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## Peace in Unity: 19th Century Irenic Motivations in European Unification

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**PEACE IN UNITY: 19<sup>TH</sup> CENTURY IRENIC MOTIVATIONS  
IN EUROPEAN UNIFICATION**

BY

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Submitted to Brigham Young University in partial fulfillment  
of graduation requirements for University Honors

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## ABSTRACT

### PEACE IN UNITY: IRENIC MOTIVATIONS IN EUROPEAN UNIFICATION

The Hauptargumenten of politicians and citizens concerning the advantages and disadvantages of the EU are almost exclusively economic or political in nature: lower tariffs; loss of monetary instruments; immigration; disenfranchisement; etc. The object of my thesis is to remind everyone, amid the flurry of speculation and uncertainty prevalent in Europe since the French rejection of the EU constitution, that a major benefit of the European integration is peace, on a continent that has been ravaged by war for centuries.

I prove that the establishment of peace was a major element in European unification by confirming links between peace movements and evolving pan-European ideas and political machinery. Limiting my research to the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, I focus on the following specific peace conferences, organizations, and activists: the 1899 Hague Peace Conference; the Interparliamentary Union; the Universal Peace Congress; and Bertha von Suttner. My research has yielded compelling evidence of early calls and movements for a united Europe in the name of peace, as well as actual political “peace” mechanisms and measures to bring about this unification.

Understanding that peace was a major element in the development of modern united Europe reminds the EU of its heritage, helping resolve the current EU crisis by arguing for integration, which fosters peace.

## **I. INTRODUCTION: CONTEXT AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS TOPIC**

*“A day will come when bullets and bombshells will be replaced by votes, by the universal suffrage of nations, by the venerable arbitration of a great Sovereign Senate, which will be to Europe what the Parliament is to England, what the Diet is to Germany, what the Legislative Assembly is to France. A day will come when a cannon will be exhibited in public museums, just as an instrument of torture is now, and people will be astonished how such a thing could have been.”*

-Victor Hugo

On May 29, 2005, French voters shocked Europe and the rest of the world by rejecting the new EU Constitution after nine other European countries (including Germany) had already ratified it. A few days later, Holland followed suit and voted “Nee” by an even greater margin. Panic and disbelief settled upon EU politicians, and the Euro dipped as markets reacted to the news. Europeans on other parts of the continent grumbled about the temperamental French, while political analysts and the media exploited this new challenge as The EU Crisis.

Since May 29, many press articles and politicians have questioned EU Identity, believing this once seamless and unified porcelain façade to have been shattered by the heavy blow of the French referendum. Others hold, rather, that this 25-member bloc features at least 25 different conceptions of what the European Union is and where it should be heading. The French vote simply stripped the porcelain of its veneer, betraying its ugly welds and hairline cracks. Still others shake their heads at the very thought of a supranational organization that could compromise national sovereignty – or make the Turks a part of their in-group.

At this critical point in EU history, as its members and the rest of the world are deciding what to make of the fledgling union, an earnest and heated debate is raging in Brussels and within the governments of each member country. Everywhere, everyone is asking the same question about this EU crisis: “What now?”

When inspecting the agreements, goals, histories, treaties, laws, and compromises that have led to modern united Europe, many are guilty of selective myopia – their magnifying glasses spend a majority of time on contemporary political and economic elements. Taking a step back to scrutinize the history of European integration provides a more enlightened viewpoint, one that helps resolve the so-called EU crisis. This new, complete viewpoint reveals that an overlooked and integral enzyme in European unification was the *establishment of peace* on a continent where, for many hundreds of years, seemingly continuous wars ravaged and destroyed.

### **The Thesis and Its Purpose**

More aptly put, imagine that Europe has embarked on a long journey towards a destination. The current EU crisis is a temporary mishap, halting its journey. At such a discouraging point, remembering the initial reasons for making the journey often help overcome any difficulties. In this case, a main reason Europe began the journey towards integration was to secure peace; plucking up courage, if Europe will only continue on its way, it may yet reach that objective of peace.

The purpose of this thesis is to prove that a central motive for Europe’s journey towards integration was to secure peace. I will trace European integration’s path back to the late 19<sup>th</sup> century to examine the significant contributions of political and popular peace movements to the gradual development of a united Europe. In light of this history

of the process of European unification, the proper response to the EU crisis is to move forward with integration, remembering one of integration's major benefits: peace.

I have chosen five specific elements to explore to prove the imperative of continued EU integration, which must be supported through establishing the link between peace and European unification. The five elements are as follows: a brief history of international movements for peace and integration; the first Hague Peace Conference; the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU); the Universal Peace Congress (UPC); and Nobel Prize Winner Bertha von Suttner. I will then conclude by making a case for integration as a means of preserving peace, and end with a literary approach to the problem of war.

## **II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND INTEGRATION MOVEMENTS**

To better understand the road that Europe has traversed until the highly significant 19<sup>th</sup> century that is the focus of this thesis, I will briefly trace the evolution of peace movements throughout recorded history. Earliest records of political peace agreements and movements do not actually originate in Europe, but in Asia. In Old Testament times, David and Solomon entered into treaties to guarantee peace and harmony. The Babylonians also entered into agreements with surrounding powers to make themselves more secure (Redlich 187).

Ideas of international peace agreements and organizations on the European continent date back to Ancient Greece, where independent city-states formed the Amphyctyonic League, which prohibited any member from destroying another or cutting off another's water supply. Many centuries after the Greeks, Thomas Aquinas, the great catholic philosopher and theologian, spoke in favor of international arbitration. A



relatively unknown student of the celebrated Saint Thomas, called Pierre du Bois, expounded his teacher's views and even proposed a "Congress of Princes, which would have as its purpose the establishment of a 'permanent tribunal of arbitration'" (Redlich 187-88).

In Europe in the early 1600's, the French statesman Maximilien de Bethune, Duke of Sully, developed a "Grand Design" for peace in Europe, which was the first comprehensive and definite plan to organize a worldwide peace movement. Sully's plan called for the formation of a council of representatives of all European countries that would settle disagreements between nations. Other progressive thinkers, like the Quaker leader William Penn and Abbé Charles Irenee Castel de Saint-Pierre, dreamt of an international Senate, with delegates from each of the European countries, to avoid the horrors of war (Tryon 358).

By the 19<sup>th</sup> century, nearly all peace thinking had visualized the same goal of a Congress of Nations. Although there was unity in this ultimate goal, there was much variation as to exactly what this Congress of Nations should be. Men like Sir Travers Twiss sought "specialized international tribunals," while Bentham and Miles would endow Congress with "a moral sanction only" (Beales 241). John Stuart Mill elaborated Victor Hugo's dream of a United States of Europe, disagreeing with others suggestions to return to the papal arbitration of the Middle Ages (Beales 241).

