Cultivating Internal Rhetoric: Lessons on Self-Directed Rhetoric from Protestant Meditation Manuals and Modern Metacognitive Theory

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ABSTRACT
Cultivating Internal Rhetoric: Lessons on Self-Directed Rhetoric from Protestant Meditation Manuals and Modern Metacognitive Theory

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Internal rhetoric describes how individuals engage in self-persuasion. Jean Nienkamp developed a theory of internal rhetoric by drawing on both the rhetorical tradition and the field of psychology. I build on Nienkamp’s work by arguing that the Christian meditative practice outlined by Joseph Hall in The Arte of Divine Meditation (1607) and Edmund Calamy in The Art of Divine Meditation (1634) provides a theoretical and practical framework for performing a particular kind of internal rhetoric in which people become the rhetorical critic by reading their own beliefs and knowledge and then become the rhetor by composing self-directed arguments. This process of internal rhetoric aims to increase understanding, rouse affections, and change behavior.

Synthesizing Hall and Calamy’s meditative approach to internal rhetoric with Gregory Schraw’s model of metacognition creates a more complete theory and practice of internal rhetoric, a practice that transforms the very nature of the individual. By bringing scholarship from multiple disciplines into conversation with one another, we can better understand how internal rhetoric is enacted and how to teach it.

Keywords: internal rhetoric, self-persuasion, meditation, metacognition, Renaissance rhetoric
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Introduction

Hamlet’s perhaps most well-known soliloquy begins, “To be, or not to be? That is the question.” To answer this troubling question, Hamlet must persuade himself to believe that being or not being is the correct course of action. This kind of persuasion is self-persuasion. Thomas Sloan suggests that self-persuasion is “antagonistic to [rhetoric’s] traditional nature” (45, 49). For Sloan, the internal workings of the mind upon itself cannot be rhetoric because the self is not a rhetorical audience, a public, external audience. Therefore, Sloan suggests that self-persuasion should not be considered rhetoric. Kenneth Burke disagrees with Sloan. Burke says, “A man can be his own audience, insofar as he, even in his secret thoughts, cultivates certain ideas or images for the effect he hopes they may have upon him” (38). Like Burke, other rhetoricians in the Western rhetorical tradition disagree with Sloan’s assessment of internal rhetoric. In Greece, Isocrates states, “The same arguments which we use in persuading others when we speak in public, we employ also when we deliberate in our own thoughts…we regard as sage those who most skillfully debate their problems in their own minds” (Antidosis 328-329). For Isocrates, the rhetoric used for internal deliberation is the same rhetoric used for external deliberation. In Rome, Cicero states that the words of the eloquent “testify that even in his leisure hours he reflected upon business, and that when he was by himself he used to talk with himself” (On Duties 3.1). Quintilian also says that “there will be oratory in an orator even though he be silent” (Institutes of Oratory 2.18.3). Cicero and Quintilian suggest that internal rhetoric is not antagonistic to the traditional nature of rhetoric, but internal rhetoric is inherent in it.

This internal rhetoric, or self-persuasion, has largely been neglected in modern scholarship. Some, however, like Jean Nienkamp, in her book Internal Rhetorics: Toward a History and Theory of Self-Persuasion, explore this concept. Nienkamp coins the term internal
rhetoric and defines it as a type of rhetoric “characterized by intentional (self-) persuasion toward a desired end” (4). She observes that internal rhetoric has “not been analyzed by most rhetorical theorists” (ix-x). Search queries for “internal rhetoric” on *MLA International Bibliography*, *Project Muse*, and *J-STOR* confirm Nienkamp’s observation. Nienkamp traces evidence of self-persuasion in ancient rhetorics—Homer, Plato, Aristotle, and Isocrates—Enlightenment rhetorics—Francis Bacon and Richard Whately—and modern rhetorics—Kenneth Burke, Chaim Perelman, and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca. Nienkamp argues that internal rhetoric precedes public rhetoric and enables good decision-making. She also argues that internal rhetoric constructs a rhetorical self and builds societies and communities. She says internal rhetoric is the answer to “how…we, as a society and as individuals, [can] make responsible ethical decisions in an era when moral principles are not agreed upon” (133), because “open-ended (open-minded) internal rhetoric [involves] testing claims and predicting the broad consequences of actions from a variety of perspectives” (133). She states that internal rhetoric “is a learned an often deliberately cultivated behavior” (4). So, if internal rhetoric constructs the self and society and can be cultivated and improved, how do we cultivate and practice internal rhetoric?

I build on Nienkamp’s work by arguing that instructions on practicing internal rhetoric are found in Renaissance Christian meditation. Nienkamp acknowledges that a comprehensive history of internal rhetoric would trace the influences of “the confessions of St. Augustine and the spiritual exercises of St. Ignatius Loyola” (41), but she went no further. St. Ignatius’s *Spiritual Exercises* certainly contains principles of internal rhetoric, as Ignatius says, “the purpose of these Exercises is to help the exercitant to conquer himself, and to regulate his life” (47). However, these exercises rely heavily on an “’affective mode’ in spiritual practice” (Fitzsimmons 90) that focuses on visualization “to carry affect into [the meditator’s] heart and so
sway his will” (Sullivan 43). Although visualization can be a powerful tool for self-persuasion, there is more to internal rhetoric than visualizing. In Renaissance Christian humanist rhetoric, we find more complete instructions on internal, self-directed rhetoric, specifically in Joseph Hall’s *The Arte of Divine Meditation* (1607) and Edmund Calamy’s *The Art of Divine Meditation* (1634), both Protestant meditation manuals. Other Puritan manuals—such as William Bradshaw’s *A Preparation to the Receiving of the Sacrament*, Richard Rogers’s *A Garden of Spirituall Flowers* and *Seaven Treatises Containing such Direction*, and Thomas Taylor’s *A Man in Christ, or: A New Creature*—only provide models of meditation, or only provide written examples of what meditation looks like rather than explicit instructions on how to meditate. Hall and Calamy provide both explicit instructions and models for how to meditate. When I use the term meditation, I do not refer to Eastern meditative practices where “the mind is in an absolute state of non-doing” (Vohra-Gupta et al. 52), nor does Hall and Calamy’s meditative practice function on “the Buddhist idea of *anatta*, or ‘not-self’” (Wright 58). Robert Wright states that this concept of not-self “links the idea of self to the idea of control” (61). If there is no self, then there is no control. When I use the term meditation, I refer to Hall and Calamy’s conceptualization of meditation as an intentional act to “talke profitably with thy selfe” (Hall 49) that, rather than seeking a contemplative “emptiness” (Wright 143), seeks to deliberately change one’s thoughts, feelings, and actions “through divers forms of discourse” (Hall 7).

While Joseph Hall’s meditation manual is foundational to Protestant meditation, Edmund Calamy’s manual extends the reach of meditation beyond Hall’s work. Milo Kaufmann says, “The central tradition in formal Puritan meditation may be said to begin with Joseph Hall” (120). Scholars, like Frank Huntley, Leonard Tourney, and Richard McCabe, have written about Hall’s life and meditative work; some scholars, like H. Fisch and Ronald Corthell, have acknowledged
the rhetorical nature of his meditation manual. Corthell most clearly states that Hall’s meditations were consciously rhetorical when he observes, “Hall models his treatment of ‘deliberate’ meditation after…the preceptive *ars rhetoricae*” (373). Although Corthell sees the “self-examination” (371) in and rhetorical aspects of meditation, he stops short of describing the self as the audience for that rhetorical process of self-examination. Corthell, like other scholars, has not addressed the presence of internal rhetoric in meditation. Unlike Hall, Calamy has received little attention in scholarship. Calamy is most often spoken of for his role as “the ‘ec’ of Smectymnuus” (McCabe 144), a group of five Presbyterians who spoke out directly against Hall’s claims for episcopal privilege and authority written in *An Humble Remonstrance to the High Court of Parliament* (1640). When scholars mention Calamy for his meditative work, they merely say that Calamy based his meditation manual on Hall’s manual (Jordan 381; McCabe 144). Calamy himself acknowledges Hall’s influence on his work (11), but Calamy’s work more clearly describes how meditation should affect the way meditators live. This key contribution from Calamy is critical for understanding internal rhetoric. This essay explores these neglected connections between Hall and Calamy’s meditation with internal rhetoric.

However, Hall and Calamy’s theory and practice of internal rhetoric remains incomplete. Scholarship on internal rhetoric cannot ignore important contributions from psychology to understand its nature. Nienkamp used the work of George Herbert Mead and Lev Vygotsky to explore social influences on language and the rhetorical self. I also look to psychology to better understand internal rhetoric by using Gregory Schraw’s model of metacognition to further develop internal rhetoric and strengthen the connection between the fields of psychology and rhetoric. In 1994, Schraw and Rayne Dennison presented a new model for metacognition and defined metacognition as “the ability to reflect upon, understand, and control one’s learning”
They separated metacognition into two processes: knowledge of cognition and regulation of cognition. Several years later, Schraw more clearly defined this model. He states that “Knowledge of cognition refers to what individuals know about their own cognition or about cognition in general” (114). This knowledge can be three types of knowledge: (1) declarative knowledge, or “knowing ‘about’ things;” (2) procedural knowledge, or “knowing ‘how’ to do things;” and (3) conditional knowledge, or “knowing the ‘why’ and ‘when’ aspects of cognition” (114). Knowledge of cognition is a knowledge about one’s own cognitive processes and knowing when to use particular strategies. Schraw defines regulation of cognition as “a set of activities that help [learners] control their learning” (114). Three major activities in the regulation of cognition are planning, or “the selection of appropriate strategies and the allocation of resources that affect performance;” monitoring, or “the ability to engage in periodic self-testing while learning” to apprehend “comprehension and task performance;” and evaluating, or “appraising the products and efficiency of one’s learning” (115). When individuals regulate their cognition, they actively make cognitive changes based on their knowledge of what is or is not working for them. They plan how to make changes, monitor those changes, and evaluate if the changes are effective. These processes are further examples of internal rhetoric.

