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NATO: THE U.S. COMMITMENT

Spencer Tall*

Introduction

In the closing phase of the Second World War, seven weeks after the capitulation of Nazi Germany and six weeks before the Hiroshima bomb, representatives of fifty nations signed the United Nations Charter in San Francisco. The date was June 26, 1945, and the world hoped that it had at last learned how to keep the peace. Within four years, however, ten European countries found themselves faced by a threat, the nature of which necessitated some more specific protection than that afforded by the United Nations Charter. Exercising the right of individual or collective self-defense (under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter), the Europeans turned to the United States and Canada to underwrite their pledge of mutual security and, on April 4, 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed.

U.S. relations with its major allies, the NATO countries, have in recent years been

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*The author wishes to express his appreciation to W. Tapley Bennett, former U.S. Ambassador to NATO, from whom much of the information for this study was obtained.

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particularly troubled by differences over what constitutes an appropriate sharing of the burdens and benefits of alliance. The United States initially discouraged its European allies from heavy spending on defense so that they might concentrate on economic recovery instead. In the last twenty-five years, however, the economic growth of the United States has not kept pace with that of its major allies. At the same time global and military responsibilities of the United States have grown while the Europeans have pulled back from global military involvement. Many Americans believe that although our defense efforts are vitally important to our own security, they also contribute a major share of the physical security enjoyed by our NATO allies. Such discrepancies in defense burden sharing were accepted when the Europeans were involved in massive post-war reconstruction efforts and were economically unsteady. But now there is a question as to whether the allies have become too dependent on the United States militarily, while reaping the advantages of the strong economies that have benefited from the United States’ security efforts.

It seems that a lot of the burden sharing problem is inherent in the structure of the alliance systems that the United States developed following the Second World War. During this time the focus of U.S. policy was not a build-up of European national forces. Then Secretary of State Dean Acheson, testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1949, described the U.S. attitude in the following terms:

... economic recovery is a prior necessity; therefore the size of the European forces must be such that they do not interfere with recovery. And it looks as though they will continue to be quite small for some time.
This kind of attitude has characterized the U.S. commitment to Allied defense ever since.

Original Formation

After the German surrender, the Western Powers, true to the wartime pledges and to popular demand, began to demobilize. The armed strength of the Allied forces in Europe at the time of the surrender of Germany was about five million men. One year later, following demobilization, their armed strength amounted to no more than 880,000 men. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, continued to keep its armed forces at a wartime level. In 1945, its strength amounted to more than four million men. It also showed no slowing in its war industries. The economic assistance that was offered by the United States during these first post-war years was also open to the Soviet Union and the countries behind the Iron Curtain. Stalin refused all American aid for the USSR and, despite initial interest on the part of both Czechoslovakia and Poland, forced satellite governments to do likewise.

From the outset there were problems with peace treaties. At a meeting in San Francisco, in 1945, the USSR and the Western powers were unable to agree on the composition of a Polish provisional government. At the London Conference of Foreign Ministers in September of 1945, Mr. Molotov blocked any discussion of the United Kingdom's proposal for the opening of an impartial inquiry into the situation in Rumania and Bulgaria.

The Peace Conference opened in Paris on July 29, 1946, and peace treaties with Italy, Finland, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania were among the accomplishments, but they were not
signed until February 10, 1947. In March of that year the Foreign Ministers met in Moscow to discuss the drafting of peace treaties with Germany and Austria. They were unable to agree on what Germany's fate should be. In November of the same year a new Foreign Ministers' Conference was held in London, but it did no more than confirm the impossibility of agreement. Shortly afterward, the Soviet representatives ceased to take part in the Allied Control Council in Berlin. For all practical purposes, the stalemate at the 1947 Moscow Conference put an end to the cooperation which had developed between the USSR and the Western democratic countries during the war.

Soviet territorial expansion under Stalin had already begun during the war by the annexation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, together with certain parts of Finland, Poland, Rumania, North-Eastern Germany, and Eastern Czechoslovakia. This territorial expansion continued after the defeat of Germany and was supplemented by a policy of control over the countries of Albania, Bulgaria, Rumania, Eastern Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia.