Presently, most surveys of peace conferences or, more generally, the modern history of peace as we understand the term today, begin in 1815 after the Congress of Vienna and Napoleon's final defeat. This commonality has more basis than mere convention – it is after the attempted restructuring of Europe following the Napoleonic

Wars that peace movements really flourish and rapidly proliferate. In this thesis I will concentrate largely upon the latter decade of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, as it is this decade that witnessed a clear and significant merger between peace and politics.

### **III. THE 1899 HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE**

*“Die Internationale Völkerjustiz ist in ein prunkvolles Heim eingezogen . . . Die Wirkung, die von diesem Monument ausstrahlen wird, ist noch unberechenbar. Andrew Carnegie hat der Welt ein Geschenk gemacht, das ihm ein paar Millionen gekostet hat, das aber, wenn es seine Bestimmung erfüllt, der Welt ungezählte Milliarden ersparen wird.”*

-Bertha von Suttner

To establish the link between peace (specifically through peace organizations and movements) and the gradual process of the development of a united Europe, the 1899 Hague Peace Conference is a logical place to start. The conference is a logical beginning and an important step in European integration because it was the first conference of European powers convened during peacetime to discuss steps toward peace, and it also resulted in the Permanent Court of Arbitration, which is separate from and often overshadowed by the International War Crimes Tribunal, housed in the same building. The Court of Arbitration was the first such institution for international conflict resolution. The First Hague Peace Conference led to a second one, in 1907, and also fathered a later, more expansive body of international law and cooperation – the Geneva Accords of 1925 (Beales 233, 257).

The events that led to the 1899 Hague Peace Conference are also a clear illustration of the link between peace organizations and the nascence of significant

European integration. Four particular elements in the story of the conference's genesis best demonstrate this link: the 1894 English *démarche*; the role of M. Basili in the Hague Conference; the controversy surrounding Tsar Nicholas II's true motives for calling the conference; and the novels of Ivan Bloch and Bertha von Suttner

### **The 1894 *Démarche***

The first link between peace and integration within the genesis of the Hague Conference is the 1894 British *Démarche*. In this year a petition circulated by the Arbitration Alliance, a peace group headed by English journalist William J. Stead, is believed to have greatly influenced Archibald Philip Primrose, Earl of Rosebery, who had just become Prime Minister of England. The petition convinced Rosebery of popular domestic support for an "international conference," encouraging him to hint to Staal, the Russian Ambassador, that a call for an international conference on disarmament would be well received in England (Ford 355).

In a later conversation with Staal, Rosebery asked:

The question then arises – how should such a conference be convoked? I am quite clear that there is one person who is preeminently fitted to summon such a gathering. The Emperor of Russia by his high, pure character, and his single minded desire for peace is the Sovereign who appears to me to be marked out as the originator of such a meeting. He is so placed as to be above the suspicion of his having an interested motive, while his power, the splendor of his position and his spirit of conciliation would attract Powers who would not care to be represented at such a Conference elsewhere . . . ( Ford 356)

Tsar Alexander III, although finding the idea of an international disarmament conference favorable, rebuffed his ambassador's reports of English wooing, writing in the margin of Staal's dispatch: ". . . I certainly do not see any positive result. Of course this would be a great benefit to humanity, and I most of all would rejoice, but I think that as yet it is utopia" (Ford 356).

Although apparently unsuccessful, this initial 1894 English *démarche* had an undeniable influence on the development of the later successful Hague Conference by showing Russia that such an international conference would be successful, as it was supported by one of Russia's main military rivals – Great Britain. It also shows a clear link between the contribution of a peace group – the Arbitration Alliance – and the eventual calling of the Hague Conference, which conference was a clear step towards European integration.

### **The Role of A. Basili – Russian Minister of War**

The second link between peace and integration discernible within the genesis of the Hague Conference is the role of A. Basili. Basili joined the Russian Cabinet in April 1897, replacing Kuropatkin as minister of war. His moment in the spotlight was brief, but very significant, for the conference in embryo. Until his new appointment as minister, Basili had served as the Consul-General for Russia in Budapest. While there, he attended several sessions of the Universal Peace Congress, which had assembled in Budapest in 1896. He went to the conference as an impartial observer and on his own volition, in no official capacity. The Universal Peace Congress, which is made up of representatives of peace organizations from around the world, had adopted a resolution calling for the termination of new weapons development. Basili believed that Russia should propose just

such an idea, and wrote to Saint Petersburg a “report summarizing the activities of the Universal Peace Congress and listing the pragmatic and humanitarian arguments which he believed should have persuaded the czarist regime to act” (Morrill 304). His report seemed to have no immediate effect.

As some doubt whether the Tsar ever saw Basili’s report exists, many scholars argue that Basili had no role in the conference proposal, but was certainly influential in the later development thereof. However, the fact that Basili was taken from his relatively unimportant post in Budapest to serve as Minister of War, and was also given charge of the conference negotiations, suggests that his appointment was more than mere coincidence. That Priklonski, one of Basili’s assistants, drafted the first *memoir* of the proposed conference is also not serendipity – and that this *memoir* referred to the Inter-Parliamentary Conference as a forerunner of the peace movement and also introduced the idea of international arbitration (Ford 361).

Certainly the interconnection of all of these occurrences is based on something more than chance. If the Tsar did not see Basili’s report, it is certainly possible that he was indirectly influenced by it; for it is very probable that either Muraviev (Foreign Minister), Kuropatkin, or Witte (Finance Minister) saw Basili’s report, and, knowing well the idealistic temperament of Tsar Nicholas II, one of these advisors could have used its contents to help convince their Tsar to propose an international conference on disarmament, though they each had their own, less idealistic, motives. (Each man wanted the Tsar to propose a conference for political and economic reasons that were unique to their posts, which reasons will be discussed later.)

Basili's role in the Hague Conference, at whatever stage it actually took place, shows a clear link between peace organizations and the eventual conference so significant in the history of European integration. First, the Universal Peace Congress inspired Basili to make his mark on the Russian government with a letter suggesting an international conference like the later Hague Conference. Second, Basili's handpicked assistant Priklonski was chosen to draft the first *memoir* of the conference. Basili certainly favored Priklonski due to Priklonski's sympathy with Basili's peace-movement inspired agenda. Third, the first *memoir* of the proposed Hague Conference specifically mentioned the Inter-Parliamentary Conference as a forerunner of the peace movement and an obvious inspiration to the germinating conference.

### **Tsar Nicholas II and His Motives**

The third link between peace and integration within the genesis of the Hague Conference is perceptible in the controversy about Tsar Nicholas II's motives in proposing the conference. The controversy is whether Nicholas II was acting on idealistic peace motives in his proposition of an international conference or whether he was looking to secure Russia's interests in the Far East, where Britain was threatening. Evidence suggests that the Tsar acted primarily out of idealism, buttressing his ideals with practical considerations.

