cheating them at cards, and stealing their money. "I can't stand it any more." Nakashima advised against the plan and told Mochizuki to relax and stay for dinner, which he did. Afterwards, he politely excused himself and left.[88]

As any amateur detective knows, there must always be a motive, and it seems we have identified it. More important to this study, however, we have uncovered a continuing chasm between the Japanese and the legal system of White Pine County. No one--not the witness Shigimi, Muranaka, Nakashima, or any number of Japanese residents who probably knew about the gambling operation--came forward with information. Even in the Japanese community of Ely, which had come far since the early days of the *Sin dai*, it seems the Japanese still distrusted white justice. Perhaps their suspicion was justified. The county sheriff, Jean E. Orrock, was considered something of a "red-neck" and would prove himself unfriendly to the Japanese during the war. Indications are that the deputy sheriff at Ruth, W.C. Cibbell, was not a friend to the Japanese at Copper Flat either, and he was as ill informed about activities there as was the rest of the law-enforcement community.[89]

In contrast, alienation from law enforcement in McGill apparently had more to do with stronger internal controls. Fred Toyota would not let his men gamble in McGill after 1930, and whatever "vice" they sought had to be found in Ely. But the boss and the company provided other recreation opportunities in McGill, including a Japanese club house, where Japanese films were shown, and an indoor swimming pool enjoyed year around by all residents.[90] Kame Toyota could proudly report in her letters to the DOJ that there was not one murder case in Japanese Town's thirty-year history. Nevertheless, contact with legal authorities was minimal there too. If the combined Japanese communities had any friends among the "cops" of the county when the war started, a little over a year after the murder-suicide, they would not surface.

This estrangement from the legal institutions of White Pine County would have direct, negative consequences during the war. But that relationship was just one symptom of a larger problem in the company

towns--the fundamental divisions between the Japanese enclaves and the people and institutions of the larger community. The preceding descriptions offer insights on how this pervasive isolation developed. More difficult to illustrate is the racial prejudice that contributed to--and grew from--these divisions. Relying again on Park, he offered that: "All our so-called racial problems grow out of a situation in which assimilation and amalgamation do not take place at all, or take place very slowly."[91] The Japanese of Ruth and McGill were, by no means, completely cut off from the larger community or constantly subjected to harsh treatment.[92] But over the thirty-year history of the Japanese in the company towns, assimilation and amalgamation had proceeded at a snail's pace, and, by the outbreak of the war, the stage was set for disaster.

WARTIME EVENTS AND CAUSES RE-EXAMINED

It would be a mistake to view wartime events in White Pine County as the natural or predictable outcome of the social history already discussed. To do so would be to suggest that the mutual declaration of war between the United States and Japan did not introduce dramatic new circumstances. It did. It also introduced outside actors, namely FBI agents under the immediate supervision of Special Agent Jay C. Newman, in charge of the Salt Lake City Field Office. The role the FBI played in all this is not yet fully understood, but it was ultimately critical.[93]

Even more damaging, however, were the attitudes and actions of influential White Pine residents and the institutions they represented. In all likelihood, their response shaped federal actions. These entities should be held accountable (historically speaking) for their conduct--they were not "slaves" to the past. Nevertheless, what transpired in White Pine County during the

war probably is best understood as an outgrowth of traditions and local circumstance. Regrettably, White pine's response to the wartime crisis was characterized by continuity and consensus.

By all accounts, anti-Japanese hysteria engulfed the county immediately with news of the attack on Pearl Harbor. Author Jack Fleming sums up local reactions by saying it was "as if Toyota and... Muranaka had personally dropped the bombs that brought America into the war."[94] Fleming's version of the White Pine "saga" is embellished with journalistic flair. But his facts (which center around experiences of the Toyota family) seem mostly sound, as does his assessment of community mood.[95] He was right, also, in identifying Muranaka and Toyota as the first victims.

Muranaka was arrested on December 7; Toyota was taken into custody the following day. Several hundred other "alien enemies" (nationals of the Axis countries) were picked up across the country and in Hawaii during the early hours of the war. These Japanese, German, and Italian aliens, many arrested under blanket warrants, commonly had ties to the government or military of their home countries, belonged to organizations that supported the Axis powers, or were recognized as leaders within their ethnic communities.[96] On the last criteria, Toyota and Muranaka certainly fit the description, and by all reports the FBI landed this first blow. However, Toyota's arrest in particular calls into question the idea that these two leaders were on a predetermined list of suspect persons.

According to Kame Toyota (who kept careful records), her husband was taken into custody only after he had made two visits to Muranaka at the Ely jail on December 8. During the second visit, when the Toyota family had brought Muranaka a Japanese dinner, FBI agents asked Fred to sign an authorization for a property search and accompanied the family back to McGill. The

investigators collected several things from the home and office and "said it would be best if Fred went [back with them] to Ely that night."[97] Whatever these gumshoes confiscated could not have been very incriminating because Mrs. Toyota pointed out that *everything* taken that night soon was returned--except her husband.

Beyond Kame's view, the county was grappling with a much larger "Japanese problem" during those early hours. When Ruth's Japanese employees showed up at the mine that Monday, some of their co-workers "damned near shot them," according to one report.[98] Hundreds of Ruth mine workers signed a petition in an open meeting that day, which demanded that all Japanese employees be dismissed from their jobs and confined under armed guard.[99] Representatives of this labor block would show up at an emergency meeting of the county defense council that night with a copy of its demands.

Attention focused on Ruth and defense enthusiasm ran high at the Monday-night meeting. Seventy persons were in attendance, none from the FBI. However, writing to his boss in Carson City the following day, State Defense Council Member James A. Johnson could report that local authorities were able to "straighten out the defense situation at Ruth without sticking [their] necks out too far."

A "lot of Japs," Johnson explained, were:

> "working on the track at Ruth in the pit, and as switch tenders." The boys up there had a mass meeting last night [sic] and were just about to shut her down if the Japs stayed on the job. It created a rather difficult situation. They sent down a committee [to our meeting requesting us to] do something about it. We took the matter up with the Governor by long distance and he referred us to Mr. Newman, chief of the Bureau of Investigation at Salt Lake City. Mr. Newman advised us that the Federal Bureau had advised the Utah Copper Company to take the Japs off the job temporarily until they got things settled. Mr. Gray, the attorney here for the Nevada Consolidated Copper Company, called up Mr. Larsh, the general manager at Ruth, and he agreed to take the Japs off the job starting this morning [; he would] keep them on the pay roll at least for the time being. When Mr. Gray reported this news

> to the council and the committee [from Ruth,] every body [sic] was satisfied.[100]

Reminding State Director Huge Shamberger of Johnson's little suggestion at their previous meeting--about "dropping a friendly bomb around here" to "get the public aroused to the situation"--Johnson said that notion could be disregarded. Suddenly White Pine County was sufficiently aroused.[101]

Like Elliott in later years, Johnson fingered Ruth workmen as the motivating force behind this first step toward mass internment. But his letter and actual minutes of the council meeting demonstrate consensus on "internment" as the best solution. The minutes even raise the possibility that more influential people led the assault. Chronologically by that account, "discussion concerning internment of Japanese workers," and the calls placed by A. E. Briggs, Judge H.M. Watson, Attorney Howard Gray, and Sheriff Orrock--"to determine what steps [could] be taken to intern Japs and impound arms"--all occurred *before* labor delegates Dave Willis and J.H. McDaniel of Ruth had the chance to read their resolution and state their demands. Gray reported back to the general council that "attempts will be made to hold the Japanese together until further notice." The "FBI did not want wholesale discharge or dismissal [because it] didn't want the Japs to spread." Gray added that NCCC "had had the measure under consideration for some time."[102]

"Demands" on the part of Ruth mine workers and "suggestions" from the FBI no doubt influenced these and subsequent actions. But at this early stage, and increasingly, NCCC officials like Gray, Larsh, and McGill General Manager Jack C. Kinnear, Sr. became key figures in deciding how local matters would be handled. The company removed the McGill Japanese from their jobs on Wednesday of that week too--and not, it seems, in response to any demands made by labor or the FBI.