Schraw’s model has been foundational to metacognitive theory, and since then models have shared characteristics with those he outlined. Other metacognitive theories may provide additional insight on internal rhetoric, but because his model is accessible and shares similarities with Hall and Calamy’s meditative practice, I use Schraw’s model for this analysis. I argue that Hall and Calamy present a theory and practice of internal rhetoric that involves reading oneself as a critic and composing self-directed arguments as a rhetor. These processes of self-reading and composing augment Schraw’s metacognitive model by explaining how people convince
themselves of what they know about and how to regulate their cognition. Furthermore, I argue that a synthesis of Hall and Calamy’s meditation and Schraw’s metacognition form a more complete theory and practice for a particular kind of internal rhetoric. This synthesized model can then be used to teach internal rhetoric. To synthesize these approaches, I will use what James Jasinski terms abduction, which is “a back and forth tacking…between text and the concept or concepts that are being investigated simultaneously” (256). I will first show the rhetorical nature of Calamy and Hall’s art of meditation and how they conceive of meditation as internal rhetoric. Next, I will outline the meditative practice that Calamy and Hall present, which will in turn provide a model for how to practice internal rhetoric and explains the processes that add to metacognition. Then, I will show how viewing their meditation and Schraw’s model of metacognition in harmony provides a more complete theory and practice of internal rhetoric.

Meditation Is Internal Rhetoric

For Hall and Calamy, meditation is a process that fosters self-knowledge and an understanding of what one knows. It is “a reflecting act of the soul, whereby the soul is carried back to it self, and considers all the things that it knows” (Calamy 24). Meditation is not merely thinking about the things of God but thinking about what one knows about those things of God—a practice that is clearly metacognitive in nature. Calamy states, “To meditate….is a communing, a consulting with our own hearts” (23). Meditators commune with their own hearts through meditation, coming to understand what they know, what they feel, and what they do by dwelling upon and thinking about subjects that “stir up holiness, and provoke you to godliness and piety” (163). Meditation stirs up the desire necessary to change one’s nature.

While Hall and Calamy differ slightly on what they include in their manuals, they follow the same basic structure: teaching what meditation is, why it should be done, and how to do it.
They define two types of meditation: (1) Occasional or extemporal meditation and (2) deliberate meditation. Calamy defines occasional meditation as “when a man makes use of the Creature, as a footstool to raise him up to God, as a ladder to Heaven” (6). Hall and Calamy believe “there are two books that God hath given us Christians to know him by, the book of the Scripture, and the book of the Creature” (Calamy 7). This book of the creature is what God created, or “what he [the Christian] sees…what he hears…[and] what he tastes of” (6). Hall gives an example from scripture of when Jesus “tooke occasion of the water fetcht up solemnly to the Altar, from the Well of Shilo…to meditate and discourse of the Water of life” (13). From the physical object of water, Jesus drew out a lesson about an abstract concept: the Water of life. Occasional meditation is a process of seeing something in creation—something concrete—and extracting a spiritual lesson from it—something abstract. Occasional meditation is seeing metaphors as argument. The water at the Well of Shilo becomes an argument for the Water of life. Occasional meditation is therefore a process of “read[ing] this great volume of the creatures” (Hall 16).

While Hall and Calamy briefly cover occasional meditation, they primarily focus on deliberate meditation. Deliberate meditation is “dwelling upon the things we know” (Calamy 23) and “a reflecting act of the soul” (24), or in other words, meditation is reading the volume of one’s own soul. This meditation occurs “when a man…sets a part some time, and goes into a private Closet, or a private Walk, and there doth solemnly and deliberately meditate of the things of Heaven” (22-23). Deliberate meditation often begins with an abstract concept taken from sermons or scripture, like sin or faith. Then, using “precepts” or principles of invention (Hall 23), meditators increase their understanding of the abstract concept and apply it to themselves, thus moving from the abstract to the concrete. Hall and Calamy teach principles of invention to engage the mind through reason and to rouse the heart through emotion and then model what
meditation looks like using the same subject throughout. Calamy uses sin as the subject for his model, and Hall uses heaven. Additionally, they give counsel on how meditation should be done. This guidance includes suggestions about where to meditate, when to meditate, how to position the body during meditation, and how often meditation should occur. Throughout their instructions on meditation, they teach individuals how to use rhetoric on themselves.

For the Christian humanists, rhetoric is the art of argumentation. Through rhetoric, individuals generate and express ideas through behaviors. This notion of expression through behaviors is expansive—inclusive of thoughts, speech, writing, gestures, and actions. These behaviors constitute the discourse, or medium, through which these arguments are given. Nancy Christiansen, in *Figuring Style: The Legacy of Renaissance Rhetoric*, says that Renaissance rhetoricians apply “rhetoric to all human activity” (91). She says:

The breadth that these humanists give to rhetoric is evidenced as well in their freely extending its application even beyond classical precedent to personal meditation, prayer, courtiership, manners, painting, music, dancing, archery, and any human art, encompassing not only verbal but also extralinguistic forms of expression. (103)

In courtiership, a courting lover chooses to bring his lover flowers because of how he hopes his act will be interpreted. The courting lover communicates his love by bringing flowers. His behavior makes an argument. Christiansen states, “rhetoric…was the art of persuasion become the art of communication” (4-5). Thomas Wilson, in *The Art of Rhetoric* (1560), states, “An Orator must labour to tell his tale, that the hearers may well knowe what he meaneth, and vnderstand [sic] him wholly….The tongue is ordained to expresse the minde, that one may vnderstand an others meaning” (3). From Christiansen and Wilson, I conclude that rhetoric is the art by which people communicate—or express their mind in a way that will be understood—to
themselves and to others through thoughts, speech, writing, gestures, and actions. People may argue to change how someone feels or acts to foster understanding. Furthermore, rhetoric also enables individuals to read the arguments of others. Thus, the power of rhetoric lies not only in formulating and delivering arguments, but also reading the arguments of others.

Although Calamy and Hall do not mention the term rhetoric, their manuals are clearly rhetorical because of how they approach meditation. Their manuals reflect the Christian humanist view of rhetoric. Both Calamy and Hall were trained in rhetoric. Calamy was educated at Pembroke Hall and had degrees in the language arts and divinity (McMahon 4). Hall spent 13 years at Cambridge, where he studied the trivium—rhetoric, logic, and grammar—and taught the University Lectureship in Rhetoric for two years (Huntley 14; Tourney 15). Their training in rhetoric and Hall’s position teaching rhetoric suggest that these two ministers were cognizant of the rhetorical nature of their meditation. Even though they do not use the term rhetoric in their manuals, Hall and Calamy lay out key characteristics of their understanding of internal rhetoric.

For Hall and Calamy, arguments can be expressed through many types of discourse. Discourse is understood to encompass all behaviors. Hall states that meditation “make[s] use of all good meanes [to] fit ourselves to all good dueties” (2). For Calamy and Hall, these means take many forms: “what he sees…what he hears, or…what he tastes of” (Calamy 6); all creation, like animals, plants or food (7-8), which then are made into metaphors (Calamy 21; Hall 110-116); talk (Hall 49); sermons and meditations (Calamy 31, 75); thoughts (45); speech and writing through words, sentences, and ideas properly placed together (Calamy 13; Hall 6, 42, 49); logic and ideas (Calamy 175-189; Hall 89, 95-130); emotions (Calamy 189-196; Hall 151-179); and even the “gesture of the bodie” (Hall 60). These means by which Hall and Calamy accomplish their goals of meditation and self-persuasion essentially encompass all behavior. Whether that
behavior is physical like a body moving, or mental like the movement of a thought, these behaviors constitute the medium by which arguments are conveyed.

Rhetoric describes how people compose arguments. Hall and Calamy teach principles of logic that they call “logical heads” (Calamy 177) or “logical places” (Hall 91) to help with this composition process. Wilson, in *The Rule of Reason* (1552), states that logic has two parts: judgment and invention. Wilson says, “The first parte [of logic] standeth in framynge of thinges aptly together, and knittyng woordes for the purpose accordyngly, and in Latine is called *Iudicium* [judgment]” (B.ii.r); the second part of logic “consisteth in findyng out matter, and searchyng stuffe agreable [sic] to the cause, and in Latine is called *Inventio* [invention]” (B.ii.r). The logical places and the meditation models provided by Hall and Calamy help meditators invent the ideas in their arguments and the style they choose to dress those ideas. Thus, meditators must judge what kinds of arguments to make and how to express those arguments. According to Hall, meditators do not need to engage “in a precise search of euerie [sic] [logical] place and argument” (89), but they determine which principles to apply in which situations (89-92). Calamy also states that meditators do not need to “pursue all the heads of reasons, but [they] should pick out so many of them as are most suitable to the subjects [they] are meditating upon” (177). Therefore, Hall and Calamy teach a rhetoric that requires exercising good judgment to appropriately apply principles within certain contexts.

From this perspective, logic is a part of the art of rhetoric rather than a separate art. In *The Art of Rhetoric*, Wilson outlines the five canons of rhetoric: “Inuention of matter. Disposition of the same. Elocution. Memorie. Utteraunce” (7). According to Wilson, invention is the “searching for things true,” which “the places of Logique, giue [sic] good occasion to finde out plentifull matter” (7). For Wilson, the rhetorical places of invention are the logical places of
invention. Wilson cannot separate logic and rhetoric. Wilson says, “The tongue is ordained to expresse the minde, that one may understand an others meaning” (3). Rhetoric, therefore, is the expression of ideas in a way that enables others to understand those ideas. When I refer to rhetoric, in particular Renaissance rhetoric, I include logic as a part of rhetoric.

Furthermore, Hall and Calamy do not prioritize logic and reasoning above the affections and emotion, but instead view them as harmonious faculties of the soul. Calamy states, “There are two faculties of the soul that must always be set on work in the practice of Divine Meditation; the one is the Understanding, the other is the heart and affections; for Divine Meditation is not only an act of the head, but of the heart” (175). Hall says that meditation “begins in the understanding, endes in the affections; it begins in the braine, descends to the heart” (84-85). Here, Hall associates the brain with understanding and the heart with affections as Calamy does. For these two humanists, reason is not given preference to emotion. Instead, they are both essential aspects of the work of meditation, and therefore internal rhetoric. If the mind and heart are not both used in meditation, then it is incomplete.