The conference proposal came at a time when British-Russian relations were at an all-time low due to the Russian acquisition of Port Arthur (Morris 296). Many other benefits in such a proposal could have also served Russian national interest. The Finance Minister Witte, for example, attested in his memoirs that the costs of keeping up with Austria in the arms race were becoming prohibitively high at an estimated 130 million

rubles (Ford 368). An international disarmament would help Russia maintain its military superiority without breaking the national coffers. In the memoirs of the Tsar's advisors, however, (men such as Witte, Muraviev, and Kuropatkin) historians meet a Tsar who is a very idealistic pushover – one who takes these national concerns only as a buttress to a more idyllic motive – peace.

Witte's characteristically self-important description of his role in the conference genesis, combined with Kuropatkin's account of his courtship of the Tsar, perfectly describe this interesting dynamic between the Tsar's supposed idealism and the Tsar's ministers' pragmatic concerns:

In other words, I knew that what was wanted was some ruse by means of which we could get Austria to stay her hand and discuss disarmament in lieu of investing in the improved gun. Within these limits then I had to work. I walked up and down the room for some time in silence, pondering the different aspects of the matter and giving utterance to my half-formed thoughts as they emerged into the realm of consciousness. They centered naturally and necessarily around my old pet idea of pacific nations vying with each other in trade, industry, science, arts, inventions, and I said to myself that even if the opportunity had not yet come to draw nearer to that, there would be no harm in setting the powers talking about it. And that started me. (Ford 368)

Kuropatkin, on the other hand, introduced the scheme to the czar in a very interesting fashion. With this “noble initiative,” the Tsar would assure himself a place in history, “being remembered always as the first ruler who told the world that the money presently

spent on military forces could be better used to uplift the well-being of the civilian population” (Morrill 299).

Meanwhile, Muraviev was worried about the “grave problem” created by the development of “military forces to proportions hitherto unknown” (Morrill 296). On August 24, 1898, he met with the diplomatic corps of St. Petersburg at Foreign office and distributed a circular calling for an international conference to discuss the problem.

Kuropatkin’s appeal to the Tsar is truly revolutionary – the trade-off modern economists term “guns or butter” was not an established idea at the time – nor is it short of astounding that a minister of war would approach his ruler with such a difficult proposition using such unorthodox rationale. The fact that all three ministers (especially Witte) essentially claimed full credit for the conference proposal is especially interesting to note – all mention very pragmatic reasons for their actions. Not one of them, however, fails to mention that they sold the idea to Nicholas II in a very different manner than that through which they themselves had reasoned it out.

Nicholas met resistance to the conference idea from his wife, mother, and uncle – the young Tsar weighed their objections heavily, which is probably why the conference was so long in commencing or even being announced (Morrill 307). His family’s objections were all very pragmatic as well – Russia could simply not afford to lose its military superiority on account of outdated weaponry. His uncle crunched some numbers and reported that the weapons upgrade could be done without breaking the national coffers. Still the Tsar hesitated. After a long period of agonizing indecision and fading dreams of the “noble cause,” Morrill reports that it was Russia’s interest in the Far East that eventually “prompted the Tsar to give the go-ahead” (310). His ideals having been



deflated by practical arguments to the contrary, it appears that he searched for practical arguments in favor of his beloved ideal.

With this background in mind, I argue that the Tsar's motives were mixed – had there been no practical benefit to Russian national interest in the proposal, he would not have had the character to propose the conference. This is forgivable – leaders are often forced to steer their nations through difficult waters, and must make the decision they believe will be best; mixed motives are not necessarily bad. The most important thing to note is the difference between the Tsar's thought process and that of his ministers; the Tsar began with an ideal he wished to satisfy, and sought practical benefits which would further justify his ideal – this is especially necessary for leaders, who must make decisions for other people that might not share their same ideals. His ministers, on the other hand, began with their practical concerns, and dressed them up in idealism to present them before the Tsar. Why did the ministers address the Tsar under the guise of idealism? Obviously they thought it was the best way to persuade him. What this means is that idealistic motives of peace are the primary reason the Tsar called the Hague Conference – one more proof supporting the importance of the peace ideal in the development of European integration.

### **The Mighty Pen: Bloch and Suttner**

The fourth and final link between peace and integration within the genesis of the Hague Conference is the effect that two novels written by prominent figures in contemporary peace movements had on the Tsar while he was contemplating the idea of an international conference. The first novelist, Ivan Bloch, published his six-volume work called *La Guerre Future* in 1898. It immediately created an international sensation

because his well-supported (over 2,000 total pages!) argument was so stunning and revolutionary in its boldness – war was to be, from 1898 on, an impossibility. He reasoned that new weapons technology (new rifles, smokeless gunpowder, etc.) had rendered traditional open-ground combat strategic suicide; the face of war was forever changed, and armies would now be forced to wage entrenched battles (as entrenched soldiers enjoyed a 4-to-1 advantage over regular infantry), which would make quick and decisive victories a thing of the past.

To resolve the inevitable stalemates, the industrialized nations would keep pouring in troops, numbering into the millions. The eventual deadlock would turn war into an industrial duel between nations, placing massive economic stress on countries. Disease, famine, and other social ills would ravage countries until they collapsed, or a revolution from below overthrew them.

Needless to say, this evaluation caused quite a stir. Many political leaders, military buffs, and scholars treated the book with much skepticism – even contempt. Peace advocates felt that they had found a new spokesman – here was a man who could fight fire with fire, so to speak, by using “war-mongers” own rationale and pragmatism against them. Reminiscent of the Cold War MAD doctrine, society had finally evolved to the point that war was no longer a realistic possibility.

Bloch wasted no time in proclaiming his results to the world – he even worked with the aforementioned William J. Stead in England and was present at the First Hague Conference, handing out pamphlets about his book (Ford 359). In 1901 he was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize by an Italian ex-ambassador to Austria. Interestingly, this former ambassador urged the Nobel committee to award Tsar Nicholas II with an

honorary Peace Prize, while dividing the prize money between Frédéric Passy, Ivan Bloch, and Bertha von Suttner (Nobel). Passy went on to win a joint Nobel Prize with Henry Dunant that year.

Scholars disagree on how much influence Bloch's book could have had on the Tsar – some argue, using a statement by Finance Minister Witte as proof, that the book had no influence whatsoever on the Tsar. Ford explains: “Witte, the Russian minister, disposed of this legend [Bloch's influence on the Tsar] finally in the spring of 1899 when he emphasized to Radolin ‘that the Tsar's fine idea to assure the peace of the world was not derived from the folios of M. Bloch’” (359). Most historians are quick to note, however, that Monsieur the Finance Minister was indeed a glory hog, and a passing comment to a subordinate should not be given much weight (Ford 359).