Because of these events, the world found itself split into two blocs. In 1948, Mr. Ernest Bevin, the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary, suggested a formula for a Western union consisting of a network of bilateral agreements along the lines of the Dunkirk Treaty. This was a treaty signed by France and the United Kingdom promising mutual assistance for fifty years in the event of any renewed attempt at aggression by Germany. Although the idea was warmly welcomed, it was felt that the Rio Treaty would be much better as a model because it was an agreement between the U.S. and Latin America to defend each other against any aggression and provided an example of regional grouping.
On March 17, 1948, the Brussels Treaty was signed by Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. These countries pledged themselves to build up a common defense system and to strengthen their economic and cultural ties. Scarcely was this treaty signed when the Soviets started the blockade of West Berlin. It lasted for 323 days and was only countered by the organization of an airlift by the Western powers. The Berlin blockade had the definite effect of hastening the setup of a total Western defense.

On April 28, 1948, the idea of a single mutual defense system, including and superseding the Brussels Treaty, was publicly put forward by Mr. St. Laurent in the Canadian House of Commons. It was recognized by all the parties involved that it was essential that the United States should be able, constitutionally, to join the Atlantic Alliance. To that end, Senator Vandenberg drew up a resolution which recommended the United States' involvement in the agreement. This resolution was adopted on June 11, 1948, by the U.S. Senate. The text of the treaty was published on March 18, 1949, and on April 4, 1949, in spite of the pressure brought to bear by the Soviet Union on the parties to the treaty, twelve nations joined together and signed the document. Subsequently, three other countries joined the twelve original signatories. Greece and Turkey were invited to join the alliance in September, 1951, and the Federal Republic of Germany was invited to accede to the treaty following the signature of the Paris Agreements in October 1954.

North Atlantic Treaty Analysis

The North Atlantic Treaty is the framework for wide cooperation among its signatories. The
organization is not just a military alliance but one which also provides for continuing joint action in the political, economic, and social fields. It consists of a preamble and fourteen articles.

The preamble outlines the treaty's main features. It emphasizes the fact that it is a treaty for the defense of a way of life, not only by military means, but also through all other aspects of alliance.

The articles define the responsibilities of each of the signatories. They also clarify the fact that the obligations undertaken by the signatories are both external (the bringing about of a better understanding of the principles upon which Western Civilization is founded) and internal (the strengthening of their free institutions and the elimination of disputes or conflicts within the alliance in the economic and social fields). They also contain a very important provision, namely that the parties involved agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all. At the same time, however, each country is free to take whatever action it judges necessary. This way every armed attack does not of necessity call for an automatic declaration of general war.

Also provided within the articles is the possibility of revisions to the treaty or withdrawals from it. After the treaty has been in force for ten years, the parties may agree to revise it. After twenty years any party may put an end to its own participation, giving one year's notice of denunciation. As for the treaty itself, it is of unlimited duration and will remain in force for as long as it is considered useful, irrespective of any decision by any individual member to withdraw.
Changing Perspectives of the Administrations

In the early 1950s, mechanisms were established to provide for scrutiny of the defense efforts of NATO members. Cost sharing formulas were also arranged to provide for financing of NATO "infrastructure" costs such as the expense of facilities, services, and programs regarded to be of common benefit to the alliance members. The cost sharing program has operated essentially on the "ability to pay" principle. In earlier times, the United States agreed to pay the largest share of infrastructure expenses. In subsequent years the U.S. share has been progressively reduced until it now constitutes approximately 27 percent of infrastructure costs.

Since the 1950s, as Europe has become more financially stable, the United States has continually sought a greater amount of participation from its allies. This participation involves not only a military commitment, but an economic one as well.