Thirty-two Japanese Americans were on the McGill payroll at the time. Six *Issei* were working over-time for the U.S. war industries build up on Sunday, December 7. One had been among the original contingent of Japanese workers who arrived in 1912, and five of the six had worked for NCCC since 1934 or before. They finished out the shift, and the following day almost all Japanese employees reported for duty as usual. Even if news of Ruth actions were slow to reach McGill, simply reporting to work that week demonstrated courage--but it also indicates that popular hysteria was less pronounced in McGill. By Thursday of that week, however, the company ordered a general Japanese layoff.[103]

NCCC appointed John Merrill to keep watch over McGill's Japanese Town. According to Kame Toyota, Merrill quickly grew suspicious and hostile. Soon after the lay off, Japanese workers--aliens and American citizens alike--were herded into a large warehouse with a dirt floor and were kept thereafter under a twenty-four hour guard. Not the initial source of concern, the McGill *Issei* apparently felt the brunt of the early crackdown and would become the first removed from the area.[104]

Meanwhile, the company gathered up Japanese American workers who had been dismissed from the Nevada Northern Railroad and brought them to Ruth and McGill. These fifteen men and their family members brought the total population of the Japanese camps to well over 100 when the FBI finally arrived in force on 15 December. The company had officially discharged virtually all *Issei* workers the previous day.[105]

The interplay between corporate officials, the local defense council, and the FBI during this period is difficult to unravel. Helpful, however, are correspondences from officials the Nevada Northern Railroad, written in response to the parent company's directives. One letter, dated 11 December,

states that "Mr. W. Howard Gray and representative F.B.I. gave [the] following instructions:" 1) remove all Japanese, German and Italian aliens employed by the NNRR; 2) check all personnel records for birth origin; 3) contact those born in Axis countries and ask whether they had been naturalized and give lists to Mr. Gray; 4) remove said workers immediately and advise them to "remain at home until the situation is clarified;" and, 5) get word to these men "today sure."[106] A letter to Jackling the following day reiterated that the railroad was acting "on advice from the Federal Bureau of Investigation and our Local Counsel [sic]." But federal advisors on the scene are described consistently as FBI "representatives," not agents, officers, or officials, and all this advice to the Nevada Northern ultimately came through NCCC. It seems that management exclusively made the decision to bring the Nevada Northern Japanese to Ruth and McGill until "the Federal Government decides what they are going to do with them."[107]

That strong racial bias influenced management's actions seems pretty clear, and further indicative is the way Italian alien employees were handled by the company. Six Italian nationals, who had been removed from railroad jobs along with the Japanese, were allowed to return to work on 20 December. This came after a call from Gray, who had been talking with another FBI "representative" named "Olsen." These Italians had an advantage over the Japanese because they had applied for their first papers for naturalization. However, these men, "who [had] been here many years in [the railroad's] service" (just like the Japanese) also enjoyed a certain unfair advantage during the company's informal "loyalty hearings." Olsen (and Gray) felt:

> that if we made inquiries among the men [the Italians] had worked with and found that such Italian aliens had made no statements in support of the Axis nations or against the United States, it would be wise to put them back to work.

This would not apply to Japanese.[108]

The McGill *Nisei* also had their jobs and some freedoms restored to them in late December. But not before "proving their loyalty" through what some have interpreted as "working for the FBI." When agents arrived on the 15th, Fred Toyota, Jr., Heed Iwamoto and other *Nisei* assisted officers in interrogating the *Issei* and thoroughly searching Japanese residences. "Contraband" collected or turned over to local law enforcement amounted to very little.[109] Certainly it fell well short of that recounted in local legend, which has it that deluxe maps, a radio transmitter, and other tools of a fifth-columnist were found in the Toyota home.[110] The weightiest "pro-Japanese" pieces of evidence uncovered were those balls of aluminum noted above.

Lighter still, but perhaps more incriminating, were the receipts for *Heimushakai* donations that were found in most of the Japanese quarters in McGill. Kame Toyota speculated that these receipts for donations to what she describes as the "Japanese Red Cross" were important. She addresses them under a separate heading in her first official appeal for a rehearing for "Fred S. Toyota and the McGill boys" in mid January 1943. She explains that there was almost 100 percent participation in the *Heimushakai* drive in White Pine County--except in McGill because Fred "did not like this name." Kame had been informed that the FBI arrested people in possession of these papers, and she speculates that the Japanese of Ruth and Ely burned their receipts when they saw what was happening in the model company town. As evidence that the McGill men thought they had nothing to hide, she offers that they too could have destroyed their receipts when they were tidying their quarters and doing routine trash burning on the day they were laid off.[111]

By late December, the McGill detainees were at last in the hands of federal investigators. After a brief stay in the county jail in Ely, twenty-six McGill Japanese were shipped to Salt Lake City on 22 December. Suichi Baba, a 53-year-old former resident of McGill with family in Japan, became the region's first suicide victim the following day. Baba tied a piece of shirt around his neck and smothered himself with a pillow in the Salt Lake County Jail. Forty more Japanese aliens were brought from Ruth to Ely by a "specially chartered bus" on the night of 30 December. Every bed in that over-taxed facility was put to use until these prisoners also were moved to Salt Lake a couple days later. Soon thereafter, the McGill and Ruth men were dispatched to internment camps in Bismarck, North Dakota and Missoula, Montana.[112]

About a month later, White Pine detainees finally had their cases heard by members of Nevada's Alien Enemy Hearing Board. According to Herbert Nicholson, who acted as translator at fifty-two hearings, the proceedings were held quickly because the board members "were all busy men and wanted to get home."[113] Few of the Nevada internees would ever see their "old Nevada home" again.

Even after mass internment, the "Japanese problem" in the company towns was by no means "solved." NCCC still employed special watchmen to keep an eye on scores of Japanese Americans remaining in Ruth and McGill. No longer under FBI scrutiny, and never a concern of military authorities, the residual group remained a source of concern locally. Sheriff Orrock, aided by his legal extensions in Ruth and McGill, imposed sweeping travel restrictions and curfews on the Japanese.[114]

From early on, the Ruth and McGill populations were viewed as an economic liability as well. Kame reports that most Japanese were at first hopeful that the McGill and Ruth detainees would be released when their cases

were heard. When that did not happen, some within Japanese Town (mainly Nevada Northern people) began to complain and speak of demanding unemployment compensation.[115] This (or other economic considerations) may have provoked the company into moving the Nevada Northern group to Copper Flat. A NCCC memorandum found in the files of then Nevada Governor E.P. Carville, which the Governor had marked "Save Subversive Activities," lists forty-one "Japs" housed in Ruth on 10 February 1942.[116] Containing a breakdown of expenses for "rent," coal and electricity, and salaries for "special watchmen," this document appears to be a request for compensation from the state.

Whether any form of state relief came remains a mystery and so does the subsequent fate of the Ruth group. At least one family "evacuated" the hostile mining town in late February, when detainee Jim Yeitaro Kawaguchi became one of the more fortunate aliens who survived the internment hearings.[117] But even *Nisei* names soon faded from Ruth payroll ledger books, and most of the residents probably departed for friendlier territory in Utah during this period.

