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Brigham Young University Prelaw Review

Keywords

antitrust, monopoly, barriers to entry, data siloing, big data, Sherman Act of 1890, remedy

Abstract

While the court-issued remedies prescribed in United States of America v. Google LLC (2024) aim to curb Google’s use of anticompetitive practices, they fail to address the structural mechanisms that sustain its monopoly. Antitrust remedies in the U.S. traditionally seek to (1) end anticompetitive practices and (2) reopen competitive market conditions. The court’s approach in this case does neither. By leaving intact Google’s ability to leverage significant barriers to entry and its unparalleled big data advantage, the court’s remedies preserve the very conditions that entrench Google’s dominance in the digital advertising and search engine markets. This note argues that data siloing, when implemented alongside currently prescribed remedies, would more directly target the structural foundations of Google’s illegal monopoly. By limiting cross-market data consolidation, data siloing would disrupt Google’s ability to accumulate mass amounts of data on consumers, reduce barriers to entry in the digital advertising and search markets, and better align antitrust enforcement with its core objective of restoring meaningful competition.

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