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Cam Chandler

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THE GOVERNMENT AND THE GRIZZLY: THE POLITICS OF PRESERVATION

*Man shapes himself through decisions that shape his environment.*

RENE DUBOS

Each year, millions of people travel to one of the most beautifully unique areas of the world: Yellowstone National Park. Despite the park's ecological and recreational diversity, geysers and grizzly bears have historically been two of the park's main attractions for the majority of tourists.¹

Unlike the geysers, however, grizzlies are rarely seen today by park visitors. Besides queries about the time of Old Faithful's next eruption, probably the most frequently expressed question in the park is, "Where are all the bears?" The answer is tragically simple: the bears are dying. Unfortunately, explanations of why the bears are dying are much more complex.

While weather cycles, habitat depletion, and poaching are all significant factors, the principal reason for the bears' decline in Yellowstone Park is political, not biological. The National Park Service--the park's caretaker--has followed a bear management policy that is based on an unattainable philosophical ideal which has been carried out by bureaucratic managers more intent on preserving their political reputations than on preserving the grizzly bear.²


The purpose of this paper is three-fold: First, to describe the precarious position of Yellowstone grizzlies. Second, to outline the assumptions behind the Park Service's bear management policy. Last, to analyze the effect of the government's policy on the bears.

In sorting out information for this paper, one thing was evident immediately. Opinions about the grizzly’s management in Yellowstone are strong and polemical. Writing this paper, I've tried to be as objective as possible. Obviously, the Park Service is not the only villain in the tragedy, nor do I believe there is a government conspiracy to eradicate bears from national parks. However, as one who has had more than one encounter with this impressive animal, I must confess a certain pro-bear bias; I believe the grizzly bear, a symbol of our shrinking wilderness, is a species that must be saved.

Background

Beginnings of the Bear Problem. When the Park Service took control of Yellowstone Park in 1916, between forty and fifty grizzlies roamed the area. As more people visited the park, the amount of garbage dumped inside park boundaries increased as well. The grizzly (Ursus arctos horribilis), an omnivorous opportunist, was naturally attracted to this new source of readily available food. Large numbers of grizzlies and black bears routinely gathered at dumpsites to feed. The National Park Service quickly capitalized on the attraction.

Beginning in 1919 and continuing until 1941, the bear-feeding spectacle at the dumps had reached such a pitch that grandstands were erected and the garbage spread out buffet-style on raised platforms. There were regular feeding schedules
just as in a zoo, and the parking lots nearby overflowed with five to six hundred cars nightly. On a good night, you might see seventy grizzly bears.

For most species, the availability of food often determines the number of animals that a given environment can support. If the food supply increases, the population generally does too. The inverse is usually equally true: if food supplies shrink, the carrying capacity, i.e., the number of animals an ecosystem can sustain, of the land is diminished and the population decreases. Such is the case with the grizzly. Food is directly related to the longevity, the ability to survive hibernation, and the reproductive rate of a grizzly. For Yellowstone bears, the park’s dumps served as a rich source of highly caloric food. Thus, although the dumps were neither naturally created or aesthetically pleasing, they boosted the park’s carrying capacity for bears. In fact, "Censuses taken at the dumps indicated that the number of grizzlies increased from 40 in 1920 to 260 by 1930." Between 1959 and 1967, bear researchers measured a 2.4% average growth rate in population indicating that the carrying capacity had been reached.

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6 Craighead, Track of the Grizzly, pp. 175-76.
The population increase was not good news for the Park Service. Bears, particularly black bears that had come to associate humans with food, were a menace to campers and residents living near the park. For Park Service officials, reports of property damage and personal injury were all too common. By the 1950s, it was obvious that new regulations needed to be established and enforced in order to avoid dangerous confrontations between man and bear.

Through the 1960s, the new regulations amounted to little more than educating tourists to the hazards of feeding the bears. The policy was working, however, as the number of bear incidents declined. But with the number of park visitors steadily rising, park officials were concerned the problem would only get worse.

Their fears were not unfounded, for in 1967, two women were fatally mauled by grizzlies in Glacier National Park. And although only three deaths were caused by grizzlies in national parks in the previous ninety-four years, a crisis atmosphere developed.

The Park Service, accused that it could have prevented the deaths and fearful of lawsuits, quickly moved to formulate a new bear management strategy. Yellowstone grizzlies, animals with few natural enemies, were suddenly subject to a new danger: The National Park Service.