Several other sources indicate that Tsar Nicholas II either read Bloch's book or was rumored to have read it (Ford 359 and Nobel). That Witte's statement should be taken for a definitive answer on the subject seems inane when the book was so well known and so widely discussed that it could be considered a part of the era's mainstream culture. The timing of the book's publication, which was during the Tsar's critical decision-making period of 1898, is another argument for its importance. Whether Nicholas II turned every page and digested every word is impossible to know; but that Bloch's book was familiar to him and could potentially serve as a huge support of his peace ideals is definite.

The second influential novelist's book predates Bloch's book by about 10 years. Bertha von Suttner's momentous novel *Die Waffen Nieder* excited a great stir in international circles. Translated into many languages, the book immediately catapulted

her into the forefront of the peace movement. Her novel, subtitled *Ein Lebensgeschichte*, appealed to a much greater and more diverse populace than Bloch's later work, because it was written as a *Roman* rather than a scholarly treatise. It tells the story of a young Baroness, Martha von Tilling, who, through the course of the wars of 1859, 1864, 1866, and 1870-71 in Europe, loses two husbands and her son. The graphic descriptions and dramatic stories of battles and the grave realities of war shocked her audience and bolstered the ranks of the peace movements.

In a letter written by Prince Peter Dolgorukov, a member of the Russian aristocracy, dated October 1898, a few months after the first circulars proposing the Hague Conference were delivered from St. Petersburg, the Prince tells Bertha that she is responsible for the conference proposal. He writes: “. . . I know from a very trustworthy source of information that the Emperor wrote this document [the Hague Conference proposal] after he had read *Die Waffen Nieder*. Consequently this fortunate event is to be ascribed wholly to your influence” (Suttner, Memoirs 193).

To her credit, Baroness von Suttner was either more humble or more intelligent (or both) than Finance Minister Witte in acknowledging her role in the conference development. She wrote as a note to this letter:

Although it delighted me to hear that the Tsar had read my book shortly before the appearance of the manifesto, yet I was firmly convinced that a long chain of many influences, among which that of reading a novel could have been of only small effect, must have preceded such an action. Later I learned that Bloch's book had made a deep impression on the Tsar . . .

(Suttner, Memoirs 193)

Prince Dolgorukov's letter and Bertha's attached note provide evidence of three important connections. First, that the Tsar had read Suttner's book shortly before issuing the proposal, and that it had certainly influenced him. Second, once again, that timing was very important – during those several months of indecision it is clear that the Tsar was feeding his idealism from Suttner's popular and very idealistic book that had been published several years earlier. Third, her note is also further evidence that the Tsar read Bloch's book during this same critical period.

The link between peace organizations and the Baroness von Suttner begins before she even joined an organization. Suttner was inspired to write her novel after hearing of the existence of an "International Peace and Arbitration Association." She recalled her reaction: "What? Such a league existed, - the idea of justice between nations, the struggle to do away with war, had assumed form and life? The news electrified me" (Memoirs 287-88). This remarkable piece of information, she wrote, "had a decisive influence on my after life and work" (Memoirs 287). Baroness von Suttner quickly put the finishing touches on the piece she had been working on at the time (*Das Maschinenzeitalter*), to begin work on *Die Waffen Nieder*: "I wanted to be of service to the Peace League," she wrote, and, being a novelist, "how could I better do so than by trying to write a book which should propagate its ideas?" (Suttner, Memoirs 294). In retrospect, she was completely right – it is difficult to imagine anything else she could have done that would have had a greater effect than her novel.

Bloch and Suttner's give-and-take relationships with peace movements are evident. In turn, Bloch and Suttner's influence upon the Tsar at the critical time of

decision about whether to propose the Hague Conference is equally clear. Again, my endeavor is to show that peace was a major motive for Europe's journey towards integration, of which Bloch and Suttner's novels and contributions are a clear indication.

#### **IV. THE INTER-PARLIAMENTARY UNION**

As a prototype of the future EU government made up strictly of politicians of different nationalities, the IPU is very strong evidence that modern united Europe's foundation is rooted in peace. Perhaps the most successful peace organization, the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), was formed in 1889 by leading members of the French and English Parliaments – in particular, Frédéric Passy and William Randal Cremer. I deem it the most successful because it seems to have had the largest *direct* influence on international arbitration, armaments agreements, and other multi-national peace treaties. The IPU was so successful because it consisted of important political figures of many different countries – political figures who were in positions to effect real and direct changes. Whereas most peace organizations and movements were made up of civilians and were typically more “grassroots” in nature, the IPU was at its heart a political mechanism – a mechanism very reminiscent of the current EU's Parliament.

August Schou, in his *Histoire de l'Internationalisme*, ascribes the original idea of the IPU to a member of Austria's *Reichsrat* in 1870. He explains exactly what this seed that later blossomed into the IPU was: “L’idée d’établir des contacts plus étroits entre les parlementaires des différents pays” (393). This Austrian politician's idea was lost in the bustle of the Franco-Prussian war that soon followed. In 1876, another Austrian politician, Adolf Fischhof, resurrected the idea and persuaded several French and Italian parliamentarians to participate. He corresponded with Henry Richard in England, writing

that the *Hauptthema* of these conferences between parliaments should be disarmament. The aggravation of international tension in 1877 impeded Fischhof's project, and a similar project presented in Paris in 1878 also failed. Only near the end of the 1880's would Passy and Cremer come to succeed (Beales 154-157, 190).

Like many such institutions, the IPU began rather modestly, but slowly developed into a powerful organization. The first meeting of the group took place in July and was attended by only British and French delegates. The next year the Americans, Belgians, Danes, Liberians, Spanish, and Hungarians joined the French and the British; every year the group grew larger and more diverse. Until the assembly in Rome in 1891, the meetings, as Schou describes, "avaient eu un caractère assez improvisé, sans ordre du jour déterminé ni rapports préliminaires sur des questions essentielles. Ce fut la quatrième conférence à Berne en 1892 qui dota l'union d'une organisation permanente" (395). Where the earlier meetings were customarily held in hotel rooms, the Berne conference took place in "la salle de réunion de l'assemblée nationale," granting the group a more formal and official status. Every conference thereafter was held in the parliament building of whatever nation was host (Schou 395).

Procedures for becoming a member of the union were also established, requiring members of national parliaments to sign up with the interparliamentary "Bureau". At the conference in Budapest in 1896, members from non-constitutional states were also allowed entrance: "sont également admis les membres des Sénats et Conseils facultatifs ou d'autres institutions analogues de pays non constitutionnels, munis de l'autorisation de leurs gouvernements" (Schou 396). There was much argument about this point, but in the end it was decided to allow members from "absolutist" states – for all decisions made in

the parliament were not necessarily adopted in the parliaments of the member nations, constitution or no.

The principal task of the Union was to work in favor of international arbitration. In a conference in the Hague in 1894, Philip Stanhope presented an idea for establishing a “central tribunal in Europe.” In Stanhope’s report, several fundamental principles for the creation of a political tribunal of arbitration were established, such as:

1. “Tous les Etats adherents doivent être sur le pied d’une parfaite égalité à l’égard de la Cour permanente.
2. Les jugements de cette Cour doivent avoir la force d’une sentence exécutoire” (Schou 398).