In May, however, a final forced "evacuation" from Ruth apparently came, and this time the FBI was conspicuously absent in vague reports of the "removal." This final blow may have been too much for Nevada Northern employee Yaichiro Homma. The sixty-six year old man, employed by the railroad since 1918 and a foreman on the line since 1924, hanged himself on the day before he was scheduled to be removed from Ruth. Isakuk Kiyonoga, a former Ruth employee, hanged himself in a sheep wagon near Brigham City, Utah about a month later. In light of the similarity between the three NCCC suicides, one from each group, it can evoke an eerie sensation to come across

specific requests for *rope* in several letters written to Kame Toyota by McGill internees.[118]

These latter suicides may have touched a nerve locally, but the persecution of Japanese residents evoked mostly positive responses from the people of White Pine County up to mid 1942. The local newspaper, not particularly racist before the war, seemed to advocate all "control" measures being taken against the "Japs" locally and regionally. A United Press affiliate, the *Ely Daily Times* shared the news of the Toyota and Muranaka arrests with major California papers and applauded when the government got tough with Japanese Americans on the West Coast in 1942. There are reports that WPHS classmates of Kimiko Toyota taunted her with headlines from a San Francisco newspaper, which announced her father's arrest. The FBI, sometimes accompanied by Sheriff Orrock, frequently searched Japanese homes in Ely, and at least two businesses had to close down. Evacuees from California, who passed through Ely that spring, were treated with even greater suspicion and discourtesy.[119]

But currents of hatred and indifference in Ely were mixed with sympathy, respect, and support. At first very frightened over the news of war, the *Nisei* of Ely report that attitudes there quickly improved. Other ethnic groups were particularly sympathetic. As elsewhere in Nevada, Japanese residents were able to bridge these difficult times through help from friends and through redoubling their contributions to the community. There is, perhaps, no better example of this than Ben Yokomizo. A star shortstop on Ely's American Legion junior baseball team, this Ely *Nisei* maintained an amazing *.600* batting average. When Yokomizo was not permitted to travel to the regional championships in California in the summer of 1942, the Ely newspaper and other influential people suddenly questioned exclusion policy

and blamed unjust restrictions against this "good American" for the team's resounding defeat.[120]

In contrast, only three defenders of the Japanese are known to have emerged in the company towns. One was an outsider, an organizer for the Mine Mill and Smeltermens Union, George Haskell. Before mass removal began, Haskell challenged the company on the Japanese crack-down. But his appeals to managers and workers apparently fell on deaf or hostile ears. Haskell even was rebuffed by his own union superiors for not being "sufficiently tactful in approaching the subject." Even though the cause was just, Allan McNeil (assistant to the Mine-Mill president) thought the organizer needed first to build up in White Pine "an educational program which will teach our members the meaning of international solidarity on a union basis."[121]

By the time Mine-Mill President Reid Robinson took an interest in the plight of Japanese workers, Haskell had to report back that the Japanese were already gone and the issue had been settled. General Manager Kinnear had personally informed him that "in the future there will not be any Japanese workers employed at either McGill or Ruth...."[122] Management and labor remained in agreement on this point even after unionization. In a move out of character for this interracial union, the nascent Mine-Mill local of McGill (no doubt reflecting sentiments in Ruth too) reiterated its opposition to allowing any form of Japanese labor back into the area in 1943.[123]

The two other known supporters were Tom Kopas and Louis Cononelos, Greek immigrants who ran successful businesses in McGill. Kopas and Cononelos submitted affidavits of support for Fred Toyota when Kame finally won a rehearing for her husband in December 1943. They stated that no one could figure out why Fred was interned; he had been "highly respected by all

the people of McGill," a "good local citizen," and a patriotic American. Kopas wondered, in his affidavit, what happened to the prior letter he had written on Fred's behalf. Kame Toyota may have known the answer. In her letters to company officials she mentioned repeatedly that the company would not write (or permit) support affidavits for Japanese employees.[124] It is open to question how much support these men could have mustered, but this probable suppression of evidence, perhaps more than anything else, sealed the fate of the internees.[125]

A steady flow of pleading letters from Kame Toyota and her college-age children (along with the Kopas and Cononelos affidavits) eventually paid off. Fred Toyota was paroled in January 1944. The rest of the White Pine internees were not so fortunate: most spent the remainder of the war interned and many returned to Japan with broken spirits after the war ended. Fred's release was a bitter-sweet occasion for Kame Toyota and precipitated the last Japanese exodus from the company towns. Mrs. Toyota was informed, through the county sheriff, that it "would be best" if Fred did not return to McGill, even for a visit. Expressing an atypical resignation, Kame Toyota wrote to Nevada's U.S. Attorney that her family would move quietly to Salt Lake City. "There is a lot I would like to tell you," she teased,

> "but since I am Japanese, I shall not tell you or make any trouble[;] I am very thankful I am living in this great country--America.
> At his special rehearing, Fred was praised very much by the board. Because he is being released and the children are doing well, I am very thankful.
> I am sorry I have troubled you so often....[126]

There is, indeed, much more to tell about the wartime and post-war experiences of this group, but that is beyond the limits and scope of this article.

Conclusion:

What *caused* the internment and forced exodus of the Japanese from the company towns of Ruth and McGill during World War II? An exhaustive search of public records and private recollections has failed to produce a simple explanation or positively identify the chief "culprits." The body of evidence examined, however, suggest that the impetus for both actions came from the local level. The tragedy was rooted in thirty years of near-stagnant race relations, while representatives of the company, county law enforcement, and semi-organized labor directed much of the drama. FBI "representatives" also had a hand in the internment, and there are few more deserving of a federal apology and redress compensation than the internees and "evacuees" of White Pine County. Nevertheless, local circumstances and local players mainly dictated the course of events.

To find some explanation for what happened in the company towns, one must dig deep. The task requires looking beyond outward signs of "hysteria" caused by a "large" presence of Japanese nationals and below the surface of visible labor hostility and segregated housing. The influences of a *small Nisei* presence, of unrelated and unattended labor grievances, and of pervasive physical and cultural isolation in the company towns must be exposed. More than a shift in perspective, this kind of analysis provides a truer picture of the negative preconditions that influenced wartime events.

Exposing the immediate causes of the internment and the "evacuation" proves more challenging. A detached perspective reveals, however, that animosity on the part of white, Ruth workers was only part of the problem. NCCC managers, faced with labor unrest while millions of dollars in increased profits stood on the bunkered horizons, played a much larger role in overall events. The source of strife was a dependable but foreign group, composed

mainly of men reaching retirement age, so there was no incentive for NCCC to defend its Japanese workers. There *was* economic incentive for dismissing them and ridding the towns of the residual Japanese populations rather than accept any long-term commitment to their care and custody. The local sheriff and other members of the White Pine Council of Defense must be counted along with the company as architects and manipulators of events.

At the heart of this disaster stood a long tradition of anti-Japanese prejudice mixed with indifference and these sentiments still linger in McGill. During the course of this research, the author asked around in McGill about attitudes toward the Japanese, then and now. Those he talked to thought it was a shame about the "Japs" being taken away by the FBI, and they did not recall any real animosity in the community before the war. But the bartender of the McGill Club, a near life-long resident, gave a slightly more candid answer when pressed about local feelings. Asked how folks in McGill feel about the Japanese today, he responded: "Well, I don't think this town...gives a hoot--but I do, 'cus I was in the China-Burma-India Theater and I hate them God-damned, slant-eyed...."