The Leopold Report: Park Policy Defined. For Park Service officials, the tragic events in Glacier reinforced their desire to "go forward with a proposal of some long standing: to close down the earth-filled


dumps scattered throughout the park and used as foraging areas by grizzlies."9 Before examining the proposal itself, it is vital to examine its misguided philosophical basis.

In 1963, A. Starker Leopold, son of noted environmentalist Aldo Leopold, prepared a paper entitled "Wildlife Management in the National Parks." The paper focused attention on wildlife biology and management—new concepts at that time. According to Leopold, the primary goal of park wildlife management should be to see "that biotic associations within each park be maintained, or where necessary recreated, as nearly as possible in the condition that prevailed when the area was first visited by the white man."10

Simply put, the philosophical ideal behind the report was that nature should be allowed to take its course inside national parks. Park officials were essentially advocating a hands-off policy. Only where necessary would they intervene in the natural order of things, and even then, human manipulation was required only to recreate primeval ecological conditions.

Certainly, minimizing human intervention in our national parks is a lofty and noble goal, but is it attainable? The policy seems fraught with inherent problems.

First, how does one preserve or recreate primeval conditions in today's national parks? Earlier, these areas were completely wild, but are presently visited by millions of people, dotted with homes and businesses, and are laced with thousands of miles of asphalt.

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9Craighead, p. 192.

10McNamee, p. 105.
Ironically, A. Starker Leopold's father understood the impossibility of attempting to turn the clock back. In 1927, he recognized the futility of trying to restore a sense of balance in nature because nature had been altered too fundamentally. "The only option we have is to create a new balance objectively determined upon for each area in accordance with the intended use of that area."\(^\text{11}\)

Second, which "biotic associations" are to be recreated? Assuming it's decided which ecological systems and associations to restore, how does one know when they are completely restored? If the goal is to recreate the systems that existed before man arrived, it is impossible to know when the restoration is complete.

Third, attempts to restore natural order while minimizing the impact of man ignores the role Indians played in the area:

If restoring wilderness meant re-creating a hunter-gather culture long since exterminated, the task of restoration was impossible, and if it meant giving land back to the Indians, it was undesirable.\(^\text{12}\)

Moreover, the hands-off approach to wildlife management ignores current realities. National parks are not self-contained ecosystems. Park boundaries are artificially created, and the species that inhabit these areas frequently wander beyond park borders where they are no longer subject to the Park Service's management ideals.


\(^{12}\)Chase, Playing God in Yellowstone, p. 46.
Overall, it is unrealistic to expect national parks to be truly or completely wild. Untouched wilderness is no longer possible in areas that are so accessible. As long as man and animals both use the area, biotic self-regulation is impossible.

In theory, the idealism behind the Leopold Report is noble and appealing. Unfortunately, by formulating the recommendations of the document into actual policy, the Park Service would jeopardize the survival of the grizzly in Yellowstone National Park.

Dump Closure

_Hasty Assumptions_. In 1967, Park Superintendent Jack Anderson, a firm supporter of the philosophy behind the Leopold Report, had work to complete before Yellowstone Park’s Centennial Celebration. The celebration was

... five years away and an international conference of park managers was to be held there in honor of the occasion. If the world’s flagship national park was to be shipshape in terms of the Leopold Report by then—restored as nearly as possible to its pristine primeval condition—work would have to begin at once, and one of the new leadership’s goals was to close open-pit garbage dumps.13

In the aftermath of the events in Glacier National Park and consistent with thinking of the Leopold Report, the Park Service concluded that the dumps had no place in national parks, especially not in Yellowstone. The Park Service decided to close the dumps and wean the bears from garbage cold-turkey. The sooner bears found a new source of food, the

13McNamee, pp. 105-6.
better. The decision to abruptly close the dumps was based on three assumptions.

First, in the opinion of park biologist Glen Cole, although grizzlies had become habituated to garbage and people, they would rapidly adjust to new sources of food once the dumps were closed. Bears, he felt, weren’t picky about where they received their food. If food was no longer available at the dumps, the bears would be forced to return to wild, more natural sources of food. The thought of bears eating roots and berries instead of stale twinkies and leftover spaghetti was certainly more in keeping with the Leopold Report’s notion of restoring pristine ecological environments.