These very principles were fundamental parts of what is considered the founding treaty of the modern European Union: the 1951 Treaty of Paris, which established the European Coal and Steel community. Establishing supra-national institutions very similar to the modern EU to govern the agreements, in chapters one, two, and three of Title II the Treaty of Paris called for equal representation (equality of the states) for each participating country. Executive power was given to the High Authority, which itself could only allow a maximum of two persons from each nationality.

Another IPU conference in Saint Louis in 1904 also laid the foundation for the vital 1951 Treaty of Paris. At this conference, the American Richard Bartholdt presented vast objectives aimed at filling the existent gaps of international law (Schou 398-399). The first gap to address was the lack of a legislature to make and “guarantee” international laws. To rectify this shortcoming, he proposed an international parliament, very much like the Assembly created by the Treaty of Paris, which called for



representatives of each country who were to be elected by universal suffrage (Title II, Chapter 2, Article 21). The second gap was an effective international judiciary, which an obligatory international court of arbitration would remedy. The Treaty of Paris incorporated this proposal in chapter 4 of Title II, where it established a court to interpret and apply the agreements of the treaty. The third and final gap was the lack of an executive, which Bartholdt advised should be established by each participating country's willingness to put its armed forces at the disposition of the tribunal to enforce decisions of the court and the laws of the parliament. The Treaty of Paris established a High Authority in chapter one of Title II, which addresses this gap in a non-military manner.

The same difficulties the multi-national IPU faced while working to establish a "union organisée et durable entre [les] Etats" were confronted later by the contemporary shapers of the modern EU (Schou 405). Without question, the actual concrete accomplishments of the IPU (i.e. the International Court of Arbitration), as well as their creative solutions to problems of integration such as those mentioned above, heavily influenced and aided the later development of the EU. A phrase in the preamble of the Treaty of Paris is particularly reminiscent of the IPU's objective: "DESIROUS of assisting through the expansion of their basic production in raising the standard of living and in furthering the works of peace . . ."

Gradually, the IPU itself implemented many of the practices it advocated nations to follow, particularly an equally-represented leadership branch, which, after the conference in Christiania in 1899, was formed of two representatives of each nationality (Schou 406). Furthermore, two of the most eminent and influential members of the Union were in constant contact with the organized peace movement: notably the Union's two

founders, Randal Cremer and Frédéric Passy. Characterized in “*La Paix par le Droit*,” a well-circulated law journal, the Union’s object was: “C’est de l’avenir qu’on se préoccupe, et – ce qui peut passer pour un paradoxe – on cherche à assurer la paix de demain en se taisant sur les causes de guerre.” The IPU’s remarkable influence and concern for the future through establishing peace were paralleled by many private peace organizations – notably the Universal Peace Congress.

## **V. THE UNIVERSAL PEACE CONGRESS**

The Universal Peace Congress (UPC) is another clear proof of the role of the establishment of peace in modern united Europe’s cultural and political development. To begin examining how the UPC is a proof of the role of peace, I will give a brief history of the organization before moving on to supporting arguments.

The UPC held its inaugural meeting the same year as the IPU, in the summer of 1889. The UPC’s concrete inception can be traced back only a few weeks before its inaugural meeting, to a peace demonstration in St. James’s Hall in London on May 19, 1889. This demonstration issued invitations to all the peace organizations of the world to inaugurate a series of annual World Peace Congresses, which should be held in the same cities as the IPU, so that the whole of the peace movement could be represented in the same capital city (Beales 192).

In its inaugural year, the UPC sat for five days (23<sup>rd</sup> to 27<sup>th</sup> of June), preceding the IPU conference. Frédéric Passy presided over the delegates, who were from both Europe and America. Beales reports on the content of the first UPC meeting:

It was in effect a revival of the series of 1848-1851, which had been curtailed at the outbreak of the Crimean crisis and never resumed . . . The

emphasis throughout the proceedings was on arbitration. It was resolved that arbitration should not only form a fundamental part of the constitution of every State, but should be embodied in principle in every future treaty as an obligatory and not an optional undertaking. (192)

The Congress passed resolutions to petition governments to take diplomatic steps towards international arbitration; the majority of the group's initial meetings, however, were confined to preparatory work for later conferences.

While the Interparliamentary Union is best conceptualized as the political side of the European peace movement, the UPC is best understood as the popular side. These twin movements complemented each other very well, working as two separate blades to shear through bellicose traditions like a scissor. The UPC, despite rather shoddy organization and a lack of capable interpreters in its first years, still managed to make a huge impact on the cultural and political scenes in Europe. While the IPU could "assail governments from within," its official declarations enjoying an "official standing higher than that of any Peace Society or Arbitration League petition," the UPC represented the "combined strength of these societies and leagues" which addressed governments and parliaments "from without" (Beales 193). As such, the UPC's particular mission was to spread peace propaganda among its several national publics. This two-pronged attack, the political IPU and the popular UPC, was very successful in getting the attentions of powerful national leaders, paving the way for significant *Vorschrift* such as the 1899 Hague Peace Conference.

Five elements in the Universal Peace Congress prove the importance of the establishment of peace in Europe's cultural and political integration. First, as I have

already mentioned, the UPC worked in tandem with the IPU, functioning particularly (although in many other capacities as well) as the proverbial public relations and recruiting arm of the IPU. Pacific parliamentarians would have had greater difficulty in their drive to unite Europe were their constituents ignorant of the peace movement. Second, there is the notion of the beast turning the head, rather than the head turning the beast. The people, it was assumed, would march *en masse* on national political centers to demand international arbitration and other peace mechanisms, were they only aware of the benefits of such machinery. It is not easy to assign exact proportions to European unifying influences, but it is certain that the broad base of citizens who would later affect their governments through universal suffrage were instrumental in the development and gradual acceptance of a united Europe. They were, in the same symbiotic sense of the IPU and the UPC, both affecters and affected. The UPC was the teacher of these future voters, and a paramount shaper of the consciousness and identity of national citizens *par apport* other EU nations.

Third, the Universal Peace Congress urged the Interparliamentary Union to adopt a project to create specific legal machinery for international arbitration. Arguments swirled within both peace organizations for several years before a definite body of legal guidelines and machinery was agreed upon. A large point of contention was whether a government could specify beforehand which types of disputes it could submit for arbitration. The ever-idealistic UPC was avid in its assertion that all governments should amend their constitutions to submit to arbitration *all* forms of disputes. The more practical IPU, led by Hodgson Pratt, argued that a government could never realistically consent to this, and pleaded for more categorical wording; definite limits had to be

recognized for nations to adopt arbitration laws. In the end, the Universal Peace Conference won out, and their version of arbitration, with slight modifications, is what was presented at the Hague Conference a few years later (Beales 228-230).