Even though Hall and Calamy separate the work of the mind and heart in theory, their models suggest the mind and heart cannot be easily separated in practice. When describing the work of the mind, Calamy says, “Sin is compared to bruises, sores, putrefaction, a leprosie, a plague, the excrements of a man” (182). Calamy increases his understanding of sin—a mental work—and simultaneously rouses his feelings about sin—an emotional work—by linking sin with repulsive images, like excrement and body sores. Similarly, when describing the work of the heart, Calamy defines sin: “Oh my soul, is sin so odious to God...? and shall it not be odious to me? Was sin so displeasing unto God, and so defiling to the soul?” (191). Although Calamy works “to get a relish and a savour” (190) of sin to influence his affections—an emotional work,
Calamy also increases his understanding of what sin is—a mental work. The mind and heart often work in conjunction in meditation, making it difficult to separate them in practice.

Another key for Hall and Calamy is that meditation is a self-directed sermon and focuses on an internal rather than external audience. Art of preaching manuals during the Renaissance taught ministers how to preach to their congregations, an external audience, by teaching rhetoric. In his art of preaching manual, *The Faithful Sherpherid*, Richard Bernard states that “Knowledge of Rhetorike” is essential for ministers to preach (36). His preaching manual teaches principles of invention, arrangement, style, memory, and delivery: the five canons of rhetoric. Additionally, Bernard says the affections are “to be stirred up” to love, desire, hope, and joy (66). Bernard uses the rhetoric and its five canons to teach ministers how to persuade and rouse their congregations.

With this understanding of preaching, Calamy says, “this Sermon [referring to meditation] will help you to practise all the Sermons you ever heard; for meditation is nothing else but…a Sermon to teach you to digest all the Sermons that ever you have heard” (75). From Calamy’s view, a Christian woman may hear many sermons, but, unless she digests those sermons through meditation, those external attempts at persuasion will lack persuasive power. Throughout their models, Calamy and Hall continually address themselves directly: “O my soul!” They are their own audience for their self-directed sermon, becoming both the preacher and the member of the congregation. Calamy acknowledges that God is also a part of the audience in meditation, “Meditation is nothing else but a conversing with God, the souls colloquie with God” (83). However, is this self-directed sermon meant to convert the meditator to God or to convert God to himself? Although God is a part of the meditator’s audience, God is not the target of the meditator’s persuasion because meditators intend to persuade themselves, not God.
During meditation, people change their understanding, feeling, or behavior. Calamy divides deliberate meditation into three parts, or doors: “Meditation must enter into three doors, or else it will never do you any good. It must get into the door of the understanding….the door of the heart…. [and] the door of thy conversation” (28). In the door of the understanding, Calamy says the goal of this door is to “enlarge[e] the understanding” (176). Meditators use the logical places of invention given by Hall and Calamy to do this enlarging by helping meditators think about definitions, properties, causes, and effects for a subject. The inclusion of the logical places in the door of the understanding reveals Hall and Calamy’s view that the mind is the source of man’s ability to reason. In the door of the affections, meditators “kindle and inflame the heart and affections” (190), rousing themselves to feel hope, fear, anger, joy, desire, or any other emotion. For Hall and Calamy, the heart is the seat of desire, motivation, and feeling. They give inventive *topoi* for the affections to help meditators consider the desirability of their subject of meditation, its applicability to the self, and their own desires. But, while they view the mind and heart as the two faculties of the soul, these faculties work in unison to help meditators dwell upon the things they know, “ransack” their own mind and heart (Hall 2), and act differently. Internal rhetoric must not only focus on what one knows, but what one feels and desires as well.

Hall and Calamy seem to differ on whether meditation ends with the mind and heart. Hall and Calamy both say at the end of their manuals that meditators should commend “[them]selves to God” but do not provide examples of what that looks like. While Calamy directly teaches meditators how to apply the subject of meditation to themselves, Hall does not. Hall certainly believes that meditators should change, but he did not see a need to articulate how to move from feelings to devotion, probably believing that the way people feel about Christ and his teachings naturally affects the way people worship. Hall structures deliberate meditation similarly to
Calamy’s, following the three-door pattern, but does not use the term doors. To simplify our discussion, I will use Calamy’s image of doors to describe their understanding of meditation and to structure the model I will propose later.

Calamy does add directions for how to change the behavior and nature of the individual. As Nienkamp states, internal rhetoric is “intentional (self-) persuasion toward a desired end” (4). For Calamy, meditation should pass through all three doors, positioning the final door of conversation as the desired end of meditation. For Calamy, conversation means the same as it does in scripture: behavior. He says, “thy meditation must not rest in the affections, but it must likewise have influence into thy conversation…thou must so meditate of God as to walk as God walks” (28). This wording is important to understand Calamy. Meditation is meant to change the very manner in which the meditator walks. By meditating on gospel subjects, meditators are “transformed into them” (26). Nienkamp says, “Internal rhetoric is thus a way of knowing the world and our minds as well as a way of deciding on or persuading to action” (106). The goal of internal rhetoric for Nienkamp is the same as Calamy: influence behavior. Christiansen says that for Renaissance humanists, “communication involves real knowledge building and character making” (151). Meditation, or internal rhetoric, is then a transformative process of mind, heart, and behavior that builds knowledge and creates character. Thus, the three doors of meditation mirror the “logical, emotional, and ethical” dimensions of rhetoric (Christiansen 8).

Hall and Calamy’s art of meditation describes the art of internal rhetoric. As Calamy says, meditation is a sermon to the self (75). It aims to “get light to our knowledge, more heate to our affections, [and] more life to our devotion” (Hall 3). Thus, meditation is intentional self-persuasion through rhetorical principles to effect change in one’s thoughts, affections, and
behaviors. Calamy and Hall extend the application of rhetoric to the personal activity of meditation. Even though they do not use the term rhetoric, meditation is internal rhetoric.

**A Practice of Internal Rhetoric**

In this section, I will outline the practice for internal rhetoric taught by Calamy and Hall. I will show that they teach invention and style in the three doors of meditation and conceptualize internal rhetoric as a process of reading oneself and composing an argument to oneself by seeing, tasting, and digesting knowledge to enlighten the meditator’s mind, inflame the meditator’s heart, and transform the meditator’s nature.

The Christian humanist understanding of figures takes a central role in this meditative practice. Christiansen says, “figures move from the periphery to the center of style and rhetoric in the Renaissance” (36). They do so because figures were understood to describe the “fundamental thought process[es]” (138) of the mind. Each figure describes one particular way the mind can think or formulate a thought. When figures are viewed in this manner, they can be used as “heuristics for both invention and style” (37). For example, the figure *comparatio*, which is Hall’s eighth step and Calamy’s seventh in the door of the understanding, means to compare either similar or dissimilar things. *Comparatio* could be used as a heuristic to think of concepts that are similar (*similitudo*), like sin, wickedness, or pride; or *comparatio* could be used as a heuristic to think of concepts that are dissimilar (*dissimilitudo*), like sin and righteousness, or pride and humility. In this way, *comparatio* is a heuristic for the invention of the ideas that constitute arguments. Additionally, *comparatio* dictates certain stylistic structures to be used to compare concepts, like when Calamy says, “Now by how much Grace is more excellent, by so much is sin more odious, for sin destroys Grace” (182). To compare sin and grace, he uses “more” as a word to show a relation between sin and grace, placing them on opposite ends of an
imagined spectrum. Comparison can also be shown by using “like” or “as,” or by using similes or metaphors. For Hall and Calamy, because “one can generate ideas from forms and figures” (Christiansen 18), figures are not merely superfluous ornamentation. The forms provided by the figures help meditators develop self-directed arguments: the ideas themselves and the way in which those ideas are conveyed. Throughout their meditation manuals, Calamy and Hall give readers figures, or heuristics, for invention and style in each of the three doors of meditation. Their practice of internal rhetoric relies on these heuristics to foster effective and thorough argumentation in the door of understanding, the door of affections, and the door of conversation.

*The Door of the Understanding*

In their meditation manuals, Hall and Calamy state that meditators must engage the mind after beginning with prayer. To do so, they give “Rules for the helping the understanding, to chew and prepare the things you meditate upon” (Calamy 176). These nine rules are nine principles of logic that help meditators with rhetorical invention to discover the necessary arguments for self-persuasion. Each principle is a figure, as indicated in parentheses below. After picking a subject for meditation, a meditator (1) “describes the thing meditate[d] upon” (*descriptio*); (2) “divides and distributes the thing meditate[d] upon” (*divisio*); and then considers (3) “the causes” (*ekparasynaptikon*); (4) “the fruits and effects” (*consecutio*); (5) “the adjuncts, qualities and properties” (*distributio, partitio*); (6) “the opposites and the contraries” (*antithesis, contraria*); (7) “the comparisons to which it is compared” (*comparatio, similitudo*); (8) “the titles that are given” (*metonymia*); and (9) “all the Scripture-testimonies that may be brought” (*oraculum*) (176-177). Hall’s rules for invention and logic are the same (Hall 95-148), except he adds that meditators ought to “consider the subject either wherein that is, or where about that is employed” (*topographia*) (110), which means to consider where something exists or is used.
These places help meditators read themselves and find arguments to use on themselves. Wilson says the logical places are “the Seconde parte of Logique called Inuentio” and the means “whereby we maie finde argumentes, and reasones, meete to proue euery matier [sic]” (The Rule of Reason L.i.v). Hall similarly states that the logical places in his manual were to “search of euerie place & argument” (89). Wilson, Hall, Calamy, and other Christian humanists viewed these logical places as metaphorical places in the mind that individuals go to create arguments. To make better sense of this concept, Wilson uses hunting as a metaphor to explain the inventive nature of the logical places:

“Likewise the huntesman in huntyng the foxe, wil soone espie when he seeth a hole, whether it be a foxe borough, or not. So he that will take profeite in this parte of Logique, must bee like a hunter, and learne by labour to knowe the boroughes, for these places bee nothing elles, but couertes [sic] or boroughs, wherein if any one searche diligently, he maie finde game at pleasure.” (L.i.v)

Thus, these meditation manuals provide meditators the locations of these boroughs, or places, where they can go to search for certain types of arguments. In this sense, the logical places listed in the manuals become a mental map of how to engage in heuristic thinking. Christiansen observes that the “fundamental relations [exhibited by figures] are the loci and topoi or ‘places’ of logic that…generate statements when a subject is taken from place to place and seen from different perspectives” (14). For example, the first step of meditation for Hall and Calamy is to describe the subject of meditation (descriptio). In his model for description, Hall says, “What then, O my soule, is the life of the Saints, whereof thou studiest? Who are the Saints, but those which having beene weakely holy upon earth, are perfectly holy above?....What is their life, but that blessed estate above?” (95-96). Descriptio helps meditators go to the “boroughs” for
descriptions in their mind. It provides a heuristic for finding the ideas to put in propositions—such as weak, perfect, holy, earth, and estate above—and the structure to put those ideas into sentence form—such as weakly holy upon earth and perfectly holy above. The figure *descriptio* is the logical place that generates both the idea and style. This example highlights the difficulty of distinguishing when figures are used for invention or for style. Erasmus, in *De Copia*, states that “you cannot tell them [content and style] apart at all easily, so much does one serve the other, so that they might seem to be distinct only in theory, rather than in fact and in use” (16). Therefore, in the door of the understanding, Hall and Calamy outline the various ways that humans use figures as heuristics for invention and style. By learning these heuristics, meditators have tools to read themselves and compose arguments to persuade themselves to think about their subject of meditation in particular ways, thus practicing internal rhetoric.

Meditators, however, must wisely apply these heuristics as needed. Calamy says that the purpose of these places was “not to practice Logick, but to kindle devotion” (177). Hall and Calamy take special care to explain that the logical places should be used with good judgment, when specific circumstances dictate their use. Rather than using all of the logical places, Calamy states, “we should pick out so many of them [the logical places] as are most suitable to the subjects we are meditating upon” (177). However, Hall and Calamy go no further in the manuals.

When meditators wisely apply these principles, these principles improve meditators’ ability to see their subject of meditation clearly. Hall and Calamy both use sight as a metaphor to describe the work of the understanding. Hall says that “In meditation wee doe both see and taste; but we see before we taste: sight is of the understanding, taste, of the affection” (151). Calamy fleshes out the metaphor when he says: “For as it is with a picture, that hath a curtain drawn over it, though the picture be never so beautiful, you cannot see the beauty of it till the curtain be
drawn aside” (44). Meditation enables meditators to see what would have been hidden to their view without meditation, and, as Ronald Corthell states, “Each place allows Hall to approach the subject from a new perspective” (376). To show how meditation fosters improved vision through the logical places, I will follow Calamy’s example of sin. When Calamy begins his meditation, he first describes sin: “is not sin the breach of the holy law of God? and doth it not therefore deserve eternal damnation?” (178). By defining sin and what it is (definitio), a Christian now finds reasons why he or she should not sin. Those who sin break the law and deserve eternal damnation. Calamy goes on to give an example for each of the logical places. After describing the thing, Calamy divides sin into two forms of sin (distributio): first in Adam, and then also in himself (178-9). Then, by thinking of what causes sin (ekparasynaptikon), he is led to meditate on the Devil and his role in tempting men to sin (180), providing further reasons for why he or she should not sin. Calamy then considers the fruits and effects of sin, or its consequences (consecutio). What are the effects of sin on humanity as a whole and the meditator individually? What are the consequences of these choices? By answering these questions, meditators find arguments for why they should not engage in sin or why it is undesirable. If sin leads to pain, heartache, or regret, which are undesirable experiences, then why would a reasonable person want to sin? Each logical place, or figure, provides meditators with different ways to approach their subject and begin to “see” the subject of meditation from different perspectives, as Corthell says. Nienkamp states: “In the use of mental language to initiate considered action, there is no functional difference between ‘persuasion’ and ‘clarification’” (15). Through “a precise search of euerie place & argument” (Hall 89), individuals deepen their understanding of things, ideas, and people, drawing back the curtain on what was hidden to meditators prior to meditation. They come to understand what they know by self-reading and compose arguments to enable self-
persuasion to clarify what they know. They persuade themselves to think or believe a certain way as they come to accept new perspectives about the world and themselves.

Although Hall and Calamy teach each step in the door of the understanding with a figure, the models for each step also encourage using other kinds of figures in internal rhetoric. For example, in the door of the understanding Hall furthers his vision of heaven by using figures like *accumulatio* and *partitio*. *Accumulatio* means to lay out many ideas or arguments one after the other to emphasize a point. In Hall’s section that meditates upon the things contrary to a glorified life in heaven, Hall spends considerable time accumulating things that stand contrary to heavenly holiness: “vanitie,” “sinnes,” “miseries,” “pride,” “filthiness,” and “profanenesse” (120-129). Hall coupled this *accumulatio* with *partitio*—which means to divide the whole into the parts. Hall explains the effects of vain living with an image of a “sicke bodie” (121), breaking the body into parts to emphasize how a vain life negatively impacts the lungs, spleen, head, veins, and bladder (121-122). This accumulation of examples allows the meditator to see the contrast between vain living and the holy living required for heaven. Each of these reasons acts like another pair of “spectacles by which we are enabled to read these things concerning God” (Calamy 8) and to understand the contrast (*comparatio*) between vain living and heavenly living. Thus, the model meditations in the manuals suggest meditators use figures to help them both read themselves and compose their arguments. The figures guide the invention and style of meditators, in this case suggesting meditators should rely on multiple reasons to change their minds or beliefs, increase sight, and create clarity.

Calamy and Hall also encourage meditators to use metaphors and scriptures as sources for both invention and style. Metaphors (*metaphora*) improve meditators’ understanding of difficult abstraction and improve meditators’ ability to read. *Metaphora* takes many forms in
these meditations. Meditators compose arguments using implied metaphors through verbs and nouns, like “it is sin that kindles the fire in Hell” (Calamy 180), or through adjectives, like “sweete songs” (Hall 107). In the example of sin, sin kindles fire. Sin, an abstract idea, cannot create fire, but the association of fire and hell allows meditators to see sin in a new way, increasing their understanding of sin and moving their affections. The concrete images make abstractions more precise. Metaphors make it easier for meditators to apply their subject of meditation to themselves. Rather than trying to imagine joy in heaven, meditators imagine themselves singing sweet songs in heaven (Hall 107-108). The sweet songs that Hall sings reveals that metaphors can encourage action because they portray the action. Rather than trying to think of Christ’s love for them, meditators think of Christ’s body being broken for them (Calamy 110), again seeing and portraying an action. Additionally, Calamy and Hall look to scripture for confirmation and support for their arguments (oraculum). Oraculum is a figure that confirms arguments using God’s word. They frequently quote scripture directly, like Romans 5:12 (Calamy 178); Malachi 3 (183); Psalms 87:3 (Hall 112); and Song of Solomon 3:1 (117). They also allude to scripture, like when Calamy references Judas or Judah (180). To use oraculum, meditators must read God’s text. By looking to scripture as a source for truth, they see God, not themselves, as the source of truth. Viewing their relationship with God in this way not only affects the kinds of argument meditators use on themselves but also the way they speak to themselves. Calamy and Hall’s meditative style frequently portrays this relationship between God and the meditator, acknowledging their own inferiority to God in knowledge and power. Calamy and Hall’s models reveal that the ideas in their arguments and the way they express those arguments work together to persuade the mind. The principles they supply therefore help meditators to convince themselves of what is or is not so.
Next in Calamy and Hall’s practice of meditation and internal rhetoric, meditators strive to incite their affections. Calamy states that meditation “must get into the door of thy heart and of thy affections; and thou must never leave meditating till it get into that door likewise” (28). Hall says, “all our former labour of the braine, is only to affect the heart” (150). For Hall and Calamy, meditation is incomplete if it does not affect the heart. Calamy says meditation that works the “affectionative part” is meant “to stir up piety and devotion in your souls” (190). To accomplish this stirring, Hall and Calamy give tools of invention to rouse the affections. Calamy says that there are “six common-place-heads…to raise the affections, and to get them so excited as to increase grace and holiness in the soul” (190). By calling these steps “common-place-heads,” Calamy cues his reader to look at the affective places like the logical places, or like figures. These common-place-heads for the affections are, as Wilson would say, the holes where the pathetic appeals borough. These affective places are nearly the same in both Hall and Calamy. To increase desire and motivation to act, meditators must do the following: (1) get a taste of the subject of meditation (acharis, glykytes) (Calamy191-2; Hall 152-4); (2) complain about not experiencing that taste (querela) (Calamy 192-3; Hall 154-9); (3) “stir up” a yearning for the subject (optatio) (Calamy 193-4; Hall 159-161); (4) “confess your inability” to obtain the subject “as of your selves” (confessio) (Calamy194; Hall 162-5); (5) “petition God for help” (deesis) (Calamy 195; Hall 166-8); and (6) “confidently believe God will help you” (fiducia) (Calamy 195-6; Hall 175-179). The difference between Hall and Calamy is that Hall says that “After Petition shall followe the Enforcement of our request” (bebaiosis) (168). Bebaiosis in this instance means that Hall confirms his request through prayer, emphasizing how much he wants the Lord’s help (169-172).
These affective places provide meditators with heuristics to guide them through a progressive process to instill a desire that will lead to change. Before meditators can decide how they will incite emotions, they must determine what kind of emotions they ought to incite. Hall and Calamy give contrasting examples in their manuals: Hall meditates on heaven, and Calamy meditates on sin. In Hall’s example, he labors to get his heart affected with the sweetness of glorified Saints (152-4). Hall uses *glykytes*, which is a figure used to describe a style that emphasizes the sweet nature of the subject. *Glykytes* helps Hall both read heaven as something sweet and compose arguments to persuade himself to desire heaven. Conversely, Calamy models how meditators “get a relish and a savour” of sin (190) by “get[ting his] heart affected with the bitterness of sin” (191). Calamy uses *acharis*, which is a figure used to describe a style that emphasizes the repulsive nature of the subject. *Acharis* helps Calamy read sin as something undesirable and compose arguments to persuade himself not to sin. Calamy’s meditation in the heart is markedly different than Hall’s because Calamy focuses on convincing himself to avoid sin, while Hall focuses on convincing himself to seek the glory of the Saints. These two figures help meditators persuade themselves to avoid or obtain their subject of meditation by seeing and tasting the sweetness or bitterness of their subject.