Second, although Cole and the Park Service had not conducted formal population censuses, they felt confident that there was a larger population of “wild” grizzlies elsewhere in the park. Their belief in a larger population of grizzlies was derived by extrapolating the density figures of the number of black bears that were attracted to bait in various parts of the park. Population estimates collected by people who had conducted more scientific grizzly censuses—namely independent bear researchers John and Frank Craighead—were not used.

Moreover, when garbage bears were forced to compete with "wild" bears, the Park Service assumed, the latter would dominate. Ultimately, a fitter, stronger, more natural population of grizzly bears would emerge in the park.

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15 Ibid.

16 McNamee, p. 108.
Last, government officials were of the opinion that because bears associated humans with food, the dumps had caused bears to lose their fear of man.\textsuperscript{17} Once the dumps had closed and the bears had moved to more remote areas of the park, the number of bear/human incidents would decline.

Based on unsubstantiated biological opinions and consistent with the philosophical underpinnings of the Leopold Report, the decision to close the dumps seemed only natural. In one masterful stroke, the Park Service found a way to rid itself of unsightly garbage and the bear problem while simultaneously demonstrating its commitment to "ecosystems management."

Predictably, the Park Service's assumptions were in sharp contrast to the opinions of the Craigheads, the deans of grizzly research. The Craigheads studied grizzlies in Yellowstone for ten years; their research, though debated, is often thought of as the most authoritative and definitive of bear studies.\textsuperscript{18}

Their research told them that the grizzlies were not habituated to humans at all because the dumps where grizzlies fed were closed to park visitors. Moreover, the garbage was as much a natural food for the grizzlies as bulbs, ants, or even elk.\textsuperscript{19} The Park Service was partly correct in saying that grizzlies are not picky eaters, but this ignores the fact that a rich


\textsuperscript{18}McNamee, p. 100.

\textsuperscript{19}Ibid., p. 108.
source of food was suddenly removed from bears who had relied on it for years.

In further contrast to the Park Service, the Craigheads did not believe there were two separate populations of grizzlies. Their data, from 1959 to 1969, showed that as much as 77% of Yellowstone's grizzly population used the dumps at one time or another, and they felt that the number of non-garbage-feeders was much too small to sustain the elimination of many dump bears.\(^\text{20}\) Even if there were two separate populations, no one had--nor could have--shown that the two populations would eventually become combative forces, each battling to supplant the other.

Finally, the Craigheads argued that the dump closure would increase rather than decrease the number of bear incidents:

> indeed they [the Craigheads] felt that the dumps helped prevent campground problems, by drawing grizzlies to a high-quality food source isolated from the park's developed areas. Recalling that there had been a camp-raiding rampage following the garbage reductions of 1941, and knowing how important a food source the dumps had been for a number of bear generations, the Craigheads reasoned that a cold-turkey dump closure would bring about a sudden, confused dispersal of suddenly very hungry grizzly bears, who would inevitably be drawn to the campgrounds and big trouble. And an abrupt dump closure, they argued, would be bad for both bears and people.\(^\text{21}\)

Towns with public dumps such as Gardiner and West Yellowstone would thus be subject to an accelerated

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\(^{20}\)Ibid.

\(^{21}\)Ibid., pp. 108-9.
dispersal of hungry bears. "The net result," warned the Craigheads, "could be tragic personal injury, costly damages, and a drastic reduction in the number of grizzlies. 22

The decision to close the dumps became the "core of an essentially scientific disagreement" between the Craigheads and the Park Service. 23 The Craigheads called for gradual closure of the dumps using human research and manipulation to aid the grizzlies' transition. The Park Service, claiming the "jury was still out" on the relationship between the dumps and the bear population and clinging to its philosophic ideal, stressed the need for a quick change to allow the bears more time to return to natural sources. 24 But what began as merely a scientific difference of opinion rapidly escalated into a heated political battle.

The Craighead Controversy. As independent researchers in Yellowstone, the Craigheads provided grizzly information to the park staff, but as the Park Service's grizzly policy became more controversial, the Craigheads began to provide their own management recommendations. Trying to help, "the Craigheads violated a cardinal bureaucratic rule: never challenge the chain of command." 25 As Thomas McNamee describes the researchers' relationship with the Park Service, the Craigheads' belief that more information would grant them more influence in the decision-making process "indicated a certain naivete about the nature of in-

22 Chase, Playing God in Yellowstone, p. 32.

23 McNamee, p. 109.


stitutional authority." Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Interior, Curtis Bohen, wrote later: "When scientists attempt to extend their products of research into the realm of policy and management decision making, this goes beyond the normal prerogatives of scientific endeavor." So long as Park Service bureaucrats had authority in Yellowstone, scientists and biologists had no business formulating wildlife policies.