Fourth, key figures in the Universal Peace Congress were also integral in creating the nuts and bolts of the international law mechanisms of arbitration. William Darby, the secretary of the London Peace Society, secured the nomination from the International Law Association in 1893 for a committee to draft arbitration treaties and a project for an arbitration tribunal. This committee completed its task by April 1895, and its report was passed at the annual UPC meeting in Brussels the following year. Beale explains the content and impact of this committee's work:

It is the first part of this project, concerned with the scope and structure of Permanent Arbitration Treaties, that forms, with the Inter-Parliamentary project for a tribunal, an outline of pacific machinery more complete than any yet evolved. The thirteen articles of the Association's plan recognized two classes of Arbitration Treaty – “all-in” treaties with no reservations, and treaties in which certain specified types of dispute were excluded from arbitration on grounds of honour or national independence . . . Should there be doubt as to whether any dispute was arbitrable under the treaty, this uncertainty should itself be resolved by arbitration. Procedure should be always by case, counter case, printed arguments presented simultaneously, and a final oral discussion . . . The arbitrator's award, finally, was to be published within a fixed time. *Much ground, then, had been cleared by the two series of conferences [UPC & IPU] and by the*

*learned societies [Int'l Law Association] when the Hague Conference ultimately met. (228, emphasis added).*

Not only was the UPC instrumental in educating the public through constant demonstrations and propaganda, it was also very influential in the development of international political machinery. A majority of preparation for the 1899 Hague Conference was completed by the group.

Lastly, the UPC, as I mentioned in the section on the Hague Conference, influenced M. Basili to write a letter to his Russian government after attending one of their conferences. This eventually landed him a job as Minister of War through Foreign Minister Muraviev, who used the UPC's ideas to woo the Tsar for armaments limitations through the guise of a pacific conference. Indeed, were it not for the UPC, there may have been no Hague Conference at all.

A final point regarding both the IPU and the UPC is further proof of the link between peace and European integration. Both organizations, concerned about the "very tender plant" that was the peace movement (so characterized by Bertha von Suttner), proposed the creation of Bureaus to "represent the Peace organizations when they were not in annual session, to knit them more closely together, to circulate information, and to build up a library" (Beales 225). The UPC created the International Peace Bureau in 1892, the first and only international federation of Peace organizations. It was directed by Albert Gobat of the Swiss National Council, and had its first meeting in Berne in August 1892. At this meeting, a motion was tabled by E. T. Mondeta, S. J. Capper, and the Baroness von Suttner, for a "Confederation of the European States" based on the plan put forth by the Geneva League of Peace and Liberty in 1867. This resolution eventually

passed, although not without opposition. The UPC worked towards this goal incessantly, until their dreams became a reality with later foundational EU treaties such as the Treaty of Paris in 1951.

## **VI. THE BARONESS BERTHA VON SUTTNER**

Bertha von Suttner's contribution to peace is a perfect example of the link between attempts to establish peace and subsequent European integration. The role she played was magnanimous, more so because of her pioneering position as a woman in a man's political world. When the 1899 Hague Peace Conference "opened with much pomp and circumstance," Peter van den Dungen recounts, "and the Dutch foreign minister welcomed the 100 diplomatic and military representatives of 26 countries, there was only one woman in the hall: Bertha von Suttner." Her tireless efforts on behalf of peace made many things possible that otherwise would have been unattainable, later earning her the honor of being the first female recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize.

Born Countess Kinsky in Prague on June 9, 1843, she was the daughter of a field marshal and the granddaughter of a cavalry captain. As part of the aristocracy, she accepted without question the militaristic traditions of her class, only to vehemently oppose them later in her life. She became Baroness von Suttner when she married Baron Arthur von Suttner in 1876 (Suttner, Lebenserrinerungen 7,13).

As mentioned in the Hague Conference section, the turning point in Suttner's life came when she first learned of the existence in London of the International Peace and Arbitration Association. She quickly set about writing a book which could transmit the Peace League's ideas. This novel, entitled *Die Waffen Nieder*, became the vehicle which catapulted her to international fame and iconic status at the forefront of the peace

movement. Within its pages she scientifically combats the *Kriegslust* prevalent in Europe at the time, characterizing war as a fire to which soldiers, like firemen, are called.

Firemen have a terrible duty, she relates; surely it would be bizarre for anyone to wish for a fire (18). Those that were clamoring for war in her society were, in essence, absurdly doing just that: wishing for a fire. The novel proved very adept at relating the horrors and futility of war, and served as the most widely-distributed (immediately translated into many languages) and successful recruiting tool for the peace movement of the time.

Some of Suttner's contribution to the growing popular and political peace movements I have already cited, though she did more than can be accurately reported or quantified. Finding herself in a position of significant influence after publishing her novel, she began to work unceasingly to build up the peace movement in her native Austria and the rest of Europe. In 1891 she formed a Venetian peace group, initiated and presided over the Austrian Peace Society, and attended her first international peace congress. She established a fund to finance the International Peace Bureau commissioned by the Universal Peace Congress. Present at many important international peace gatherings, she was outspoken in her refutations of the necessity of war and persistent in her political lobbying to convince powerful leaders of her views. "Like no other figure in the international peace movement," van den Dungen comments, "Suttner had access to royalty – notable is her friendship with Prince Albert I of Monaco, who established the world's first International Peace Institute in 1903."

Suttner and her husband worked hard to gain support for the Czar's Manifesto and the Hague Peace Conference of 1899. They arranged public meetings, formed committees, and lectured. Together with A.H. Fried, she initiated the peace journal *Die*



*Waffen Nieder*, named after her influential book. Through this journal she kept the public informed on current events and the progress of the expanding international peace movement. She sent accounts of the Hague Conference to the *Neue Freie Presse* and to other papers across the world. In the year following the Hague Peace Conference, she wrote articles and held public meetings to popularize the idea of the Permanent Court of Arbitration set up by the Conference. Considering the peace movement in its political and popular entirety as a great machine with many connected wheels and belts, Suttner was the genius mechanic, oiling joints and tightening straps to ensure the machine's smooth operation.

While men such as Muraviev, Witte, Tsar Nicholas II, and Bloch were arguing for peace from rather practical, short-term perspectives relevant to their professional positions, Suttner was not afraid to call the game as it was: war was simply terrible. It destroys families, lives, fortunes, nations, culture, and diverts resources from more productive ventures. False unquestioning loyalty to the state, dubbed patriotism, and philosophies such as Leibniz's "we live in the best of all possible worlds" operated then as they do today, leading people to support bellicose policies and campaigns. Suttner met and countered such sentiments and arguments masterfully, especially within the pages of *Die Waffen Nieder*. In something of an antedating Mark Twain "War Poem," Suttner wrote about the preparations for a war between Austria and Prussia. Kaiser Franz Joseph, in his speech to his people, invokes the name of God in his justification of war and *Siegesgewiss*. On the other side of the battlefield, the Prussian commander appeals to the same God:

Sobald mit Gottes Hilfe der Gegner geschlagen und zum Rückzug gezwungen sein wird, werden wir ihm auf dem Fusse folgen und ihr werdet im Feindesland euch ausrasten und diejenigen Erholungen im reichlichsten Masse in Anspruch nehmen, die sich eine siegreiche Armee mit vollstem Rechte verdient wird. (149-50).