While sight is the metaphor that applies to the door of the understanding, Calamy and Hall use tasting and eating as the metaphor to describe what meditators do in the door of the affections. Halls says, “Let the heart therefore first conceive and feele in it self the sweetnesse or bitternesse of the matter meditated” (152). Tasting the sweetness or bitterness of the subject of meditation requires meditators to first chew the subject. Calamy says that “the Understanding, to the heart and affections must be as the nurse to the child, as the nurse cuts the meat and, many times chews it, and prepares it for the child to eat” (177). Chewing relates to the understanding
and tasting to the affections. Chewing and tasting happen simultaneously because breaking apart
the food enables eaters to taste their food while they are chewing, for “the way to taste the
sweetness is to chew it” (33). For example, to get a taste of the bitterness of sin, Calamy
describes how sin is “odious to God” (191). This description echoes his observations about sin in
the first step of the understanding where he states that sin was a “breach of the holy law of God”
and was a “walking contrary unto God” (178). Determining the sweet or bitter nature of sin must
also describe and define sin. Christiansen says that “figures are both lines of thinking and of
feeling” (164). Thus, just as meditators inevitably influence their emotions in the door of the
understanding, meditators also increase their understanding in the door of the affections through
descriptio and glykytes. This metaphor of tasting emphasizes the strong link between these doors.

To ensure the style of the meditators’ self-directed discourse contributes to the sweetness
or bitterness of the subject, meditators create a certain type of character in the discourse to
communicate what the subject of meditation tastes like. As substantiated by Annabel Patterson in
her book Hermogenes and the Renaissance: Seven Ideas of Style, Hermogenes played a critical
role in Renaissance rhetorical education. Hermogenes says that character, or “ideas,” are
produced by “thought, approach, diction, figures, clauses, word order, cadence, and rhythm” (4).
In their models, Hall and Calamy reinforce a certain character or idea by reinforcing the sweet
characteristics of heaven or the bitterness of sin. Calamy uses words like “odious,” “displeasing,”
and “defiling” to describe sin (191). These words do not create a sweet character, but a bitter
one. This bitter character helps meditators to feel that they ought to “shun” sin because “it be
evil” (188). Conversely, Hall uses words like “blessed,” glory,” and “incomprehensible” to
describe the life of the saints in heaven (152). These words create a sweet character and help
meditators feel they should “obtain” eternal life because “it be good” (Calamy 188). This manner
of thinking about sin or eternal life began in the door of the understanding, for sin was said to
“defile” and “destroy” (181) and eternal life was said to be “holy” and “blessed” (Hall 96). The
congruity between the door of the understanding and the affections produces a sweet style for
Hall and a bitter one for Calamy. Therefore, individuals practicing internal rhetoric must work to
read their own understanding of their subject of meditation, read the character of their subject,
and compose arguments that clarify their understanding of that subject and its character.

When meditators taste the sweetness or bitterness of their subject, they prepare
themselves to recognize what they lack and what they need to fill that lack. The second common-
place-head is the “complaint [querela], where-in the hart bewayleth to it selfe his owne poverty,
dulnesse, and imperfection” (Hall 154). Hall lacks a desire for heaven and instead desires earthly
things: “How hath the worlde bewitched and possessed thee [my soul], that thou art become so
carelesse of thine house, so senselesse of spiritual delights, so fond upon these vanities?” (155-
6). Calamy lacks a soft heart and sensitivity to evil: “How is it, Oh my soul, that thou shouldest
be thus hart-hearted, and unaffected with thy sins?” (192). Their complaints recognize what they
do not possess and what is holding them back. Why is the meditator tasting the bitterness of sin?
His heart is hard. Why is the meditator unable to taste the sweetness of heaven? He desires the
vanities of the world. This recognition leads meditators to nurture “a passionate wish” (optatio)
(193) that will overcome that lack. Optatio is a figure that helps meditators consider how they
could obtain what they wished they had if they possessed what they lack. Hall wished he “could
waite and long for thy salvation” and put God as his focal desire (160-1), while Calamy wished
he “could mourn with a godly mourning…for all my sins” (193). A longing for salvation
overcomes the desire for earthly things. An ability to mourn for one’s own sins overcomes hard-
heartedness. While Hall stated, “I desire not to binde every [sic] man to the same uniforme
proceeding in this part….to the prosecution of all these Logical places” (90-1), this does not seem to be the case for the common-place-heads of the affections. These places for rousing the affections should be done in order to “set forth the [weight of the matter], as though they [the audience] sawe it plaine before their eyes” (Wilson, *The Art of Rhetoric*, 150), for meditators must properly see or taste whether their subject is sweet or bitter before they can know their complaint—where they are now in the present and what they do not have—and their wish—where they want to go in the future. Thus, these logical and affective places enable self-reading. While the logical places enable a process of reading what one believes or understands, these affective places enable a process of reading what one feels or desires.

After dwelling on the sweetness or bitterness of the subject, meditators try to instill new motivation to no longer experience the bitterness of sin, amplify their desire for the opposite of bitterness, and ultimately turn to God for help abandoning sin. The fourth through seventh steps of the door of the affections shift the meditator’s focus to God. The meditators confess to God (*confessio*), petition him for help (*deesis*), and confirm they truly need him in the enforcement (*bebaiosis*). Lastly, they “encourage [themselves] by faith in a confident hope and trust in God, that the Lord will hear [their] prayer, and give [them] strength” (Calamy 195). This self-encouragement comes through the figure *fiducia*, or confident statements. These steps of invention lead meditators to focus on a being that has more strength than they do. This focus alters the way meditators approach their subject. They can live differently because of the power that God bestows upon them. This mindset rouses faith, hope, and encouragement, which are critical feelings for successful persistence in changed behaviors. Furthermore, prayer naturally shifts the focus of meditators to application. In his prayer, Hall asks, “Let mee not alwayes bee thus dull and brutish; Let not these seales of earthly affection alwaies dimme and blind mine
eyes” (166-7); Calamy asks that God would “take away my heart of stone, and give me to mourn for my great abominations” (195). They are looking to live differently. Both prayers reinforce bitterness and sweetness, what they do not have, what they wish they had, and most importantly application. By helping themselves experience the associated emotions, or giving themselves a “taste,” the meditator creates “a stirring or forsing of the minde, either to desire, or els to detest and loth” (Wilson, *The Art of Rhetoric*, 149).

Like in the door of the understanding, Hall and Calamy also use other types of figures in their models to show different heuristics to help meditators with invention and style. For example, Hall and Calamy use *isocolon*, or parallel structure in clauses or phrases, to amplify the characters of sweetness or bitterness. In Calamy’s prayer asking God for strength to overcome sin, Calamy states, “take away my heart of stone, and give me a heart of flesh” (195). This structure emphasizes his desired transformation because taking and giving are juxtaposed and the outcomes of stone and flesh are placed in similar positions. Calamy also used *isocolon* to create a list of sins (*accumulatio*) that reinforced sin’s bitterness: “Oh that I could mourn…all my sins of omission, commission, my Sacrament-sins, my family-sins, my Closet-sins, the sins of my youth, the sins of my riper age! (193-4). Through this example, Calamy demonstrates meditators’ need for parallelisms in their meditations to structurally emphasize connections between ideas, helping meditators feel the accumulation of reasons and not just see them.

Hall and Calamy also frequently shift into and out of themselves, altering the distance between their subject of meditation and themselves. Hall and Calamy address themselves throughout their meditation, “Oh my soul!”, revealing their conceptualization of their internal audience in meditation. Sometimes, Hall and Calamy make assertions about themselves as if they were making assertions about someone else (*allophylos*). For example, Hall says, “Looke up
to him therefore, O my soule, as the beginner and finisher of thy salvation; and while thou magnifiest the author, be ravished with the glorie of the worke” (104). Hall addresses himself as if he is someone else by using pronouns like “thou” and possessive pronouns “thy” to create a strong sense of external audience. Calamy writes in a similar style: “Oh my soul! why shouldest not thou hate and abhor sin?” (178). But, while they frequently address their own souls in this manner, they also address themselves as if they are the speaker (idophasis). Hall and Calamy both use idophasis: Hall states, “O Lord, that I could waite and long for thy salvation! Oh that I could minde the things above that as I am a stranger in deed” (160); Calamy states, “Oh my soul! how great is thy guilt! I have sinned not only against God, but against light; my sins have bloody aggravations, I have sinned against the heart-blood-mercy of Jesus Christ” (182). Calamy and Hall switch between “thou”—addressing someone else (allophylos)—and “I”—addressing themselves (idiophasis). When using “thou,” they are positioned outside of themselves, creating distance between themselves and their subject to allow meditators to talk more freely about their own errors. However, meditators must personally apply their meditation, so they move to “my sins” to create that personal application. When they switch to “I,” they move back into themselves. By using allophylos and idophasis, Calamy and Hall encourage awareness of the complex nature of audience in meditation in order to bring about a change of behavior.

Finally, as with the door of the understanding, the affections also rely on metaphors (metaphora). To increase the soul’s desire for the things of God, Calamy states, “no bath but a bath of Christs blood can wash away the stain of [sin]” (191). Here Calamy uses both metaphor and enargia, which means to give a vivid description to move the audience. What bath is more unsettling than a bath of blood? The idea of bathing in blood should repulse the meditator. If committing sin requires bathing in blood, then sin is therefore bitter and an undesirable act. By
using metaphors and imagery, meditators produce clarity in and bring affective weight to their meditations. Metaphors strengthen the character of bitterness or sweetness and the desirability of the subject of meditation. Figures therefore act as heuristics for invention and style to kindle and inflame the emotions in the door of the affections.