In 1971, the Park Service agreed to renew the Craigheads' research permit only if the men would not speak out against the park's policies without first obtaining Park Service approval. The Craigheads refused, viewing the condition as a threat to their academic and personal freedoms under the First Amendment. Their ten-year study of bears in Yellowstone was over.

Meanwhile, though the dumps had closed, the number of problems involving bears increased. The exact number of control actions—removal or disposal of bears that invaded campgrounds or homes—was in dispute. The Park Service reported one figure. The Craigheads, maintaining the park's records were "grossly incomplete," reported another. Frank Craighead claimed that some park rangers admitted the park's unofficial policy was "get rid of the bears, just don't let anybody know." Alston Chase, relying on three

26 McNamee, p. 110.


29 Craighead, pp. 197-99.
separate sources, verifies the Park Service cover-up of bear kills.30

So why the discrepancies over numbers and all the government secrecy? Besides the outrage that likely would have occurred if the public was aware of the park's policy, according to Chase, the Park Service was breaking the law:

A year before the Trout Creek dump was closed, Congress passed the Environmental Policy Act. This law required that no major federal action be taken until an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) had been completed. But no such review was begun until 1974. "Suddenly, in the early seventies," one former senior Park Service official explained to me, "just as the Park Service was in the midst of killing bears, they found what they were doing was in violation of the EPA. They had to cover it up."31

The news media, catching wind of the controversy and the adverse effects upon the grizzly, began to inform the public. Feeling the pressure in 1973, the Department of Interior authorized a National Academy of Sciences committee to look into and report on bear management problems in Yellowstone. The committee's report was almost a complete vindication of the Craigheads' research and sharply reproved the Park Service and Cole for supplying exaggerated estimates of bear numbers.32

Strangely in 1975, Ian Cowan, the committee's chairman, reversed his decision and concluded that the

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30 Chase; Playing God in Yellowstone, pp. 155-56.
31 Ibid., p. 157.
32 McNamee, p. 115.
number of backcountry bears was now more in accordance with Cole’s numbers.\textsuperscript{33} The debate over whose estimates are most accurate continues today, only clouding the issue of how to best manage the bears.

In order to collect more objective data, a new interagency committee, the Interagency Grizzly Bear Study Team (IGBST) was established from members of the Park Service, the Fish and Wildlife Service, the Forest Service, and representatives of the Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming state governments.

From the outset, however, it quickly became obvious that the agency would be a lackey for Yellowstone Park officials. The Park Service, specifically Glen Cole, was given authority to choose the team’s leader.\textsuperscript{34}

The controversy, which sprung from differences of scientific opinion, evolved into allegations of wrong doing, bureaucratic reshuffling, and job loss. Ultimately, however, the grizzly was the big loser. While all the hullabaloo and reorganization went on in Washington, the bears continued to die in Yellowstone.

*Effects on the Grizzly.* Following the dump closure in 1968, the grizzly fought a double-edged sword. On the one side, a significant source of food suddenly disappeared. In his quest for alternative food sources, the grizzly faced the other edge of the sword: being trapped, relocated, and killed by the National Park Service.

Logs kept by Park Service employees in the Fishing Bridge area revealed a change in the bears’ behavior directly after the dump closures. During the summer of 1967, before the dumps were closed, black

\textsuperscript{33}National Park Service, p. 13.