Just then the telephone rang, and, while the country juke box played on, the interviewer re-shaped his question. Afterwards, he asked: "What about Japanese *Americans*?"

"Japanese Americans? Well, they're alright, but I still got that forefather in me, you know? I seen too much dirty work that they done over there in the China-Burma and Indian Theater."[127]

If this man's feelings about the Japanese were shaped in part by his wartime service, they also were molded by influences closer to home. Even today in McGill there seems to be great difficulty in recognizing any distinction between "Japs" and Japanese Americans. There is a fundamental

link between this traditional local view and the wartime tragedy. Explanations for the source of the confusion can only be found by looking back at the unique and peculiar social factors that shaped race relations in McGill and Ruth before the war.

NOTES

[1] Relocation studies expert Roger Daniels is cautious about evoking erroneous images, yet he argues consistently that they were, in fact, concentration camps. However, he notes that internment "is not really the appropriate term" to describe typical experiences in *Prisoners Without Trial: Japanese Americans in World War II* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1993), 27.

[2] A rare case study, which lends itself to comparison, is John J. Culley, "World War II and a Western Town: The Internment of the Japanese Railroad Workers of Clovis, New Mexico," *Western Historical Quarterly* 13 (January 1982): 43-61. However, in that case local hostility surfaced gradually and was more closely tied to larger, wartime events. For more about the internment camps see Paul F. Clark, "Those Other Camps: An Oral History Analysis of Japanese Alien Enemy Internment During World War II" (Master's Thesis, California State University, Fullerton, 1980), parts of which were incorporated into Arthur A. Hansen, ed., *Japanese American World War II Evacuation Oral History Project Vols. I -II* (Westport, CT: Meckler Publishing, 1991). Michi Weglyn, *Years of Infamy: The Untold Story of America's Concentration Camps* (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1976), also contains information about Japanese internment, but Clark suggests Weglyn's book is "flawed by its overriding emphasis on the relocation centers...."

[3] Two popular sources, Effie O. Read, *White Pine Lang Syne: A True History of White Pine County, Nevada* (Denver: Big Mountain Press, 1965), and, White Pine Public Museum, *Saving Our Heritage: Ethnic Cultures of White Pine County, Nevada* (White Pine Public Museum, 1987), each describe the wartime experiences of the Japanese in one sentence. Several White Pine County residents relayed to me their understanding that "strategic" considerations caused the demise of the Japanese.

[4] Russell Elliott, *History of Nevada* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1973), 311.

[5] Many fantastic legends have grown out of these events, but the cruelest is one claiming that Shizutaro Toyota's son, Taro (Fred Jr.), turned his father in as a spy. Elliott seemingly accepted the myth, writing: "Fred Toyota, Jr. [was]

forced to choose between loyalty to his father and his nation, maintaining loyalty to the latter." He adds that the young man worked for the FBI, served in the armed forces, and only visited McGill occasionally during the war--see Russell Elliott, *Growing Up In a Company Town: A Family in the Copper Camp of McGill* (Reno: Nevada Historical Society, 1990). Actually, Fred, Jr., continued working for Nevada Consolidated and remained in McGill with his mother and one sister, until the family secured the release of his father in 1944 and they all moved to Salt Lake City, Utah, as more accurately explained in Jack Fleming, *Copper Times: An Animated Chronicle of White Pine County, Nevada* (Seattle: Jack Fleming's Publications, 1987), 136-138. The spy-buster myth was vehemently denied and damned by every Japanese-American source cited below. Elliott's earliest account of the internment can be found in Russell Elliott, "History of Nevada Mines Division, Kennecott Copper Corporation," TMs (written under a commission from NCCC around 1956) [Copy] Nevada Historical Society, Reno, Nevada. Calling the internment an "unfortunate meeting of people and events," this account renders all blameless. Still, therein Elliott more rightly observed that Fred "offered his services" to the U. S. Army and the FBI (as explained below). Taro, however, was never selected into the ranks of either.

[6] My prior studies of Japanese Nevadans and World War II, published as "A Fortunate Few: Japanese Americans in Southern Nevada, 1905 to 1945," *Nevada Historical Society Quarterly* 31 (Spring 1988): 32-52, and "Hearts of Gold and Hostile Times: Wartime Reactions to the 'Japanese Question' in Churchill County Nevada," *In Focus: Annual Journal of the Churchill County Museum Association* 7 (1993-1994): 57-86, have uncovered only one Nevada internee outside White Pine County.

[7] I am indebted to scholar Louis Fiset for reviewing another draft of this article and suggesting that I clarify and improve my terminology.

[8] Letter from Kame Toyota to unidentified official (probably U.S. Attorney for Nevada Thomas O. Craven), 26 January 1944, The Toyota Family Papers, Box 145, Folder 8, *Japanese American Research Project, Collection 2010* , Department of Special Collections, University Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles (cited hereafter as "Toyota Papers," followed by box and file numbers). This collection contains several lengthy letters from Kame wherein she seeks new hearings for her husband and "the McGill boys." Kame's testimonials, first sent to NCCC managers and later revised and sent to DOJ officials, carry the weight and careful detail of a person writing to omniscient entities. She argues that there had been a "big mistake."

[9] For the best account of Nevada Consolidated's early development see Russell Elliott, *Nevada's Twentieth-Century Mining Boom: Tonopah, Goldfield, Ely*, (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1988) [First Printing, 1966].

[10] *Ibid.*, 192; also see David F. Myrick, *Railroads of Nevada and Eastern California, Vol. I and II* (Berkeley: Howell-North Books, 1962), and Russell, "A Fortunate Few," for a little more on the Japanese in Nevada railroad construction.

[11] The 1906 figure and many statistics below were gathered from NCCC company records housed at the East Ely Railroad Depot Museum, with the aid of Curator Sean Pitts. The number of Japanese employees fell to fifty-two in October and to thirty-three by June 1907, as noted in Nevada Northern Railroad, Payroll Ledger Books, 1906-1907. This source is cited as "NNRR Payroll" hereafter. Other resources at the Museum are also abbreviated as: Nevada Consolidated Copper Corporation, McGill Plant, Payroll Ledger Books, "McGill Payroll," and Ruth, Payroll Ledger Books (soon to be transfer from the Nevada State Museum, Reno) as "Ruth Payroll." Copies of correspondence between NCCC and NNRR managers, cited herein as "NNRR Letters," also came from the Museum's files, through Nevada scholars Mary and Elmer Rusco. The author also draws from a collection of service records for Ruth's Japanese employees of the late teens and early twenties, which he calls "Ruth Service Records" (copies in his possession). For more on the E. D. Hashimoto Company see Yuji Ichioka, *The Issei: The World of the First Generation Japanese Immigrants, 1885-1924* (New York: The Free Press, 1988), 60, and Alice Kasai, "Japanese Life in Utah," in Helen Z. Papanikolas, ed., *The People of Utah* (Salt Lake city: Utah Historical Society, 1976), 336-37.

[12] Ichioka, *The Issei*, 72-74.

[13] By 1907 the Japanese were working in smaller section gangs dispersed throughout the region, generally under a Japanese foreman, but sometimes under white foremen--even in ethnically mixed crews. On average, Japanese laborers earned $1.75 per day in August 1906, but that increased to $1.85 by September. Greek and Italian laborers earned $2.00 to $2.25 per day and paid $1.00 per month into the hospital fund--see, NNRC Payroll, 1906-1908.

[14] National Archives, *Census Manuscripts, Thirteenth Census of the United States, 1910: Nevada.* Vol. 3.