The Kennedy/Johnson Administrations

The Administration of President John F. Kennedy in the early 1960s advocated a policy of Atlantic partnership with shared responsibilities between the United States and an eventually united Europe. This period witnessed the beginning of the financial arrangements between the United States and West Germany designed to offset the costs of stationing U.S. forces in that country. In 1961, the United States and West Germany agreed to an offset program whereby West Germany would purchase military equipment in the United States so as to compensate for U.S. military expenditures in West Germany. These agreements were renewed and expanded in later administrations to include purchases of U.S.
treasury bonds and, in the 1970s, repair of barracks used by American forces in Germany.

During the Johnson Administration, the problems with the Vietnam experience, French withdrawal from the integrated military structure of NATO in 1966, and U.S. economic problems coupled with general diminished support in Congress for U.S. overseas troop commitments, contributed to the administration's pressures on the Europeans to increase their defense efforts.

All of this prompted the first of the "Mansfield Resolutions" on August 31, 1966. Though these resolutions and similar efforts through 1974 failed to win final passage, they did force Congress and the administration to take a hard look at the various commitments to the treaty by the parties involved. The resolution judged that "the condition of our European allies, both economically and militarily, has appreciably improved since large contingents of forces were deployed"; the commitment by all members of the North Atlantic Treaty is based upon the full cooperation of all treaty partners in contributing materials and men on fair and equitable terms, but "such contributions have not been forthcoming from all other members"; "relations between the two parts of Europe are now characterized by an increasing two-way flow of trade, people, and their peaceful exchange"; and "the present policy of maintaining large contingents of United States forces and their dependents on the European Continent also contributes further to the fiscal and monetary problems of the United States." The Senate was asked to resolve that "a substantial reduction of United States Forces permanently stationed in Europe can be made without adversely affecting either our resolve or ability to meet our commitment under the North Atlantic Treaty."
The Nixon Administration was also concerned about U.S. balance of payments problems. But U.S. efforts to get the Europeans to compensate for the U.S. presence in terms of new offset deals, trade, or monetary concessions made little headway with the Europeans. The allies objected to the prospect of American troops becoming a type of mercenary presence in Europe and argued that the U.S. troop presence was, after all, in America's as well as Europe's interest.

The development of the "Nixon Doctrine," first enunciated in an Asian context in Guam in 1969 and subsequently applied globally, brought a turn away from intensive efforts to get the Europeans to redress financial imbalances caused by the troop presence. U.S. policy began to focus almost exclusively on encouraging the allies to make improvements in their own defense capabilities. This was a sharp refocusing of U.S. policy and set the tone for the subsequent decade. President Nixon felt that NATO's conventional forces should not only be maintained, but in certain key areas, strengthened. He felt that the United States should maintain and improve its own forces in Europe if the allies would take a similar approach, and should not reduce them unless there was reciprocal action from our adversaries.

The main success of the new U.S. policy was the encouragement it gave to the European allies to intensify the work of the Eurogroup. The Eurogroup started as an informal caucus of European defense ministers, meeting originally in 1968, and progressed into a very powerful body. The first major Eurogroup project was the European Defense Improvement Program announced in December 1970. The program represented
about one billion dollars (1970 prices) of European defense improvements over a five-year period. It included increased European contributions to NATO infrastructure costs and special nation force improvements.

These increased European contributions, along with a combination of other events in the mid-1970s, decreased congressional pressure for unilateral U.S. troop reductions in Europe. A major influence was the talks on mutual force reductions which opened between NATO and Warsaw Pact delegations in Vienna in 1973. The Nixon Administration and the successor administration under President Gerald Ford argued that chances of getting the Warsaw Pact countries to reduce their forces would be undermined if the United States reduced unilaterally. In addition, reports of Warsaw Pact force improvements tended to weaken the case for Western troop reductions. On the financial front, U.S. balance of payments improved considerably in 1975, lessening pressure from that quarter. Also, during this time Congress became very aware of the U.S. commitment abroad, and worked on the streamlining of U.S. forces and placed increased emphasis on interoperability and standardization of NATO equipment.

The Carter Administration

The policies under President Jimmy Carter basically continued the policy approaches of the Nixon and Ford Administrations. Efforts focused on encouraging improvements in European forces, promoting efficiencies in alliance defense cooperation, and continuing to improve U.S. forces committed to NATO.