As in Twain's "War Poem," two warring sides were appealing to the same God for both justification and victory. This passage effectively confronted her audience with the ridiculousness of such a supplication, common though it may be. Through this and other methods Suttner effectively revealed the "*Widerspruch über Widerspruch*" – the attempts by society and leaders to invoke two mutually-exclusive principals in war justifications and supplications: "*wie Krieg und Gerechtigkeit, wie Völkerhass und Menschlichkeit, wie Gott der Liebe und Gott der Schlachten*" (150). Such passages in her novel won many readers to the peace movement by pointing out flawed reasoning in traditional arguments in support of war.

Suttner's rebuttals, together with descriptions of the carnage, confusion, and fear prevalent on the battlefield, are what garnered so much popular support for the burgeoning peace movement. She addressed a majority of the popular and oft-cited rationales for the inevitability of war, such as patriotism, the state superseding the individual, love of the patria, human nature, national defense, freedom, and national heroes. Not only did her novel increase the strength of the popular half of the peace movement, it put her in a position to rub shoulders with men in powerful political positions, gaining support for the peace movement in high places that would otherwise have not existed. Finally, the novel itself influenced politically potent men, as Count

Dolgorukov's concession to the Baroness mentioned in the Hague Conference section made clear: the great Tsar of Russia himself was supping at this great feast of irenic ideas.

## **VII. CONCLUSION: THE CASE FOR INTEGRATION**

The political and social scenes of the 19<sup>th</sup> century were almost magical; an anti-war novel such as *Die Waffen Nieder* would not attract much notice today. More improbable still in our day are international *popular* (nonpolitical) meetings to discuss the furtherance of peace hosted by the United States Secretary of State, as was the 1893 World Peace Congress in Chicago. For many reasons, the fruit of international cooperation toward peace was ripe during these several decades, to be plucked and enjoyed particularly during the last decade of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, with the peacetime gathering at the Hague in 1899, the advent of the IPU and the UPC, and the presence of unique and potent personalities such as Tsar Nicholas II and Bertha von Suttner.

The story behind the genesis of the 1899 Hague Peace Conference leaves little doubt that the quest for peace was an imperative element in the inception, preparation, and accomplishments of that conference. The first Hague Conference is a clear step towards a more united Europe: politically, through the mechanisms such as the International Court of Arbitration which were created there; and culturally, as it was primarily a conference of European powers, proposed and directed by Europeans on behalf of peace on that quarrelsome continent.

Among the ranks of the Interparliamentary Conference and the Universal Peace Congress were found those working doggedly for peace through the universal dream of a united Europe. Although they differed in methods and principle, they were unified in

their determination to avoid armed conflict, initiating and perpetuating political mechanisms and cultural tendencies which later culminated in the creation of the European Union, among other similar worldwide organizations of international cooperation, such as the UN.

Baroness Bertha von Suttner is typically hailed as “*die Mutter des Friedens*,” famous for her pacifist writings and her involvement in the popular peace movements. Though her contributions are significant in these two areas, her lesser-known political engagements are of equal importance in assessing the development of Europe’s unification. Her iconic status, aristocratic background, and sincere intentions gave her access to the world’s elite political arenas, making her a beloved and respected gadfly capable of influencing Europe’s most powerful rulers. A masterful mechanic, the peace movement was well maintained until her death a few months before the outbreak of WWI. How the peace movement and therefore Europe’s process of unification would have been affected without this unique woman’s influence is impossible to tell; needless to say, Europe, and the world, would be very different places.

Examination of the genesis of the 1899 Hague Peace Conference, the accomplishments and goals of the Interparliamentary Conference and the Universal Peace Congress, and *Fridensnobelpreisträgerin* Bertha von Suttner’s political and popular peace contributions convincingly prove that an integral part of modern Europe’s development is the establishment of peace and, therefore, one of the primary reasons for its existence.

## **Resolving the European Crisis**

Understanding that a major reason for European integration was peace is extremely important for resolving the EU crisis, which crisis is the uncertainty about the role and the future of the EU. Embroiled in econometric and political analysis lies this overlooked benefit of Europe's interdependence – Ivan Bloch's prediction of the "impossibility of war" seems to be more probable in modern-day Europe than ever before. The difficult "What now?" question is more easily solved after giving peace its proper due – only examine, with the new understanding gleaned from this thesis, the most difficult questions facing the EU at present, particularly enlargement (Turkey) and the failure of complete ratification of the EU constitution. In positing this argument, I am already implying that peace is an absolute benefit to the region. This may seem like a tautology to some, but in reality such a statement should be supported.

For simplicity, imagine that each country in the world is merely an individual, interacting with other individuals (countries) while trying to maximize its own definition of utility. Each individual has a limited amount of money to buy or save as she pleases, according to her preferences. An individual who is constantly fighting with other individuals or who lives in a perilous area is necessarily going to spend a lot of her limited income on simply securing her life and that which she owns. Instead of buying her dream home and eating well, she must pay to put up an electric fence and install alarms around her shoddy dwelling. This trade-off – buying unwanted goods to simply maintain the status quo as opposed to buying desired goods – is termed "guns and butter" by economists.

Imagine another common scenario: an individual invests huge amounts of her money to develop better ways to defend herself and maintain the status quo, which she then utilizes – such as developing then throwing a hand grenade. Each time a one-hundred dollar grenade is thrown, she becomes, in essence, one hundred dollars poorer: that is a hundred dollars she could have used to build her dream house. War has many, more terrible, costs – in particular, the psychological and physical damage done to those involved. The consequences are far-reaching and impossible to quantify: a true application of the “butterfly effect” in mathematical chaos theory.

The arguments for war, such as those presented by Nietzsche and others, certainly have some merit. Nietzsche contends that war (hardship in general) fosters the best qualities in people, such as hard work, resourcefulness, and others. These arguments fall short, however, as the level of total human suffering seems completely relative; as B.C. Johnson notes, in a world where the worst thing that could happen were a stubbed toe, that would quite possibly provide enough *relative* suffering and opposition to generate like qualities. Besides, war certainly also generates the worst qualities in people (cowardice, bloodlust, hate). Therefore, my contention is that peace is an absolute benefit that should be actively sought through all feasible methods.