[15] Although they performed similar duties and worked for the same parent company, the railroad gangs of the Nevada Northern lived outside the company towns. The group lived a different life-style, and more families were present on those tracks over the years; apparently, few railroad workers actually were interned.

[16] Harvey O'Connor, *The Guggenheims: The Making of an American Dynasty* (New York: Covici Friede, 1937), 276-80, and Elliott, *Nevada's Mining Boom,* 182-190. Although other copper companies were active in the region throughout this period, NCCC clearly dominated the economy. The other concerns did not employ Japanese labor. Guggenheim Exploration became the Kennecott Copper Corporation in the 1930s, and NCCC officially became known as the Western Mines Division. It was still known locally as NCCC through W.W. II, however, and operated much the same: local managers controlled daily operations, but major decisions were made by corporate superiors. To minimize confusion, NCCC is used exclusively herein.

[17] O'Connor, *The Guggenheims*, 276-280, and Kasai, "Japanese Life in Utah," 341.

[18] O'Connor, *The Guggenheims*, 310. For an overview of labor's reactions to these "innovative" tactics see Lucie Cheng and Edna Bonacich, *Labor Immigration Under Capitalism: Asian Workers in the United States Before World War II* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).

[19] For an account of the strike, and the fairly harmonious ethnic relations at Bingham, see Helen Z. Papanikolas, "Life and Labor Among the Immigrants of Bingham Canyon," *Utah Historical Quarterly 33* (1965),292, and Kasai, "Japanese Life in Utah," 341. Contrary to the rhetoric of labor leaders, the *Issei* took an interest in labor's struggle and actively sought entry into the unions, which was almost universally denied. For a rare exception see, Yuji Ichioka, "Asian Immigrant Coal Miners and the United Mine Workers in America: Race and Class at Rock Springs, Wyoming, 1907," *Amerasia Journal*, 6 (Fall 1979).

[20] Elliott, *Nevada's Mining Boom*, 264-267.

[21] *Ibid.*, addresses some of the developments in the wake of the strike but fails to mention the entry of the Japanese. Elliott has the Japanese working for NCCC from 1906 on. This is technically correct (since they were working for the Nevada Northern then) but not an accurate reflection of when the Japanese entered the company towns. There may, however, have been a third influx. In a notebook of the late Wilbur Shepperson there is information from "Russ" Elliott that the company paid train fares of $16.60 each to bring 75 Japanese to McGill from Bingham, Utah in May 1907. Only about 30 made it to McGill, and they turned out to be Korean. Apparently, they were quickly replaced by Greeks and Austrians, and they do not appear in the 1910 Census Manuscripts--see the uncataloged notes of Wilbur Shepperson, "Nevada Immigrants Notebook, G," Nevada Historical Society, Reno. The existence of selective re-hiring practices and the exodus of Greeks was gathered from newspaper stories in the *Ely Daily Mining Expositor* (hereafter, *EDME*) and the *White Pine News* (Ely and hereafter *WPN*) that appeared frequently during December. News of the "Labor Scarcity in Ely," due to the Greek exodus, reached as far as the *Nevada State Journal* (Reno), 6 January 1913--also found in the notes of Wilbur Shepperson. Strangely, the local newspapers also overlook the entry of the Japanese, by my search of them through January 1913. Just over 100 Japanese suddenly appear in Ruth Payroll and McGill Payrolls in January 1913.

[22] Prewar biographical sketch of "Fred S. Toyota," Toyota Papers, Box 145, Folder 2. This states that 250 Japanese arrived around this time.

[23] Ruth Payrolls, January 1913, list almost all Japanese as powdermen. Combined sources indicate that perpetual track work, which included repairs, re-routing, and adjustments of rails to fit the changing seasons, became the main occupation of the group, while National Archives, *Census Manuscripts, Fourteenth Census of the United States, 1920: Nevada* , Vol. 2 [microfilm], lists virtually all Japanese workers in Ruth and McGill as trackmen or general "laborer." It has them employed at the mine, mill and smelter and living in mostly unspecified "Japanese quarters."

[24] O'Connor, *The Guggenheims*, 393.

[25] The philosophy and practices of welfare capitalism are discussed in detail in, Stuart Brandes, *American Welfare Capitalism, 1880-1940* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), while Elliott, *Nevada's Mining Boom*, 214-216, discusses NCCC's decision to pursue the strategy.

[26] Elliott, *Nevada's Mining Boom*, 218-229 and elsewhere. Elliott reports that most residents willingly accepted the trade-off, and he paints a fairly positive picture of McGill.

[27] *Ibid.*, with additional descriptions from, Elliott, *Growing Up*, 27-28.

[28] The smelting deposits would dry in the flats and winds would blow a fine, irritating dust back across McGill, see Iwamoto Interview, 1995 (below) and most histories of McGill. The Environmental Protection Agency is studying the channel, and a seemingly high rate of death by cancer and organ disease among this study group indicates such a study is needed.

[29] Elliott, *Nevada's Mining Boom*, 230-231, supported by my own reviews of NCCC payroll records.

[30] In order, quotes are from Stanley W. Paher, *Nevada Ghost Towns and Mining Camps* (San Diego: Howell-North Books, 1980), 233, and Read, *Lang Syne*, 34. Read inaccurately states that the Japanese were first brought in under Grant. Also see Elliott, "The NCCC," 188.

[31] Read, *Lang Syne*, 34-35.

[32] This analysis profited from several oral interviews, including: Sam Hase, Interview with the Author, 18 October 1993 (hereafter, "Hase Interview, 1993"); Nobuo Nakashima, Interview with the Author, 21 October 1993 ("Nakashima Interview, 1993"); Norman Linnell, Interview with the Author, 19 October 1993 ("Linnell Interview, 1993"); Elsa Culbert, Interview with the Author, 19 October 1993 ("Culbert Interview 1993); and, Hideo Iwamoto, Interview with the Author, 9 February 1995 ("Iwamoto Interview, 1995"). Hase and Nakashima are residents of Ely, born there in 1919 and 1931 respectively. Linnell is slightly younger than Sam Hase. He is of Scandinavian descent and has lived in McGill most of his life. Culbert Moved to Ely in 1938, when her husband became assistant pharmacist at the Steptoe Drugs; later they operated a pharmacy in McGill. Iwamoto came to work at McGill in 1939 or 1940 and eventually married one of the Toyota daughters, Kimiko. In combination, these sources were able to provide useful insights about the Japanese towns, particularly from 1930 on (although they do not necessarily agree with my assessments). Tapes or transcripts of these interviews will be deposited at the James Dickinson Library, Special Collections, University of Nevada, Las Vegas.

[33] Fifty Ruth employees from Ruth Service Records (described above), essentially those whose last name began with A-F, were analyzed for the following profile. National Archives, *Census Manuscripts, Fourteenth Census of the United States, 1920: Nevada*, was also consulted to draw some

generalities. Unfortunately, the census-takers at Ruth and McGill were far too general. All but a couple Japanese at Ruth, for instance, were listed as unable to speak English, which is possible, but they are also listed as illiterate in Japanese, which seems unlikely.

[34] *Ibid.*

[35] Survey of Ruth Service Records.

[36] *Ibid.* Those who did seek more permanent settlement, like several Japanese residents of Ely who came to the area working for NCCC, moved into farming or small businesses. Ichioka, *The Issei*, explains that the *dekasegi* orientation of most early immigrant laborers began to be replaced by a desire to settle more permanently in the U.S. after 1910. Men who wanted to stay in America were encouraged to move out of mining and railroad work.