In May 1977, the Carter Administration proposed a new long-term defense program for the alliance. An important part of this program
was that NATO countries pledge to increase defense expenditures in real terms 3 percent above inflation during the life of the program. In May 1978, a summit-level NATO meeting was held in Washington and the program of defense improvements that had been developed over the preceding year, including the 3 percent commitment, was approved.

In 1979 and 1980, a number of factors created renewed concern about European defense efforts. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan reinforced the consensus in the United States in support of major increases in U.S. defense expenditures in Europe. But most Europeans did not interpret the invasion as a direct threat to Europe and were therefore reluctant to see it as requiring additional defense efforts on the part of the allies. Furthermore, economic growth slowed in most European countries in 1980 and 1981, making real increases in defense spending particularly difficult, if not impossible, to achieve.

In 1979 and 1980, Congress showed increasing impatience with the defense efforts of the allies by requiring the Secretary of Defense to report on allied progress toward meeting the 3 percent spending objective, to describe cost sharing arrangements within NATO, and to explain efforts being undertaken to equalize the sharing of defense burdens with NATO allies.

The Reagan Administration

The Reagan Administration transmitted the required report to the Congress in March 1981. The report found that, on the average, the allies had failed to meet the 3 percent objectives in all three years of its existence. The report also stated that while failure of the allies to meet the commitment could be seen by the Soviet Union as a weakening of the collective resolve and could
result in widespread shortfalls in meeting NATO force goals, fixed percentage contributions from allied governments are an issue of somewhat lesser importance than development of a mutually agreed, coherent effort to counter the Soviet challenge. The report concluded that, based on quantitative indicators developed for the report, the allies as a group appeared to be shouldering at least their fair share of the NATO defense burden, with some allies carrying somewhat more than their fair share and others less.

The Reagan Administration has been very diligent about working with U.S. allies and negotiating in good faith toward funding participation at an equal level by all parties concerned. To achieve this it seems that the opinions of both sides need to be considered, and a more accurate method of measuring the commitments of each participating country needs to be implemented.

Measuring Defense Efforts: Opposing Concepts

It seems that there is no one definitive way to measure contributions to Western security. The very selection of measuring devices depends heavily on subjective considerations that can vary according to differing national historical experiences, threat perceptions (particularly prominent in relationships with Europe), world roles, ideological assumptions, and concepts of security. Furthermore, there are a number of more technical questions associated with attempts to compare defense efforts. For example, some items, such as the expense of military retirement programs, are included in some defense budgets while they are excluded from others. Even more confusion is caused when one finds that it is at least possible to assess inputs (defense spending) by using graphs and tables but virtually impossible to quantify the outputs (capabilities of the forces resulting from defense programs).
It seems that the dominant official and unofficial American perspective on burden sharing is that the allies should do more. Over the years, American observers have used a great variety of arguments to buttress the case for increased allied defense efforts. The following arguments have been among the most prominent:

--By all quantitative measures of expenditures, the United States spends more on defense than its allies. In 1982, the United States spent more on its defense budget than the European allies and Japan combined.

--U.S. strategic forces, which would be essential for U.S. national security even if the United States were not committed to participate in European and Japanese defense, nonetheless are the ultimate guarantee of Western security and are essential to allied security.

--U.S. global military commitments contribute to Western security. The global U.S. naval role, in particular, makes a direct contribution to the security of Western Europe to the extent that it protects Western maritime trade and access to vital raw materials, oil in particular. Military efforts in the Persian Gulf region are of increasing importance and expense to the United States.

--A major U.S. role in the defense of Europe and Japan was warranted when our allies were weak economically with fragile political structures, but the economic and political maturity of the allies now suggests that they should play an increasingly more responsible role in their own defense. Under the protective shield of the United States, our allies have been able to modernize their industrial plant. The U.S. industrial plant is on average considerably older than that
of our allies, contributing to a competitive advantage for our allies in international trade.