### **Integration Fosters Peace**

To understand how integration fosters peace, return to the metaphor of each country being represented as an individual in a society. In a completely fragmented society (which is really not a society at all), each individual would be completely independent of other people in every way. This means that each person is completely self-reliant and can furnish herself with all the necessities of survival. This necessarily

means that the individual can only “consume,” in any form, that which she “produces.” In such a society, an individual sustains very little injury if another individual suddenly dies or disappears. Therefore, if an individual crosses another, the costs of “eliminating” that individual are much lower in a fragmented society. Cooperation has no immediate self-interest for anyone. Such a scenario is representative of empires in their international “society” throughout much of history.

The scenario representative of modern Europe is quite different in that integration has made each individual very dependent upon others. Each individual specializes in particular trades and services and exchanges her goods for those produced by others. In such a society of cooperation, each individual has a greater self-interest in the preservation of other individuals – if Mrs. O’Reilly were to die, I would have no one to care for me when I am sick. The costs of eliminating another individual when crossed in this integrated society are much higher. Therefore, incentives in integrated societies (whether among nations at the world level or individuals at the local level) are so much different as to dissuade harmful action and encourage supportive action.

Recognition of modern unified Europe’s foundation in peace may prove integral in deciding the future of the EU, especially in regard to EU enlargement. Polls show that a majority of Europeans are against opening accession talks with Turkey, seeing the majority Islamic country as very different from their own. Obviously, enlargement should take place as economic and political factors come into alignment (a certain level of economic integration is necessary before complete benefits from monetary unification, among other things, can be fully realized), but Europe’s very history shows that integration fosters a great benefit – peace.

The French rejection of the EU constitution is not necessarily a setback to European integration at all – if the voters have qualms about the undemocratic nature of the document, it is best to make some changes to address their concerns. An understanding of united Europe’s foundation in peace and the pacific benefits of integration should calm politicians’ and citizens’ nerves by reminding them of three things: first, that the benefits of the EU project are greater than the drawbacks; second, that establishing satisfactory integration mechanisms takes time; and third, that the EU has a definite identity, which is a product of hundreds of years of revolutionary changes and idealistic sacrifice for the ultimate benefits secured by a peaceful society. EU politicians and citizens can take further comfort and encouragement knowing that their accomplishments serve as a model for the world, promoting symbiotic international cooperation: and therefore, peace.



## **A LITERARY APPROACH**

### **The Game of Historical Inevitability**

\*Pacifism, you say? What are we to do against maniacs like Hitler? One must protect the innocent from harm and evil!\*

So many of the evils we are drawn into are the result of a game. It is a game that begins with two people in a rowboat on a lake. One decides to lean far to one side, causing the boat to tip down and take on water. The other person reacts and leans to the other side to counteract the first's movement and to maintain balance to prevent capsizing. Others come and pick a side, supporting either the one leaning on the starboard side or the one leaning on the port side. They too lean. Still others come, and they lean simply because they must: everyone else is; it wouldn't affect the balance of the boat whatever they did. Still more come, angry at the game and the shifting weight of others, and lean. And so, caught up in the inevitability of the cascading water down the fall, more and more people come and choose sides, because it wouldn't matter if they decided different, it wouldn't affect the balance of the boat with so many others leaning . . .

And so the game continues, long after the original two are dead and forgotten, each person on the boat thinking to themselves: "How stupid that I must do this! But that is the way of it, I must play the game."

\*So it is with war. Each person thinks to herself: "This is awful. It could be avoided, but what can I do against all these people? I must simply go along with it. There is no other way."

Hitler would not have been a threat had each German soldier and citizen simply said: "No!" But that would have been unpatriotic and unpopular: cowardly. And each

soldier thinks to himself: “If I protest this barbarous action I will be shot and the others will carry it out all the same.” Each soldier is thinking this same thing.

\*In this game, everyone holds out and suppresses what they really want so that there are no winners, only losers.\*

Those few who come to themselves after tiring of the glare of the sun on the water and the monotony of the necessity of leaning, pass by those who lean morally, and patriotically, and with fear, and with misery. They pass by those who simply sit numbly on the boat without casting a shadow. Receiving scowls and angry stares for their troubles, they jump into the water.

. . . The cool, clear water, and swim to a shore, an oasis, and gain their land-legs and eat coconuts and fish and rest their weary limbs and nurse their hollow minds.

Those still back on the boat whisper what they have taught themselves to believe: “I must continue or the boat will capsize. If those who have gone before me hadn’t sacrificed so much by leaning so hard I wouldn’t be where I am today. The boat would have capsized. Certainly I am living in the best of all possible worlds. Had anything happened differently than it did, I would be worse off.”

And thus are we still engaged, rushing together in the imperative cascading of water down the fall.

We are so worried about doing what’s right because of what others may do: we are so busy doing what no one wants because we are afraid the boat will capsize if we do not. We are so intent on doing evil because evil will prevail if we do not. Because one began to play the game, we all must play to survive. And by playing the game we have missed our God-given right to something better.

\*\*The truth is, no one wants to fight a war. But the German soldier must be true to his country and history, and so must the American soldier. No one would betray and dishonor those who have gone before, who have given them what they have today. Thus we become arrows, sharp for killing, bristling in the quiver of our respective madmen to shoot and kill or be killed . . .

And the weeping German widow asks God why. And the disfigured American soldier asks God why he deserves such a fate.

We turn from them in silence.

Deep down, our silence answers their despairing cries:

The boat musn't capsize.\*\*

“I would rather die for something I believe in, like peace, than for something I do not believe in, like war.”

-Albert Einstein

### **A Just Cause**

One day two young brothers were fighting over a toy. The older, stronger brother prevailed and took it. The younger felt wronged, as the toy had been his, given to him by his father. The older brother felt justified, as he knew the father had given the toy to him. Neither child understood that their father had given the toy to both of them, to share. The younger brother, sure of the justness of his cause, took his petition to his father. He pleaded with his father for help to get back what rightfully belonged to him; he pleaded for a redress of wrongs and justice to be done.

The older brother, aware of his brother's designs upon his newly won toy, went also to his father to ask for help in keeping and defending what was rightfully his.

But the father never intervened, and each boy, believing his cause to be just and supported by his loving father, battled over the toy again.

The victor later told others how his father had fought for him, helping him in his cause.

The vanquished later spoke of his defeat as a chastening, a wordless lecture from his father. Of course his father had not answered his petition for help; he had forgotten to take out the trash last week as promised, and so was undeserving of his father's aid.

And the father, seeing all of this, wept bitterly, wishing his two children would not ask him for their separate victories – for the victory of one implied the defeat of the other. The tears of joy of one would necessarily mean the tears of misery of the other. One's glory was the other's shame.

And he loved them both!

Neither of the boy's explanations was of course true. Because of his love for them both the father could not interfere.

He could only weep.

“The God of Heaven looked upon the residue of the people, and He wept [. . .]  
And God said ‘And unto they brethren have I said, and also given commandment, that they should love one another, and that they should choose me, their father; but behold, they are without affection, and they hate their own blood.’”

- Moses 7: 28, 33: The Pearl of Great Price

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