\textsuperscript{34}McNamee, p. 117.
bears accounted for 25 of the 31 incidents of activity in the Fishing Bridge campground area. The next year, following closure of nearby Trout Creek dump, 78 of the 91 reported entries involved grizzlies, indicating the degree to which grizzlies were now wandering into campgrounds looking for food.\(^{35}\) Witnessing the increased dispersal of grizzlies, many began to recognize that the Craigheads’ predictions were absolutely correct.\(^{36}\)

In response to the increase in bear activity, the Park Service performed more control actions. The Craigheads’ records showed that in the Trout Creek area there were only nine control actions in 1967. In 1968, following the closure of the dump, the number jumped to eighty-four.\(^{37}\) As previously noted, the Park Service disputed these data and claimed only twenty-four control actions were performed in 1968.\(^{38}\) But according to the report by the National Academy of Science

\[\ldots\] the number of control actions [parkwide] rose from an average of 13 a year in 1967 and earlier, to 63.3 a year between 1968 and 1970. The number of grizzlies reported killed by control actions rose from an average of three a year before 1967 to nine a year between 1968 and 1970. The number of grizzlies reported killed by control actions, according

\(^{35}\)Chase, “Grizzly and the Juggernaut,” p. 32.


\(^{37}\)Craighead, p. 196.

\(^{38}\)National Park Service, p. 13.
to these official figures, rose from an average of 18.9 bears per year to 31.5.\textsuperscript{39}

All told, the Park Service says that 261 bears have been killed since 1968. The Craigheads believe 320 is closer to the truth.\textsuperscript{40}

In June 1972, park managers’ worst nightmare became a reality. Harry Walker, hiking in the park near Old Faithful, was fatally mauled by a grizzly. Grizzlies had become a deadly menace. The incident is even more tragic because, in the opinion of Frank Craighead, it could have been avoided by Yellowstone authorities.\textsuperscript{41} Others agreed.

In a civil suit brought on behalf of the deceased’s estate, the Park Service was declared negligent. In a fatal case of misplaced aggression, the Park Service responded by killing even more bears. The government’s policy followed a lamentable train of events: Park officials would sanitize an area to discourage bear use. Bears, in turn, would then wander through campgrounds and backyards searching for food. Eventually, the bears would either be drugged, captured and relocated, or killed outright.

By the 1980s, it was evident that the Park Service’s policy had been a failure. "Whereas in 1974 the IGBST saw an average of 1.58 black bears and 2.5 grizzlies on every observation flight, by 1980 the ratio had dropped drastically, to .22 for blacks and 1.16 for

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{39}Chase, Playing God in Yellowstone, p. 155.
  \item \textsuperscript{40}"The Fall of the Wild," Newsweek, 28 July 1986, p. 54.
  \item \textsuperscript{41}Craighead, pp. 212-14.
\end{itemize}
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Moreover, as one senior park official purportedly told Mr. Chase, "When Dick Knight told me in 1980, that in five years he had been able to find only 46 bears, I suddenly realized we had been had. The Park Service got what it wanted [to get rid of the bear] and they had succeeded." And while the present situation for the grizzly is precarious, the future may be even more bleak.

**Future Implications.** The grizzly's future in Yellowstone National Park is tenuous at best. Although Park Service policies have, perhaps irreparably, harmed the bear, other factors such as increased poaching and the development of land bordering the park are working against this magnificent animal. Much work remains to be done if the bears are to be preserved.

In order to save the grizzlies it is essential that the Park Service reevaluate its interpretation of ecosystems management. As has been shown, the concept of natural regulation is fraught with problems. One of the worst problems is the range depletion caused by the ever-burgeoning elk population. Unless park officials act soon, many species other than the bears will be harmed.

The grizzly was removed from the Endangered Species List in 1969. Today, they are classified as only as "threatened." What this means is that the grizzlies can still be killed by hunters and by park officials. Though controversial, especially with hunters and politicians, upgrading the grizzly's classification to "endangered" would certainly help the bears. The Park Service is not presently advocating such a change.

To this point, I have focused on past abuses of

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42 Chase, Playing God in Yellowstone, p. 163.

43 Ibid., p. 167.
the grizzly by the Park Service. Unfortunately, the abuse is not over. On the shores of Yellowstone Lake lies another example of Park Service malfeasance: Grant Village. The Grant Village project is a development complex--complete with parking lots, souvenir shops, and sewage treatment facilities--built right on top of five cutthroat trout spawning streams. The area contains some of the best and most heavily used grizzly habitat in the park.44

The purpose behind Grant Village is to move overnight facilities and park visitors away from environmentally sensitive areas such as Old Faithful and Fishing Bridge. The idea was to exchange land that could be developed at Grant Village for land at Fishing Bridge that would be left to the animals.