--The increased threat of Soviet aggression warrants large increases in defense spending. If the United States is going to make sacrifices to take the lead in this effort, the allies should be willing to put forth at least the same effort.

Allied Perspectives

While some allies agree that their countries should increase their relative share of the Western defense burden, the prevalent feeling is that many American criticisms of their defense efforts are unwarranted.

They feel that the United States is over-reacting to the Soviet threat. They feel that the Soviets have in fact been weakened by Afghanistan and the events in Poland and will not be tempted to attack any of the NATO allies if already planned improvements in Western defense are made.

Facts and Figures Put Forth by the Allies

Expenditure. In 1981, Eurogroup contributed about $80 billion to NATO's total defense expenditure. During 1970-78, their real spending rose an average of about 2 percent per year over and above inflation, so that by the end of the 1970s, NATO allies had taken on a proportionately greater share of the common defense burden than it carried ten years earlier.

Force Levels and Manpower. Of the ready forces currently available in Europe, about 91 percent of the ground forces and 86 percent of the air forces come from European countries, as
do 75 percent of NATO's tanks and more than 90 percent of its armored divisions. The size of the armed forces of European countries amounts in peacetime to some 3 million, rising to nearly 6 million when reserves with an assigned role in mobilization are included. The North American figures are 2.15 million, rising to 3 million.

Other Contributions by the Allies. Some allied contributions to Western defense cannot be measured in terms of defense expenditures alone. West Germany, for example, contributes a great deal of real estate to the support of NATO forces. The costs of foregoing other productive uses of that real estate and of lost tax revenues are substantial.

Continuing Arguments by the Allies. The allies argue that Americans cannot understand Scandinavian approaches to defense without taking into account the tradition of small standing forces combined with far more extensive civilian participation in contingency war plans through the integration of reserve and militia forces in territorial defense plans than is the case in the United States. Also, because most continental allies maintain some form of conscription, manpower costs are lower than the costs incurred by the United States for volunteer service.

Both Britain and France continue to maintain strategic nuclear forces which enhance the deterrence effect of U.S. capabilities. Over the last thirty years, the allies have purchased far more military equipment from the United States than the United States has purchased from allied arms manufacturers. U.S. industrial profits, employment, and balance of payments have all benefited from this fairly one-sided trade.

These various arguments coming from both sides have shaped the relationship within NATO
for years now, but in recent times another very important burden sharing issue has come to have a great effect on that relationship.

Third World Security as a Burden Sharing Issue

How to interpret and deal with potential threats to Western security arising outside of NATO's boundaries has been one of the most difficult burden sharing issues for the alliance in recent years. With the Iranian crisis and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the U.S. felt that the West had need to strengthen its military posture in the Persian Gulf region. The threat in this region was seen by the U.S. as a continuum of Soviet threats with which Europe had just as much reason to be concerned as the United States. Out of this perception grew demands for European contributions to security in the region through increased European defense efforts in Europe to provide greater flexibility for the U.S. to shift resources to Persian Gulf contingencies.

The Europeans, taking a different point of view, were of the opinion that the instability in the Persian Gulf area was most likely the result of factors indigenous to Middle Eastern countries and conflicts among regional countries (e.g., the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Iran-Iraq war), and not Soviet subversion or indirect involvement in the region (e.g., aid to PLO, Syria, and indigenous Communist parties).

The different perspectives taken by the United States and its allies come from differing national roles, capabilities, and historical experiences. The United States is a global power with global military capabilities while the European nations are, with the exception of France and to
a lesser extent Great Britain, regional powers with military capabilities limited to Europe.

The decline over the last thirty years in Europe's ability to influence events in the Third World was accompanied by an evolving strategic approach to Third World problems. European policies became increasingly dependent on political and economic instruments to influence events in the Third World. The American experience in Vietnam confirmed for many Europeans the wisdom of using military force as a last resort in the Third World.