*The Door of the Conversation*

The final door of meditation is the door of the conversation. Calamy states that meditation “will never do you any good” if it does not pass through this final door (28). Meditation cannot remain merely an activity of thought or feeling, but it must get into the way meditators live. If these three doors are viewed chronologically, the only part of the door of the conversation that happens after the door of the affections is to close with a resolution to act. Calamy says meditators should “close with a resolution of heart, to spend thy life as becomes one that hath been meditating of holy and heavenly things” (199). Here, meditators rely on the figure *adjuratio*, or an oath, to close with a commitment to live differently. For example, Calamy says, “I would conclude [a meditation on heaven] with a resolution, that I would labour to live more heavenly, and walk as becometh one that looks to live with Christ for ever in Heaven” (199). Hall is similarly brief, saying meditators should make a “recommendation of our selves to God; wherein the soule doth cheerfully give up it selfe…committing her selfe to him in all her ways” (183). Although this commitment to live differently orients meditators toward action, Calamy and Hall’s models show a general resolution to live more holy rather than resolving to take specific actions to be a holier person. Besides this step of commitment, Calamy and Hall do not provide more instruction for the door of the conversation after the door of the affections.

Thus far, Calamy and Hall have mostly mirrored one another in the framework for their meditation. They both provide *topoi* for the mind and heart. However, Hall states that meditation
“endes in the affections” (85), and Calamy takes meditation one step further by stating that the final door of meditation is “The door of thy conversation; for thy meditation must not rest in the affections” (28). Where Hall does not provide any additional explicit guidance on the door of conversation besides the resolution, adjuratio, Calamy provides additional guidance throughout his manual to reinforce the importance of this door in his view. Calamy uses “digestion” as a metaphor to understand the work in the door of the conversation, and he teaches meditators principles application to help them live differently.

To understand the door of the conversation, Calamy repeatedly uses digestion as a metaphor to describe it. Calamy does not say digestion represents the door of the conversation, but it is the extension of chewing and tasting that reveals this understanding. If chewing and tasting are respectively the doors of the understanding and affections, then digestion, which comes after chewing and tasting, must be the door of the conversation. Calamy says, “A man may eat his meat and be never more nourished if he do not digest it, if he vomit it up as soon as he hath eaten it, or if his meat presently go through him, it will do him no good” (59). If it is chewed and digested, then “the meat is conveyed from the stomack into the liver, and into the heart, and then into all the other parts of the body” (29). When meditation digests the subject being meditated on, it changes the meditator, fully affecting all parts of the body. Calamy says, “One sermon well digested, well meditated upon, is better than twenty Sermons without meditation” (31). In this statement, complete digestion is associated with complete meditation. Thus, meditation only nourishes when the subject of meditation becomes a part of the meditator.

Before discussing the three doors in depth, Calamy teaches key principles to help move meditation from the head and heart to action. In one instance, Calamy seems to downplay the importance of application by including the step “to join application” (187) in a list of “plainer
rules, for helping ordinary Christians” who find the logical places “somewhat difficult” (184). The rest of his manual does not support that perspective. Earlier on, he says there are “six properties of Divine Meditation, for the right manner of performing it” (96). One of these properties is to make meditation “not only notional and speculative, but practical and affectionate” (105); meditation must be “particular and applicative; for generals will not work at all” (108-110). Later in the fifth step in the door of the understanding, he says the meditator should “consider the adjuncts and properties of sin in general, and of my sin in particular” (181). Thus, meditation is not only thinking of sin in general, but also thinking about one’s own sins. It is not only thinking of Christ in general, but also thinking about how Christ’s life instructs one how to live. Unlike Hall, Calamy continually gives instructions on how to make application throughout his manual, leaving a clear focus on bringing general truths into the specifics of the meditator’s life. Calamy says, “I hardly ever heard of a man that was converted by Generals” (187), for “it is the particular application that works upon people’s hearts” (188). By bringing general abstract truths into their own concrete experiences, meditators can become a participant and become converted. Through Calamy, meditators come to understand how bringing truths to their own lives leads to digestion and making those truths a part of themselves.

To help meditators make application, Calamy suggests meditators consider “Necessity and Excellency, Propriety and Perpetuity” (109). Meditators can consider “the excellency of God, Christ, and Heaven, and [then] the necessity of enjoying them” (109). By characterizing God as excellent (characterismus) and determining the necessity of enjoying him, meditators will have greater motivation to make personal application. Furthermore, individuals “can add a propriety, all these are mine, God is my God, Christ is my righteousness, and Heaven is my inheritance, and my inheritance for ever” (109). Propriety in this sense means to describe
essential qualities or attributes (*attributio*). If God is not only a god for the earth but also
Calamy’s God, then propriety helps him learn essential characteristics that can lead him to want
or not want what he is meditating upon. By describing the inheritance of heaven as forever
(*chronographia*, or describing time), meditators will be more likely to do what is necessary to
receive that inheritance. Thus, using these ideas of excellency, necessity, propriety, and
perpetuity lead the meditator toward personal application.

Furthermore, meditators increase the likelihood they will live differently when they plan
how they will apply what they are meditating on. Calamy admonishes in the final step of the
door of the understanding: “consider the means how to obtain what you meditate upon, if it be
good; and the means to shun it, if it be evil” (188). This step acts as an inventive heuristic for
considering the actions necessary to avoid sin. However, Calamy does not model this principle of
meditation as he does others, making it unclear what this principle looks like to him in practice.
Furthermore, Calamy relegates this step for considering how to obtain or shun the subject of
meditation to a lesser status by placing it in the list of “plainer rules” that are “the five helps to
weak Christians” (188-189) as he did with application. This relegation seems inconsistent with
Calamy’s stated purpose for meditation to pass into the door of conversation. Even though
Calamy may see this step as inferior to the logical places, his placement of it is important. If
meditators consider how to obtain their subject before the work in the affections—to taste,
complain, wish, confess, petition, enforce, and encourage the self—then the work of the
affections bolsters the meditators’ efforts to obtain or shun that subject. Next, as meditators end
their meditation with a prayer to God, they naturally shift their focus toward action.

Because of these efforts to apply the subject of meditation to the self, meditators must
employ a style that emphasizes personal application. Earlier in his manual, Calamy states that
when meditating upon the symbols of the sacrament, “you must meditate of [these symbols that]…This blood was poured out for me, this body was broken for me, and now God offers Christ, God gives Christ to me” (110). While soldiers broke Christ’s body, and spears, nails, and thorns released Christ’s blood, meditating on those things does not bring the necessary power to change the meditator. Calamy frequently changes generalities to specifics in this manner. “You” becomes “I” or “me.” “Our” becomes “my.” Rather than being a truth of God, Calamy laid claim to that truth as his own. It was not man’s sins, but it became “my sins.” It was not hear prayers, but “hear my prayer” (195). Hall uses similar stylistic moves in his meditation, like when he asks, “But alas, where is my love? where is my longing? where art thou, O my soule?” (155). So, while Hall models making these connections, he does not explain how to make application, nor does he explain why it is important. Some readers may not register the need to make personal application from Hall’s models, but Calamy explains why meditators should apply truths and how to do so, making it easier for readers to learn this key aspect of meditation. However, Calamy’s coverage is not as comprehensive in the door of the conversation as the other doors. Although he stresses application, he does not provide specific strategies to help meditators move the application of truths in their mind to actual lived truths in their lives.

Metacognition Is Internal Rhetoric

Hall and Calamy’s meditation and Schraw’s metacognitive model are synergistic approaches to internal rhetoric. While Protestant meditation and metacognition both teach similar cognitive processes and methods of assessing what one knows, neither approach to internal rhetoric stands complete on its own. Each approach has its strengths that add to the other. Calamy and Hall provide a detailed compilation of strategies and models for those strategies in their manuals. They also describe how meditators can rouse their affections as well as apply their
subject of meditation to themselves. These strategies and processes make rhetorical reading and composition possible. Conversely, because Schraw’s metacognitive model explains how people think about their cognition, Schraw’s metacognitive model adds to meditation at two different levels of cognition. The higher level is the general meditation level, or the level that gives meditators a view of the mechanics of meditation and the application of the places. The lower level is the subject of meditation level, or the level that gives meditators a view of their own thoughts, feelings, and behaviors relating to that subject of meditation. At the overall meditation level, Schraw’s metacognitive model teaches meditators how to gain the knowledge necessary to decide when to use certain strategies and improve their effectiveness at applying those strategies. At the subject of meditation level, Schraw’s principles in the regulation of cognition provide meditators a method for planning, monitoring, and evaluating specific behaviors to enact after deliberate meditation has finished. Together, meditation and metacognition form a more complete model of internal rhetoric that can be used to teach how to practice internal rhetoric.

Similarities between Metacognition and Meditation

Metacognition and meditation both describe similar processes of cognitive self-awareness, teach domain-general principles that are transferrable across domains, support the pedagogical approach of the other, and encourage meditators to use the three types of knowledge, namely declarative, procedural, and conditional knowledge. John Flavell, who coined the term metacognition in 1979, defines metacognitive experiences as “any conscious or affective experiences that accompany and pertain to any intellectual enterprise. An example would be the sudden feeling that you do not understand something another person just said” (906). Antonio Gutierrez et al.—Schraw is the second author on this article—add that metacognitive monitoring can “be applied in a variety of activities such as judgments of learning,
understanding, and performance” (1). Just as people who are metacognitive become consciously aware of and make judgments on their mental and behavioral processes, meditators do the same. In meditation, Calamy says the soul “considers all the things that it knows….To meditate, is to continue and fix our selves and our hearts upon the things we know” (24). In meditation, meditators become conscious of their own thoughts and feelings, examine themselves, and pass judgments on those mental, emotional, and behavioral processes just like those who practice metacognition. Meditation is a metacognitive experience.