[37] The Sakai legal file, cited below, includes a diagram of a typical barrack.

[38] In Hase Interview, 1993, Sam remembers a few women living in Ruth and McGill over the years. By the late 1930s both towns had some housing for Japanese families. However, U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Sixteenth Census of the United States, 1940, Population.* II:4 (Washington, D.C., 1943), 753, lists only seven foreign-born Japanese women in White Pine, and most lived in Ely.

[39] Although it is not possible to distinguish *Nisei* from *Issei* in the earlier employment records, Hase Interview, 1993 recounts the entry of *Nisei* into the labor force beginning during the depression. He remembers "quite a few" *Nisei* during the depression (Ely, Ruth, and McGill each had *Nisei* basketball teams that would compete with each other). But the 1940 Census lists only 59 *Nisei* in White Pine County, and most were not employed in the company towns.

[40] See figures for White Pine County in Nevada, *Appendix to Journal of Senate and Assembly* , "Reports of the Commissioner of Labor, 1917-1921," (Carson City: 1919, 1921, 1923).

[41] Service Records, Ruth. This figure may be somewhat misleading because a 1922 fire at the smelter caused a protracted shut-down.

[42] U. S. Bureau of the Census: *Fourteenth Census of the United States, 1920, Population,* I (Washington, D.C., 1922), p. 520, and *Sixteenth Census of the United States, 1940, Population,* II (Washington, D.C., 1943), 753. Mexicans comprised the second largest group of color (numbering 75 in 1940) and there were even fewer African and Chinese Americans in the county. Native Americans outnumbered the Japanese in the county but were rare in the company towns.

[43] For example, in his study on the sources of anti-Japanese prejudice in California, Edward Strong said it was, "the comparatively large number of Japanese in the state, emphasized particularly by their concentration in certain localities...that made every other charge against them so significant."

See, Edward K. Strong, Jr., *The Second-Generation Japanese Problem* (Stanford: University of California Press, 1934), 149.

[44] Linnell Interview, 1993. With the exception of Elsa Culbert, the four McGill residents I spoke with consistently and casually used the term "the Japs."

[45] See especially Letter from Kame Toyota to (NCCC managers) Messrs. Kinnear, Huffer, Larson, and Morgan, 9 June 1942, p. 9, Toyota Papers, Box 145; Folder 8.

[46] NCCC Payroll, McGill, lists monthly deductions from the checks of almost all Japanese employees going to "F.S. Toyota," and the size and relative uniformity of those deductions indicate that they are for room and board. Toyota was also receiving a separate monthly salary check of $119.50 in 1941, his position listed as "Jap. Board. House Steward." Kame's letters clarify that Fred was not a commission boss.

[47] Letters from internees to the Toyota family (cited bellow) bear out that the Japanese workers had great respect for Fred, even when he was no longer "boss." A sure sign of a disgruntled workforce was a strike against the boss, and by extension the company (see Ichioka, *The Issei*, 74-75), and their is no indication of any labor unrest among these crews.

[48] This point is demonstrated in the memoirs of NCCC General Manager Jack C. Kinnear, which mention his friendship with some workers but contains absolutely no mention of the Japanese, see Jack Kinnear, *Fifty Years in Mining* (Kennecott Copper Corporation private publication, 1967).

[49] This practice is noted in Ichioka, *The Issei*, 26, as it developed during early Japanese immigration. Payrolls, censuses, and other sources demonstrate it was standard practice in White Pine County too.

[50] Charley Hosono also was forced to "evacuate" the McGill area during the war; he moved to Ely and worked as a "swamper," or janitor, at a local club thereafter. Frank Yuasa, an *Issei* on the regular payroll, also leased from Toyota and operated a small barber shop, as noted in my interviews of Hase, Iwamoto, and Linnell. Linnell remembers Hosono only as "Charley the Jap," but he was on friendlier terms with Yuasa, who "cut all the Japs' hair." Linnell says he was Yuasa's only white customer.

[51] Hase and Iwamoto interviews provide descriptions of how Japanese goods were obtained, while Reverend Jerry Hirano of the Salt Lake City Buddhist Temple recently shared insights on how fish sellers and other merchants made the rounds in Nevada.

[52] See McGill Payroll for lack of deductions. Fred Toyota held saving accounts for several of his men at the McGill Bank by the late 1930s as revealed in the Toyota Papers. The Saturday-night activities of the Japanese laborers are discussed in, Hase Interview, 1993, which says the *Issei* laborers were some of the "best customers" of the white prostitutes of Ely, and in Iwamoto Interview, 1995. Both stress that the *Nisei* avoided the brothels.

[53] See, Cheryl Nakashima (Nobuo's spouse), "Japanese in White Pine County During World War II," TMs [Copy], East Ely Railroad Depot Museum. Within a week of Pearl Harbor the Yokohama Laundry and the Tokyo Cleaners became the Star Laundry and the Nevada Cleaners, respectively. Indications are that most customers of these businesses were Euro-Americans.

[54] *EDME*, 25 December 1907, as found in Elliott, *Mining Boom.*

[55] See, particularly, *EDME* : 29 October; 2, 5, November; 25 December 1907; and 23 May 1908. Opposition to foreign labor is discussed in Elliott, *Nevada's Mining Boom*, 254-258.

[56] Elliott, *Nevada's Mining Boom*, 258-268.

[57] See Ichioka, *The Issei*, for the various agreements and legislation enacted to stem Japanese immigration, which culminated in the 1924 Exclusion Act.

[58] See David M. Anderson, "'Such Contented Workers': Mine-Mill Organizers in the Ely, Nevada Copper District, 1920-1943 (Master's Thesis, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, 1994). Anderson's work challenges Elliott's assessments of White Pine labor history as conservative and bias.

[59] Elliott, *History of Nevada*, 230. For additional descriptions see Elliott, *Growing Up* and *Mining Boom.*

[60] *Ibid.*, 311.

[61] These findings were gathered from NCCC payroll books and Ruth Service Records. The 1913 McGill payroll lists most of the Japanese working part-time as "laborers," at $2.90 per day, and part-time as track laborers at $3.55 per day. These were the going rates for anyone in those positions, but also could suggest company manipulation of wages. However, these duel listings appear only briefly. Although most Japanese workers were still listed as laborers in 1941, several were listed as "labor sub-formen, repairman's helper, furnace helper, and power-house laborer," which may indicate that they were performing work in the skilled category but being paid at a lower rate.

[62] Elliott, "History of Nevada Mines Division," Chapter X.

[63] McGill Payroll, April 1934.

[64] This was a fairly common practice in company towns, as explained in, Brandes, *American Welfare Capitalism.*

[65] Thanks again to David Anderson for directing me to: Work Projects Administration, *The WPA Guide to 1930s Nevada: Nevada Writers' Project of the Work Projects Administration* (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1991), 252. For a similar assessment see Effie Read, *Lang Syne,* which says the Japanese were handled through an "interpreter and agent, Roy Murenake"(sic),who "collected a fee from each Jap but did not work for the company."

[66] There is a possibility that Muranaka acted as a paymaster of sorts, but in Ruth and McGill each man was issued a separate check--see McGill Payroll and Ruth Payroll. The Japanese were not responsible for the wage scale, and these population figures for Ruth seem inflated.

[67] Anderson, "'Such Contented Workers,'" viii, explains that Mine-Mill "initially met frustration" but eventually became the accepted bargaining agent for most of the area's copper workers in October 1943. Unrelated demographic shifts and new labor relations laws made way for reform.

[68] Robert Park, *Race and Culture* (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1950), 16.