West European leaders, for the most part, take the position that the West derives considerable security from the needs of Third World countries for access to Western markets and technology. They also believe that similar Soviet requirements for Western technology and other Western goods, such as wheat, tend to constrain Soviet temptations to intervene in Third World trouble spots. They are inclined to believe that instead of a military intervention, in many cases Western interests can be more effectively advanced by developing economic ties with Third World nations. On the whole, the Europeans can be expected to use military power only when political and economic approaches have failed and vital interests are threatened. Both France and Great Britain, however, and a few other European countries, retain some capability for military involvement in the Third World, particularly in Africa and the Middle East, and their use of that capability is not totally excluded. Both France and Italy have demonstrated by their participation in the multinational force in Lebanon that European military contributions to Western interests in the Third World are not out of the question. It seems, though, that the European allies will continue to resist any formal linkage between the NATO commitments and Third World
contingencies, meaning that the Europeans will continue to oppose any formal extension of NATO's boundaries.

Technical Problems with Measuring

The problems with measuring the various commitments to burden sharing within NATO are not only limited to political, social, or economic factors, there are in addition a number of technical difficulties that make measuring these appropriate shares of the Western defense burden difficult. These problems include fluctuating currency exchange rates, differing national approaches to defense budgeting, and the fact that no quantitative methods effectively measure the quality or will of military forces. Therefore, determining what constitutes an equitable sharing of alliance burdens is, ultimately, a very subjective political process.

Policy Options for the U.S.

If the policymakers within the United States decide that, in principle, the allies should make a greater contribution, there are a number of different approaches that need to be taken into consideration. At the level of high policy, the choice of approaches depends on the value attached to alliance relationships by the participants. For example, the U.S. contributions to NATO defenses and security are perceived by the governments of all NATO allies as a vital element of their national security. They therefore want the contribution to continue, which creates a certain amount of leverage that the United States can use to influence the allies' policies and defense spending.

The values that American observers place on our alliance relationships can also influence policy approaches to a certain degree. Those who see
little self-interest in U.S. defense commitments to Europe would likely be willing to risk far more acrimony in relationships with the allies. If one believes that there is no compelling political or military rationale, in terms of U.S. interest, for the presence of sizable contingents of U.S. forces in Europe, then the threat of withdrawal of these forces may be a credible source of leverage. On the other hand, those who see basic commitments to the defense of Europe as clearly beneficial to U.S. interests would presumably want to work within the context of those commitments to encourage larger allied contributions to Western security. Once it is accepted that the U.S. commitment is derived from self-interest rather than from any sense of charity, there are some constraints on the levers available to pressure the allies. The risks of rupturing the alliance relationship are greatly reduced under this assumption, and, for better or worse, the possibilities for fundamental changes in the relationship are diminished. Since World War II this approach has generally characterized U.S. policy toward the defense efforts of its allies.

Legislative Approaches

The U.S. Congress cannot require the allies to increase defense efforts. The Congress can, however, require the administration to take actions to increase pressure on the allies or can provide the administration with levers to "use" the allies. The most direct approach is through the defense authorization process. Amendment of authorization bills has been used in the past to deny funds for activities that the Congress decided should more appropriately be funded by an ally. For example, the FY82 authorization bill on military construction "killed" a 6.4 million dollar authorization to harden logistical facilities for tactical aircraft in Europe, on the ground, that NATO as a whole should pay these expenses.
Even if the threat of massive troop withdrawals is foregone as too extreme, some members of Congress might want to use the threat of marginal reductions as a means of pressuring the allies to improve their own defense efforts, to contribute more to the costs of the U.S. presence, or both.

Summary

While it is understood that a subject as broad as this one can take up many volumes, the purpose of this paper has been to explain what the current policy toward burden sharing within NATO is, and to help clarify where those policies may take us in the future.

From this perspective, it seems that the burden sharing problem is inherent in the structure of the alliance systems that the United States developed following World War II. U.S defense commitments arise from the perception that Soviet dominance in Western Europe would pose a long-term threat to U.S. economic well-being and national security. That perception, plus allied weakness in the 1940s and early 1950s, underlies the structure of our alliance systems and has determined U.S. force structures which give rise to relatively high costs for the United States. If the United States wants to encourage increased defense efforts while simultaneously sustaining a broad base of support for the alliance in Europe, then policies must be designed with great sensitivity to the political and economic circumstances in the allied countries. Forms of pressure that produce friction but no increases in defense efforts would, from this perspective, be counterproductive for U.S. interests.