Next, metacognition and meditation are domain-general processes that are transferrable across domains. Schraw observes that some skills are domain specific, such as “a specific content domain (e.g., mathematics), sub-domain (e.g., algebra), or task (e.g., proofreading)” (Gutierrez et al. 2). While isolating \( x \) on one side of the equation is a helpful skill for algebra, that skill likely is not helpful for reading literature. He contrasts domain-specific skills with domain-general skills: “The domain-general monitoring hypothesis states that skilled adult learners construct a repertoire of general regulatory skills that enables them to make accurate judgments of performance even in low-knowledge domains” (2). Schraw states, “Metacognitive skills span multiple domains, even when those domains have little in common” (116). For Schraw, metacognitive skills are domain-general because they easily transfer between domains from task to task. Meditation similarly teaches domain general skills. Calamy says, “[the practice of meditation] is an universal remedy against all sin; it is a help to all goodness, it is a preservative of all godliness, it is armour of proof against all the Devils temptations, and the want of it is the cause of all iniquity” (72). Hall and Calamy’s meditative skills help meditators to gain an awareness of what they know and feel in any domain, such as defeating sin, doing
good, and protecting oneself from temptations. Meditation and metacognition therefore both teach meditators domain-general skills that can be applied in various contexts.

Furthermore, metacognition provides evidence for the effectiveness of Hall and Calamy’s pedagogical approach to teaching meditation. Schraw states that “promoting metacognition begins with building an awareness among learners that metacognition exists….The next step is to teach strategies, and more importantly, to help students construct explicit knowledge about when and where to use strategies” (123). The art of meditation does exactly what Schraw says will promote metacognition. Hall and Calamy help meditators become aware that meditation, or internal rhetoric, exists and then instruct meditators on how to use strategies. Additionally, Gutierrez and Schraw argue, “Strategy instruction is one of the most effective ways to increase student learning and metacognition about learning” (387), and Schraw says, “teachers should make a concerted effort to model their own metacognition for their students” (119). Therefore, Hall and Calamy’s strategy instruction and modeling in their manuals is one of the most effective ways to increase meditative learning.

Lastly, Hall, Calamy, and Schraw teach meditators how to use and apply three types of knowledge to consider “all the things that [they] know” (Calamy 24). Schraw and Moshman state, “Knowledge of cognition refers to what individuals know about their own cognition and about cognition in general” (352). Within Schraw’s knowledge of cognition, Schraw defines three types of cognitive knowledge—declarative, procedural, and conditional. Declarative knowledge is “knowing ‘about’ things” (Schraw 114). Procedural knowledge is “knowing ‘how’ to do things” (114). Conditional knowledge is “knowing the ‘why’ and ‘when’ aspects of cognition” (114). Calamy and Hall rely on these three types of metacognitive knowledge in their meditation manuals at the meditation level—knowledge about the procedures and strategies—
and at the subject of meditation level—knowledge about what one knows about the subject of meditation. At the meditation level, Calamy and Hall define strategies, which are the places. For example, Hall gives information about the complaint (querela), an affective place, when he says the complaint is “where-in the hart bewayleth [sic] to it self his owne poverty, dulnesse, and imperfection” (154). This definition of complaint gives declarative knowledge about that strategy. Calamy and Hall’s entire manuals give meditators procedural knowledge about how to do meditation and what order to apply the principles of meditation. Furthermore, Calamy gives conditional knowledge by telling meditators to “pick and chuse [sic] out such subjects especially to meditate upon, that are most seasonable to thy condition” (164-5). For example, Calamy shows meditators the importance of knowing when and why to meditate and apply strategies when he says, “Suppose thou art a man troubled in mind, exceedingly dejected; thou art ready to despair, because thou art a great sinner….I would have thee go and meditate of the willingness of Christ to receive poor sinners” (165). On the subject of meditation level, these three types of knowledge act as broader categories for Hall and Calamy’s strategies, categorizing the places by function. For example, if meditators need to learn “about” sin, they can use figures like divisio to understand parts of sin or similitudo to understand the characteristics of sin by comparison. Likewise, if meditators know they need to learn procedural knowledge about sin, they will know to apply consecutio to know what leads to sin and ekparasynaptikon to know what causes sin. If meditators need to know about the “when” and “why” aspects of sin, they would use descriptio in such a way to describe when and why a certain behavior is a sin. Just as Christiansen organized the figures by function in “Appendix I: A Handlist of the Figures” (199-457) to make it easier to apply figures, Schraw’s types of knowledge organize the logical places by function,
making them easier to use during meditation. Calamy, Hall, and Schraw depend on these three types of knowledge to understand what they know about strategies and the subject of meditation. 

Differences between Metacognition and Meditation

Although Calamy and Hall share similarities with Schraw, their differences illustrate why the two different approaches to internal rhetoric must be combined to be more complete. From the Protestant meditation manuals, we find a multitude of strategies for meditation and several examples of how to use those strategies, directions for how to rouse the affections, and instructions on how to apply the subject of meditation to ourselves. From Schraw’s model of metacognition, we find a structured method to identify the information needed to determine when and why to use strategies, regulatory principles to monitor and evaluate strategy use, and questions to plan what actions to take and to monitor and evaluate those behaviors after deliberate meditation has finished.

Strengths of Hall and Calamy’s Meditation Manuals

Unlike Schraw, Calamy and Hall give meditators numerous strategies for meditation and present a lengthy example meditation with additional scenarios to show how to use the strategies. Together, Calamy and Hall give ten places for increasing understanding and seven places for rousing the affections. In all, I have shown how they have explicitly taught or given an example of thirty-three different figures. Although I have not described all figures present in their manuals, my selected examples show Calamy and Hall’s pattern of strategy instruction through their example meditations on sin and heaven. Their descriptions and models help meditators know what the strategy is and how it may be used in context. Calamy also provides a list of many different types of subjects to meditate upon (121-140), and he demonstrates how different situations may require different strategies. The five additional scenarios are “a man troubled in
mind,” “troubled in conscience,” who is “in outward want,” who is “sick, like to lose thy husband, or thy own own [sic] life,” or who is “to receive the Sacrament” (165-169). Schraw does not provide a detailed list of cognitive strategies in his articles. Some of the strategies he does include are skimming, slowing down, activating prior knowledge, mental integration, diagramming (Schraw 120), hypothesis testing (122), seeking help from peers (Schraw et al. 120), self-checking, summarizing (122), drawing a picture, and looking for key words (Nietfield and Schraw 137). However, Schraw’s purpose in his articles was not to describe all strategies learners can use. Other research focuses on those strategies. Schraw’s purpose was to describe the domain-general skills that help people use strategies more effectively across domains. Thus, Calamy and Hall’s manuals provide an abundance of meditative strategies lacking from Schraw.

Although Schraw does not describe how meditators shift from a knowledge of cognition to a regulation of cognition, Hall and Calamy’s meditative principles for rousing the affections bridges the gap between the knowledge and regulation of cognition. Cao and Nietfield hypothesized that students who recognized difficulties in their learning would adjust their learning strategies to adapt to those difficulties. Their data suggests however that “students perceived various kinds of difficulties in learning the class content over the semesters…. [but they] did not vary their study strategies according to the different kinds of difficulties they perceived in the learning process” (38). Schraw also states that strategy evaluation matrices, a tool for describing cognitive strategies, may be “effective at improving knowledge of cognition, but may not impact regulation” (120). Their findings raise a question: why does an awareness of inefficient strategies not necessarily lead to an adjustment of those strategies? Or why does a knowledge of cognition not lead to an appropriate regulation of that cognition? I believe Hall and Calamy’s approach in the door of the affections connects these two. Calamy says that his
instructions for the door of the affections will “get your affections warmed and heated, so as to stir up piety and devotion in your souls” (190). The door of the affections leads meditators to devotion and piety, qualities expressed by action. The work in the heart rouses the affections and fosters the motivation needed to enact change, thus linking the knowledge and regulation of cognition. People need to feel something and not just know something to be motivated to change.

Lastly, Calamy more clearly articulates the need for and the way to personally apply the subject of meditation. Calamy repeatedly emphasizes the importance of making the subject of meditation personally applicable (105, 108-110, 182, 187-188). He says meditation “doth [sic] you no good unless you apply it; the water in the fountain will never do you good, unless it be brought to you in a cistern” (109). He also explains how meditators accomplish this application. Mediators change pronouns to I, me, and my. By doing so, meditators bring their meditation to themselves in a cistern, making it much easier to drink and incorporate that subject into their lives. Schraw, on the other hand, does not explain how meditators make their knowledge about strategies personally applicative. Perhaps Schraw did not see the need to explain or emphasize how to apply strategy knowledge to themselves because that personal application is inherent in the regulation of cognition, which “refers to metacognitive activities that help control one’s thinking or learning” (Schraw and Moshman 354). Calamy’s explicit teachings on why personal application is important and what it looks like can help people improve their metacognition. People may know the what and why about looking for key words (Nietfield and Schraw 137). They may say, “Looking for key words helps people understand what they read.” But, if they apply this statement to themselves, “Looking for key words will help me understand what I read,” then it builds a desire and makes it easier to apply it. Meditators can visualize how certain
strategies can help them, increasing the likelihood they will live differently after meditation. Calamy’s focus on application therefore strengthens Schraw’s approach to metacognition.

### Strengths of Schraw’s Metacognitive Model

Just as Hall and Calamy’s meditative practice strengthen Schraw’s metacognitive model, Schraw also strengthens meditation. At the meditation level, Schraw equips meditators with a framework to determine the information needed to best use strategies, plan how to use them, and monitor and evaluate how to effectively apply them in context. At the subject of meditation level, Schraw supplies meditators with the skills necessary to plan specific behaviors, monitor those behaviors, and evaluate the efficacy of those behaviors when meditation has ended.