[69] See, for instance, the message of White Pine High School Superintendent Benjamin W. Wheatley in, *Blue and White* [White Pine High School yearbook] (Ely, Nevada: White Pine High School, 1938), pages not numbered.

[70] Nakashima Interview, 1993, mentions that his mother was a trained nurse when she arrived in America but learned English through helping her children study. For seemingly accurate descriptions of race barriers coming down at school see Elliott, *Growing Up*, 31-32.

[71] George graduated in 1943, see *Blue and White*, 1943. George's father died when he was young and he was raised by his mother (a Euro-American) in McGill. After graduating he joined the all-*Nisei* 442 and was killed in Italy. His picture hangs with photos of other veterans on the wall of the McGill Club. Frank Yasumatsu, a brother to George, continued working at the smelter in McGill during the war and may have graduated earlier from White Pine High.

[72] *Blue and White*, issues 1935-1943. The Hase children and the Miyama/Nakashima children (who had different fathers) were the most numerous, but the Kihara, Yokomizo, and Oki *Nisei* from Ely helped fill the roll books, along with the Endows and Kawamotos from railroad families in outlying areas.

[73] For common "Americanization" practice under Welfarism, see Brandes, *American Welfare Capitalism.* Local Greeks registered an appeal for English courses to reduce social barriers and job-related accidents in 1919 (*WPN*, 12 January 1919, 1), but immigrants had to settle for "self-help" programs.

[74] *Blue and White*, 1936-1943. Other office-holders included: Sam Hase, Vice-President of the Senior Class, 1938; Lilly Hase, President of the Girls Athletic Association, 1939; and Utaka Miyama, Freshman Class President, 1939. For a discussion of the first ten *Nisei* women to complete medical school see, Mei T. Nakano, *Japanese American Women: Three Generations, 1890-1990* (Berkeley: Nina Press Publishing, 1990), 113, which overlooked Toshiko Toyota.

[75] Culbert Interview, 1993.

[76] A practice that continues with support from the Ely Japanese community today, see Nakashima Interview, 1993, and Iwamoto Interview, 1995. This section is dirt and gravel and segregated from the rest of the cemetery.

[77] Sam Hase says he and his siblings attended the Methodist Church--Hase Interview, 1993; Nobuo Nakashima says he did not feel he fit in and that Japanese children were not baptized--Nakashima Interview, 1993.

[78] These coincided with the rises and quick demise of the Klan in Nevada, see Craig F. Swallow, "The Ku Klux Klan in Nevada During the 1920s" (Master's Thesis, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, 1978). Some people used to tell Hide Miyama, when she was married to her first husband, "'well, they're going to burn the cross tonight, so you better stay home,'" as revealed in Nakashima Interview, 1993.

[79] Elliott, *Nevada's Mining Boom*, 222, says that "McGill was strongly Republican...," but that political activity was kept to a minimum by the company. David Anderson has made some interesting observations about how NCCC fostered patriotism to distract workers from other concerns.

[80] The author heard about children selling aluminum during an informal interview with a man who grew up in McGill. Iwamoto confirmed that aluminum balls were found during the FBI search. Consider also (but cautiously) Read, *Lang Sign*, 259, which tells how a "Jap spy" was apprehended in Reipetown, just west of Copper Flat, back in the early part of the century.

[81] For an account of difficulties having Japanese citizenship status removed see Mrs. Toyota's letters, wherein she claims hers were the only children of the county who were strictly Americans. For Mitsuhata see *EDT*, 2 January 1942.

[82] The county sheriff and his deputies handled criminal activity but the company supplemented law enforcement in Ruth and McGill with town watchmen.

[83] See Nakashima Interview, 1993.

[84] In addition to the case cited below, there were other murders that occurred. In 1927 F. Ito was shot and killed at Copper Flat by Louis Horimoto, possibly because the former was romantically involved with the latter's wife, see White Pine County Coroner, "Inquest over the Body of F. Ito," White Pine County, Nevada, 7 July 1927, and *Ely Daily Times* (hereafter, *EDT*), 7 July 1927. On 17 April 1937 J. Sakai shot and killed Y. Yamada after a heated argument. Both were laborers in the Liberty Pit, and Sakai was sentenced to life in prison, see White Pine County Justice's Court, "State of Nevada vs. J. Sakai," 19 April 1937, and *EDT*, 17 April 1937. In 1933 workman T. Tanaka fell and struck his head on the job and the fatal accident was reportedly the result of a quarrel, see White Pine County Coroner, "Inquest over the body of T. Tanaka," White Pine County, Nevada, 19 September 1933. The Coroner's inquests and court records cited here and below are at the White Pine County Courthouse, Recorder's Vaults,

Ely, Nevada. Local newspapers also report several fights between Japanese workers at Copper Flat that resulted in serious injuries.

85 In the 1930s Muranaka married a "very nice [white] lady," Ann, who was an ex-prostitute, and the couple lived in Ely--See Nakashima Interview, 1993. Nevada law forbid Japanese-Euro-American marriage at the time, so Roy and Ann must have been married elsewhere. Similar to Kame Toyota, Ann made appeals to the DOJ on behalf of Roy and the Ruth internees, but little else has been uncovered about the Muranakas.

86 White Pine County Coroner, "Inquest over the Bodies of Mrs. H. Shiki, Y. Urabe, and S. Mochizuki," White Pine County, Nevada, 7 August 1940. Strangely enough, this case was not reported in the local newspaper.

87 *Ibid.*

88 Nakashima Interview, 1993.

89 White Pine County Coroner, "Inquest over the Bodies of H. Shiki, Y. Urabe, and S. Mochizuki." In his testimony at the inquest, Cibbell said he did not remember seeing Mochizuki and that he rarely saw a drunk Japanese. Never once during his testimony did he refer to any of the principals in the case by name, all of which indicates that he had little real contact with the Japanese community. There is indication that Japanese residents may not have always been treated fairly by the courts in the verdict that resulted from the Sakai case noted above.

90 These films, which also showed in Ruth and Ely (where whites also attended), actually were brought in by an independent company. Toyota stopped the McGill showings in 1939, probably because of the Sino-Japanese War and the growing unpopularity of Japan. Japanese propaganda sometimes colored these films, but Hase, Nakashima, and Iwamoto remember them mostly as "tear-jerkers," comedies, and samurai stories.

91 Park, *Race and Culture*, 353.

92 Kame Toyota's letters and the *Nisei* interviews used herein stress that the Japanese of McGill had few problems before the war and that the Toyota children had many friends.

93 The author has filed a Freedom of Information Act request with the FBI; however, their precursory search has only revealed documents on Toyota and Muranaka. They say I can expect those documents around 1996-97, due to backlogs in their FOIA division. For identification of Newman see *Deseret News* (Salt Lake City), 9 December 1942, 6, which counted 23 Japanese arrests thus far in a continuing Nevada-Utah "round-up."

94 Fleming, *Copper Times*, 138.

95 See especially "The Saga of Fred Toyota [Jr.]" (*Ibid.*), who died from kidney disease on his wedding night in 1948. Fleming apparently got most of this

information at a WPHS reunion, also attended by Iwamoto. (The latter attended for his wife, Kimiko, who had just passed away, and remembers that locals treated him "like a king" (i.e. cordially and with respect), see Iwamoto Interview, 1995.

96 Local arrests are noted in *EDT*, 8 December 1941, 1; 9 December 1941, 1, and in secondary materials. Brief descriptions of the internment phase can be found throughout the literature on Japanese relocation, while Steven Fox, *The Unknown Internment: An Oral History of the Relocation of Italian Americans during World War II* (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1990), views it from another ethnic perspective.