Unfortunately, the land at Grant is generally considered better grizzly habitat than the area near Fishing Bridge.45 When recommending the plan to the Park Service, the Fish and Wildlife Service stated that "grizzly densities [are] higher [in the Fishing Bridge/Pelican Valley complex] than at other locations in the park—with the exception of the Yellowstone Lake spawning streams."46 Thus, in trying to reduce human involvement in the wilds, as prescribed in the Leopold Report, park officials did nothing but shift the problem from one area of the park to another.

In the original deal orchestrated with the Fish and Wildlife Service, the Park Service agreed to close Fishing Bridge to campers by 1985. As of yet, this has

44McNamee, p. 175.


46McNamee, p. 175.
not occurred. Recreational organizations and business people in communities near the park such as Cody, Wyoming, have lobbied hard in Washington to keep the area open. Operating both developments forces grizzlies to compete with man—contests grizzlies usually lose.

Once again, National Park Service policy has placed the wants of people ahead of the needs of the grizzly bear—despite laws stipulating that it do just the opposite. And once again the Park Service, in trying to separate bears and humans, actually brought them closer together.

Unfortunately, it will be extremely difficult to reverse the effects of the Grant Village development. "Like the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway or the war in Vietnam, Grant Village seems to be one of those lousy things so hugely lousy that nobody can stop them."

The National Park Service was established to "... conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and wildlife therein and to provide for the enjoyment of same in such a manner and by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations."

Decisions to push ahead on projects such as Grant Village warrant concern because they reflect the preference of the Park Service for recreation and tourism over wilderness preservation.

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47"Battling for the Bears at Fishing Bridge Campground," National Parks, July/August 1984, p. 33.


49McNamee, p. 177.

During the last three years, perhaps more has been done for the grizzlies of Yellowstone than for any wild species in history. The federal government in 1984 spent $2.7 million on Yellowstone grizzly management—more than $13,500 per bear. Though well funded, management programs have been ill-advised and detrimental to the bears. Somewhat ironically, political fortitude, more than money or further research, is what may yet save the bear. John Craighead has said:

We already know enough about grizzly biology to save these bears. No matter what else we learn, we're not going to have grizzlies very long unless we preserve large enough tracts of good wildlife habitat. Too often, when a tough political decision in favor of the bear is called for, we put it off by ordering up another research project to— you know—"study the situation." We could end up studying the grizzly to death.

Craighead is not alone in his warnings about what may lie ahead for the grizzly without a reversal of political inertia. Alston Chase, who has studied the events in Yellowstone for several years, observes:

... this tragic course of events could, very possibly, be reversed tomorrow if there were the bureaucratic will to do so. But if history is any guide, that almost certainly will not happen. Seventeen years after its introduction, government grizzly policy still enjoys the support of the federal bureaucracy and many environmental groups. Neither wants to admit that they have been mistaken and are bringing about


52 Chadwick, p. 213.
the extinction of a threatened species. And while the trendy slogan of "ecosystems management" continues to hold many under its sway, the plight of the grizzly is serving a variety of hidden political agendas. Taken together, these disparate forces may soon bring about a Yellowstone without bears. 53

Conclusion

The grizzly bears' history is closely tied with our own; we have both helped and hindered them. The garbage we brought into Yellowstone helped the grizzlies multiply. But, we thought, the population was too large and trouble would eventually occur. To protect us from grizzlies, the government adopted an illogical policy based on unsound philosophical and biological assumptions. The policy is directly responsible for much of the grizzlies' present plight. If a viable population of grizzlies is to be preserved, it will be a victory against government indifference and malfeasance.

If we don't make a far-sighted, deliberate effort to preserve the grizzly in Yellowstone, we will lose not only a powerful symbol of the wilderness, but also one of nature's most magnificent achievements: the grizzly bear.

The quotation from Dubos that prefaced this paper is particularly apt in terms of describing man's relationship with the grizzly. The problem is not protecting ourselves from the bear, it is protecting the bear for and from ourselves.

The grizzlies of Yellowstone National Park represent not only what man has done to harm his environment, but also the opportunity he has for environmental preservation. If we do succeed in preserving this

unique creature, we will have demonstrated compassion and unselfishness, and thereby become all the more human. In the words of nature lover Bil Gilbert, "solving the problem will be hard work, but we need the exercise."\footnote{Bil Gilbert, Our Nature (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1986), p. 247.}

**Cam Chandler**
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"Battling for the Bears at Fishing Bridge Campground," National Parks, July/August 1984, p. 33.