While Hall and Calamy teach meditators specific strategies that guide internal rhetoric, Schraw gives meditators a structured method to identify the information they need in order to decide when and why to use those strategies. Schraw developed what he called a “strategy evaluation matrix (SEM)” to help people identify declarative, procedural, and conditional knowledge about a strategy. By completing this SEM, people come to understand what a cognitive strategy is, how to use it, and why to use it, improving their metacognitive knowledge (Schraw 120). Calamy and Hall explain some about how to use strategies, but do not provide much detail in their explanation. For example, to explain how to use scriptures in meditation (*oraculum*), Calamy says, “I would consider all that the Scripture saith concerning sin” (183). Hall says meditators should recall “Testimonies of Scripture concerning our Theme….For that in these matters of God, none but divine authoritie can comand [*sic*] [?], and settle the conscience” (145). Hall’s description does more than Calamy’s to suggest to the reader why scripture testimonies are valuable. Meditators can use Schraw’s SEM to better understand *oraculum*. They would define *oraculum*; explain how to use *oraculum* as a heuristic for invention and style; and
determine why it is used and when it is best used. This kind of information gives meditators knowledge beyond what Hall and Calamy provide in their explanations, giving meditators the information required to be more intentional about when to apply *oraculum*. The SEM enables meditators to make better use of the abundant strategies Hall and Calamy offer.

Furthermore, Schraw teaches meditators how to plan, monitor, and evaluate their strategy use to better apply these strategies effectively. In his article in 1998, Schraw included a regulatory checklist (RC) “to provide an overarching heuristic that facilitates the regulation of cognition….The RC enables novice learners to implement a systematic regulatory sequence that helps them control their performance” (120). For each of the three activities in the regulation of cognition, Schraw’s RC has four questions that promote “metacognitive knowledge about how to use strategies” (122). Schraw defines planning as “the selection of appropriate strategies and the allocation of resources that affect performance” (115). Under planning, Schraw lists the following four questions in his RC: “What is the nature of the task? What is my goal? What kind of information and strategies do I need? How much time and resources will I need?” (121). Hall and Calamy do provide meditators with this kind of information through their model meditations and where they place the figures in the meditation. For example, Hall and Calamy say meditators use *similitudo* in the door of understanding and *optatio* in the door of affections. Placing these figures in these specific doors of meditation helps meditators understand the purpose for these figures and what other strategies, times, or resources can help accomplish that purpose.

However, because Hall and Calamy do not provide counsel on monitoring or evaluating strategy use, Schraw’s RC questions for monitoring and evaluating strengthen their meditative practice. Schraw defines monitoring as “the ability to engage in periodic self-testing while learning” to apprehend “comprehension and task performance” (115). Under monitoring, Schraw
gives the following questions: “Do I have a clear understanding of what I am doing? Does the task make sense? Am I reaching my goals? Do I need to make changes? (115).” Schraw then defines evaluating as a process of “appraising the products and efficiency of one’s learning” (115). He provides the following questions for evaluating: “Have I reached my goal? What worked? What didn’t work? Would I do things differently next time? (115).” Meditators can use Schraw’s RC as a systematic approach to monitor and evaluate their strategy use. For example, while meditators are quoting and referencing scripture, oraculum, about miracles, they monitor whether they understand what they are doing when they quote scripture and if their task makes sense. Does quoting scripture help them achieve their goal to better understand miracles? Or does quoting scripture make them more confused? Or perhaps they are quoting scripture only to quote scripture rather than use it to purposefully achieve their goal to deepen their knowledge about miracles? The answer to those questions will determine whether meditators need to make changes in how they apply oraculum during meditation. Meditators can similarly use Schraw’s RC questions to evaluate their use of oraculum after they have used it. Before moving on to the next part of meditation, meditators can reflect on whether they reached their goal to increase understanding through oraculum and what worked or did not work in the way they used oraculum. Based on their responses, meditators can then decide to apply oraculum differently the next time they meditate. Perhaps Hall and Calamy did not see a need to provide counsel on monitoring or evaluating strategy use because they believed doing meditation repeatedly would lead to this understanding, or their manuals were not comprehensive enough to allow for a detailed description of how to monitor and evaluate strategies. Whatever the case may be, meditators will be more likely to cement their knowledge of meditative strategies by using the framework given by Schraw’s RC to develop specific knowledge about these figures. Thus,
although Schraw does not teach how to make judgments, he teaches skills to determine the information necessary to make good judgments on strategy application.

While Schraw’s metacognitive model helps meditators understand strategies of meditation at the general meditation level, Schraw’s model also helps meditators plan specific behaviors they will engage in after their deliberate meditation has finished at the subject of meditation level. Schraw’s RC helps meditators develop plans for specific behaviors, such as how meditators will overcome specific sins. If meditators are omitting prayer from their lives, they ask, “What is the nature of this task to pray morning and night?” Considering the task’s nature may lead to thinking about what is hard about it or what praying in the morning or at night looks like. Then, meditators ask themselves, “What is my goal?” This question gets to specifics. Perhaps my goal is to pray before getting out of bed in the morning. Or maybe it is to pray on the way to work for my morning prayer. If meditators ask themselves, “what kind of information and strategies do I need?”, they begin thinking about what resources can help them pray before getting into bed, like setting an alarm. Finally, meditators consider, “How much time and resources will I need?” Meditators may need to wake up earlier or start their bedtime routine earlier to allow themselves enough time to pray. These regulatory questions empower meditators to make plans for specific, individual actions. Although Calamy emphasizes the need to live differently because of meditation, his methods to plan behaviors stays general. In an example meditation, Calamy says, “Oh that I could mourn…for all my sins of omission, commission” (193). Calamy shifts from mourning for sin in general to his own specific kinds of sins, which must come before he can plan how he will repent of his sins. However, this application does not get down to the specific sins of omission, like not praying, or sins of commission, like judging others. Similarly, when Calamy tells meditators “to consider the means how…to shun [what you
meditate upon], if it be evil” (188) to help them plan how they will live differently after their meditation, he remains broad: “What must I do to avoid sin?” (189). He does not model how a meditator might meditate to avoid specific sins, like not praying or judging others. To “walk as God walks” (Calamy 28), meditators must not just wish they could walk but they must walk. Schraw’s regulatory checklist for specific planning help meditators plan how they will walk.

Lastly, Schraw’s metacognitive model empowers meditators to monitor and evaluate their behavior after deliberate meditation has ended. At the end of meditation, meditators may commit to live differently, \textit{adjuratio}, but humans often struggle to keep the promises they make. What happens when meditators wake up in the morning and their exhaustion makes it difficult to pray? Or, when meditators are out late with their friends and collapse on their bed after returning home? In these moments, will meditators keep their promise to pray? Meditators can use Schraw’s RC to monitor their behavior in the moment and also later pause and evaluate their behavior. To monitor their behavior, meditators can ask themselves, “Do I have a clear understanding of what I’m doing? Does the task make sense? Am I reaching my goals? Do I need to make changes?” Meditators consider whether they still understand the goal they made during meditation to pray morning and night. If they recognize they are doing a poor job at going to bed earlier to make it easier to pray at night and easier to wake up to pray in the morning, then they can consider whether they need to make changes or not. They can adjust their planned actions in the moment rather than waiting until the next time they have “set [them] selves a time” for deliberate meditation (Hall 57). Then, perhaps after a week of trying to pray, meditators may pause and ask themselves, “Have I reached my goal? What worked? What didn’t work? Would I do things differently next time?” (121). If they have been praying in the morning, they think about what has helped them achieve the goal; if they have not been praying in the morning, they
think about what has prevented them from achieving the goal. These considerations help meditators determine whether they need to do differently the next time they work toward this goal. Hall and Calamy tell meditators to meditate frequently. Hall compares meditation to “this daiies meale” (34), and Calamy says “to set apart some time every day for meditation” (82). However, if meditators wait until their scheduled time for deliberate meditation to monitor and evaluate their efforts to avoid judging others or to obtain daily prayers, then it will be much harder to adjust and improve their efforts to obtain or shun their subject of meditation. Schraw’s RC helps meditators monitor and evaluate their behaviors, “help[ing meditators] control their performance” (120), and therefore strengthens the meditative practice of Calamy and Hall.

Conclusion

Hall and Calamy’s meditative practice and Schraw’s metacognitive model form a more complete view of a particular kind of internal rhetoric, which is characterized by cognitive and metacognitive processes through which people read themselves, read others, and compose arguments to persuade themselves to think, feel, and act differently. Internal rhetoric is an umbrella term for the many internal processes that bring about self-persuasion, and meditation and metacognition offer an overlapping understanding of what internal rhetoric is and how to do it. Hall and Calamy’s processes of internal rhetorical reading and composition can improve the way individuals practice metacognition. Seeing meditation and metacognition in tandem emphasizes the need to view internal rhetoric as a hub for interdisciplinary research. Nienkamp believed similarly. She used both the history of rhetoric and the work of George Herbert Mead and Lev Vygotsky to define internal rhetoric and describe the rhetorical nature of the self. Other areas of psychology, such as cognitive dissonance theory and cognitive behavior therapy, areas of rhetoric, such as Wayne Booth’s listening rhetoric, and areas of communication, such as the
work of Patterson et al. to master self-told stories and David Bohm’s proprioceptive listening in
dialogue, can provide more insight on the various processes at work during internal rhetoric.
Quantitative and qualitative research examining how teaching Hall and Calamy’s strategies
affects individuals’ learning may offer further insight and evidence for the value of these
meditation manuals for modern learners and metacognitive practice.

Lastly, the meditative practice of the Renaissance can help individuals and society “make
responsible ethical decisions in an era when moral principles are not agreed upon” (Nienkamp
133). By learning the heuristics provided in this integrated model of internal rhetoric, individuals
can “cultivat[e] internal rhetoric,” helping them develop a “sense of open-ended dialogue” (133).
The principles of internal rhetoric taught in meditation and metacognition help individuals to
read themselves for what they know, feel, and do, becoming the critic. Then, individuals
compose and deliver self-directed rhetoric as the rhetor to persuade themselves to see different
perspectives, taste the bitterness or sweetness of those perspectives and realities, and then digest
these new ideas and experiences, changing the way they behave. Like Nienkamp says, through
internal rhetoric, “People develop phronesis—a practical wisdom that guides ethical decisions—
through a liberal education that teaches them to exercise judgment and allows them to practice
applying principles in context” (133).
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