97 Letter from Kame Toyota to Messrs. Kinnear,..., 9 June , 1942, Toyota Family Papers, Box 145; Folder 8.

98 Nakashima Interview, 1993.

99 Copies of the petition supposedly were sent to the FBI in Salt Lake and the governor of Nevada, see *EDT*, 9 December 1941, 1, and secondary sources.

100 Letter from James A. Johnson to Hugh A. Shamberger, 9 December 1941, in *Records of the State Council of Defense*, Box 0010, File 10, Nevada State Archive, Carson City. Little is known about what occurred at Utah Copper, except that few if any Japanese from there were interned.

101 *Ibid.*

102 White Pine Council of Defense, "Minutes of Meeting," 8 December 1941, *Ibid.*, Box 0007, File 15.

103 McGill Payroll, 1913, 1934, 1941. The first-half of December's payroll, 1941, shows the McGill Japanese worked up until 11 December. S. Kohara, about whom we know little else, appears in the 1913 and 1941 payrolls.

104 For accounts of the McGill crackdown see the Letters of Kame Toyota and Iwamoto Interview, 1995.

105 Letter from Kame Toyota to Messrs. Kinnear, Huffer, Larsen and Morgan, 3 August 1942, Toyota Papers, Box 145; Folder 8, states that the McGill Issei were arrested on the night of the 15th. Elliott, *History of Nevada*, 311, says NCCC "dismissed most of its Japanese employees on December 14," and payroll notations confirm this.

106 Letter from NCCC official H.M. Peterson to unidentified Nevada Northern official, 11 December 1941, NNRR Letters.

107 Letter from L.J. Beem to Jackling, 12 December 1941, NNRR Letters.

108 Letter from H.M Peterson to L.J. Beem, 19 December 1941, NNRR Letters.

[109] Turned over by Fred Jr. to McGill Deputy Sheriff Bryan Robison were: four cameras, four table radio sets, three shotguns, and one (Fred Sr.'s) pistol, see Letter from Fred T. Toyota to Leslie S. Kofoed (United States Marshall, Reno), 25 March 1946, Toyota Papers, Box 146; Folder 2. (To that point, none of these items had been returned.)

[110] Among others, Linnell described the legends, but he at least did not think there was any truth to them--see Linnell Interview, 1993.

[111] She further speculates that this December 11 house-keeping, combined with a personality conflict between Merrill and one of the workers, may have led to the confinement phase in her letters to the company and DOJ officials.

[112] See "McGill Jap Kills Self in S. L. Jail," *EDT*, 23 December 1941, 1; "40 Jap Aliens to Be Removed..." in the "Happy New Year" edition of *EDT*, 31 December 1941, 1; and, *EDT*, 3 January 1942, 1. The *Humboldt Star* (Winnemucca, Nevada), 5 January 1942, 2, reported that the Nevada prisoners had been sent to "concentration camps" in Montana and North Dakota

[113] See Interview with Herbert V. Nicholson by Betty E. Mitson in Arthur A. Hansen and Betty Mitson, eds., *Voices Long Silent: An Oral Inquiry into the Japanese American Evacuation* (Fullerton: California State University, Fullerton, Oral History Program, 1974), 121, as found in Clark, "Those other Camps," 11. (This information corrects my previous stand that the Nevada board was not involved in these internment proceedings.) A Letter from Fred S. Toyota to "Folks," 31 January 1942, in Toyota Papers, Box 145, Folder 6 states: "All Nevadan's hearings do not start yet, but it will be very (sic) near future, but do not worry about that." (Even in the camps, Fred's biggest worries were that their Income Tax get paid on time and that the children "study hard.")

[114] The notion that military authorities had anything to do with local decisions is quickly dismissed. Even after Nevada was made a "military area" by Lieut. Gen. John L. DeWitt in March 1942, no "prohibited areas" were designated within White Pine County, much to the chagrin of the local defense council, which continued to partition DeWitt for such status. This slight did not stop Sheriff Orrock from instituting his own firm curfew and travel restrictions on *all* Japanese Americans of the county--see especially *EDT*, 17 March 1942, 1; 9 May 1942, 1, and the interviews of *Nisei* residents used herein.

[115] Letter from Kame Toyota to Messrs. Kinnear,..., 3 August 1942, Toyota Papers, Box 145; folder 8. Perhaps reflecting her frustration and desperation, Kame Toyota reserved some harsh criticism for actions of specific Japanese people of the region, which, she believed, may have escalated events. This author sees as important the fact that her early appeals focus on things like unemployment compensation and "trouble-makers"--things that might have been offensive to the company.

[116] "Nevada Consolidated...Mines Division Memorandum" from Ruth, an incomplete document in the Papers of Governor Carville, Box 23, Folder 23 Nevada State Archives, Carson City. The exact breakdown listed: 12 single and 2 married men of the Nevada Northern, 3 Nevada Consolidated Japanese

workers who were not removed or had returned, 9 women, 10 children, and 5 "Japs (American Born-working [sic])," for a total of 41 "Japs". It unclear whether this total includes McGill residents.

[117] This family's "evacuation" from Ruth is described as such in appeals for monetary redress, which family members have submitted to the Office of Redress Administration (copies in author's possession).

[118] For suicides and internee letters see *EDT*, 8 May 1942, 3 June 1942, and the Toyota Papers, Box 145; Files 6, 7, and 8. For Homma also see NNRR Letters.

[119] *EDT*, December 1941-June 1942; Flemming, *Copper Times*, for report on WPHS; Hase Interview, 1993 and Nakashima Interview, 1993 for FBI searches and harsh treatment of evacuees.

[120] Hase and Nakashima say that throughout the war there were some "red-necks" who would "call you a Jap," but attitudes in Ely improved greatly by mid-1942. For Ben Yokomizo see, *EDT*, 14, 17, 20 August 1942, cites provided by Phillip Earl of the Nevada Historical Society, Reno.

[121] See Letter from Allan D. McNeil to George Haskell, 23 December 1941, in the Letters of George Haskell, Western Federation of Miners/ International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers Archives, Box 35, Folder 6, University of Colorado, Denver, copies of which were provided to the author by David Anderson. Haskell's original letter to McNeil could not be found.

[122] Letter from Reid Robinson to George Haskell, 6 January 1942 ("On behalf of the minority groups branch"), and Letter from George Haskell to Reid Robinson, 13 January 1942 in the Letters of George Haskell. Indications are that NCCC kept the policy in force after the war--see, Culbert Interview, 1993.

[123] Playing off a controversy over using relocation-camp labor in Nevada, the Steptoe Mill and Smeltermens' Union informed Governor Carville that they were, "fully in cooperation with [his] views concerning the importation of Alien Japanese labor into this state. We refuse to work with the Japanese if they are brought into this area"--see Letter from Recording Secretary Oran H. Whitlock to E.P. Carville, Carville Papers, Box 23; File 23.

[124] For copies and discussions of support affidavits see Toyota Papers, Box 145; folder 8. Kame was confident she could have found more fair witnesses in town, but she did not want to "trouble" anyone.

[125] Clark, "Those Other Camps," 10, notes that signed affidavits or witness testimony weighed heavily at internment hearings.

[126] Letter from Kame Toyota to Craven, 26 January 1944, Toyota Papers, Box 145, File 8. The Toyota family continued to receive letters from other internees, which expressed their intentions of returning to Japan. Some joined the Toyotas in Salt Lake after the war--see, Iwamoto Interview, 1995.

[127] Linnell Interview, 1993.