Self-interest naturally dictates that U.S. officials should try to get the allies to do whatever will relieve the defense burden confronting the
American people. Similarly, European officials see it as their responsibility to pursue defense spending policies consistent with their political mandates and responsibilities.

The view from this perspective is that the allies should do somewhat more than they are now doing, but that the United States should approach this subject with a policy that seeks to understand the European commitment by both input and output. The U.S. should not just consider the dollar amounts that are committed, but the economic capabilities in relation to that commitment as well.

In summary, barring any unexpected and dramatic security threats, the current expectation is for trends in allied spending patterns to continue as they have in the recent past. There will probably be no substantial shifts in the apportionment of Western defense burdens without overall reductions in allied defense capabilities unless they should come as a product of arms control agreements with the Soviet Union. As long as the underlying perceptions and alliance structures remain valid and the United States wishes to remain a global power, the United States will likely continue to spend more on defense than its allies.
Annexed or under Soviet administration

Controlled by USSR

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<th>Area</th>
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Soviet expansion 1940-48
The EUROGROUP is an informal grouping, within NATO, and is open to all European members of the Alliance. Those taking part at present are:

Belgium
Denmark
Germany
Greece
Italy
Luxembourg
The Netherlands
Norway
Portugal
Spain
Turkey
The United Kingdom
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<td>Norway</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>194</td>
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<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1,083</td>
<td>1,505</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>3,650</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>5,084</td>
<td>8,950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1,229</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>3,837</td>
<td>5,162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>2,291</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>23,084</td>
<td>25,893</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afloat</td>
<td></td>
<td>26,621</td>
<td>5,932</td>
<td></td>
<td>32,553</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL IN EUROPE</td>
<td>227,270</td>
<td>39,564</td>
<td>7,224</td>
<td>81,575</td>
<td>355,633</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(TOTAL COMMITTED</td>
<td>(227,245)</td>
<td>(12,938)</td>
<td>(1,216)</td>
<td>(81,588)</td>
<td>(322,957)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TO NATO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO FORCES as % of TOTAL</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>0.05%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
</tr>
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*The continuing resolution for FY83 defense appropriations froze levels of U.S. troops "on shore" in Europe at 315,600.*
Table 2: NATO Defense Efforts

Defense Spending 1981 (comparisons corrected for inflation)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total armed forces</th>
<th>% change from previous year</th>
<th>4-year avg % change</th>
<th>as a % of GDP</th>
<th>as a % of gov't spending</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>109,000 Belgium</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>2.77</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>9.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>81,000 Canada</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>8.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>31,000 Denmark</td>
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<td>1.35</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>7.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>578,000 France</td>
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<td>3.97</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>20.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>495,000 Germany</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>2.55</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>28.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>186,000 Greece</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>20.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>517,000 Italy</td>
<td>-1.2</td>
<td>1.93</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>5.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>1,000 Luxembourg</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>106,000 Netherlands</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>4.55</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>347,000 Spain</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>769,000 Turkey</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>20.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1.8</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>12.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>2,189,000 United States</td>
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<td>3.78</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>25.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ENDNOTES


2 Ibid., pp. 20-25.

3 Ibid.

4 See Map #2 reference on Soviet expansion.


7 U.S., Department of State, NATO, Western Security, and Arms Reduction, Address by Kenneth Dam, Deputy Secretary of State, Executive Club, Oslo, Norway, U.S. Department of State Current Policy no. 583, March 21, 1983.


13 U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *NATO Today: The Alliance in Evolution*, Senate Report, April 1982, p. 82 (also see map #2).


18 Ibid.

19 See tables #1 and #2.

20 Ibid.


22 Ibid.


NATO: THE U.S. COMMITMENT


